MARCH 15, 2005

Chairman Mica, Congressman Costello, and Members of the Subcommittee,

Good morning, it is a pleasure to be here today as the Subcommittee on Aviation explores an important issue for aviation safety—the focusing of lasers on cockpits of aircraft and helicopters.  I am Nick Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and this morning, I would like to provide an overview of how hand-held lasers are regulated, the potential of catastrophic events from the irradiation of a cockpit, and what the FAA is doing to protect air crew members from these incidents. 

With me today is Dr. Van Nakagawara, a Research Optometrist and Vision Research Team Leader at the FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, popularly known as CAMI.  Dr. Nakagawara is the lead author of a study entitled, “The Effects of Laser Illumination on Operational and Visual Performance of Pilots During Final Approach,” which was published in June 2004.

In recent years, LASER (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) devices have become less expensive and more commonplace.  Lasers are used in supermarket scanners, CD and DVD players, construction and surveying instruments, laser pointers for presentations, and for other medical and industrial purposes.  Also, lasers are often used outdoors as part of orchestrated laser light shows at theme parks, casinos, and special events.

The issue of how lasers affect pilots and whether they pose a threat to aviation safety has received media attention recently.  The aviation safety issue is very straightforward.  Obviously, pilots use their eyes to obtain the vast majority (approximately 80%) of all the information needed to safely fly an aircraft.  Operation of an aircraft at night presents additional visual challenges.  Exposure to relatively bright light such as a laser, when the eye is adapted to low-light levels, can result in temporary visual impairment.  Visual effects can last from several seconds to several minutes.  The three most common physiological effects associated with exposure to bright lights are:  1) glare, 2) flash-blindness, and 3) afterimage.

The principal concern for pilots is the possibility of being illuminated with a laser during terminal operations, which include approach, landing and take-off.  Pilots conducting low-altitude operations at night are particularly vulnerable to accidental or malicious laser illumination. 

Let me state at the outset that, to date, no accidents have been attributed to the illumination of air crew members by lasers.  While a few of these incidents have resulted in reported eye injury, no civilian pilot has had any permanent visual impairment as a result of laser exposure.  However, given the considerable number of reported laser incidents—over 400 since 1990—and approximately 112 incidents since November 2004, the potential for an aviation accident does exist.

I want to emphasize that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assures us that they have no information that would suggest that any of these incidents is in any way related to terrorist activity.  Some incidents have made national news.  One such incident occurred in December when a father and daughter allegedly were experimenting with a new laser pointer to test its capabilities.  The man allegedly pointed it at an aircraft on its final approach, and then, two days later, at a helicopter.  The helicopter was operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department, who were searching for the suspect in the earlier laser incident, when it was illuminated.  The helicopter was able to identify the location based on the earlier complaint, and the man was arrested.

FAA’s role in the issues surrounding the use of lasers rests with our mandate to ensure aviation safety.  There are other entities who are investigating this issue from a security perspective, and it is important for everyone to understand the various roles and responsibilities.  The FAA has no authority to either regulate lasers or take enforcement action against individuals who illuminate aircraft cockpits.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has authority to regulate light-emitting products and electronic product radiation.  With respect to the enforcement issue, federal, state and local law enforcement entities have the authority to prosecute individuals who recklessly illuminate aircraft cockpits.  Certainly, FAA has an important role in working with these entities to ensure aviation safety, but our role is not a primary one. 

The FDA regulates lasers under their “Performance Standards for Light-Emitting Products.”  This FDA standard utilizes the American National Standard Institute (ANSI Z136.1) recommended Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) of 2.5 milliwatts per centimeter squared for continuous wave lasers, which is applied to the previously established Normal Flight Zone to prevent ocular tissue damage in all navigable airspace.  The MPE is used to calculate the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance (NOHD), which is the distance of a laser beam beyond which an individual may be exposed without risk of ocular tissue damage. 

Based in part on historical laser safety data and military research on vision performance loss from laser exposure, the FAA issued a revised FAA Order 7400.2 on December 31, 2002, which includes new guidelines for Flight Safe Exposure Limits (FSELs) in specific zones of navigable airspace associated with airport terminal operations.   The revised FAA Order 7400.2 establishes four specific zones:  1) the Laser Free Flight Zone; 2) the Critical Flight Zone; 3) the Sensitive Flight Zone; and 4) the Normal Flight Zone.  The Laser Free Flight Zone includes airspace in the immediate proximity of the airport, up to and including 2,000 feet above ground level, extending two nautical miles in all directions measured from the runway centerline.  The Critical Flight Zone includes the space outside the Laser Free Flight Zone to a distance of 10 nautical miles from the Airport Reference Point to 10,000 feet above ground level.  Virtually all of the lasing incidents to date have occurred in the Critical Flight Zone.  The parameters of the Sensitive Flight Zone include airspace outside the critical flight zones that authorities (e.g., FAA, local departments of aviation, military) have identified that must be protected from the potential effects of laser emissions.  The Normal Flight Zone includes all navigable airspace not defined by the Laser Free, Critical, or Sensitive Flight Zones.

The necessity of establishing Laser Free Zones around airports is documented in the results of a study done by CAMI and published in June 2004.  The study consisted of subjecting 34 pilots to four eye-safe levels of visible laser light during four final approach maneuvers in a flight simulator.  All test subjects were volunteers who participated after giving informed consent.  Subjective responses were solicited after each trial and during an exit interview, and the pilots were asked to rate the affect the laser exposure had on their ability to operate the aircraft and on their visual performance. 

Approximately 75 percent of the responses solicited from subjects indicated they had experienced adverse visual effects resulting in some degree of operational difficulty when illuminated by laser radiation during final approach maneuvers at or below 100 feet above ground level.  Even at the lowest level of laser exposure, two-thirds of the responses indicated that the subjects experienced glare, flash-blindness, or afterimages.  However, it is important to note that all subjects were able to maintain operational control, and safely land the plane or successfully execute a missed approach.  Significantly, none of the actual lasing incidents against aircraft to date have occurred within these parameters.

In response to the recent increase in reports of pilots being illuminated with lasers, and as a result of the findings in the CAMI report, Secretary Mineta announced on January 12, 2005, a new FAA policy designed to protect air crews and passengers, and to discourage future laser incidents.  Secretary Mineta directed the FAA to distribute an Advisory Circular, AC 70-02, which contains new guidelines to give pilots, air traffic controllers, and law enforcement timely information about laser incidents.  The new guidelines will help pilots identify areas where lasers have been sighted; will assist controllers in reporting laser incidents; and will give law enforcement officers the information as quickly as possible in order to investigate and prosecute those persons who put aircraft at risk. 

As of January 19, 2005, all pilots are now requested to immediately report any laser sightings to air traffic controllers, who will then be required to share these reports through the Federal Domestic Events Network.  Once these laser incidents are posted on the network, air traffic controllers will work with law enforcement entities to identify the source of the lasers, with the goal of assisting police in locating the scene of the lasing incident swiftly, and hopefully, apprehending the person responsible.  As Secretary Mineta said when announcing this new policy, “We must act now, before someone’s reckless actions lead to a terrible and tragic incident.”

At the present time, there is no system or device that can be installed on aircraft or given to pilots and crew to protect them from these incidents without possibly affecting operational performance.  The U.S. Military has dedicated a great deal of time and research to finding ways of protecting their pilots from an enemy’s use of lasers to impair pilot performance during military flight operations.  Their efforts have established that there is no easy answer to this problem.  For example, efforts to develop pilot goggles that will screen out all the wavelengths of visible lasers, and thereby prevent any adverse affects from exposure to them, have proven to have limited practical application and may even be potentially hazardous to flight safety.  Screening out the wavelengths that produce red and green light (the most common colors of lasers) would also impair the pilot’s ability to read the instruments in current cockpits, which are often displayed in either green or magenta.  The goggles can also impair the pilot’s vision by reducing the amount of visible light.  Both of these results are unacceptable.  Consequently, other initiatives that call for installing filters or screens on cockpit windscreens to intercept or deflect lasers could similarly result in an unacceptable reduction of critical visibility for safe flight.  Protecting pilots from the real, but remote, risk of being illuminated by a commercially available laser powerful enough to cause an accident cannot be accomplished by a solution that could create an even more dangerous operating condition.  We at the FAA are working with the Department of Defense to explore technologies and protocols that may provide protection for pilots and air crews, while not impairing their ability to safely operate their aircraft.

An alternative solution may be an operational one.  We are hopeful that by obtaining and evaluating more information on the affects and risks of laser illumination, FAA might, at some point, be in a position to develop protocols for pilots to follow to best mitigate the affects of a laser, much as we have for other operational challenges.  Examples of these protocols for flight crews include:  shielding their eyes to the maximum extent possible, yet consistent with aircraft control and safety; avoiding flight within areas of reported on-going unauthorized laser activity; and avoiding areas, if practicable, where an incident has just been reported and a warning broadcasted.  Other measures could include obtaining authorization to deviate from the last assigned clearance in the event laser activity is encountered, and expediting the reporting of incidents to the appropriate air traffic control facility.

In the interim, the FAA will continue to partner with the Department of Homeland Security to better define the threat posed by laser devices and identify countermeasures to minimize the risk to aviation safety.  We will also work collaboratively with Department of Defense scientists to determine whether any of their research could have practical applications to the civil aviation arena.  It is our hope that the Advisory Circular the Secretary announced earlier this year will result in an improvement in the ability of state and local government to prosecute individuals who intentionally attempt to focus lasers on aircraft.  Aggressive enforcement will hopefully discourage reckless laser use.  The FAA will also continue working with the FDA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission to improve product labeling and better educate the general public concerning the potential harm from the inappropriate use of lasers.  Improved labels and better education represent the best means of raising awareness among the public in the short term.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

JON L. JORDAN, M.D.,
FEDERAL AIR SURGEON,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE FAA’S AGE 60 COMMERCIAL PILOT RULE

JULY 19, 2005

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Age-60 rule, which provides that a pilot may not engage in what are known as part 121 operations if the pilot has reached his 60^th birthday.  Part 121 covers operations of large commercial passenger aircraft, smaller propeller aircraft with 10 or more passenger seats, and common carriage operations of all-cargo aircraft with a payload capacity of 7500 pounds.  I am accompanied today by my colleague, Jim Ballough, Director of FAA’s Flight Standards Service.

The Age-60 rule represents the FAA's best determination of the time when a general decline in health-related functions and overall cognitive and performance capabilities may begin and reach a level where a pilot's judgement and physical ability may begin to decline and therefore jeopardize safety.  Our rule means that a pilot who reaches age 60 must leave part 121 operations, but it does not mean that he or she can no longer play an important role in aviation.  Many pilots continue to work for part 121 airlines in the screening, recruitment and training of pilot applicants, serve as flight engineers, or fly in non-part 121 operations, or become flight instructors, or, fortunately for us, work as safety inspectors for the FAA.

Since its adoption in 1959, the FAA has reviewed the Age-60 rule several times to determine whether new and sufficient evidence exists to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation.  The FAA has also successfully defended the rule in several administrative and judicial challenges. 

FAA has conducted five studies on the relationship of pilot age to accidents between 1999 and 2004.  The first four studies were conducted at the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which requested in 1999 that the FAA study and provide data regarding relative accident rates based on pilot age.  The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) conducted a four-part study.  The four studies were as follows:  1) an annotated bibliography of the scientific literature (1990-1999); 2) a re-analysis of the Chicago Tribune study data (1999) relating pilot age and accident rates; 3) an empirical analysis of accident rates by pilot age for professional pilots holding Air Transport Pilot (ATP) and Class 1 medical certificates between 1988 and 1997; and, 4) an empirical analysis of accident rates by pilot age for professional pilots holding ATP or Commercial Pilot and Class 1 or Class 2 medical certificates between 1988 and 1997.

Certain aspects of the analytic methodology used in the third and fourth studies were criticized in the open scientific literature.  In response, the first author for those studies, Dr. Dana Broach of CAMI, re-analyzed the accident rate data.  That study was published in 2004.  The 2004 study used more restrictive criteria to select which accidents to include in the analysis than were used in the previous studies.  Taken together, the criteria resulted in an “apples-to-apples” comparison of accident rates for pilots age 60-63 and younger pilots in that the accident and non-accident pilots had the same credentials, worked for the same employers, and operated complex, multi-engine commuter or larger aircraft now covered by Part 121.  As in the previous studies, the data were aggregated by age group (in five-year increments) and year, and analyzed with the same statistical technique. 

The results of the 2004 study were similar to those reported in the third and fourth empirical studies previously reported to Congress.  Overall, accident rate increased with pilot age.  The patterns of findings across the three empirical studies are similar – there appears to be a relationship between pilot age and accident rate.  The consistency of this finding across the three empirical studies suggests that changes to the Age 60 rule should be approached cautiously.

I must emphasize that before making any change to a safety rule, the FAA must be satisfied that the regulation will maintain or raise the current level of safety.  What is clear to us from reviewing public comments and relevant literature concerning the Age-60 rule is that there is no single "right answer."  What is also clear is that the question for the FAA is one of public safety and determining acceptable risk.  At this time, the FAA cannot be assured that changing the Age-60 rule will maintain or raise the level of safety. 

At some age, every individual reaches a level of increased infirmity leading to decreased reliability.  That age will vary from person to person but cannot yet be predicted in a specific individual.  While science does not absolutely dictate the age of 60 for commercial passenger pilot retirement, that age is within the age range during which sharp increases in disease mortality and morbidity occur.  Clearly, there is a progressive anatomic, physiological, and cognitive decline associated with aging, albeit variable in severity and onset among individuals.  There is no absolute, scientific formula that may be readily applied.

It is indisputable that, as people age, they experience more illnesses and disorders, and suffer more cognitive decline.  Cardiovascular disease rises with age, steeply, beginning between ages 55 and 65, and, though mortality has dropped since 1960, cardiovascular disease remains the most frequent cause of death in pilots and the general population.  With this increased incidence of cardiovascular disease in the older population, the risk for unexpected events that could be a threat to safety of flight is increased.  Cardiac events (e.g., heart attacks, heart failure) during flight have continued to occur in low but fairly consistent numbers over the years and have caused general aviation accidents.

Other health conditions are known to increase in incidence or to become more complicated with aging.  Many present greater difficulties of detection and risk assessment than do cardiovascular disease.  Among these are cerebrovascular disease; malignancies; endocrine dysfunction; neurological disorders; psychiatric disorders, including depression; and decline in sensory and motor capabilities.  There has been an increasing awareness of the more subtle adverse conditions affecting performance, such as those related to cognitive functioning.

The “Age 60 rule” has served well as a regulatory limit in the United States.  It remains the best determination that can be made of the time when a general decline in health-related functions and overall cognitive capabilities has reached a level where decrements in a pilot's performance may jeopardize safety.  The “Age 60 rule” has been repeatedly reviewed to determine whether new and sufficient evidence exists to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation.  Studies conducted to date do not present sufficient information that would address concerns about negatively impacting the current level of safety by changing the rule. 

The FAA has invited the public to provide comments on the viability of the “Age 60 rule.”  The most recent comment period was opened in September 2002 in relation to a petition for exemption to the rule filed by a coalition of U.S. pilots approaching age 60.  Nearly 7,000 comments were submitted during the month-long open comment period.  Overwhelmingly, the comments favored retaining the current “Age 60 rule.”  They cited safety and medical issues most often as reasons for retention of the current rule. 

Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have reviewed the “Age 60 rule” and studies related to the rule.  Uniformly, these courts have denied petitioners’ requests for relief from the rule.  In September 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to review FAA’s denial of a petition for exemptions from the rule.  In May 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear arguments on the same matter.

In recent years several bills to revise the age limit for airliner pilots have been introduced.  In February 2001, a bill to modify the “Age 60 rule” by increasing the age limit to age 65 was referred to the House Subcommittee on Aviation.  In March 2001, a bill to modify the “Age 60 rule” to age 63 was favorably reported by this Committee.  Neither bill was ultimately enacted.  Most recently, legislation was proposed earlier this year that would tie an age limit for air carrier pilots to Social Security retirement age eligibility. 

Modifying the long-standing baseline of age 60 in the U.S. requires that the public be shown how such modification would maintain an equivalent level of safety.  The “Age 60 rule” is a long-standing operational rule that pre-dates subsequent studies completed over the years.  None of the studies completed since implementation of the rule provide satisfactory data that conclusively supports changing the rule.  No protocols exist to reliably predict when or whether an over-age-60 pilot might experience a medical event that could jeopardize aviation safety.  With inconclusive data and no practical experience with pilots above age 60, the FAA does not agree, at this time, to modify the current age limit for airliner pilots. 

Mr. Chairman, the FAA will develop regulations in the context of what is best for public safety.  The FAA's primary mission is ensuring the safety of the National Airspace System.  We work hard to manage a growth oriented aviation system--and the constraints on the system that growth imposes--in the most efficient and safe way possible.  The FAA establishes, through our regulations, basic safety standards for aircraft and crewmembers that will ensure the safety of our traveling public.  We construct our regulations very carefully, taking into account as many factors as we can, but ultimately, always making the decision that will best enhance aviation safety.  While economic factors are certainly a part of that calculation, I am sure the Committee and our colleagues in industry would agree that safety must be the top priority.

That concludes my prepared remarks.  I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF

JON L. JORDAN, M.D., J.D.
FEDERAL AIR SURGEON,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

EFFORTS TO PREVENT PANDEMICS BY AIR TRAVEL

APRIL 6, 2005

Chairman Mica, Congressman Costello and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Jon L. Jordan, the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Federal Air Surgeon.  It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the efforts to prevent pandemics by air travel.  I recognize that this is a priority of this Subcommittee and FAA shares your concerns.  It has also been a matter of significant concern to aviation passengers and the crews that earn their living by working on commercial transport aircraft.  Secretary Mineta and Administrator Blakey both take these concerns seriously.  They are supportive of efforts to help protect the health, safety and comfort of the traveling public and cabin crews. 

The FAA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have strengthened their relationship with the airline industry on the issues of infectious diseases and travelers’ health through the Air Transport Association’s Medical Committee.  The FAA and the CDC have become regular attendees at the meetings of the Medical Committee of the Air Transport Association.  The effectiveness of this growing partnership was demonstrated during the SARS outbreak, when the CDC and the ATA Medical Committee conducted weekly teleconferences to discuss developments, and the CDC and FAA took special care to make sure that the airline industry received notice of all updates and alerts issued by the CDC on SARS.  Presently, the CDC is exploring with the airline industry methods to improve communications in a number of areas.

An important new initiative is underway in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, (OST). OST in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services is compiling a Best Practices Manual to provide airport operators and local health authorities with assistance in responding to the threats of contagious diseases at international gateway airports.  Guidelines and other important information are being assembled from experiences at airports throughout the world, and will be used for training sessions that the CDC plans to begin this spring.  This project will result in the publication by the Department of a Best Practices Manual, which will be available to airport owners and operators and public health officials.

Considering the potential of pandemics and contagious disease transmission on airliners in general, issues inevitably arise concerning the quality of air in airliner cabins.  It is important, however, to understand that studies have indicated that many aspects of cabin air are as good as or better than the air found in office and home environments.  Air carriers have the benefit of flying at altitudes above the air pollution that is circulated into spaces on the ground that we occupy on a daily basis.

For those aircraft that recirculate some part of the cabin air, that air is typically passed through high quality filters before it returns to the cabin.  Manufacturers of new airplanes used by air carriers incorporate either High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters, similar to those used in hospital isolation areas and surgical suites, or particulate filters that are somewhat less efficient.  HEPA filters are defined by the EPA as those with a filtering efficiency of 99.97 percent.  These filters remove dust, vapors, bacteria and fungi.  HEPA filters also effectively capture some viruses.  Several airlines, in coordination with aircraft manufacturers, have even installed HEPA filters on board airplanes that did not originally incorporate them into their design.

Today, I will describe new developments related to airliner cabin air as well as FAA’s ongoing efforts in this area. 

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT

In December 2001, the National Research Council (NRC) completed a congressionally-directed study of cabin air quality.  The NRC developed ten recommendations related to cabin air quality.  FAA concurred with the intent of all of the recommendations and, for many of these recommendations, we have either completed actions that address the underlying concerns or we are in the process of addressing specific items. 

The first four NRC recommendations involve assessing the validity of current regulations related to airplane ventilation systems and potential contaminants of cabin air.  We anticipate that by the close of 2006 or early 2007, when a comprehensive study on cabin air quality being conducted by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) is completed, that substantial data will be available for our consideration that will enable us to do these assessments.

NRC Recommendation 5 addresses allergen exposure.  Allergens in the airplane cabin are a serious, potentially life-threatening issue for a small segment of the airline passenger population.  Although some air carriers do not allow pets in the cabins, FAA and DOT regulations do not prohibit animals in air carriers for two primary reasons.  We believe that most animal allergens are brought onto the airplane on the clothes of passengers rather than by animals.  Therefore, prohibiting small animals altogether would have only a modest reduction in allergen levels.  In addition, carriage of service animals in the cabin may be necessary to assist disabled travelers.  FAA issued an Advisory Circular (AC) providing information to passengers, crew, and operators on how to prepare for air travel when allergens could present a medical concern and how to respond in the case of an allergen induced medical emergency. 

The agency also issued an AC implementing NRC Recommendation 7, concerning ventilation failure or shutdowns on the ground.  We have advised air carriers to remove passengers from an airplane within 30 minutes of a ventilation failure or shutdown, as long as operational safety is not compromised.

In Recommendation 6, the NRC suggested that FAA increase efforts to provide information on health issues related to air travel to crew, passengers and health professionals.  FAA has taken significant steps to make available information and recommendations regarding air travel health and medical issues through the FAA website, and have linked our site with the CDC website, and other websites that provide health information to passengers and crews.

In Recommendations 8 and 9, NRC recommends that FAA establish a surveillance and research program for air quality and health that would provide the data to analyze the relationship between cabin air quality and health effects or complaints.  These recommendations are being addressed through research efforts by the FAA’s newly established Center of Excellence for Airliner Cabin Environment (ACER), which I discuss in detail below, and ASHRAE.  The data collected from these studies on air quality and the potential air quality correlation with health concerns will provide us with information essential to developing an implementation plan for the first four NRC recommendations.  As I mentioned earlier, FAA expects data to be available by the end of 2006 or early 2007, and thereafter, as a result of the work done both by ASHRAE and FAA’S ACER.

FAA AIR TRANSPORTATION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

FOR AIRLINER CABIN ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH

In September of 2004, the FAA announced the establishment of the Air Transportation Center of Excellence for Airliner Cabin Environment Research (ACER), headed by Auburn University.  ACER will research cabin air quality and conduct an assessment of chemical and biological threats.  Other universities taking part in the effort include Purdue University, Harvard University, Boise State University, Kansas State University, the University of California at Berkeley, and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.  The FAA will provide funding for the center and matching funds will be provided by the private sector.  

ACER will conduct a comprehensive and integrated program of research and development on the cabin environment.  The team brings the diverse expertise necessary to conduct research on the healthfulness of the cabin environment for passengers and crew, enhancement of aircraft environmental control systems, and detection and mitigation of chemical and biological threats aboard aircraft.  ACER aims to be a unique resource for airlines, equipment manufacturers, cabin crews and the traveling public, and places a major emphasis on partnerships with industry.  Among others, the University of Oregon and Oklahoma State University will contribute to this research effort.

DISINSECTION

Chemical disinsection—a term used to describe the process of ridding an airplane of insects-- has been a long-time concern, although a 1995 World Health Organization report concluded that aircraft disinsection, if performed appropriately, would not present a risk to human health.  Chemical disinsection has been significantly reduced and approximately half of the 15 countries that still require disinsection of all in-bound flights allow disinsection prior to boarding the aircraft.  The Office of the Secretary of Transportation chairs an interagency working group that is taking a lead in researching and developing means of non-chemical disinsection of aircraft.  OST’s efforts are currently focused on air curtain technology, which would prevent insects from both entering and leaving aircraft, thus eliminating the need for treatment with pesticides.  DOT is about to embark on a pilot program with Jamaica to demonstrate this technology. 

TUFTS-NEW ENGLAND MEDICAL CENTER STUDY

The Lancet published, in its March 12, 2005 issue, a study by doctors at Tufts-New England Medical Center and the Lahey Clinic Medical Center entitled, “Transmission of Infectious Diseases During Commercial Air Travel.”  The report notes that cabin air quality has been the focus of many media investigations and criticism from special interest groups and that most of this concern is associated with the perception that airborne particles are distributed throughout the entire cabin by the ventilation system.  The report states, however, that no peer-reviewed scientific work links cabin air quality and aircraft ventilation rates to heightened health risks compared with other modes of transport or with office buildings.  The report concludes that the environmental control system used in commercial aircraft seems to restrict the spread of airborne pathogens, and the perceived risk is greater than the actual risk.

CONCLUSION

In closing, on behalf of Administrator Blakey, I would like to reiterate that FAA is committed to ensuring the safest flight possible – from the safety of the operation of the aircraft to the quality of the air that passengers and crew breathe inside the cabin.  I look forward to working with the Subcommittee regarding any concerns you may have on the quality of airliner cabin air and specifically, efforts to prevent pandemics by air travel.  This concludes my testimony, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

MICHAEL A. CIRILLO
VICE PRESIDENT, SYSTEM OPERATIONS SERVICES
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION

ON

THE MAY 11 INCIDENT THAT LED TO THE EVACUATION
OF THE US CAPITOL, WHITE HOUSE AND SUPREME COURT

JUNE 9, 2005.

Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye, Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) responsibility in matters involving general aviation security, particularly in and around the Nation’s Capital.  This includes the role FAA played with respect to the incident that occurred on May 11, 2005, which led to the evacuation of the U.S. Capitol, the White House and the Supreme Court.  I will also discuss how FAA will help implement the Administration’s recent decision to reopen Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) to general aviation on a limited basis.  It’s a pleasure to be here with my colleague from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

As you know, since September 11^th, security in and around our Nation’s Capital has changed significantly.  With respect to aviation, a number of restrictions and procedures have been put in place that were designed to protect the significant assets in this area.  At the outset, I would note that the restrictions and requirements for operating aircraft in this area are unique.  Ordinarily, a general aviation aircraft operating at low altitudes and under visual flight rules (VFR) could operate legally within the National Airspace System without filing a flight plan or communicating with air traffic control.  Flights occur all the time around the country without direct FAA control or contact.  For obvious reasons, however, that is not the case in this area.  When aircraft approach the national capital region, we want to know who they are and where they are going. 

There are two airspace zones established around the national capital region.  There is a 2,000 square mile area surrounding Washington’s three major airports known as the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).  How flights are handled heading toward or entering the ADIZ varies depending on the existing threat level, but generally aircraft operating in the zone are required to file a flight plan, be in continuous communication with air traffic control, and have a functioning transponder that transmits a discrete or uniquely identifiable code.  Within the ADIZ and extending approximately fifteen miles around the U.S. Capitol is the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ).  Additional operating requirements apply to general aviation aircraft operating within the FRZ, including applying for and receiving a TSA and FAA waiver.

Unidentified aircraft operating in restricted airspace are taken very seriously.  FAA is a member of the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), a group comprised of representatives of security and military agencies to ensure that, in the event of a threat from an unidentified aircraft, coordinated action can be taken to appropriately address the threat and keep the region safe.

An analysis of what happened on May 11, 2005 will serve as a good example of how FAA interacts with other agencies when an unidentified aircraft approaches Washington, D.C.  At 11:28 a.m., FAA and the NCRCC became aware of an aircraft entering the ADIZ from the northeast, approximately 44 miles from DCA.  The FAA’s watch officer for key communications working with the Domestic Events Network (DEN), contacted the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (Potomac TRACON), which confirmed to participating NCRCC agencies that the aircraft was not in communication with air traffic control, had not filed a flight plan and that its transponder was transmitting a generic, rather than a unique code.  At this point, the aircraft was considered to be a track of interest (TOI).  Because the aircraft was flying just within and parallel to the northern boundary of the ADIZ, it was not considered an immediate threat and, while it was monitored closely, no intercept action was taken at this point. 

The aircraft subsequently turned southbound toward the FRZ, the second restricted zone surrounding the Capitol.  This information was communicated on the DEN to the participating NCRCC agencies.  At this point, the Customs and Border Protection Office of Marine Operations (AMO) ordered the launch of its Blackhawk helicopter and Citation jet aircraft from DCA.  In addition, two F-16 aircraft were scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base.  The AMO Blackhawk initially intercepted the aircraft about 10 miles north of the Capitol.  When the aircraft continued to proceed south toward the Capitol, the F-16s moved in to intercept.  The aircraft was visually identified as a high-winged, single-engine Cessna-type aircraft. 

Attempts by the Blackhawk helicopter to signal to the pilots of the Cessna and get them to communicate on an emergency frequency were initially unsuccessful.  At noon, the Department of Defense authorized the F-16 pilots to use flares.  The flares were dispensed when the aircraft was 6.7 miles from DCA.  At this time, the Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol Police made the decision to evacuate the White House and the Capitol, respectively.  The Blackhawk continued to signal to the pilots to get them to communicate with them.  Ultimately, the Cessna pilots were able to make contact with the AMO Citation on an emergency frequency and the Cessna turned west.  The Cessna proceeded through the prohibited airspace over the Naval Observatory with the F-16s in escort.  As the aircraft exited the FRZ, the Blackhawk joined the escort north.

The Potomac TRACON reported on the DEN that the pilots were in communication with air traffic controllers at 12:22 p.m.  The pilots reported to the controllers that they had been instructed to proceed to the airport in Frederick, Maryland.  Escorted by the Blackhawk and the F-16s, the aircraft exited the ADIZ at12:25 p.m. and landed in Frederick at 12:39 p.m.  During the flight, Potomac TRACON controllers communicated with the pilots several times to tell them how far they were from the airport and to warn them to look for other VFR traffic.  There was little communication back from the pilots of the light aircraft to the controllers during the flight. 

The Secret Service sounded the all clear at the White House at 12:14 p.m. and the U.S. Capitol Police sounded the all clear at 12:40 p.m.  Upon landing, the occupants of the aircraft were taken into custody by the FBI, Secret Service, and Maryland state authorities for questioning. 

In this instance, we consider the interaction of the agencies to have worked as intended.  The communication and interface that took place during this incident were an improvement over the interagency communication that took place during the incident last June involving the Governor of Kentucky’s plane which, on approach to DCA, was known to FAA controllers, but appeared as an unidentified aircraft to the other members of the NCRCC.  By contrast, on May 11th, the decision to evacuate the Capitol and the White House was made by the U.S. Capitol Police and the Secret Service based on the accurate information that an unknown aircraft operator had penetrated the ADIZ and the FRZ, was heading toward the Capitol, and was not immediately responding to the intercept.  Once the aircraft changed direction away from the areas of concern, an all clear was announced.  All agencies in the NCRCC learned from the June 2004 event and, as a result, today, both FAA controllers and NCRCC members are seeing and acting on the same information.

After federal and state authorities questioned the occupants of the aircraft, they determined that there was no criminal intent involved in their actions and they were released.  One of the individuals, Hayden L. Sheaffer, held an FAA pilot’s license.  The other individual, Troy Donovan Martin, holds a student pilot certificate.  Although Mr. Martin was manipulating the controls of the aircraft during the entire incident in question, Mr. Sheaffer, by virtue of being the only fully certificated airman in the aircraft, was pilot-in-command of the flight.  As such, he failed to navigate properly and to check adequately for, and adhere to, airspace restrictions during the flight.  This resulted in the aircraft penetrating the Class B airspace around BWI Airport, the restricted airspace around the national capital region (both the ADIZ and the FRZ), and the prohibited airspace over the Naval Observatory without authorization and in violation of FAA regulations and procedures.  His inability to navigate adequately, his lack of knowledge of how to respond to an intercept, his failure to communicate with air traffic control despite being lost in controlled and restricted airspace, have led FAA to conclude that he lacks the qualification required to hold an airman pilot’s certificate.  Therefore, on May 20, 2005, FAA issued an emergency order revoking Mr. Sheaffer’s pilot’s license.  The emergency nature of the order means that the revocation is effective immediately.  Mr. Sheaffer appealed both the merits of the revocation and the emergency nature of the action to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).  On June 3, 2005, an NTSB administrative law judge (ALJ) sustained the emergency nature of FAA’s revocation and set a hearing date of June 15 and 16 to adjudicate the merits of the action. 

The ALJ’s ruling could be appealed to the members of the NTSB.  A final NTSB decision is appealable to the U.S. Courts of Appeal.  Because Mr. Sheaffer’s case is ongoing, I am limited in what I can discuss with respect to our investigation and subsequent enforcement action. 

While Mr. Sheaffer’s case received an extraordinary amount of media attention due to how far into the ADIZ and FRZ he penetrated and the resulting evacuations, ADIZ violations are fairly common around the D.C. area.  Most are inadvertent and the pilots do not travel very far into the restricted area.  Although not all pilot deviations have resulted in enforcement action, the FAA has taken enforcement action against approximately 600 pilots for violations of the ADIZ since the beginning of calendar year 2003.  Our sanction guidance recommends a 30 to 90 day suspension of a pilot’s license for a typical ADIZ violation.  However, that guidance does not preclude imposing a more severe sanction should the circumstances warrant.  In one case, a revocation was sustained due to the intentional nature of the violation.  The case against Mr. Sheaffer is not just an ADIZ case.  It involves his basic qualifications to hold an airman pilot certificate.

The other major security issue concerning general aviation in this area is the continued restriction in place that effectively prevents general aviation aircraft from using Reagan National Airport.  This restriction has been in place since September 11, 2001.  I know that this Committee has long supported reopening National Airport to general aviation and I am pleased to say that on May 25, 2005, the Administration, under the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA announced a plan to do just that.  As the agency that has control over the airspace, FAA’s role in implementing this plan is critical, but limited.

FAA will work with TSA and other stakeholders to solidify all procedures and requirements necessary to implement the Administration’s plan.  The FAA’s representatives at the NCRCC and the DEN will develop procedures to timely disseminate and validate information on all approved aircraft and operators.  We are working on a Web based program to streamline this process.  FAA will also be responsible for issuing advisory circulars and notices to airmen to pilots that include all new procedures put in place.  At this time, we do not anticipate that approved general aviation aircraft will be required to install special equipment beyond what would already be required.  Obviously, reintroducing general aviation to DCA will be monitored closely by all interested agencies and adjustments to the plan may be made as necessary.  We see the announcement of this plan as a significant benefit for general aviation in the DC area.

In conclusion, I would like to say that, although the May 11 incident was disturbing and resulted in an evacuation of thousands of people, causing alarm and uncertainty for a period of time, the system worked as it was designed to.  NCRCC member agencies coordinated their decisions based on accurate information that was shared in real time.  While it is always appropriate after an event such as this to review whether and to what extent the government’s responses were proper, from a coordination and communication standpoint, the FAA believes the system worked.

This concludes my statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

RUSS CHEW,
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITEE ON AVIATION,

ON

TRANSFORMING THE FAA:  A REVIEW OF THE ATO

APRIL 14, 2005.

Chairman Mica, Congressman Costello, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to talk about the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Traffic Organization (ATO).  This morning I will discuss the ATO’s activities and achievements as well as the ongoing challenges we face as we continue our work to restructure the FAA's air traffic services. 

I know I speak for Administrator Blakey and Secretary Mineta when I say we are proud to operate and maintain the largest and safest air traffic system in the world.  Our employees safely orchestrate the takeoff, landing and routing of approximately 50,000 aircraft a day across U.S. controlled airspace.  It is worth noting that last year commercial aviation achieved a remarkable safety record:  the lowest airline fatal accident rate in the history of aviation.  Both industry and government can take credit for the hard work that went into attaining this milestone and ensuring that the traveling public has the safest air transportation system possible.

Mr. Chairman, you and this Committee have focused on ways to make FAA more customer-oriented and efficient by providing us with the statutory authority to reform and streamline our activities.  Last year, we began one of the largest reorganizations ever undertaken in government.  The 36,000 member ATO workforce was realigned to become a more customer-focused, bottom-line business designed to respond to the needs of our customers and stakeholders and to improve our fiscal accountability.  Just over a year ago, in February 2004, we began removing layers of management, reducing our executive ranks by 20 percent and reducing the number of high paid non-executive positions by 9 percent.  We also began streamlining administrative services and reducing overhead by consolidating work under one service unit rather than having it spread throughout the organization as it was prior to the ATO.  Reducing overhead in the first year was primarily focused in Washington.  We will continue to reduce overhead as we expand our efforts in the field. 

There are now 10 operations and support service units that are accountable for achieving specified, measurable results.  Basically, as I testified to you last year, we moved everyone in the ATO closer to the customer; those people using the system whether as a passenger or pilot.  These changes are already resulting in positive trends and tangible accomplishments.  Our unit cost is down and our productivity is up.  For example, the FAA’s average cost of controlling a single Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) flight fell $17 from $457 to $440 per flight as compared to 2003.  In addition, we used the competitive sourcing opportunity outlined in the President's Management Agenda, more commonly referred to as the A-76 process, for the delivery of services now provided by our Automated Flight Service Stations.  This was the largest public/private competition our government has ever attempted.  As a result, we expect to save more than $2.2 billion over the next ten years. 

As the year continued, we created financial baselines, ensuring that each of our individual service units would have cost accounting and labor distribution reports.  We began a five-year strategic business planning process that incorporates both operational and financial commitments and is tied to the FAA's Flight Plan.  Working with our employees and industry partners, we assessed the value of our core functions and activities in 2004 and will use that assessment to guide our investments in programs and services.  By implementing the cost accounting and labor distribution reports I mentioned as well s a new financial management system, we have established a basis for an ATO cost-control program that identifies where costs can be managed and reinvested to meet the strategic initiatives described in our 2005 business plan.  This new approach to financial management will help us develop analytic tools to make management decisions based on sound business principles.  Managing our costs enables us to manage our future.  We must have the tools and the plans in place to accomplish this.

When it comes to the ATO’s goals for a safe and reliable air traffic system, we must succeed.  Much of the nation’s economy depends on a safe, secure and reliable air transportation system.  The ATO has set ambitious goals for increasing capacity in the system.  Arrival and departure capacity at the 35 Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) airports has steadily increased since 2001.  In fact, we set out to increase the number of daily arrivals at those top airports by 780 flights over last year’s average but actually increased the daily arrival capacity by more than 1,035 arrivals per day. 

Another significant accomplishment that is a tremendous boost to capacity occurred earlier this year when we implemented a procedure known as Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (RVSM), which essentially doubles capacity at high altitudes.  The procedure permits controllers to reduce minimum vertical separation at altitudes between 29,000 and 41,000 feet for aircraft that are equipped with dual altimeter systems and autopilots.  Not only does this double the capacity options for controllers and pilots, but the higher altitude routes are more fuel efficient, so it is estimated that RVSM will save airlines over $5 billion through 2016, an estimate that may prove to be conservative if fuel prices remain high. 

Finally, we must make sure we are using the best technology to maintain a safe and efficient air traffic system.  Jeff Shane’s testimony addresses our next generation system, but one example of what we are doing today is the Wide Area Augmentation System called WAAS.  WAAS is a precise navigation system that provides the accuracy and reliability necessary for pilots to rely on the Global Positioning System during flight.  Because the system is satellite-based, WAAS costs us a lot less to maintain than traditional ground-based navigation systems.  Plus WAAS can be made available at numerous airports without ground-based systems, opening up more runways, which ultimately increases capacity.  Since WAAS became operational in July 2003, the FAA has developed 3,000 WAAS approaches.  Industry surveys predict that as many as 20,000 certified WAAS receivers will be in aircraft by the end of this year.  This is a significant accomplishment in modernizing how we use our airspace and one that will have lasting, positive affects on capacity. 

I would also like to note that many FAA employees, including those in the ATO, must be commended for putting their personal safety and comfort at risk in order to help establish air traffic control and aviation safety systems, procedures, and oversight in the war torn countries of Afghanistan and Iraq.  Their important work, largely unheralded, is essential to the success of these fledgling democracies.  When asked to help, they answered and, as a result, these countries are receiving critical assistance from the foremost aviation safety experts in the world.  The Department of Transportation, the FAA and I, personally, am very proud of these extraordinary individuals.

Along with our successes in this first year, we faced a number of challenges.  As the 11,000 controllers hired after the strike in 1981 become eligible to retire, it was imperative that the ATO find a way to meet the demand for controllers without straining the hiring and training pipelines.  We developed the Air Traffic Controller Workforce Plan and delivered the plan to Congress in December 2004.  This plan lays out cost-saving mechanisms that will allow the ATO to reduce previous staffing projections by 10 percent over the next five years.  Full implementation of the plan is underway and it will enable us to have the right people in the right places at the right time.

Obviously, other significant challenges lie ahead.  For example, we will enter into negotiations with two of our bargaining units this year.  But with our labor costs accounting for almost 80 percent of our operating costs, we also must reach an equitable agreement that ensures financial solvency and corporate efficiency on all sides. 

Another significant challenge we face is the fact that the nation’s $30 billion inventory of air traffic control facilities and equipment is aging and deteriorating.  The average condition of the FAA’s en route centers is poor and is getting worse each year.  The maintenance and repair backlog for these 21 facilities alone is about $118 million, a combination of repairs not made in the past, and the projected repairs needed in the current year.  At some point we are going to have to replace them.

These challenges make it critical for us to change “business-as-usual” operating practices.  We must make some fundamental changes.  We need a revenue stream based both on our costs and on our actual units of production.  And we need the right incentives in place to remain efficient.

Our biggest challenge will be to ensure that the ATO is as streamlined and efficient as possible in order to justify supporting our essential operating and capital costs as they compete with other important programs for limited fiscal resources.  The ATO must deliver the safest, most efficient, cost-effective, and well managed services in order to serve our customers and stakeholders.  Air traffic in this country is dynamic and the ATO must be able to adapt to future demands seamlessly and effectively without compromising safety.

The structural changes we have made and the management tools we have put in place in the last year will help us be more accountable and help you better understand those areas on which you want to focus your oversight responsibilities.  Hopefully, in the upcoming years, I will be able to describe to you how these tools have helped us measure our success, prioritize our investments, and become a better, smarter, safer organization.

I am proud of the work we have done in the last year and I am even more confident in the direction we are headed.  As we progress in our transformation, we intend to retain our global leadership in delivering air traffic services, by providing the greatest value to our customers, owners, and employees. We are very cognizant of the fact that we are part of a much broader team of people in government and industry that all of us are working toward keeping the most complex airspace in the world, the safest and most efficient in the world.  We will work with Congress to determine the best methods for meeting the challenges facing the future of air traffic.  I am grateful for the opportunity to be in a position to play a role at a time when meeting the challenges facing us will make such a difference to the future of aviation.  There is hard work and tough choices before us, and I am confident that together we will do what needs to be done.

This concludes my prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer any questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

MARION BLAKEY,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

ON

SAFETY ISSUES,

NOVEMBER 17, 2005.

Chairman Burns, Senator Rockefeller, Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss some of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) many important safety initiatives and how they contribute to extending this unprecedented aviation safety record.  In the United States, the three year average commercial accident rate is .017 accidents per 100,000 departures.  To put that in more understandable terms, that accident rate is the equivalent of one fatal accident for every 15 million passenger carrying flights.  This means that we are living in the safest period in aviation history.  All of us who work for and with aviation safety professionals take pride in the results of our collective efforts, especially given the economic turbulence being experienced by U.S. carriers.  But even as we recognize how safe it is to travel in commercial air transportation, we must look beyond to face the challenge of how to make the system safer.  How can we continue to improve aviation safety as demand and complexity increase?  We are facing record setting passenger numbers, new light jets, UAVs, . . . even space travel is not as far away as it once was.  We cannot afford to rest on our laurels.

Since it would be impossible for me to cover in any significant detail the extremely broad range of FAA safety initiatives, I will focus my remarks on two areas that I know are of interest to this subcommittee, our oversight of aircraft maintenance and our efforts to reduce runway incursions.  I think you will find our efforts in these areas to be innovative and effective.

Over the last several years, FAA has changed the way we oversee aircraft maintenance.  In the past, FAA’s inspectors were required to complete a prescribed number of oversight activities focused on compliance with FAA regulations.  In 1998, FAA began overseeing the ten largest airlines using the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) model which goes beyond simply ensuring regulatory compliance.  The goal of the oversight model is to foster a higher level of air carrier safety using a systematic, risk-management-based process to identify safety trends and prevent accidents.  ATOS has improved safety because it identifies and helps manage risks before they cause problems by ensuring that carriers have safety standards built into their operating systems. 

This oversight approach leverages FAA’s inspector workforce by reducing the likelihood of repeating inspections of the same aircraft or function, unless deficiencies were found in prior inspections of the aircraft or function.  Our inspectors develop safety surveillance plans for each air carrier based on data analysis, and adjust plans periodically based on identified risks.  For example, with so many of our legacy carriers in financial distress,  FAA inspectors can adapt their surveillance plan to increase their focus on areas that might be at risk due to financial cut-backs, such as training, quality assurance and quality control processes, and to ensure that discrepancies reported by pilots are properly addressed.  I know it is important to the Inspector General (IG) that our inspectors have the tools and information necessary to be flexible in our oversight of carriers as their financial and operational situation changes.

I also know that the IG agrees with us that our new approach to oversight is a better way to make the best use of agency resources as well as to improve safety.  We are currently moving all air carriers to this oversight system.  In the interim, we created the Surveillance and Evaluation Program (SEP) to bridge between the old system – where inspectors went out and “kicked the tires” – and this new oversight approach.  SEP inspectors use data and risk analysis in targeting their inspections to areas within the air carrier’s operation that pose a greater safety risk.  Both inspection approaches use the Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS), a computer based system that analyzes inspection and air carrier data to help inspectors identify safety problems.  The IG would like to see us move more carriers more quickly from the interim inspection approach to the new approach, and we are working within our existing resources to do that.

This change in oversight recognizes that FAA cannot be expected to provide quality control for every airline or effectively police millions of flights.  The laws you passed and the regulations we implement all place the responsibility for safety on the airlines.  FAA’s role is an important one, and we see this new approach as making better use of our resources.  By focusing on risk we can determine how well the airline is managing its processes and whether or not the processes are performing as designed to meet the safety standards.  Our inspection tools are designed to collect data for these purposes.  Our oversight systems engage air carriers in the management of their safety issues.

I am very aware of your concern with U.S. carriers having more of their maintenance performed by repair stations, both foreign and domestic.  Oversight of repair stations is a good example of why our current focus on risk management is preferable to compliance based oversight.  We know FAA inspectors cannot oversee all maintenance performed on U.S. aircraft, but if some maintenance component is identified as a risk, our oversight focus would be triggered, regardless of who or where the maintenance is performed.

That having been said, we continue to work to improve our process for targeting inspector resources for oversight of repair stations based on risk assessment or analysis of data collected on air carrier outsourcing practices.  We are also working on improving our automated data basis to more thoroughly document repair station inspections in order to provide the most helpful guidance to our Flight Standards Field Office inspectors.  I know our efforts in these areas have been identified by the IG as being very important.  The intent of our current policy is to standardize repair station inspections to provide better consistency and thorough oversight.  As we consider different models of repair station oversight, we are mindful that our goal is to obtain data that is useful in our ongoing risk analysis.

I know there has been particular sensitivity to U.S. carriers’ use of repair stations outside the U.S.  The concern has been that such practices, done solely to reduce maintenance costs, could have unintended safety consequences.  The reality is that FAA only certificates repair stations abroad if U.S. carriers want to use the repair station and if the station meets our certification standards.  FAA performs periodic inspections of these foreign repair stations.  In addition, many of them hold certificates from their own countries who also perform audits and inspections.  In several countries where we have Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreements (BASA), we have outlined maintenance information procedures (MIP) to ensure that foreign inspectors are placing appropriate emphasis on the Federal Aviation Regulations when conducting reviews of work done on U.S. aircraft.  In these countries, we rely on the oversight of the aviation authority in addition to our periodic inspections.  We are also working to ensure that these foreign aviation authorities inform and seek FAA approval of changes to repair stations operations if they directly impact FAA requirements. 

It is also worth noting that a recent regulatory change has increased the accountability of all repair stations for maintenance that they contract out to third party providers.  The repair station is required to be directly in charge of the work performed by third party providers and FAA now has the authority to inspect contract work performed for repair stations.

I am confident that the changes we have made in our oversight philosophy and the work we continue to do with input and assistance from the aviation community, Congress, and the international community has contributed to this historically safe period of commercial aviation safety.  Our safety oversight must keep pace with the industry as it changes and I think we are well positioned to accept that challenge.

Turning to another of the FAA’s top priorities, I would like to discuss agency efforts to reduce the number and risk of runway incursions.  As outlined in the FAA Flight Plan 2006-2010, the FAA is developing a range of initiatives from airport design concepts to surface movement procedures.  Related efforts address the errors committed by pilots, air traffic controllers, and airport-authorized vehicle operators and pedestrians.  We have set performance targets and we are holding ourselves accountable for meeting those targets.  We are working hard and making progress, but we are not there yet.

Let me start with where we are today.  The United States National Airspace System (NAS) has nearly 500 FAA and contract tower staffed airports that handle more than 176,000 aircraft operations – takeoffs and landings – a day, averaging approximately 64 million airport operations per year.  Of the approximately 257 million aircraft operations at U.S. towered airports from FY 2001-2004, there were 1,395 reported runway incursions.  This translates into approximately 5.4 runway incursions for every one million operations and less than one serious runway incursion for every one million operations.  There were five collisions during this period, none of which resulted in a fatality.  So when viewed in the context of the total number of operations, the number of incursions is low which means that further reducing the rate is quite a challenge, but a challenge we are undertaking.

Because we are taking it seriously, the FAA reconstructs each runway incursion using the available information and plots the approximate location of each event on airport diagrams.  During this exercise, we systematically categorize each runway incursion in terms of its severity.  Severity Categories A through D (A being the most serious, D the least) consider factors such as the speed and performance characteristics of the aircraft involved, the proximity of one aircraft to another aircraft or vehicle, and the type and extent of any evasive action by those involved in the event.  Aircraft involved in runway incursions are grouped into either commercial or general aviation operations.  Incidents are further categorized into three error types: pilot deviations, operational errors/deviations, and vehicle/pedestrian deviations.  It is important to remember that runway incursions do not occur in a vacuum.  The actions of pilots, air traffic controllers and vehicle drivers are intermingled and can significantly impact one another.

We have made important progress over the last few years, especially in reducing serious Category A and B runway incursions by more than 40 percent since FY 2001.  In FY 2005, we had a total of 324 runway incursions.  Twenty-nine of those were Category A and B incursions, which is less than 10 percent of the total.  In terms of error types, there were 167 pilot deviations, 105 operational errors/deviations, and 52 vehicle/pedestrian deviations.  While pilot deviations are the most common type of runway incursion, they accounted for only 31 percent of serious incursions in the past fiscal year.  Operational errors/deviations, on the other hand, accounted for only 32 percent of total deviations, but 55 percent of serious deviations which represents a notable change in the distribution of runway incursion types with respect to severity.  Unfortunately, in the last fiscal year we had three Category A runway incursions between two commercial jets, an event that had not occurred for the previous three years.  These are the types of statistics our runway incursion safety team continuously analyzes in order to understand where our efforts will have the greatest impact in reducing risk.

During their most wanted meeting, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) highlighted the Category A incursion that took place at Boston Logan International Airport in which two commercial aircraft almost collided.  We certainly share the NTSB’s concern about this incident, so I would like to describe what we have done in response.  We have imposed temporary procedural restrictions until such time as controllers receive additional training to result in improved coordination within the tower.  Increased runway incursions at Logan are also attributable to construction on the airfield that has caused some pilots to inadvertently cross over a runway hold short line instead of stopping.  We are improving taxiway centerline markings and surface-painted holding position signs to better define hold short locations for pilots.  We expect completion of this paint enhancement by mid-year 2006.  Further, in October we put together a “Tiger Team” to develop other short, mid- and long-term initiatives to further reduce risk on the airport surface.  Additionally, we have developed a software enhancement to the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) that adds alert capability for intersecting runways.  Installation at Logan was completed last week.

FAA is also working closely with other airport sponsors to address runway incursions.  Just last week, I met with the City of Los Angeles and discussed the chronic runway incursion problem at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).  Roughly 80 percent of runway incursions at LAX occur on the south side of the airport.  It is important to note the current airfield layout was designed to accommodate jetliners that were in service over 40-years ago.  The City’s recently completed Master Plan for LAX identifies changes in the airfield layout to resolve this problem.

On May 20, 2005, FAA issued its Record of Decision for the City’s Master Plan.  In August FAA issued a grant to the City for approximately $38.8 million for the relocation of the southern most runway and the addition of a new parallel taxiway at LAX.  This project is expected to significantly reduce runway incursions at LAX.  The City has an aggressive schedule to begin the project in January 2006 and complete it in about 26 months.  We also stressed the importance of addressing runway incursions on the north side of LAX.  The City plans to reconfigure the north airfield with a parallel taxiway as well to reduce runway incursions on that side of the airport.  This project is currently scheduled to begin in six to eight years.

Overall, we are taking a proactive approach to address operational vulnerabilities through awareness, education, procedures, airport infrastructure, and surface technology initiatives.  The FAA has worked with external organizations, airport officials, and safety experts to increase surface safety awareness on a national level.  We have developed and promoted runway safety training material in conjunction with organizations such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety Foundation.  Efforts have included the creation of an interactive Web-based program to inform pilots about preventing runway incursions.  The program, accessible from both the FAA and AOPA web sites, provides an introduction to runway incursion risk, information about airfield signs and markings, and strategies for enhanced position awareness and improved cockpit management.  Throughout the program, various quizzes, tasks, and information visualization tools offer an interactive learning experience.  Since its inception, an average of 1,800 pilots a month have completed the training program.

We have also created a brochure, Runway Safety - A Pilot’s Guide to Safe Surface Operations which highlights the importance of pre-taxi planning and properly identifying aircraft signs and markings.  Over 500,000 brochures have been distributed to pilots through the AOPA magazine, AOPA Pilot and in a direct mailing to certified flight instructors and designated pilot examiners to supplement their training materials. Additionally, we collaborated with famed aerobatic pilot Patty Wagstaff and influential aviator Dick Rutan to produce educational DVDs.  These DVDs review the fundamentals of airport operations through a series of common sense rules and standard communication procedures.  Since the first DVD, Heads Up, Hold Short, Fly Right was released last year, flight instructors and pilots alike have consistently praised it.  We believe the second film, Listen Up, Read Back, Fly Right, will merit the same response.  Producing effective resource materials is a vital part of our continued outreach.    

In addition to the work we are doing with Boston Logan and LAX, we have identified what we refer to as the Focus-35 airports, those airports that reported the most runway incursions from FY 2001 to 2004.  For example, of those 35 airports, 30 airports reported more than 10 runway incursions during the four-year period.  During that period, the Focus-35 airports handled 20 percent of all NAS operations yet accounted for 41 percent of all runway incursions (565).  Through airport infrastructure and safety management programs, some of these airports have successfully reduced the number of runway incursions in the last year or two.  The Focus-35 airports accounted for 39 percent of the Category A and B runway incursions.  However, the number of such incursions decreased by 71 percent, from 24 to seven, from FY 2001 to 2004.  Continued implementation of risk mitigation strategies at the Focus-35 airports offers the most immediate opportunity to continue to reduce the severity, number, and rate of runway incursions in the NAS. 

As presented in the FAA Flight Plan 2006-2010, the FAA’s performance target is to reduce the number of Category A and B runway incursions to an annual rate of no more than 0.450 per million operations by FY 2010.  Analysis of the trend of runway incursions from 2001 through 2004, shows that the rate of reduction flattened, suggesting that the runway safety management strategies that have been implemented early in that period had achieved their maximum effect.  Therefore, in order to achieve our stated targets, the FAA must identify new strategies and re-prioritize their application.

That is why we are currently deploying a newer warning system called Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X) to further enhance safety and improve “error tolerance”—as human error is inevitable.  ASDE-X capabilities will be added to some of the sites that already have AMASS, as well as being deployed to additional busy airports.  The FAA is also evaluating Runway Status Lights, an automatic system designed to improve the situational awareness of pilots and vehicle drivers through visual alerts.  Red in-pavement runway entrance lights are illuminated if the runway is unsafe for entry or crossing, and red in-pavement takeoff hold lights are illuminated if the runway is unsafe for departure.  The operational evaluation of runway entrance lights using ASDE-X surface surveillance occurred at Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport and the system showed promising initial results.  The lights were compatible with the tempo and style of operations at a busy airport, there was no increase in air traffic controller workload, and the lights proved useful to pilots.  In the future, Runway Status Lights could help mitigate runway incursions like the one at Boston Logan to which I referred.  Unfortunately, this program is still in the research and development stage and will not be ready for fielding for several years.  Another effort worth mentioning is a change to the airfield paint markings standard for taxiway centerlines at 72 large airports, based on enplanements.  We are requiring the new markings as another proactive way to alert pilots when they are approaching hold short lines so they do not inadvertently enter a runway without authorization.  We will continue to pioneer work that offers the greatest opportunity for improving NAS-wide runway safety.

Mr. Chairman, the FAA’s commitment to improving safety and extending the excellent safety record we are currently experiencing is our number one priority.  I hope some of what I have shared with you today exemplifies that commitment.  Of course, as I stated at the outset, FAA is involved in hundreds of important safety initiatives and what I have highlighted represents only a small fraction of what we are doing and what has contributed to today’s impressive safety record.  So, while this concludes my prepared statement, I will be happy to answer your questions on any of our important safety initiatives. 

STATEMENT OF

MARION C. BLAKEY,
ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,

IN ANCHORAGE, ALASKA,

ON

AVIATION SAFETY IN ALASKA

JULY 5, 2005

Good Morning, Chairman Stevens and Members of the Committee.  It is a great pleasure to be here today in Alaska to testify, along with Secretary Mineta and Regional Administrator Poe.  Improving aviation safety and lowering accident rates in Alaska, have been a major focus of efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) over the last decade, and I’m proud to acknowledge, also by the aviation community in Alaska.  The aviation community here has demonstrated a strong commitment to safety.  After all, the aviation system is what connects Alaska’s cities, towns, villages, businesses and families.  I believe we in the FAA have a good news story to tell about improvements in aviation safety in recent years, and an even better story to tell about future efforts to expand and build upon the successes already achieved.

Today I would like to highlight a few areas of interest to the Committee:  the Capstone and Medallion programs, the growing use of weather cameras, particularly in remote locations, and the very practical benefits of the Rural Alaska Lighting program.

As I’ve often said, aviation safety will always be the first priority at the FAA.  Every decision we make is with the safety of the flying public in mind.  Let me begin this morning by describing how serious the FAA is in pursuing the goal of increased aviation safety in Alaska.  When I first came to the FAA, we put in place a strategic business plan – we call it our Flight Plan – with specific objectives and performance targets.  The FAA’s Flight Plan for 2004-2008 lists among the safety objectives for the next five years a specific objective, “Reduce Accidents in Alaska.”  The stated strategy is to expand and accelerate the implementation of safety and air navigation improvements programs here.  It is noteworthy because no other state was listed individually, only Alaska.  Why, you might ask, does the FAA Flight Plan have a specific objective of improving aviation safety in Alaska?  The answer is simple, Alaska has been called the “flyingest state in the union.”  It is a place where schoolchildren board aircraft to travel to school, instead of a bus.  When someone in a village is ill and needs medical attention, they will most likely be transported to the hospital via aircraft.  As an essential mode of everyday transportation, aviation must be a safe mode.

A 1999 study by the National Institute on Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) ranked being a commercial airline pilot as the most hazardous occupation in Alaska.  Clearly, a focused, dedicated, multifaceted, approach to improving aviation safety in Alaska was needed.  I am happy to say the approach we are taking, one that represents the collective efforts of aviators, the State of Alaska, and the FAA, is working.

The most promising initiative with potential for broad application to a range of hazards, including terrain, other airborne traffic, and weather, is the Capstone demonstration program in the Alaska Region.  Capstone is a technology-focused safety program in Alaska that seeks near term safety and efficiency gains in aviation by accelerating implementation and use of modern technology, in both avionics and ground system infrastructure.  The key enabling technology on which Capstone is based is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).  ADS-B gives an aircraft with the requisite data uplink/downlink and cockpit display capabilities the same information about other aircraft in the vicinity as air traffic control now receives.  Capstone Phase I, which began in 1999, included the installation of government-furnished Global Positioning System (GPS) driven avionics suites in 200 commercial aircraft serving the region around Bethel, Alaska, known as the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta Region (YK Delta), consisting of over 160,000 square miles.  One of the two approved datalink technologies for ADS-B, the Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) also provides an uplink for weather information via Flight Information Services-Broadcast (FIS-B).  The weather data is displayed on the same multifunction cockpit display used for the ADS-B display of traffic, and for terrain data. 

Through 2004 the FAA Alaskan Region Capstone Program has achieved significant safety and efficiency results.  Capstone equipped aircraft have had a consistently lower accident rate than non-equipped aircraft.  From 2000 through 2004, the rate of accidents for Capstone-equipped aircraft dropped significantly--by 47 percent.  Also, the rate of accidents for Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta Region-based air carriers has been falling since 2001, and is now at the lowest rate since 1990.  Historically, the rate of air taxi accidents within the YK Delta has been two to four times the rest of Alaska, but in 2003 the accident rate for the region was below the rest of the state for the first time.  That is real progress.

Phase II of Capstone will expand the coverage to southeast Alaska, in the Juneau area, and Phase III contemplates expanding the program to cover the entire state.  Also as part of Phase II, additional technology infrastructure will be deployed.  New Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Procedure (RNP) arrival and departure procedures will continue to be developed for the airports recommended by the industry for upgrade to Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) access.  RNAV procedures provide flight path guidance incorporated in taxi procedures, with minimal instructions required during departure by air traffic controllers.  RNP is on-board technology that promises to add to capacity by allowing pilots to fly more direct point-to-point routes reliably and accurately.  Key benefits of RNAV and RNP include more efficient use of airspace, with improved flight profiles, resulting in significant fuel efficiencies to the airlines. An airport-to-airport Global Positioning System (GPS)/Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) based route structure will be mapped between all IFR airports.  Aircraft avionics equipage is key to an accelerated implementation strategy; therefore Capstone will continue to pursue affordable avionics so that aircraft owners will have a range of choices appropriate to their operational needs.  This includes both creating options for equipage and a strategy to ensure that all aircraft in Alaska are equipped.

In addition to technology improvements, the FAA has also undertaken safety management and training efforts in partnership with the aviation community here to increase safety awareness and reduce aircraft accidents.  In joint efforts with the Medallion Foundation, a non-profit aviation safety organization that provides management resources, training and support to the Alaskan aviation community, the FAA is funding a program known as the Five Star Shield program, which is an enhanced safety management system.  The Medallion Five Star Shield program takes a business-like approach to safety, providing for the setting of goals as well as planning and measuring performance in specific areas through the use of system safety concepts.  The program is voluntary, and focuses on establishing and sustaining an elevated level of safety performance through:  the development of a safety culture that holds safety as a core value; continuous professional development of individual skills and competence; proactive sharing of operational control responsibilities; hazard identification and risk management; and management practices that support the organization’s safety objectives.

The Five Stars in the Medallion Five Star Shield program include numerous methods for improving safety.  To earn the First Star, each air carrier must establish a safety program which, at a minimum, should include safety meetings and audits, the use of root-cause analysis, hazard identification, incident investigations, and a viable emergency response plan.  The Five Star program also requires a classroom training program for pilots, mechanics and ground service personnel, as well as required training on a PC-based computer simulator.  Two annual check rides are required to receive this second Star, and annual pilot proficiency check rides are required to keep the Star.  The Third Star involves operational risk management.  A dynamic system that provides analytical tools as well as a system of checks and balances to proactively identify hazards and manage risks is required.  The carrier must have an operational risk management system that quantifies the risks for each flight, including weather, airport, and crew readiness.  The total risk score determines if the flight is conducted normally, if more management evaluation is required for release of the flight, or if the flight is cancelled.  The Fourth Star concerns maintenance and ground service operations, requiring specific training and manning levels.  The Fifth Star is an internal audit program, which requires incorporation of a proactive internal audit system that focuses on the use of systems safety principles, as well as regulatory compliance.  This is a comprehensive audit program requirement intended to allow the operator to continuously monitor their operating systems and provide for continuous improvement.  Medallion has specific detailed requirements.

The FAA is supporting the Medallion Foundation in the implementation of this program. Once an applicant has received all five Stars, and passed an independent audit, they may be certified for the Medallion Shield, which is attested to by a decal displayed on the aircraft, and can be used on uniforms and promotional materials.  In order to maintain shield status, the operator must successfully pass an audit each year.  If the operator fails to pass the audit, or Medallion on-site inspectors notice that a specific activity represented by a star is not being properly addressed on a continuing basis, the star and shield may be revoked.  A direct benefit of the Shield program for operators is that the insurance industry has agreed to provide favorable rates for Shield carriers.

It’s worth noting here that the FAA and the Medallion Foundation are not just focused on improving safety in commercial operations, but are also targeting improvements to safety in the general aviation (GA) community as well.  Our efforts in this area are coordinated through the Medallion Flyer General Aviation Program, which is proving to be quite popular among the GA community.  Interested pilots begin by submitting an application to the Medallion Foundation, which will then issue the pilot a free copy of the FAA “Back to Basics – Runway Safety” CD.  After that, the pilot is invited to attend the FLYER Step II course, which provides access to free usage of Medallion state-of-the-art flight training devices.  During this course, pilots are provided with tools designed to help establish a personal safety program.  They are also introduced to hazard assessment and risk management techniques.  Pilots also receive important information on flying in “white out” and “flat” light conditions, risk assessment, pilot/ATC communications, and Alaska flying tips.

The Capstone and Medallion programs clearly demonstrate that better information, better training, and better risk-management procedures can contribute significantly to reductions in aviation accidents and save lives.  People here in Alaska can be very proud of the progress they’ve made.  Alaska has set an example for the rest of the country.

The on-going and increasing deployment of weather cameras in numerous parts of Alaska is another beneficial use of technology that can dramatically improve aviation safety by providing near real-time information to help with pilot decision making and risk management.  There are currently 55 operational locations for weather cameras, which stretch into every region of the state, and 12 more operational sites will be available in 2005.  Many of these weather cameras are positioned in or near mountain passes and other geographical features which are often used by pilots to navigate on their flights.  The other feature of these cameras that is so beneficial to pilots is that they are often located at rural airports where there are no weather observers, and no other means to find out what current weather conditions are prior to deciding to take off.  They are also co-located with automated weather systems, providing additional visual information previously only available at those few sites with a weather observer.

These cameras, all of which can be viewed at one website, http://akweathercams.faa.gov, provide two images from each camera located at the site.  One image is a file photo of the area within the camera’s range on a clear, sunny day.  The other image is a real-time photo, which is refreshed every 10 minutes, of the exact same view as the file photo.  This provides an instant visual comparison of weather conditions, precipitation, cloud cover, ceiling, and visibility. 

The real value in these weather cameras is that they help pilots decide whether to even begin their flight, based on weather conditions, rather than have the pilots have to make difficult and hazardous decisions once they have encountered the deteriorating weather conditions in flight.  Flight service specialists also have access to the weather camera images, and routinely brief pilots on the weather camera images when they call for a pre-flight briefing and during their flight, providing the most up-to-date information on the weather camera images to help pilots make that “go or no-go” decision.  During an independent study conducted between December 2002 and March 2003 by Parker Associates, Inc., 68 percent of the reported decisions made based on weather cameras were to cancel or delay a flight due to weather.  Air carriers, commercial operators, and general aviation pilots can avoid the cost of fuel from flights that must be diverted or repeated due to bad weather.  Cameras have a positive financial impact on an industry undergoing economic challenges.  Our website for the cameras has received 1.3 million “hits” in 2003, 2.3 million “hits” in 2004, and we expect the number of “hits” to increase by another 1 million this fiscal year—a real testament to how important real time knowledge of weather conditions is for pilots.

Turning now to another area of interest to this Committee, I would like to briefly highlight the FAA’s Rural Alaska Lighting Program (RALP).  The goal of the Rural Alaska Lighting Program is to install airport lighting in communities with limited access to 24-hour medical facilities, to provide better access and improved lighting for aeromedical services.  The Program is comprised of three tiers.  Tier One is Medium Intensity Runway Lighting (MIRLs) or permanent edge lighting at those airports that meet minimum safety requirements.  Tier Two is portable, battery-powered lights for communities or airports that are unable to accommodate permanent edge lights.  Tier Three is Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) and Runway End Identifier Lights (REILs) to support approach procedures at airports. 

This program began in 2001 with a study that identified 63 communities needing the improved lighting.  Federal funding began in FY02.  In addition to the $35 million that has been appropriated for this effort so far under the FAA’s Facilities and Equipment program, the Airport Improvement Program has provided the funding for necessary runway pavement or runway safety area improvements.  All of the 63 communities have received at least an interim solution to provide for 24 hour VFR aeromedical access.  Twenty-six of the 63 communities have also received permanent lighting solutions.  An additional 19 communities will have permanent lighting solutions by 2010.  The final 18 communities have complicated land and/or environmental issues, but we will continue to work with the State of Alaska to resolve all outstanding issues.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to take a moment to mention the great contributions to aviation safety in Alaska made by a true visionary, Tom Wardleigh.  Mr. Wardleigh shared his vision for the future of aviation in Alaska with you and all Alaskan aviators in testimony to this body in 1999.  That vision is now part of Mr. Wardleigh’s legacy.  The FAA is pleased to announce the creation of a new National safety award in honor of the late Thomas Wardleigh, Master Pilot, Master Mechanic, elder statesman of aviation.   As with so many of this region’s innovations, Mr. Wardleigh’s contribution to aviation safety is now a national asset.  Tom urged the FAA to strive for exceptional customer service and to be a proving ground for new ideas.  He was a visionary who knew that if we could make an idea work in Alaska with all of its challenges, it would benefit all of aviation.

Mr. Wardleigh’s wife, Jan, is with us today.  I hope she is pleased with our memorial to him.   I know that this award has special meaning for you, Mr. Chairman, as I have been told that you received your floatplane rating from Tom just a few years ago

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me reiterate what I said at the outset of my testimony today – aviation safety is, and always will be, the first priority at the FAA.  These programs I have discussed are the leading edge of efforts to improve aviation safety for everyone, and Alaska is once again showing the way.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify today on such an important topic.  I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

MARION C. BLAKEY,
ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

AVIATION CAPACITY AND CONGESTION CHALLENGES - SUMMER 2005 AND FUTURE DEMAND

MAY 26, 2005

Good morning Chairman Burns, Senator Rockefeller, and Members of the Subcommittee.  Thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning to discuss our plans to ease air traffic congestion this spring and summer.  Secretary Mineta and I wish to offer our congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman, on assuming the Chair of this Subcommittee and to extend our good wishes to the new and returning Members of the Subcommittee.  But before we discuss capacity and delays, let me address safety.  As you know, safety is and will always be the FAA’s top priority.  Every decision we make is done with the safety of the flying public in mind.  The system must be safe, as you know, and we deliver a remarkably safe system.  I am pleased to note that over the last three years, the commercial airline fatal accident rate is the lowest in history.  That’s a tribute to the men and women of the FAA and the industry we support. 

The health of our aviation system is critical to our economy, and the good news is that air travel has rebounded.  We now project that overall passenger demand and commercial activity at FAA air traffic facilities will return to pre-9/11 traffic levels by the end of this year, reaching about 710 million passengers.  Commercial operations at 17 of this country’s top 35 airports have already exceeded their pre 9/11 levels, with some airports like Salt Lake City and Fort Lauderdale already showing very high growth, above 11.5 percent and 6.6 percent over pre 9/11 levels respectively.

With approximately 9 percent of our country’s Gross Domestic Product tied to aviation, this is a very welcome rebound.  However, we need to brace up because with this rebound will come delays, potentially serious ones, as early as this summer, and we need to do all we can to avoid them.  That’s why today’s hearing is both important and timely. 

Certainly some aviation markets have fared better than others, and new trends have emerged.  Low-cost carriers have increased their market share, while the larger “legacy carriers” have been restructuring and downsizing.  Also, regional and commuter carriers have been replacing and supplementing flight routes once dominated by legacy carriers, as well as introducing new services that use longer range regional jets.  As a result, we are seeing significant growth in the regional carrier market, and we expect it will continue to grow. 

Following 9/11, the agency worked with this Committee and industry stakeholders to prepare for the return of air traffic demand.  We developed careful plans and worked to ensure that the agency was better situated to avoid the delay problems of past summers.  We will continue the successful innovative steps begun in recent years that have helped to avert a repeat of past delay-riddled summers.  To address and alleviate congestion and delays over the short term we will work to implement new procedures, more pavement, and better technology. 

Our plan takes into account the myriad of factors -- some well beyond our control -- that contribute to system delays, including weather, security, airline operations, air traffic control, airports, infrastructure, and equipment.  We are confident that this approach will provide effective inroads to manage the surge in traffic that will coincide with the busy summer travel season. 

To emphasize the difficulty some of these factors create for the National Airspace System, you may recall that last summer four major hurricanes made landfall in the state of Florida, one of the country’s primary tourist and travel destinations, in just a six-week period.  Airports and air traffic facilities across the state suffered significant damage, including Southwest Florida in Fort Myers; Orlando International in central Florida -- which was hit by three different hurricanes; and the FAA’s Pensacola TRACON in the Panhandle.  The FAA responded quickly to restore capabilities damaged by the storms.  For example, the Pensacola TRACON was nearly destroyed by Hurricane Ivan.  The facility was closed on September 15^th because of the forecasted winds and storm surge.  Employees volunteered to stay behind to monitor the facility condition and begin service restoration after the hurricane passed.  However, during the height of the storm, the roof of the Pensacola TRACON was partially torn off.  Employees on site quickly unplugged and protected the sensitive ATC equipment from the wind and rain, saving millions of dollars worth of equipment.  Through the dedicated work of our employees and the cooperation of several agencies, the Pensacola TRACON was reopened for daylight operations only within two days, and to full ATC operations only 20 days after Ivan’s devastation.  Additionally, FAA’s Airports Organization distributed $25 million from the Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act to 85 airports in Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Puerto Rico in record time, allowing the airports to make repairs and resume operations.

Many of the new procedures we are now using were the result of a first-of-its-kind meeting of industry decision makers and the government, known as “Growth Without Gridlock,” which we convened last year.  The group agreed to a series of new procedures designed to relieve congestion during the heavy summer travel season.  We moved away from the “first come-first served” model of air traffic when demand far exceeds capacity by issuing revised flight plans or rerouting some aircraft away from problem areas, allowing  us to maximize utilization of available airspace under adverse conditions. 

The most innovative of these new procedures, a concept we call “delay triggering,” imposes minor delays on the ground to avert massive delays across the National Airspace System.  When delays at an airport are anticipated to reach 90 minutes or more, other airports sending aircraft into the congested area will hold flights until our controllers clear the congestion.  Although this may mean brief delays for some flights, it helps prevent the massive delays that can occur system-wide when critical airports become gridlocked.  This procedure has been so successful that we have incorporated the philosophy into other areas of managing demand and delays.  Most recently, we began using this concept in managing departure delays from Fort Lauderdale.  The feedback from our customers has been very positive, and we will continue to apply this procedure during the upcoming convective weather season.

A major accomplishment this year is our implementation of Domestic Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums or DRVSM.  This is a tremendous boost to air traffic capacity because it essentially doubles capacity at high altitudes, adding six cruising altitudes or jet lanes above 29,000 feet.  The procedure permits controllers to reduce minimum vertical separation at altitudes between 29,000 and 41,000 feet from 2000 feet to 1000 feet for aircraft that are equipped with dual altimeter systems and autopilots.  Not only does this double the capacity options for controllers and pilots, but the higher altitude routes are more fuel efficient.  We estimate the DRVSM will save airlines approximately $5 billion through 2016, an estimate that will prove to be conservative if fuel prices remain high.

Another major initiative is the expanding implementation of Area Navigation (RNAV) procedures to additional airports.  RNAV procedures have been implemented and are performing successfully at Las Vegas, Philadelphia, and Dulles airports.  Just last month, 13 RNAV departure procedures went into full operation at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport – the world’s busiest airport.  These procedures provide flight path guidance incorporated in taxi procedures, with minimal instructions required during departure by air traffic controllers.  This significantly reduces routine controller-pilot communications, allowing more time on frequency for pilots and controllers to handle other safety-critical flight activities.  Key benefits of the RNAV procedures include more efficient use of airspace, with improved flight profiles, resulting in significant fuel efficiencies to the airlines.  RNAV procedures are scheduled for implementation at Dallas-Ft. Worth airport this year as well. 

Another technological innovation, known as Required Navigation Procedure or RNP, promises to add to capacity.  RNP is on-board technology that allows pilots to fly more direct point-to-point routes reliably and accurately.  RNP give pilots not only lateral guidance, but vertical precision as well, and the system is highly precise and accurate.  RNP reaches all domains of flight – departure, en route, and arrival.  This not only will allow more efficient airspace management, but also provide savings in fuel costs for the airlines.  For example, in January 2005, in partnership with Alaska Airlines, we implemented new RNP approach procedures at Palm Springs International Airport, which is located in very mountainous terrain.  Under the previous conventional procedures, planes could not land unless the ceiling was at least 2,300 feet.  With the new RNP procedures, approved air carriers can now operate to a ceiling of 684 feet, which allows much better access during bad weather.  Additionally, RNP has enabled aircraft to cut significant mileage out of their flight path into Palm Springs – nearly 30 miles – which translates into substantial fuel savings for operators.  The U.S. is leading the world in RNP, by issuing the first set of criteria and standards in this area in the very near future.  Boeing and Airbus support RNP, and our standards are being embraced in Europe, Asia and South America, and by our neighbors to the north in Canada.

In addition, we improved communication among the system users and the FAA.  Airlines agreed to improve their input to the FAA’s flight schedule monitor system using new software so that it will more accurately reflect the latest airline schedule plans.  This move minimizes unused airport capacity when flights are rescheduled or cancelled.  Also, airlines are encouraged to file flight plans earlier, allowing for more time to address potential congestion problems.  In addition, our relationship with the air carriers who participate in our daily conference calls is genuinely cooperative, reflecting our common understanding that we all have a stake in the process.  The conference calls – scheduled every 2 hours during the busiest portion of the day -- also provide an opportunity for feedback.  Customers let us know if they believe they were disadvantaged by a prior day’s delay reduction measures or offer ideas on how we can all improve the system.  We all know that continued cooperation is essential to the success of our spring and summer airspace management plans.  Delays are bad for business, regardless of whether you are a large, legacy carrier, a low-cost carrier or a regional airline.

I’d like to take a moment to recognize this Committee’s role in addressing system capacity constraints.  With the passage of Vision 100 – Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, you provided the FAA and DOT with additional tools to address unexpected challenges that threaten to reduce capacity or cause delay at critical chokepoints.  We must be ready to react to situations when they unfold.  For example, the authority provided by Vision 100 enabled us to take initial action last year at Chicago O’Hare International Airport to address over-scheduling by air carriers and the resultant excessive delays that affected the entire National Airspace System.

As you know, two major carriers, American Airlines and United Airlines, have hubs at O’Hare.  The competition for market share is compounded by the obvious physical limitation on the number of planes that can take off and land during any time period.  Moreover, it has been well demonstrated over the years that delays at O’Hare have the potential to cause delays at as many as 40 other airports nationwide.  Consequently, managing delays at O’Hare is essential to the effective management of air traffic nationally.  In November 2003, major delays began occurring as a result of steady increases in flights, as O’Hare’s slot rules phased out, and a shift by American Airlines of flights from St. Louis to O’Hare.  Vision 100 enabled us to take action. 

Early last year, Secretary Mineta and I asked United and American to make a voluntary 5 percent schedule reduction during peak travel times.  This voluntary reduction took effect March 4, 2004.  American and United further agreed to reduce their overall peak-hour schedules by another 2.5 percent by June 10, 2004.  This voluntary agreement was extended through last summer, as negotiations between the FAA and all airlines serving O’Hare continued in an effort to craft a more comprehensive plan to reduce flight delays, and one which treated all air carriers serving O’Hare fairly.  Eventually, in August 2004, a voluntary agreement for schedule reductions during peak hours was reached involving all airlines currently serving O’Hare, and which allowed some leeway for new entrant carriers as well.  This agreement took effect in November, and in March 2005 was extended through October 29, 2005.  At the same time we extended the agreement, we also published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) which proposes options to address congestion at O’Hare for the next three years.  By that time, if approved by FAA, O’Hare’s proposed Modernization Project or a reasonable alternative to that project could provide additional airport capacity.

Since the voluntary agreement took effect last November, O’Hare’s on-time arrival performance has improved by more than 10 percent, and overall delay minutes from November through this past February have been cut by 22 percent, as compared to the previous year.  We estimate that maintaining limits on the number of arrivals through April 2008 will result in a reduction in delays at O’Hare, and save airlines and passengers over $700 million lost through delays as compared to November 2003.  As noted above, the proposed rule is timed to expire as airport capacity improvements are expected to take hold.  Under the terms of the NPRM, we will review every six months the level and length of delays and other operating conditions, to determine if the airport can accommodate more arrivals.  If additional capacity becomes available while the rule is in effect, we propose a method to assign the additional capacity to air carriers interested in initiating or expanding service at O’Hare.

We partner with airports to address capacity and delay concerns and we support implementation of solutions with funding from the Airport Improvement Program (AIP).  By the end of 2008, eight new runway projects are scheduled for commissioning.  These include new runways at:  Minneapolis-St. Paul; Cincinnati; St. Louis; Atlanta; Boston; Charlotte; and Seattle, and a runway extension at Philadelphia.  Beyond 2008, we are working with other airports to increase capacity.  We recently announced our final Record of Decision for Los Angeles, which will permit the airfield reconfiguration project to go forward.  We continue to maintain and monitor the schedule for the Environmental Impact Statement at Chicago as well.  We are also working closely with Fort Lauderdale on a major runway extension, and three major metropolitan areas Chicago, Las Vegas, and San Diego who are considering the need for new airports.  We are supporting, through AIP funding, the preparation of regional studies in the New York Metropolitan area and the LA Basin.

While new runway construction typically provides the largest increase in capacity, there are new technologies and procedural improvements, such as Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) and Precision Runway Monitor (PRM), which add capacity, as well.  TMA is a tool that assists the air traffic controller to sequence and schedule aircraft to the runway to maximize airport and terminal airspace capacity without compromising safety.  PRM approaches have been implemented at San Francisco, Philadelphia, Cleveland and Minneapolis-St. Paul, and are planned for Atlanta and St. Louis.  PRM allows air traffic controllers to run simultaneous operations on closely spaced parallel runways.  It should be noted that increases in capacity from new runway construction often cannot be fully realized unless implemented along with new procedures and technology. 

As with other networks that experience peak period demand surges, congestion management, such as congestion pricing, could be an option at a small number of airports where demand may come to exceed capacity in the short term, pending capacity expansion, or in the long term if capacity expansion is not a practical option.

In FY 2004, the FAA completed a study analyzing system capacity, taking into account the socio-economic and demographic trends expected to occur in the United States through 2020.  This study expanded the focus of the 35 OEP airports and evaluated nearly 300 commercial service airports nationwide.  This study identified airports and metropolitan areas expected to have significant growth in population and/or income that could result in an increase in the demand for air transportation that may not have been previously anticipated.  The study identified the airports that need additional capacity and any constraints to enhancing capacity.  Without capacity improvements at airports in these areas, this demand may go unsatisfied.  In FY 2005, the FAA will complete a second phase of this study that will take a more detailed look at the non-OEP airports and will begin to identify possible solutions to increase long-term capacity 

We must also make sure we are using the best technology to maintain a safe and efficient air traffic system.  One example of this is the Wide Area Augmentation System, known as WAAS.  WAAS is a precise navigation system that enhances the satellite signals from the Global Positioning System (GPS) to provide the accuracy and reliability necessary for pilots to rely on GPS during flight.  Because the system is satellite-based, WAAS procedures cost a lot less to implement and maintain than traditional ground-based navigation systems.  WAAS makes more airspace usable to pilots, provides more direct en route paths, and provides new precision approach services to runway ends.  The implementation of WAAS into the NAS will result in safety and capacity improvements.  Since WAAS became operational in July 2003, the FAA has developed 3,000 WAAS approaches.  This is a significant accomplishment in modernizing how we use our airspace, and one which will have a lasting, positive effect on capacity.

In the longer term, however, we know that these short and mid-term efforts will simply not be enough.  The recent FAA aviation forecast provides further evidence that our current system, already coming under stress in some areas, will be stretched to its limit as future demands continue to grow.  Passenger totals are expected to exceed one billion by 2015, and we project up to a tripling of passengers, operations and cargo by the year 2025.  As Secretary Mineta said in a speech before the Aero Club in January 2004: “The changes that are coming are too big, too fundamental for incremental adaptations of the infrastructure.  We need to modernize and transform our air transportation system – starting right now.”

Our overarching goal in the Next Generation initiative is to develop a system that will be flexible enough to accommodate very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned or unmanned air vehicles, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, and to handle up to three times the number of operations that the current system does with no diminution in safety, security and efficiency.  At the same time, the system would minimize the impact of aviation on the environment.

However, the move to a modern, efficient and technology-driven aviation system is going to require sustained, long term investments.  The problem we face is that the status of the Aviation Trust Fund, which supports these investments, is inextricably tied to the fortunes of the aviation industry.  Policy makers need to know that there is a gap that exists between our revenue and expenses, and this gap is quickly eroding the Trust Fund.  The FAA needs a stable source of funding that is based both on our costs and the services we provide so that we can meet our mission in an extremely dynamic business environment.  Tying fees to the cost of providing service protects both FAA and the customers who use FAA services by not subjecting our ability to provide a critical level of service to unrelated factors like ticket prices.  A stable, cost-based revenue stream can also ensure funding for long-term capital needs.  We also believe that a cost-based revenue structure would provide incentives to our customers to use resources efficiently and to the FAA to operate more efficiently, as stakeholder involvement can help us ensure that we are concentrating on services that the customer wants and is willing to pay for.

Mr. Chairman, with a comprehensive plan in place, cooperative initiatives underway, and thanks to the tools provided to us by this Committee, we are ready for the spring and summer travel season.  This completes my statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

MARION C. BLAKEY,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

ON

COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION

FEBRUARY 9, 2005

Chairman Mica, Mr. Costello, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Good afternoon.  It is a pleasure to be here today at the Subcommittee’s first hearing of the 109^th Congress.  Today I would like to provide a brief overview of the Federal Aviation Administration’s activities in overseeing the commercial space transportation industry.  Specifically, I will address how we plan to implement the most recent changes that Congress enacted in December, and how we see the future of this growing industry.  But first, I wish to offer my congratulations to the new Members of the Subcommittee.  I would also like to extend my best wishes to the new Ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee, Mr. Costello.  Congressman Costello has been a valuable Member of this Committee since his election to Congress. I look forward to working with all of you, as well as the returning Members of the Subcommittee, on the important agenda ahead of us.  Secretary Mineta and I truly value our partnership with Congress and the work we do together to make our nation’s aviation and space transportation systems the safest and most efficient in the world. 

Commercial space transportation is an increasingly important part of our nation’s transportation system.  Last year, the FAA completed a study examining the contributions of commercial space transportation, and other industries that are linked to space transportation.  We found that in 2002, commercial space transportation and enabled industries created more than $95 billion in economic activity, $23.5 billion in earnings, and 576,400 jobs.  Commercial space launches deliver communications, weather and science satellites to orbit.  Satellite communications are integrated now into our daily lives, providing us with television, access to the Internet, credit card purchasing, and digital radio. 

The timing of this hearing is particularly appropriate given that tomorrow is the opening of the FAA’s annual Commercial Space Transportation Conference here in D.C.  This event will feature remarks by some of the key individuals in both industry and government and will include panels on the X Prize and Beyond, Emergent ELV Technologies, Regulating Outside the Box, Space and Air Traffic Management, and Educating Tomorrow’s Engineers. 

The FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation Office is responsible for protecting public health and safety through the licensing and regulation of commercial space launches and reentries and the operation of launch and reentry sites.  Our Commercial Space Office encourages, facilitates and promotes commercial launches and reentries and to facilitate the strengthening and expansion of the U.S. space transportation infrastructure.  As always, our first priority is the safety of the public at large.

The Commercial Space Office was originally established in 1984, by President Reagan, following the passage of the first law governing the commercial space industry.  It was located at that time in the Office of then Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole.  The Office was later transferred to the FAA in 1995.  The Office licensed its first launch of an expendable, vertically launched rocket in 1989.  Since then there have been 168 licensed launches by U.S. companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Orbital Sciences, and most recently Scaled Composites.  Headed by Mr. Burt Rutan, Scaled Composites SpaceShipOne was the first private, manned vehicle to reach space.  While the FAA does not license launches performed by and for the U.S. government—we do work very closely with our colleagues at NASA and the Air Force to establish seamless safety rules for both government and private launch facilities.

As you may know, commercial space launches are inherently dangerous and risky operations-- a fact that is recognized not just by those who are directly involved but also by the law and regulatory regime that governs the industry.  As a result, the approach to safety in the commercial space arena differs from the approach for civil aviation, where safety is achieved with the high reliability of today’s aircraft.  The FAA’s safety focus in commercial space transportation has been on protecting the general public and their property from the dangers inherent in such operations.  For launches, the safety approach is to contain the hazards.  As noted above, rocket failures occur with some regularity.  Historically, the failure rate has been approximately 10 percent for licensed launches.  The mission of the FAA is to ensure that each rocket that fails has a safety system that ensures no damage is done to life or property on the ground. 

Our licensing process includes a pre-licensing consultation period during which our technical team begins a dialogue with launch applicants regarding what they propose and requirements they must meet to receive a license.  After this initial dialogue, we proceed to a more comprehensive review and analysis during which we analyze and evaluate every possible aspect of a proposed space launch operation.  This includes a policy review, payload review, safety evaluation, financial responsibility determination, and an environmental review.  We issue a license only after we determine that an applicant’s launch or reentry proposal will not jeopardize public health and safety, the safety of property, or conflict with U.S. national security or foreign policy interests and obligations. 

In addition to licensing launches, the FAA is also responsible for licensing and regulating the operation of launch sites.  We have licensed four launch sites in the U.S. – in California, Florida, Virginia, and Alaska.  Last year, we added a fifth—the Mojave Airport in California, which is a dual use facility.  In fact, it is the first inland launch site in the country to receive a license.  States are increasingly interested in hosting a launch site because they see spaceports as potential sources of future economic growth.  We are currently in discussions with Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas about their license applications.  In the future, we anticipate there will be a network of non-federal launch sites throughout the U.S.

During the 20-year history of the government’s oversight of commercial space launches, there have been no launch accidents that have resulted in loss of life, serious injuries, or major property damage.  While there have been rocket launch failures, where, for example, the rocket malfunctioned or had to be destroyed deliberately because it veered from its intended trajectory, or where a satellite payload was not successfully inserted into orbit, the uninvolved public was still protected.  We believe that this is an impressive safety record that speaks to the skill, dedication, and commitment to safety of the FAA’s team, our industry partners, and of our government partners like NASA and the Air Force.

One of the key ways the U.S. supports the commercial space industry is through a statutory risk-sharing program between private industry and the federal government.  It consists of three major components:  (1) liability and government property insurance that is obtained by the launch operator; (2) cross-waivers of liability; and (3) provisions for payment by the government of third-party liability claims in excess of required liability insurance, up to $ 1.5 billion, as adjusted for inflation.  This liability risk-sharing arrangement was recently extended by Congress through 2009 with a provision for a comprehensive study on whether this program could be eliminated and what alternatives there are to maintain a viable and competitive U.S. industry.  Because of the excellent safety record of the industry, the indemnification provision has never been invoked.

Let me now briefly discuss FAA’s recent commercial space activities.  Last year the FAA licensed 14 commercial launches, the most since 1999 and more than what both NASA and DOD launched in 2004.  These included five Atlas launches, three Sea Launch missions, one Taurus Launch, and five launches by SpaceShipOne.  The industry is continuing to develop and evolve to an era of reusable launch vehicles, suborbital launch vehicles and, most recently, personal human spaceflight.

You may recall that last June, we all witnessed the first privately funded launch of a manned vehicle into space.  Before that day, the commercial space industry dealt only in unmanned vehicles.  Burt Rutan and his team at Scaled Composites accomplished this historic feat.  Mike Melville piloted SpaceShipOne--traveling to an altitude of 337,500 feet and reaching the X-Prize threshold of space.  The FAA’s Associate Administrator, Patti Grace Smith, presented Mr. Melville with the first FAA-issued commercial astronaut wings.  A few short months later, on October 4^th, I had the privilege of awarding the next set of wings to Astronaut Brian Binnie.  Astronaut Binnie’s flight on SpaceShipOne was the flight that won the $10 million Ansari X-Prize, which was awarded to the first company to launch a vehicle that carried the equivalent of three persons on board and returned twice within a two-week span. 

Mr. Rutan and his team earned the respect and admiration of the entire country with the accomplishment.  I am also proud of the exceptional licensing and safety work done by our FAA team, which included not only staff from our Commercial Space Office, but also experts from our Aviation Safety Organization and from our Air Traffic Organization.  Our people worked tirelessly with Mr. Rutan’s company throughout the development of SpaceShipOne to enable these historic flights and to fully protect the American public. 

SpaceShipOne marked the beginning of a new chapter in commercial space transportation.  A new generation of vehicles shows the potential for the development of a space tourism industry.  Congress recognized this new beginning in passing last December the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, designed to promote the development of human space flight.  It does so by giving the FAA responsibility over the safety of the crew and passengers.  Under a new regulatory regime, paying passengers, deemed “space flight participants,” will now be able to fly into space on board commercial space vehicles after such passengers are informed of and assume the significant risks of the venture.  The new legislation sets an ambitious schedule for issuing rules on commercial human space flight.  The FAA’s staff are already working on rules for experimental permits called for by the new law and for rules on medical and training requirements for crew and space flight participants.

Advocates of this new law were concerned that “over-regulation” by the Federal Government might stifle development of new launch vehicles.  Today’s commercial space innovators have been compared to the barnstorming aviators that created the foundation for what is now the safest form of transportation.  Like those early pioneers, the innovators of today need an environment that will allow them to develop the spacecraft of the future.  We agree that government regulation should not be the enemy of innovation, particularly where design concepts and standard are unknown.  At the dawn of aviation, industry pioneers were left to create aircraft designs without benefit of government oversight.  The government requirements for building or designing an aircraft date from 1926, more than 20 years after the Wright Brother’s historic flight.  Ensuring safety often is an evolutionary process.  Part of the improvement to safety involves the simple result of mitigating risks and learning from mistakes. 

Government oversight of civil aviation evolved as the aircraft industry developed.  Likewise, government oversight of commercial space transportation must also evolve appropriately as the industry matures.  This may mean permitting more risk now to those who choose to assume those risks in order to achieve an ultimately safer, more advanced launch vehicle.  At the same time, the new law does not disturb the FAA’s current authority to fully protect the safety of the uninvolved public.  I assure you, we will continue to take that responsibility very seriously in conducting our licensing and permitting reviews under the new law.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say a few words about the current economic condition of and outlook for the industry.  In the orbital segment of the industry, there has been a downturn in the launch of expendable launch vehicles (ELV’s) from 2000 to the present.  Today, the supply of available launch vehicles internationally has increased while demand has not.  As a result, launch prices have dropped compared to the mid-1990s.  In addition, U.S.-manufactured launch vehicles have to compete against low-cost Russian rockets.  At this time, the future outlook for 2004-2013 is for only slight growth in the expected demand for commercial launch services.

We see future potential growth in the suborbital segment of the industry, as new U.S.-built vehicles are developed to meet the demand for human space travel and tourism.  As noted above, SpaceShipOne’s five launches have led the way.  Additional entrepreneurs are expected to enter the market.  For example, Sir Richard Branson, owner of Virgin Airlines, announced plans to fly customers into space aboard a fleet of five passenger rockets on a service he will call Virgin Galactic.  We understand he plans to lease or buy these spacecraft from Scaled Composites, no doubt a welcome investment for the innovative American company. 

In conclusion, I want to assure the Committee that the FAA will continue to strive to be proactive, vigilant, and responsive to the needs of the commercial space transportation.  We will create a sound regulatory framework that protects public safety while enabling the industry to manage risk, evolve its technology, and bring its products to the global marketplace with appropriate regulatory oversight.  As Secretary Mineta recently said before the Aero Club here in Washington:  “The first rule, to quote an old adage, is ‘do no harm.’  This means that your government will not stand in the way of airlines as they seek to innovate.  It means giving the fledgling commercial space industry the freedom to develop, and I am very pleased that we now have a streamlined legislative foundation in place to support this exciting new area of transportation.”  I agree with the Secretary. 

That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman.  I would be happy to answer any questions you and the Members of the Subcommittee may have.

STATEMENT OF

BILL WITHYCOMB,
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR
WESTERN PACIFIC REGION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

AIRSPACE REDESIGN OVER SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
AND RUNWAY INCURSIONS AT LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL

ON MARCH 20, 2006.

Chairman Mica, Members of Congress

I am pleased to welcome you to southern California and to discuss with you aviation issues that are important to this region.  Specifically, you have asked that I update you on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) airspace redesign efforts in southern California and the status of ongoing efforts to reduce runway incursions at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).  The FAA is well aware of the importance of southern California to the effectiveness of the overall national airspace system (NAS).  We are working on these issues and several others to preserve the safety and efficiency that is critical to not only the citizens of California, but the nation as a whole.

The airspace over southern California is highly complex.  It includes high volume traffic in the north – south corridors, military airspace and eight busy airports located in close proximity to one another.  There are over two million operations a year in approximately 10,000 miles of airspace.  Post September 11, the total annual operations for the region remain lower than pre-September 11 levels, especially with respect to operations at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).  In recent years, the number of annual operations has remained fairly constant and the number of delays has decreased, but FAA anticipates that there will be significant growth in the area that must be factored into future planning.

In June 2004, FAA published a report entitled, “Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System: An Analysis of Airport and Metropolitan Area Demand and Operational Capacity in the Future.”  It identified a need for additional capacity in southern California in the 2013 to 2020 timeframe.  This is premised on the anticipated growth of both the population and wealth of the region in addition to the expectation that the use of very light jets will increase and that there will be more low cost operations.  Because the airports in the region are land locked, the opportunity for capacity expansion lies largely in airspace redesign.  Unlike other parts of the country where FAA has worked on airspace redesign because of existing congestion problems impacting the NAS, this is not yet the case in southern California.  Therefore, we have the opportunity to get out in front of the problem instead of waiting for the situation to develop.

In order to prepare for the future, FAA has identified four program projects to support anticipated growth; southern California redesign, central California redesign, bay to basin redesign, and high altitude redesign.  For purposes of this hearing, I will focus on the planned southern California redesign.

The southern California redesign has three parts that will ultimately result in a four to twelve million dollar annual savings due to reduced delays and additional throughput.  The first part of the project has largely been completed.  It optimizes the departure and arrival flows of LAX.  In September of 2004, FAA modified the LAX departure climb to permit a steady climb to more than 5,000 feet.  Previously, the aircraft would climb then level off, then climb and level off.  This change reduced the number of LAX departure transmissions with air traffic control because it was a single direction to climb steadily.  It also removed an offshore conflict with a north - south route flown by general aviation aircraft.  In February of this year, FAA announced the LAX arrival enhancement which will become operational in April.  This will permit aircraft to follow the same path over the ground, but on a lower gradient which will result in arrivals being quieter, burning less fuel, and producing less wear and tear on the aircraft.

The second part of the redesign is the actual redesign of the airspace.  The goal here is to take a “complete clean sheet” view of the airspace to determine how things should look if we were starting from scratch.  At the center of the redesign would be how best to feed aircraft into LAX.  The traffic at other airports would be optimized as they fit into the plan for LAX.  This redesign project is very ambitious and it will take several years to scope, design and conduct the required environmental analysis and review before implementation can take place.  As this Committee is well aware, projects of this size and sensitivity must achieve industry and community consensus in order to be successfully implemented.  There is a lot of work ahead to make this happen, but we believe it is an important and necessary investment in the future.

The final piece of the southern California redesign project focuses on arrival enhancement into San Diego.  The airspace around San Diego is complicated by military operations being conducted in the area.  New training needs have resulted in FAA working with our military partners to maximize the efficiency and safety of this shared space.  Ultimately, we would like to conduct a more thorough analysis and redesign of this airspace to meet the anticipated long term needs of both commercial and military operations.

Turning now to runway incursions, I want to emphasize that reducing runway incursions is not just an FAA priority at LAX.  We have been working hard to reduce the most serious runway incursions around the country.  As outlined in the FAA Flight Plan 2006-2010, the FAA is developing a range of initiatives from airport design concepts to surface movement procedures.  Related efforts address the errors committed by pilots, air traffic controllers, and airport-authorized vehicle operators and pedestrians.  We have set performance targets and we are holding ourselves accountable for meeting those targets.  We are working hard and making progress, but we are not there yet.

Because we are taking it seriously, the FAA reconstructs each runway incursion using the available information and plots the approximate location of each event on airport diagrams.  During this exercise, we systematically categorize each runway incursion in terms of its severity.  Severity Categories A through D (A being the most serious, D the least) consider factors such as the speed and performance characteristics of the aircraft involved, the proximity of one aircraft to another aircraft or vehicle, and the type and extent of any evasive action by those involved in the event.  Aircraft involved in runway incursions are grouped into either commercial or general aviation operations.  Incidents are further categorized into three error types: pilot deviations, operational errors/deviations, and vehicle/pedestrian deviations.  It is important to remember that runway incursions do not occur in a vacuum.  The actions of pilots, air traffic controllers and vehicle drivers are intermingled and can significantly impact one another.

We have made important progress over the last few years, especially in reducing serious Category A and B runway incursions by more than 40 percent since FY 2001.  In FY 2005, we had a total of 327 runway incursions.  Twenty-nine of those were Category A and B incursions, which is less than 10 percent of the total.  In terms of error types, there were 169 pilot deviations, 105 operational errors/deviations, and 53 vehicle/pedestrian deviations.  While pilot deviations are the most common type of runway incursion, they accounted for only 31 percent of serious incursions in the past fiscal year.  Operational errors/deviations, on the other hand, accounted for only 32 percent of total deviations, but 55 percent of serious deviations which represents a notable change in the distribution of runway incursion types with respect to severity.  These are the types of statistics our runway incursion safety team continuously analyzes in order to understand where our efforts will have the greatest impact in reducing risk.

FAA is working closely with other airport sponsors to address runway incursions.  Late last year, Administrator Blakey met with the City of Los Angeles and discussed the chronic runway incursion problem at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).  In fiscal year 1998, there were 12 runway incursions at LAX.  Since then, we have made some progress.  In fiscal year 2000, there were 10 runway incursions, 9 in 2003, and 8 last year.  We see an improving trend, but there is still risk so we need to continue to reduce runway incursions at LAX as well as other airports around the country.

Roughly 80 percent of runway incursions at LAX occur on the south side of the airport.  It is important to note the current airfield layout was designed to accommodate jetliners that were in service over 40-years ago.  The City completed Master Plan for LAX identifies changes in the airfield layout to resolve this problem.

On May 20, 2005, FAA issued its Record of Decision for the City’s Master Plan.  In August FAA issued a grant to the City for approximately $38.8 million for the relocation of the southern most runway and the addition of a new parallel taxiway at LAX.  This project is expected to significantly reduce runway incursions at LAX.  Last month FAA provided an additional $29.5 million for the runway relocation.  The City has an aggressive schedule for the project and should be commended for this vital safety initiative and encouraged to expedite the project to the greatest degree possible.

Overall, we are taking a proactive approach to address operational vulnerabilities through awareness, education, procedures, airport infrastructure, and surface technology initiatives.  The FAA has worked with external organizations, airport officials, and safety experts to increase surface safety awareness on a national level.  We have developed and promoted runway safety training material in conjunction with organizations such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety Foundation and the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA).  Efforts have included the creation of an interactive Web-based program to inform pilots about preventing runway incursions.  The program, accessible from both the FAA, AOPA, and ALPA web sites, provides an introduction to runway incursion risk, information about airfield signs and markings, and strategies for enhanced position awareness and improved cockpit management.  Throughout the program, various quizzes, tasks, and information visualization tools offer an interactive learning experience. 

In addition to the work we are doing with LAX, we have identified what we refer to as the Focus-35 airports.  These are airports, LAX included, that reported the most runway incursions from FY 2001 to 2004.  During that period, the Focus-35 airports handled 20 percent of all NAS operations yet accounted for 41 percent of all runway incursions (565).  Through airport infrastructure and safety management programs, some of these airports have successfully reduced the number of runway incursions in the last year or two.  The Focus-35 airports accounted for 39 percent of the Category A and B runway incursions.  However, the number of such incursions decreased by 71 percent, from 24 to seven, from FY 2001 to 2004.  Continued implementation of risk mitigation strategies at the Focus-35 airports offers the most immediate opportunity to continue to reduce the severity, number, and rate of runway incursions in the NAS. 

As presented in the FAA Flight Plan 2006-2010, the FAA’s performance target is to reduce the number of Category A and B runway incursions to an annual rate of no more than 0.450 per million operations by FY 2010.  Analysis of the trend of runway incursions from 2001 through 2004, shows that the rate of reduction flattened, suggesting that the runway safety management strategies that have been implemented early in that period had achieved their maximum effect.  Therefore, in order to achieve our stated targets, the FAA must identify new strategies and re-prioritize their application.

That is why we are currently deploying a newer warning system called Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X) to further enhance safety and improve “error tolerance”—as human error is inevitable.  ASDE-X capabilities will be added to some of the sites that already have AMASS, including LAX, as well as being deployed to additional busy airports.  Another effort worth mentioning is a change to the airfield paint markings standard for taxiway centerlines at 72 large airports, including LAX.  We are requiring the new markings as another proactive way to alert pilots when they are approaching hold short lines so they do not inadvertently enter a runway without authorization.  We will continue to pioneer work that offers the greatest opportunity for improving NAS-wide runway safety.