JOINT STATEMENT OF

ROBERT STURGELL,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
AND
CHARLES LEADER,
DIRECTOR,
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

ON

THE FUTURE OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MODERNIZATION

May 9, 2007

Good morning Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee.  I am Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and interim Chief Operating Officer for the Air Traffic Organization.  With me is Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).   We thank you for the opportunity to testify today about modernization of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System (ATC), and the work we are doing to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that deliver benefits to our customers today.

Reforming FAA’s financing system will better enable the modernization of the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System and transformation to NextGen.  Congress mandated in Vision 100 the establishment of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO).  Since the establishment of the ATO in 2003, we have required air traffic leadership to establish metrics for performance.  These metrics are also reflected in our budget preparation and execution, and are based on the cost of doing business.  We need to continue these practices as we establish the financing of our current and future operations- based on actual costs and investment requirements that will translate to tangible benefits and increasing efficiency for our nation’s air transportation system.  The NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration, provides the necessary reforms to our financing to allow for a reliable funding stream as we continue on the path towards the implementation of the NextGen system.

And implementing that system is imperative.  Our nation's air transportation system has become a victim of its own success.  Administrator Blakey and the FAA have taken many steps to delay this gridlock.  Since FY 2000, 13 new runways have opened, and we’ve worked with operators—through forums like Growth Without Gridlock—to find ways to squeeze extra capacity from our system.  In addition, we’ve kept our modernization projects on schedule—2006 is the third straight year that we produced good results.  As we reported in our Flight Plan, in FY 2006, 100 percent of our critical acquisitions were within 10 percent of budget and 97.4 percent were on schedule.

To get to the future, we need to prepare now.  The actions of today are necessary for us to continue on a progressive path of solutions to address the current and future demands of the aviation industry and the flying public.

We have created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.   But we now face a serious and impending problem:  today’s system is at capacity.   While the industry downturn following the attacks of September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly.   And we have to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.

Flight delays have increased each of the last three fiscal years, and cancellations remain at an unacceptable level.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are placing additional stresses on the system.  A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015 – absent modernization.

NextGen is a steady, deliberate, and highly collaborative undertaking, aimed at the long-term transformation of our air transportation system.  It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric systems.  The FAA is not waiting for 2025 to implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and increase capacity.  We are moving forward now with technologies and procedures which have two purposes;  one, to improve efficiency, increase capacity and reduce congestion in the present system; and, two, to provide the foundation to build upon for further improvements in NextGen.  The FAA is currently expanding the use of procedures like Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP), which collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity, predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced environmental impacts. 

RNAV operations remove the requirement for a direct link between aircraft navigation and a ground-based navigational aid, thereby allowing aircraft better access and permitting flexibility of point-to-point operations.  By using more precise routes for take-offs and landings, RNAV enables reductions in fuel burn and emissions and increases in capacity.  FAA is expanding the implementation of RNAV procedures to additional airports.  The FAA has authorized 128 RNAV procedures at 38 airports for FY2005 and FY2006.  We will publish at least 50 additional procedures in FY2007. 

An example of how we better use the airspace is our introduction of Domestic Reduce Vertical Separation Minimums (DRVSM) in 2005.  We reduced separation minimums from 2000 feet to 1000 feet, effectively doubling the high altitude airspace, and saving airlines close to $400 million per year in fuel.

Another FAA initiative is implementing Required Navigation Performance (RNP) on a greater scale.  RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard monitoring and alerting function.  This onboard capability enhances the pilot’s situational awareness providing greater access to airports in challenging terrain.  RNP takes advantage of an airplane’s onboard navigation capability to fly a more precise flight path into an airport.  It increases access during marginal weather, thereby reducing diversions to alternate airports.  RNP reduces the overall noise footprint and aggregate emissions.  The FAA has authorized a total of 40 RNP procedures at 18 airports.  We plan to publish at least 25 RNP approach procedures in FY2007.

Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve, and plans for how to get there from here.  For NextGen, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan provide us with that picture and the plans for how to achieve it.  We will be discussing the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan later in this statement.  We are setting the stage for the long-term development of an air transportation system that will be scalable to a growing demand and the need for safer and more flexible aviation business models.  It is a new approach to the way we view the future of the system, and it demands a new level of collaboration, planning and vision.

The unique structure of the NextGen initiative, setting up an inter-agency office to coordinate the efforts of the federal partners, while also bringing in the private sector as a full partner from the very beginning, will be instrumental in the success of NextGen.  Indeed, it is our expectation that this new structure will help us avoid some of the problems that FAA has experienced in previous modernization efforts. 

NextGen, while representing a continuum of research, investment and implementation activities, can be broken out into three major phases.  Each one represents a key period in NextGen’s development.  The first phase focuses on the development and implementation of certain key NextGen foundational technologies and capabilities.  These initiatives represent our current programs.  This phase also includes the essential research and development needed to support the next two phases.  The second phase builds upon this foundation to begin critical implementation of NextGen capabilities.  This is when many aircraft in the fleet will begin to operate using on-board NextGen tools.  This will allow greater expansion of RNP/RNAV procedures, net-enabled weather, advanced data communications, and the development of critical infrastructure for Trajectory-Based Operations.  The third phase will be maturation of our core NextGen capabilities into an operational nationwide system.  This will allow aviation services to be managed and operated in a way that achieves the NextGen transformation across the entire air transportation system.

FAA and JPDO are beginning to move from planning to implementation.  In fact, the FAA’s FY 2008 – 2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in projects and activities that directly support NextGen.  The CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the National Airspace System modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the Agency intends to accomplish during that time.  Several key NextGen technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded in the FAA’s FY08 budget request.  These technologies and programs are:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.

These technologies are essential to begin the transition from today’s air traffic control system to the NextGen system of 2025.  One important transformational technology is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B.  ADS-B is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control.  A key element of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways.  Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.  When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic, thereby substantially improving safety. 

ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA’s Capstone program in Alaska, where GA accidents have been reduced by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped aircraft.  And UPS has been working with us on a demonstration program in Louisville using ADS-B to conduct continuous descent arrivals, where they have been able to reduce noise by 30 percent and emissions by 34 percent as a result.  One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska and Louisville will be in the Gulf of Mexico.  The FAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI), helicopter operators, and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of Mexico to improve service in the Gulf.  Using ADS-B technology, helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the Gulf.

The FAA is considering a rulemaking that would mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and is working closely with stakeholders to determine a timeline.

In today’s NAS, there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed, developed, and managed connections.  The future, however, demands an infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of expanding today’s point-to-point system is simply prohibitive.  System Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need.  As many major national and international corporations have done with their own technological systems, SWIM will provide for NextGen the infrastructure and services to deliver network-enabled information access across air transportation operations, and high quality, timely data to many users and applications.  By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing, eliminating redundant information and providing information where it is needed.  When implemented, the efficiencies provided by SWIM will contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service.  In addition, SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations.  It will also allow for better use of existing capacity en-route.   While transparent to the flying public, these are efficiencies that will benefit the consumer and the aviation industry.

The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts lies within the digital data communications infrastructure of the future.  In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne aircraft is by voice communications.  NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications, especially in the areas of aircraft trajectory-based operations, net-centric and net-enabled information access.  Data communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned strategic traffic management.  Eventually, the majority of communications will be handled by data communications for appropriately equipped users.  It is estimated that with 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. 

Approximately 70 percent of annual national airspace system delays are attributed to weather.  The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather picture across NextGen.  The goal of this investment is to cut weather-related delays at least in half by improving the integration and dissemination of aviation weather information.  The benefits will be uniform real-time access to key common weather parameters, common situational awareness, improved utilization of air space across all flight domains, and reduced flight delays.

The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air/ground and ground/ground voice communications in the air traffic control environment.  The switches today are static, and our ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited.  Under the current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate and redesign the airspace.  In the future, the impacts of bad weather could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions to air traffic.  The new voice switch allows us to replace today’s rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of traffic.  Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA’s ability to implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase efficiency and improve performance.

At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them.  For the first time, FAA is requesting funding for these defining activities in the FY08 budget.  This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.  The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing in new technologies.  One demonstration will test trajectory-based concepts in the oceanic environment.  The ultimate goal is to increase predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel efficiency.  The other demonstration will accelerate the first integrated test of super density operations.  Procedures for increasing capacity at busy airports will be explored.  The demonstration should achieve near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to implement the same procedures at other locations.

It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.  The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of transformations that will truly modernize today’s system.  Let me provide a few examples of this.

In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate highways in the sky.  In the high performance airspace of the future, each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.  Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same precise information, transmitted via data communications.  Investments in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based operations.

The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic management.  The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major demand and capacity imbalances.  SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.

With NextGen the impact of weather is reduced through the use of improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of weather into automation to improve decision-making.  New capabilities in the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic restrictions.  Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments for these improvements.

We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the JPDO’s vision of the NextGen system into reality.  Because the JPDO is not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision.  The FAA is using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide their transformation to NextGen.  In the past the Operational Evolution Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA that extended ten years into the future.  The new OEP will include strategic milestones through 2025.  JPDO representatives will participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.

FAA will use the OEP to plan, execute and implement NextGen in partnership with private industry.  Required operational implementation schedules will be tracked, as well as dates by which initiatives must be funded in order to meet those schedules.

OEP will provide a single entry point for new NextGen initiatives, jointly developed by the JPDO and the FAA, to enter the FAA capital budget portfolio.  It ties these initiatives directly to the FAA budget process.  Beginning in fiscal year 2008 and continuing in 2009, the FAA worked closely with the JPDO in budget formulation utilizing JPDO budget guidance.  For the fiscal year 2009 budget formulation, the FAA is using a Review Board under the auspices of the OEP Associates Group, which includes the Director of JPDO, to review and prioritize NextGen initiatives based on the JPDO Concept of Operations, JPDO roadmaps, and the NAS Enterprise Architecture.

The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing, and prototype demonstrations.  This Operational Evolution Partnership will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA’s progress towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.

Cost will be a vital factor:  we cannot create a NextGen system that is not affordable.  Requirements for the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10 billion.  Preliminary estimates by FAA, JPDO and the Research, Engineering, and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC) suggest that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22 billion in FAA funding.  We are working with our users to continuously refine these estimates.

MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the NextGen avionics costs.  It concludes that a wide range of costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of equipage schedules.  MITRE concluded that the most probable range of total avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.  This range reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of time out of service required for equipage installation.

The importance of developing this system of the future is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering substantial consumer benefits.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet. 

Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program.  The FAA and the EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based air traffic management systems and technologies.  This coordination will address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA and Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical initiative. 

Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate for SESAR.  SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen.  They consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25 billion to $37 billion in US dollars through the year 2020.  SESAR, like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and better define the system.  However, there is an important difference in scope between SESAR and NextGen.  While SESAR focuses almost exclusively on air traffic management, NextGen takes what’s called a “curb-to-curb” approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and DoD and DHS NAS requirements.

One of the major products for the JPDO, and indeed, one of the critical elements in defining the NextGen initiative itself, is the development of the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan.  These documents define each NextGen transformed state and how to evolve to it.  They are absolutely essential to the future development of the NextGen system.

The Concept of Operations is a text description of the transformed state of NextGen.  This kind of explanation, offered in one document, is critical to developing the specific requirements and capabilities that will be necessary for our national air transportation system in 2025.  In a sense, the Concept of Operations is like an architect’s blueprints. 

However, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently with the Concept of Operations, and that’s the Enterprise Architecture.  The Enterprise Architecture provides the technical details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder’s plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its power, water, sewage, cable and internet connections to the rest of the community.  The Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of the general contractor’s work plan.  It specifies the timing and interdependencies of multi-agency activities required to achieve the NexGen system vision.

These documents, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan are essential to defining the NextGen system and will guide the future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and systems development.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28^th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are anxious to receive their feedback.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months. 

Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a more automated system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of users -- very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security and efficiency.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony.  We would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

JOINT STATEMENT OF

ROBERT STURGELL,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
AND
CHARLES LEADER,
DIRECTOR,
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

ON

FAA MODERNIZATION

March 22, 2007

Good morning Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Lott, and Members of the Subcommittee.  I am Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and interim Chief Operating Officer for the Air Traffic Organization.  With me is Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).   We thank you for the opportunity to testify today about FAA modernization, and the work we are doing to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that deliver benefits to our customers today.

Modernization and moving to NextGen is inextricably linked to changes in the FAA’s financing system.  We need to establish the financing of our current and future operations based on actual costs and investment requirements that will realize tangible benefits and increasing efficiency.  The NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration, provides the necessary reforms to our financing, and puts us on the path towards fully implementing the NextGen system.

And implementing that system is imperative.  Our nation's air transportation system has become a victim of its own success.  Administrator Blakey and the FAA have taken many steps to delay this gridlock.  Since FY 2000, 13 new runways have opened, and we’ve worked with operators—through forums like Growth Without Gridlock—to find ways to squeeze extra capacity from our system.  In addition, we’ve kept our modernization projects on schedule—2006 is the third straight year that we produced good results—delivering 90 percent of our programs on time and within budget.  In fact, in FY06, 97 percent of our projects met our schedule, and 100 percent were within 10 percent of budget.

An example of how we better use the airspace is our introduction of Domestic Reduce Vertical Separation Minimums (DRVSM) in 2005.  We reduced separation minimums from 2000 feet to 1000 feet, effectively doubling the high altitude airspace, and saving airlines close to $400 million per year in fuel.

We have created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.   But we now face a serious and impending problem:  today’s system is at capacity.   While the industry downturn following the attacks of September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly.   And we have to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.

The warning signs are everywhere.   Flight delays and cancellations have reached unacceptable levels.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are placing additional stresses on the system.   If we fail to address these issues, we will suffocate the great engine of economic growth that is civil aviation.  A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015 – absent modernization, the consequences will be a total system collapse.

NextGen is about a long-term transformation of our air transportation system.  It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric systems.  However, the FAA is not waiting for 2025 to implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and increase capacity.  The FAA is currently expanding the use of procedures like Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) which collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity, predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced environmental impacts. 

RNAV operations remove the requirement for a direct link between aircraft navigation and a navigational aid NAVAID, thereby allowing aircraft better access and permitting flexibility of point-to-point operations.  By using more precise routes for take-offs and landings, RNAV enables reductions in fuel burn and emissions and increases in capacity.  FAA is expanding the implementation of RNAV procedures to additional airports.  The FAA has authorized 128 RNAV procedures at 38 airports for FY2005 and FY2006.  We will publish at least 50 additional procedures in FY2007. 

Another FAA initiative is implementing Required Navigation Performance (RNP) on a greater scale.  RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard monitoring and alerting function.  This onboard capability enhances the pilot’s situational awareness providing greater access to airports in challenging terrain.  RNP takes advantage of an airplane’s onboard navigation capability to fly a more precise flight path into an airport.  It increases access during marginal weather, thereby reducing diversions to alternate airports.  RNP reduces the overall noise footprint and aggregate emissions.  The FAA has authorized a total of 40 RNP procedures at 18 airports.  We plan to publish at least 25 RNP approach procedures in FY2007.

Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve, and plans for how to get there from here.  For NextGen, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan provide us with that picture and the plans for how to achieve it.  I will be discussing the Concept of Operations and the Enterprise Architecture later in this statement.  We are setting the stage for the long-term development of an air transportation system that will be scalable to a growing demand and the need for safer and more flexible aviation business models.  It is a new approach to the way we view the future of the system, and it demands a new level of collaboration, planning and vision.

FAA and JPDO are beginning to move from planning to implementation.  In fact, the FAA’s FY 2008 – 2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in projects and activities that directly support NextGen.  The CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the National Airspace System modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the Agency intends to accomplish during that time.  Several key NextGen technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded in the FAA’s FY08 budget request.  These technologies and programs are:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.  FAA proposes to spend $173 million on these programs in FY08.

These technologies are essential to begin the transition from today’s air traffic management system to the NextGen system of 2025.  Perhaps the most significant of these transformational technologies is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B.  ADS-B is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control.  A key element of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways.  Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.  When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic; thereby substantially improving safety. 

ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA’s Capstone program in Alaska, where GA accidents have been reduced by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped aircraft.  And UPS has been working with us on a demonstration program in Louisville using ADS-B to conduct continuous descent arrivals, where they have been able to reduce noise by 30 percent and emissions by 34 percent as a result.  One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska and Louisville will be in the Gulf of Mexico.  The FAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI), helicopter operators and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of Mexico to improve service in the Gulf.  Using ADS-B technology, helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the Gulf.       

The FAA is looking at a rulemaking that would mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and is working closely with stakeholders to determine that timeline.

In today’s NAS there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed, developed, and managed connections.  The future, however, demands an infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of expanding today’s point-to-point system is simply prohibitive.  System Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need.  SWIM provides the infrastructure and services to deliver network-enabled information access across the NextGen air transportation operations.  SWIM will provide high quality, timely data to many users and applications.  By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will reduce redundancy of information and better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing.  When implemented, SWIM will contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service.  In addition, SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations.  It will also allow for better use of existing capacity en-route.

The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts lies within the digital data communications infrastructure of the future.  In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne aircraft is by voice communications.  NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications, especially in the areas of aircraft trajectory-based operations, net-centric and net-enabled information access.  Data communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned strategic traffic management.  Eventually, the majority of communications will be handled by data communications for appropriately equipped users.  It is estimated that with 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. 

The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather picture across NextGen.  Approximately 70 percent of annual national airspace system delays are attributed to weather.  The goal of this investment is to cut weather-related delays at least in half.  The weather problem is about total weather information management, and not just the state of the scientific art in weather forecasting.  The weather dissemination system today is inefficient to operate and maintain, and information gathered by one system is not easily shared with other systems.    The benefits will be uniform real-time access to key common weather parameters, common situational awareness, improved utilization of air space across all flight domains, and reduced flight delays.

The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air/ground and ground/ground voice communications in the air traffic control environment.  The switches today are very static, and our ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited.  Under the current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate and redesign the airspace.  In the future, the impacts of bad weather could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions to air traffic.  The new voice switch allows us to replace today’s rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of traffic.  Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA’s ability to implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase efficiency and improve performance.

At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them.  For the first time, FAA is requesting funding for these defining activities in the FY08 budget.  This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.  The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing in new technologies.  One demonstration will test trajectory-based concepts in the oceanic environment.  The ultimate goal is to increase predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel efficiency.  The other demonstration will accelerate the first integrated test of super density operations.  Procedures for increasing capacity at busy airports will be explored.  The demonstration should achieve near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to implement the same procedures at other locations.

It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.  The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of transformations that will truly modernize today’s system.  Let me provide a few examples of this.

In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate highways in the sky.  In the high performance airspace of the future, each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.  Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same precise information, transmitted via data communications.  Investments in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based operations.

The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic management.  The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major demand and capacity imbalances.  SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.

With NextGen the impact of weather is reduced through the use of improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of weather into automation to improve decision-making.  New capabilities in the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic restrictions.  Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments for these improvements.

We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the JPDO’s vision of the NextGen system into reality.  Because the JPDO is not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision.  The FAA is using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide their transformation to NextGen.  In the past the Operational Evolution Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA that extended ten years into the future.  The new OEP will include strategic milestones through 2025.  JPDO representatives will participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.

FAA will use the OEP to plan, execute and implement NextGen in partnership with private industry.  Required operational implementation schedules will be tracked, as well as dates by which initiatives must be funded in order to meet those schedules.

OEP will provide a single entry point for new NextGen initiatives, jointly developed by the JPDO and the FAA, to enter the FAA capital budget portfolio.  It ties these initiatives directly to the FAA budget process. 

The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing, and prototype demonstrations.  This Operational Evolution Partnership will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA’s progress towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.

Cost will be a vital factor:  we cannot create a NextGen system that is not affordable.  Requirements for the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10 billion.  Preliminary estimates suggest that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22 billion in FAA funding.  We are working to continuously refine these estimates, particularly with our users as we implement new cost-based financing mechanisms, as proposed in the NextGen Financing Act, the FAA’s  reauthorization proposal.

MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the NextGen avionics costs.  It concludes that a wide range of costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of equipage schedules.  The most probable range of total avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.  This range reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of time out of service required for equipage installation.

The importance of developing this system of the future is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering substantial consumer benefits.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet. 

Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program.  The FAA and the EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based air traffic management systems and technologies.  This coordination will address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA and Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical initiative. 

Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate for SESAR.  SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen.  They consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25 billion to $37 billion in US dollars through the year 2020.  SESAR, like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and better define the system.  However, there is an important difference in scope between SESAR and NextGen.  While SESAR focuses almost exclusively on air traffic management, NextGen takes what’s called a “curb-to-curb” approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and DoD and DHS NAS requirements.

One of the major products for the JPDO, and indeed, one of the critical elements in defining the NextGen initiative itself, is the development of the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan.  These documents define each NextGen transformed state and how to evolve to it.  They are absolutely essential to the future development of the NextGen system.

The Concept of Operations is a text description of the transformed state of NextGen.  This kind of explanation, offered in one document, is critical to developing the specific requirements and capabilities that will be necessary for our national air transportation system in 2025.  In a sense, the Concept of Operations is like an architect’s blueprints. 

However, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently with the Concept of Operations, and that’s the Enterprise Architecture.  The Enterprise Architecture provides the technical details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder’s plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its power, water, sewage, cable and internet connections to the rest of the community.  The Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of the general contractor’s work plan.  It specifies the timing and interdependencies of the research, demonstrations, and development required to achieve the NexGen system vision.

These documents, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan are essential to defining the NextGen system and will guide the future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and systems development.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28^th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are anxious to receive their feedback.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months. 

Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of users -- very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security and efficiency.  Research will continue to help us find the right balance between a centralized satellite and ground system and a totally distributed system, where aircraft “self-manage” their flight with full knowledge of their environment.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony.  We would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF

D. KIRK SHAFFER,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIRPORTS,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE FAA’S REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSAL,
THE “NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM FINANCING REFORM ACT OF 2007,”

ON

MARCH 28, 2007.

Chairman Costello, Representative Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

I am happy to appear before you today as part of the series of hearings that the Subcommittee is holding on the Federal Aviation Administration’s proposal entitled the "Next Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007” (H.R. 1356).  We have the opportunity during this reauthorization cycle to lay the groundwork to enable us to meet the greatest challenge we currently face---transforming the aviation system so it can accommodate future demand safely and efficiently.  Our nation’s airports—large, medium and small—must be part of that transformation, providing the capacity to serve over 1 billion passengers annually by 2015.  Today I would like to provide an overview of the airport financing reforms we seek in order to provide strategic investment in our national airport system.  Our proposal contains a number of significant reforms to the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) and to the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) programs.

We started looking at elements of our airport funding system almost two years ago.  We examined airport capital requirements—from the largest commercial service airports to the smallest general aviation fields—and the ability of airports to pay for those capital improvements.  We talked to the municipal bond markets and rating agencies; and we looked at emerging trends in airport financing.

Four major factors came into focus during that review that shaped our proposal. 

• Capital Requirements are up;
• Airports have recovered financially from the decline in air travel at the start of this decade, but they need to increase their financial self-sufficiency;
• Small airports still depend on AIP support to meet their capital needs; and
• Federal funds for airports are limited, they need to be better targeted to fund priority requirements and to keep pace with the changing trends in aviation.

Capital Requirements are Up

Our last reauthorization came on the heels of the events of 2001.  Airlines and airports were still reacting to the dramatic changes in the aviation industry, spiraling jet fuel prices, and the bankruptcies of major legacy carriers.  Congress crafted a reauthorization package that reflected that unsettled state of the industry.  Airports pulled back from major expansion projects, taking instead a “wait and see” attitude.  Passenger traffic plunged and an atmosphere of cautiousness prevailed.  But now, four years later, the industry has settled and recovered. 

In 2005, for the second year in a row, passenger demand on U.S. airlines was strong with 49 million passengers traveling.  Commercial air carrier enplanements rose seven percent from 2004, and were six percent higher than enplanements in 2000.  With passenger levels back to pre-9/11 levels and air carriers shifting from larger aircraft to smaller regional jets, delays returned to the system.  2006 was the worst year ever for delays, and 2007 is shaping up for more of the same.  Major airfield improvements together with enhanced technology are planned to help mitigate delays at those airports.

The impact of these changes has been shown in our latest National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems or NPIAS, a report we prepare for Congress every two years.  This report details the projected capital needs of airports of all sizes throughout our aviation system.  The current NPIAS report reflects the economic recovery of the airport industry.  Capital needs across all sizes and categories of airports are up four percent over the prior NPIAS, published when the effects of September 11 were still being felt.  In fact, the current NPIAS report may understate the true cost of needed capital investment, as sharp increases in construction costs occurring in the last half of 2006 were not fully reflected in the most recent NPIAS report.

Airports have recovered financially

We also studied the financial health of the airport industry itself.  We found that airports had recovered financially from the difficulties of the early 2000s.  Across all sizes of airports, net operating results (revenue minus expenses) are up.  That does not mean that all categories of airports are profitable however.  There is a direct relationship between the size of the airport (measured by passenger enplanements) and the profitability of the airport.  The large airports (meaning the large- and medium-hub airports, or about the top 70 or so airports) which enplane 89 percent of the nation’s passengers are profitable.  These airports are financially stable and have had the ability to reach beyond federal grant funding for needed capital improvements.  They have ready access to the general airport revenue bond (GARB) markets, and all but four collect a PFC.

The financial performance of small primary airports (small hub and nonhub primary airports) which enplane 11 percent of the nation’s passengers, has returned to the levels of the late 1990s, but those levels are not always robust.  Many of these airports just break even and even more operate at a loss.  Most collect a PFC, but we found that these airports continue to rely on federal AIP grants for major capital improvements.  The general aviation (GA) community also reflects the stratification found in the commercial service airports.  The largest of the general aviation airports are more financially stable, but the GA airport community, as a whole, depends on AIP for funding capital improvements. 

Airports need to increase their financial self-sufficiency

There was also a consensus that airports need to reduce their reliance on air carriers when making major capital improvements.  The financial markets were unified in their positions that airports relying on the inherent revenue-generating potential of their local market‑their passengers‑rather than the vagaries of airline financial health, make the strongest credit risks.  Financial markets see local revenue, especially that generated through PFCs, as stable and desired sources of airport revenue.  The financial markets also recommended that airports increase non-aeronautical sources of revenue, such as from concessions providing services to airport users. 

More strategic Federal investment—AIP and PFC Reform

AIP Reform

Our proposals for Airport Improvement Program and Passenger Facility Charge reform are designed to empower local airports with strong local revenue sources and strategically target federal dollars to the airports where they will have the most impact.  We are proposing major reforms to AIP apportionment and set aside formulas and are also proposing substantial reform to the PFC program. 

FAA is committed to a healthy national air transportation system.  Airports are a key part of the system, and that includes small primary and general aviation airports that rely on AIP funding to help meet their capital needs and complete strategic projects.  Our proposal will stabilize and enhance these funding sources for airports.  The level of our AIP request, when combined with programmatic changes to AIP and the PFC program, will provide the financial resources FAA needs to meet the nation’s highest priorities for safety, security, and capacity.  This includes projects such as upgrading runway safety areas and mitigating runway incursions, funding current and future letters of intent for capacity projects at commercial airports, preserving existing airfield infrastructure, and advancing compliance with airport standards.

Our reform proposal for AIP includes the following major elements:

• Phasing out passenger entitlements for medium and large hub airports (approximately 70 airports) after FY 2009, while preserving discretionary funding for these airports.  This proposal recognizes on the one hand, the ability of these airports to finance their own routine capital needs through the PFC program.  On the other hand, the important role these airports play in the national system is recognized by continuing to allow these airports to apply for discretionary AIP grants for the most important projects.  This change will provide more discretionary funding for the FAA to direct in order to meet national priorities.  For FY 2008 and 2009, passenger entitlements for these airports would be reduced by 50 percent from current levels.
• Retaining the higher passenger entitlements for the remaining smaller airports for all levels of AIP funding, eliminating the link, or “trigger,” between these entitlement levels and an AIP funding level of $3.2 billion.  This change recognizes smaller airports’ continued dependency on AIP.
• Increasing the minimum discretionary fund level from $148 million to $520 million, enabling FAA to better target AIP investment to meet national priorities.
• Reforming general aviation airport entitlements to better target AIP to those airports that will be impacted by emerging technologies by –
  • Establishing a separate state apportionment fund with a minimum funding level of $300 million;
  • Eliminating the uniform $150,000 individual nonprimary airport entitlement with a tiered system of entitlements.  The largest and busiest airports would receive $400,000, while the very smallest airports would receive no annual guaranteed AIP amount.  These airports would remain eligible for state apportionment and for discretionary funds.
• Eliminating the Military Airport Program and Reliever airport set aside and instead funding these needs out of regular AIP discretionary funds.

In a strategic investment context, large airports are strong and mature financial enterprises that no longer need guaranteed passenger entitlements to meet their capital needs. Most of these airports are already returning 50 or 75 percent of their passenger entitlements under the PFC turnback requirements in current law.  Moreover, under our proposed PFC increase (discussed below), these airports, as a group, could gain over $3 in PFC revenue for every dollar of AIP passenger entitlement lost.  In FY2006, large airports were allocated approximately $295 million in passenger entitlements.  Using the same passenger counts as FY2006, large airports could see an increase in PFC revenue of approximately $1 billion. 

Large airports will continue to qualify for discretionary funds, including letters of intent or LOIs.  Discretionary funding is a more useful form of Federal assistance to large airports, because it allows AIP to be concentrated on very costly projects that occur infrequently. 

We also propose to update the AIP formula for the discretionary fund.  Current law sets that minimum at $148 million (a figure dating from the 1990s, when the level of AIP was about $1.4 billion), plus a calculated amount based on Letters of Intent prior to January 1, 1996.  However, all those LOIs have been completed.  Our proposal would set a minimum level of $520 million, which will assure that funding is available to cover current and anticipated LOI commitments and high priority safety, capacity, environmental, and security projects, such as runway safety area projects and new runways at Operational Evolutionary Partnership (OEP) airports.  We believe that airports of all sizes will benefit from this change.

Our proposal contains a broad range of formula changes for small primary airports, which depend on AIP to meet their capital needs.  Current levels of small primary airport entitlements will be retained at all levels of AIP.  The current statutory penalty that reduces passenger entitlements by 50 percent and reduces the minimum passenger entitlement from $1,000,000 to $650,000 when AIP levels are less than $3.2 billion will be eliminated.  This proposal thus allows small primary airports to be assured of a stable flow of passenger entitlements.

Small airports of all categories will benefit from a new discretionary small airport fund that would replace the existing Small Airport Fund.  The current Small Airport Fund is financed from the passenger entitlements that large airports collecting a PFC must return to the FAA.  Once passenger entitlements at large airports expire in FY 2010, the current Small Airport Fund will no longer have a source of funding, so our proposal would repeal the fund as it is currently constituted.  The new discretionary small airport fund would be established at 20 percent of available discretionary funds.

As noted above, our proposal also provides a more rational structure for general aviation (GA) airport apportionments while preserving their access to essential AIP funds through three critical reforms.  We propose to restore the state apportionment to a meaningful level by separating it from the non-primary entitlements.  We would set the level of the state apportionment at 10 percent of AIP, and provide for a minimum level of $300 million per fiscal year.  This more robust state apportionment funding will allow states to meet their own strategic investment objectives, with the knowledge that this fund will be stable.  This commitment to local funding through state apportionment will allow prudent growth of the individual state aviation systems. 

Also in order to better target AIP funding to where it is most needed, we propose to modify the current non-primary entitlement program by providing for tiered funding levels based on airport size and aviation activity.  Under current AIP formulas, while primary airports are divided into five categories, the 3,000+ nonprimary, or general aviation airports are allocated a single maximum entitlement regardless of size or role in the system.  We analyzed the infrastructure needs of general aviation airports in detail in developing our proposal.  The outcome should surprise no one.  Busier GA airports – and those used by more sophisticated aircraft – have more complex and costly airfield infrastructure to maintain and improve.  One size does not fit all when it comes to GA airports–just as one size does not fit all with primary airports.  Our investment in the general aviation system must follow the model long established by primary airports.  The entitlement would range from $400,000 per fiscal year for the largest GA airports to $100,000 for those airports with 10 to 49 based aircraft.  Airports with less than 10 based aircraft would not be eligible for a guaranteed annual apportionment.  These airports would continue to qualify for state apportionment and discretionary funds, and would retain the 95% federal share scheduled to sunset at the end of FY 2007. 

The tiered general aviation entitlement is supported by historical data.  This data shows that busier general aviation airports tend to be larger, have more complex airfield geometry and more sophisticated lighting and navigational aids.  All of this translates into greater capital requirements.  The proposed level of the non-primary entitlement is based on engineering and planning reviews that identified essential airfield infrastructure requirements for each tier of airports.  We also looked at a number of measures of activity at GA airports.  None was perfect, but based aircraft data had the benefits of being objective, obtainable and verifiable.  Other options, such as operations or fuel sales lacked one or more of these characteristics.  Based aircraft is a good indicator of the current operational status of an airport.  However, like passenger entitlements, it may not be representative of all of the activity at a GA airport.  There are airports that have high transient operations and low based aircraft counts.  Our experience is that the capital needs of airports with high transient operations tend toward the kinds of high priority airfield projects that compete well for state apportionment or discretionary funds. 

In making this tiered proposal, the FAA is not suggesting that the lowest tier airports do not need AIP funding.  Rather, we have concluded that these airports do not need, and in some cases cannot use, a guaranteed annual entitlement.  In the 42 states that do not participate in the state block grant program, 618 airports would qualify for the lowest tier.  (We focused on the non-block grant states because we cannot readily track individual airport grant activity in the block grant states.)  Of these, 134 airports, or 22 percent, did not qualify for a non-primary entitlement (NPE) in FY 2006 because they had not reported capital development needs in the NPIAS.  Of the remaining airports in the lowest tier that did get a non-primary entitlement, 141 did not take a grant in the four years ending in FY 2006.  In other words, 44 percent of the airports that would not receive a NPE under our proposal have shown that they do not need, and cannot use, an annual guaranteed amount of AIP.  Given this data, we concluded that an annual guarantee to each and every airport in the NPIAS is not justified.

Our proposal also supports the scheduled sunset at the end of FY2007 of temporary subsidies included in Vision 100.  Congress responded to the financial turmoil the airport industry faced in the early 2000s by including temporary, short-term subsidies to airports.  The decision to make these subsidies temporary was the right one.  The financial data shows that airports have recovered to their pre 9/11 financial conditions.  The financial crisis that triggered the subsidies has passed, and the financial subsidies should be allowed to sunset.  The two Vision 100 subsidies, the Virtual Primary subsidy and the temporary increase in federal share for all but the largest primary airports cost over $150 million per year.  At a time when capital development needs are rising, these funds should be better support additional capital projects at small airports.

Passenger Facility Charge Reform

The PFC program, which Congress enacted in 1990 and currently authorizes airports to collect fees of up to $4.50 per enplaned passenger, has been very successful at providing a stable source of revenue to fund capital development projects.  The reforms we propose are designed to enhance the status of PFCs as a revenue source to support airport debt financing.  First, we propose to increase the maximum PFC to $6.00*.  Much of this proposed increase would simply compensate for inflation since the PFC was first authorized.  The remainder would help airports cope with the increased capital needs identified in the current NPIAS.  Also, this increase would bring in an additional $1.5 billion annually in PFC revenues to airports of all sizes.  Large airports would account for about $1 billion of this increase, while small airports would get about $500 million–more than compensating for the loss of passenger entitlements (described above).

Our proposal would also expand PFC eligibility to include most airport capital development projects in non-exclusive use areas, including revenue-producing facilities, as long as it will not hinder competition, and amends statutory PFC provisions to make it easier to use PFCs to help finance intermodal airport ground access projects. 

Except for the requirements for competition, PFC eligibility for capital projects would match the eligibility for using airport revenue to fund capital projects.  PFCs are local airport revenue, and the airport community has demonstrated that they can be trusted to use PFCs responsibly.  In talking to our stakeholders, especially small airports, one of their biggest frustrations is the inability to use PFCs to pay for the construction of revenue-producing facilities.  They told us that if PFCs could help pay for the construction costs of these facilities, the airports would have more net revenue going to the bottom line, which they can share directly with the carriers in the form of reduced landing fees and terminal rents, or indirectly with the carriers by reinvesting in additional revenue-producing facilities.  Either way, small airports in particular have told us that additional PFC flexibility will help them structure their airport finances to retain current air service and attract new service. 

Even connecting passengers will benefit from the use of PFCs for revenue producing facilities.  Airports function as a financially integrated whole.  When profits from revenue-producing facilities increase, those added profits are available to help defray the operating cost of the entire airport.  Those lowered costs in turn are passed on to the carriers and ultimately the passenger.  Similarly, for those airports that issue debt, higher profits from concessions may translate into better credit ratings, which in turn mean lower costs.  This change in eligibility will also address one of the municipal bond market’s major criticisms of PFCs as support for debt.  The current criteria require expensive accounting and tracking procedures to keep PFC revenues separate from other revenue when an airport issues GARBS to finance a combination of PFC eligible and ineligible work. 

The expanded eligibility should not lead to a lessening of PFC support for vital airfield and terminal capacity projects.  We looked at 15 OEP runway projects completed since 1999 or under construction.  Eleven of the 15 included GARB proceeds in the financing package with percentages as high as 65 percent.  In other words, even when they have the freedom to use local revenue on any capital development at an airport, major airports have exercised that freedom to apply their revenue to major capacity projects. 

In addition, the PFC administrative review process would be streamlined.  Instead of filing applications and amendments, airports would file an annual status report reviewing how they used PFCs in the previous year and how they plan on using PFCs in the coming year.  If their plan includes using PFCs for a new project, the airport would have to consult with their air carriers and provide for notice and comment in the community, just as they do today.  Likewise, air carriers and the public would have an opportunity to object to a project before the FAA and to receive a determination by the FAA on project eligibility.  This new administrative procedure will focus FAA’s oversight on the handful of PFC projects that raise serious questions or controversy; and preserve the role of the carriers and the local community in the PFC decision process, while eliminating unnecessary federal oversight and bureaucratic paperwork exercises that provide minimal benefit to the traveling public.  Airports will be able to put their PFCs to work faster building the airport infrastructure the nation needs.

Along with the increased flexibility and streamlining of the review processes for new PFC projects, this provision would also provide explicit authority for the FAA to investigate complaints of non-compliance with PFC requirements.  This approach more closely resembles the same approach that current law provides for oversight of the use of other locally-generated airport revenue, including rates and charges.

For new intermodal rail projects, the current prior approval requirement will be retained.  These projects tend to be controversial and require close coordination between FAA and other Department of Transportation modal administrations to determine the project’s feasibility and likely airport ridership.  Retaining the prior approval requirement will assure that the necessary coordination and review occurs.

Finally, this provision would extend the sunset date of the current non-hub airport PFC pilot program until adoption of final regulations for the new streamlined review procedures called for by this proposal.  Once the new administrative review procedures are implemented, the pilot program will no longer be needed. 

Other Program Highlights

Our proposal includes two pilot programs to encourage airports to be active participants in the NextGen transformation.  One proposes a new pilot program to broaden AIP eligibility to include installing ADS-B ground stations in markets that FAA cannot reach from the ATO capital program.  This program will supplement the FAA program, allowing states or metropolitan planning organizations to install ADS-B ground stations to “fill in” blank areas of ADS-B coverage, or to accelerate ADS-B coverage ahead of the FAA schedule.  FAA has made a technical determination that 100% coverage with ADS-B is not necessary to assure the safety and efficiency of the system.  Likewise, FAA’s planned deployment schedule addresses the needs of the national system.  However there may be some small airports that fall outside the planned national ADS-B coverage areas that will gain regional or local benefits from the added reliability that ADS-B coverage provides.  The pilot program would be open to states, metropolitan planning agencies and regional consortiums to encourage installation of ground stations that would provide coverage at multiple airports.  This coverage could extend the situational awareness offered by ADS-B to include several small airports with only one station. 

To enhance transition to NextGen, the second pilot offers 10 large airports the opportunity to charge an extra dollar of PFCs (to $7.00 total) in exchange for taking over ground based terminal navigational and weather equipment at their airport.  Because the FAA will not simply turn on the NextGen system and turn off the ground based legacy systems on a single day, ground based systems will need to be maintained and operated while the NextGen system is being deployed.  FAA views these terminal navigation aids and weather reporting systems as functional extensions of the runways and runway lighting systems that airports already own and maintain.  In many countries around the world, airports already own and maintain their navigational aids.  The pilot program is limited to large airports, because we know these airports have the financial resources to operate and maintain the equipment to FAA standards.

Finally, I would note that our proposal includes a number of provisions to help FAA and airports work cooperatively to be better environmental stewards.  Our bill would modify the eligibility standards and funding calculation for what now is commonly referred to as the “noise set-aside.”  We would extend eligibility to include water quality mitigation projects that are approved as part of an environmental record of decision (ROD) for an airport project and for carrying out projects authorized as part of a new environmental research pilot program included in Title VI of the bill.  In addition to projects allowed under current law (noise mitigation, compatible land use planning, compliance with Americans with Disability Act requirements, air quality improvements such as low-emission fuel systems, gate electrification, and vehicle conversion), this section’s changes would make these AIP funds more flexible so as to be available for a range broader environmental uses.  To recognize this broader eligibility, we would redesignate it as the “environmental set-aside.”  We also propose to change how the set-aside is apportioned from the current 35% of the AIP discretionary fund to 8% of all AIP apportioned funds.  This change results in a more stable funding stream for the environmental program because each year the amount of the discretionary fund varies depending not only on the overall funding level but also due to the amount of “carryover” of unused entitlements.

As noted, our bill modifies the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) and includes specific funding for environmental research.  This proposal would provide for the ACRP to enhance R&D support specifically related to airport environmental needs.  Funding for the ACRP would be authorized to increase from $10 million to $15 million per year, of which at least $5 million is specifically targeted to research related to the airport environment.

Finally, I would note that we propose a new pilot program to allow the FAA to fund six projects at public-use airports that would take promising environmental research concepts that have been proven in the laboratory into the actual airport environment for demonstration.  Eligible projects would demonstrate whether implementation of research results would measurably reduce or mitigate aviation impacts on noise, air quality or water quality in the airport environment.  For example, a project could demonstrate new operating procedures that are currently in the developmental stage that offer promising near term environmental improvements. FAA would publish information on best practices based on the results of the projects.  Funding would come from the environmental set-aside of the AIP discretionary fund.  FAA would fund 50 per cent of the project costs except that a maximum Federal contribution of $2.5 million per project would apply.

Mr. Chairman, our authorization proposal provides the targeted investment, program flexibility and innovations, and environmental protection that will support a healthy airport community, enabling them—large or small--to meet their capital needs and plan for future growth.  It provides Federal resources to where they are most needed.  I thank you for the opportunity to be here today and look forward to working with this Subcommittee as well as the airport community over the next few months as reauthorization of our programs proceeds.  This concludes my prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

NICHOLAS A. SABATINI,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE FAA’S OVERSIGHT OF FALSIFIED AIRMAN MEDICAL CERTIFICATION APPLICATIONS,

ON

JULY 17, 2007

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s oversight of the Airman Medical Certification application process.  Let me assure you, at the outset, that the FAA takes this matter seriously, and we are very concerned about any falsification of information in our nation’s aviation system.  Let me also say that the vast majority of our nation’s pilots are honest, dedicated, and have contributed significantly to our current unprecedented safety record.  We support and are in the process of implementing the recommendations of the Inspector General on falsified airman medical applications, as I will discuss.  We are also taking other proactive steps regarding this issue, which I will also discuss.

As you are aware, the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General issued a report in 2005 describing the results of an investigation conducted jointly with the Social Security Administration’s Inspector General, the United States Attorney’s office for Northern California, and the FAA’s Office of Aerospace Medicine, Western-Pacific Region, into the falsification of applications for FAA airman medical certificates.  The investigation was known as “Operation Safe Pilot.”  I will not spend time discussing the details of the IG’s findings, for they are already well known to you; however, I will discuss the IG’s recommendations, and the FAA’s response to those recommendations. 

The Inspector General recommended that FAA work with the Social Security Administration (SSA) and other disability benefits providers, to develop and implement a strategy to conduct checks of applicants for airman medical certificates with the databases of SSA and other disability providers, and take appropriate enforcement actions where falsifications are found.  The IG also recommended that FAA consider revising our Application for Airman Medical Certificate to require applicants to explicitly identify whether they are receiving medical disability benefits from any provider.  I am pleased to inform you that the FAA is moving forward to implement both of the IG’s recommendations.

FAA is working to develop a program, in cooperation with the Office of the Inspector General for the Social Security Administration (SSA), to cross-check randomly selected applicants for FAA airman medical certificates with the SSA disability database to determine if any applicants are receiving disability benefits from SSA.  We hope to start by cross-checking applicants to the SSA database, because to receive SSA disability benefits, an individual must be totally disabled.  Thus, virtually any applicant who is receiving SSA disability benefits will necessarily have a condition that would disqualify the applicant from holding an airman medical certificate from the FAA.  We are still in discussions with the Social Security Administration, with the goal of signing a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the use of their database, and exactly what information the SSA will be able to divulge without violating privacy rules.  Before we consider expanding the cross-checking of applicants to disability databases other than the Social Security Administration, we have to consider the potential resources required to conduct investigations and make medical determinations regarding an applicant’s disability and whether that condition disqualifies the applicant from holding an airman medical certificate. 

In order to proceed with cross-checking applicants for airman medical certificates against the SSA disability database, or any other database, FAA must first revise the system of records notice for FAA’s “Aviation Records on Individuals” to permit disclosure of the records through a routine use.  This will require publishing a notice of the revised system of records in the Federal Register, and a period for public comments, before the records may be disclosed, and FAA can begin any cross-checking.  This process may take six to twelve months to complete.  However, we will immediately begin efforts to implement the IG’s second recommendation, the addition of a question to the airman medical certificate application regarding disability benefits.  The FAA will take appropriate administrative actions to change the application form to include the new question.  Once that is completed, the new application form can be printed and distributed to Airman Medical Examiners (AME) nationwide.

We are proposing to change the Airman Medical Certificate application to add a question specifically asking if the applicant is receiving any disability benefits.  While this additional question appears straightforward, the investigative work will begin after a positive response to the question.  Once an applicant indicates that he or she is receiving disability benefits, FAA must then investigate to determine the disability benefits provider, the condition for which the applicant is receiving disability benefits, and the extent of the applicant’s disability.  Social Security disability benefits, as I’ve already stated, are based on 100% disability, and would, presumably, disqualify the applicant from holding an airman medical certificate in virtually all cases.  However, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability benefits, for example, cover a wide range of gradation from minor disabilities to total disability, and many conditions that would qualify for VA benefits would not necessarily disqualify the applicant from holding an airman medical certificate. 

FAA is also being proactive in other areas regarding falsification of data on airman medical certificate applications.  The FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) has now developed an integrated Scientific Information System (SIS) that will provide a continuous monitoring of all airman medical certification records compared to aviation accidents or incidents and post-mortem toxicology reports.  The FAA will therefore have the capability of continuously monitoring any aircraft accident and assessing any discrepancy between the pre-mortem certification and post-mortem findings.  This includes prescription and non-prescription medications and medical abnormalities that could affect the ability to safely perform duties permitted by the airman certificate, which are related to National Transportation Safety Board causal accident factors.

In 2006, the FAA’s Office of Aerospace Medicine initiated a routine process analysis study to evaluate and improve the efficiency of airman medical certification within the FAA.  The Airman Medical Examiner (AME) Airman Certification Quality Assurance study evaluated the accuracy of AMEs in determining the suitability of airman medical certification.

The review of 2000 records, randomly selected from 320,000 examinations, determined that 2.5 percent of records contained medical issues that should have resulted in the AME not issuing a certificate.  However, further review indicated that most of these cases could have been issued if additional information was provided.  In addition, 1.8 percent of the cases were submitted without enough information to determine if the airman should have been issued a certificate.  Again, it was determined that most of these cases could have been issued if all information had been submitted.

Each of these proactive measures will assist the FAA in monitoring this issue.  We are committed to expanding our efforts to review medical certificates and pursue appropriate enforcement actions when falsifications are discovered.   Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by stating that the FAA’s first priority always has been, and always will be, safety.  Safety is our agency’s mission, and we have dedicated our careers to promoting safety.  It is a responsibility we do not take lightly.

This concludes my statement, and I will be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF

NICHOLAS SABATINI,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATON SAFETY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

ON

THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S
OVERSIGHT OF OUTSOURCED AVIATION MAINTENANCE,

ON

MARCH 29, 2007.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to appear before you once again, this time to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) oversight of air carrier maintenance that is outsourced to repair stations, both domestically and abroad.  (Just to be clear, outsourcing is any maintenance performed for an air carrier by any individuals who are not employed by the air carrier here and abroad.)  I know the industry trend to outsource more of its maintenance in recent years has been a concern for some of you.  To some, outsourcing equates to cutting corners to save a few dollars.  To some, less costly maintenance means less safe maintenance.  To some, repair stations represent lesser quality maintenance.  All these assumptions imply that safety is being compromised as more maintenance is outsourced.  I am here today to reassure you that the quality of maintenance is not compromised simply because it is not being done by an air carrier.  No less an authority than the former Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG), Ken Meade, testified before Congress that use of these stations is not a question of quality, but rather an issue of oversight.  We agree, which is why the FAA is continually improving and refining our oversight of maintenance, no matter where it is performed or by whom.

Let me start by stating the obvious.  The system is safe.  As this subcommittee well knows, we have achieved the highest safety standards in the history of aviation.  Even so, our goal is – as always – to continue to improve safety.  I would like to share with you a chart that goes to the heart of this hearing.  (See the attachment at the end of the statement.)  The lines represent the percent of maintenance that is being outsourced and the accident rate, per million operations.  I think this picture is worth a million words.  Although the percentage of outsourcing has never been higher, the accident rate has never been lower.  These statistics amply demonstrate that aviation safety is not dependent on airlines performing their own maintenance. 

Before I explain the specifics of FAA’s oversight of outsourced maintenance, let me take a moment to describe the office of aviation safety.  Last year, after years hard work, my office achieved ISO 9001 certification.  This certification ensures that, worldwide, FAA safety offices provide standardized service and products, and that we adhere to the same safety standards as those businesses we regulate.  We are the only federal organization of our size, scope and complexity to have achieved ISO certification under a single quality management system.  It was through my employees’ dedication and hard work that we achieved ISO certification.  Not one milestone was missed on our road to certification.  So, our oversight of maintenance is part of an independently validated approach to holding ourselves to some pretty high standards.

Previously, our oversight was based largely on inspector knowledge and information that was available as the result of individual inspections.  This approach was the best we could do at the time, but it was far from comprehensive.  The effectiveness of our oversight could vary from facility to facility.  What we are doing now is managing risk and requiring system safety.  Just as we have worked the concept of system safety with the airlines, we are currently introducing the concept to repair stations.

Let me explain what I mean by system safety.  System safety is extremely comprehensive.  It sounds like a simple list of requirements, but in reality, it is a sophisticated approach to ensuring that everything is in place to obtain the information that can identify vulnerability in time to address it before safety is compromised.  System safety requires the following attributes.  It must be clear who is responsible for different aspects of the operation.  The responsible person must have the authority to take necessary action.  There must be procedures in place to execute required actions.  There must be controls in place to insure that a consistent product or service is being provided.  There must be oversight/auditing procedures in place to independently evaluate the effectiveness and consistency of the operation.  And lastly, there must be interface procedures in place to ensure that different parts of the organization are effectively talking to each other.  Consistency is the goal.  Inconsistency signals the need for a closer look and can provide us the early warning we need to get ahead of problems that could affect safety.

In addition, these attributes must be supported by a written Safety Policy expressing senior management’s commitment to continually improve safety and includes safety risk management processes, safety assurances, and safety promotion.  Safety risk management processes are used to assess system design and verify that safety risk management is integrated into all processes.  Safety assurances continually identify new hazards and ensure risk controls achieve their intended objective.  Safety promotion ensures an environment where action is taken to create a positive safety culture where people acknowledge their accountability and act on their own individual responsibility for safety.

This is what we requiring of all organizations for which we have safety oversight responsibility, whether it be an airline, a manufacturer or a repair station.  With these elements in place, our inspectors can perform hazard analyses and identify risk so that threats can be pre-empted.  Instead of relying solely on information from individual inspections alone, we now perform a sophisticated analysis of anomalies identified and entered into the system.  The analysis can provide us trend information that effectively targets our oversight.  This is a much more comprehensive approach than what we were able to do previously.  It allows us to get in front of potential problems in order to prevent them.  This is not only a better use of FAA resources, it enhances safety.

The past few years have been about continuing forward and making adjustments to an already robust system.  We have been working closely with the Department of Transportation Inspector General’s (IG) office since their issuance in 2003 of the report “Review of Air Carriers’ Use of Aircraft Repair Stations.”  The report identified specific areas where the IG felt improvements could be made.  In response to the report, we made a number of changes to our oversight of repair stations.  In 2004, we revised the regulations that apply to repair stations.  The rule improved quality control requirements, equipment requirements, and provided more detailed requirements on the use by repair stations of external maintenance providers.  In 2005, we issued guidance to enhance oversight of repair stations based on system safety requirements and risk assessment.  In 2006, we developed and implemented software to further enhance oversight, risk assessment, and risk management processes used in our oversight.  We’ve improved our Safety Performance Analysis System to provide sharing of information between the inspectors assigned to the repair station, and those assigned to the air carrier.  We’ve also improved the training requirements for certain repair station personnel.

We are currently testing a different way to oversee the work performed by complex repair stations.  We call this approach the Certificate Management Unit (CMU) concept.  CMU is a model of oversight for complex repair stations that parallels the way we conduct oversight of air carriers.  It is currently in place at two of the country’s most complex repair stations.  CMU will provide for dedicated inspectors providing oversight at the assigned repair station.  This addresses the criticism that FAA has failed to adapt its oversight of repair stations to reflect their increasing use by air carriers.  Having assigned inspectors at these repair stations will further reduce the differences between the way we oversee major repair stations versus major airlines.  We will continue to evaluate, modify and expand this concept as appropriate.

I mentioned at the outset that my office is ISO certified.  Part of what this means is that, as an organization, we must continually evaluate what we are doing to identify where we can improve.  So I fully expect ongoing modifications to our oversight procedures and analysis as we learn more and develop new and better tools.

I would now like to turn my focus to foreign repair stations because I know they have been of particular interest to this subcommittee.  As is the case with domestic repair stations, there is an incorrect perception that a carrier’s use of a foreign repair station is somehow unsafe or done solely to reduce maintenance costs.  I know there have been a number of efforts to restrict a U.S. carrier’s ability to use foreign repair stations, but I do not believe these efforts would enhance safety.  It is important to understand that FAA only certifies a foreign repair station if a U.S. carrier wants to use it.  So there is a need element in place.  The repair station must meet the same standards that we apply to repair stations in the United States or we will not certify it.  Safety is addressed because we require that all aircraft that are registered in the United States be maintained to U.S. standards, regardless of where they operate.  Due to the global nature of aviation, we must have repair stations that meet U.S. standards throughout the world.  It is an essential element of the U.S. being a leading provider of international transportation services.  Finally, keep in mind that, as is the case when a carrier uses a domestic repair station, the carrier has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the maintenance is being performed appropriately.  All of this adds up to a great deal of supervision.  The repair station has internal controls, foreign government oversight, airline oversight, and FAA oversight.\

In three countries (France, Ireland and Germany) where we have Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements (BASA), we have outlined maintenance information procedures (MIP) to ensure that foreign inspectors are placing appropriate emphasis on the Federal Aviation Regulations when conducting review of work done on U.S. aircraft.  We have a long history and experience with these aviation authorities.  In these countries, we rely on the oversight of the aviation authority in addition to our periodic inspections.  We are also working to ensure that these foreign aviation authorities inform us and seek FAA approval of changes to repair station operations if they directly impact FAA requirements. 

In response to the IG, we have also made some changes to our oversight of foreign repair stations.  For example, we eliminated the 10% sampling requirement on FAA’s inspection of repair stations in countries where there is a BASA/MIP in place.  In FY 2006, FAA conducted sampling inspections in 21% of the repair stations located in these countries.  We have also developed and implemented policy and procedures in the BASA/MIP countries to capture and document the results from the inspections conducted by foreign authorities for inclusion in the Program Tracking and Reporting System.

It is also important to remember that, by its nature, aviation is truly an international enterprise.  An aircraft, especially in commercial aviation, contains parts manufactured all around the world.  The original equipment manufactures (OEMs) have a wealth of expertise in repairing their products.  In addition, their parts may have warranties.  It would be extremely unwise to restrict a U.S. carrier’s ability to use OEM maintenance, even if the OEM is abroad. 

There are a number of other reasons for air carriers to choose to outsource some maintenance and repair activities.  The expertise of OEMs is so considerable and their work is so consistent that maintenance is often outsourced to them, regardless of whether the maintenance being performed is on a part they manufactured.  In other cases, overseas repair and maintenance facilities may provide a great deal of expertise, or lower costs.  Nevertheless, just as aviation safety is in no way compromised by allowing U.S. carriers to fly aircraft made in Europe, in Brazil, or in Canada, so too is safety in no way compromised by allowing other countries to conduct repair and maintenance on our aircraft.

I would like to conclude this morning by saying that our work with the IG’s office in the past few years has been productive.  We have made a number of adjustments that I think have improved the effectiveness of our oversight.  That can only improve safety.  I think we generally agree that we are moving in the right direction.  Certainly, the chart I talked about reflects that airline use of repair stations has not compromised safety.

I understand and appreciate this subcommittee’s concern about the increased use of repair stations in this country and abroad.  Obviously, we share a common goal to find ways to improve safety at a historically safe period in U.S. aviation.  I can assure you that my office is totally committed to making whatever adjustments the situation demands when it comes to safety oversight.  Hearings like the one today continue a necessary dialogue.  I do not claim to have all the answers.  I think the changes we have made in recent years are good ones.  But we can’t sit still.  There will always be ways to improve and we will continue to look for them.

This concludes my statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

CHARLES LEADER,
DIRECTOR,
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

ON

JPDO AND THE NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANPORTATION SYSTEM: STATUS AND ISSUES,

MARCH 29, 2007

Good morning, Chairman Udall, Congressman Calvert, and Members of the Subcommittee.  I am Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).   I am honored to be here this morning to testify about the JPDO, and the work we are doing to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that deliver benefits to our customers today.

Moving to NextGen is inextricably linked to changes in the FAA’s financing system.  We need to establish the financing of current and future operations based on actual costs and investment requirements that will realize tangible benefits and increasing efficiency.  The NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration, provides the necessary reforms to our financing, and puts us on the path towards fully implementing the NextGen system.

And implementing that system is imperative.  Our nation's air transportation system has become a victim of its own success.  We have created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.   But we now face a serious and impending problem:  today’s system is at capacity.   While the industry downturn following the attacks of September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly.   And we have to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.

The warning signs are everywhere.   Flight delays and cancellations have reached unacceptable levels.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are placing additional stresses on the system.   If we fail to address these issues, we will suffocate the great engine of economic growth that is civil aviation.  A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015 – absent modernization, the consequences will be serious.

NextGen is about a long-term transformation of our air transportation system.  It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric systems.    Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve, and plans for how to get there from here.  That’s where the work of the Joint Planning Development Office has come in to develop, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan.  These documents provide us with that picture of where we want to go and the plans for how to achieve it. 

The Concept of Operations is a description of the transformed state of NextGen, much like what an architect’s blueprints offers a builder.  Then, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently with the Concept of Operations, and that’s the Enterprise Architecture.  The Enterprise Architecture provides the next level of technical details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder’s plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its power, water, sewage, cable, and internet connections to the rest of the community.  Finally, the Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of the general contractor’s work plan.  It specifies the timing and interdependencies of the multi-agency research, demonstrations, and development required to achieve the NexGen system vision.

This set of documents will define the NextGen system and guide the future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and systems development.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28^th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are anxious to receive their feedback.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months. 

Let me emphasize, however, that we are not waiting for 2025 to implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and increase capacity in an environmentally sound manner.  FAA and JPDO are beginning to move from planning to implementation.  In fact, the FAA’s FY 2008 – 2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in projects and activities that directly support NextGen.  The CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the National Airspace System modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the Agency intends to accomplish during that time.  Several key NextGen technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded in the FAA’s FY08 budget request.  These technologies and programs are:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.  FAA proposes to spend $173 million on these programs in FY08.

These technologies are essential to begin the transition from today’s air traffic management system to the NextGen system of 2025.  Perhaps the most significant of these transformational technologies is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B.  ADS-B is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control.  A key element of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways.  Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.  When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic; thereby substantially improving safety. 

ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA’s Capstone program in Alaska, and it has contributed to the recent reduction of GA accidents in Alaska by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped aircraft.    One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska will be in the Gulf of Mexico.  The FAA has signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI), helicopter operators and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of Mexico to improve service in the Gulf.  Using ADS-B technology, helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the Gulf.

The FAA is looking at a rulemaking that would mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and is working closely with stakeholders to determine an appropriate proposed timeline for a future NPRM.

In today’s NAS there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed, developed, and managed connections.  The future, however, demands an infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of expanding today’s point-to-point system is simply prohibitive.  System Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need.  SWIM will provide high quality, timely data to many users and applications.  By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will reduce unnecessary redundancy of information and better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing.  When implemented, SWIM will contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service.  In addition, SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations.  It will also allow for better use of existing capacity en-route.

The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts lies -- like much of our society -- in the ability to communicate large amounts of complex information in a fast, efficient, and robust manner. In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne aircraft is by voice communications -- in other words you pick up the “phone” to talk to someone else on another “phone.”  NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications, especially if you want to manage tens of thousands of aircraft flights on optimal trajectory-based routes.  Data communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned strategic traffic management.  Eventually, the majority of communications will be handled by data communications for appropriately-equipped users.  It is estimated that with 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. [FAA ATO-P Future Enroute Work Station Study, Preliminary Results, 2006] 

The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather picture to all NAS users.  Approximately 70 percent of annual national airspace system delays are attributed to weather.  The goal of this investment is to cut weather-related delays by at least 50 percent.  The weather problem is about total weather information management, and not just the state of the scientific art in weather forecasting.  The weather dissemination system today is inefficient to operate and maintain, and information gathered by one system is not easily shared with other systems.    We must integrate predictive weather information with decision support tools and provide uniform real-time access to key common weather parameters, and common situational awareness.  The benefits will be improved utilization of air space across all flight domains, and reduced flight delays.

The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air-to-ground and ground-to-ground voice communications in the air traffic control environment.  The switches today are very static, and our ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited.  Under the current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate and redesign the airspace.  In the future, the impacts of bad weather could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions to air traffic.  The new voice switch allows us to replace today’s rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of traffic.  Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA’s ability to implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase efficiency and improve performance.

At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them.  A crucial part of this activity is demonstrations of new technologies and capabilities.  In late April, we will demonstrate the use of continuous descent approaches with time metering.  We are requesting funding for additional activities related to defining operational concepts and technologies in the FY08 budget.  This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.  The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing in new technologies.  One demonstration will test trajectory-based concepts in the oceanic environment.  The ultimate goal is to increase predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel efficiency.  The other demonstration will accelerate the first integrated test of super-density operations using procedures for increasing capacity at busy airports.  This demonstration should achieve near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to implement the same procedures at other locations.

It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.  The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of transformations that will truly modernize today’s system.  Let me provide a few examples of this.

In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate highways in the sky.  In the high performance airspace of the future, each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.  Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same precise information, transmitted via data communications.  Investments in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based operations.

The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic management.  The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major demand and capacity imbalances.  SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.

With NextGen, the impact of weather is reduced through the use of improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of weather into automation to improve decision-making.  New capabilities in the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic restrictions.  Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments for these improvements.

Another vital consideration in the development of the NexGen system is successfully managing aviation’s environmental impacts.  We have set out an aggressive vision that grew out of a report to Congress that was requested under Vision 100.  Two years ago we delivered “Aviation and the Environment- A National Vision.”  Developed through the Partnership for Air Transportation Noise and Emissions Reduction (PARTNER) Center of Excellence, it brought near 40 stakeholders together: airlines, manufacturers, community groups, airports, universities, research establishments, and other government agencies to develop a common vision.  The participants agreed that the US aviation system should ensure significant impacts from noise and local emissions continue to decline, identify appropriate metrics to deal with greenhouse gas emissions, improve the relationship between airports and communities that surround them, and ensure the US remains a global leader in aviation environmental matters- even as we grow the system two to three fold.

A preliminary JPDO analysis has shown that long before we run into limits from technology, we run into constraints to capacity from noise and emissions impacts.  In fact, we potentially lose tens of billions of dollars in foregone aviation activity.  That’s why the NexGen reauthorization is so important.  It offers a number of programs that are essential if we are to meet the environmental objectives- and so foster capacity expansion and benefits it brings to the American public.  These include: demonstrating the use of new environmentally-friendly procedures; underwriting the implementation of such procedures at airports; targeting research of environmental issues at the airport level; accelerating the maturing of new noise and emission reduction technologies for use in aircraft; and exploring the use of alternative fuels to enhance supply security and environmental performance.  

We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the JPDO’s vision of the NextGen system into reality.  Because the JPDO is not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision.  The FAA is using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide their transformation to NextGen.  In the past the Operational Evolution Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA that extended ten years into the future.  The new OEP will include strategic milestones through 2025.  JPDO representatives will participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.

The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing, and prototype demonstrations.  This Operational Evolution Partnership will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA’s progress towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.

Cost will be a vital factor:  we cannot create a NextGen system that is not affordable.  Out-year funding estimates over the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10 billion.  Preliminary estimates suggest that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22 billion in funding.  We are working to continuously refine these estimates, particularly with our users as we implement new cost-based financing mechanisms, as proposed in the Next Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007, the FAA’s reauthorization proposal.

MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the NextGen avionics costs.  It concludes that a wide range of costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of equipage schedules.  The most probable range of total avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.  This range reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of time out-of-service required for equipage installation.

The importance of developing this system of the future is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering substantial consumer benefits.  The further opening of US and European markets in the recently-agreed “Open Skies” agreement reinforces this need.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet.  

Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program.  The FAA and the EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based air traffic management systems and technologies.  This coordination will address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA, and Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical initiative.  We hope to take the first steps under this agreement later this summer to lay out a roadmap of flight trials to test a number of procedures and technology that will reduce noise and emissions.

Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate for SESAR.  SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen.  They consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25 billion to $37 billion in US dollars through the year 2020.  SESAR, like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and better define the system.  However, there is an important difference in scope between SESAR and NextGen.  While SESAR focuses almost exclusively on air traffic management, NextGen takes what’s called a “curb-to-curb” approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and DoD and DHS NAS requirements.

Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of users -- very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security, environment and efficiency.  Research will continue to help us find the right balance between a centralized satellite and ground system and a totally distributed system, where aircraft “self-manage” their flight with full knowledge of their environment.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony.  I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF

BRUCE JOHNSON,
VICE PRESIDENT OF TERMINAL SERVICES,
AND
STEVEN ZAIDMAN,
VICE PRESIDENT OF TECHNICAL OPERATIONS,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE FAA’S AGING ATC FACILITIES:  INVESTIGATING THE NEED TO IMPROVE FACILITIES AND WORKER CONDITIONS,

ON

JULY 24, 2007.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s efforts to improve aging air traffic control facilities and the worker conditions at those facilities.  My name is Bruce Johnson, and I am the Vice President of Terminal Services in the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization.  With me today is Steven Zaidman, the ATO’s Vice President of Technical Operations.  Improving our air traffic control facilities is one of the FAA’s greatest challenges, in breadth and in depth, and we appreciate having the opportunity to discuss it with you.  We have an extensive multi-tiered program to address our aging facilities, and we look forward to continuing our efforts as we transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System.

The Challenge

As you know, the current air traffic system is built around 1960s radar technology and is constrained by its limitations.  At the time the system was built, each air traffic facility could receive signals from only one radar.  That operational limitation required that we build more than 300 air traffic control facilities spread across the country.  That number has grown to 526 terminal and en route air traffic control facilities across the country.  Out of these, the FAA has responsibility for replacing and transitioning over 400 to NextGen.  Additionally, FAA is responsible for maintaining more than 9,000 smaller buildings and 13,000 structural towers associated with navigational aids, radars, and other components of the ATC infrastructure.  Our airspace is also divided into artificial boundaries based on the limits of legacy radar technology.

Today, radar and air traffic control automation technology permits individual facilities to handle up to 16 radars.  In the meantime, as we replace and transform these facilities, we still need to sustain them, that is, performing maintenance and repair where needed and bringing the facilities up to building code, where applicable. 

In 1999, the FAA began assessing our terminal facilities, which include Airport Traffic Control Towers and Terminal Radar Approach Control facilities (TRACON), to collect information about the condition of the facility and the costs associated with maintaining the facility.  In addition, we have a facility planning process in place that methodically analyzes each facility for potential modernization, including replacement.  As part of this planning process, we include a facility life-cycle model that will better enable us to predict the maintenance and repair costs of each facility, as it undergoes modernization or replacement.  Finally, our long range plans under our airspace redesign efforts include potential facility consolidation, which will result in better service to air travelers, better work environments for our controllers, and lower costs to the taxpayer.

Sustaining Current Facilities

As both our en route and terminal facilities age, we strive to get the most mileage out of them.  We collect and review our maintenance and repair needs annually in order to budget appropriately for them.  Once we identify what is needed, we prioritize our needs – maintenance and repairs impacting safety, as always, are our first priority, followed by waterproofing, HVAC and electrical issues, and on down the line.  High priority needs, such as a leaking roof or an air conditioner outage during the summer, are addressed immediately while lower priority needs, such as new paint and carpet, are planned through the normal budget cycle.

Additionally, we are striving to be more proactive in our approach to maintenance and repairs.  We have developed our processes to identify and process maintenance and repair issues as they arise.  When a critical need that immediately affects operation arises, we reprioritize our maintenance and repair schedule as needed to address it.  We recognize that we have a backlog of maintenance and repair, and we are taking steps to reduce that backlog.  We have completed condition assessments for various facility types to determine what repairs are needed and how to budget for them.  We have also developed systems to ensure that the highest priority backlog items are addressed first.  I am pleased to report that we are making headway on the backlog and will continue to do so over the coming years.  Finally, as we transition into NextGen, we are developing individual facility life-cycle plans, which will allow us to be more proactive in planning for sustaining our facilities over their lifespans.

Replacing Facilities

It is an unfortunate fact that some of our facilities have aged to the point where the responsible thing to do is replace them.  We have facilities in our system that have so many issues that to repair and remediate them indefinitely would be financially unsound.  We certainly appreciate that replacing an air traffic control facility is a major financial investment.  Thus, the FAA has set out criteria for facilities replacement that are intended to ensure that resources are allocated responsibly.

First, we are only replacing facilities that have a solid business case and meet fixed requirements.  When we identify a tower deficiency, we examine all of the options for addressing the issues.  In some cases, we determine that it is a better long-term solution, technologically and financially, to replace the facility.  In others, we have found that a complete replacement is unnecessary, and that we are able to update the facility sufficiently.  Thus far, 13 new sites have been commissioned from FY 2005 – FY 2006, and we have 12 sites that we plan to commission between FY 2007 – FY 2008.

Transition to NextGen

As you all know, today’s aviation system is operating at full capacity, making our transition to NextGen an absolute necessity.  As we maintain our current facilities to make the most of them, and replace them when needed, we are simultaneously working to transition facilities into NextGen by identifying where and when new technologies and equipment can be put into place.  For instance, at the Morristown, New Jersey facility, the FAA made the business decision to modernize instead of replace.  That modernization effort is currently in the design phase and scheduled to be complete in Spring 2008.

Consolidation

A key element of the FAA’s transformation into NextGen is consolidation of our facilities.  The number and specific locations of many existing FAA facilities were determined by the capabilities and limitations of 1960’s technology.  In the subsequent four decades, the available technology has vastly improved, rendering the long-existing pattern of FAA facilities no longer the best configuration.  Without consolidation, the FAA is tied to maintaining outdated facilities with outdated technology based on outdated 1960’s radar boundaries.  Further, consolidation lowers infrastructure costs, and helps improve safety and efficiency by making new technologies available for controllers.  These savings and improvements mean fewer air traffic delays and lower costs for air travelers.

The FAA has proven that we can consolidate both airspace and facilities, improving the safety of flight while at the same time saving money.  For example, in 2002, the FAA consolidated the airspace control that was formerly managed by five separate airports in the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area into one brand new facility – called the Potomac Terminal Approach Control.   Now instead of having five compartments of airspace, the FAA has a large geographic area in which the airspace was redesigned to improve the safety of operations and provide more direct routes for aircraft.  This consolidation has the additional benefit of allowing aircraft to fly at higher altitudes longer, reducing fuel consumption and the incumbent noise impacts created with low-level flight.  The Baltimore-Washington airspace consolidation has been extremely successful, saving millions of dollars in fuel, reducing carbon emissions, reducing noise exposure and reducing delays.  Facilities and airspace consolidations in New York, Atlanta, Northern California and Southern California have seen similar results. 

However, despite proven success, a provision in this Committee’s aviation reauthorization proposal, H.R. 2881, would impose a moratorium on any FAA’s consolidation plans and prohibit FAA from managing our assets.  Section 807 of H.R. 2881 would require the FAA to submit a report on our consolidation efforts, but would also allow delay tactics by communities that could postpone any consolidation efforts virtually indefinitely.

We recognize that consolidation is a highly emotional and sensitive issue, which is why the Administration proposed a process where objective recommendations would be made regarding which facilities to close, public input would be considered, Presidential review would be required, and, ultimately, congressional action would be necessary.  The provision was included in the FAA’s reauthorization proposal to augment the FAA’s current consolidation authority to include an open, public process where all concerned parties may have their say.  We believe this approach is the fairest way for the FAA to make objective, informed decisions about facility consolidation.

Not only does H.R. 2881 not include this comprehensive approach, but it would take a step backwards.  If the House provision is enacted, with its moratorium on facility closure and the decisionmaking delays it allows, the FAA would be tied to continuing to maintain outdated facilities with outdated technology.  Our transition to NextGen would be at risk, and the result would be aviation gridlock. 

The development and deployment of NextGen, by its very nature, will be a complex, challenging, and expensive technological endeavor.   It will entail a total system reengineering of our airspace and air traffic control systems without the luxury of slowing down or interrupting the growing volumes of air traffic that we see each and every day.  A provision such as section 807 that limits, or removes entirely, our discretion to determine how best to transition to NextGen according to objective safety, efficiency, and economic considerations will greatly hamper, or entirely halt, this important initiative.  The Administration’s proposal is what is needed to help us move effectively toward NextGen, and we strongly urge Congress to adopt our approach.

While we recognize that there may be disruption to a few individuals and communities with the consolidation of facilities, it is simply unrealistic to expect that a major overhaul of the nation’s air traffic control system will not result in some growing pains.  At every phase, we are taking steps to minimize worker disruption and ensure smooth transitions wherever possible.  In the case of the recent Palm Springs consolidation, we did not require anyone to relocate.  In those cases where relocation is unavoidable, workers will be offered a fully paid move and notified well in advance of the transition.  In addition, the FAA will provide appropriate training and orientation at the new facility to further ensure success.

In fact, worker conditions are always a major concern.  Maintenance and repairs, replacement of facilities, and transitioning to NextGen are all conducted with worker conditions in mind.  We have several procedures in place to protect worker safety as construction projects get underway.  Replacing facilities and NextGen technologies are primarily designed with the worker environment in mind, to make our controllers’ jobs more streamlined and efficient and provide them a safe and comfortable working environment.

Conclusion

FAA’s transition to NextGen is a lengthy, phased process, and until we achieve our final goals, we are committed to working on remedies available to us, whether that entails further maintenance and repairs or replacement of a facility.  Our multi-level approach to maintaining, improving, and replacing our aging facilities is designed to get us to NextGen without any compromise in safety and with maximum levels of efficiency.  But, time is of the essence here, and we urge the Committee not to tie our hands with regard to facilities consolidation.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony.  We thank you, Congressman Petri, and the Members of the Subcommittee once again for inviting us to testify today.  We would happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have.

STATEMENT OF

FRANKLIN HATFIELD,
DIRECTOR OF SYSTEM OPERATIONS SECURITY FOR THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

ON

AVIATION SECURITY; ARE WE TRULY PROTECTED?

OCTOBER 16, 2007.

Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Congressman Lungren, Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to appear before you this afternoon to discuss the role of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in supporting the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) response to aviation security threats and incidents.  I want to assure the Subcommittee that FAA and TSA are aligned and work very closely together in terms of understanding and implementing our respective roles in responding to aviation security threats.  The FAA supports TSA through a broad range of standing mechanisms, some of which are continuous in nature, and some of which are activated in response to an identified threat.  FAA’s mission is aviation safety and efficiency.  FAA supports TSA’s aviation security mission.  Accordingly, we work with TSA, the Department of Defense (DoD), and other key partners to effectively respond to any potential threat without compromising the safety of the National Airspace System (the NAS) and while mitigating impacts of system efficiency.

The FAA is uniquely qualified, trained, and equipped to operate the NAS and manage the nation’s airspace.  This is why FAA retains control of the airspace, even when security incidents arise.  While other entities have missions and skill sets that are essential to responding to security threats, the FAA’s understanding of the complexity of the NAS makes it uniquely suited to recognizing aviation threats and identifying the options available based on the facts of a given situation without compromising operational safety and unduly impacting NAS efficiency and the nation’s economy.

As security has become a greater focus of managing air traffic, and responsibility for transportation security rests with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it is helpful to understand the legislative history of why the FAA was given and retains operational control of the airspace.  The FAA was created almost 50 years ago in 1958 to provide a centralized focus for aviation, replacing an ineffective system of diffused authorities that had evolved over time.  Prior to 1958, the functions of the FAA were splintered, with the Civil Aeronautics Authority (under the Department of Commerce) possessing day-to-day air traffic control responsibilities; the Civil Aeronautics Board possessing accident investigation and safety regulatory responsibilities; and an Airways Modernization Board having the responsibility for planning and developing a system of air navigation facilities.  On top of that, there was an inter-agency Air Coordinating Committee which reviewed all matters involving use of the airspace.  This approach to managing the NAS was clearly inefficient and ineffectual.

The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAAct) makes it clear that Congress wanted one independent agency with “plenary authority” over the nation’s airspace.  The FAA Act was intended to address two fundamental deficiencies in the Federal Government’s aviation responsibilities, one of which was a “lack of clear statutory authority for centralized airspace management.”  When it was unclear which civilian agency or the military had authority over air traffic, airspace and other aviation safety issues, the confusion led to aviation accidents, including mid-air collisions.  The current statutory framework for the Administrator’s airspace authority and the accompanying legislative history confirm that the FAA continues to be the sole authority for airspace management, air traffic regulatory authority, and use of the airspace.

To more fully understand how FAA supports the security responsibilities of the TSA and other agencies on a daily basis and in response to a perceived threat, I will review the communications and technological initiatives that are currently in place and how they work.  I will also briefly summarize the ongoing government exercises to ensure that all the requisite individuals throughout government know what is expected of them should a crisis arise.

Communications

In the aftermath of 9/11, the FAA established the Domestic Events Network (DEN) – a continuous, twenty-four hour a communications capability that includes over a hundred agency partners.  Through the DEN, agencies monitor ongoing activity in the National Airspace System (NAS) along with their respective areas of expertise to identify anomalies to determine whether they could pose a threat and to coordinate operational responses to defeat any such threats.  The DEN enables all of the key aviation security stakeholders to connect the dots and ensure that responses reflect the risk-based decisions of the Government.  It is a first line of defense that provides ongoing information sharing on a real-time basis.  For example, FAA manages day-to-day operations in the NAS.  Based on information provided by controllers, our watch officer may use the DEN to alert TSA and other partners about aircraft that are flying where they shouldn’t be or aircraft that are not responding to controllers’ attempts to contact them.  In the vast majority of cases, the identified aircraft turn out not to be a security threat, but providing early information to the DEN gives other parts of the government the opportunity to input their areas of expertise in order to provide a more complete picture of what may or may not be happening.  The level of interest a flight receives would obviously be determined through shared information about the situation, triggering higher levels of scrutiny as appropriate.

In addition to the DEN, the FAA supports the TSA in a variety of operational elements, including the Freedom Center (formerly known as the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)) in Herndon, Virginia.  The Freedom Center is staffed with TSA personnel as well as representatives from various partner agencies, including the FAA, which has air traffic control specialists assigned to the facility’s National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC).  If an incident arises, the FAA personnel are immediately available to provide air navigation services related input to the interagency response decisions, including information on flight behavior (e.g., flight path and communication with air traffic control (ATC)); aircraft registration; pilot history; and critical safety factors such as the FAA’s ability to safely divert the aircraft to alternate landing locations while mitigating potential threats.  These personnel also are able to leverage the FAA’s ATC capabilities to communicate with the suspect flight and provide security driven instructions.

Should the situation warrant, TSA can activate a bridge telephone conversation with high ranking officials throughout DHS.  This will permit DHS senior officials to immediately understand the situation at hand in order to make informed, coordinated decisions from the top for their immediate implementation.  Usually, if this bridge is activated, the FAA Administrator’s representative will immediately be joined to the network discussion.  In this manner, the merits of different options can be discussed, informed decisions can be made, and implementation of those decisions can occur expeditiously. 

It is important to understand that the range of potential scenarios that may unfold means that a standard protocol or checklist is neither and optimal or practical solution. When a problem is identified, the facts of any given situation will dictate how the situation is handled and what decisions get made.  For example, if it is discovered that a passenger enroute to the United States is on the no-fly list, the decision of where and/or whether to divert the flight could be impacted by the actions of the passenger in question.  Is the passenger exhibiting signs of anxiety or restlessness?  Or is the passenger sound asleep? The specific facts around the situation could lead to different conclusions, different decisions and consequently, different results.  The important thing is that the conclusions and decisions are made at the appropriate level of government with all the players in the decision making process basing those decisions on the same coordinated, integrated, real-time information.

These means of communicating have proven to be very effective in ensuring the level of response is appropriate to the threat at hand, while avoiding unduly impacting the nation’s aviation system, which is already the most complex and busy system in the world, and creating unwanted economic consequences.

Technology

In addition to effective inter-agency communication, new and better technology is also an essential tool in the war against terror.  The FAA supports TSA through sharing technology.  For example, FAA provides the Traffic Station Display (TSD) system at key facilities operated by TSA and other partners.  While TSD was only designed to support air traffic management activities, the system’s ability to share situational information reduced the potential for miscommunication or misunderstanding among agencies sharing information, which, past incidents have demonstrated, is essential in reacting to developing situations appropriately.

We are actively working with TSA now both in the short and long term on new, shared and interoperable technological platforms, which will support TSA’s aviation security responsibilities.  We are also cooperating with TSA on longer range plans through the FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), which is currently working to integrate security capabilities into the architecture for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). 

Joint Planning/Coordination Groups

The FAA and TSA also work in close partnership through a variety of interagency planning groups.  For example, the FAA and TSA co-chair an interagency airspace procedures working group that meets every week to discuss, resolve and ensure that positive communication and coordination continues between all agencies.  We co-chair an interagency working group working on improving the Government’s ability to counter and respond to Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) threats posed by terrorists.  We partner on event specific task forces such as those established to protect National Special Security Events (NSSE) such as the recent UN General Assembly.  These are just a few examples of the many ongoing inter-agency efforts designed to optimize our nation’s security.

Exercises

Improved communication and technology is further enhanced by regular joint TSA-FAA as well as national level, Government wide exercises.  These exercises, which are built around various threat scenarios identified by the Intelligence Community and/or real world events (e.g., the August 2006 UK terror plot), enable the FAA and TSA to explore and refine our cooperation at all levels ranging from policy decisions to tactical operations.  The FAA and TSA senior officials regularly conduct exercises led by each agency’s Administrators.  The last such exercise, held earlier this year in April, enabled us to explore and significantly clarify how we would work together to effectively respond to a terrorist attack premised on the UK plot scenario, in which the terrorists intended to blow up flights from Heathrow bound for the U.S.  

In addition to these bilateral exercises, we participate in partnership with TSA in broader, Government wide exercises such as Top Officials 4 (TOPOFF 4), which is being conducted this week.  TOPOFF 4 will help the participating agencies identify gaps and strengthen cooperation on responses to terrorist attacks using Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) or “dirty bombs”. 

In conclusion, the FAA is committed to supporting fully TSA in its efforts to improve aviation security.  While we continually look to refine and improve these efforts, I am confident that both agencies agree that our working relationship is a strong one. 

This is the conclusion of my prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

MARGARET GILLIGAN,
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATON SAFETY

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

ON THE

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN AVIATION REPAIR STATIONS,

ON

JUNE 20, 2007

Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Lott, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) oversight of air carrier maintenance that is outsourced to foreign repair stations.  (Just to be clear, outsourcing is any maintenance performed for an air carrier by any individuals who are not employed by the air carrier whether in the US or abroad.)  I know the industry trend to outsource more of its maintenance in recent years has been a concern for some of you.  To some, outsourcing equates to cutting corners to save a few dollars.  To some, less costly maintenance means less safe maintenance.  To some, repair stations represent lesser quality maintenance.  All these assumptions imply that safety is being compromised as more maintenance is outsourced.  I am here today to reassure you that the quality of maintenance is not compromised simply because it is not being done by an air carrier.  No less an authority than the former Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG), Ken Meade, testified before Congress that use of these stations is not a question of quality, but rather an issue of oversight.  We agree, which is why the FAA is continually improving and refining our oversight of maintenance, no matter where it is performed or by whom.

Let me start by stating the obvious.  The system is safe.  As this subcommittee well knows, we have achieved the highest safety standards in the history of aviation.  Even so, our goal is – as always – to continue to improve safety.  I would like to share with you a chart that goes to the heart of this hearing.  (See the attachment at the end of the statement.)  The lines represent the percent of maintenance that is being outsourced and the accident rate, per hundred thousand operations.  I think this picture is worth a thousand words.  Although the percentage of outsourcing has never been higher, the accident rate has never been lower.  These statistics amply demonstrate that aviation safety is not dependent on airlines performing their own maintenance. 

Before I explain the specifics of FAA’s oversight of outsourced maintenance, let me take a moment to describe the office of aviation safety.  Last year, after years of hard work, the Office of Aviation Safety (AVS) achieved ISO 9001 certification.  This certification ensures that, worldwide, FAA safety offices provide standardized service and products, and that we adhere to the same safety standards as those businesses we regulate.  We are the only federal organization of our size, scope and complexity to have achieved ISO certification under a single quality management system.  It was through my employees’ dedication and hard work that we achieved ISO certification.  Not one milestone was missed on our road to certification.  So, our oversight of maintenance is part of an independently validated approach to holding ourselves to some pretty high standards.

Previously, our oversight was based largely on inspector knowledge and information that was available as the result of individual inspections.  This approach was the best we could do at the time, but it was far from comprehensive.  The effectiveness of our oversight could vary from facility to facility.  What we are doing now is managing risk and requiring system safety.  Just as we have worked the concept of system safety with the airlines, we are currently introducing the concept to repair stations.

Let me explain what I mean by system safety.  System safety is extremely comprehensive.  It sounds like a simple list of requirements, but in reality, it is a sophisticated approach to ensuring that everything is in place to obtain the information that can identify vulnerability in time to address it before safety is compromised.  System safety requires the following attributes.  It must be clear who is responsible for different aspects of the operation.  The responsible person must have the authority to take necessary action.  There must be procedures in place to execute required actions.  There must be controls in place to insure that a consistent product or service is being provided.  There must be oversight/auditing procedures in place to independently evaluate the effectiveness and consistency of the operation.  And lastly, there must be interface procedures in place to ensure that different parts of the organization are effectively talking to each other.  Consistency is the goal.  Inconsistency signals the need for a closer look and can provide us the early warning we need to get ahead of problems that could affect safety.

In addition, these attributes must be supported by a written Safety Policy expressing senior management’s commitment to continually improve safety and includes safety risk management processes, safety assurances, and safety promotion.  Safety risk management processes are used to assess system design and verify that safety risk management is integrated into all processes.  Safety assurances continually identify new hazards and ensure risk controls achieve their intended objective.  Safety promotion ensures an environment where action is taken to create a positive safety culture where people acknowledge their accountability and act on their own individual responsibility for safety.

This is what we will require of all organizations for which we have safety oversight responsibility, whether it be an airline, a manufacturer or a repair station.  With these elements in place, our inspectors can perform hazard analyses and identify risk so that threats can be pre-empted.  Instead of relying solely on information from individual inspections alone, we now perform a sophisticated analysis of anomalies identified and entered into the system.  The analysis can provide us trend information that effectively targets our oversight.  This is a much more comprehensive approach than what we were able to do previously.  It allows us to get in front of potential problems in order to prevent them.  This is not only a better use of FAA resources, it enhances safety.

The past few years have been about continuing forward and making adjustments to an already robust system.  We have been working closely with the Department of Transportation Inspector General’s (IG) office since their issuance in 2003 of the report “Review of Air Carriers’ Use of Aircraft Repair Stations.”  The report identified specific areas where the IG felt improvements could be made.  In response to the report, we made a number of changes to our oversight of repair stations.  In 2004, we revised the regulations that apply to repair stations.  The rule improved quality control requirements, equipment requirements, and provided more detailed requirements on the use by repair stations of external maintenance providers.  In 2005, we issued guidance to enhance oversight of repair stations based on system safety requirements and risk assessment.  In 2006, we developed and implemented software to further enhance oversight, risk assessment, and risk management processes used in our oversight.  We’ve improved our Safety Performance Analysis System to provide sharing of information between the inspectors assigned to the repair station, and those assigned to the air carrier.  We’ve also improved the training requirements for certain repair station personnel.

We are currently testing a different way to oversee the work performed by complex repair stations.  We call this approach the Certificate Management Unit (CMU) concept.  CMU is a model of oversight for complex repair stations that parallels the way we conduct oversight of air carriers.  CMU will provide for dedicated inspectors providing oversight at the assigned repair station.  This addresses the criticism that FAA has failed to adapt its oversight of repair stations to reflect their increasing use by air carriers.  Having assigned inspectors at these repair stations will further reduce the differences between the way we oversee major repair stations versus major airlines.  We will continue to evaluate, modify and expand this concept as appropriate.

I mentioned at the outset that AVS is ISO certified.  Part of what this means is that, as an organization, we must continually evaluate what we are doing to identify where we can improve.  So I fully expect ongoing modifications to our oversight procedures and analysis as we learn more and develop new and better tools.

I would now like to turn my focus to foreign repair stations because I know they have been of particular interest to this subcommittee.  As is the case with domestic repair stations, there is an incorrect perception that a carrier’s use of a foreign repair station is somehow unsafe or done solely to reduce maintenance costs.  I know there have been a number of efforts to restrict a U.S. carrier’s ability to use foreign repair stations, but I do not believe these efforts would enhance safety.  It is important to understand that FAA only certifies a foreign repair station if a U.S. carrier wants to use it.  Unlike a domestic applicant, a foreign applicant must provide evidence that a U.S. operator or manufacturer needs its services.  The repair station must meet the same standards that we apply to repair stations in the United States or we will not certify it.  Safety is addressed because we require that all aircraft that are registered in the United States be maintained to U.S. standards, regardless of where they operate.  Due to the global nature of aviation, we must have repair stations that meet U.S. standards throughout the world.  It is an essential element of the U.S. being a leading provider of international transportation services.  Finally, keep in mind that, as is the case when a carrier uses a domestic repair station, the carrier has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the maintenance is being performed appropriately.  All of this adds up to a great deal of supervision.  The repair station has internal controls, foreign government oversight, airline oversight, and FAA oversight.

In three countries (France, Ireland and Germany) where we have Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements (BASA), we have outlined maintenance implementation procedures (MIP) to ensure that foreign inspectors are placing appropriate emphasis on the Federal Aviation Regulations when conducting review of work done on U.S. aircraft.  We have a long history and experience with these aviation authorities.  In these countries, we rely on the oversight of the aviation authority in addition to our periodic inspections.  We are also working to ensure that these foreign aviation authorities inform us and seek FAA approval of changes to repair station operations if they directly impact FAA requirements. 

In response to the IG, we have also made some changes to our oversight of foreign repair stations.  For example, we eliminated the 10% sampling requirement on FAA’s inspection of repair stations in countries where there is a BASA/MIP in place.  In FY 2006, FAA conducted sampling inspections in 21% of the repair stations located in these countries.  We have also developed and implemented policy and procedures in the BASA/MIP countries to capture the results from the inspections conducted by foreign authorities.  

It is also important to remember that, by its nature, aviation is truly an international enterprise.  An aircraft, especially in commercial aviation, contains parts manufactured all around the world.  The original equipment manufactures (OEMs) have a wealth of expertise in repairing their products.  In addition, their parts may have warranties.  It would be extremely unwise to restrict a U.S. carrier’s ability to use OEM maintenance, even if the OEM is abroad. 

There are a number of other reasons for air carriers to choose to outsource some maintenance and repair activities.  The expertise of OEMs is so considerable and their work is so consistent that maintenance is often outsourced to them, regardless of whether the maintenance being performed is on a part they manufactured.  In other cases, overseas repair and maintenance facilities may provide a great deal of expertise for lower costs.  Nevertheless, just as aviation safety is in no way compromised by allowing U.S. carriers to fly aircraft made in Europe, in Brazil, or in Canada, so too is safety in no way compromised by allowing other countries to conduct repair and maintenance on our aircraft.

I would like to conclude this morning by saying that our work with the IG’s office in the past few years has been productive.  We have made a number of adjustments that I think have improved the effectiveness of our oversight.  That can only improve safety.  I think we generally agree that we are moving in the right direction.  Certainly, the chart I talked about reflects that airline use of repair stations has not compromised safety.

I understand and appreciate this subcommittee’s concern about the increased use of foreign repair stations.  Obviously, we share a common goal to find ways to improve safety at a historically safe period in U.S. aviation.  I can assure you that my office is totally committed to making whatever adjustments the situation demands when it comes to safety oversight.  Hearings like the one today continue a necessary dialogue.  I do not claim to have all the answers.  I think the changes we have made in recent years are good ones.  But we can’t sit still.  There will always be ways to improve and we will continue to look for them.

This concludes my statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

PEGGY GILLIGAN,
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE MOST WANTED LIST OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD,

ON JUNE 6, 2007.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the state of aviation safety with a focus on the recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Most Wanted List.  The relationship and interaction between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the NTSB is an important component in aviation safety.  Our roles are different, but complimentary.  Through accident investigation, the NTSB makes findings of probable cause that lead to the issuance of safety recommendations.  The FAA receives the vast majority of the NTSB’s safety recommendations.  In turn, the FAA takes action on the vast majority of the NTSB’s recommendations, even when the recommendation asks that we develop new technology to address the recommendations.  We always value the intent of the recommendations, even if we are unable to do exactly what the Board recommends.  Their recommendations represent the ideal, our consideration of those recommendations must, by law, factor in certain realities.

At the same time FAA has a proactive safety agenda that is developed independently from the NTSB.  Naturally, there are overlapping issues, and in many cases, the FAA is already pursuing safety actions well before the NTSB recommendation is received.  We do not wait to act until the NTSB has issued a recommendation.  Just one example of this would be the inspections that were mandated on the A300 composite rudders, following the American Airlines Flight 587 accident.  As the NTSB continued to uncover key information in the investigation, we were gathering fleet information of our own.  In fact, many of our safety priorities over the years have not been in response to the NTSB at all.  For example, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS); the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) Safety Enhancements that indicated the value of Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS); and the initiatives that resulted from Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems (EAPAS) were all developed independent of any NTSB recommendations .  The FAA has a strong sense of responsibility as the world-wide leader for aviation safety, but we do appreciate that it is the role of the NTSB to push us to attain ever more ambitious standards.

The historic safety record we are currently experiencing has been the subject of discussion before this Subcommittee many times recently.  Today’s aviation safety is not attributable to luck or good fortune, but rather it is due to hard work and innovative safety initiatives.  It is important that we put the safety record into the proper context in order to have a better understanding of why it has come about.

About half of all the aviation in the world takes place in the United States.  It is a large, complex system with strong regulation, with 116 major carriers and more than 2,300 smaller commuter and on-demand operators.  Our scheduled carriers alone operate over 32,000 flights each day.  Before an aircraft even enters our system, it has gone through a rigorous approval process against design standards that are the toughest in the world, followed by a separate approval process for production and quality control. 

There are many ways to measure safety, and we use different approaches as we constantly analyze risks and evaluate the benefits of safety measures.  One measure is simple and straight forward.  It compares the number of commercial aviation fatalities per 100 million people carried.  In the early days of commercial flight, the number of fatalities reflected the newness of the venture.  In 1946 we had about 1,300 fatalities for every 100 million people carried.  Jumping ahead to just the last decade, by 1994-1996, the current baseline period against which we measure our progress, that number had dropped to 45.7 fatalities for every 100 million people carried.  And while that record must be considered remarkable, it has been significantly improved upon.  The average from 2004 to 2006 has been 4.2 fatalities for every 100 million carried.

The safety improvement in commercial aviation is an incredible accomplishment, shared by the entire aviation community and it is a story that continues to improve.  Some of the major improvements that have contributed in this decline in fatalities include pressurized aircraft capable of flying above most weather, and precision guidance systems which allow safe landings in limited visibility.  The jet engine, the single greatest safety improvement, provides modern aircraft with large performance margins, and levels of reliability that are orders of magnitude better than the last piston engines in airline service.

But perhaps the most telling fact that explains the reduction in fatalities is the answer to the question, “What are the major causes of airliner accidents today?”  Because the answer is, “There are none.”  Let me cite three specific types of accidents which, like polio and smallpox, used to take a persistent toll, and which, like polio and smallpox, have been virtually eliminated through human ingenuity and determination in finding and implementing solutions.   I say virtually eliminated because I cannot say with certainty that we will never see one of these accidents again, but I can say with certainty that they will not return as persistent and recurring accident types.

Mid-Air Collisions

The last mid-air collision in which a U.S. Airliner was involved occurred 29 years ago.  While the installation of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS) is the most often cited improvement, as with most safety improvements there was a layered approach, including implementation of virtually universal radar coverage in the U.S. National Airspace System, installation of conflict alert technology in the radar system, and effective training of controllers and pilots on the use of this technology.  This success story is instructive on two points as we look for technology to improve safety in other areas including the critical runway environment.  The first point is that the promise of a specific technology can only be safely realized through a methodical implementation process, which assures that safety will not be degraded by unintended consequences of implementation, for example problems like software glitches or high false warning rates.  The second point is that even with superior technology, the human element remains critical.  This was tragically demonstrated in the skies over Germany five years ago, as the pilot of a Russian airliner, which was equipped with a state-of-the-art TCAS system, failed to properly respond to a resolution advisory because it conflicted with an air traffic controller instruction.

Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)

The last commercial airplane Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accident in the United States also occurred 29 years ago.  There are many parallels between the successful interventions addressing CFIT and mid-air collisions.  While the institution of ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) is cited as the single greatest safety enhancement to counter CFIT, again, a layered approach was implemented, which included wide radar coverage and minimum safe altitude warning technology.  Problems of false warnings had to be addressed as GPWS technology evolved, and the crew training element remained critical.   In fact, the last airliner CFIT in the United States occurred when the flight crew disabled the GPWS, after mistakenly thinking the alarm was due to a temporarily excessive descent rate.  The last CFIT accident for a U.S. commercial airplane outside the United States occurred 12 years ago in the non-radar environment near Cali, Columbia.  Since that accident commercial airplanes, along with all turbine-powered aircraft with six or more passenger seats, are required to be equipped with enhanced GPWS, which uses terrain mapping technology to provide earlier and more effective warnings.

Windshear

Again, while the on-board warning system is a key improvement, progress has been made on other important safety enhancements, such as ground-based windshear detection systems, prediction and detection of severe weather, displays of this key information to pilots, and in the critically important area of pilot training.   Modern realistic simulators that mimic the flight environment have provided situational training for pilots to recognize and either avoid or safely escape from severe windshear encounters.  Based on this unmatched record of continuous improvement, the aviation community faces the critical safety issues we are discussing today with confidence and with the unabated determination to further improve.

It is within this context that I would like to touch upon several of the safety areas on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List and what FAA has done in those areas, both in response to NTSB recommendations and on our own initiative.

Fuel Tank Explosions

In the aftermath of the TWA 800 tragedy, all aviation safety experts were focused on how to prevent center fuel tank explosions.  The accident fundamentally altered the assumptions held not only by the FAA and NTSB, but by the entire aviation community.  Preventing another such accident required us to look at different safety options, including how to eliminate ignition sources and how to reduce the flammability of the fuel tank.  In the 11 years that have passed since the accident, the FAA has been extremely effective in increasing the safety of fuel tanks.  We have issued more than 100 Airworthiness Directives (ADs) and a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) to reduce or eliminate ignition sources.  The ADs addressed a broad range of issues, including fuel pump manufacturing discrepancies, wear of fuel system wiring, shielding of fuel system components, and overheating solenoids.  The SFAR, issued in May 2001, changed the way airplanes are designed, operated and maintained.  By the end of 2002, the required manufacturer design reviews resulted in the identification of more than 200 previously unknown ignition sources.  As new ignition sources were identified, the FAA issued additional ADs to address them.  But the sheer volume of ignition sources confirmed that reducing fuel tank flammability was the necessary and complementary strategy to improve fuel tank safety.

Beginning in 1998, the FAA charged the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to evaluate options for reducing the flammable vapors in fuel tanks.  The first of two ARAC groups determined that on-board inerting was too costly and impractical.  In 2001, the second ARAC working group determined that a ground based inerting concept presented a new set of safety and operational issues at airports.  The ARAC group acknowledged that, at that time, on-board inerting options (most of which were used by the military in conditions very dissimilar to commercial aviation) were too complex, heavy, unreliable, and costly. 

What became clear was that the solution to this pressing problem required entirely new approach and FAA set about finding that solution.  FAA scientists and engineers challenged the assumptions that existed at that time and ultimately developed the first prototype inerting system for commercial airplanes.  The purpose of an inerting system is to replace the oxygen in the fuel tank with an inert gas, such as nitrogen, in order to prevent the ignition of fuel vapor.  This means that even if all ignition points have not been identified and dealt with, there is nothing that the ignition source can ignite, thus averting a catastrophic event.  On military aircraft, engine exhaust was typically used to produce the inert gas, but the technologies available could not meet the safety standards required by the FAA and were designed to operate only a few hours per day or per week compared to the average 14 hours per day flown by a commercial airplane.

More recently, nitrogen has been used to render the fuel tank inert.  Various techniques were considered for separating nitrogen from air for use in inerting.  In May 2002, the FAA unveiled a prototype on-board inerting system. We believe our prototype is the simplest and most reliable technology now known.  Finally, the FAA prototype is substantially lighter and smaller than the systems the military uses.  This combination amounted to an important breakthrough.

To remove the likelihood of explosion from unidentified ignition sources, the FAA expects to finalize a rule to require airplane operators to reduce the flammability levels of fuel tank vapors.  We believe fuel tank inerting is the best solution for meeting the standards outlined in the agency’s proposal.

The FAA is extremely proud of our work in this area.  A tragic aircraft accident resulted in the NTSB making safety recommendations for which there was no existing technology at the time.  Utilizing all resources available to us, we kept working the problem from all possible angles.  We challenged assumptions and created new solutions.  This is an example of the aviation community working at its best, combining ingenuity and resources to make flying safer.

Voice and Flight Data Recorders

The FAA views data recorders as important tools for the accident investigation, consequently, we are extremely sensitive to NTSB requests for improvements in this area.  The information provided by Digital Flight Data Recorders (DFDRs) and Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVRs) is often the cornerstone in determining the probable cause of an accident or incident.  Therefore, the FAA has had a generally positive reaction to NTSB recommendations for improvements to data recorders, including those for additional parameters to collect more information.  We are in the process of three rulemaking projects that will address a number of the NTSB recommendations on data recorders.  However, as much as FAA understands the priority NTSB places on data recorder recommendations, the fact is that there are no major accidents for which a probable cause determination has not been concluded.  The value of data recorders is realized only after an accident when the information has been collected and analyzed; they do not prevent accidents in and of themselves.  As accident rate attests, we must be extremely prudent with regard to how we proceed to improve aviation safety. 

The first of these rulemaking projects is an NPRM that proposed a series of improvements to Cockpit Voice Recorders and Flight Data Recorders.  Some of the proposed improvements are longer recording times, independent power sources for each box, and emergency power sources to keep the boxes running when the aircraft’s main power source is disrupted. 

The second rulemaking activity is an NPRM, published in November 2006, to specifically address flight data recorder (FDR) data filtering issues.  This proposed rule clarifies the FAA’s intent to ensure the accurate recording of flight data under all operating conditions.  This clarification will ensure that the NTSB has the most accurate data readily available to conduct investigations in a timely manner.

The third rulemaking project began in November 1999 when the FAA proposed the addition of flight recorder equipment to monitor the Boeing 737 rudder system after several rudder system anomalies had been identified.  The FAA made several safety improvements to the B737 rudder system, and subsequently mandated a redesign of the rudders system.  In September 2006, the FAA published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to assess the need for recording additional B737 rudder parameters. 

The improvements required by these three rulemaking efforts will achieve the right balance between enhancing accident investigation and wisely investing our safety resources.

Icing

This is another area where the Board has recommended that the FAA design the solution, test the effectiveness of the solution, and then mandate the solution.  As meteorologists will attest, simply understanding some of these icing phenomena is difficult and complex.  And then determining how to address these phenomena to assure safe aircraft operations takes time.  That’s why we have taken a multi-pronged approach to the icing issue by taking immediate safety actions, as well as performing longer-term research to improve our understanding of icing phenomena. 

One of our most effective tools to address safety issues is the airworthiness directive (AD).  We have issued over 100 ADs to address multiple threats from icing on over 50 different aircraft models.  These ADs cover safety issues ranging from crew operating procedures in the icing environment to direct design changes.  These ADs have had the effect of significantly reducing the icing risk to the overall fleet. 

Following the issuance of ADs, the FAA conducts general rulemaking intended to institutionally prevent the same icing risk for future airplane designs that were averted by implementing ADs on specific models. FAA is presently in the process of two rulemaking efforts on icing.  The first, which we anticipate publishing as a final rule, requires designers to demonstrate specific airplane performance handling qualities for flights in icing conditions.  The second rulemaking is an NPRM, published on April 26, 2007, entitled Activation of Ice Protection, which would introduce requirements to ensure timely activation of ice protection systems (IPS).  The proposed rule would require installation of an ice detector or activation of the IPS based on visible moisture and temperature..

The recommendation that we have not yet been able to address in rulemaking is related to a phenomenon known as supercooled large droplet (SLD) icing conditions.  This phenomenon has been a challenge because conditions that result in SLD are difficult to forecast and detect.  It is also not easy to reproduce in a test environment.  So, to first forecast and characterize SLD, then reproduce it, and finally evaluate its affect on aircraft operations has required extensive research.  Our research has engaged leading experts from academia, industry, and the government.  Due to the technical complexity, our activities continue today.  We are committed to identifying the right solution for long term design and operational requirements for the SLD threat.  In addition, we have issued numerous ADs that direct the crews of certain airplane designs to monitor and detect early signs of the onset of SLD conditions and to exit the area immediately.  These ADs serve as an effective interim measure until such time we complete our research on SLD and complete the necessary rulemaking.

Runway Incursions

Reducing the risk of runway incursions is one of the FAA’s top priorities.  The agency has been aggressively addressing the issue and has made progress reducing the most serious incidents, particularly those involving commercial aircraft.  The number of serious runway incursions – called Category A and B – has dropped by more than 40 percent since fiscal year 2001.  In 2006 there was only one serious incursion for every 2 million take-offs and landings.

The FAA has implemented important new technologies to allow tower controllers to see everything that takes place around them.  One of these is the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS).  AMASS tracks ground movements and provides an alert so controllers can notify the crew if evasive action is required.  The FAA has installed AMASS at the nation’s top 34 airports.  ASDE-X, or Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X, is an even more sophisticated surface detection technology.  While AMASS is radar-based, meaning signals might bounce off rain and fog, ASDE-X integrates data from a variety of sources, including surface movement radars located on air traffic control towers or remote towers, multi-lateration sensors, and aircraft transponders, to give controllers a more reliable view of airport operations, especially during bad weather. 

By fusing the data from these sources, ASDE-X is able to determine the position and identification of aircraft and transponder-equipped vehicles on the airport movement area, as well as aircraft flying within five miles of the airport.  Controllers in the tower see this information presented as a color display of aircraft and vehicle positions overlaid on a map of the airport’s runways, taxiways and approach corridors.  The FAA is in the process of enhancing ASDE-X with visual and audio alarms that will alert controllers to potential collisions.

The first ASDE-X was activated for operational use and testing at General Mitchell International Airport in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in June 2003.  In addition to Milwaukee, ASDE-X is now operational at T.F. Green Airport in Providence, RI; Orlando International Airport in Orlando, FL; Hobby Airport in Houston, TX; Lambert-St. Louis International in St. Louis, MO; Seattle-Tacoma International in Seattle, WA; Bradley International in Hartford, CT; and Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta, GA.  ASDE-X is scheduled to be deployed at all 35 OEP airports.

The FAA is also testing new technologies that will alert pilots to potential runway incursions.  One of these, called Runway Status Lights, is just what is sounds like – an advanced series of runway lights, not unlike traffic lights, that tell pilots whether or not runways are clear.  The operational evaluation of the runway entrance lights using ASDE-X surface surveillance was completed in June 2005 at Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport, and the system showed promising initial results.  An enhanced lighting configuration is being installed on a second runway at DFW this year.  The evaluation of Runway Status Lights with AMASS began last year at San Diego’s Lindbergh Field.  Other new technologies include an experimental system called the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS), which is being tested at the Long Beach/Daugherty Field Airport in California.  FAROS is designed to prevent accidents on airport runways by activating a flashing light visible to landing pilots to warn them that the runway is occupied and hazardous.

Fatigue

Flight and Duty time rules have been in existence since the 1950s, and the 121 domestic and 135 scheduled rules were updated in 1985.  The rules on pilot flight time and rest have evolved along with advances in commercial air travel.  The FAA is confident that, overall, the airline industry complies with the FAA’s current rules. In the intervening time, much research has been done on fatigue, which has resulted in a better understanding of complex fatigue-related issues.  The research tells us that this issue does not easily lend itself to a set of prescriptive rules.  While the existing prescriptive rules have served us well, they do not allow for the flexibility needed to address the various flight regimes that exist. 

Understanding the limits of a strictly prescriptive regulatory regime, we worked to alleviate fatigue through other means.  Fatigue countermeasures were first developed by NASA, and include providing in-flight rest, as well as training crew members on the use of proper diet, exercising, and even caffeine to manage fatigue.  Fatigue countermeasures are covered during Crew Resource Management (CRM) initial training and during CRM recurrent training. 

It is also critical to understand the role that personal responsibility plays in fatigue and why prescriptive rules can only provide a framework for safety.  Crew members, mechanics, air traffic controllers, everyone involved in the safety of flight must make a personal commitment to report for work well rested and ready to perform their duties.  No regulatory scheme can instill that sense of personal commitment and professionalism. 

One thing we know, aviation operations will always challenge us in the area of flight time and rest.  Aircraft design allows for longer and longer flight times.  Recently, FAA issued approval to Delta Airlines for flights in excess of 16 hours from New York JFK to Mumbai, India.  This approval was our first implementation of a fatigue risk management approach.  Delta proposed – and we analyzed and approved – a detailed plan to assure the crew is rested before the flight begins, is provided appropriate rest throughout the flight, and have sufficient rest before conducting the return flight.

The procedure specifically addresses the impact to circadian rhythm, including the recognized affect of circadian law which occurs at specific times in the daily cycle.  This is an example of where we need to move in the future – away from prescriptive rules and into fatigue risk management.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me restate that the FAA’s first priority has always been, and will always be, safety.  As I said at the outset, we very much appreciate the unique relationship FAA has with the NTSB and we consider them a vital partner in advancing the safety of our Nation’s skies.  The interaction between the FAA and the NTSB is certainly a factor in the unparalleled safety record we have achieved in recent years.  NTSB has the responsibility to push us and the industry by identifying everything that could be done.  The FAA has the responsibility to determine the actions that will provide the greatest safety benefit.  We believe we have achieved the proper balance and are, understandably, proud of the safety record we are currently enjoying.  We will continue to strive to implement NTSB’s recommendations as quickly as prudence, technology and science will allow. 

This concludes my statement, and I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.