FAA

Legacy ID

8081

FAA Oversight of Boeing’s Broken Safety Culture

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WHITAKER ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

SEPTEMBER 25, 2024

Chair Blumenthal, Ranking Member Johnson, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss the FAA’s oversight of Boeing’s production and manufacturing system and the agency’s whistleblower programs.

I would like to begin by reiterating that the number one priority for the FAA is the safety of the flying public. As we carry out our regulatory responsibilities and oversight activities, safety will always inform our decision-making, and I am prepared to use the full range of my authority to ensure accountability whether from a manufacturer, an air carrier, or the FAA’s own operations.

FAA Whistleblower Program

I want to start off by stressing the importance of our Whistleblower and Safety Hotline programs. The safety and integrity of our air transportation system relies heavily on having a culture where people come forward with their safety concerns without fear of reprisal, and they have confidence in the process to know that their report will be investigated thoroughly. It is a priority for me to have a strong whistleblower program at the FAA. I want to thank the many individuals who have already reached out to our Office of Audit and Evaluation, and I strongly encourage anyone with safety concerns to report them to the FAA’s Hotline at hotline.faa.gov. We thoroughly evaluate every report we receive.

In addition to having our hotline program available to employees, Boeing must maintain its own robust safety reporting programs and promote a safe and proactive reporting culture within its organizations. The FAA will continue to closely monitor Boeing’s implementation of the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and the maturity of its Speak-up program as part of our oversight.

FAA Safety Oversight and Boeing Issues

Boeing’s manufacturing and production system is complex and multi-faceted, spanning multiple facilities and thousands of suppliers. Because of the complexity of its operations, Boeing must have a robust safety system comprising of multiple layers that can detect and mitigate identified risks. The FAA will hold Boeing accountable for having an effective system in place with procedures that ensure the production and delivery of safe airplanes.

787 Shimming Issues

Following reports of shimming-related discrepancies, in 2019 the FAA required Boeing to conduct a system-wide assessment of its shimming practices. During this assessment, Boeing stopped production and reinspected airplanes within its production system. FAA regulations required Boeing to evaluate the issue and implement immediate corrective actions within the production system to ensure only conforming products were built after the point of discovery. The FAA oversaw Boeing’s implementation of the corrective actions, which included adding additional shim training requirements for mechanics and quality personnel, improving the workforce skillsets, and incorporating lessons learned and best practices for shimming into its production planning. The FAA also increased its surveillance of Boeing’s shimming and gap management activities and retained our authority to issue airworthiness certificates for new 787 airplanes.

Extensive evaluations of the non-conforming joins showed that their strength significantly exceeded the load limits requirements and that there were no immediate safety of flight concerns.

In 2021 and 2022, the FAA also issued two airworthiness directives to require repetitive inspections to ensure any damage accumulated over time does not create a safety issue. The FAA will continue to monitor the long-term safety of the in-service fleet by requiring inspections to be performed over the life of the aircraft.

Alaska Airlines Flight 1282

On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid-exit door plug blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. Immediately following the accident, on January 6, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug configuration.

We mandated and oversaw a thorough inspection and maintenance process on each of the grounded airplanes before allowing them to return to service. Our findings during those inspections revealed that the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and required further scrutiny. We increased oversight activities including:

Capping production of new Boeing 737 MAX airplanes to achieve system stability and compliance with required quality control procedures.
Launching an investigation scrutinizing Boeing’s compliance with manufacturing requirements.
Increasing oversight of the production of new airplanes with more FAA safety inspectors on-site at all Boeing manufacturing facilities.
Increasing data monitoring to identify significant safety issues.
Commissioning an independent analysis of potential safety-focused reforms around quality control and delegation.

Boeing Comprehensive Plan

This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive action plan within 90 days to address its systemic quality control and production issues. During the subsequent months, the FAA worked closely with Boeing as it developed its roadmap and plan for the path forward. I required this plan to address the findings from the FAA’s special audit as well as the recommendations from the expert review panel report required by Section 103 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020 (ACSAA). Boeing provided its plan to the FAA on May 30, 2024, marking the beginning of the next chapter of ensuring implementation and a renewed focus on safety at Boeing.

However, this plan does not mark the end of the FAA’s increased oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There must be a shift in the company’s safety culture to holistically address its systemic quality assurance and production issues. Our goal is to make sure Boeing implements the necessary changes and has the right tools in place to sustain those changes in the long term.

In April of this year, we issued regulations that require Boeing to have a Safety Management System, which will ensure a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to identifying hazards and managing risk.

As part of its comprehensive plan, Boeing has committed to the following:

Increasing and enhancing employee training, engagement, and communication;
Encouraging their employees to speak up without fear of reprisal;
Boosting supplier oversight;
Increasing quality oversight at every step of the production process, and ensuring things happen in the right sequence and are approved before moving forward;
Getting more input from users of the system;
Simplifying production processes and procedures; and
Bringing state-of-the-art technology to Boeing tool and parts management.

To monitor the health of Boeing’s production and quality system, we also directed Boeing to identify key performance indicators (KPIs). These KPIs directly correspond to the targets outlined in its comprehensive action plan to improve its safety and quality systems and will help assess the effectiveness of its proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time visibility into the production system with specific control limits that will trigger corrective action if needed.

FAA’s Oversight Activities

As a result of systemic production quality issues, Boeing must make significant changes to transform its quality system and ensure the right layers of safety are in place. I am directly engaged to ensure Boeing executes the necessary changes to transform its safety culture and address its production quality issues. I met with their new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, last month and reemphasized to him our expectations that these changes must be sustained in the long term. We will also remain engaged with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to expeditiously provide notice, in real-time, of any activities that may be criminal so that DOJ can take any action they deem appropriate.

We have added more safety inspectors in the Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems facilities, and we will maintain our increased on-site presence for the foreseeable future. Our surveillance activities include:

More engagement with company employees to hear directly from them and gauge the effectiveness of changes outlined in Boeing’s plan;
Added inspections at critical points of the production process; and
Increased auditing of quality systems, build processes, and changes outlined in Boeing’s plan.

Our safety inspectors are also monitoring each of Boeing’s sub-teams tasked with implementing the key areas of the plan. Our safety inspectors are providing direct feedback on Boeing’s proposed changes and monitoring the KPIs to identify potential system risks. The FAA is closely reviewing the KPIs to monitor Boeing’s production system health and will independently assess any early indicators of risks within the system.

In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing, we also have hundreds of other personnel who are focused on our oversight of Boeing. These employees are monitoring the in-service fleet through our continued operational safety processes, overseeing Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization, and conducting certification activities.

Addressing these safety issues also requires that the FAA continually examine the effectiveness of its own oversight processes and make the necessary improvements. We must continue to be increasingly proactive and establish more dynamic oversight protocols that allow us to anticipate and identify risks before they manifest themselves as events. As our first step, we are reevaluating our current safety management programs and other internal safety oversight initiatives.

As the FAA enhances our oversight models agency-wide, we are also examining opportunities to leverage the vast internal and external data resources to become more predictive in identifying risks across the aviation system. To this end, the agency is taking a fresh look at our current capabilities to provide more real time insight into any emerging safety trends and to share relevant data across the various components of our safety ecosystem.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.

Implementation of Boeing’s Comprehensive Action Plan

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WHITAKER ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

SEPTEMBER 24, 2024

Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Subcommittee Chairman Graves, Subcommittee Ranking Member Cohen, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to provide an update on the FAA’s oversight of Boeing’s production and manufacturing system. I want to thank the committee for your hard work in passing the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA started implementation immediately, and we are committed to keeping you and your staff updated on our progress on a quarterly basis.

Alaska Airlines Flight 1282

On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid exit door plug blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. Immediately following the accident, on January 6, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug configuration.

Capping production of new Boeing 737 MAX airplanes to achieve system stability and compliance with required quality control procedures.
Launching an investigation scrutinizing Boeing’s compliance with manufacturing requirements.
Increasing oversight of the production of new airplanes with more FAA safety inspectors on-site at all Boeing manufacturing facilities.
Increasing data monitoring to identify significant safety issues.
Commissioning an independent analysis of potential safety-focused reforms around quality control and delegation.

Boeing Comprehensive Plan

As part of its comprehensive plan, Boeing has committed to the following:

Increasing and enhancing employee training, engagement, and communication;
Encouraging its employees to speak up without fear of reprisal;
Boosting supplier oversight;
Increasing quality oversight at every step of the production process, and ensuring things happen in the right sequence and are approved before moving forward;
Getting more input from users of the system;
Simplifying production processes and procedures; and
Bringing state-of-the-art technology to Boeing tool and parts management.

To monitor the health of Boeing’s production and quality system, including the impacts of those changes, we also directed Boeing to identify key performance indicators (KPIs). These KPIs directly correspond to the targets outlined in its comprehensive action plan to improve its safety and quality systems and will help assess the effectiveness of its proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time visibility into the production system with specific control limits that will trigger corrective action if needed.

FAA’s Oversight Activities

Boeing’s manufacturing and production system is complex and multi-faceted, spanning multiple facilities and thousands of suppliers. Because of the complexity of its operations, Boeing must have a robust safety system comprised of multiple layers that can detect and mitigate identified risks. The FAA will hold Boeing accountable for having an effective system in place with procedures that ensure the production and delivery of safe airplanes.

As a result of systemic production quality issues, Boeing must make significant changes to transform its quality system and ensure the right layers of safety are in place. As FAA Administrator, I am directly engaged with Boeing’s senior leadership to ensure they execute the necessary changes to transform Boeing’s safety culture and address its production quality issues. I met with their new CEO, Kelly Ortberg, last month and reemphasized to him our expectations that these changes must be sustained in the long term.

The safety and integrity of our air transportation system rely heavily on having a culture where people come forward with their safety concerns without fear of reprisal, and they have confidence in the process to know that their report will be investigated thoroughly. Boeing must maintain its own robust safety reporting programs and promote a safe and proactive reporting culture within its organizations.

More engagement with company employees to hear directly from them and gauge the effectiveness of changes outlined in Boeing’s plan;
Added inspections at critical points of the production process; and
Increased auditing of quality systems, build processes, and changes outlined in Boeing’s plan.

In addition to the work the safety inspectors are doing on production oversight, we also have hundreds of other FAA personnel who are focused on other aspects of our oversight of Boeing. These employees are monitoring the in-service fleet through our continued operational safety processes, overseeing Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization, and conducting certification activities.

As our first step, we are reevaluating our current safety management initiatives and establishing a strategy to revamp our agency-wide safety management program. As part of this long-term strategy, we are in the process of elevating the role of our Executive Committee which oversees our regulatory oversight and safety management programs. To drive the necessary improvements to our oversight model across the agency, both the Deputy Administrator and I will serve on the Executive Committee. By doing so, this commitment underscores the importance of promoting an effective safety culture at every level of the agency.

As the FAA enhances our oversight models agency-wide, we are also examining opportunities to leverage the vast internal and external data resources to become more predictive in identifying risks across the aviation system. To this end, the agency is undertaking a fresh look at our current capabilities to provide more real-time insight into any emerging safety trends and to share relevant data across the various components of our safety ecosystem.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.

Risks and Rewards: Encouraging Commercial Space Innovation While Maintaining Public Safety

STATEMENT OF KELVIN B. COLEMAN
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
RISKS AND REWARDS: ENCOURAGING COMMERCIAL SPACE INNOVATION WHILE MAINTAINING PUBLIC SAFETY
SEPTEMBER 10, 2024

Chair Lucas, Chair Babin, Ranking Member Lofgren, Ranking Member Sorensen, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the important role the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have in enabling safe commercial space transportation. As the regulator of commercial space transportation, we are committed to ensuring the safety and economic competitiveness of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry. Maintaining our safety record is a key to the uninterrupted growth of this industry that has become an important economic engine for our nation. A safe industry is a successful industry.

U.S. commercial space capabilities and innovation are vitally important to our Nation.
Space exploration has an impact on our everyday lives in countless ways and many benefits are yet to be realized. The commercial space transportation industry continues to develop new technologies that hold tremendous potential for further advancements that will assure our Nation’s access to space, take us back to the moon and to other interplanetary destinations, connect global communities, better serve the planet, and improve the daily lives of our citizens. Commercial space activity worldwide increases every day, resulting in a half-trillion dollar global space economy that will nearly double in the next decade. The United States contributes roughly half of all commercial space activity, and the U.S. commercial space industry will continue to be an extremely important contributor to the growth of this space economy.

I’m here before you today to discuss how our office drives the mission to enable safe space transportation and our ongoing efforts to streamline and improve our regulatory framework and processes.

Overview of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation and its Responsibilities

The Secretary of Transportation (Secretary), in accordance with Title 51 of the United States Code, regulates and oversees U.S. commercial space transportation operations, which include launch and reentry operations worldwide, the operation of launch and reentry sites, and human space flight missions. This authority has been delegated by the Secretary to the FAA, and I have led the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) as the Associate Administrator since September 2022. Our office carries out these authorities to protect public health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to these important responsibilities, our office is also responsible for encouraging, facilitating, and promoting commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector and facilitating the strengthening and expansion of U.S. space transportation infrastructure. To put it simply, the U.S. relies on our office to ensure public safety while enabling safe commercial space transportation, and we recognize and embrace the central role the DOT and the FAA play in ensuring the U.S. continues to be the global leader in space.

Licensing and Permitting of Commercial Space Transportation Operations

Commercial space transportation operations are increasing in complexity, diversity, and frequency, creating a significant growth in demand for AST’s licensing and permitting services and our resulting safety oversight.

Since 1989, the FAA has licensed or permitted more than 800 commercial space transportation operations, more than any other country in the world by far. To put the growth of the U.S. commercial space transportation sector into perspective, this fiscal year, AST has overseen the safety of 130 launch and reentry operations, which is more than triple the number of licensed operations that occurred in fiscal year 2020—and the year isn’t over yet. Additionally, we made 150% more application determinations in fiscal year 2024 as compared to fiscal year 2020. The catalyst for this increase is that we have seen steady growth of licensed vehicle operators and now have 26 licensed commercial launch and reentry operators.

The FAA has leveraged its licensing and regulatory capabilities and other various programs and initiatives in a manner that has resulted in an impressive safety record for this rapidly growing industry. No FAA-licensed launch or reentry operation has ever resulted in a fatality or injury to a member of the public, nor has there been any significant public property damage. I’ve encouraged our team to learn from every operation and to identify potential risks so that potential hazards and vulnerabilities become smaller and fewer. Looking forward, we expect the total number of licensed commercial space operations to double by fiscal year 2026. The FAA is committed to meeting this increased demand.

The safety record is the result of our licensing and permitting process, consisting of three phases: pre-application consultation, application evaluation, and operations and compliance monitoring. Prior to submitting an application, license and permit applicants are required to consult with the FAA to discuss the application process and other information relevant to the FAA’s licensing or permitting determination. Pre-application consultation marks the formal beginning of a relationship between AST and an applicant, and this phase of the licensing and permitting process ends when the applicant formally submits an application that is accepted by AST for evaluation. AST is required by statute to make a licensing determination within 180 days from license application acceptance and a permit determination within 120 days from permit application acceptance. During the application evaluation phase, AST reviews an application for compliance with applicable regulations and determines whether to issue an authorization (i.e., license or permit) to the applicant. The following reviews are conducted as part of an evaluation: a policy review, a payload review, a safety review, a financial responsibility determination, and an environmental review. Further, once AST issues a license or permit, it must ensure that the licensee or permittee complies with the governing statute, regulations, representations made in the application, and the terms and conditions of the license or permit. After a license or permit has been issued, operators frequently make changes to the vehicle configuration, launch procedures, or operations that may require the operator to apply for a license or permit modification. AST must evaluate all such changes in making determinations to approve or deny any modification to a license or permit. An applicant may also request a waiver(s) to regulatory provisions, and AST must evaluate and respond to each waiver petition to determine if it can be granted in the public’s interest and will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of property, or any national security or foreign policy interest of the United States. In the event there is a launch- or reentry-related mishap, AST or the National Transportation Safety Board oversees the mishap investigation.

We understand the importance of making timely licensing and permitting determinations and continue to make it our priority— over the last 11 years, we have issued 49 license determinations, averaging 151 days to issue a new license. We have taken action to improve our internal efficiency, which includes bolstering our staffing to handle licensing, permitting, and inspections; improved communication with industry that is clear, concise, specific, and actionable; wider availability through office hours and workshops; and investments in the development of new tools that will improve license application and processing efficiency.

We have also highlighted to industry a number of steps they can take to speed up license and permit determinations. We continue to encourage operators to ensure their licensing applications speak directly to our requirements at the outset, with clear narratives that spell out their safety case—exactly how their methodologies support the means of compliance.
Additionally, it is important that operators minimize amendments and go-backs after their application review has started. When operators require significant changes to their applications, it often leads to significant and additional delays, as our experts have to verify and validate the changed data and its effects on other areas of the application. When a quality application is provided by an applicant at the start, a more expeditious approval is possible. The burden of proof of compliance rests with the operator, and with the increased demands placed on our office, we need operators to submit well-reasoned applications that clearly spell out means of compliance to make the most efficient and effective use of our resources.

The FAA’s impressive safety record and ability to meet the needs of this rapidly growing industry are in large part because of the incredible staff that we have in AST. FAA-licensed commercial operations have grown in the last decade by over 900%. Thanks to recent support from Congress, utilizing various hiring and recruiting authorities, we have been able to increase our total staff size to 150 staff members, which allows us to address some of the growing demands that have been placed on our office. The President’s fiscal year 2025 Budget Request continues this support by providing funding for the agency to hire additional staff to conduct authorization evaluations, safety analyses, and safety inspections.

FAA’s Commercial Space Regulatory Framework

AST has embraced a mindset and methods to become better, smarter, more agile, and more efficient—always in ways that won’t compromise safety. In December 2020, the FAA published a final rule to overhaul our launch and reentry regulations and consolidate, update, and streamline all launch and reentry regulations into a single performance-based part, which is found in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 450 (Part 450). This rule replaced prescriptive public safety requirements with performance-based requirements to provide more flexibility, allow more methods of compliance, and clear the path for innovation. We designed Part 450 to allow a commercial space operator to obtain a license for a portfolio of launch and reentry operations, which allows for different vehicle configurations, mission profiles, and even multiple sites under one license. The rule was developed to reduce the number of times an operator would need to come to the FAA for an approval and reduce the need to process waivers, improve regulatory clarity, and relieve administrative and cost burdens on industry and the FAA. Another benefit of Part 450 is that it enables an operator to streamline and include negotiated timelines for certain reporting requirements, which allows operators to design the reporting component of their program to fit their specific needs within a safe capacity.

Additionally, Part 450 enables coordination between the FAA and our Federal range partners, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Defense, on ground safety at Federal launch sites to eliminate gaps and duplication in oversight. By March 10, 2026, all launch and reentry licenses issued by the FAA under legacy regulations will no longer be valid, and launch and reentry vehicle operators must be in compliance with Part 450. We are encouraging industry to apply under Part 450 as soon as possible.

Currently, operators with proven launch vehicles and well-established concepts of operations, who could transition the soonest and benefit the most from Part 450, aren’t yet using it for their programs. New operators have begun using Part 450, but not to its fullest extent. As we approach these next 18 months, through various initiatives, AST is working to ensure industry has a full understanding of how to achieve compliance with Part 450 and how to take advantage of its intended benefits. To facilitate industry transition to Part 450, we have provided an assortment of aids, including license application checklists, advisory circulars, as well as virtual tutorials, office hours, and workshops. Part 450 will move us in the right direction toward efficiency and workload reductions for both the government and industry without compromising safety. As we look to the future, we will also continue to consider opportunities to improve the rule to better meet its objectives and identify other aids and resources to facilitate industry transition to Part 450. Additionally, we are also working to utilize advanced tools to adapt to the changing landscape. We are developing a Licensing Electronic Application Portal (LEAP), which will be used to accept, modify, exchange, and approve licensing materials under Part 450. LEAP is expected to enhance our ability to identify, track, and quickly resolve questions and issues both internally and externally with applicants. LEAP will streamline the licensing process for new applicants, provide more transparency into the process, and guide applicants in a step- by-step process.

Conclusion

I once again would like to reiterate the importance of the work we do at the FAA to enable safe space transportation. We have undertaken significant efforts to update our regulations and processes to create more capacity, and we continue to encourage legacy operators to move to the more efficient licensing process established under Part 450, well before they are required to do so. The Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, are here to ensure the U.S. continues to be the global leader in space by leading safely. We know the consequences can be enormous if we get it wrong—consequences for our lives, our planet, industry, and more. That’s why we remain committed to safety as our North Star. We will continue leveraging our licensing and regulatory capabilities, as well as other programs and initiatives, to enable the success of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry and ensure the U.S. remains the preeminent commercial space country of choice. Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss the important role DOT and the FAA play in enabling safe commercial space transportation. This concludes my testimony, and I will be glad to answer any questions from the Committee.

FAA Oversight of Aviation Manufacturing

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WHITAKER ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OVERSIGHT OF AVIATION

MANUFACTURING JUNE 13, 2024

Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the committee thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss the agency’s oversight of Boeing’s production and manufacturing processes. But first, I want to thank the committee for your hard work in passing the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The FAA has already started implementation, and we will keep you and your staff updated on our progress.

Alaska Airlines Flight 1282

On January 5, shortly after departure, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 experienced rapid depressurization after the left mid exit door plug blew out of a Boeing 737-9 MAX. The next day, on January 6, the FAA took immediate action and issued an emergency airworthiness directive grounding all 737-9 MAX airplanes with that particular door plug configuration.

We mandated and oversaw a thorough inspection and maintenance process on each of the grounded airplanes before allowing them to return to service. Our findings during those inspections showed that the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and required further scrutiny. That is why we increased oversight activities including:

Capping production expansion of new Boeing 737 MAX airplanes to ensure accountability and full compliance with required quality control procedures.
Launching an investigation scrutinizing Boeing’s compliance with manufacturing requirements.
Enhancing oversight of the production of new airplanes with more FAA safety inspectors on-site at all Boeing manufacturing facilities.
Increasing data monitoring to identify significant safety issues and mitigate risks early in the process.
Launching an analysis of potential safety-focused reforms around quality control and delegation.

Boeing’s Comprehensive Action Plan

This past February, I directed Boeing to develop a comprehensive action plan within 90 days to address its systemic quality control and production issues. During the subsequent months, the FAA worked closely with Boeing as it developed their roadmap and plan for the path forward. This plan was required to incorporate the results of the FAA’s special audit as well as the findings and recommendations from the expert review panel report required by Section 103 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act of 2020 (ACSAA). Boeing provided its comprehensive plan to the FAA on May 30, 2024, marking the beginning of the next chapter of ensuring implementation and a renewed focus on safety at Boeing.

However, this plan does not mark the end of the FAA’s increased oversight of Boeing and its suppliers. There must be a shift in the company’s safety culture in order to holistically address its systemic quality assurance and production issues. Our goal is to make sure Boeing implements the necessary changes and has the right tools in place to sustain those changes in the long term.

We anticipate that Boeing’s roadmap will be part of an iterative process as it receives feedback and implement improvements to their design, manufacturing, and production processes.

Thanks to the ACSAA, and as reemphasized in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Boeing is now required to have a mandatory Safety Management System, which will ensure a structured, repeatable, systematic approach to identifying hazards and managing risk. A robust Safety Management System is the foundation and structure of a safe manufacturing operation and will be a key factor in improving Boeing’s safety culture.

Boeing has also committed to the following:

Increasing and enhancing employee training, engagement, and communication;
Encouraging their employees to speak up without fear of reprisal;
Boosting supplier oversight;
Increasing quality oversight at every step of the production process, and ensuring things happen in the right sequence and are approved before moving forward;
Getting more input from users of the system;
Simplifying production processes and procedures; and
Bringing state-of-the-art technology to Boeing tool and parts management.

To monitor the health of Boeing’s production and quality system, we also directed Boeing to identify key performance indictors (KPIs). These KPIs directly correspond to the targets outlined in their roadmap to improve their safety and quality systems and will help assess the effectiveness of their proposed initiatives. The KPIs provide real-time visibility into the production system with specific control limits that will trigger corrective action if needed.

FAA’s Oversight Activities

Boeing must do their part and the FAA will continue to hold them accountable for producing and delivering safe aircraft. As part of the FAA’s enhanced oversight of Boeing and its suppliers, we have added more safety inspectors in the Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems facilities, and we will maintain our increased on-site presence for the foreseeable future. Our surveillance activities include:

More engagement with company employees to hear directly from them and gauge the effectiveness of changes outlined in Boeing’s plan;
Additional inspections at critical points of the production process; and
Increased auditing of quality systems, build processes, and changes outlined in Boeing’s plan.

Our aviation safety inspectors will also monitor each of Boeing’s sub-teams tasked with implementing the key focus areas of the plan. The safety inspectors will provide direct feedback on Boeing’s proposed changes and will be able to validate the reported results of the KPIs. In addition to reviewing Boeing’s KPIs, the FAA will utilize its own metrics to monitor their production health and independently assess any early indicators of risks in the system.

The FAA is committed to continuously improving our oversight practices to ensure each design and manufacturing organization meets all regulatory requirements and produces safe and compliant products. Following the lessons learned from January 5^th, the FAA changed its oversight approach and those changes are permanent. We have now supplemented our audits with more active, in-person oversight—the “audit plus inspection” approach, which allows the FAA to have much better visibility into operations at all OEMs, including Boeing.

Continuous Safety Improvement

Recent events, especially the incident involving the Boeing 737-9 MAX, have shown us we cannot become complacent when it comes to maintaining safety and public confidence in the nation’s aviation system. Aviation safety is a collaborative effort, and we must all work together to ensure we continue to maintain and build on the agency’s safety record. We must all continuously improve and reexamine our processes and procedures that support our shared safety mission by collecting, sharing, and using data to detect risks, simulate outcomes, and optimize our decision-making to ensure the safety of the flying public.

Maintaining the safest aviation system in the world requires rigorous oversight over the entire aviation system, including ourselves – ranging from our own workforce to pilots, air carriers, manufacturers, and airport operators. Since being confirmed as Administrator, I have committed to looking internally within the FAA and improve our own processes and procedures. We already have taken a number of actions over the last several months to strengthen our safety culture and mitigate risk in the system.

From an oversight perspective, the FAA has multiple monitoring tools that we are actively leveraging across different parts of the agency. For example, the risk index utilized as part of our assessment of an air carrier’s operations has been an effective tool in identifying emerging safety trends before they become significant risks in the system. This data-driven process recently led us to conduct more rigorous oversight and an in-depth examination of an air carrier following an indication of an increase in the level of risk in their operations.

We are working to bring similar types of monitoring principles across the board to the entire aviation system. We can apply these types of principles to evaluate risk, regulatory capture, and other safety concerns to how we oversee manufacturers, air carriers, airport operators, air traffic controllers, pilots, and other aviation users. As we leverage different tools and best practices internally and externally, we will continue to look for ways to improve and refine our safety oversight activities at the FAA.

In closing, let me stress: the agency’s number one priority is safety. The FAA will always take appropriate action to protect the flying public – whether that action is against a manufacturer, toward an airline, or enhancing oversight of our own operations. As we carry out our regulatory responsibilities and oversight activities, safety will always inform our decision-making.

I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

The State of American Aviation and the Federal Aviation Administration

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL WHITAKER

ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

THE STATE OF AMERICAN AVIATION AND THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

FEBRUARY 6, 2024

Chairs Graves and Graves, Ranking Members Larsen and Cohen, and members of the subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today for the first time as the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to discuss the agency’s priorities and my initial observations within the agency.

The agency’s number one priority is safety. We must continuously be proactive, consistent, and deliberative executing our mission to maintain and build on the agency’s safety record. Since being sworn in as the FAA Administrator on October 25, 2023, I have worked to ensure that we remain solely focused on our mission. Upon joining the agency, I began a process of renewed focus on potential risks to the National Airspace System (NAS), initially targeting three specific areas: first, significant safety events, including close calls and runway incursions, and related safety events; second, air traffic controller workforce issues including fatigue and the workforce shortage; and third, continuous safety improvement.

Significant Safety Events

Close Calls, Runway Incursions, and Related Safety Events

My initial area of inquiry was around the close calls, runway incursions, and related safety events that occurred in 2023.

Focus on these events began in March of last year when Acting Administrator Billy Nolen convened more than 200 leaders from across the aviation industry to examine ways to prevent future occurrences. That summit resulted in a variety of concrete actions and a commitment from the FAA and the aviation community to collaborate on the goal of reaching zero significant close calls.

Following the summit, the FAA moved swiftly, taking several actions to enhance flight safety and reduce incursions by providing more controller training and supervision as well providing pilot and operator outreach and training. In 2023, the FAA held over 100 runway safety meetings at airports with control towers to identify and address airport-specific risks. Also, the FAA tasked the Investigative Technologies Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to recommend new technologies, such as cockpit alerting systems, to reduce runway safety events. I expect the ARC to submit an interim recommendation report later this year.

Additionally, the FAA named an independent National Airspace Safety Review Team to examine ways to enhance safety and reliability in the nation’s air traffic system. The team
examined the FAA’s internal safety processes, staffing levels, practices, facilities and equipment, and how the agency’s air traffic budget is funded. I received the independent report on November 15, 2023. Two days later, I took immediate action on their recommendations including several that provide resources to assist air traffic controllers, such as deploying tower simulator training systems in 95 facilities by December 2025. On January 29, the agency installed the first system at Austin-Bergstrom International Airport.

These technology investments will continue to be an effective mechanism to enhance aviation safety, in particular, runway safety. We are committed to continue to develop, test, and deploy technologies to improve surface surveillance and situational awareness for controllers, flight crews, and ground personnel through a variety of means, including surface lighting, visual and aural alerts, and enhanced displays. Over the last several years, the FAA has researched and issued standards for both Runway Incursion Warning Systems (RIWS) and Vehicle Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) emitters to help combat Vehicle/ Pedestrian Deviations (VPDs). RIWS and vehicle ADS-B transmitters are available for installation on airport and airline-owned ground vehicles that regularly operate in the movement area. These technologies enhance situational awareness for surface operators and Air Traffic Controllers. The FAA has been actively encouraging airports to voluntarily equip their vehicles and grants are available through the FAA Office of Airports. As a result, there are now over 2,100 vehicles equipped with ADS-B transmitters and over 1,000 vehicles equipped with a RIWS.

Moreover, the FAA continues to focus on airport infrastructure improvements to address airfield geometry issues, a significant contributing factor for many runway incursions. The Runway Incursion Mitigation (RIM) Program is at the forefront of industry and FAA partnerships in mitigating airport locations with a history of runway incursions. To date, this work has achieved a 70 percent overall reduction at more than 100 locations. Because of their high safety impact, the FAA prioritizes funding RIM projects through its competitive grant programs. We appreciate the funding Congress has provided through the Airport Improvement Program, Supplemental Discretionary Grant Program, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law to achieve these critical safety improvements.

The FAA also continues to evaluate runway safety areas (RSAs) and works with airport operators to improve RSAs that do not meet federal standards. RSAs enhance the safety of aircraft that undershoot, overrun, or veer off a runway. The FAA previously assessed all RSAs serving air carrier runways at the nation’s commercial airports and is now focused on
determining the RSA status of general aviation airports. The FAA also continues to work closely with industry and other Federal agencies to address and reduce the risks associated with wildlife hazards.

Since the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 2023, the FAA has awarded 57 grants for runway safety projects under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and 154 runway safety projects under the Airport Improvement Program, totaling more than $1 billion. These projects will install airfield lighting, signage, and markings, as well as reconfigure and construct new taxiways to enhance safety on the airfield.

Overall, our data shows a recent downward trend in the rate of runway incursions. We are optimistic that our recent and ongoing work and collaboration with industry will lead to continued safety improvements. But to drive the number of runway incursions to zero, we must continue to focus on and invest in this priority.

Controller Workforce

The safety of the United States aviation system is due in large part to our skilled and dedicated air traffic controllers. To maintain our safety record, the agency must accelerate the pace of recruiting, training, and hiring to meet increasing volume and safely integrate new entrants in the NAS.

The President’s FY 2024 budget request includes funding for the hiring and training of 1,800 controllers, an increase of 300 controllers as compared to the hiring level for FY 2023. This funding also supports the continued training of the 1,500 controllers hired in FY 2023. We have 2,716 trainees making their way through the system right now, and nearly 1,600 of these trainees are partially certified to work an air traffic control position, adding capacity to support operations. The budget request will allow the FAA to continue progress toward attaining the necessary Certified Professional Controller staffing levels to meet current traffic demands, which have returned to, and in some markets exceeded, pre-pandemic levels.

To increase this pipeline of new controllers, we are working with colleges and universities in the Air Traffic-Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI) to expand their curriculums so that AT-CTI schools can offer training that is equivalent to the FAA Academy. Once implemented, graduates of the FAA-approved AT-CTI programs will still need to pass the Air Traffic Skills Assessment exam, be selected for employment by the FAA, and meet medical and security requirements. If hired as trainees, these graduates will be able to move directly to on-the-job training at the start of their employment instead of attending the FAA Air Traffic Controller Academy before being assigned to a facility as required today.

Similarly, we have launched several other initiatives to increase controller hiring:

Initiating a year-round hiring track for experienced controllers from the military and private industry.
Filling every seat at the FAA Academy and increasing our classroom capacity.
Finishing the deployment of upgraded tower simulation systems (software and hardware) in 95 facilities by December 2025. As I mentioned earlier, the FAA deployed the first upgraded system in Austin last month. These tower simulation systems will help address staffing shortages by reducing time to certification by 27 percent for new hires and 21 percent for Certified Professional Controllers in Training.

Increasing our controller ranks will help mitigate risks associated with controller fatigue resulting from shifting schedules and excessive overtime. During my first three months at the agency, I met with air traffic controllers in Boston, Philadelphia, Dallas, and Washington, D.C. to get their perspective on issues facing the workforce. Controller fatigue came up repeatedly, which is why the agency established a panel of fatigue experts to study the issue. The panel will examine how the latest science on sleep needs and fatigue considerations could be applied to controller work requirements and scheduling. We look forward to receiving their report in the coming weeks.

Continuous Safety Improvement

As we learned from the tragic accidents of Lion Air Flight 610 in 2018 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 in 2019, we must continuously improve and reexamine processes and accepted procedures that support our safety mission by continuing to gather and use data to detect risks, simulate outcomes, optimize the agency’s safety decision-making, challenge our organizational structures and assumptions, and introduce more transparency in how we do business.

My commitment to continuous improvement begins by looking internally within the FAA and is reflected in a number of actions we have taken over the last three months, including the following:

To further strengthen our safety culture and the connection between the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV) and the ATO, and consistent with the Safety Review Team recommendations, I realigned the AOV Executive Director to report to both the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety and directly to me. AOV is responsible for directing independent, risk-based, data-driven safety oversight of air navigation services provided by the Air Traffic Organization. Direct, candid feedback is crucial to aviation safety, and that is why I have provided a direct line from the person who independently assesses the safety of air navigation services to the Administrator.
I chartered the Mental Health and Aviation Medical Clearances Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). This ARC is comprised of members of the aviation and medical communities. It is intended to provide a forum for discussion among such communities and provide recommendations to the FAA that break down the barriers that prevent pilots and air traffic controllers from reporting and seeking care for mental health issues. The same disclosure issues exist for pilots and air traffic controllers and can impact safety. I expect the ARC to submit its report to me this spring.
We proposed requiring certificated repair stations located outside the United States whose employees perform safety-sensitive maintenance functions on certain air carrier aircraft to obtain and implement a drug and alcohol testing program. These programs would align with the FAA and Department of Transportation (DOT)’s drug and alcohol standards.
I am exploring how the agency can better collect and utilize safety data. We are assessing tools, techniques, and processes that will better identify and mitigate risk in the NAS.

Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 and Boeing Production Problems

On January 5, the left mid-cabin door plug blew out of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. The next day, on January 6, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive grounding all 737-9 MAX aircraft with the door plug configuration.

We then approved a thorough inspection and maintenance process that was performed on each of the grounded aircraft before returning to service. Our findings during inspections of those aircraft showed that the quality system issues at Boeing were unacceptable and require further scrutiny. That is why we are increasing oversight activities including:

Capping expanded production of new Boeing 737 MAX aircraft to ensure accountability and full compliance with required quality control procedures.
Launching an investigation scrutinizing Boeing’s compliance with manufacturing requirements. The FAA will consider the full extent of its enforcement authority to ensure the company is held accountable for any non-compliance.
Aggressively expanding oversight of new aircraft with increased floor presence at all Boeing facilities.
Closely monitoring data to identify and mitigate significant safety trends and risks in the system.
Launching an analysis of potential safety-focused reforms around quality control and delegation.

As we increase our oversight of Boeing, we also look forward to the results of the Boeing Safety Culture Review report, which will inform the agency regarding future action. Required by the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act, the review panel included representatives from NASA, the FAA, labor unions, independent engineering experts, air carriers, manufacturers with delegated authority, legal experts, and others. The panel has been reviewing thousands of documents, interviewed more than 250 Boeing employees, managers, and executives, Boeing supplier employees, and FAA employees and visited several Boeing sites as well as Spirit AeroSystems’ (a subcontractor for Boeing) facility in Wichita.

Let me stress: we will follow the data and take appropriate and necessary action. The safety of the flying public will continue to inform our decision-making. We will continue to implement the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act as recent events underscore the importance of continuously looking for ways to improve and refine safety oversight activities.

Additionally, the FAA has been working closely with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to support their investigation of the incident. We will take further safety actions based on the findings, as necessary.

National Outreach Program for Diversity and Inclusion

Before I close, I would like to address inaccurate reporting related to the FAA’s National Outreach Program for Diversity and Inclusion. Congress enacted equal employment opportunity laws years ago, and we comply with them. Let me be clear—all FAA employees contribute to our safety mission. The FAA employs tens of thousands of people for a wide range of positions, from administrative roles, like a clerical assistant, to oversight and execution of critical safety functions, like an air traffic controller. Like many large employers, the agency seeks qualified candidates from as many sources as possible, all of whom must meet rigorous qualifications that of course vary by position. These policies go back over several bipartisan administrations. Any statements to the contrary are misleading. The FAA must follow the law in its hiring practices. It does and will continue to do so as long as I am honored to lead the agency.

Closing Observations

In the three months since I have been back at the FAA, I have reaffirmed that our employees are our most important asset. I have met with the FAA employees who work daily to carry out the agency’s mission. I saw first-hand their professionalism and commitment, and I hold them in the highest regard.

Notably, I began my tenure as FAA Administrator shortly before the busiest time of the year for air travel, and 2023 was also the busiest year for air travel ever. I saw firsthand the steadfast professionalism of our controllers as I visited various FAA facilities during the holiday season. They worked around the clock so that passengers were safe from takeoff to touchdown, and it is because of them that travel during the holiday season was notably smooth. From Sunday, December 17, 2023, to Monday, January 1, 2024, the cancellation rate was just 0.8 percent despite a record number of passengers flying during the busy holiday season. The cancellation rate during that same period in 2022 was 8.2 percent. Taking a broader view, in 2023, there were 16.3 million flights and a cancellation rate below 1.2 percent, the lowest rate in a decade.

I appreciate the opportunity to serve as Administrator of the FAA, and I am confident in the FAA’s ability to address the challenges ahead. I also want to express the Administration’s support for the enactment of a long-term FAA reauthorization bill and commend the bipartisan efforts in the House to complete this important work. I look forward to working with Congress as it considers the Administration’s recently submitted views and finalizes the FAA reauthorization bill.

I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Government Promotion of Safety and Innovation in the New Space Economy

STATEMENT OF KELVIN B. COLEMAN
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND SCIENCE GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF SAFETY AND INNOVATION IN THE NEW
SPACE ECONOMY

DECEMBER 13, 2023

Chair Cantwell, Chair Sinema, Ranking Member Cruz, Ranking Member Schmitt, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the important role the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) play in ensuring the safety and economic competitiveness of U.S. commercial space activities. We are committed to continuing to enable safe space transportation and keeping pace with the growth of the commercial space sector while prioritizing U.S. leadership.

U.S. commercial space capabilities and innovation are vitally important to our Nation. The U.S. commercial space transportation industry is rapidly developing new technologies that will assure our Nation access to space, take us back to the moon and to other interstellar destinations, connect global communities, help us better serve the planet, and improve the daily lives of our citizens. Commercial space activity worldwide surged in the past decade, resulting in a half-trillion dollar global space economy that will nearly double in the next decade. The United States contributes roughly half of all commercial activity, and the U.S. commercial space industry will continue to be an extremely important contributor to the growth of this space economy. My testimony focuses on DOT’s authorities and responsibilities for commercial space, the Biden-Harris Administration’s proposal to establish additional regulatory roles and responsibilities for DOT and FAA regarding new and novel U.S. in-space activities that will ensure the U.S. remains the world’s preeminent commercial space country of choice, and ongoing efforts to streamline and improve our commercial space regulatory framework.

Overview of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation and its Responsibilities

The Secretary of Transportation (Secretary), in accordance with Title 51 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), regulates and oversees U.S. commercial space transportation operations, which include launch and reentry operations worldwide, the operation of launch and reentry sites, and human space flight missions. This authority has been delegated by the Secretary to the FAA. The FAA, through the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), which I have led as Associate Administrator since September of last year, carries out these authorities to protect the public health and safety, the safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. In addition to these important responsibilities, the FAA is also responsible for encouraging, facilitating, and promoting commercial space launches and reentries by the private sector and facilitating the strengthening and expansion of U.S. space transportation infrastructure. To put it simply, consistent with these responsibilities, our mission is to enable safe commercial space transportation, and we recognize and embrace the central role the DOT and the FAA play in ensuring the U.S. continues to be the global leader in space.

Since 1989, the FAA has licensed or permitted nearly 700 commercial space transportation operations, more than any other country in the world by far. To put the growth of the commercial space sector into perspective, in fiscal year 2023, AST oversaw the safety of 113 operations, tripling the number of licensed operations since fiscal year 2020. Additionally, we have received a 186% increase in license applications since fiscal year 2020. And in the last few years, we’ve seen an increased use of reusable launch vehicle technology, new manufacturing techniques, and other innovation. The FAA has leveraged its licensing and regulatory capabilities and other various programs and initiatives to enable the growth of the U.S. commercial space industry in a manner that has resulted in an impressive safety record for this rapidly growing industry. No FAA-licensed launch or reentry operation has resulted in a fatality or injury to a member of the public, nor has there been any significant public property damage. Looking forward, we expect the total number of licensed commercial space operations to double by fiscal year 2026. This is fantastic growth, and the FAA is committed to seeing it continue.

Additionally, the FAA's involvement in commercial space transportation operations is extensive; it also includes license modifications and license renewals, conducting payload and policy reviews with our interagency partners, conducting an assortment of safety analyses, safety inspections, mishap investigations, and more. We’ve seen significant increases in all of these activities. For example, since fiscal year 2020, we’ve increased safety inspections by 124%.

Currently, about two-thirds of the AST organization is dedicated to working on these important activities. The FAA’s impressive safety record and ability to keep up with this rapidly growing industry are in large part because of the incredible staff that I have in AST. Thanks to recent support from Congress in fiscal year 2023, which allowed us to expand our team, we were able to hire an additional 33 new employees using various hiring and recruiting authorities, raising our total staff size to a current level of 147 individuals, which allows us to address many of the growing demands that have been placed on our office.

Looking forward – Novel Space Activities

Last month, the Biden-Harris Administration unveiled a legislative package titled the “Authorization and Supervision of Novel Private Sector Space Activities Act,” which, if enacted, will provide clear and predictable authorization and supervision for novel U.S. private sector in- space activities. The Administration's legislative package would expand the Department's

licensing authority to include the operation of human space flight vehicles in outer space and the operation of space transportation vehicles if the operation is for the sole purpose of conducting in-space transportation. This is a logical extension of the Department’s existing authorities and will simplify the process for industry. The authority to license operations of human space flight vehicles in outer space would ensure consistent oversight of human space flight activities throughout a mission’s full lifecycle, addressing public safety, space sustainability, and other

U.S. interests and, after the learning period expires, occupant safety from launch through reentry. AST would utilize our extensive expertise in space transportation to carry out in-space transportation licensing authority. For some missions, this authority would allow for in-space transportation operators to apply for a single license to conduct all transportation activities, including launch, in-space transportation, and reentry, which will reduce the regulatory burden on applicants and ensure consistency in transportation rules from launch through reentry.

We recognize the importance of a robust domestic commercial space transportation industry to the Nation. The Department’s approach to the authorization and supervision of these in-space activities would prioritize a clear, predictable, and flexible oversight process that promotes access to space and imposes minimal burdens on the industry. The Department would also work closely with the Department of Commerce, NASA, and other departments and agencies to ensure the application of consistent standards.

We are in full support of the Biden-Harris Administration’s commitment to fostering a policy and regulatory environment that enables the competitive and burgeoning U.S. commercial space sector, including through this legislative package, and we look forward to continued conversations with Congress on this incredibly important topic.

Efforts to Streamline and Improve FAA’s Commercial Space Regulatory Framework

At the present time, as we work to enable safe space transportation within our existing authorities and keep up with this rapidly growing industry, we have also undertaken efforts to streamline and improve our commercial space regulatory framework. These efforts include:

Part 450: In December 2020, the FAA published a final rule to consolidate, update, and streamline all launch and reentry regulations into a single performance-based part, which is found in Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 450 (Part 450). We designed Part 450 to allow a commercial space operator to obtain a license for a portfolio of operations, which enables an operator to streamline and include different vehicle configurations, different mission profiles, and even multiple sites under one license. The FAA anticipates full implementation of Part 450 will reduce the number of times an operator will need to come to the FAA for an approval. Ultimately, this will free up licensing resources and ensure there are adequate resources available for evaluating the safety of new operators, vehicles, sites, and technologies. Additionally, among other things, Part 450 enables coordination between the FAA and our Federal range partners, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense, on ground safety at Federal launch sites to eliminate gaps and duplication in oversight. By March 10, 2026, all launch and reentry licenses issued by the FAA under legacy regulations will no longer be valid, and launch and reentry vehicle operators must be in compliance with Part 450.

We are committed to ensuring this transition to Part 450 is as smooth as possible. Part 450 is a relatively new rule, and as we approach these next two years, through various initiatives, AST is working to ensure that the FAA has the tools in place to ensure that the industry has a full understanding of how to achieve compliance with Part 450 and how to take advantage of the intended benefits of this streamlined process. Among these initiatives are:

Continual Website Improvements: We have worked, and continue to work, on improving the FAA’s website to ensure that information is easily accessible for prospective license applicants. For example, we have replaced relevant portions of the website that contained licensing information with a “Getting Started with Licensing” page² that provides prospective applicants with important information they will need to successfully submit an application to the FAA for a license, permit, or safety element approval. The page contains a link to commercial space regulations, a link to all active Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Circulars, a link to contact AST and provide project and operator information in order to efficiently begin the pre- application process, a link to pre-application checklists, a detailed step-by-step process for all applicants, and more. Additionally, we have added a tool to the page to guide prospective applicants in determining what type of license they will need.
Application Checklists: We have developed application checklists that prospective applicants may use when applying for a launch or reentry license, experimental permit, launch site operator license, or safety element approval. These checklists provide prospective applicants with the information they need in the pre-application process to ensure they submit a comprehensive, compliant, and complete application for FAA review and approval.
Virtual Tutorials and Workshops: We have posted educational videos on our website that cover various Part 450 topics, including a Part 450 modular “at your pace” training video that offers a broad walkthrough of Part 450.³ We have also hosted workshops to assist prospective applicants with Part 450. For example, we held a Part 450 workshop in 2020 with industry participants where we did a broad walkthrough of Part 450 and provided a crosswalk of mapping tools comparing the new rule to legacy regulations. Additionally, this summer, we held a compliance and enforcement workshop with industry participants. We plan to develop more training videos and hope to host more workshops in the future.
Guidance: The FAA has published guidance on means of compliance with Part 450 requirements through Advisory Circulars to assist the commercial space industry. As of today, the FAA has published 18 Advisory Circulars related to Part 450 compliance, which cover topics like Space Nuclear Systems, Flight Hazard Analysis, Ground Safety, Population Exposure Analysis, System Safety Program, High Consequence Event Protection, and Computing System Safety. The FAA anticipates publishing two more advisory circulars in the near term, one that will provide guidance to the industry on elements required for a complete application and one addressing denial and tolling processes. We are working to publish more advisory circulars in the future to further facilitate applicants’ understanding of and compliance with Part 450.
Licensing Electronic Application Portal: FAA is working to develop a Licensing Electronic Application Portal (LEAP), which will be used to accept, modify, exchange, and approve licensing materials under Part 450. LEAP is expected to enhance our ability to identify, track, and quickly resolve questions and issues both internally and externally with applicants.

Human Space Flight Occupant Safety: In addition to supporting industry’s efforts on voluntary consensus standards and updating a set of recommended practices for human space flight occupant safety, DOT established the Human Space Flight Occupant Safety Aerospace Rulemaking Committee (Human Space Flight SpARC) on April 21, 2023. The Human Space Flight SpARC allows us to engage with the commercial space industry and will provide consensus information, concerns, opinions, and recommendations to the Department regarding the establishment of a commercial human space flight occupant safety framework. We expect recommendations from the Human Space Flight SpARC by the summer of 2024, which we will use to plan our efforts with the industry on a future safety framework.

Financial Responsibility: On March 15, 2023, DOT established the Financial Responsibility Aerospace Rulemaking Committee (Financial Responsibility SpARC) to engage the commercial space transportation industry and solicit information, concerns, opinions, and recommendations about updating the financial responsibility regime for licensed launch and reentry operations. The financial responsibility requirements for a launch and reentry license have not been updated in years, and the Financial Responsibility SpARC’s recommendations, due in early 2024, will help the FAA modernize the financial responsibility regulations.

Conclusion

I once again would like to reiterate the importance of the commercial space transportation industry and express the strong commitment of the Department of Transportation, especially the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, to ensuring the U.S. continues to be the global leader in space. The U.S. must remain the world’s preeminent commercial space country of choice, and the Administration’s proposal on in-space authorization will ensure that. We will continue leveraging our licensing and regulatory capabilities, as well as other programs and initiatives, to enable the growth of the U.S. commercial space transportation industry, and we are committed to continued growth. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here to discuss the important role DOT plays in ensuring the safety and economic competitiveness of U.S. commercial space activities. This concludes my testimony, and I will be glad to answer any questions from the Committee.

Addressing Close Calls to Improve Aviation Safety

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY L. AREL
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION SAFETY, OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION ADDRESSING CLOSE CALLS TO IMPROVE AVIATION SAFETY

NOVEMBER 9, 2023

Chairs Cantwell and Duckworth, Ranking Members Cruz and Moran, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the chance to be here today to testify about some of the significant events we have seen in the National Airspace System (NAS) this year. Before I delve into the details and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) actions to address these events and prevent them in the future, I want to emphasize the seriousness with which we approach this issue. Collectively, air traffic controllers, pilots, commercial operators, general aviation, and airports all play an important role in minimizing risk within the system. Through years of collaboration with these stakeholders, the FAA has established multiple layers of safety that protect the traveling public from the time they board an aircraft to the time they deplane. These efforts include continued pilot outreach and training, controller awareness and training, investments in surface safety and situational awareness technology tools, robust procedures managed by air traffic controllers, and the application of Safety Management Systems internally and across part 121 commercial operators as well as major airport operators.

The level of safety we have would not be possible without continuous transparent and collaborative communication between the FAA and industry. At the FAA, we are proud of our proactive safety culture, which emphasizes the value of nonpunitive sharing of data and safety information between the agency and industry to reduce risk and maximize safety. Nevertheless, we view even one runway incursion or other unsafe operation in the NAS as too many, and the FAA is committed to the relentless pursuit of continual improvement in everything we do. Any runway incursions or other event in the NAS, whether isolated or part of a possible trend, is a concern, and we don’t take it lightly. We appreciate the oversight and attention this subcommittee has focused on this issue, as increased awareness helps us improve safety.

Runway Incursions

A runway incursion is any occurrence at an airport involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft. Incursions are caused by operational incidents attributed to air traffic control action or inaction, pilot deviations, or vehicle/pedestrian deviations.

We measure four categories of runway incursions based on objective, observable standards:

Category A is a serious incident in which a collision was narrowly avoided.
Category B is an incident in which separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision, which may result in a time-critical corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision.
Category C is an incident characterized by ample time and/or distance to avoid a collision.
Category D is an incident that meets the definition of runway incursion (e.g., the incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft) but results in no immediate safety consequences.

For fiscal year 2023, of the approximately 54.4 million takeoffs and landings in the NAS, there were 1,756 total runway incursions. Approximately 60 percent of those incursions were attributable to pilot deviations, approximately 20 percent were caused by air traffic controller action or inaction, and the remaining approximately 20 percent were caused by vehicle or pedestrian deviations. It’s important to note that the total number of Category A and B runway incursions was 23. Although these statistics suggest that runway incursions account for approximately 0.003 percent of all NAS operations, and the more serious incursions in Categories A and B combined account for about 0.00004 percent of all NAS operations, we recognize that any number is an unacceptable safety risk and we are working hard to drive the number of such incursions to zero.

Overall, our data, which is regularly shared with Congress and publicly available, shows a recent downward trend in the rate of runway incursions. For example, in fiscal year 2022, there were approximately 33 incursions per one million takeoffs and landings. In fiscal year 2023, there were 32 incursions per one million takeoffs and landings. Although the change is modest so far, we are optimistic that our recent and ongoing work and collaboration with industry is bearing fruit and will lead to continued safety improvements in the NAS.

The FAA takes seriously every safety event in the NAS, whether it occurs on the surface or in the air. Through the promotion of Voluntary Safety Reporting Programs and expanded system monitoring through Aviation Risk Identification and Assessment, we identify and mitigate events that would have previously been unknown even two years ago. Our focus is on maintaining our status as the premier air navigation service provider, keeping aircraft safe, separated, and on time.

Safety Summit and Follow-on Actions

In March of this year, in response to an uptick in the most severe runway incursions, the FAA took a number of additional actions aimed at helping to drive down the incidence of all runway incursions. The Administrator’s call to action led to a safety summit that brought more than 200 safety leaders from across the aviation industry to examine ways that safety could be enhanced to prevent future occurrences. These discussions covered commercial and general aviation operations, the air traffic system, and airport and ground operations. The FAA also held a series of surface summits separately with stakeholders, including general aviation, air carriers, business aviation, and airport operators.

Since the safety summit, the FAA has taken a number of actions to enhance flight safety and reduce incursions:

March: The FAA issued a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) identifying items for safety management focus, including guidance related to runway safety, and asking all pilots, air carrier management, and operators to review processes, procedures, or training to ensure operations are conducted at the highest level of safety, including adherence to air traffic control instructions and maintaining a “sterile cockpit” to mitigate risks associated with extraneous communication.
March: The FAA announced additional steps the agency’s Air Traffic Organization (ATO) will take:
- Ensure that supervisors devote their full attention to the operation and airfield during peak traffic periods at each facility.
- Provide more dedicated training for unusual circumstances.
April: The FAA named an independent safety review team to further examine ways to enhance safety and reliability in the nation’s air traffic system. The Safety Review Team began its work in May and will complete its work this fall and present concrete recommendations on how the agency can advance air traffic safety.
June: The FAA launched the “Stand Up for Safety” Campaign. The series will provide monthly, mandatory special emphasis training for our controller workforce, including operations supervisors and managers, in collaboration with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).
August: The FAA announced it will hold runway safety meetings at approximately 90airports between August and the end of September. The meetings, held annually at each airport with a control tower, are the primary forum for pinpointing and addressing airport-specific risk in the surface environment and are part of the ongoing work of the Runway Safety Action Teams discussed below.
August: The FAA issued a SAFO with reminders of practices to prevent injuries while workers are towing aircraft and guiding them to and from gates. The SAFO reminds aircraft operators that it is important for personnel to remain clear of operating engines until they are shut down.
September: The FAA tasked the Investigative Technologies Aviation RulemakingCommittee to provide recommendations on new technologies, such as cockpit alerting systems, designed to reduce runway safety events. When aircraft land on the wrong surface, it presents risks that can lead to catastrophic events where the surface could be closed, damaged, or an unsuitable length for a safe takeoff or landing.

Moreover, over the course of fiscal year 2023, the FAA awarded grants for 55 runway safety projects under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and 154 runway safety projects under the Airport Improvement Program, totaling more than $1.0 billion. These projects will reconfigure taxiways that may cause confusion, install airfield lighting, signage or markings, or construct new taxiways to enhance safety on the airfield.

Longterm Runway Safety Initiatives

The actions since March that are noted above are a small fraction of the overall sustained effort that the FAA and industry have undertaken over time to lower runway incursions. Runway safety will continue to be a high priority for the FAA, and we will continue to develop and refine initiatives to enhance runway safety. Here are some of the more significant FAA initiatives that are moving the needle on safety.

Runway Safety Council. The FAA convened the Runway Safety Council (RSC) to fundamentally change the existing safety culture and move toward a systemic proactive management strategy that involved cooperation throughout the FAA and among the different segments of the aviation industry. By applying the formalized and proactive approach of the ATO’s Safety Management System, the RSC is advancing the shift from a compliance-based safety system to a risk-based, data-driven, integrated systems solution to runway safety.
Collaboration with the aviation community is a key component of runway safety. The RSC includes aviation stakeholders from across FAA Lines of Business, including Airports, Aviation Safety, and the ATO, as well as FAA employee labor organizations like Professional Aviation System Specialists and NATCA, and industry representatives such as aircraft operators, airline representatives, and flight instructors.
Runway Safety Action Teams. Runway Safety Action Teams (RSAT) bring local airport stakeholders together at least once a year at towered airports to identify risks to surface safety at individual airports and develop plans to mitigate or eliminate those risks. RSATs provide the foundation of the Runway Safety Program at individual airports. The RSAT meetings are the primary forum for pinpointing and addressing airport-specific risks in the surface environment. The product of a RSAT meeting is a Runway Safety Action Plan in which the stakeholders document and agree to pursue specific actions intended to improve surface safety.
Runway Incursion Mitigation. The Runway Incursion Mitigation (RIM) program is a national initiative at airports with a history of runway incursions to identify airport- specific risk factors that might contribute to a runway incursion. These risk factors may include unclear taxiway markings, airport signage, and more complex issues such as the runway or taxiway layout. The FAA then works with the airport sponsors to develop strategies to mitigate runway incursions at these locations. Currently, 131 unmitigated RIM locations have been identified across 80 airports. To date, the program has mitigated 99 locations. Other solutions like operational modifications or a hot spot designation (to optimize pilot awareness) are employed when physical changes are not feasible or best suited. There is a 78-percent average reduction of runway incursions at mitigated RIM locations. The RIM program continuously monitors these locations for reoccurrence and assesses incoming data for any new RIM location candidates.

Runway Safety Technologies

Investment in technology will continue to be an effective mechanism to enhance aviation safety and runway safety in particular. We are committed to the continued development and deployment of safety technologies in support of aviation safety. Here are some examples of technologies that are advancing safety.

Technology Sprints. The FAA has announced that we are pursuing a technology sprint by fast-tracking the deployment of three initiatives to address specific safety concerns on the airport surface.
- The Surface Awareness Initiative will deploy a situational awareness display of airport surface traffic to tower air traffic controllers for airports that do not currently have a surface surveillance system.
- The Approach Runway Verification will add functionality in the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement Terminal System (STARS) to provide controllers with alerts of wrong runway, closed runway, and wrong airport alignments to prevent wrong surface landings.
- The Runway Incursion Device will provide a memory aid device that generates an audible and visual alert to controllers to enhance situational awareness of occupied and closed runways, which we plan to deploy to over 70 towers.

Runway Status Lights. The FAA developed Runway Status Lights (RWSL) technology to increase situational awareness for flight crews and airport vehicle drivers and thus serve as an added layer of safety. A RWSL system derives traffic information from surface and approach surveillance systems and illuminates red in-pavement airport lights to signal a potentially unsafe situation. Runway Entrance Lights are deployed at taxiway/runway crossings and illuminate if it is unsafe to enter or cross a runway. Takeoff Hold Lights are deployed by the departure hold zone and illuminate red when there is an aircraft in position for departure and the runway is occupied by another aircraft or vehicle and it is unsafe for takeoff. RWSL is operational at 20 U.S. airports.
Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X. Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) integrates data from a variety of sources, including radars, transponder multilateration systems, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) to provide accurate target position and identification information and thus give controllers a more reliable view of airport operations. ASDE-X provides tower controllers a surface traffic situation display with visual and audible alerting of traffic conflicts and potential collisions. ASDE-X is operational at 35 airports in the United States.
Airport Surface Surveillance Capability. Airport Surface Surveillance Capability (ASSC) is similar to ASDE-X. It improves surface surveillance and situational awareness in all kinds of weather. With ASSC, air traffic controllers see aircraft and ground vehicles on the airport surface and on approach and departure paths within a few miles of the airport. Like ASDE-X, ASSC fuses data from multiple sources, including radars, to provide a highly accurate display for controllers with the same visual and aural alerting capabilities. ASSC is operational at nine airports in the United States.
Runway Incursion Warning Systems and Vehicle ADS-B Transmitters. Runway Incursion Warning Systems (RIWS) and vehicle ADS-B transmitters are available for installation on airport and airline-owned vehicles that regularly operate in the movement area. These technologies enhance situational awareness for surface operators and Air Traffic Controllers. FAA has been actively encouraging airports to voluntarily equip their vehicles. Grants are available for installation of these systems. As a result, there are now over 2,100 vehicles equipped with ADS-B transmitters at airports with ASDE-X and ASSC and over 1,000 vehicles equipped with a RIWS.
From the Flight Deck and the Runway Safety Pilot Simulator. The FAA has produced 100 site-specific “From the Flight Deck” videos to educate and inform pilots and controllers of the risks associated with operating at specific airports around the NAS. Other videos cover safety topics, including wrong surface landings, complex airfield geometry, hold short, wrong direction intersection takeoffs, and more. Additional airport videos are forthcoming.

FAA's Runway Safety Pilot Simulator video series is a self-guided resource to assist flight instructors with teaching student pilots surface safety best practices before they step foot into the cockpit. It allows student pilots to navigate on airport surfaces while communicating with air traffic control and gain experience following instructions provided by air traffic control. The scenarios are interactive and allow viewers to make decisions based on air traffic control instructions.
Pilot Information on Airports Across the NAS. To supplement From the Flight Deck videos, we began publishing additional information on faa.gov. This content includes details such as airport-specific cautions, information local controllers want pilots to know, airport communications, airspace details, more general best practices, lost communications tips, and other preflight planning resources. This supplemental web content is currently available for 25 airports across the NAS, with more content in development.

Controller Hiring

Finally, although eliminating runway incursions requires close coordination and collaboration with industry, we recognize the vital role we play in working to avoid and eliminate them. Part of that work is the hiring and training of air traffic controllers. The President’s FY 2024 budget request includes funding for the hiring and training of 1,800 controllers, an increase of 300 above the hiring level for FY 2023. This funding supports the continued training of the 1,500 controllers hired in FY 2023. The FAA Academy's training schedule in execution for FY 2024 will support the FAA's overall goal to hire 1,800 controllers to include the added training cost for the additional 300 controllers reflected in the FY 2024 budget request. The budget request will allow the FAA to continue progress toward attaining the necessary Certified Professional Controller staffing levels to meet current traffic demands, which have returned to, or in some markets exceeded, pre-pandemic levels. The 2023 Controller Workforce Plan released in May includes facility-specific staffing targets. As we continue to work with our labor partners, we also submitted to Congress the results of the Collaborative Resource Workgroup and look forward to continued discussion and progress as we all work toward the shared goal of staffing targets to meet traffic demands.

Conclusion

I would like to reemphasize the seriousness with which we approach this issue and assure you that although we are proud of our safety culture and the work we have done, the FAA will doggedly press for continued collaboration with industry to further enhance safety initiatives and technologies to reduce runway incursions with the goal of eliminating them. Thank you again for the chance to speak about this critical safety issue.

Advancing Next Generation Aviation Technologies

STATEMENT OF KEVIN WELSH
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ADVANCING NEXT GENERATION AVIATION TECHNOLOGIES

MARCH 29, 2023

Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) work related to advancing next generation aviation technologies. My name is Kevin Welsh, and I am the executive director of the FAA’s Office of Environment and Energy. My office conducts research, develops policy, and collaborates across the U.S. government, with the aviation community, and internationally to address the environmental impacts of aviation. The FAA’s core mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. This mission also includes addressing the environmental impacts of aviation, such as climate change, local air quality, and noise. As laid out in the National Aeronautics Science and Technology Priorities and U.S. Aviation Climate Action Plan, this administration is committed to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions in the aviation sector by 2050. To achieve this, we are working with industry and other important aviation stakeholders to develop new technologies, enable increased production of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), increase the energy efficiency of air traffic operations, and conduct research and develop tools to support the FAA’s mission. Our work in these areas not only helps address environmental impacts, but can also reduce costs, such as through reduced fuel burn, and supports job growth and economic development.

TECHNOLOGY

Improvements in aircraft technology have long played a central role in reducing aviation’s environmental impact. Continued FAA investment in aircraft technology research and development is focused on accelerating the development and introduction of new aircraft technologies that reduce emissions and noise while improving fuel efficiency. For example, the FAA, aircraft manufacturers, and airlines collectively work toward further reducing aircraft noise and emissions at the source through efforts like the Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and Noise (CLEEN) Program, which began in 2010. The FAA’s CLEEN program provides funding to develop and accelerate the introduction of technologies that will reduce noise, emissions, and fuel burn. CLEEN is implemented in 5-year phases, and we are currently in the third phase of the program. Funding for the CLEEN program, including the industry cost share component, has exceeded $500 million since its inception. Cumulatively, CLEEN Phases I and II are estimated to save the aviation industry 36 billion gallons of fuel through 2050, reducing CO2 emissions by 420 million metric tons over this period. These fuel savings would reduce airline costs by over 90 billion dollars at current jet fuel prices. These savings would also benefit passengers. These CO2 reductions are equivalent to removing three million cars from the road from 2020 to 2050. These technologies, as well as the use of SAF, will also dramatically reduce nitrogen oxide and soot emissions from aircraft operations. Technologies from Phases I and II are estimated to eliminate over 997 kilotons of nitrogen oxide emissions during landing and takeoff through 2050. Phase III will continue to target further reductions in aviation noise, emissions, and fuel burn.

A few examples of the accomplishments from the FAA’s investments in the CLEEN program include:

Under CLEEN Phases I and II, GE Aerospace has developed new low-emissions jet engine combustion systems. The enhanced “TAPS” combustion system is used in aircraft engines, reducing nitrogen oxide emissions for over 500 aircraft in service and over 5,000 on order. A further improved TAPS combustor was developed under CLEEN Phase II to reduce emissions for the forthcoming Boeing 777X aircraft.
Under CLEEN Phase II, Boeing has developed and demonstrated advanced aircraft wings made of stronger and lighter-weight materials to support innovative development of current and future aircraft. This technology alone is expected to reduce fuel consumption by 3.5 percent.
In addition to the technologies being developed by the CLEEN Program, our industry partners are using the knowledge gained through the program to enhance other systems. For example, Pratt & Whitney leveraged the CLEEN Program to demonstrate new engine fan technologies to further reduce fuel consumption and noise from their geared turbofan engines. This knowledge has also resulted in improvements to the design software that Pratt & Whitney uses to design all of their engines. As such, CLEEN has an impact that is far greater than the individual technologies that we are working to mature.
Finally, data from CLEEN Program tests have contributed to the approval of a number of alternative jet fuels for safe use.

Through the FAA Center of Excellence for Alternative Jet Fuels & Environment, also known as the Aviation Sustainability Center, or “ASCENT,” work is also underway to develop innovative technological solutions to reduce noise, emissions, and fuel burn from subsonic and supersonic aircraft. ASCENT technology research is complementary to CLEEN, partnering with academia, rather than industry, to advance the state of the art knowledge broadly within the aviation community. Whereas CLEEN research focuses on a higher maturity for the technology and a direct path to product application, ASCENT research can cover a wider range of ideas and different maturity levels. Further, ASCENT is using its research efforts to develop analytical tools that can be used by industry to develop quieter, cleaner, and more efficient products. This research spans partnerships with sixteen universities, covering a breadth of technical areas, including noise reduction technologies, system-level modeling and design, propulsion-airframe integration, combustion, turbomachinery, and supersonics.

The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 provided over $46 million for a new Low Emissions Technology grant program that the FAA calls “FAST-TECH.” The FAA will launch the program this year, which will support projects to develop, demonstrate, or apply low-emission aviation technologies. This grant program is expected to support projects that are designing, prototyping, and testing new low-emission aviation technologies, as well as projects enhancing technology testing and demonstration capabilities that will accelerate a broad range of low-emission aviation technologies. FAST-TECH will play a complementary role to CLEEN and ASCENT by providing a focus specifically on low-emission aviation technologies and building up not only individual technologies, but also testing capabilities to drive a new generation of low-emissions aircraft.

The FAA also continues to demonstrate international leadership on aviation and climate change, including our leadership in setting international environmental standards for aviation at the International Civil Aviation Organization. Adoption of international environmental standards not only advances environmental protection globally, but also helps to set a level playing field and facilitates the export of Unites States-developed and manufactured aerospace technology.

SUSTAINABLE AVIATION FUEL

SAF presents the most promising near-to-medium-term tool to dramatically reduce aviation emissions and will be critical to longer-term efforts to decarbonize aviation. Creation of good jobs is a priority for this administration, and SAF production is expected to enhance the creation of jobs related to agricultural production, municipal solid waste reduction, fuel refining, and engineering. Over the last 15 years, the FAA has led efforts to support SAF development through testing, analysis, and coordination across government, academia, and the private sector. The FAA supports SAF development through a robust research program that spans the breadth of fuel testing and qualification to environmental and economic analysis. Through ASCENT, the FAA advances new research on SAF production and supply chain analysis and enables streamlined fuel approval via ASTM International. Since 2006, the FAA has partnered with industry to support broad engagement of SAF stakeholders through the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative. Additionally, under the CLEEN Program, the FAA partners with industry to support critical SAF testing to ensure safety and performance. This administration is broadly committed to the development of SAF. In September 2021, the Departments of Transportation, Energy, and Agriculture entered into a memorandum of understanding launching a government-wide Sustainable Aviation Fuel Grand Challenge (the SAF Grand Challenge). The objective of this effort is to reduce the cost, enhance the sustainability, and expand the production and use of SAF that achieves a minimum of 50 percent reduction in lifecycle greenhouse gas compared to conventional fuel to meet a goal of supplying 3 billion gallons of SAF by 2030 (approximately 10 percent of projected jet fuel use) and sufficient SAF to meet 100 percent of domestic aviation fuel demand by 2050. The FAA is coordinating closely and collaborating with the other agencies on the SAF Grand Challenge to effectively use resources and accelerate the increased production of SAF. At the FAA we are, among other things, coordinating SAF testing and analysis, working with standards organizations to ensure the safety and sustainability of SAF, providing international technical leadership, and seeking opportunities to support the development of infrastructure to connect SAF producers with aviation users.

Finally, in addition to the FAST-TECH grant funding noted earlier, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 also provided $244.5M to support the development of a new SAF- focused grant program that the FAA calls Fueling Aviation’s Sustainable Transition via SAF (“FAST-SAF”). The program aims to support rapid SAF deployment, focusing on domestic projects that enable SAF production, transportation, storage, and blending. The objectives of this grant program are in line with the goals of the Administration’s SAF Grand Challenge, with a primary focus on enabling the rapid scale-up of the domestic production of SAF that provides significant lifecycle greenhouse gas reductions.

CERTIFICATION OF NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES

An important aspect of the quest to reduce aviation emissions and noise is the development of new technologies to power aircraft, such as hydrogen or electric propulsion systems. As the FAA works to certify aircraft that seek to use these technologies, safety will always be the agency’s first priority. As a mechanism to help facilitate the safe introduction of new, innovative products, including new propulsion technologies, the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service established a structure and process to facilitate the introduction of new technology through early engagement with companies to identify policy and certification issues and to develop strategies to address them early in the application process for type certification.

Although current regulations may not have been drafted with these technologies in mind, our regulatory framework has the flexibility necessary to certify them. Where necessary, FAA technical specialists are developing performance-based requirements to address novel or unusual design features that current requirements do not address. In addition to applying the extensive technical knowledge and experience of our own specialists, the FAA is also leveraging the work of NASA, industry standards committees, research organizations, and other industry working groups to broaden our understanding of the technical issues that new technologies like electric and hydrogen propulsion systems pose.

As the technology matures and the FAA and industry gain experience in the certification of these new technologies, we expect the regulatory structure to evolve. In the meantime, however, current processes are effective in ensuring the technologies meet the expected level of safety.

CONCLUSION

The FAA will continue to support the development and deployment of innovative technologies, SAF, and other new energy sources to reduce aviation’s environmental impact, ensure continued global leadership in innovation and aviation, and support continued economic growth and job creation. We are focused on continuing to pursue and support cutting-edge research and development, and establishing and maintaining close partnerships within government, industry, and academia, as the safest and most efficient airspace system in the world evolves to meet the needs of the future. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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The Federal Aviation Administration’s Flight Plan: Examining the Agency’s Research and Development Programs and Future Plans

STATEMENT OF SHELLEY J. YAK DIRECTOR, WILLIAM J. HUGHES TECHNICAL CENTER
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

FAA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
MARCH 9, 2023

Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Sorensen, and members of the subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Research and Development portfolio. My name is Shelley Yak, and I am the Director of the William J. Hughes Technical Center and represent the FAA as its Director of Research.

From 1958 to the present day, many of the concepts, technologies, and systems in the National Airspace System (NAS) were researched, developed, tested, and began their nationwide deployment at the Technical Center and its sister center, the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center where the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) is located.

Through our federal laboratories, our workforce, and partnerships with industry, academia, and other government agencies, the two Centers are able to turn ideas into value and problems into solutions. The work we do ensures that the United States continues to lead the world in embracing, implementing, and integrating new technologies in support of the aviation ecosystem. Entrepreneurs around the world are exploring innovative ways to use aviation in their commercial activities, and the need for us to integrate these new technologies into the NAS continues to be a national priority.

The research, development, test, and evaluation work of the FAA is best summarized through six domain areas, which I wish to briefly share with you today. To do so, let us go on an imaginary flight together.

We start our trip, of course, at the airport in the Airport Technologies and Infrastructure domain. This domain is comprised of research areas that include airport planning and design, airport pavement, airport data mining to prevent or mitigate safety incidents, aircraft rescue and firefighting, wildlife hazard abatement, visual guidance research including airfield marking, lighting and signage, and runway surface technology research.

Airport pavement research includes evaluating various innovative pavement materials and assessing their projected life cycle for our runways and taxiways—the largest capital expense of an airport. Airport research also includes surveillance sensors and emerging entrant research. Our current emerging entrant research includes vertiport design research to accommodate powered lift aircraft. Our drone research includes assessing technologies for drone detection and mitigation at airports, as well as assessing the use of drones in the airport environment for such things as pavement inspection and management of wildlife near runways. We are also actively conducting research related to climate change risks and adaptation in order to address airport resiliency and sustainability. This domain also includes the testing we conduct on the performance of airport fire extinguishing agents to replace firefighting foams that contain polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS).

We then board the aircraft– this is the Aircraft Safety Assurance domain. Our work here has everything to do with the aircraft—including its skin, which may be made of composites and new materials, the propulsion and fuel systems, items carried aboard the aircraft, such as lithium batteries and devices powered by them, and fire protection and detection in the aircraft.One of our current projects is developing an alternative to Halon as a fire suppression agent for use aboard aircraft.

Still on the aircraft, we begin settling in, and that means interacting with the entertainment system in front of us while our flight crew interacts with their Digital Systems & Technologies domain. This includes everything electronic on the plane and across the NAS— including entertainment and aircraft systems, electronic flight bags used on the flight deck, and cybersecurity. One example of cyber research includes using artificial intelligence and machine learning to establish cybersecurity tools that enable proactive monitoring of systems used to manage the national airspace to prevent, detect, and mitigate the effects of cyberattacks.

Well, it looks like we are waiting to take off. The number one cause of delays is weather and weather mitigation is a part of the Environment and Weather Mitigation domain. In this domain, we perform research on everything that affects aviation or is affected by aviation, such as improving the accuracy of weather forecasts. Better forecasts can help reduce delays, increase passenger safety and comfort, and keep the NAS running more efficiently. Other efforts in this domain include aircraft deicin g and anti-icing methods prior to takeoff, aerodynamic and operational effects of inflight icing on all types of aircraft, and finding ways to reduce the effects of noise and emissions on our communities and the natural environment. We have several efforts on this front. This includes our Continuous Lower Energy Emissions and Noise Program, a public private partnership with industry to accelerate the development of certifiable aircraft and engine technologies that reduce noise, emissions, and fuel use. It also includes a comprehensive program to support the development of sustainable aviation fuels through our Aviation Sustainability Center, or ASCENT, and the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative. We are also working with industry to eliminate aviation gasoline lead emissions from general aviation.

As we are waiting for takeoff, let us not forget the people we depend upon during our flight. Our Human and Aeromedical Factors domain supports our pilots, technicians, and air traffic controllers and is where we look at ways to improve human performance. The research, development, and testing conducted here is on how people best interface with the systems they use and on developing training requirements. The Civil Aerospace Medical Institute is the location for all of our aeromedical research, which focuses on safety sensitive personnel and airline passenger health, safety, and performance ability in current and forecasted future civilian aerospace operations. CAMI’s Aerospace Human Factors Research Division also conducts field and laboratory research supporting the performance of front-line aviation personnel, including pilots, air traffic controllers, aviation maintainers, dispatchers, avionics (technical operations) technicians, flight attendants, and ramp workers, with the goal of improving operational efficiency and safety.

We finally take off, and you know your pilot and air traffic controllers are well-trained and checked out. This last domain, to the passenger, is behind the scenes. However, it is the most important domain for getting us to our destination, the Aerospace Performance and Planning domain. This domain includes the air traffic management of our flight and the tools/systems we use to ensure we arrive safely. It includes the safety management systems we have in place and the airspace integration work we are doing on growing operations such as commercial space transportation, unmanned aircraft systems, and advanced air mobility.

Our flight proceeds, and we even make up the time we lost waiting on bad weather due to the tools and forecasting systems we talked about in two of our domains. We land safely at our destination airport—a smart airport that uses technology to manage and plan operations in a digital environment. It is the airport we are envisioning and researching for our future.

Throughout our history, the FAA has adapted to changes in technology and has successfully integrated new operators and equipment into the NAS. We are well-positioned to maintain our global leader status. We are committed to working with Congress and all of our stakeholders to find solutions that balance safety and security with innovation and deliver on our mission to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

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Implementation and Oversight of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act

STATEMENT OF
BILLY NOLEN, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

HEARING BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPOTATION:
IMPLEMENTATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THE AIRCRAFT, CERTIFICATION, SAFETY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

MARCH 8, 2023

Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be with you today to discuss how the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is strengthening our certification and safety oversight processes and our implementation of the bipartisan Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (“Act”). Before we discuss certification reform implementation, on behalf of everyone at the United States Department of Transportation and the FAA, I want to recognize the families of the victims of the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents and thank them for their continued advocacy for aviation safety.

The FAA understands and embraces the importance of continuously raising the bar on aviation safety, not only in the U.S., but around the world. During the past two years, we have made significant progress meeting the requirements of the law to improve and refine our certification and safety oversight processes. Using a comprehensive approach to implementing the provisions from the recent certification reform legislation and the various recommendations received from investigations and independent reviews, we have rededicated our processes to treat aircraft as complex systems, with full consideration of how all the elements in the operating system interact. We are integrating human factors considerations more effectively throughout all aspects of the design and certification process. We are improving the agency’s oversight process by ensuring coordinated and flexible flow of data and information. And finally, we are recruiting a workforce that can meet the demands of the future—by hiring new talent who understand the safety implications of new and innovative technologies, as required by the Act. We will continue to prioritize this important work as we carry out our responsibilities for public safety. It is more important than ever that we maintain our safety record while making improvements that will help sustain our progress. The discussion below provides an overview of some of our accomplishments to date.

Safety Management Systems (SMS). SMS is a systematic and comprehensive way to identify, monitor, and address potential operational hazards early on, to prevent serious problems from occurring. U.S. airlines have been required to have SMS since 2018. Expanding SMS to other players in the aviation industry is critical for achieving the next level of safety. As required by the Act, we recently published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), which proposes SMS requirements for certain design and manufacturing organizations. Recognizing the importance and value of SMS, we included Part 135 operators and air tour operators conducting operations under Part 91 in NPRM as well. As rulemaking is underway, we continue to promote participation in voluntary SMS programs. These participants submit elements of SMS to the FAA for acceptance; and commit to regular oversight of their SMS by the FAA. As of today, we have accepted more than 60 SMSs for Part 135 operators, Part 91 air tour operators, and Part 145 repair stations; and accepted five SMSs for design and manufacturing organizations, with many more working towards acceptance. The FAA is using the lessons learned from these voluntary programs to inform FAA’s SMS rulemaking and policy development.
System Safety and Human Factors. In accordance with the Act, we incorporated system safety assessments and validation of human factors assumptions into the FAA’s aviation safety policy and oversight, including the design and certification process. We recently published an NPRM that proposes new requirements on how to conduct system safety assessments for transport category airplanes. We are also working on several initiatives to increase the incorporation of human factors to improve the way systems account for the broad range of pilot capabilities around the world. For example, pursuant to the Act, the FAA completed a preliminary review of human factors rules, guidance, and pilot response assumptions to identify and prioritize changes to better incorporate system safety analyses and human factors assumptions into the FAA’s aviation safety policy and oversight. Finally, the FAA launched a call to action to review revisions made to pilot certification standards. The group provided recommendations on how to improve manual flying skills and automation management, and the FAA is in the process of implementing these recommendations.
Global Collaboration. Global collaboration is crucial to maintaining U.S. leadership in aviation safety. The FAA continues to participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Personnel Training and Licensing Panel Automation Working Group, which is assessing the pilot dependency on automation globally. The FAA is also leading an international authority working group to evaluate the Act’s requirements regarding amended type certificates. This working group recently recommended process improvements based on more than a decade of harmonized application of changed product rules. We are working to implement these recommendations. The Act requires the FAA to ensure that pilot operational evaluations for transport category airplanes include foreign and domestic pilots of varying levels of experience. In response, the FAA issued a notice in 2021, to update the policy to include pilots in Flight Standards Board operational evaluations.
Data. As the aviation system evolves, the FAA is constantly considering options to improve data accessibility and foster collaboration in order to share data on identified risks throughout the government and with the public. FAA continues to expand the agency’s capability to collect, consolidate, analyze, and share safety data within the FAA and with aviation and transportation stakeholders and international partners. Data enhances the FAA’s ability to identify and respond to potential safety issues and to better identify safety trends in aviation. It is key in our efforts to move to a predictive system, not just preventative. The FAA continues to improve the Aviation Safety Information and Sharing (ASIAS) database, including incorporating rotorcraft data and voice data from air traffic control to support safety analyses. Pursuant to the Act, we have worked with the Transportation Research Board to identify, categorize, and analyze emerging safety trends in aviation and completed the first required report in August 2022. We have also partnered with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to establish the framework for real-time data monitoring.
Integration of Certification and Oversight Functions. The Act requires the FAA to form an interdisciplinary project team for any type certificate project for transport category airplane. The FAA’s Integrated Program Management team includes subject matter experts from Flight Standards and the Aircraft Certification Service who make recommendations to improve oversight during aircraft certification and operational evaluations. As the team finalizes recommendations, they are already integrating best practices into certification projects and ensuring proper integration on those projects. In February 2022, the FAA expanded the Technical Advisory Board (TAB) process for all new and amended type certification projects for transport category airplanes, and applied this new approach to the Boeing 777X certification program. We also established the FAA Compliance Program Executive Council to monitor the operation and effectiveness of the Compliance Program, and I received the second report earlier this year.
Culture of Safety and Excellence. The safety culture at the FAA is one that promotes continuous improvement of safety systems and outcomes, while providing support for employees and industry stakeholders to self-disclose safety issues and noncompliance. These efforts include promoting the voluntary safety reporting program (VSRP) among other efforts, and recruiting talented staff. VSRP empowers all Aviation Safety (AVS) employees to confidentially report safety concerns without fear of reprisal or other repercussions. We recently completed the first AVS safety culture assessment, which included surveys of AVS employee’s opinions about safety culture and the implementation of VSRP. The FAA is reviewing the results to determine what actions may be needed in response to the data. We have also hired specialized staff within the AVS organization and provided training to increase competencies on human factors. FAA will continue to evaluate the safety culture and implement measures to improve collaboration between employees and management to identify and address safety concerns.
Delegation. The Act requires the FAA to make extensive and meaningful changes to the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program. As required by law, we now require FAA approval of individual ODA unit members for certain ODA types, and established a policy to prevent interference with ODA unit members. The ODA expert panel was established in December 2022, and we held the kickoff meeting for the expert panel earlier this month. Finally, the ODA Office within AVS now has approximately 50 employees and is tasked with overseeing the ODA system across all of AVS.
Certification and Continued Operational Safety Processes. Ensuring the safety of aviation products through certification is an important function of the FAA, and we are enhancing the type certification process. This includes revising guidance and criteria used for determining significant changes to best ensure that proposed changes to an aircraft are evaluated from a whole aircraft- level perspective, including human interface elements. Pursuant to the Act’s requirements, we recently published an order that outlines the aircraft certification service issue resolution and appeals processes.
Innovation. Aviation is incredibly dynamic, and it is imperative for the FAA to accelerate and enable the deployment of new technologies to reduce barriers and promote innovation that enhances the safety and efficiency of air transportation. Through our Center for Emerging Concepts and Innovation we have expanded efforts to support certification of new aircraft and technologies, including structured pre-application engagement with companies to identify a clear path to compliance.

Chair Cantwell, Ranking Member Cruz, I want to assure you, and each member of the Commerce Committee, that the FAA is fully committed to the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. As we continue this work, we will maintain a posture of transparency and accountability, including providing regular briefings with the Committee and stakeholders across the industry.

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FAA Oversight of Boeing’s Broken Safety Culture

Implementation of Boeing’s Comprehensive Action Plan

Risks and Rewards: Encouraging Commercial Space Innovation While Maintaining Public Safety

FAA Oversight of Aviation Manufacturing

Alaska Airlines Flight 1282

Boeing’s Comprehensive Action Plan

FAA’s Oversight Activities

Continuous Safety Improvement

The State of American Aviation and the Federal Aviation Administration

Government Promotion of Safety and Innovation in the New Space Economy

Addressing Close Calls to Improve Aviation Safety

Advancing Next Generation Aviation Technologies

TECHNOLOGY

SUSTAINABLE AVIATION FUEL

CERTIFICATION OF NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES

CONCLUSION

The Federal Aviation Administration’s Flight Plan: Examining the Agency’s Research and Development Programs and Future Plans

Implementation and Oversight of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act

U.S. Department of Transportation

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