FAA

Legacy ID

8081

FAA Aviation Certification

STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. ELWELL
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, AND HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OVERSIGHT HEARING: FAA AVIATION CERTIFICATION
SEPTEMBER 25, 2019

Chairman Price, Ranking Member Diaz-Balart, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to speak with you about the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) certification process. The FAA’s aircraft certification processes are well-established, thorough, and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs. Our aviation safety record in the United States bears this out; since 1997, the risk of a fatal commercial aviation accident in the United States has been cut by 94 percent. And in the past ten years, there has been one commercial airline passenger fatality in the United States in over 90 million flights. But one fatality is one too many, and a healthy safety culture requires commitment to continuous improvement.

The regulations and policies that guide our approach to aircraft certification have evolved over time in order to adapt to an ever-changing industry, and to ensure safety is always our first priority. Continuous improvement is an integral component of the FAA’s safety culture and we are committed to learning from our experiences and using what we’ve learned to improve our process. With that as the basis for our approach to certification, I would like to outline for you the significant aspects of FAA’s certification process and the recent initiatives that have been put in place to review our processes and procedures.

Aircraft Certification

Information sharing is a cornerstone of aviation safety and has significantly contributed to the United States outstanding safety record. One of the FAA’s core functions, aircraft certification, has always relied on the exchange of information and technical data. The FAA certifies the design of aircraft and components that are used in civil aviation operations. Some version of our certification process has been in place and served us well for over 60 years. This does not mean the process has remained static. To the contrary, since 1964, the regulations covering certification processes have been under constant review. As a result, the general regulations have been modified over 90 times, and the rules applicable to large transport aircraft, like the Boeing 737 MAX, have been amended over 130 times. The regulations and our policies have evolved in order to adapt to an industry that uses global partnerships to develop new, more efficient, and safer aviation products and technologies. What has not changed is that, for any new project, the FAA identifies all safety standards and makes all key decisions regarding certification of the aircraft.

The use of delegation has been a vital part of our safety system, in one form or another, since the 1920s. Congress has continually expanded the designee program since creation of the FAA in 1958, and it is critical to the success and effectiveness of the certification process. Under this program, the FAA may delegate a matter related to aircraft certification to a qualified private person. During the past few years, Congress has endorsed FAA’s delegation authority, including in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which directed the FAA to delegate more certification tasks to the designees we oversee.

Delegation is not self-certification; the FAA retains strict oversight authority. The program allows the FAA to leverage its resources and technical expertise while holding the applicant accountable for compliance. The FAA reviews the applicant’s design descriptions and project plans, determines where FAA involvement will derive the most safety benefit, and coordinates its intentions with the applicant. When a particular decision or event is critical to the safety of the product or to the determination of compliance, the FAA is involved either directly or through the use of our designee system.

In aircraft certification, both individual and organizational designees support the FAA. The aircraft certification process has four stages: (1) certification basis; (2) planning and standards; (3) analysis and testing; and (4) final decision and certification of design. The FAA determines the level of involvement of the designees and the level of FAA participation needed based on many variables. These variables include the designee’s understanding of the compliance policy; consideration of any new and novel certification areas; or instances where adequate standards may not be in place. The work FAA delegates primarily relates to analysis and testing. About 94% of work in this area is delegated, and that work involves lower risk and routine items. The FAA does not delegate the other functions. The FAA determines the certification basis, identifies the standards, and makes all key and final decisions.

The Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program is the means by which the FAA may authorize an organization to act as a representative of the FAA under strict FAA oversight. Currently, there are 79 ODA holders. ODA certification processes allow FAA to leverage industry expertise in the conduct of the certification activities and focus on important safety matters. The FAA has a rigorous process for issuing an ODA and only grants this authorization to mature companies with a proven history of designing products that meet FAA safety standards. ODA holders must have demonstrated experience and expertise in FAA certification processes, a qualified staff, and an FAA-approved procedures manual before they are appointed. The FAA delegates authority on a project-by-project basis, and the manual defines the process and procedures to which the ODA must adhere when executing the delegated authority. The ODA holder is responsible to ensure that ODA staff are free to perform their authorized functions without conflicts of interest or undue pressure.

There are many issues that will always require direct FAA involvement, including equivalent level of safety determinations, and rulemakings required to approve special conditions. The FAA may choose to be involved in other project areas after considering factors such as our confidence in the applicant, the applicant’s experience, the applicant’s internal processes, and confidence in the designees.

Something that is not well understood about the certification process is that it is the applicant’s responsibility to ensure that an aircraft complies with FAA safety regulations. It is the applicant who is required to develop aircraft design plans and specifications, and perform the appropriate inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design complies with the regulations. The FAA is responsible for determining that the applicant has shown that the overall design meets the safety standards. We do that by reviewing data and by conducting risk-based evaluations of the applicant's work.

The FAA is directly involved in the testing and certification of new and novel features and technologies. When a new design or a change to an existing design of an aircraft is being proposed, the designer must apply to the FAA for a design approval. While an applicant usually works on its design before discussing it with the FAA, we encourage collaborative discussions well in advance of presenting a formal application. Once an applicant informs the FAA of the intent to develop and certify a product, a series of meetings are held both to familiarize the FAA with the proposed design, and to familiarize the applicant with the certification requirements. A number of formal and informal meetings are held on issues ranging from technical to procedural. Once the application is made, there is a structured way of documenting the resolution of technical, regulatory, and administrative issues that are identified during the process.

Once the certification basis is established for a proposed design, the FAA and the applicant develop and agree to a certification plan and initial schedule. In order to receive a type certificate, the applicant must conduct an extensive series of tests and reviews to show that the product is compliant with existing standards and any special conditions, including lab tests, flight tests, and conformity inspections. These analyses, tests, and inspections happen at a component-level and an airplane-level, all of which are subject to FAA oversight. If the FAA finds that a proposed new type of aircraft complies with safety standards, it issues a type certificate. Or, in the case of a change to an existing aircraft design, the FAA issues an amended type certificate.

737 MAX Post-Grounding Actions

The crashes of two Boeing 737 MAX airplanes in five months placed a spotlight on safety and FAA’s approach to oversight of those we regulate. With respect to the certification of the 737 MAX, the facts are these: it took five years to certify the 737 MAX. Boeing applied for certification in January 2012. The certification was completed in March 2017. During those five years, FAA safety engineers and test pilots put in 110,000 hours of work, and they flew or supported 297 test flights.

As part of the FAA’s commitment to continuous improvement, we both welcome and invite review of our processes and procedures. A number of reviews and audits have been initiated to look at different aspects of the 737 MAX certification. After the FAA grounded the 737 MAX, Secretary Chao asked the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General to conduct an audit of the certification for the 737 MAX, with the goal of compiling an objective and detailed factual history of the activities that resulted in the certification of the 737 MAX aircraft. Secretary Chao also announced the establishment of an expert Special Committee to advise the department on aviation safety oversight and certification programs, including a review of the FAA’s procedures for the certification of new aircraft. The Special Committee has been formed within the structure of the Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC). Established by Congress in the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, the SOCAC is an independent panel that will advise the FAA more broadly on aircraft and flight standards certification processes, oversight of safety management systems, risk-based oversight efforts, and utilization of delegation and designation authorities. Secretary Chao recently announced that the SOCAC’s 22-member panel will include officials from Delta Air Lines, GE Aviation, United Airlines, Bell Helicopter Textron, Garmin, Wing Aviation LLC, Pratt & Whitney (a unit of United Technologies Corp), and Gulfstream (a unit of General Dynamics Corp), as well as union, airport, and trade association officials.

The FAA established a Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) to conduct a comprehensive review of the certification of the automated flight control system on the Boeing 737 MAX. The JATR is chaired by former National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chairman Christopher Hart and comprises a team of experts from the FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the aviation authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.

Additionally, the FAA met with safety representatives of the three U.S.-based commercial airlines that have the Boeing 737 MAX in their fleets, as well as the pilot unions for those airlines. This meeting was an opportunity for the FAA to hear individual views from operators and pilots of the 737 MAX as the agency evaluates what needs to be done before the FAA makes a decision to return the aircraft to service in the United States. In keeping with the FAA’s longstanding cooperation with its international partners, the FAA also hosted a meeting of Directors General of civil aviation authorities from around the world to discuss the FAA’s activities toward ensuring the safe return of the 737 MAX to service. We continue to be in frequent communication with the international aviation safety community and are working closely with our counterparts to address their concerns and keep them informed of progress.

The FAA also initiated a multi-agency Technical Advisory Board (TAB) review of Boeing’s software update and system safety assessment in order to determine compliance. The TAB consists of a team of experts from the U.S. Air Force, NASA, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and the FAA. None of the TAB experts have been involved in any aspect of the Boeing 737 MAX certification. The TAB is charged with evaluating Boeing and FAA efforts related to the software update and its integration into the flight control system. The TAB will identify issues where further investigation is required prior to approval of the design change. The JATR is looking broadly at the original certification of the 737 MAX flight control system, while the TAB is evaluating Boeing’s proposed technical solutions related to the two accidents. The TAB’s recommendations will directly inform the FAA’s decision concerning the 737 MAX fleet’s return to service.

The FAA is following a thorough process, not a prescribed timeline, for returning the 737 MAX to passenger service. We continue to evaluate Boeing’s software modification and we are still developing necessary training requirements. The 737 MAX will not return to service for U.S. carriers and in U.S. airspace until the FAA’s analysis of the facts and technical data indicate that it is safe to do so.

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to your questions.

Drone Security: Enhancing Innovation and Mitigating Supply Chain Risks

STATEMENT OF ANGELA H. STUBBLEFIELD, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR SECURITY AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY
DRONE SECURITY: ENHANCING INNOVATION AND MITIGATING SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS

JUNE 18, 2019

Chairman Sullivan, Ranking Member Markey, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. As the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Deputy Associate Administrator for the Office of Security and Hazardous Materials Safety, I share the Associate Administrator’s responsibilities for formulating policies and plans, and directing national programs involving internal security, intelligence analysis and threat warning, emergency response, and safe air transportation of dangerous goods. This includes ensuring programs and operations are coordinated and integrated with the appropriate external and internal organizations. My office coordinates regularly with the National Security Council (NSC), the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and Energy (DOE), as well as other security and safety partner agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, to resolve complex national security, safety, and crisis-response challenges. My office is helping to coordinate FAA engagement with stakeholders on Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) security issues including UAS detection and Counter-UAS (C-UAS) policy.

UAS technology represents one of the fastest growing sectors in aviation today. The volume of UAS operations is outpacing manned aircraft, and there are currently nearly four times as many UAS as registered manned aircraft. UAS are used every day to inspect infrastructure, provide emergency response support, survey agriculture, conduct geological and environmental surveys, and to go places that are otherwise dangerous for people or other vehicles. Entrepreneurs around the world are exploring innovative ways to use UAS in their commercial activities. The need for us to fully integrate this technology into the National Airspace System (NAS) in a safe, secure, and efficient manner continues to be a national priority—one in which both the FAA and our security partners are heavily invested.

UAS technology offers tremendous benefits to our economy and society, as Congress has recognized, but we must also acknowledge that potential misuse of this technology poses unique security challenges that enable bad actors to overcome the traditional ground-based security measures in place at most sensitive facilities. Today, I would like to discuss with you the FAA’s efforts in support of the safe, secure, and efficient integration of UAS into the NAS, including the status of our work with our federal partners to implement counter-UAS authorities and coordination efforts with airport sponsors and other critical infrastructure owners to support their desire to identify and respond effectively to the safety or security risks that may be posed by the errant or malicious use of UAS.

Safe and Secure Integration of UAS into the NAS

The FAA’s primary mission is to provide the safest, most efficient airspace system in the world. The FAA uses its statutory authority to carry out this mission by issuing and enforcing regulations and standards for the safe operation of aircraft, by developing procedures to ensure the safe movement of aircraft through the nation’s skies, and by providing air traffic control and other air navigation services. In exercising its authority, the FAA also must consider the public’s right of free transit through the navigable airspace. This requires close coordination to balance the needs of our security partners with the right of airspace access for both manned and unmanned aircraft. Consistent with our mission, in 2016, the FAA issued the basic rules for small UAS operations—14 C.F.R. part 107—which set the global standard for integration and provided small UAS operators with unprecedented access to the NAS.

Recently, as part of our effort to address the ever-expanding universe of UAS operations and capabilities, the FAA together with the Department’s Office of the Secretary published a proposed new rule on the operation of small UAS over people.^{^[1]} The proposal seeks to balance the need to mitigate safety risks with supporting technological and operational advances. The FAA also recently published an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking seeking public input to identify UAS safety and security issues and explore ways to mitigate risks UAS may pose to other aircraft, to people on the ground, or to national security.^{^[2]} The FAA’s security partners have highlighted for us some of the important security and public safety questions as we work through these issues. Further, in February 2019, the FAA published an interim final rule on external marking requirements for small UAS.^{^[3]} The rule requires small unmanned aircraft owners to display their unique identifier (FAA registration number) on an external surface of the aircraft. Small unmanned aircraft owners are no longer permitted to enclose the FAA-issued registration number in a compartment. The FAA took this action to address concerns expressed by the law enforcement community and the FAA’s interagency security partners regarding the risk a concealed explosive device poses to first responders who must open a compartment to attempt to find the small unmanned aircraft's registration number.

I would also highlight the work of our joint industry Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team (UAST), which is taking a data-driven approach to the analysis of small UAS safety issues and potential mitigation initiatives. This joint government - industry collaboration is a key effort by FAA’s UAS Integration Office and engages leaders from government and a wide variety of industry participants.

Going forward, however, perhaps one of the most important UAS efforts underway at FAA is drafting a remote identification rule. The ability to remotely identify UAS operators and connect them with a UAS in flight will be a crucial stepping stone for UAS traffic management and will facilitate what we envision as high volume, safe, and secure low-altitude UAS operations. Congress recognized the importance of remote identification when it enacted the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016. That Act laid the foundation for the FAA’s work with operators and our security partners to realize the importance of remote identification and to reach a consensus on how to address it. More recently, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 provided the FAA with additional authority to move ahead with work on universal registration and remote identification—both of which are critical to the success of commercial UAS operations and safe and secure UAS integration more broadly.

Remote identification is fundamental to both safety and security of UAS operations. Remote identification will be necessary for routine beyond visual line-of-sight operations and operations over people, package delivery, operations in congested airspace, and for the continued safe operation of all aircraft in shared airspace. It will also be foundational for the advancement of automated passenger or cargo-carrying air transportation—what is often referred to as Urban Air Mobility. From a security perspective, remote identification is vital to enabling us to connect a suspect UAS to its control station location and to identify the registered owner of a suspect UAS. With universal remote identification, the FAA, our national security partners, and state and local law enforcement will be better able to locate and identify a UAS operator, determine if a UAS is being operated in an unsafe, unauthorized, or criminal manner, and take appropriate action if necessary. The FAA is committed to establishing remote identification requirements as quickly as possible.

Congress has recognized that integration of UAS into the NAS will require dedicated traffic management. In 2016, Congress granted authority to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the FAA to conduct research and a pilot program for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM). UTM is essentially a set of concepts and tools being developed to safely de-conflict and facilitate dense low-altitude UAS operations. In 2018, Congress provided continued broad authority for UTM implementation, which will allow the FAA to continue its important work to balance the needs of all system users and ensure that UAS are safely and securely integrated into the NAS. DOD, DHS and other national security partners have joined in the development of UTM concepts to support their missions. The FAA is already implementing prototype foundational UTM capabilities such as the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC), which gives UAS operators the ability to request and receive near real-time response from the FAA to authorize operators to quickly plan and execute their flights in controlled airspace.

We are also using our existing airspace authority to address concerns about unauthorized UAS operations over certain national security-sensitive federal facilities. To date, we have restricted UAS flights over military installations and vessels, sensitive energy facilities, and iconic landmarks, like the Statue of Liberty, Hoover Dam, and Mount Rushmore, in the interest of national security. To ensure the public is aware of these restricted locations, we created on the FAA website an interactive map and repository of geospatial data used by UAS Service Suppliers and others, and we have updated our B4UFLY mobile app to include a warning to users in close proximity to these sites. This work is also informing our efforts to determine the most efficient and effective way to implement section 2209 of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, which will establish a process for critical infrastructure owners to petition the FAA for UAS-specific flight restrictions over their facilities.

Counter-UAS Authority

Through the Fiscal Year 2017 and 2018 enactments of the annual National Defense Authorization Act, Congress provided DOD and the DOE with authority to respond to UAS that pose a threat to designated facilities and assets. To ensure that C-UAS systems are operated safely in the NAS, Congress requires close FAA coordination with DOD and DOE to define what actions constitute a credible threat, develop a concept of operations for employing C-UAS systems, analyze and mitigate the spectrum impact of selected systems, and draft notification procedures and reporting requirements. Pursuant to similar authority contained in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, DOJ and DHS are also working closely with the FAA to ensure that UAS detection and mitigation technologies are tested, evaluated, and deployed in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts on airspace access, air navigation services, avionics, and other systems that ensure safe and efficient operations in the NAS, while also protecting individuals’ privacy and civil liberties.

The FAA’s role in supporting our partner agencies’ research and eventual use of C-UAS technologies is to ensure that the safety and overall efficiency of the NAS is not compromised while facilitating their security responses. The FAA must be involved in deployment of C-UAS technology at each fixed location, and for ad hoc and mobile operations. We must conduct specific, data intensive analyses for each potential deployment of C-UAS to ensure the concept of operations balances the need for operator notification, airspace access, and appropriate airspace safety mitigations with the protective missions of our security partners. Neither the FAA nor our partner agencies want to jeopardize aviation safety or interfere with compliant UAS operations. In order to strike that balance, the FAA will continue working closely with all of our partner agencies as they deploy C-UAS technology at sensitive facilities and to cover high-risk operations and assets in the United States. We worked through many of the toughest aspects of C-UAS deployment with DOD and DOE and are now sharing these processes and procedures with DHS and DOJ in order to expedite their implementation.

C-UAS in the Airport Environment

Section 2206 of the FAA Extension Safety, and Security Act of 2016 required the FAA, working with DHS and other relevant federal agencies, to evaluate UAS detection technology at airports. From February 2016 through December 2017, the FAA and our partner agencies observed and assessed UAS detection technologies operating at domestic airports in Atlantic City, New York City, Denver, and Dallas-Fort Worth. Through this important work, the FAA learned that the airport environment presents several unique challenges to the effective use of such technologies. The technical readiness of the systems, available at the time, combined with a multitude of other factors, such as geography, interference, location of the majority of reported unauthorized UAS sightings, and the cost of deployment and operation, demonstrate that more testing, evaluation, technology development, and sensor integration is required for effective use in domestic civil airport environments.

In view of these results, the FAA believes other actions, such as education and outreach in the local community, as well as implementation of remote identification requirements, offer effective and cost-efficient options to address many of the concerns related to non-compliant UAS operations on and around airports and air traffic patterns. That said, with the December 2018 protracted UAS disruption at Gatwick Airport, and other disruptions at airports around the world and in the United States, we understand and share the concerns of airport sponsors and our security partners regarding the potential safety hazards and security threats presented by errant or malicious UAS in the airport environment. A number of airport sponsors have acquired or are pursuing possible acquisition of UAS detection systems for their airports. In an effort to make sure such activity is conducted in a safe and coordinated manner, in early May, the FAA sent informational correspondence to airport sponsors, which included information to support informed airport decision-making regarding the potential issues surrounding the demonstration or installation of UAS detection systems at airports (including the legal uncertainties posed by certain UAS detection systems), answers to some frequently asked questions, and technical considerations that the FAA has used to assess the readiness of UAS detection technologies.^{^[4]} The FAA wants to coordinate with airports that plan to use UAS detection systems to ensure deployment and use does not create interference or obstruction with aviation safety and efficiency systems at the airport.

Another serious consideration is the quality and timeliness of data provided from privately developed and purchased detection systems. Poor quality information could lead to a reaction that is more detrimental than the errant UAS itself. Such information could cause a significant distraction to air traffic control and create unnecessary delays. Detection systems would be a tool for airports to determine if there is in fact a UAS in their airspace. That detection is the first step in determining whether a UAS poses a threat. This underscores the importance of implementing remote identification. Remote identification will provide critical information to help determine the errant UAS operator’s intent. In addition, it is imperative that airports develop and coordinate risk-based operational response plans with relevant airport stakeholders, including the FAA, the Transportation Security Administration, and airport law enforcement, to ensure safety hazards or disproportionate efficiency impacts are not created when attempting to respond to a potential security risk.

In the FAA’s May communication with airport sponsors, the Agency also reiterated its objection to the use of UAS mitigation systems by any public or private sector entity outside the four federal Departments that have been provided statutory authority for C-UAS. Given the impacts many UAS mitigation technologies can have on the safety and efficiency of manned aircraft operations, compliant unmanned aircraft, and the provision of air navigation services, the FAA does not currently endorse the general use of any UAS mitigation technology on or around an airport. The use of mitigation technology could introduce more disruption and safety risk than the suspect UAS operation, the very thing its use is intended to counter.

However, given the events in Gatwick, there is no doubt about the significant operational and economic impacts a persistent UAS disruption can have in the airport environment and the need to be able to not only detect, identify, and track a disruptive UAS but also to be able to take action to end the disruption. The FAA along with our federal security partners have formulated a concept of operations (CONOPS) for a National Federal Response plan through which current federal C-UAS authorities and existing federal C-UAS equipment can be rapidly projected into a major U.S. airport experiencing a persistent operational disruption due to an unauthorized UAS operation. This CONOPS has been socialized with airport and airline associations and should be finalized for implementation soon.

While there are a number of UAS detection and mitigation technologies in the marketplace, relatively limited testing and evaluation of these systems has been conducted at airports and in other domestic civil environments due in large part to legal constraints. The efficacy of their performance and the collateral impacts of their use have not been documented sufficiently to provide confidence in their purchase or use. The 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act directed the FAA to undertake several pilot program activities related to testing and evaluation of UAS detection and mitigation technology, including at airports (Section 383) and to support safety enforcement (Section 372). In addition, the FAA was directed to establish standards for the use of C-UAS systems and to develop a plan for permitting, authorizing, or allowing the use of such systems in the NAS (Section 383). The Agency is currently developing plans and milestones for these efforts.

Enforcement

The interagency work to address the security challenges presented by UAS appropriately has been focused on the risks presented by criminal operations. To date, however, the FAA and our security partners assess that a preponderance of the non-compliant UAS operations that have occurred are likely errant with no malicious intent. These errant operations present a safety concern, which the FAA is addressing in a number of ways. First, public education and outreach are key to reducing these incidents. Efforts such as the “Know Before You Fly” information campaign and the small UAS registration process serve as opportunities to help UAS operators understand the rules and responsibilities for flying an aircraft in the NAS. The Agency is also working to implement the requirements of Section 349 of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, which, among other things, provided the FAA with authority to require knowledge testing of recreational users. Section 349 also requires recreational flyers to receive authorization from the FAA to fly in controlled airspace and provides better clarity on authorized operations. In the future, the FAA anticipates opening the LAANC system to recreational pilots to allow users the ability to efficiently request and receive authorization to operate in controlled airspace.

That said, if an operator is unwilling or unable to comply with applicable regulations, or is deliberately flouting the regulations, the FAA will not hesitate to take enforcement action. We have a range of civil enforcement tools available to address a violation of federal regulations—from warning letters to civil penalties, and, in the case of an FAA certificate holder, suspension or revocation of that certificate. Civil penalties range from a maximum per violation penalty of $1,466 for individual operators to $32,666 for large companies. Congress also gave the FAA authority to assess civil penalties of up to $20,408 for interfering with law enforcement, first responders, or wildfire fighting operations. The FAA may take enforcement action against anyone who conducts an unauthorized UAS operation or who operates a UAS in a way that endangers the safety of the NAS. Since the promulgation of 14 CFR part 107 (August 2016), the FAA has initiated more than 35 legal enforcement actions for unauthorized UAS operations

The FAA also supports criminal investigation and enforcement actions by federal, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies through its Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) and as part of its airspace security planning for sensitive events such as this year’s Super Bowl. LEAP special agents and the FAA’s operations security personnel engage in extensive outreach and education efforts that include providing guidance on the FAA’s website to assist the law enforcement community in responding to UAS incidents and hosting monthly UAS information webinars. Law enforcement officials are often in the best position to detect and deter unsafe and unauthorized UAS operations, and we rely heavily on their reports to provide us with actionable information concerning these incidents. Accordingly, the FAA works closely with these agencies to develop and implement airspace security plans to protect sensitive events, provide them with investigative support and information, as well as to provide a communications link where these law enforcement agencies can pass along reports and receive assistance in a timely manner.

Cyber and Data Security Risks

While security risks posed by the malicious use of UAS are usually the focus of our discussions with critical infrastructure owners and security partners, increasingly there are concerns about threats to the safe and secure use of UAS due to cyber and data security risks. The FAA considers cyber and data security risks and mitigations in every aspect of our mission, including as they apply to aircraft certification and systems as well as to protection of our own air navigation services infrastructure. As FAA does with manned aviation, the Agency takes a risk based approach regarding system and data protection for UAS. While UAS are aircraft, they are also like so many highly computerized devices we use in our professional and personal lives. They can collect data and connect to the internet where information systems and data can be vulnerable to misuse if they are not adequately protected. UAS operators, like computer users, need to be aware of what data is on their systems and consider what level of protection is required. The FAA strongly recommends that UAS operators read the user licensing agreements for their UAS and consider whether the data access, sharing, and protection policies the manufacturer has in place are adequate or whether their data sensitivity necessitates additional protection from disclosure and misuse. The FAA is also looking at agreements the Agency has with non-federal UAS service suppliers to ensure data transparency, sovereignty, and protection requirements are included. Lastly, the FAA continues to work with its federal national security partners to identify and address cyber and data security threats to aviation generally, including those specifically related to UAS.

Conclusion

A robust security framework is critical to advancing the Administration’s goal to fully integrate UAS into the NAS. By enabling federal security and federal law enforcement agencies to detect and mitigate UAS threats and risks posed by errant or malicious UAS operations, and by working with operators to develop the technology to help minimize the risks posed by UAS, the United States will continue to lead the way in UAS innovation, and offer the safest and most efficient aviation system in the world. Working together, we are confident we can balance safety and security with innovation. We thank the Committee for its leadership on this issue, and we look forward to working with you as we continue to safely, securely, and efficiently integrate UAS into the NAS and solidify America’s role as the global leader in aviation.

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

^{^[1]} https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/13/2019-00732/operation-of-small-unmanned-aircraft-systems-over-people

^{^[2]} https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/13/2019-00758/safe-and-secure-operations-of-small-unmanned-aircraft-systems

^{^[3]} https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/13/2019-00765/external-marking-requirement-for-small-unmanned-aircraft

^{^[4]} https://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/media/Updated-Information-UAS-Detection-Countermeasures-Technology-Airports-20190507.pdf

Status of the Boeing 737 MAX

STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. ELWELL

ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STATUS OF THE BOEING 737 MAX

MAY 15, 2019

Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss aviation safety and the issues surrounding the Boeing 737 MAX. On behalf of the United States Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration, we would like to take this opportunity to, once again, extend our deepest sympathy to the families of the victims of the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air accidents.

Safety is the core of the Federal Aviation Administration’s mission and our top priority. With the support of this Committee, we have worked tirelessly to take a more proactive, data-driven approach to oversight that prioritizes safety above all else inside the FAA and within the aviation community that we regulate. The result of this approach is that the United States has the safest air transportation system in the world. Since 1997, the risk of a fatal commercial aviation accident in the United States has been cut by 94 percent. And in the past ten years, there has been one commercial airline passenger fatality in the United States in over 90 million flights. But, one fatality is one too many, and a healthy safety culture requires commitment to continuous improvement.

Our commitment to safety and fact-based, data-driven decision making has been the guiding principle in the FAA’s response to the two fatal accidents involving the Boeing 737 MAX airplane outside the United States. Today, I would like to provide you with an overview of the FAA’s certification and oversight processes, our current actions with respect to the 737 MAX, and the steps that the FAA is taking to foster safety enhancements here and abroad.

The FAA is a Data-Driven Agency Focused on Safety

As the aerospace system and its components become increasingly more complex, we know that our oversight approach needs to evolve to ensure that the FAA remains the global leader in achieving aviation safety. In order to maintain the safest air transportation system in the world, during the past two decades the FAA has been evolving from a prescriptive and more reactive approach for its safety oversight responsibilities to one that is performance-based, proactive, centered on managing risk, and focused on continuous improvement. A key part of this transition has been the adoption of safety management systems, or SMS, within the FAA. The evolution toward SMS began internally at the FAA more than 15 years ago, starting with the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization and expanding across the FAA to include all of our lines of business. Consistent with recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), we have been working towards implementation of SMS in various sectors. For example, as of March 9, 2018, scheduled commercial air carriers, regulated under 14 CFR part 121, are required to have an SMS.

Safety is not just a set of programs that can be “established” or “implemented.” It is a way of living and working, and it requires the open and transparent exchange of information. We know that it takes collaboration, communication, and common safety objectives to allow the FAA and the aviation community to come together, to identify system hazards, and to implement safety solutions. This approach gives us knowledge that we would not otherwise have about events and risks. Sharing safety issues, trends, and lessons learned is critical to recognizing whatever might be emerging as a risk in the system. The more data we have, the more we can learn about the system, which in turn allows us to better manage and improve the system.

To be clear, the SMS approach does not diminish the FAA’s role as a safety regulator. Any party that the FAA regulates remains responsible for compliance with the FAA’s regulatory standards, and the FAA does not hesitate to take enforcement action when it is warranted.

Aircraft Certification

Information sharing is a cornerstone of aviation safety and has significantly contributed to the United States’ outstanding safety record. One of the FAA’s core functions, aircraft certification, has always relied on the exchange of information and technical data. The FAA certifies the design of aircraft and components that are used in civil aviation operations. Some version of our certification process has been in place and served us well for over 60 years. This does not mean the process has remained static. To the contrary, since 1964, the regulations covering certification processes have been under constant review. As a result, the general regulations have been modified over 90 times, and the rules applicable to large transport aircraft, like the Boeing 737 MAX, have been amended over 130 times. The regulations and our policies have evolved in order to adapt to an ever-changing industry that uses global partnerships to develop new, more efficient, and safer aviation products and technologies. What has not changed is that, for any new project, the FAA identifies all safety standards and makes all key decisions regarding certification of the aircraft.

The FAA focuses its efforts on areas that present the highest risk within the system. The FAA reviews the applicant’s design descriptions and project plans, determines where FAA involvement will derive the most safety benefit, and coordinates its intentions with the applicant. When a particular decision or event is critical to the safety of the product or to the determination of compliance, the FAA is involved either directly or through the use of our designee system.

The use of designation, in some form, has been a vital part of our safety system since the 1920s. Congress has continually expanded the designee program since creation of the FAA in 1958, and it is critical to the success and effectiveness of the certification process.Under this program, the FAA may delegate a matter related to aircraft certification to a qualified private person.This is not self-certification; the FAA retains strict oversight authority.The program allows the FAA to leverage its resources and technical expertise while holding the applicant accountable for compliance. During the past few years, Congress has endorsed FAA’s delegation authority, including in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, which directed the FAA to delegate more certification tasks to the designees we oversee.

In aircraft certification, both individual and organizational designees support the FAA.The FAA determines the level of involvement of the designees and the level of FAA participation needed based on many variables.These variables include the designee’s understanding of the compliance policy; consideration of any novel or unusual certification areas; or instances where adequate standards may not be in place.

The FAA is directly involved in the testing and certification of new and novel features and technologies. When a new design, or a change to an existing design, of an aircraft is being proposed, the designer must apply to the FAA for a design approval. While an applicant usually works on its design before discussing it with the FAA, we encourage collaborative discussions well in advance of presenting a formal application. Once an applicant informs the FAA of the intent to develop and certify a product, a series of meetings are held both to familiarize the FAA with the proposed design, and to familiarize the applicant with the certification requirements. A number of formal and informal meetings are held on issues ranging from technical to procedural. Once the application is made, issue papers are developed to provide a structured way of documenting the resolution of technical, regulatory, and administrative issues that are identified during the process.

Facts Concerning the Boeing 737 MAX

While the FAA is always striving to improve safety, the certification processes described above are extensive, well-established, and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs for decades. The Boeing Company has designed and built 14 variations of its original model 737 since the FAA issued the original type certificate in 1967. Following standard certification procedures, and based on the information Boeing provided, the FAA determined in February 2012 that the 737 MAX qualified as an amended type certificate project eligible for management by the Boeing ODA. The formal application was submitted in June 2012. Under such an arrangement, FAA subject matters experts are directly involved in safety related aspects of the project. For example, the FAA was directly involved in the System Safety Review of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).

The process from initial application to final certification took five years; the 737 MAX was certified in March 2017. The process included 297 certification flight tests, some of which encompassed tests of the MCAS functions. FAA engineers and flight test pilots were involved in the MCAS operational evaluation flight test. During the FAA’s continued oversight of airworthiness standards, as we obtain pertinent information, identify potential risk, or learn of a system failure, we analyze it, mitigate the risk, update the certification requirements and require operators to implement the mitigation.

737 MAX Accidents and the Decision to Ground the Fleet

On October 29, 2018, a Boeing 737 MAX 8 operated by Lion Air as flight JT610 crashed after taking off from Soekarno-Hatta Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia. Flight JT610 departed from Jakarta with an intended destination of Pangkal Pinang, Indonesia. It departed Jakarta at 6:20 a.m. (local time), and crashed into the Java Sea approximately 13 minutes later. One hundred and eighty-four passengers and five crewmembers were on board. There were no survivors. An Indonesian-led investigation into the cause of this accident is ongoing, supported by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), FAA, and Boeing. A preliminary report prepared by the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee was released in November 2018.

On November 7, 2018, based on all available and relevant information, including evidence from the Lion Air accident investigation and analysis performed by Boeing, the FAA issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive. The airworthiness directive requires operators of the 737 MAX to revise their flight manuals to reinforce and emphasize to flight crews how to recognize and respond to uncommanded stabilizer trim movement and MCAS events. The FAA continued to evaluate the need for software and/or other design changes to the aircraft including operating procedures and training as additional information was received from the ongoing Lion Air accident investigation. On January 21, 2019, Boeing submitted a proposed plan for an MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for certification. To date, the FAA has tested a prototype of this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. FAA flight test engineers and flight test pilots performed a preliminary evaluation of the prototype which included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery procedures.

On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302, also a Boeing 737 MAX 8, crashed at 8:44 a.m. (local time), six minutes after takeoff. The flight departed from Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with an intended destination of Nairobi, Kenya. The accident site is near Bishoftu, Ethiopia. One hundred and forty-nine passengers and eight crewmembers were on board. None survived. An Ethiopian-led investigation into the cause of this accident is ongoing, supported by the NTSB, FAA, and Boeing. A preliminary report prepared by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of Ethiopia was released in April 2019.

Following the second accident, the FAA gathered all of the data it had, regarding 737 MAX operations in the United States and continued to review information from the investigation as it became available. On March 11, 2019, the FAA issued a Continuous Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) for 737 MAX operators. The CANIC included a list of all of the activities the FAA had completed in support of the continued operational safety of the 737 MAX fleet. These activities included the airworthiness directive issued on November 7, 2018, ongoing oversight of Boeing’s flight control system enhancements, and updated training requirements and flight crew manuals.

After issuing the CANIC, the FAA continued to evaluate all available data and aggregate safety performance from operators and pilots of the 737 MAX, none of which provided any data to support grounding the aircraft. Also, at that time, other civil aviation authorities had not provided any data to the FAA that warranted action. The FAA’s initial review of flight safety data for U.S. operators showed no systemic performance issues and provided no basis to order grounding the aircraft.

On March 13, 2019, however, the Ethiopian Airlines investigation developed new information from the wreckage concerning the aircraft’s configuration just after takeoff that, taken together with newly refined data from satellite-based tracking of the aircraft’s flight path, indicated some similarities between the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air accidents that warranted further investigation of the possibility of a shared cause that needed to be better understood and addressed. Accordingly, the FAA made the decision to ground all 737 MAX airplanes operated by U.S. airlines or in U.S. territory pending further investigation, including examination of information from the aircraft’s flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders.

Post-Grounding Actions

On March 19, 2019, Secretary Chao asked the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Inspector General to conduct an audit of the certification for the Boeing 737 MAX 8, with the goal specifically to compile an objective and detailed factual history of the activities that resulted in the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft. That audit is ongoing, with the cooperation of the FAA.

On March 20, 2019, the FAA issued a second CANIC with updated information for operators of the 737 MAX. Specifically, the CANIC notified operators that Boeing had begun work on a Service Bulletin that would specify the installation of new flight control computer operational program software and had developed flightcrew training related to this software. Boeing is still to submit the final software package for certification. The FAA’s ongoing review of this software installation and training is an agency priority, as will be the roll-out of any software, training, or other measures to operators of the 737 MAX.

On March 25, 2019, Secretary Chao announced the establishment of a Special Committee to review the FAA’s procedures for the certification of new aircraft, including the Boeing 737 MAX. The Special Committee to Review FAA’s Aircraft Certification Process is an independent body whose findings and recommendations will be presented directly to the Secretary and the FAA Administrator. The Special Committee is formed within the structure of the Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC) created by section 202 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.

Further, on April 2, 2019, the FAA announced it was establishing a Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) to conduct a comprehensive review of the certification of the automated flight control system on the Boeing 737 MAX. The JATR is chaired by former NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart and comprises a team of experts from the FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the aviation authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. On April 29, the JATR initiated its review, with members tasked to provide the FAA with their findings regarding the adequacy of the certification process and any recommendations to improve the process. Completion of the JATR’s work is not a prerequisite for returning the 737 MAX to service.

Additionally, on April 12, 2019, the FAA convened a meeting at the agency’s Washington, D.C. headquarters with safety representatives of the three U.S.-based commercial airlines that have the Boeing 737 MAX in their fleets, as well as the pilot unions for those airlines. The meeting covered three major agenda items: a review of the publicly available preliminary findings of the investigations into the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accidents; an overview of the anticipated software enhancements to the MCAS system; and, an overview of pilot training. Each presentation corresponding to the agenda, delivered by FAA subject matter experts, allowed for an open exchange between all participants. This meeting was an opportunity for the FAA to hear individual views from operators and pilots of the 737 MAX as the agency evaluates what needs to be done before the FAA makes a decision to return the aircraft to service in the United States.

The FAA recently solicited public comment on a draft report prepared by the FAA’s Boeing 737 MAX Flight Standardization Board (FSB). The FSB is a panel that FAA utilizes to evaluate and determine the sufficiency of proposed training developed by Boeing and related to the proposed software enhancements for the 737 MAX aircraft. An FSB is generally comprised of qualified pilots from FAA’s Certificate Management Offices, foreign authorities, and industry. The FSB report outlines the minimum guidelines for an air carrier training program. The comment period on the draft report has been extended multiple times to ensure ample opportunity for public input. The FAA will review this input before making a final assessment.

On May 6, 2019, the FAA initiated a multi-agency Technical Advisory Board (TAB) review of the MCAS software update and system safety assessment in order to determine sufficiency. The TAB consists of a team of experts from the U.S. Air Force, NASA, Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, and the FAA. None of the TAB experts have been involved in any aspect of the Boeing 737 MAX certification. The TAB is charged with evaluating Boeing and FAA efforts related to the software update and its integration into the flight control system. The TAB will identify issues where further investigation is required prior to approval of the design change. Although the JATR is broadly considering certification of the flight control systems, the TAB is evaluating the proposed technical solutions. The TAB’s recommendations will directly inform the FAA’s decision concerning the 737 MAX fleet’s return to service.

On May 23, 2019, the FAA will host a meeting of Directors General of civil aviation authorities from around the world to discuss the FAA’s activities toward ensuring the safe return of the 737 MAX to service. This meeting is part of the FAA’s efforts to work with other civil aviation authorities to address specific concerns related to the 737 MAX, in keeping with the FAA’s longstanding cooperation with its international partners. As recent events have reminded us, aviation does not have borders or boundaries. The FAA is focused on continuous safety improvement here at home and internationally through our ongoing engagement with other civil aviation authorities and industry stakeholders throughout the world. Aviation remains the safest mode of transportation in the United States and globally, and we advance this level of safety by sharing issues, trends, and lessons learned throughout the world. The United States is the gold standard in aviation safety. The FAA is resolute in its commitment to maintaining that standard. In our quest for continuous safety improvement, the FAA welcomes external review of our systems, processes, and recommendations. And the 737 MAX will return to service for U.S. carriers and in U.S. airspace only when the FAA’s analysis of the facts and technical data indicate that it is safe to do so.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer your questions.

The State of Airline Safety: Federal Oversight of Commercial Aviation

STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. ELWELL, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, & TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION AND SPACE ON THE STATE OF AIRLINE SAFETY: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION

MARCH 27, 2019

Chairman Cruz, Ranking Member Sinema, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the current state of aviation safety. On behalf of the United States Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration, we extend our deepest sympathy to the families of the victims of the recent Ethiopian Airlines accident, as well as the Lion Air accident.

Safety is the core of the Federal Aviation Administration’s mission and our top priority. With the support of this Committee, we have worked tirelessly to take a more proactive, data-driven approach to oversight that instills a safety above all approach inside the FAA and within the aviation community that we regulate. The result of this approach is that the United States has the safest air transportation system in the world. Since 1997, the risk of a fatal commercial aviation accident in the United States has been cut by 95 percent. And in the past ten years, there has only been one commercial airline passenger fatality in the United States in over 90 million flights. But a healthy safety culture requires commitment to continuous improvement.

Our commitment to safety and fact-based, data-driven decision making has been the guiding principle in the FAA’s response to the two fatal accidents involving the Boeing 737 MAX airplane outside the United States. Today, I would like to provide you with an overview of the FAA’s certification and oversight processes, our current actions with respect to the 737 MAX, and the next steps that the FAA will take to foster safety enhancements here and abroad.

The FAA is a Data-Driven Agency Focused on Safety

As the aerospace system and its components become increasingly more complex, we know that our oversight approach needs to evolve to ensure that the FAA remains the global leader in achieving aviation safety. In order to maintain the safest air transportation system in the world, during the past two decades the FAA has been evolving from a prescriptive and more reactive approach for its safety oversight responsibilities to one that is performance-based, proactive, centered on managing risk, and focused on continuous improvement. A key part of this transition has been the adoption of safety management systems, or SMS, within the FAA. The evolution toward SMS began internally at the FAA more than 15 years ago, starting with the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization and expanding across the FAA to include all of our lines of business. Consistent with recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), we have been working with industry towards implementation of SMS in various sectors. For example, as of March 9, 2018, scheduled commercial air carriers, regulated under 14 CFR part 121, are required to have an SMS.

Aircraft Certification

One of the FAA’s core functions, aircraft certification, has always relied on the exchange of information and technical data. The FAA certifies the design of aircraft and components that are used in civil aviation operations. Some version of our certification process has been in place and served us well for over 60 years. This does not mean the process has remained static. To the contrary, since 1964, the regulations covering certification processes have been under constant review. As a result, the general regulations have been modified over 90 times, and the rules applicable to large transport aircraft, like the Boeing 737 MAX, have been amended over 130 times. The regulations and our policies have evolved in order to adapt to an ever-changing industry that uses global partnerships to develop new, more efficient, and safer aviation products and technologies.

The designee program was originally authorized by Congress in 1958 and is critical to the success and effectiveness of the certification process. Under this program, the FAA may delegate a matter related to aircraft certification to a qualified private person. This is not self-certification; the FAA retains strict oversight authority. The program allows the FAA to leverage its resources through delegation. Last fall, Congress specifically directed the FAA to make full use of this authority in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. In aircraft certification, both individual and organizational designees support the FAA. The FAA determines the level of involvement of the designees and the level of FAA participation needed based on many variables. These variables include the designee's understanding of the compliance policy; consideration of any novel or unusual certification areas; or instances where adequate standards may not be in place.

The Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program is the means by which the FAA may authorize an organization to act as a representative of the FAA, allowing that organization to conduct inspections and tests and issue certificates on behalf of the FAA. Currently, there are 79 ODA holders. ODA certification processes allow an applicant greater flexibility and control over schedules than applicants whose projects are directly managed by the FAA. The FAA has a rigorous process for issuing an ODA. ODA holders must have demonstrated experience and expertise in FAA certification processes, a qualified staff, and an FAA-approved procedures manual before they are appointed. The procedures manual defines an ODA holder’s authority and limitations, and identifies the functions it may perform.

The FAA determines its level of involvement on a project-by-project basis. There are many issues that will always require direct FAA involvement, including equivalent level of safety determinations, and rulemakings required to approve special conditions. The FAA may choose to be involved in other project areas after considering factors such as our confidence in the applicant, the applicant’s experience, the applicant’s internal processes, and confidence in the designees.

Something that is not well understood about the certification process is that it is the applicant’s responsibility to ensure that an aircraft conforms to FAA safety regulations. It is the applicant who is required to develop aircraft design plans and specifications, and perform the appropriate inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design complies with the regulations. The FAA is responsible for determining that the applicant has shown that the overall design meets the safety standards. We do that by reviewing data and by conducting risk-based evaluations of the applicant's work.

The FAA is directly involved in the testing and certification of new and novel features and technologies. When a new design, or a change to an existing design, of aircraft is being proposed, the designer must apply to the FAA for a design approval. While an applicant usually works on its design before discussing it with the FAA, we encourage collaborative discussions well in advance of presenting a formal application. Once an applicant approaches us, a series of meetings are held both to familiarize the FAA with the proposed design, and to familiarize the applicant with the certification requirements. A number of formal and informal meetings are held on issues ranging from technical to procedural. Once the application is made, issue papers are developed to provide a structured way of documenting the resolution of technical, regulatory, and administrative issues that are identified during the process.

Facts Concerning the Boeing 737 MAX

The certification processes described above are extensive, well-established, and have consistently produced safe aircraft designs for decades. The Boeing Company has designed and built 14 variations of its original model 737 since the FAA issued the original type certificate in 1967. The FAA followed its standard procedures in determining that the 737 MAX project would qualify as an amended type certificate project, and identifying what items would be delegated to the Boeing ODA to approve and which would be retained by the FAA for approval. Boeing first applied for an amended type certificate for this aircraft in January 2012. As a result of regular meetings between the FAA and Boeing teams, the FAA determined in February 2012 that the project qualified as an amended type certificate project eligible for management by the Boeing ODA. The FAA was directly involved in the System Safety Review of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).

The process from initial application to final certification took five years; the FAA added the 737 MAX to the 737 type certificate in March 2017. The process included 297 certification flight tests, some of which encompassed tests of the MCAS functions. FAA engineers and flight test pilots were involved in the MCAS operational evaluation flight test. The certification process was detailed and thorough, but, as is the case with newly certified products, time yields more data to be applied for continued analysis and improvement. As we obtain pertinent information, identify potential risk, or learn of a system failure, we analyze it, we find ways to mitigate the risk, and we require operators to implement the mitigation. And that is what has happened in the case of the 737 MAX.

737 MAX Accidents and the Decision to Ground the Fleet

On October 29, 2018, a Boeing 737 MAX operated by Lion Air as flight JT610 crashed after taking off from Soekarno-Hatta Airport in Jakarta, Indonesia. Flight JT610 departed from Jakarta with an intended destination of Pangkal Pinang, Indonesia. It departed Jakarta at 6:20 a.m. (local time), and crashed into the Java Sea approximately 13 minutes later. One hundred and eighty-four passengers and five crewmembers were on board. There were no survivors. An Indonesian-led investigation into the cause of this accident is ongoing, supported by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), FAA, and Boeing.

On November 7, 2018, based on all available and relevant information, including evidence from the Lion Air accident investigation and analysis performed by Boeing, the FAA issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive. The airworthiness directive requires operators of the 737 MAX to revise their flight manuals to reinforce to flight crews how to recognize and respond to uncommanded stabilizer trim movement and MCAS events. The FAA continued to evaluate the need for software and/or other design changes to the aircraft including operating procedures and training as additional information was received from the ongoing Lion Air accident investigation. On January 21, 2019, Boeing submitted a proposed MCAS software enhancement to the FAA for certification. To date, the FAA has tested this enhancement to the 737 MAX flight control system in both the simulator and the aircraft. The testing, which was conducted by FAA flight test engineers and flight test pilots, included aerodynamic stall situations and recovery procedures. The FAA’s ongoing review of this software installation and training is an agency priority, as will be the roll-out of any software, training, or other measures to operators of the 737 MAX.

On March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302, also a Boeing 737 MAX, crashed at 8:44 a.m. (local time), six minutes after takeoff. The flight departed from Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with an intended destination of Nairobi, Kenya. The accident site is near Bishoftu, Ethiopia. One hundred and forty-nine passengers and eight crewmembers were on board. None survived. An Ethiopian-led investigation into the cause of this accident is ongoing, supported by the NTSB, FAA, and Boeing.

Following the second accident, the FAA gathered all of the data it had and continued to review information from the investigation as it became available. On March 11, 2019, the FAA issued a Continuous Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) for 737 MAX operators. The CANIC included a list of all of the activities the FAA had completed in support of the continued operational safety of the 737 MAX fleet. These activities included the airworthiness directive issued on November 7, 2018, ongoing oversight of Boeing’s flight control system enhancements, and updated training requirements and flight crew manuals.

After issuing the CANIC, the FAA continued to evaluate all available data and aggregate safety performance from operators and pilots of the 737 MAX, none of which provided any data to support grounding the aircraft. The FAA’s initial review of flight safety data for U.S. operators showed no systemic performance issues and provided no basis to order grounding the aircraft. This review included analysis of recent Aviation Safety Reporting System reports that reference MCAS and/or controllability issues with the Boeing 737 MAX. In no case did the reporting party state that the problems experienced were due to the MCAS system. Also, at that time, other civil aviation authorities had not provided any data to the FAA that warranted action.

Next Steps

The FAA will continue to support the ongoing Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines accident investigations, review the evidence and data obtained, and take immediate and appropriate action based on the facts. U.S. and international operators of the 737 MAX are relying on the FAA to get it right. I want to assure this Committee and everyone else concerned that the FAA will go wherever the facts lead us, in the interest of safety. The 737 MAX will return to service for U.S. carriers and in U.S. airspace only when the FAA’s analysis of the facts and technical data indicate that it is appropriate. In our quest for continuous safety improvement, the FAA welcomes external review of our systems, processes, and recommendations. We will work with the new Special Committee established to examine the 737 MAX certification process, cooperate fully with the Inspector General’s review, and continue our work with the congressionally-mandated Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee and ODA Expert Review Panel.

As recent events have reminded us, aviation does not have borders or boundaries. The FAA is focused on continuous safety improvement here at home and internationally through our ongoing engagement with other civil aviation authorities and industry stakeholders throughout the world. Aviation remains the safest mode of transportation globally, and we promote this level of safety by sharing issues, trends, and lessons learned throughout the world. The United States is the gold standard in aviation safety. The FAA is resolute in its commitment to maintaining that standard.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer your questions.

AIRSPACE INTEGRATION OF NEW AIRCRAFT

STATEMENT OF SHELLEY J. YAK, DIRECTOR OF THE WILLIAM J. HUGHES TECHNICAL CENTER,
BEFORE THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,
“AIRSPACE INTEGRATION OF NEW AIRCRAFT,”
SEPTEMBER 6, 2018

Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the role of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) William J. Hughes Technical Center in facilitating new entrants, new users, and new technologies into the National Airspace System (NAS). Accompanying me today is Peter “Jay” Merkle, the Deputy Vice President of the Program Management Organization (PMO) within the Air Traffic Organization (ATO). The PMO is responsible for implementation of all Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) program activity; all NAS communications; navigation, weather, surveillance and automation modernization programs; and all service life extensions to legacy NAS sensors, communications and navigation aids.

William J. Hughes Technical Center

The Technical Center has served as one of the core facilities for sustaining and modernizing the air traffic management system, and for advancing programs to enhance aviation safety, efficiency, and capacity since 1958. It is the Nation’s premier air transportation system federal laboratory. The Technical Center’s highly technical and diverse workforce carries out activities to support the full system/service development lifecycle—from conducting research and development, testing and evaluation, verification and validation, to operational sustainment and decommissioning.

The Technical Center’s staff develops scientific solutions to current and future air transportation safety, efficiency, and capacity challenges. Our engineers, scientists, mathematicians, and technical experts utilize a robust, one-of-a-kind, world-class laboratory environment to identify integrated system solutions for the modernization and sustainment of the NAS. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) and Data Communications (Data Comm) were all developed, tested and began their nationwide deployment at the Technical Center through its engineering, testing, evaluation, and deployment platforms.

The Technical Center replicates the entire NAS, with the capability to support not only NextGen, but all aviation systems. The Technical Center’s areas of focus include air traffic management, communications, navigation, surveillance, aeronautical information, weather, human factors, airports, and aircraft safety. More recently, the Technical Center has been instrumental in the FAA’s efforts to facilitate new entrants and users to the NAS; particularly, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS or drones).

FAA’s Vision for UAS Integration

Future aviation operations must accommodate the increasing demand for airspace access by traditional civil aviation users as well as new entrants. UAS are at the forefront of change in the aviation industry. They are being used today to inspect infrastructure, provide emergency response support, survey agriculture, and to go places that are otherwise dangerous for people or other vehicles. Entrepreneurs around the world are exploring innovative ways to use drones in their commercial activities. To date, we have processed over 1.1 million UAS registrations, over 230,000 of which are for unmanned aircraft that can be flown commercially. For perspective, as of July 2018, there are just under 300,000 manned aircraft listed on the U.S. registry. The need for us to fully integrate this technology into the NAS continues to be a national priority.

The Department of Transportation and FAA’s vision for integration is ambitious. We intend to fully integrate UAS into the most complex airspace system in the world, enabling UAS to operate harmoniously with manned aircraft, occupying the same airspace and using many of the same standards and procedures. Two years ago, we established the regulatory framework—and set the global standard—for small UAS integration. Our roadmap for full UAS integration is intended to enable increasingly more complex UAS operations over time: (1) operations over people; (2) operations beyond the visual-line-of-sight of the operator; (3) small UAS package delivery operations; (4) routine/scheduled operations; (5) large carrier cargo operations; and, finally, (6) passenger transport operations.

Research and Development

As the FAA’s Director of Research, I oversee the FAA’s aviation research and development (R&D) activities. Effective research enables the FAA's mission to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. As new technologies change the aviation industry, our approach to research must evolve as well. Emerging innovations, such as UAS, require an agile research and development strategy focused on change driven by technology and collaborative, data-driven partnerships across government and with industry and academia. Through this collaboration, we will continue building on our unparalleled safety record, while increasing the efficiency of our system and more fully integrating new users.

With the exponential growth of UAS technologies and market applications we have witnessed in just a few years, we know that research must keep pace to support full integration. We are aligning our UAS research activities with our integration roadmap. Safety is and will always be the FAA’s first priority, and continued support for UAS research initiatives will ensure that UAS are integrated into the NAS in a safe, secure, and efficient manner.

UAS research activities are coordinated across many different types of entities, including internal FAA organizations, different U.S. Government agencies, and nongovernmental entities that perform collaborative research to support the FAA’s overall integration objectives. Coordination with each type of entity includes the identification of research needs and current research, governance for continuous cooperation, and mechanisms for managing progress and results. Issues and considerations being addressed include detect and avoid standards and technologies, collision avoidance standards, command and control standards and technologies, human factors, severity thresholds (for example, impact effects), automation/autonomy, and wake turbulence effects. One example of this coordination is the UAS Standardization Collaborative (UASSC), co-chaired by the FAA and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) and managed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). UASSC brings together over 230 members from the user applications, manufacturer, safety and emergency response, academic and government communities to accelerate development of standards and conformity assessment programs to facilitate the safe integration of UAS into the NAS.[1]

The FAA’s NextGen organization also has appointed a UAS portfolio manager to unify and manage all UAS R&D execution. The UAS R&D portfolio includes UAS research conducted at the Technical Center, the Center of Excellence for UAS, interagency UAS partnerships, UAS flight demonstrations and test sites, and all aviation safety research defined by the Office of Aviation Safety through the FAA’s UAS Integration Office. Additionally, the FAA’s ATO is developing concepts and requirements to address FAA challenges associated with the provision of air traffic services to UAS airspace users.

The FAA is also gathering operational data and experience that will inform future rulemaking to enable UAS operations over people and beyond line-of-sight. While the small UAS rule—14 C.F.R. part 107—has been largely successful by enabling operations such as crop monitoring/inspection; research and development; educational/academic uses; power-line/pipeline inspection; antenna inspections; emergency response; bridge inspections; aerial photography; and wildlife nesting area evaluations, it does not permit several potential uses for UAS that are highly valued by industry, such as operating beyond line-of-sight or at night. To accommodate these operations, the rule allows operators to apply for waivers from its provisions. As of August 2018, the FAA has reviewed almost 12,000 operational waiver applications and has issued approvals for over 1,800 waivers, significantly reducing the processing time from almost 90 days to approximately 20 days.

While most of these approved waivers (more than 90 percent) have been for night flying, others have been granted for more complex activities, such as for flying over people or beyond line-of-sight. The commercial activities that typically receive waivers for UAS operations are for filmmaking, photography, and infrastructure inspections.

The newly launched UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP) sets the stage to move even closer to expanded operations through enhanced partnerships among industry and state, local and tribal authorities. On May 9, 2018, the Secretary of Transportation announced that 10 state, local, and tribal governments were selected to participate in the IPP. Each of the participants is partnering with private sector entities to evaluate operational concepts and provide DOT and FAA with actionable information that will accelerate safe and secure UAS integration. The goals of the program are to: identify ways to balance local and national interests; improve communications with local, state, and tribal jurisdictions; address security and privacy risks; accelerate the approval of operations that currently require special authorizations; and collect data to support the development of regulatory actions necessary to allow more complex, routine low-altitude operations. A list of the participants and each of their proposed operational concepts may be found at: https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/uas_integration_pilot_program/awardees/.

Airspace Management

The FAA’s primary mission is to provide the safest, most efficient airspace system in the world. We are responsible for providing air traffic control and other air navigation services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for 29.4 million square miles of airspace. In addition to this critical operational role, the FAA uses its statutory authority to carry out this mission by issuing and enforcing regulations and standards for the safe operation of aircraft—manned and unmanned—and by developing procedures to ensure the safe movement of aircraft through the nation’s skies.

Automated Airspace Authorization

The basic rules for small UAS operations—14 C.F.R. part 107—set the global standard for integration and provided small drone operators with unprecedented access to the NAS. Part 107 creates airspace rules specific to small UAS operations. It allows line-of-sight, daytime operations in uncontrolled Class G airspace without the need for approval from the FAA. Operations in controlled airspace—Class B, C, D, and surface area E—require prior approval from air traffic control.

Compliance with basic airspace requirements—the “rules of the road”—is essential to maintaining safety and efficiency in the NAS and ultimately will make it easier for our national security and law enforcement partners to identify a drone that is being operated in an unsafe or suspicious manner. To facilitate airspace approvals for small UAS operators, last November, we deployed the prototype Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) at several air traffic facilities to evaluate the feasibility of a fully automated solution enabled by public/private data sharing. Based on the prototype’s success, we began the first phase of a nationwide beta test of LAANC on April 30, 2018, enabling LAANC services at about 80 airports. This rollout will continue incrementally to nearly 300 air traffic facilities covering approximately 500 airports. We recently completed the fifth wave of this nationwide rollout, which now covers 82 percent of air traffic facilities, and we are on track to complete nationwide deployment in September 2018.

LAANC uses airspace data based on the FAA’s UAS facility maps, which show the maximum altitudes in one square mile parcels around airports where UAS may operate safely under part 107. It gives drone operators the ability to request and receive real-time authorization from the FAA, allowing them to quickly plan and execute their flights. LAANC also makes air traffic controllers aware of the locations where planned drone operations will take place, and it can provide information on aircraft that have requested access to a defined airspace.

UAS Traffic Management

LAANC is an important foundational step toward implementing UAS Traffic Management (UTM). UTM is a “traffic management” ecosystem for UAS operations not under FAA air traffic control (ATC), and is separate but complementary to the FAA’s air traffic management system. UTM development will ultimately identify services, roles/responsibilities, information architecture, data exchange protocols, software functions, infrastructure, and performance requirements for enabling the management of low-altitude UAS operations where ATC does not typically provide services.

We view UTM as a suite of capabilities that will incorporate components from the FAA, industry, and our government partners to create a comprehensive system of low-altitude airspace management for UAS. Our plan for future UTM capabilities includes a number of components—LAANC, remote identification, and dynamic airspace management—that will support the needs of industry, FAA, and our security partners. The eventual full deployment of UTM services will create an environment in which the entire spectrum of unmanned aircraft can be safely realized, including the transportation of people and property.

UAS in Controlled Airspace

We are also making headway with an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to address UAS in controlled airspace, which will provide recommendations on UAS integration in, and transit to, high altitude airspace. The ARC will develop scenarios that will encompass the most desired operations, identify gaps in research and development needed to successfully integrate larger UAS into controlled airspace, and recommend up to five prioritized changes to policies and procedures that will spur integration and economic growth. The ARC held its fifth meeting in May 2018 and will continue to meet through the expiration of the ARC’s charter in June 2019.

Impediments to Full UAS Integration

The FAA has made significant progress in integrating UAS into the NAS and, through our ongoing research activities, we are well-positioned to continue to build on our accomplishments. We know, however, that there is much more work to do. The FAA’s commitment to the safe, secure, and efficient integration of UAS and the expansion of routine UAS operations also requires resolving specific challenges to enable this emerging technology to achieve its full potential.

Statutory Exemption for Model Aircraft

The most significant challenge the FAA continues to encounter is the perception by many recreational UAS operators that they are not required to follow the basic rules of UAS operation because they erroneously believe they fit under the statutory exemption for model aircraft operated under the programming of a community-based organization. These unknowing operators present risks to both manned and unmanned compliant operators. The current exemption for model aircraft—Section 336 of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012—makes it difficult for the FAA to develop new regulatory approaches that will help expand and facilitate more advanced uses of UAS in the NAS. A set of basic requirements for all UAS operators are essential to allow both the FAA and our security and law enforcement partners to discern between the clueless, the careless, and the criminal—including serious threats to national security—and to ensure all operators conduct compliant operations or face the consequences of introducing a safety or security risk into the NAS.

Remote Identification

As Congress has recognized, remote identification of UAS is another critical step on the path to full integration of UAS technology. In order to support beyond visual line-of-sight operations, UAS operators need to know where their aircraft is and where other aircraft are along their flight path. Remote identification is also essential to enable our law enforcement and national security partners to identify and respond to security risks. Effective integration and threat discrimination will continue to be a challenge until all aircraft in the NAS—manned and unmanned—can be identified. Anonymous operations are inconsistent with safe and secure integration.

Last December, we published the report and recommendations prepared by the summer 2017 UAS Identification and Tracking ARC[2]. The ARC’s 74 members represented a diverse array of stakeholders, including the aviation community and industry member organizations, law enforcement agencies and public safety organizations, manufacturers, researchers, and standards developing organizations involved with UAS. The ARC’s recommendations cover issues related to existing and emerging technologies, law enforcement and national security requirements, and how to implement remote identification. Although some recommendations were not unanimous, the group reached general agreement on most issues. The FAA is reviewing the technical data and recommendations in the ARC report to support the development of the FAA’s remote identification requirements. We are currently working on a proposed rule to implement these requirements as quickly as possible.

Conclusion

Throughout our history, the FAA has adapted to changes in technology and has successfully integrated new operators and equipment into the NAS. Our progress in accommodating new technologies and operations demonstrates that the agency is well positioned to maintain its status as the global leader in UAS integration. We are committed to working with Congress and all of our stakeholders to find solutions to our common challenges. Working together, we are confident we can balance safety and security with innovation. With the support of this Committee and the robust engagement of our stakeholders, we will continue to safely, securely, and efficiently integrate UAS into the NAS and solidify America’s role as the global leader in aviation.

Finally, before I conclude I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the support of Chairman Shuster and Subcommittee Chairman LoBiondo. You have been instrumental in providing the FAA with the direction and necessary resources to maintain our position as a global leader in aviation. I thank you both for your leadership and wish you well as you retire from Congress.

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

[1] https://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/standards_boards_panels/uassc/overview#UASSC%20Overview

[2]Seehttps://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=89404&omniRss=news_updatesAoc&cid=101_N_U

KEEPING PACE WITH INNOVATION – UPDATE ON THE SAFE INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTO THE AIRSPACE

STATEMENT OF

EARL LAWRENCE

DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION OFFICE

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS,

SAFETY AND SECURITY: KEEPING PACE WITH INNOVATION –

UPDATE ON THE SAFE INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTO THE AIRSPACE

MAY 8, 2018

Chairman Blunt, Ranking Member Cantwell, Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) integration efforts. UAS—also referred to as drones—are at the forefront of aviation. They are being used today to inspect infrastructure, provide emergency response support, survey agriculture, and to go places that are otherwise dangerous for people or other vehicles. Entrepreneurs around the world are exploring innovative ways to use drones in their commercial activities. As of mid-April 2018, we have processed over 1 million UAS registrations, over 170,000 of which are for unmanned aircraft that can be flown commercially. The need for us to fully integrate this technology into the National Airspace System (NAS) continues to be a national priority.

The Department of Transportation and FAA’s vision for integration goes beyond the accommodation practices in use today by most countries, which largely rely on operational segregation to maintain systemic safety. Our goal is ambitious. We intend to fully integrate UAS into the most complex airspace system in the world, enabling UAS to operate harmoniously with manned aircraft, occupying the same airspace and using many of the same standards and procedures. With the support of this Committee, and the continued engagement of our stakeholders, we have made significant progress toward realizing this vision.

One year ago, we appeared before this Committee to discuss the status of the safe integration of UAS into the NAS. Since then, we have worked tirelessly to maintain the United States’ position as the global leader in UAS integration. Today, I would like to share with you some of our accomplishments, our challenges, and our ongoing work toward our goal of fully integrating drones and their operators into the NAS.

Enabling Increased UAS Operations

The FAA is open for business. Using existing authorities, we are working with stakeholders to authorize increased UAS operations to the extent they can be accommodated safely. The small UAS rule, waivers and exemptions, and our traditional certification processes provide different pathways for UAS operators to access the NAS.

The small UAS rule, 14 CFR part 107, sets the global standard for small drone integration, enabling UAS operations with unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds. Today, drone operators are using part 107 to inspect oil and gas infrastructure, survey land and crops, support search and rescue, conduct disaster impact assessment, and capture photographs and videos for real estate and other commercial marketing purposes.

In keeping with our goal of a flexible regulatory framework to accommodate the rapid growth of UAS technology, some provisions of part 107 can be waived to allow expanded operations. Applicants must demonstrate that their proposed operation can be conducted safely outside the provisions of part 107. To assist applicants, we have published guidance on our website, including a step-by-step explanation of the waiver process.

We are also taking steps to further streamline the waiver and authorization process. Operators can now apply for waivers through the FAA DroneZone, our online portal for all UAS information and resources. To date, the FAA has issued almost 20,000 authorizations for operations in controlled airspace, and over 1,500 operational waivers, most of which enable night operations.

Consistent with our risk-based approach we are increasingly able to grant waivers for more complex operations, including for operations over people and beyond visual line-of-sight. Two of our original Pathfinder Program partners, BNSF Railway and PrecisionHawk, have been using these waivers to inspect infrastructure and conduct precision agricultural operations and crop monitoring, respectively. CNN, another Pathfinder partner, is using a waiver for operations over people to enhance its newsgathering and reporting. And X’s Project Wing has used a waiver to test package delivery at an FAA-designated UAS test site in Blacksburg, Virginia. We encourage operators and innovators to bring us new ideas. If an operator provides the appropriate safety case to justify a more complex UAS operation, we will issue the waiver.

We are also working with stakeholders to enable additional UAS operations using more traditional certification pathways. Like manned aircraft, drones are increasingly being used to spray pesticides and fertilizers, and for other aerial applications needed for agriculture, horticulture, and forestry. Using our existing certification process under 14 CFR part 137 and our exemption authority, we have issued three agricultural aircraft operator certificates to UAS operators, with additional certifications in process. Other applicants are in the process of demonstrating compliance with applicable aircraft, operator, and airspace requirements for small cargo delivery beyond what is currently authorized under part 107. And we are working with several manufacturers to certify larger UAS. In November 2017, we published the first Federal Register notice seeking public comments on proposed design standards needed for an unmanned aircraft weighing 55 pounds or more—the FlightScan Corporation Camcopter S-100—to fly safely in the NAS.

Supporting Emergency Response

UAS were invaluable in supporting response and recovery efforts following the widespread devastation brought about by hurricanes in 2017. When winds and floodwaters destroyed homes, businesses, roadways, and industries, many agencies and companies sought FAA authorization to fly drones in the affected areas. We responded quickly, issuing a total of 355 emergency airspace authorizations, many within an hour or two of the request, to ensure that those drones could operate safely.

Drones played a critical role in performing search and rescue missions, assessing damage to roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure, and helping insurance companies act more quickly on claims from homeowners. In Puerto Rico, the FAA approved the first UAS operation of its kind to provide essential communication services. We granted AT&T approval to operate a 60-pound tethered drone to provide temporary voice, data, and internet service while construction crews rebuilt a tower to restore permanent service on the island. Today, drones are playing an important role in restoring power to many parts of the island where the terrain makes it difficult and dangerous for workers to make repairs. Drones are being used to find broken utility poles and downed power lines, and to lift new transmission lines into place, making it easier and safer for workers to do their jobs.

The FAA’s ability to quickly authorize UAS operations after these storms was especially critical because most local airports were either closed or dedicated to emergency relief flights, and the fuel supply was low. As former Administrator Michael Huerta said: “Essentially, every drone that flew meant that a traditional aircraft was not putting an additional strain on an already fragile system. I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that the hurricane response will be looked back upon as a landmark in the evolution of drone usage in this country.”

UAS Airspace Authorizations and Traffic Management

Under part 107, drone operators must secure approval from the agency to operate in any airspace where air traffic control is providing separation services. To facilitate those approvals, we deployed the prototype Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) at several air traffic facilities last November to evaluate the feasibility of a fully automated solution enabled by public/private data sharing. Based on the prototype’s success, we began the first phase of a nationwide beta test of LAANC on April 30, 2018, enabling LAANC services at about 80 airports in the South Central United States. This rollout will continue incrementally to nearly 300 air traffic facilities covering approximately 500 airports. We expect to complete nationwide deployment in September 2018.

LAANC uses airspace data based on the FAA’s UAS facility maps, which show the maximum altitudes in one square mile areas around airports where UAS may operate safely under part 107. LAANC gives drone operators the ability to request and receive real-time authorization from the FAA, which allows operators to quickly plan and execute their flights. Air traffic controllers are also made aware of the locations where planned drone operations will take place.

LAANC is an important step toward implementing UAS Traffic Management (UTM). NASA’s UTM research efforts are exploring concepts of operation, data exchange requirements, and a supporting framework to enable multiple beyond visual line-of-sight UAS operations at low altitudes in airspace where FAA air traffic services are not provided. NASA is coordinating with the FAA’s seven UAS test sites around the country, as well as a variety of industry partners, to perform phased testing. Phase one testing was completed in 2016, and phase two testing concluded in June 2017. While we’re supporting NASA in completing the final stages of their testing this spring, the FAA is already implementing foundational UTM capabilities like LAANC, and also beginning work to establish remote identification requirements. The UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) delivered their recommendations last October, and we have initiated a rulemaking process as directed by Section 2202 of the FAA 2016 Reauthorization (FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act).

UAS Integration Pilot Program

On October 25, 2017, President Trump directed the Secretary of Transportation to launch an initiative to safely test and validate advanced operations of drones in partnership with state, tribal, and local governments in select jurisdictions—the UAS Integration Pilot Program. The pilot program is a crucial step in accelerating the Department of Transportation’s and FAA’s UAS integration efforts. The goals of the program are to identify ways to balance local and national interests, improve communications with local, state, and tribal jurisdictions, address security and privacy risks, accelerate the approval of operations that currently require special authorizations, and collect data to support the regulatory development steps needed to allow more complex, routine low-altitude operations. The results of this program will be used to help ensure the United States remains the global leader in UAS integration and fully realizes the economic and societal benefits of this technology.

As stated in the Federal Register notice announcing the pilot program, the deadline for Lead Applicants—state, local, or tribal governments—to submit their completed proposals was January 4, 2018. The response to the program has been enthusiastic—149 lead applicants submitted proposals for consideration. After evaluating the applications, the Secretary of Transportation will invite a minimum of 10 government/private sector partnerships to participate in the pilot program. We are in the final stages of the selection process and anticipate an announcement soon.

Additionally, in the course of reviewing the applications for the UAS Integration Pilot Program, we realized some good news: a large number of the projects and activities proposed by applicants could go forward under the FAA’s existing rules, including with waivers where appropriate. Accordingly, once the ten selections for the Pilot Program are announced, the FAA will be reaching out to other applicants, as well as interested state and local authorities, to provide additional information on how to operationalize their proposed projects.

Challenges Ahead

The FAA’s commitment to the safe, secure, and efficient integration of UAS and the expansion of routine UAS operations requires resolving several key challenges to enable this emerging technology to achieve its full potential. Congress recognized a number of these challenges in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016. Technical issues to ensure that a drone maintains a safe distance from other aircraft and that the pilot retains control of the drone must be addressed before UAS operations beyond visual line-of-sight can become routine. And there are additional policy questions raised by UAS use, including security, privacy, and enforcement.

The 2016 FAA Extension clearly articulates Congress’s concerns that the security challenges presented by the malicious or errant use of UAS technology require a layered and integrated government response. We are using our existing authority to address concerns about unauthorized drone operations over certain sensitive federal facilities. To date, we have restricted drone flights over military facilities, sensitive energy facilities, and iconic landmarks like the Statue of Liberty, Hoover Dam, and Mount Rushmore in the interest of national security. Using this authority, we are considering additional federal agency requests for restrictions as they are received. To ensure the public is aware of these restricted locations, we created an interactive map available on the FAA website, and we updated our B4UFLY mobile app to include a warning to users in close proximity of these sites. This work is also helping us determine the most efficient and effective way to implement section 2209 of the 2016 FAA Extension, which will offer non-federal critical infrastructure owners to petition the FAA for flight restrictions over their facilities.

We also continue to work with our interagency federal partners to develop policies and procedures that will support protection of critical facilities and assets from UAS-based threats, while preserving airspace access and the safety and efficiency of operations in the NAS. Congress has provided the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy authorities to respond to UAS that pose a threat to designated facilities and assets. We also support the Administration’s proposal to enable the Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) to protect certain facilities, assets, and operations critical to national security against threats from UAS. Under this proposal, DOJ and DHS will work closely with FAA to ensure that detection and mitigation technologies are developed, tested, and deployed in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts on airspace access, as well as air navigation services, avionics, and other systems that ensure safe and efficient operations in the NAS. By enabling Federal security and law enforcement agencies to detect and mitigate UAS threats and risks posed by errant or malicious UAS operations, the United States will continue to lead the way in UAS innovation and offer the safest and most efficient aviation system in the world.

Another ongoing challenge to UAS integration is the potential for conflict between manned and unmanned aircraft. Last year, we saw a significant increase in the number of reported drone-sightings from pilots of manned aircraft. Although we cannot verify these reports, as the federal agency responsible for the safety of the flying community, we are greatly concerned with the increasing number of these reports, along with events in New York, South Carolina, and Las Vegas.

Our Unmanned Aircraft Safety Team (UAST) made recommendations to further reduce the likelihood of serious incidents and provide more accurate information about UAS sightings. First, public education and outreach are key to reducing these incidents. Efforts such as the “Know Before You Fly” information campaign and the small UAS registration process serve as opportunities to ensure UAS operators understand the rules and responsibilities for flying an aircraft in the NAS. The UAST also recommended continued work on remote identification of UAS to provide more accurate and critical data that will allow us to contact a UAS operator, educate the operator, or, when necessary, take enforcement action to address a violation of federal regulations. We, along with our security and law enforcement partners, need to be able to quickly identify unmanned aircraft and their operators in order to discern between the clueless, the careless, and the criminal—including serious threats to national security—and to ensure that all operators conduct compliant operations or face the consequences of introducing a safety or security risk into the NAS.

Remote Identification

As Congress has recognized, remote identification of UAS is a critical step on the path to full integration of UAS technology. In order to ensure that our airspace remains the safest in the world, and to enable our law enforcement and national security partners to identify and respond to security risks, we need to know who is operating in the airspace. Effective integration and threat discrimination will continue to be a challenge until all aircraft in the NAS—manned and unmanned—are able to be identified. Anonymous operations are inconsistent with safe and secure integration.

We recently published the report and recommendations prepared by the summer 2017 UAS Identification and Tracking ARC. The ARC’s 74 members represented a diverse array of stakeholders that included the aviation community and industry member organizations, law enforcement agencies and public safety organizations, manufacturers, researchers, and standards entities involved with UAS. The ARC’s recommendations cover issues related to existing and emerging technologies, law enforcement and national security, and how to implement remote identification and tracking. Although some recommendations were not unanimous, the group reached general agreement on most issues. The FAA is reviewing the technical data and recommendations in the ARC report to support the development of the FAA’s remote ID requirements, which we are committed to implementing as quickly as possible.

We are also making headway with an ARC to address UAS in controlled airspace, which will provide recommendations on UAS integration in, and transit to, high altitude airspace. It will develop scenarios that will encompass the most desired operations, identify gaps in research and development needed to successfully integrate larger UAS into controlled airspace, and recommend up to five prioritized changes to policies and procedures that will spur integration and economic growth. The ARC held its fourth meeting at the end of March 2018 and plans to have its fifth meeting at the end of this month, where the ARC will draft and prioritize a working list of recommendations. The ARC will continue to meet through the expiration of the ARC’s charter in June 2019.

Conclusion

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

State of Aviation Safety

STATEMENT OF ALI BAHRAMI, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA),

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & INFRASTRUCTURE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION:

STATE OF AVIATION SAFETY,

FEBRUARY 27, 2018.

Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss the current state of aviation safety. Aviation safety is the FAA’s top priority. We are in the safest period in commercial aviation, and we just experienced the safest year in general aviation. We are actively leveraging our experience from commercial aviation to advance safety in other domains. We remain committed to working with industry and other stakeholders to identify and address risks. With the support of this Committee, we have worked tirelessly to take a more proactive approach that instills a culture of safety – both in the industry and inside the FAA. Additionally, industry’s commitment to engage early on innovative ideas, embrace systems safety, place value on compliance, and work collaboratively with us to develop tools and measures, has been critical to our efforts.

The result is the safest, largest, most complex, and most efficient air transportation system in the world. Indeed, there has not been a fatal U.S. commercial passenger accident since 2009. I am proud of the hard work that has gone into providing a basis for achieving this level of safety. Our success in addressing risk and improving safety in aviation during these past two decades is the result of strong and mature safety partnerships between government and industry to pursue safety improvement collaboratively and in a proactive manner.

We have made significant progress, which I would like to share with you today.

Fostering a Culture of Safety

As the aviation system and its components have become increasingly more complex, we know that our oversight approach needs to evolve to accommodate the future state. In the last few years, the FAA has been shifting to a risk management based approach for its safety oversight responsibilities. A key part of this has been safety management systems, or SMS. With SMS, the FAA is taking a smarter, risk-based, comprehensive approach to managing aviation safety. It requires an organization-wide safety policy. It has formal methods for identifying hazards, mitigating and controlling risk, and continually assessing performance.

Under SMS, the FAA is a more data-driven agency. We are leveraging this approach in many areas, particularly runway approaches and landing procedures, and air carrier oversight. Following runway events at San Francisco International Airport last year, in addition to the NTSB investigation, the FAA quickly took action and established a Safety Risk Management Team. The team is composed of members from across FAA and external stakeholders, and was tasked with identifying the causes of the incident, and taking steps to mitigate and prevent similar occurrences.

In 2016, the FAA replaced its air carrier oversight system for aviation safety inspectors. Previously, inspectors used a calendar-based, non-scaling tool to conduct oversight. The FAA is now transitioning to a risk-based, scalable tool that relies on data collection to drive decisions for adjusting oversight plans. We are also working to incorporate the tools needed for inspectors to identify and adjust surveillance during times of rapid growth, or downsizing into guidance and training materials. These steps demonstrate FAA’s transition from its legacy oversight model to a data-driven approach – a key part of SMS.

SMS allows operators to structure a system that matches the size, complexity, and business model of its organization. The requirement for part 121 commercial carriers to have an SMS comes into effect on March 9, 2018. SMS gives airlines a set of business processes and management tools to examine data gathered from everyday operations, isolate trends that may be precursors to incidents and accidents, take steps to mitigate the risk, and verify the effectiveness of the program. SMS stresses more than compliance with technical standards. It puts an increased emphasis on the overall safety performance. Most importantly, SMS creates a safety culture that assures hazards are identified, that actions are taken, and that results are measured. Then the process repeats itself. In the business of aviation, safety cannot be an “add-on” – it must be built in. Our stakeholders understand that and we thank the Committee for its support.

Another part of our evolving oversight model is our embrace of a new compliance philosophy, which emphasizes accountability of all stakeholders. It clearly distinguishes between compliance, which is the goal; and enforcement, which is one of our many tools. To emphasize, compliance is expected and required of everyone who operates in the airspace. We recognize our role in assuring the public of a safe system, and we will not hesitate to use strict enforcement where necessary.

I am very encouraged by the results thus far. Communications are now more open and working relationships with certificate holders has improved. Certificate holders are now more likely to call when they have questions; whereas in the past, they were might have been more reluctant to contact the FAA for fear of enforcement action. We are also seeing industry take a proactive approach to address deficiencies, even before being contacted by an FAA inspector. We know that it takes collaboration, communication, and common safety objectives to allow the FAA and the aviation community to come together, to identify system hazards, and to implement safety solutions. Safety culture is not just a set of programs that can be “established” or “implemented.” It is a way of living and working, and it requires the open and transparent exchange of information. That, in turn, requires mutual cooperation and trust.

Transforming the FAA

We are actively working to facilitate policies and management processes that promote a broad safety culture transformation both within and outside of our organization. Two of our biggest service offices, flight standards and aircraft certification, have undergone major realignments to better meet the needs of a changing industry.

Flight Standards Service (FS) plays a vital role in making the U.S. aviation system the world’s safest. We want to make sure we maintain that high level of safety. We are in the process of restructuring the FS organization. By moving away from an organizational structure based on geographic locations to an organization built around functions, FS will operate with greater accountability and greater flexibility to adapt to change. The FAA expects the restructuring to yield benefits to both the agency and the aviation community by strengthening our ability to keep pace with changes in the aviation industry. We will also be able to increase our ability to maximize fixed resources, and better ensure that our employees develop and interpret regulations and policies consistently.

Additionally, in July 2017, the Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) was realigned from a product-based structure to a functional alignment. The new organizational structure is designed to enable transformation. The newly created Organizational Performance Division will oversee AIR’s roadmap to transformation, and establish and track effectiveness metrics for both the FAA and industry.

With respect to aircraft certification process improvements, the FAA is moving beyond the initiatives that were driven by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. The Aircraft Certification Service is transforming to meet the demands of today’s dynamic aviation environment by moving to a systems approach. Emphasis will be placed on up front planning for new technologies, risk based level of involvement in certification programs and a robust oversight program. For example, in December of 2016, the FAA issued a complete overhaul of 14 CFR part 23, the rules for small aircraft certification. Instead of prescriptive standards that limit innovation, the new rules define performance-based objectives and give industry the flexibility to determine the best and safest way to meet them. On the international front, we signed agreements with the European Aviation Safety Agency and Transport Canada to accept each other’s approvals of Technical Standards Orders and to validate basic approval with no technical review.

In previous hearings, there was discussion about the effectiveness of the Organization Designation Authorization, or ODA, and our use of metrics. Working closely with industry, we developed the ODA Scorecard. The scorecard is used to define mutually agreed measures, identify areas that need greater focus, and identify issues and concerns with respect to FAA and ODA holders' performance. We piloted the program in 2015, and set up a joint FAA/Industry Continuous Improvement team in 2016. In 2016, 40 companies participated. The goal is for our measures of success to show a year-to-year improvement. I am pleased to report that in just over a year, we have realized performance improvements in both FAA certification offices and ODA holders. The results are published on our website. By measuring appropriate indicators and developing action plans to continuously improve joint industry and FAA performance, we are positioned to optimize our involvement with no adverse impact on safety.

Working with stakeholders

With the advent of new entrants such as unmanned aircraft systems, commonly referred to as UAS or drones, and commercial space operations, a balanced approach that involves collaboration between government and industry is needed. We strive to engage stakeholders throughout the lifecycle of policymaking. For example, the FAA’s commitment to the safe, secure, and efficient integration of drones and the expansion of routine drone operations requires resolving several key challenges to enable this emerging technology to safely achieve its full potential. Because drone technology is evolving at such a rapid pace, we involve stakeholders in framing challenges, prioritizing activities, and developing consensus solutions. By leveraging this expertise, we ensure that the FAA maintains its position as the leader in aviation safety.

The Drone Advisory Committee (DAC), formed in 2016, is a prime example of stakeholder engagement. Its members include representatives from industry, government, labor, and academia. The DAC allows us to look at drone use from every angle, while considering the different viewpoints and needs of the diverse unmanned aircraft systems community. Our collaborative working relationships with groups such as the DAC will help inform and prioritize integration activities, ensure we remain engaged with industry trends, and maintain clear channels of communication to convey expectations and solicit feedback.

The impressive gains in safety are due in part to the aviation industry and government voluntarily investing in the right safety enhancements. The work of the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST), along with new aircraft, regulations, and other activities, reduced the fatality risk for commercial aviation in the United States by 83% from 1998 to 2008. The CAST model uses data to develop an understanding of the best actions or interventions to prevent accidents. The goal was to collaborate on identifying the top safety areas through the analysis of past accident and incident data, charter joint teams of experts to develop methods to understand the chain of events leading to accidents, identify effective interventions to address these safety areas, and remain focused on implementing these critical interventions.

CAST has been extremely successful. It has moved beyond the historic approach of examining past accident data to a more proactive approach that focuses on detecting risk and implementing mitigation strategies before accidents or serious incidents occur with a disciplined, data driven focus. Using data from non-accident sources and voluntary reporting programs, CAST has adopted nearly 100 safety enhancements. CAST aims to further reduce the U.S. commercial fatality risk by 50% from 2010 to 2025.

In a related effort, the FAA is working to reduce safety challenges in general aviation (GA) as well. Much like CAST, the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), which was formed in the mid-1990s, established a data-driven, aviation-safety strategy to reduce fatal accidents in GA. The FAA, industry, and the general aviation community are working together to mitigate the risks that lead to fatal GA accidents. One result of this collaboration is the FAA’s policy on non-required safety enhancing equipment referred to as NORSEE. NORSEE encourages GA aircraft owners to voluntarily install equipment to provide pilots with better overall situational awareness.

Working with the GA community alongside industry, the efforts have been successful. We have targeted, and have been working toward, a yearly 1% reduction in fatal GA accidents to bring a cumulative 10% reduction by the close of fiscal year 2018. I am proud to say that we have already exceeded our original goal, making last year one of the safest years we have had in general aviation.

The collaboration between government and industry, at all levels, has been instrumental to the success we have achieved in the improvement in aviation safety. Our continued success in advancing aviation safety depends on these strong safety partnerships built on trust and the ability to share and protect voluntarily provided safety information. As the work of CAST and the GAJSC has evolved, so has the agency’s ability to collect and analyze safety information.

In 2007, the FAA launched the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing, or ASIAS, program to help transform safety analysis from a forensic approach, looking at accidents and incidents after they occurred, to a risk management approach, allowing for proactive discoveries of safety concerns before they lead to significant events. It took years to establish voluntary safety programs and build trust within the community. Congress has been an important advocate in helping us protect vital safety information. These safety information protections are imperative so that we can continue to provide the environment in which safety personnel are voluntarily providing safety information. This, in turn, provides carriers and government with valuable insight into potential systemic safety issues.

ASIAS partners with CAST and the GAJSC to monitor known risk, evaluate the effectiveness of deployed mitigations, and detect emerging hazards. There are currently 46 part 121 member air carriers, 63 corporate/business operators, five manufacturers and two maintenance, repair, and overhaul organizations participating in ASIAS. The program continues to evolve, and has matured to the point that the FAA and industry can leverage voluntarily provided safety data from operators that represent 99 percent of U.S. air carrier commercial operations. ASIAS has established metrics that enable CAST and the GAJSC to evaluate the effectiveness of mitigations. It is also expanding to support other areas in aviation, such as rotorcraft.

We also regularly engage with our Federal and international partners to improve safety. Along with our law enforcement partners, the FAA maintains a multi-layered oversight of the aviation system, including its aircraft and airmen registry. This includes a team of special agents from the FAA who work with domestic and international law enforcement partners to investigate cases involving fraudulent aircraft registrations. The agency is constantly working to enhance the integrity of registry information, and is developing a plan to significantly upgrade and modernize the aircraft registration process to make the system more effective.

The online pilot record database is an example of the FAA’s and Congress’ commitment to establishing an electronic database for pilot records. In December of 2017, the FAA released a beta version of the database. We are deploying the database in phases to ensure minimal disruption to air carrier and operator access to existing pilot records. Initial feedback of the database has been positive. When complete, the database will enable air carriers to easily check the qualifications and background of pilots as part of the hiring process.

As safety management systems mature, our reliance on sound safety analysis to identify risks to the aviation system, mitigate hazards and track safety enhancements, will be key to sustaining a safe and efficient airspace. This type of capability is achieved only through sustained safety partnerships and the reporting of critical safety information among stakeholders. We must collaborate on safety analysis and best practices, and monitor safety performance and implementation of mitigation strategies. SMS, risk-based decision-making, and collaborative transparent information sharing will be the cornerstone for future FAA oversight and industry’s management of the safety risks that affect their operations.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the support of Chairman Shuster and Subcommittee Chairman LoBiondo. You have been instrumental in providing the FAA with the direction and necessary resources to maintain our position as a global leader in aviation. I thank you both for your leadership and wish you well as you retire from Congress.

Conclusion

We have been diligent in our efforts to address what is at the heart of your direction: that the system be safe, responsive, and flexible. We have made significant progress in restructuring our organization to adapt to the new business models, while keeping safety at the forefront of any decision. It is because of the collective hard work of the men and women of the FAA, the work of Congress, and stakeholders that aviation is the safest it has ever been. Aviation safety is, and must always be, our number one priority. There can be no compromise on safety. Yet, we do not want to stifle innovation. Working together with all interests, we are confident we can balance safety and innovation. The Administration is committed to working with Congress to foster American innovation and solidify America’s role as the global leader in aviation.

This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any of your questions at this time.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION: EMERGING USES IN A CHANGING NATIONAL AIRSPACE

STATEMENT OF DANIEL K. ELWELL, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, BEFORE THE HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION: EMERGING USES IN A CHANGING NATIONAL AIRSPACE, NOVEMBER 29, 2017

Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss a subject that is at the forefront of aviation; Unmanned Aircraft Systems or UAS. UAS—also referred to as drones— are the fastest growing field in aviation. They are being used today to examine infrastructure, survey agriculture, provide emergency response support, examine damage caused by time or disaster, and to go places that would otherwise be dangerous for people or other vehicles. Entrepreneurs around the world are exploring innovative ways to use drones in their corporate activities. And we have witnessed a significant influx of new, casual users of UAS—people who fly drones for recreation or entertainment—into the National Airspace System (NAS). The need for us to fully integrate this technology into the NAS continues to be a national priority.

Accompanying me today is Earl Lawrence. Earl is the Executive Director of the FAA’s UAS Integration Office and is responsible for facilitating all of the regulations, policies, and procedures required to support the FAA’s UAS integration efforts. The Department of Transportation and FAA’s vision is ambitious. We intend to fully integrate UAS into the NAS, with UAS operating harmoniously, side-by-side with manned aircraft, occupying the same airspace and using many of the same air traffic management systems and procedures. Our vision goes beyond the accommodation practices in use today by most countries, which largely rely on operational segregation to maintain systemic safety. As we work to realize this vision, UAS must be introduced to the NAS incrementally to ensure the safety of people and property both in the air and on the ground.

Two years ago, we appeared before this committee to discuss the status of the safe, incremental integration of drones into the NAS. In that time, we have made significant progress toward our goal of fully integrating this new class of aircraft and their operators. Today, I would like to highlight for you some of our accomplishments, our challenges, and our ongoing work to build upon our successes as we move forward with the next phase of UAS integration.

Small UAS Rule

At the outset, the FAA recognized that managing the safe integration of drone technology into the world’s busiest and most complex airspace system would require the participation of all stakeholders—the FAA, industry, aviation groups, and our public safety and security partners, to name just a few. The FAA adopted an approach of engagement and collaboration with these stakeholders in the development of the first set of operating rules for small UAS, which forms the bedrock of the regulatory framework for full UAS integration. Because UAS technology is changing at a rapid pace, a flexible regulatory framework is imperative. Our goal is to provide the basic rules for operators, instead of specific technological solutions that could quickly become outdated. We’ve met this goal with the final small UAS rule (14 CFR part 107), which went into effect on August 29, 2016.

Part 107 introduces a brand new pilot certificate specific to UAS—the Remote Pilot Certificate. Unlike an airman certificate for manned aircraft issued under part 61, which necessarily has more stringent requirements, an individual can obtain a Remote Pilot Certificate under part 107 by passing an aeronautical knowledge test at an FAA-approved testing center. Alternatively, if the individual already holds a current non-student part 61 airman certificate, the individual may complete an online UAS training course in lieu of the knowledge test. Remote pilots must be 16 years of age, be able to read, speak, write, and understand English, and be in a physical and mental condition to safely operate a small UAS. The certificate is valid for two years, after which the remote pilot must take a recurrent knowledge test. Since this rule went into effect, the FAA has issued almost 70,000 remote pilot certificates and 92% of the people who take the remote pilot certificate knowledge exam pass it.

The provisions of part 107 are designed to minimize risks to other aircraft and people and property on the ground. Among other things, the regulations require pilots to keep an unmanned aircraft within visual line-of-sight. Operations are allowed during daylight and twilight hours if the drone has anti-collision lights. The new regulation also addresses altitude and speed restrictions as well as other operational limits such as prohibiting flights over unprotected people on the ground who are not directly participating in the UAS operation.

In keeping with our goal of a flexible framework, some provisions of part 107 may be waived. Operators may apply on our Web site for a waiver to allow drones to fly in controlled airspace or at night, for example. Applicants must demonstrate that their proposed operation can be conducted safely outside of the provisions of part 107. Part 107 allows for operations in Class G airspace without prior air traffic control authorization. Operations in Class B, C, D, and surface area E airspace, all of which exists primarily around airports, may be permitted with authorization from the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) using the online waiver portal. To date, the FAA has issued 1,200 operational waivers and 11,000 authorizations or waivers for controlled airspace operations. Consistent with our risk-based approach, we are increasingly able to grant waivers for more complex operations, including one recently granted to CNN for operations over people. And we are taking steps to further streamline the waiver and authorization process.

The small UAS rule provides UAS operators with unprecedented access to the NAS while also ensuring the safety of the skies. However, it is only the first step in the FAA’s plan to integrate UAS into the NAS. Consistent with our incremental approach to integration, we are using a risk-based analysis to facilitate expanded UAS operations, including operations over people, operations beyond visual line-of-sight, and transportation of persons and property.

Supporting Emergency Response

UAS have been invaluable in supporting response and recovery efforts following the widespread devastation brought about by recent hurricanes. When winds and floodwaters damaged homes, businesses, roadways and industries, a wide variety of agencies and companies sought FAA authorization to fly drones in the affected areas. We responded quickly, issuing a total of 355 airspace authorizations to ensure that those drones could operate safely.

Drones played a critical role in performing search and rescue missions; assessing damage to roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure; and helping insurance companies act more quickly on claims coming in from homeowners. And in Puerto Rico, the FAA quickly approved the first UAS operation of its kind to provide essential communication services. We granted AT&T an exemption from part 107 to operate a 60-pound tethered drone to provide temporary voice, data, and internet service while construction crews rebuild a tower to restore permanent service on the island.

The FAA’s ability to quickly authorize UAS operations after these storms was especially critical because most local airports were either closed or dedicated to emergency relief flights, and the fuel supply was low. As Administrator Huerta recently said: “Essentially, every drone that flew meant that a traditional aircraft was not putting an additional strain on an already fragile system. I don’t think it’s an exaggeration to say that the hurricane response will be looked back upon as a landmark in the evolution of drone usage in this country.”

UAS Integration Pilot Program

The FAA’s commitment to the safe and efficient integration of UAS and the expansion of routine UAS operations requires resolving several key challenges to enable this emerging technology to safely achieve its full potential. Congress recognized a number of these challenges in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016. Technical issues to ensure that a drone maintains a safe distance from other aircraft and that the pilot retains control of the drone and can comply with air traffic instructions must be addressed before UAS operations beyond visual line-of-sight can become routine. And there are additional policy questions raised by UAS use, including security, both physical and cyber, privacy, and enforcement.

To address these challenges and leverage the experience of our stakeholders, on October 25, 2017, President Trump directed the Department of Transportation to launch an initiative to safely test and validate advanced operations for drones in partnership with state and local governments in select jurisdictions—the UAS Integration Pilot Program. The results of this program will be used to improve the safe and secure integration of UAS into the NAS and to realize the benefits of this technology in our economy.

The pilot program will help tackle the most significant challenges in integrating drones into the NAS while reducing risks to public safety and security. Ultimately, it is expected to help the Department of Transportation and the FAA develop a comprehensive regulatory framework that will allow more complex low-altitude operations; identify ways to balance local and national interests; improve communications with local, state, and tribal jurisdictions; address security and privacy risks; and accelerate the approval of operations that currently require special authorizations.

As stated in the Federal Register Notice announcing the pilot program application process, the deadline for Lead Applicants—state, local, or tribal government entities—to submit a notice of intent to participate in the program was yesterday, November 28, 2017. Private sector companies or organizations, UAS operators, public sector entities, and other stakeholders may submit a request to be on the Interested Parties List by December 13, 2017. After evaluating the applications, the Department of Transportation will invite a minimum of five government/private sector partnerships to participate in the pilot program.

UAS Airspace Authorizations and Traffic Management

Starting in spring 2017, the FAA began publishing UAS facility maps, which indicate safe UAS flight altitudes in areas of controlled airspace around airports. Part 107 operators can use these maps to submit better airspace authorization requests. This was a first step toward setting up a data exchange program with external stakeholders, and on October 23, 2017, the FAA launched a prototype evaluation of the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC). LAANC is a joint public-private initiative for the FAA to work with industry to develop the requirements for an application that automates the process for UAS operators to get authorization to fly in certain classes of airspace. In the future, operators will also be able to use LAANC to notify airports and Air Traffic Control when they want to fly within five miles of an airport, as required by the Special Rule for Model Aircraft. The initial LAANC prototype evaluation will cover 10 air traffic facilities and nearly 50 airports. A list of these facilities and airports can be found on the FAA's Web site at: www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/uas_data_exchange/airports_participating_in_laanc/.

LAANC is the first step toward implementing UAS Traffic Management (UTM). The FAA is working with NASA and industry to develop and eventually deploy a UTM concept, which will enable more routine beyond line-of-sight operations. NASA’s concept specifically addresses small UAS operations, primarily below 400 feet above ground level, in airspace that contains low-density manned aircraft operations, where air traffic services are typically not provided. NASA has developed a phased approach for their UTM platform, building from rural to urban and from low- to high-density airspace. In April 2016, NASA coordinated with six FAA-selected test sites to perform phase one testing of the UTM research platform. A Research Transition Team has been established between the FAA and NASA to coordinate the UTM initiative, as the concept introduces policy, regulatory, and infrastructure implications that must be fully understood and addressed before moving forward with technology deployment.

Security and Enforcement

As Congress recognized in the 2016 FAA Extension, the security challenges presented by UAS technology require a layered and integrated government response. Addressing one challenge, the Department of Homeland Security is leading an interagency coordinated effort by federal partners, including the FAA, the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense, to identify and evaluate technologies that help detect and track unmanned aircraft movement through the NAS. We continue to work closely with our government and industry partners to evaluate these drone-detection technologies, including evaluations around airports in New York, Atlantic City, Denver, and Dallas-Fort Worth.

The potential for conflicts between manned and unmanned aircraft has become a very real challenge in integrating these new technologies into the NAS. We are seeing an increased number of drone-sighting reports from pilots of manned aircraft. This year, we’ve received an average of almost 200 reports from pilots each month—over 2,000 to date—which is significantly higher than the number received in 2016 and 2015. In 2016, we received approximately 1,800 complaints, compared to 1,200 complaints the year before.

As the Federal agency responsible for the safety of the flying community, the increasing number of these reports is of great concern. As a result, the FAA has actively engaged in public education and outreach efforts, such as “Know Before You Fly” and the small UAS registration process. Sometimes, however, education is not enough. To be clear, if an unauthorized UAS operation is intentional, creates an unacceptable risk to safety, or is intended to cause harm, strong and swift enforcement action will be taken. Earlier this year, we announced a comprehensive settlement agreement with a UAS operator that flew drones in congested airspace over New York City and Chicago, and violated airspace regulations and aircraft operating rules.

One of our ongoing challenges in this area, however, is the limited amount of information available to our inspectors when they need to contact a UAS operator or take action to address a potential violation of our regulations. As Congress has recognized, identification and tracking of UAS is critical to the full integration of this technology in the NAS. As discussed further below, the FAA established an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to develop standards and provide recommendations for remote identification and tracking of UAS this year.

Engagement with the law enforcement community also is paramount to ensuring that our airspace remains the safest in the world. In January 2015, the FAA published guidance for the law enforcement community on the UAS Web site, and has been actively engaging with law enforcement agencies at local, State, and Federal levels through a variety of channels. The goal of these efforts is to reduce confusion in the law enforcement community about how to respond to UAS events. The FAA encourages citizens to call local law enforcement if they feel someone is endangering people or property on the ground or in the sky. Local law enforcement will then work with local FAA field offices to ensure these safety issues are addressed. We have also started a webinar series specifically geared toward educating law enforcement and other public safety officials about how to enforce unsafe or unauthorized operations, and how to fly UAS safely and legally when they need to.

Moving Forward

As we move forward with UAS integration, we need to continue to involve all stakeholders in framing challenges and finding solutions. By leveraging this expertise, we will continue to ensure that the FAA maintains its position as the global leader in aviation safety. This month, I attended a meeting of the Drone Advisory Committee (DAC). Our main goal with the DAC moving forward is to harvest the collective technical and operational expertise of its members, which include representatives from industry, government, labor, and academia. With the announcement of the UAS Integration Pilot Program, we will ask the DAC to provide us with the technical and operational recommendations we need to implement the program. In addition, the DAC will continue to assist us with determining what the highest-priority UAS operations are and how we can enable access to the airspace needed to conduct these operations.

We are also making headway with two Aviation Rulemaking Committees (ARC) tasked with making recommendations for the next critical steps in the pathway to full UAS integration: remote identification and tracking of UAS and integrating larger UAS into the NAS. This past spring, we established the UAS Identification and Tracking ARC to make recommendations about technologies that can be used to remotely ID and track UAS, and that would address some of the concerns of the law enforcement and security communities. The ARC recently concluded its work and submitted its report to us last month; we are now reviewing the committee’s recommendations and expect to publish this report in the coming weeks.

In addition, we recently convened a UAS in Controlled Airspace ARC, which will provide recommendations on integrating larger UAS into the NAS. It will develop and recommend scenarios that will encompass the most desired operations, identify gaps in research and development needed to successfully integrate larger UAS into controlled airspace, and develop and recommend up to five prioritized changes to policies and procedures that will spur integration. The ARC held its second meeting at the end of October 2017 and will continue to hold regular meetings over the next 15 months.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the support that Chairman LoBiondo has provided to the FAA and, in particular, the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. In its role as the core facility for sustaining and modernizing the air traffic management system, the Technical Center has been instrumental in the FAA’s efforts to facilitate new entrants and users to the NAS. I thank Chairman LoBiondo for his leadership and wish him well as he retires from Congress.

Conclusion

The FAA’s progress in accommodating new technologies and operations demonstrates that the agency is well positioned to maintain its status as the global leader in safe and efficient air transportation. The progress we have made would have seemed unimaginable not long ago. We know, however, that these accomplishments are only the first step. There are many important issues yet to be addressed and we will continue to work with our stakeholders as we write the next chapter in aviation history. This concludes my statement. I will be glad to answer any questions you have.

Controlling Restricted Airspace; An Examination of Management and Coordination of Air Defense

STATEMENT OF

ROBERT STURGELL,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,

CONTROLLING RESTRICTED AIRSPACE; AN EXAMINATION OF MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION OF AIR DEFENSE

JULY 21, 2005

Chairman Davis, Congressman Waxman, Members of the Committee:

My name is Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and I’m pleased to appear before you today to discuss how air traffic is controlled in restricted airspace and how the government manages and coordinates air defense. FAA has always worked to ensure that our nation’s airspace is managed efficiently, effectively, and, most importantly, safely. Prior to September 11^th, FAA’s air traffic management focused primarily on improving communications with users of the national airspace system (NAS) to manage the dynamic weather, traffic, and airport capacity issues that arose to maximize capacity and efficiency without compromising safety. Since September 11^th, the FAA has redoubled our efforts to improve communications with our counterpart agencies to ensure that we can respond to the dynamic security issues that may arise at any time.

As security has become a greater focus of managing air traffic, and responsibility for security has been concentrated in the Department of Homeland Security, it is appropriate that a clarification of who controls the airspace, under what circumstances and why should be reviewed and explained. The FAA was created in 1958 to provide a centralized focus for aviation, replacing an ineffective system of diffused authorities that had evolved over time. Prior to 1958, the functions of the FAA were splintered – the Civil Aeronautics Authority under the Department of Commerce possessed day-to-day air traffic control responsibilities; the Civil Aeronautics Board possessed accident investigation and safety regulatory responsibilities; and an Airways Modernization Board had responsibility for planning and developing a system of air navigation facilities; and an interagency Air Coordinating Committee had, until shortly before, reviewed all matters involving the use of airspace. It was clear that this approach to managing the national airspace was inefficient and ineffectual.

The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAAct) makes clear that Congress wanted one independent agency with “plenary authority” over the nation’s airspace. Legislative history notes that the bill to create the FAA is intended to address two fundamental deficiencies in the Federal Government’s aviation responsibilities, one of which was a “lack of clear statutory authority for centralized airspace management.” The report stated that, “the bill proposes to vest in a single Administrator plenary authority for airspace management. If such authority is once again fractionalized and made subject to committee or panel decision, the evil will be continued.” The “evil” that the report alludes to included the problems that developed before 1958 when it was not clear who, i.e., a particular civilian agency or the military, had the sole authority over air traffic, airspace and other aviation safety issues. These problems led to aviation accidents, including midair collisions.

Although Congress passed various statutory amendments, including those relating to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, during and after the formation of the Department of Homeland Defense and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), it did not alter the FAA’s status. The current statutory framework for the Administrator’s airspace authority and the accompanying legislative history confirm that the FAA continues to be the sole authority for airspace management, air traffic regulatory authority, and use of airspace.

Even in circumstances that potentially affect the national defense, whereby the Secretary of Defense has an interest in articulating the views of the military, it is the Administrator – in consultation with the Secretary of Defense – who decides to establish areas in the airspace that are necessary for national defense. Section 40107(b) of title 49, United States Code, provides that in the event of war, the President may transfer to the Secretary of Defense (by executive order) a duty, power, activity, or facility of the FAA. Executive Order 1161, dated July 7, 1964, directs the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to prepare and develop plans, procedures, policies, programs and courses of action in anticipation of the probable transfer of the FAA to the DOD in the event of war. Furthermore, both Departments are instructed that consistent with the above and in the event of war, these provisions are to be accomplished smoothly and rapidly. To that end, the FAA and the DOD entered into several MOUs setting forth agreements on certain procedures and policies for military exercises and missions. FAA and various parts of the military entered into subsequent MOUs to address a variety of air traffic control issues to accommodate military training operations and military missions. Unlike the statutory provision of § 40107(b), which explicitly provide for the transfer of a duty, power, activity or facility of the FAA to the military in the event of war, no such provision exists in regard to the transfer of any duty, power, activity or facility from the FAA to any other agency or entity.

With respect to airspace security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works closely with, consults and coordinates with FAA as appropriate, but it has no authority to circumvent FAA’s operational control. It is vital that FAA defer to TSA’s security expertise in order to facilitate executing security enhancing aviation procedures as necessary. It is equally important that TSA defer to FAA’s operational and safety expertise in order to provide to TSA the required support in the manner that is safest for all operators in the NAS. Section 114(g) of title 49, United States Code, clearly underscores that TSA’s security role does not preempt or supersede the FAA’s own safety and security authority.

It is important to acknowledge and preserve the respective roles and expertise among the DoD, TSA, and FAA. It is equally important that we coordinate our actions and activities together to provide maximum effectiveness.

Recognizing the need to delineate clear lines of authority and responsibility and establish open communication, the FAA and various other agencies have entered into a number of agreements and/or memoranda of understanding. By establishing cooperative interagency relationships that emphasize organizational capabilities, we are improving service to and relationships with each other, other Federal, State, and local agencies, non-governmental stakeholders, and the American public and Tribal Nations. These agreements define strategic relationships with an aim towards identifying and leveraging respective core competencies, capabilities, resources, and authorities to enhance the safety and security of aviation and commercial space transportation in the United States; to promote efficiency of government and reduce overall costs; to minimize the adverse economic and regulatory impact of measures required of the public and regulated entities; and to achieve national performance security goals for the National Airspace System.

The greatest evidence of the open sharing of information and joint decision making efforts amongst the various agencies as it relates to aviation is the operation of the “DEN,” the Domestic Events Network. The DEN is a 24/7 operational center that links the Transportation Security Administration, United States Secret Service, Federal Marshall Service and other components of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, North American Air Defense Command, U.S. Park Police, U.S. Capitol Police, local law enforcement agencies, and others as needed. It is set up to respond to emergency situations quickly – in real time. It is set up so that operational personnel and political appointees in many agencies can be tied together quickly to share information and rapidly decide on a course of action.

While the DEN monitors events nationwide, the majority of restricted airspace violations occur in and around the Washington, D.C. area. Although there is restricted airspace throughout the country depending on events that are occurring, nowhere is the airspace more regulated on an ongoing basis than here in Washington. Unidentified aircraft operating in restricted airspace are taken very seriously. FAA is a member of the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), a group comprised of representatives of security and military agencies to ensure that, in the event of a threat from an unidentified aircraft, coordinated action can be taken to appropriately address the threat and keep the region safe.

An analysis of what happened on May 11, 2005 will serve as a good example of how FAA interacts with other agencies when an unidentified aircraft approaches Washington, D.C. At 11:28 a.m., FAA and the NCRCC became aware of an aircraft entering restricted airspace from the northeast, approximately 44 miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). The FAA’s watch officer for key communications working with the DEN, contacted the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (Potomac TRACON), which confirmed to participating NCRCC agencies that the aircraft was not in communication with air traffic control, had not filed a flight plan and that its transponder was transmitting a generic, rather than a unique code, which essentially meant that FAA did not know who the aircraft was. At this point, the aircraft was considered to be a track of interest (TOI). Because the aircraft was flying just within and parallel to the northern boundary of the restricted zone, it was not considered an immediate threat and, while it was monitored closely, no intercept action was taken at this point.

The aircraft subsequently turned southbound toward the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), the second restricted zone surrounding the Capitol. This information was communicated on the DEN to the participating NCRCC agencies. At this point, the Customs and Border Protection Office of Marine Operations (AMO) ordered the launch of its Blackhawk helicopter and Citation jet aircraft from DCA. In addition, two F-16 aircraft were scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base. The AMO Blackhawk initially intercepted the aircraft about 10 miles north of the Capitol. When the aircraft continued to proceed south toward the Capitol, the F-16s moved in to intercept. The aircraft was visually identified as a high-winged, single-engine Cessna-type aircraft.

Attempts by the Blackhawk helicopter to signal to the pilots of the Cessna and get them to communicate on an emergency frequency were initially unsuccessful. At noon, the Department of Defense authorized the F-16 pilots to use flares. The flares were dispensed when the aircraft was 6.7 miles from DCA. At this time, the Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol Police made the decision to evacuate the White House and the Capitol, respectively. The Blackhawk continued to signal to the pilots to get them to communicate with them. Ultimately, the Cessna pilots were able to make contact with the AMO Citation on an emergency frequency and the Cessna turned west. The Cessna proceeded through the prohibited airspace over the Naval Observatory with the F-16s in escort. As the aircraft exited the FRZ, the Blackhawk joined the escort north.

The Potomac TRACON reported on the DEN that the pilots were in communication with air traffic controllers at 12:22 p.m. The pilots reported to the controllers that they had been instructed to proceed to the airport in Frederick, Maryland. Escorted by the Blackhawk and the F-16s, the aircraft exited restricted airspace at 12:25 p.m. and landed in Frederick at 12:39 p.m. During the flight, Potomac TRACON controllers communicated with the pilots several times to tell them how far they were from the airport and to warn them to look for other VFR traffic. Upon landing, the occupants of the aircraft were taken into custody by the FBI, Secret Service, and Maryland state authorities for questioning.

In this instance, we consider the interaction of the agencies to have worked as intended. The communication and interface that took place during this incident were an improvement over the interagency communication that took place during the incident last June involving the Governor of Kentucky’s plane which, on approach to DCA, was known to FAA controllers, but appeared as an unidentified aircraft to the other members of the NCRCC. By contrast, on May 11th, the decision to evacuate the Capitol and the White House was made by the U.S. Capitol Police and the Secret Service based on the accurate information that an unknown aircraft operator had penetrated restricted airspace and the FRZ, was heading toward the Capitol, and was not immediately responding to the intercept. Once the aircraft changed direction away from the areas of concern, an all clear was announced. All agencies in the NCRCC learned from the June 2004 event and, as a result, today, both FAA controllers and NCRCC members are seeing and acting on the same information.

It is always appropriate for the Federal Government to review incidents, such as the one that occurred on May 11^th in order to determine if improvements in how these incursions are handled can be made. Toward this end, I am aware that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has prepared a report at the request of Chairman Davis on the management improvements that are needed throughout government to address violations of restricted airspace. As I’ve noted, FAA takes these incursions very seriously. We will continue to work with GAO, other federal agencies and Congress to improve airspace security through better coordination, clarification of information and definitions, and development of protocols to share our available information (including data on violations) with eligible recipients.

Finally, I think it is important to note that, although we must continue to be vigilant with respect to these incursions, to date, the overwhelming majority of incursions into restricted airspace around in the Washington, D.C. area were made inadvertently. Of the restricted airspace violations made since September 11^th, there was only one instance in which the pilot was found to have penetrated the restricted area intentionally. This violation resulted in the FAA revoking the pilot’s certificate. The combination of better pilot education, dissemination of information on airspace restrictions, and enforcement against violators is having an impact on the number of violations taking place. We are open to any recommendations GAO makes to further improve the security of flight restricted zones.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

Cell Phones on Aircraft: Nuisance or Necessity

STATEMENT OF

NICHOLAS A. SABATINI,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

CELL PHONES ON AIRCRAFT: NUISANCE OR NECESSITY.

JULY 14, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Costello and Members of the Subcommittee:

It is a pleasure to be here this morning to review for the Subcommittee the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) policy and rules regarding the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs), including cell phones, on aircraft and how those may be affected by a proposed rulemaking by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to relax their ban on the use of certain cell phones on aircraft. I welcome the opportunity to appear here today with my colleagues from the FCC, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), to discuss our respective roles and responsibilities, as well as with my colleague from the RTCA, Inc., whose organization has greatly contributed to the understanding of the operational effects of PEDs.

Before providing you with a brief outline of responsibilities, I would like to emphasize at the outset that, regardless of the final outcome of the FCC’s proposed rulemaking, the FAA’s safety regulations regarding portable electronic devices onboard aircraft will remain in place.

In order to prevent potential interference with aircraft communications and navigation equipment, the FAA has regulations[1] that prohibit the use of portable electronic devices, with some limited, specified exceptions, onboard a U.S. air carrier aircraft or any other U.S. registered aircraft operating under instrument flight rules (IFR). The specific exceptions to the rule are for portable voice recorders, hearing aids, heart pacemakers, and electric shavers. Use of those devices is allowed. Our regulation also provides an additional, more general, exception one that is relevant to today’s discussion: if an aircraft operator has determined that a portable electronic device will not interfere with the navigation or communication systems of the aircraft on which the PED will be used, the operator may permit use of the PED onboard that aircraft. This general exception sounds deceptively simple, but I assure you it is quite complex in this era where the old cable and pulley flight control systems on many aircraft have been replaced by modern “fly-by-wire” aircraft equipped with analog and digital technology that translate pilot control input to the aircraft control surfaces electronically (wires / circuit boards). These advanced avionics depend on clear signal communications onboard aircraft. Air carriers routinely provide information to the FAA about their electromagnetic studies.

We commissioned a Federal Advisory Committee under the auspices of RTCA, Inc., to study radio frequency emission and interference issues. During the first phase of their study, they issued a report in 1996 as well as procedures for air carriers to use in making a determination about whether a PED interferes with onboard navigation or communication systems. The RTCA is continuing to investigate the use of new technologies onboard aircraft and we expect this phase to extend to the end of next year. My colleague here today will provide more details about their work with not only the FAA, but with the aviation community and the PED industry.

To understand the issues that PEDs pose for the aircraft environment and, therefore, the underlying reason for our safety regulations, one needs to understand the basic problem: electromagnetic interference. All electronic devices send out electromagnetic waves. The power and frequency of these waves depends on the type of device and its physical condition; that is, whether it’s been damaged or repaired or “souped up.” PEDs can be categorized more simply into two kinds: intentional and unintentional transmitters. Intentional transmitters work by using radio signals to talk or transfer data to another device or service provider. These are devices such as cell phones, two-way pagers, wireless modems, built in WiFi devices[2], remote control toys, walkie-talkies and many other things. Basically, if the device “talks” to another device without physically being connected by a wire, it is probably an intentional transmitter. Unintentional transmitters are all other electronic devices, which include such things as electronic games, laptop computers and Personal Data Assistants (PDAs)—at least the ones that do not use wireless technologies. Unintentional transmitters give off electromagnetic waves whenever they operate. The power level of these waves vary depending on the device and complexity of the device’s circuitry.

Modern avionics on aircraft transmit and receive radio signals to communicate with onboard systems, with other aircraft, air traffic control and ground stations. These onboard systems are used for navigation, communication, surveillance, and security and can be affected by the radio signals or electromagnetic waves transmitted intentionally or unintentionally by PEDs. The chance of this occurring is greater with intentional transmitters such as cell phones. Additionally, radio signals originating external to an aircraft may combine with signals produced inside the cabin, resulting in a higher probability of interference to the aircraft avionics or flight control systems. To prevent possible interference affecting an aircraft’s navigation and communication systems during the critical phases of flight, such as take-off and landing (e.g. when the aircraft is below 10,000 feet), we recommend that air carriers prohibit the operation of any PED (including cell phones) during these times[3].

Cell phones are different from other PEDs on aircraft in that they can interfere with the cellular networks on the ground. For this reason, in 1991, the FCC issued a rule that prohibited the use of certain cell phones on aircraft during flight. As I understand it, under the FCC rules, while an air carrier may permit passengers to use their cell phones while an aircraft is on the ground, passengers must turn off their phones once the aircraft has left the gate.

As my colleague will testify this morning, the FCC now believes that, with advances in cell phone technology since 1991, their rule banning 800 MHz cell phone use in flight, may not be needed in order to protect the terrestrial or ground based cellular networks. In February, they published an NPRM that proposed to lift the ban on the use of 800 MHz cell phones while airborne if such phones are operating at their lowest frequency power under control of onboard equipment, e.g. a “pico cell,” which is installed on the aircraft and acts as a controller for onboard callers. In this scenario, the pico cell would manage the power levels of the cell phones that would potentially solve the FCC’s concern with interference with ground-based cell phone communications. We are not aware of any current technology that restricts emissions to the confines of the particular aircraft with such an installation.

The FAA and the FCC coordinated closely during the development of the FCC’s proposed rulemaking action so that the public would be apprised of our respective roles. The FAA supports the FCC’s action in examining these issues and seeking public comment. The NPRM notice clearly notes throughout the document that whatever the outcome of the FCC’s proposal, use of cell phones onboard aircraft is still subject to FAA’s safety regulation and air carrier policies. This rulemaking action by the FCC has generated substantial public comment, and I will defer to my colleague to review for you the proposal and the status of their action.

What I do want to emphasize is that the FAA is not changing its rules. We will certainly continue to work with the FCC and any other agencies that have roles to play to ensure that the public is well aware of the prerequisites for using cell phones or any other PED while in flight. If an air carrier elects to permit cell phone usage (or other PED) onboard during flight, they must determine that the use of that particular model phone won’t interfere with the navigation or communication systems onboard the specific type of aircraft on which the phone will be used. That’s a substantial challenge with ever-changing cell phone technology on the one hand, and, on the other, increasingly advanced and complex aircraft technology as the national airspace system moves to satellite navigation. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a critical enabler of new procedures and must be protected from increased background noise as well as direct interference.

The GPS received signal is at a very low level. The proper operation of GPS receivers can be disrupted by a relatively low level signal generated by an undesired signal source. Nevertheless, if an air carrier is willing to take the time and incur the expense of testing and verifying that the cell phone usage presents no in-flight interference problems, our rules allow an air carrier to permit such devices.

Most airlines now prohibit the use of intentional transmitters such as cell phones during flight. However, we have recently worked with a couple of carriers who have allowed the use of PED technology under our rule on certain aircraft. The first instance involved a proposal by American Airlines and Qualcomm for a one-time test in July 2004 of the use of a Qualcomm cell phone onboard a Boeing MD-80 aircraft with a pico cell that was brought on board for the test (i.e. it was not permanently installed on the aircraft). The test was successful in that it provided data for the airline and the cell phone providers to analyze and further study. For example, it showed that the pico cell would control the strength of cell phone emissions but that it would only allow so many people onboard to use their cell phone at any one time due to the capacity limit of the pico cell. In the second instance, last month we approved the installation of equipment that will allow United Airlines and Verizon to permit the use of WiFi wireless internet connection onboard Boeing 757 aircraft during flight after the aircraft reaches cruising altitude. Under this system, a passenger may use a laptop computer or other device with an 802.11 ethernet card to connect to a server onboard the aircraft that directs the communication to a ground-based internet provider. Using this technology, a passenger could not only surf the internet but could also use a voice-over internet protocol (IP) connection with a headset to make phone calls over the internet. Also, we understand that Airbus, last September, demonstrated an airborne pico cell using the European GSM mobile phone technology on an Airbus A320.

It remains to be seen if carriers will seek approvals for use of more PEDs on other types of aircraft. Should the FCC relax its rule regarding the use of 800 MHz cell phones, it could provide an impetus for air carriers to permit the use of a variety of cell phones (or other PEDs) in flight. If that’s the case and if an air carrier has met our safety requirements, the carrier may permit such use, with procedures to help passengers be aware of exactly what phones may be used and under what conditions.

We will also closely monitor what potential effects that wider use of cell phones or other PEDs in flight might have on new satellite navigation procedures and aircraft capabilities to take advantage of such procedures. That means we have to be careful to protect the more advanced onboard technology from harmful interference from PEDs. For example, there is potential that such interference could reduce the number of GPS satellites that an aircraft could “see” and therefore reduce the accuracy of the GPS signal. The FAA takes this into consideration in requirements for the GPS accuracy expected for navigation procedures. The navigation procedures are also designed with missed-approach procedures for alternative navigation capability.

This potential to provide passengers with new communication technologies also raises the issue of what FCC Commissioner Copps refers to as the “annoying-seatmate issue.” This is largely a social issue, albeit one with potential safety implications. Other modes of transportation are also dealing with the issue of cell phone use by passengers. For example, Amtrak designates “quiet cars” for passengers who do not want to be disturbed by cell phones.

We expect that air carriers will have to sort this out, weighing the pros and cons—but inflight cell phone use could also present unique safety and security concerns. DOJ is here today to address the security aspects of this issue. We will continue to work with our colleagues as these issues are examined. What effect in-flight cell phone use may have on pilot workload or interference with a flight attendant’s safety duties due to incidents of passenger “air rage” is an unknown at this point. However, it’s not hard to imagine a scenario where use of cell phones by several passengers in the confined space of an aircraft cabin could lead to conflicts. We are concerned that, should cell phone use be permitted, flight attendants might be distracted from their critical safety duties and responsibilities if they are increasingly required to deal with irate passengers. This will be one of the issues that we will continue to assess and monitor if cell phone technology proliferates onboard aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, I trust this information about our program is helpful. Safety is the FAA’s highest priority and we will continue to enforce and maintain our regulatory oversight on the use of all PEDs, including cell phones, onboard aircraft.

That concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

[1] See 14 C.F.R. 91.21, 121.306, 125.204, 135.144).

[2] For example, an 802.11 ethernet card, or a Bluetooth wireless device, or Blackberry.

[3] See the FAA Advisory Circular 91.21-1 that accompanies our safety rule.

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