The few comments on this section asked for more detail and clarification. In the interest of flexibility, the Department is reluctant to be prescriptive in the matter of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. What we are looking for is a strong and effective set of monitoring and compliance provisions in each recipient's DBE program. These mechanisms could be most anything available to the recipient under Federal, state, or local law (e.g., liquidated damages provisions, responsibility determinations, suspension and debarment rules, etc.)
One of the main purposes of these provisions is to make sure that DBEs actually perform work committed to them at contract award. The results that recipients must measure consist of payments actually made to DBEs, not just promises at the award stage. Credit toward goals can be awarded only when payments (including, for example, the return of retainage payments) are actually made to DBEs. Under the final rule, recipients would keep a running tally of the extent to which, on each contract, performance had matched promises. Prime contractors whose performance fell short of original commitments would be subject to the compliance mechanisms the recipient had made applicable.