STATEMENT OF

NICHOLAS A. SABATINI,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

FAA SAFETY OVERSIGHT,

SEPTEMBER 20, 2006.

Chairman Mica, Congressman Costello, Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the current state of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aviation safety oversight.  My primary message to you today is that despite the tragic accident that took place in Lexington, Kentucky last month, the safety record of aviation in the United States (U.S.) is extraordinary.  And while the Kentucky accident serves as an important reminder that our work as safety professionals is never done, we remain in the midst of the safest period in aviation history.  Since 2001, U.S. scheduled air carriers have transported approximately 2.2 billion passengers, or seven times the population of our country.  Over that time period we have had a total of seventy-eight passenger fatalities.

All of us who work for or with aviation professionals can take pride in the results of our collective efforts, especially given the economic turbulence that has been experienced by U.S. carriers in recent years.  I am here today to commit to you that, while I take great pride in the current state of aviation safety, the FAA has no intention of becoming complacent.  Aviation is extremely dynamic and FAA must be prepared to not only keep pace with, but stay ahead of changes in the industry.  It is in that context that I would like to share with you where we are in terms of aviation safety today, the challenges we face now and in the future, and how we intend to address them. 

In the early 1990’s, the Boeing Company projected that if the aviation industry did not take strong preventive measures in safety initiatives in commercial aviation, the projected growth in operations over the next 20 years would increase the number of hull loss accidents worldwide to approximately one every week.  This was a wake up call to all who worked in and cared about aviation.  Because of work done collectively by government, industry, and operators, today a fatal accident occurs about every 15 to 16 commercial million flights.  This is a far cry from what Boeing predicted, and is an accomplishment for which we can all be proud.  Today, commercial airline accidents are so rare that when they do occur, they are big news, as we recently experienced.  In the glare of all the media, it is sometimes hard to fully appreciate the magnitude of the achievement that our safety record reflects.  By no means do I want to downplay the Kentucky accident, but it must be put into context so the flying public understands that our system is extremely safe.  In fact, pilots are actually safer on the job than when they are not at work.

It is also important to understand that FAA’s commitment to aviation safety is not limited to commercial operations, and that we are meeting our safety goals in general aviation as well.  We are in the midst of a major revitalization in that segment of the industry that is due, in large part, to legislation Congress passed in 1994 - the General Aviation Revitalization Act.  The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) recently announced record breaking shipment and billing figures.  Over the past year, FAA issued approvals for new general aviation airplane designs, such as Sino Swearingen’s SJ-30, Cessna’s Mustang, and Eclipse’s 500 model.  These new aircraft, and the introduction of the light sport classification of aircraft and pilots last year, represent growing segments of general aviation and the continued evolution of our system.  FAA sets tough safety improvement targets for general aviation expressed as a “not-to-exceed” number of fatal accidents, which decreases every year.  With 10 days left in the fiscal year, we are on target to come in about 10% below our not-to-exceed number.  Put more simply, this has been the safest year in general aviation since we started keeping records.  General aviation is a vital part of the industry and we are pleased to report that it is so robust and safer than ever.

Turning to the area of air cargo, there are two primary operational federal aviation regulations (FAR) overseeing air cargo, FAR part 121 for operators of larger aircraft, and FAR part 135 for non-scheduled operators using smaller aircraft.  The part 121 cargo operation per departure hull loss accident rate has consistently improved, and now stands at about one-third of where it was in 1990.  Without precise data on the number of departures for the part 135 operators, we track the total number of accidents.  A consistent downward trend is also shown for the 135 operators with the number of accidents in 2005 at about half of what they were in 1990. 

A review of the accident data indicates that in both types of operations, the accident rates are declining.  The trends are coming down.  The FAA implemented a number of safety initiatives after the Fine Air accident in 1998, which involved improper loading of cargo.  We issued several guidance documents including an Advisory Circular AC 120-85 titled “Air Cargo Operations.”  This AC focuses on cargo loading procedures, cargo handling systems, and weight and balance. 

Another area of focus for the FAA is in the Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) operations, an industry that has grown rapidly in recent years.  These operations are unique due to the emergency nature of the mission.  The number of accidents nearly doubled between the mid-1990s and 2004.  There were 9 accidents in 1998, compared with 15 in 2004, with a total of 83 accidents from 1998 through mid-2004.  The main causes were controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), inadvertent operation into instrument meteorological conditions, and pilot spatial disorientation/lack of situational awareness in night operations.  

Safety improvements were clearly needed.  That is why in August 2004 the FAA initiated a new government and industry partnership to address these concerns and improve the safety culture of HEMS operators.  Working with industry, the FAA developed several short and long-term strategies for reducing accidents.  An example was the development of Risk Assessment Program guidance for HEMS operations.  Another example was the development and implementation of Air Medical Resource Management Training.  As a result of the efforts of the FAA and industry, there has been a marked decrease in accidents in this area. 

As I stated at the outset, we recognize that we cannot rest on our laurels.  We are constantly looking ahead and working with people in both government and industry to find ways to make this very safe system even safer.  It is not acceptable for FAA to react to changes in the system, we must anticipate them. 

With that in mind, what are we anticipating in the years ahead?  What are the challenges we will face, and how will we face them?  The legacy carriers are undergoing fundamental shifts and changes in their business models.  There are significant pressures to reduce costs which have resulted in more and more production and maintenance being outsourced, something I know this Committee has long been interested in.  At the same time, commercial airline traffic is rebounding.  FAA forecasts commercial airline traffic will triple over the next ten years.  In addition to the new large commercial aircraft we expect, such as the Boeing 787 and the Airbus 380, there are many more types of aircraft we know will be introduced into the system.  We can expect everything from light sport aircraft to commercial space vehicles; from very light jets (VLJs) to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).  In fact, there are some 20 models of VLJs in various stages of design and production.  FAA forecasters predict 4,000 VLJs could be in operation in 10 years.

The growing presence of UAS introduces a number of safety concerns about which I know this Committee is aware.  We need to know about the mission, characteristics, requirements, and performance of the many, many different models of UAS.  For safety’s sake, we need UAS operations to be transparent and seamless.  But first and foremost, we must ensure that UAS operating in civil airspace will have no adverse impact to the thousands of aircraft already operating in the national airspace system (NAS).  As I testified before you earlier this year, we are currently working with government and industry to establish standards and metrics to enable us to move forward in this area.

In short, from my perspective we are experiencing the greatest change in the history of civil aviation, yet at the same time U.S. travelers are enjoying unprecedented safety.  FAA is committed to maintaining and improving upon this record of performance.

In 1998, FAA began overseeing the ten largest part 121 carriers using the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) model, which goes beyond simply ensuring regulatory compliance.  The goal of the ATOS model is to foster a higher level of air carrier safety using a systemic, risk-management-based process to identify safety trends and prevent accidents.  ATOS has improved safety because it identifies and manages risks before they cause problems with safety, thus ensuring that carriers have safety adequately built into their operating systems. 

To continue to improve aviation safety we must use every tool at our disposal.  The most effective way to improve safety is through Safety Management Systems (SMS).  Safety Management Systems enable organizations to identify and manage risk far better than before.  With this formalized approach, we can identify issues, fix them, and ensure they stay fixed.  

Operating under a Safety Management System assures a disciplined and standardized approach to managing risk.  The best part is we can review past experience and address known hazards, and at the same time we can look ahead and rigorously apply Safety Risk Management principles to any changes or introduction of new elements.

Furthermore, under an SMS, the whole process — identifying potential problems and putting corrections in place — is ongoing and the procedure is continuously assessed to make sure it is working. 

In short, SMS formalizes risk management, which is imperative as we move from a forensic, or after-the-fact accident investigation approach, to a diagnostic and more prognostic, or predictive, approach.  With the accident rate as low as it is, we must get in front of information, analyze trends, and anticipate problems if we are to continue to improve on an already remarkable record of achievement.  Operating under a Safety Management System will allow airlines, manufacturers, and the FAA to do this better than before.  So that we are all operating from the same approach, FAA must apply the same high standards to ourselves that we require of the entities that we regulate. 

We are no longer dealing with “common causes” of accidents.  To meet tomorrow’s challenges, we need more data points and the analytical expertise to discern trends and identify precursors.  And we need to share what we learn.  We have an effort underway called the Aviation Safety Information Analysis System that begins to address this challenge by integrating multiple data bases for a more comprehensive analysis.  To keep the pressure on reducing the accident rate, we will need far more information about trends, about precursors, and about what is going on every day in the manufacturing and operating and maintenance environments.

Turning to a new and slightly different oversight function in my organization, I would like to discuss the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service.  As you know, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is a performance-based organization and has the responsibility for internal safety monitoring and compliance with safety standards.  Like an airline or other certificate holder, it is important to have an independent safety oversight function of the ATO to ensure the highest level of compliance with established safety standards.  We formally established the safety oversight office in March 2005 with 15 Air Traffic Safety Inspectors; currently there are 37 personnel on board.  Oversight of the ATO follows the model of our long history of regulating the airlines and service providers such as manufacturers and repair stations. 

We have the responsibility to oversee, audit and apply a risk-management based approach to ensure continued safety of air traffic operations.  To this end, we have granted approval of an interim Safety Management System (SMS) which will be implemented throughout the ATO.  In addition to the monitoring, audits and surveillance of the NAS, we have recently implemented a program to issue credentials to ATO safety personnel modeled on the successful oversight of the aviation industry and airmen.  Credentialing will help assure continuous operational safety by providing standards for training, testing, and competency, as well as compliance with the ATO’s policies and directives.  Our oversight of the ATO has already yielded important safety benefits such as changes to taxi into position and hold procedures that were based on safety risk management principles.  Essentially, our vision is to regulate the ATO in the same way that we would regulate any other certificate holder.

Finally, although it is not a function under my organization, let me summarize where we stand with our efforts on runway incursions.  As you know, the FAA, along with pilot groups and industry, has invested a great deal of time and effort to reduce the number and severity of runway incursions in the past several years.  Today, the United States National Airspace System (NAS) has nearly 500 FAA and contract tower-staffed airports that handle more than 173,000 aircraft operations — takeoffs and landings — a day, averaging approximately 63 million airport operations per year. Of the approximately 254 million aircraft operations at U.S. towered airports from FY 2002-2005, there were 1,311 reported runway incursions.  This translates into approximately 5.1 runway incursions for every one million operations and less than one serious runway incursion for every one million operations.  There were six collisions during this period, none of which resulted in a fatality.  When viewed in the context of the total number of operations, the number of incursions is low.  This tells us that further reducing the rate will be quite a challenge, but a challenge we are embracing.

We have made important progress over the last few years, especially in reducing serious Category A and B runway incursions by more than 40 percent since FY 2001.  In FY 2006, we have had a total of 313 runway incursions.  Twenty-seven of those were Category A and B incursions, which is fewer than 10 percent of the total. Pilot deviations are the most common type of runway incursion, they accounted for 55 percent of serious incursions in the past fiscal year.  Operational errors/deviations, on the other hand, accounted for only 28 percent of total incursions, but 33 percent of serious incursions which represents a notable change in the distribution of runway incursion types with respect to severity.  Unfortunately, in the last fiscal year we had three Category A runway incursions between two commercial jets as a result of operational errors.  These are the types of statistics our runway incursion safety team continuously analyzes in order to understand where our efforts will have the greatest impact in reducing risk. 

As presented in the FAA Flight Plan 2006-2010, the FAA’s performance target is to reduce the number of Category A and B runway incursions to an annual rate of no more than 0.450 per million operations by FY 2010.  Analysis of the trend of runway incursions from 2001 through 2005 shows that the rate of reduction flattened, suggesting that the runway safety management strategies that have been implemented early in that period had achieved their maximum effect.  Therefore, in order to achieve our stated targets, the FAA must identify new strategies and re-prioritize their application.  We are currently deploying and evaluating new technologies that will improve “error tolerance” in the system – as we understand only too well that human error is inevitable.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize that I have just touched on a few of the very many important safety initiatives ongoing at the FAA.  I will be happy to talk to you about these or any other safety programs.  We are at a critical time in aviation and I want to leave you with a clear understanding of the strength of the commitment that exists within FAA at all levels of the agency.  We are proud of our record, but we recognize that many challenges still await us.  I know we have the support of this Committee and that of a dedicated industry as we move forward.  This concludes my prepared statement.  I’ll be happy to answer your questions at this time.

* * *

STATEMENT OF

NICK SABATINI,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,

ON

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN ALASKA
AND THE PACIFIC REGION: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATION.

July 13, 2006

Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, Members of the Committee.

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss a subject that serves to remind us that the future is now.  The development and use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) is the next great step forward in the evolution of aviation.  As it has throughout its history, FAA is prepared to work with other government agencies and industry to ensure that these aircraft are both safe to operate and are operated safely.  The extremely broad range of UAS makes their successful integration into the national airspace system (NAS) a challenge, but certainly one worth meeting.  To meet this vital need, the FAA has established an Unmanned Aircraft Program Office which has the expressed purpose of insuring a safe integration of UAS into the NAS.

At the outset, you must understand that UAS cannot be described as a single type of aircraft.  UAS can be vehicles that range from a 12-ounce hand launched model to the size of a 737 aircraft.  They also encompass a broad span of altitude and endurance capabilities.  Obviously, the size of the UAS impacts the complexity of its system design and capability.  Therefore, each different type of UAS has to be evaluated separately, with each aircraft’s unique characteristics being considered before its integration into the NAS can be accomplished.  FAA is currently working with both other government agencies and private industry on the development and use of UAS.

Today’s hearing is another indicator that the number of government agencies wanting to explore the use of UAS in support of their mandate is on the rise.  In addition to the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of the Interior (DOI), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and state and local governments are all interested in increasing their use of UAS for a range of very different purposes.  Any aircraft operated by government agencies in the NAS, including a UAS, is considered a public aircraft operation and the oversight and certification of that aircraft is the responsibility of the relevant Federal agency.  These public operations are, however, required to be in compliance with certain federal aviation regulations administered by the FAA, especially those that ensure that the operation of these aircraft do not compromise the safety of the NAS.  FAA’s current role is to ensure that UAS do no harm to other operators in the NAS and, to the maximum extent possible, the public on the ground.

In working with government agencies, the FAA issues a Certificate of Authorization (COA) that permits the agency to operate a particular UAS for a particular purpose in a particular area.  In other words, FAA works with the agency to develop conditions and limitations for UAS operations to ensure they do not jeopardize the safety of other aviation operations.  The objective is to issue a COA with terms that ensure an equivalent level of safety as manned aircraft.  Usually, this entails making sure that the UAS does not operate in a populated area and that the aircraft is observed, either by someone in a manned aircraft or someone on the ground.  In the interest of national security the FAA worked with DHS to facilitate UAS operations along the Arizona/New Mexico border with Mexico.  In order to permit such operations, the airspace was segregated to ensure system safety so these UAS flights can operate without an observer being physically present to observe the operation.  In addition, the FAA worked with NOAA in 2005 to approve a COA that allowed atmospheric testing using a UAS to take place over the Channel Islands, off of the coast of California.  It was a unique operation that required the flexibility to climb and descend randomly between 1,000 feet and 12,000 feet as needed for mission success.  In June, 2004, FAA issued a COA to the United States Coast Guard for a UAS mission that operated from King Salmon, AK.  This mission consisted of flights along the United States and Russia Maritime Boundary Line, the 100 fathom curve in the Bering Sea, and in the High Sea Driftnet Area south of the Aleutian Island chain.  There was also a provision to conduct a fly-over of the Alaska pipeline.  Each of these operations required extensive coordination and effort.  With the steadily expanding purposes for which UAS are used and the eventual stateside redeployment of large numbers of UAS from the theater of war, the FAA expects to issue a record number of COAs.  In fact, the FAA has issued over 55 COAs this year alone, compared with a total of 50 for the two previous years combined.

FAA’s work with private industry is slightly different.  Companies must obtain an airworthiness certificate by demonstrating that their aircraft can operate safely within an assigned flight test area and cause no harm to the public.  They must be able to describe their unmanned aircraft system, along with how and where they intend to fly.  This is documented by the applicant in what we call a program letter.  An FAA team of subject matter experts reviews the program letter and, if the project is feasible, performs an on-site review of the ground system and unmanned aircraft, if available.  If the results of the on-site review are acceptable, there are negotiations on operating limitations.  After the necessary limitations are accepted, FAA will accept an application for an experimental airworthiness certificate which is ultimately issued by the local FAA Manufacturing Inspection District Office.  The certificate specifies the operating restrictions applicable to that aircraft.  We have received 14 program letters for UAS ranging from 39 to over 10,000 pounds.  We have issued two experimental certificates, one for General Atomics’ Altair, and one for Bell-Textron’s Eagle Eye.  We expect to issue at least two more experimental certificates this year. 

Each UAS FAA considers, whether it be developed by government or industry, must have numerous fail safes for loss of link and system failures.  Information must be provided to FAA that clearly establishes that the risk of injury to persons on the ground is highly unlikely in the event of failures or loss of link.  Like everything else having to do with UAS, the methods that link the aircraft with ground control can be as simple as frequency line of sight or as complex as multiple ground and satellite paths making up a functional connection.  If the link is lost, it means the aircraft is no longer flying under control of the pilot.  Because FAA recognizes the seriousness of this situation, we are predominantly limiting UAS operations to unpopulated areas.  Should loss of link occur, the pilot must immediately alert air traffic control and inform the controllers of the loss of control link.  Information about what the aircraft is programmed to do and when it is programmed to do it is pre-coordinated with the affected air traffic control facilities in advance of the flight so that FAA can take the appropriate actions to mitigate the situation and preserve safety.  

The COA and Experimental Airworthiness Certificate processes are designed to allow a sufficiently restricted operation to ensure a safe environment, while allowing for research and development until such time as pertinent standards are developed.  They also allow the FAA, other government agencies, and private industry to gather valuable data about a largely unknown field of aviation.  The development of standards is crucial to moving forward with UAS integration in the NAS.  FAA has tasked the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), an industry-led federal advisory committee to FAA, with the development of a Minimum Operational Performance Standard (MOPS) for sense and avoid, and command, control and communication.  These standards will allow manufacturers to begin to build certifiable avionics for UAS.  It is expected that the MOPS for avionics will take at least three to four years to develop.  Until there are set standards and aircraft meet them, UAS will continue to have appropriate restrictions imposed.  In addition, the FAA is working closely with DoD and DHS to collaborate on the appropriate approach to certification standards.  

Because of the extraordinarily broad range of unmanned aircraft types and performance, the challenges of integrating them safely into the NAS continue to evolve.  Urgent future ground surveillance needs must be balanced with ongoing air transportation operations.  The certification and operational issues described herein highlight the fact that there is a missing link in terms of technology today that prevents these aircraft from getting unrestricted access to the NAS.  Currently there is no recognized technology solution that could make these aircraft capable of meeting regulatory requirements for see and avoid, and command and control.  Further, some unmanned aircraft will likely never receive unrestricted access to the NAS due to the limited amount of avionics it can carry because of weight, such as transponders, that can be installed in a vehicle itself weighing just a few ounces.  Likewise, the performance difference with surrounding air traffic can present challenges.  Some UAS operate in airspace used primarily by jet aircraft that can fly at twice their speed, thus complicating the control of the airspace.

FAA is fully cognizant that UAS are becoming more and more important to more and more government agencies and private industry.  The full extent of how they can be used and what benefits they can provide are still being explored.  Over the next several years, when RTCA has provided recommended standards to the FAA, we will be in a position to provide more exact certification and operational requirements to UAS operators.  As the technology gap closes, we expect some UAS will be shown to be safer and have more access to the NAS.  The future of avionics and air traffic control contemplates aircraft communicating directly with one another to share flight information to maximize the efficiency of the airspace.  This could certainly include some models of UAS.  Just as there is a broad range of UAS, there will be a broad range of ways to safely provide them access to the NAS.  Our commitment is to make sure that when they operate in the NAS, they do so with no denigration of system safety.

The FAA has a long-standing history of working with the State of Alaska in the development of new technologies.  A recent example of this is the Capstone program for which Alaska has been the proving ground of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast technology or ADS-B, a technology I know the Administrator spoke about at the recent field hearing in Alaska.

The FAA has other ongoing initiatives in Alaska.  Starting in September 2005, the FAA tasked the University of Alaska, Anchorage and Fairbanks campuses, with participating in a research and development program through the FAA’s Air Transportation Center of Excellence for General Aviation Research (CGAR).  The CGAR is a consortium of academia, industry, and government that is ready to address the critical needs of general aviation through synergistic relationships.  The University of Alaska has been teamed up with two other institutes to evaluate detect, sense and avoid systems, primarily through an extensive library search, that have a benefit to aviation safety.  This project will build on the work already completed by University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) at the Poker Flats range located near Fairbanks, Alaska.

Another project assigned to the CGAR team involved with the University of Alaska is looking at the potential design and certification criteria of UAS with an emphasis on size, speed and impact energy limits as it relates to the safety of manned aircraft and persons and property on the ground.  This project will again, build on the work already completed by UAF at the Institute of Northern Engineering and the Transportation Research Center. The University of Alaska already has airspace experience gained from UAS work conducted to/from, and within Alaska and will be working on other UAS projects in conjunction with this one.

In our history, FAA and its predecessor agencies have successfully transitioned many new and revolutionary aircraft types and systems into the NAS.  Beginning in 1937, we completed the U.S. certification for the first large scale production airliner (the DC-3), then went on to certify the first pressurized airliner (the Boeing B-307 in 1940), civil helicopter (Bell 47 in 1946), turboprop (Vickers Viscount in 1955), turbojet (Boeing 707 in 1958), as well as the supersonic transport (Concorde in 1979), and the advance wide-body jets of today (Boeing 747-400 in 1989).  It seems appropriate that, as we begin a new century and new millennium, advances in aviation technology present us with another addition to the fleet with great potential - unmanned aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, FAA is prepared to meet the challenge.  We will continue to work closely with our partners in government, industry and Congress to ensure that the National Airspace System has the ability to take maximum advantage of the unique capabilities of unmanned aircraft.

This concludes my prepared remarks.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

Statement of

Terry Rosapep
Deputy Associate Administrator for Program Management
Federal Transit Administration
United States Department of Transportation

before the

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity

Hearing on

Transit and Rail Security Training

September 28, 2006

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). I am pleased to have this opportunity, with my colleague,

William Fagan, Director of Security at the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), to update you on transit and rail security training and the U. S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) initiatives in that area.

FTA and Transit Security

America's transit system is complex, dynamic, interconnected, and composed of over 6,000 local systems. By their nature, these systems--and the entire transit network--are open and accessible, and therefore difficult to secure. Each workday, transit and commuter rail systems move approximately 14 million passengers in the United States. 

FTA, its Federal and state partners, and the transit industry have built a solid foundation for security in the years following the attacks of September 11, by focusing on three security priorities:  public awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness. FTA has designed its security training programs with the certainty that regardless of where an attack comes from or how it is devised, security training of employees and passenger awareness will always help to prevent or mitigate damage.

Since September 11, in our ongoing collaboration with partners at the National Transit Institute (NTI) of Rutgers University, the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) of the Department of Transportation, and Johns Hopkins University (JHU), FTA has delivered security training to almost 80,000 transit employees nationwide.  We have utilized an array of formats for security training, ranging from classroom instruction and roundtables to videos and toolkits, to suit the needs of each audience and to disseminate broadly our knowledge about security.

In September 2005, FTA and two agencies within the Department Homeland Security – the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness, now the Office of Grants and Training (G&T), signed the Public Transportation Security Annex to the Department of Transportation (DOT/Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security.  The annex identifies specific areas of coordination among the parties, including citizen awareness, training, exercises, risk assessments, and information sharing.  To implement the Annex, the three agencies have developed a framework that leverages each agency’s resources and capabilities.

With the Annex in place as a blueprint, FTA, TSA and G&T have established an Executive Steering Committee that interacts with DHS, DOT, and transit industry leaders.  This committee oversees eight project management teams that spearhead the Annex’s programs.  Each of these programs advances one or more of FTA’s three security priority areas, which again are public awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness.  We have been implementing the Annex energetically since its inception.  

The "Training Team" looks specifically at how to develop new courses on timely, cutting-edge security topics such as strategic counter-terrorism, and biological and chemical threats. The Annex's "Safety and Security Roundtables" team also enhances security training. It works on direct outreach to the transit industry, and plans two educational events a year for the security chiefs of the 50 largest transit agencies. Transit security leaders have responded favorably to opportunities for peer-to-peer forums, and the security roundtables provide just that. The next roundtable, our third, will be held in December 2006 in Secaucus, New Jersey.

It is also worth noting that the Annex includes a team dedicated to the "Transit Watch" program, which is tantamount to a security training initiative that teaches transit passengers to become more mindful of their environment in the context of risks of the times for terrorism.

FTA, with our Federal partners at DHS, continues to work with Johns Hopkins, TSI, and NTI to deliver and develop security training programs.

Before I detail these course offerings, I would like to call your attention to a few highlights. First, FTA's course offerings are comprehensive and focus on all transit environments, including smaller agencies. Second, security training aims to disseminate the most current and up to date thinking on the most current and up to date threat information for the transit industry. Third, these courses cover a comprehensive range of topics that mesh with transit industry realities and needs. Finally, FTA's courses equip transit agencies to implement security training for all of their employees. This magnifies the impact of security training courses, as it encourages those we educate to educate, in turn, their peers and employees.

In partnership with JHU, FTA has already piloted and revised a two-day course on Strategic Counter-Terrorism for Transit Managers. This course provides counter-terrorism management training to transit police and security forces in a large enough number to ensure a core, consistent approach to security planning across transit agencies.

With JHU, FTA has also developed a Strategic Curriculum Development Guidance Document, which is an essential tool for standardized, high quality security training.

Finally, in conjunction with JHU, FTA is just now completing the Security Training Assessment for Top 30 Transit Agencies, and for 20 smaller agencies.  This assessment will help FTA and our partners in the Federal government identify security training gaps and needs in the industry. Usefully, it takes into account smaller agencies, whose requirements and characteristics often differ from those of larger urban systems.

FTA is working with NTI to deliver six security training initiatives for the transit industry: 

The System Security Awareness for Transportation Employees training that FTA developed with NTI imparts basic security skills and is offered in the form of a four-hour class, DVD/video or employee handouts.  FTA has also distributed over 4,200 copies of its system security awareness Warning Signs video, developed in collaboration with NTI. FTA is in the process of developing a parallel video targeted specifically to smaller transit agencies.

FTA has just developed a six-hour course on Chemical/Biological and Explosive Incident Management for Operations Control Center Personnel.  This course has been developed and is currently being delivered to ten transit agencies in large metro areas; an additional 20 deliveries will be scheduled for 2007.

The Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction course draws on FTA's work with Israeli experts on passenger monitoring, and lessons learned from Israel's security experts. FTA has already reached 6,000 employees with this material. In the next quarter, FTA plans to complete two additional training initiatives with NTI. The first is an Emergency Drills/ Exercise Guidance Document for transit agencies. The second is a new training course that will help ensure that transit employees can use the National Incident Management System for Transit to collaborate effectively with emergency responders and services during an incident.

During 2006, FTA has collaborated with TSI to offer or develop six security training courses.

In June, FTA and TSI offered a Crime Prevention through Environmental Design course in El Paso, Texas; FTA is now developing a Security Design training course with TSI that achieves the same purpose but with the emphasis against terrorism.

From April to August of this year, FTA offered its Transit System Security course five times. This course encourages participants to develop and implement security policies in a uniform format. The FTA-TSI course in Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies also takes a broad perspective and teaches transit employees how to understand the emergency management concept.

Two additional courses train employees to handle specific kinds of security threats. FTA offered the Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus and Rail Hijackings course eight times this year. It also offered a course in the Transit Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction.

TSI is in the process of updating and revising all of its courses so as to be in compliance with FTA and DHS requirements. 

As this brief review illustrates, FTA has forged successful collaborations both within the Federal government, between the government and the transit industry, and with JHU, NTI and TSI, to develop and disseminate the latest security training and knowledge. FTA's work with these organizations and within the MOU Annex is the primary way that we influence security training practices in the transit industry.

FRA’s Role in Railroad Security

FRA’s primary mission is to promote the safety of the U.S. railroad industry.  FRA’s railroad safety mission necessarily includes its involvement in railroad security issues, and FRA works closely with TSA and the railroad industry on a daily basis in addressing railroad security issues. 

The United States railroad network is a vital link in the Nation’s transportation system and is critical to the economy, national defense, and public health.  Amtrak and commuter railroads provide passenger rail service to more than 500 million passengers yearly.  Freight railroads connect businesses with each other across the country and with markets overseas, moving 42 percent of all intercity freight, measured in ton-miles.  Passenger and freight railroads operate over 170,000 route miles of track and employ over 227,000 workers.

FRA’s involvement in railroad security predates the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  From 1997 through the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 in March of this year, DOT worked closely with Congress to secure the enactment of Federal criminal legislation to more effectively deter and punish terrorist who attack railroads and mass transportation systems.  In 1998, FRA issued regulations requiring passenger railroads to prepare and secure FRA approval of plans to address emergencies (such as security threats), conduct employee training on the plan, and conduct emergency simulations.  This regulation is discussed in more detail below.

Since the terrorist atrocities on September 11, 2001, FRA has been actively engaged in the railroad industry’s response to the terrorist threat.  The railroads have developed their own security plans, and FRA has worked with the railroads, rail labor, and law enforcement personnel to develop the Railway Alert Network, which enables timely distribution of information and intelligence on security issues.  Working with the FTA, we have participated in security risk assessments on commuter railroads, and we have conducted security risk assessments of Amtrak as well.  FRA’s security director works on a daily basis to facilitate communications on security issues between government agencies and the railroad industry.

Freight Railroad Security

A special focus for FRA and DOT, collectively, is the security of hazmat transported by rail.  A major initiative to improve hazmat security has been the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) March 2003 regulation requiring each shipper and carrier of significant quantities (amounts for which placards are required) of hazmat to adopt and comply with a security plan. Under the regulation, security plans must include an assessment of security risks and appropriate countermeasures or mitigation strategies, or both, to address those risks.  The plans must, at a minimum, address three specific areas:  the company personnel who prepare and handle hazmat shipments; unauthorized access to hazmat shipments or transport conveyances; and the security of hazmat shipped or transported by the company from its origin to its destination.  To assist railroads that transport hazmat and shippers that offer hazmat for transportation by rail to comply with this regulation, particularly small- and medium-sized companies, FRA and PHMSA developed a program on how to write and implement security plans for their companies.  FRA, PHMSA, and TSA have been working together on developing proposed revisions to the PHMSA rule.

FRA recognizes that railroad and shipper employees’ awareness and understanding of the PHMSA regulation and procedures governing the safe and secure transportation of hazmat shipments are critical.  Therefore, PHMSA’s regulation provides for safety and security training for employees engaged in the transportation of hazmat.  Specifically, every shipper and carrier of hazmat must give its employees training in awareness of risks associated with hazmat transportation and methods designed to enhance hazmat transportation security.  In addition, every shipper and carrier required to have a security plan must give its employees in-depth security training concerning the company’s security plan and its implementation.  These training requirements are also recurrent; employees must receive the required training at least every three years. To date, FRA personnel have reviewed more than 6,105 security plans (including the plans for all Class I freight railroad carriers) and conducted 4,054 inspections for compliance with the security training requirements.    

Further, as a result of extensive collaboration with the freight railroad industry, on June 23, 2006, DHS and DOT issued “Recommended Security Action Items for the Rail Transportation of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) Materials.”  The Action Items are based on lessons learned from an assessment of high-threat urban area rail corridors and from reviews of railroads’ security plans.  Implementation of the Action Items is expected to  raise the security baseline for the transportation of TIH materials.  We believe the Security Action Items are of great value and can be quickly implemented.  They include regularly reinforcing security awareness and operational security concepts to all employees at all levels of the organization, training employees to recognize suspicious activity and report security concerns found during inspections of cars containing TIH materials, and other security training program elements.  DOT and TSA are monitoring implementation of the Action Items and, should they not be voluntarily adopted as expected, we will consider more formally instituting the Action Items.

While we must remain ever vigilant to secure hazmat shipments on our Nation’s railroads, for the sake of railroad employees and the public whom we all serve, it bears emphasis that the vast majority of hazmat shipments arrive at their destinations safely; few tank cars have leaks or spills of any kind; fewer still are breached in an accident or incident.  Considering just chlorine, for example, since 1965 (the earliest data available) there have been at least 2.2 million tank car shipments of chlorine–only 788 of which were involved in accidents (0.036 percent of all the shipments).  Of those accidents, there were 11 instances of a catastrophic loss (i.e., a loss of all, or nearly all) of the chlorine lading (0.0005 percent of all the shipments).  Of the 11 catastrophic losses, four resulted in fatalities (0.00018 percent of all the shipments).  For all hazardous materials, in the 12 years from 1994 through 2005, hazardous materials released in railroad accidents resulted in a total of 14 fatalities.  While one death is obviously too many, the record of transporting these commodities is very good. 

Railroads have also voluntarily imposed their own, additional security requirements addressing the security of not only hazmat but of freight in general.  The Nation’s freight railroads have developed and put in place security plans based on comprehensive risk analyses and the national intelligence community’s best practices.  The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has established guidance for the major freight railroads in the form of a model strategic security plan.  Further, the AAR and Class I railroads have been working with the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University to develop employee training modules for security.  With FRA and TSA input, four video modules have been developed covering security awareness training.  In particular, the video training modules help frontline employees identify potential security breaches, threats and risks and explain how they should report them.  A fifth training module is being developed to address the notification of employees in a security incident and what they need to do under the railroad’s security plan, such as moving cars to more secure areas.  Notably, the training is intended for all railroad employees—not just those employees responsible for the transportation of hazmat.  The video training modules will be made part of a training library for use in recurrent training, rules classes, training of new employees, and other training.  The training modules will also continue to be shared with the smaller railroads.

Passenger Railroad Security

In the area of passenger railroad security, FRA requires railroads that operate intercity or commuter passenger train service or that host the operation of that service to adopt and comply with a written emergency preparedness plan approved by FRA.  Each plan must address employee training and qualification.  Crewmembers aboard a passenger train must be trained initially and then periodically every two years on the applicable plan provisions.  At a minimum, training must include the following subjects:  rail equipment familiarization; situational awareness; passenger evacuation; coordination of functions; and “hands-on” instruction concerning the location, function, and operation of on-board emergency equipment.  Personnel of a control center (a central location on a railroad with responsibility for directing the safe movement of trains) must also be trained initially and then periodically every two years on appropriate courses of action for potential emergency situations.  This training must include dispatch territory familiarization and protocols governing internal communications between appropriate control center personnel whenever an imminent, potential emergency situation exists.  Additionally, each railroad must establish and maintain a working relationship with emergency responders on its line by developing and making available a training program on the plan, inviting them to participate in emergency simulations, discussed more below, and by distributing updated plans to them, including documentation concerning the railroad’s equipment, the physical characteristics of its line, necessary maps, and the position titles and telephone numbers of relevant railroad officers to contact.   Further, railroads providing passenger service must periodically conduct full-scale passenger train emergency simulations and must conduct a debriefing and critique session after actual or simulated passenger train emergency situations.  These requirements for full-scale simulations and for post-simulation and post-emergency debriefing help ensure that employees’ abstract knowledge of emergency procedures is put into practice and then refined based on their collective experience.

Amtrak and commuter railroads have instituted their own security plans and conduct security training.  FRA assisted Amtrak in the development of its security plan.  Specifically, in coordination with Amtrak’s Inspector General, FRA contracted with the RAND Corporation to conduct a systematic review and assessment of Amtrak’s security posture, corporate strategic security planning, and programs focusing on the adequacy of preparedness for combating terrorist threats. 

              In partnership with FTA, FRA participated in security risk assessments on the ten largest commuter railroads and contributed the funding for security risk assessments on three of these railroads.  FRA also participated in FTA’s “best practices tool kit” initiative, contributing our knowledge of commuter rail operations, infrastructure, and organization to ensure that the recommended security enhancement measures were sound and feasible in a railroad environment.  FRA staff worked closely with many of the railroads that receive FTA grant funding, to plan and assist in the development and implementation of security simulations and drills.  FRA also devoted staff with both railroad knowledge and facilitation skills to the 17 FTA-sponsored workshops across the country (called “Connecting Communities”) to bring together commuter railroads, emergency responders, and State and local government leaders so that they might better coordinate their security plans and emergency response efforts. 

The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is also leading commuter railroads in the development of industry standards for passenger rail security.  This initiative is in addition to APTA’s system safety audit program, to which most commuter railroads subscribe, and which includes security as an element of overall system safety. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, be assured that the Department of Transportation will continue to strengthen transit and rail security.  We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to advance the shared goal of protecting our transit and rail infrastructure, and all that rides on it. I, and my colleagues, will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

###

STATEMENT OF

MICHAEL W. REYNOLDS
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AVIATION and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

before the

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

on

Air Service to Small and Rural Communities

September 14, 2006

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to this hearing.  I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you air service to small communities, and the two programs administered by the Department of Transportation that deal specifically with such service, namely the Essential Air Service (EAS) program and the Small Community Air Service Development Program.  I can assure you that the Department is committed to implementing its small community air service programs in the best and most efficient manner and thereby helping smaller communities meet the challenges that they face in obtaining and retaining air service. 

It is clear that air service in this country has changed dramatically over the past several years.  Many of these changes have been very positive.  The growth of low-fare carriers, for example, has made affordable air transportation available to millions of people across the country.  The number of air travelers has expanded dramatically, as hundreds of passengers have taken advantage of the low fares that have become more widely available.  While this is a good development overall for consumers, we recognize that it can create new challenges for some small communities.  With a greater number of service choices available, particularly those involving lower fares, many consumers are willing to drive to places with a broader array of air service options, making it more difficult for some individual airports to sustain their own traffic levels.  There are, for example, some communities receiving EAS assistance within ready driving distance of two or three major airports.  This “leakage” can result in a struggling community airport, but not necessarily consumers who lack access to the national air transportation system. 

Another challenge is the change in aircraft used by carriers that serve small communities.  Many commuter carriers have been replacing their 19-seat aircraft with 30-seat aircraft, due to the increased costs of operating the smaller planes and larger carriers’ reluctance to offer code sharing on 19-seaters.  This trend began at least 10 years ago and has continued.  There are now fewer and fewer 19-seat aircraft in operation as many carriers have up-gauged to 30-seat aircraft, and, in some cases, even regional jets.  As a result, many small communities that cannot support this larger size of aircraft are being left without air service.  Additionally, the rise in the cost of jet fuel has made all carriers more cost-conscious and more selective in initiating new service and maintaining service where yields are low.  Finally, some changes have occurred in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Many consumers, leisure and business, have changed their travel patterns and carriers have altered the structure of their airline services.  Generally, this has meant carriers abandoning the smaller markets, as evidenced by the fact that we have received notices to suspend service at more than 100 communities since September 11.  In addition, the financial condition of the network carriers has added further uncertainty for their regional code-share partner service.

The challenge that we face is one of adjusting the programs to account for these changes in an efficient and effective manner, giving appropriate and balanced recognition to the reasonable needs of the communities, the carriers, the consumers, and the taxpaying public at large.   Mr. Chairman, I do not use the word “challenge” lightly.  All of us -- the Federal Government that manages programs affecting service at small communities, as well as the States and the communities themselves -- need to reexamine the way we approach small community air service. 

We at the Department of Transportation have recognized for a while now that the way the Federal Government helps small communities address air service concerns has not kept pace with the changes in the industry and the way service is now provided in this country.  For that reason, we have initiated some important reevaluations of the programs that we manage.  I want to share with you today what we have done and are doing to address this issue.

As you know, the Department administers two programs dealing with air service at small communities.  The EAS program provides compensation to air carriers to provide air service at certain statutorily mandated communities.  The Small Community Air Service Development Program, which was established by Congress in 2000 under the AIR-21 legislation, provides federal grants-in-aid to help small communities address their air service and airfare issues.  While initially established as a pilot program, it was reauthorized through FY 2008 in Vision 100.

Essential Air Service Program

Let me first address the EAS program.  The laws governing our administration of the EAS program have not changed significantly since its inception 28 years ago, notwithstanding the dramatic changes that have taken place in the airline industry.  As currently structured, the EAS program acts only as a safety net for small communities receiving subsidized air service by providing threshold levels of air service.  While ensuring some service, this approach does little to help communities attract self-sustaining unsubsidized air service, as evidenced by the fact that once a community receives subsidized air service it is rare for an air carrier to come in offering to provide unsubsidized air service.   The goal of our proposed changes to the EAS program is to end this dependency and to give communities the ability to obtain transportation services more tailored to the communities’ needs.

With this in mind, the Administration proposed very fundamental and substantial changes to the program in its last FAA reauthorization proposal, as well as in the last several budget requests.  Those changes were based on our extensive experience dealing with the communities and the carriers involved with the program, recommendations from both of these constituencies, as well as studies by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that were geared toward finding “the answer” to successful service at small communities.  Two major themes came through repeatedly -- the need for greater participation by communities in addressing their air service issues, and the desire for greater flexibility in doing so. 

The Administration’s proposed revisions to the EAS program would, for the first time since the program was established in 1978, require communities to be stakeholders in the air service they receive and thus have a vested interest in its success.  With the proposed reforms, the Administration would also ensure that the small communities most in need would be able to maintain access to the national air transportation system.

Currently, a community’s eligibility for inclusion in the EAS program is based only on whether it was listed on a carrier's certificate on the date the program was enacted – October 24, 1978.  Once subsidized service was established, there was little incentive for active community involvement to help ensure that the service being subsidized would ultimately be successful.  I can tell you anecdotally that a number of EAS communities do not even display their subsidized EAS flights on their Internet homepages, but some in the past have shown the availability of air service at nearby hubs, especially if it is low-fare service.  As a result of these and other factors, EAS-subsidized flights are frequently not well patronized and our funds are not being used as efficiently or effectively as possible.

Under the Administration’s proposal, communities are asked to become partners in the financing of their air services, but in exchange are given a much bigger role in determining the nature of that service.  As a result, currently eligible communities would remain eligible, but would have an array of new transportation options available to them for access to the national air transportation system.  In addition to the traditional EAS schedule of two or three round trips a day to a hub, the communities would have the alternatives of charter flights, air taxi service, or ground transportation links.  Regionalized air service might also be possible, where several communities could be served through one airport, but with larger aircraft or more frequent flights.

Under the Administration’s proposals, community participation would be determined by the degree of its isolation from access to the national air transportation system.  The most remote communities (those greater than 210 miles from the nearest large or medium hub airport) would be required to provide only 10 percent of the total EAS subsidy costs.  Communities that are within a close drive of major airports would not qualify for subsidized air service, but could receive subsidies constituting 50 percent of the total costs for providing surface transportation links to that service.  Specifically, communities within:  (a) 100 driving miles of a large or medium hub airport, (b) 75 miles of a small hub, or (c) 50 miles of a non-hub with jet service would not qualify for subsidy for air service.  All other EAS communities would have to cover 25 percent of the subsidy costs attributable to the provision of air service.

The proposed small-hub and non-hub criteria are important.  Under current law, communities located within 70 miles of a largeormedium hub are not eligible for subsidized air service because they have nearby, attractive alternatives.  Given the growth of air services in this country since deregulation, our proposal simply recognizes that the same principle should apply for communities located near small hubs and non-hubs offering jet service. 

We believe that this approach would allow the Department to provide the most isolated communities with air service that is tailored to their individual needs.  Importantly, it provides communities in the program greater participation, control, and flexibility over how to meet their air service needs, and a far greater incentive to promote the success of those services.

Congress has also recognized the need for reform and made some changes in the reauthorization bill, Vision 100.  One program is the Community Flexibility Pilot Program.  It allows up to ten communities to receive a grant equal to two years’ worth of subsidy in exchange for their forgoing their EAS for ten years.  The funds would have to be used for a project on the airport property or to improve the facilities for general aviation, but no communities have volunteered for that program.  Another program is the Alternate Essential Air Service Program.  The thrust of this program is that, instead of paying an air carrier to serve a community as we typically do under EAS, communities could apply to receive the funds directly -- provided that they have a plan as to exactly how they would use the funds to the benefit of the communities’ access to air service.  The law gives great flexibility in that regard.  For example, funds could be used for smaller aircraft but more frequent service, for on-demand air taxi service, for on-demand surface transportation, for regionalized service, or to purchase an aircraft to be used to serve the community.  The Department issued an order establishing that program in the summer of 2004, but to date no communities have applied.  I cannot tell you for sure why, but my guess is that part of it is that it is just human nature to resist change.  More importantly, while there have been criticisms that the EAS program does not provide optimum service, I do think that the communities have gotten very comfortable in knowing that they are guaranteed their two or three round trips a day no matter what, i.e., EAS is viewed as an absolute entitlement whether the communities invest any time and effort in supporting the service or not. 

With respect to the EAS program, it is important to note the continued growth in both the size and cost of the program to taxpayers over time.  As a point of reference, before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Department was paying subsidy for 75 communities (plus 32 in Alaska) and the budget had been flat at $50 million a year.  We are now subsidizing service at 110 communities (plus 39 in Alaska) and our budget is $110 million for fiscal year 2006.  Currently, there are approximately 70 communities that are eligible for EAS subsidy under the parameters of the existing statute that are served by one carrier without subsidy support.  As most of these communities would be eligible for subsidy if the last carrier requested to stop service, this represents a significant potential liability.  Moreover, should more eligible communities now served by multiple carriers get down to service by a single carrier, the number of communities on the verge of requiring subsidy support could increase further.  That is why an approach along the lines proposed by the Administration is needed to more directly address  small community air service issues and the Department is fully prepared to work with this committee in that effort.

Small Community Air Service Development Program

The Department is now in its fifth year of administering the Small Community Air Service Development Program.  Under current law, the Department can make a maximum of 40 grants in each fiscal year to address air service and airfare issues, although no more than four grants each year can be in any one state.  Until 2006, Congress provided $20 million in each year for this program.  In 2006, the funding for the program is $10 million.

On January 20, the Department issued an order requesting that communities interested in receiving a grant under the Small Community Air Service Development Program for fiscal year 2006 file their applications by April 7.  The Department received 75 applications seeking nearly $33 million.  On August 10, the Department selected 25 communities for grant awards and we are currently working to complete the individual grant agreements with the selected communities.

Our experience to date with this program demonstrates the great interest and desire of communities to tackle their air service challenges head on and to contribute substantially to meeting those challenges.  The Department has received as many as 180 applications for the opportunities available, although that level has dropped to approximately 100 applications per year as the number of grant recipients has increased.  In each year, between 2002 and 2005, the Department has made at least 35 grant awards, and in fiscal year 2004, the Department made an additional six grant awards using unspent funds from prior years’ completed or terminated grants.   This year the Department issued 25 grant awards.

Following statutorily mandated selection criteria, we have made many awards to communities throughout the country and authorized a wide variety of projects, seeking both to address the diverse types of problems presented and test communities’ different ideas about how to solve them.  Some of these projects include a new business model to provide ground handling for carriers at the airport to reduce station costs, financial assistance for a new airline to provide regional service, expansion of low-fare services, a ground service transportation alternative for access to the Nation’s air transportation system, aggressive marketing and promotional campaigns to increase ridership at airports, and revenue guarantees, subsidies, and other financial incentives to reduce the risk to airlines for initiating or expanding service at a community.  For the most part, these projects extend over a period of two to four years.

This program differs from the traditional EAS program in a number of respects.  First, the funds go to the communities rather than directly to an airline serving the community.  Second, the financial assistance is not limited to air carrier subsidy, but can be used for a number of other efforts to enhance a community’s service, including advertising and promotional activities, studies, and ground service initiatives.  Third, communities design their own solutions to their air service and airfare problems and seek financial assistance under the program to help them implement their plans.  Fourth, while not a requirement for participation, most communities provide a portion of the cost of the activity receiving financial assistance.

Over the past four years, the Department has made 150 grant awards.  Communities have been very successful in implementing their authorized grant projects.  Overall, more than 90% of the grant recipients have implemented their authorized projects and we expect that pattern to continue. 

For example, new services have been inaugurated at many communities; others have received increased frequencies or services with larger aircraft.  Several communities have begun targeted and comprehensive marketing campaigns to increase use of the services at the local airport and to attract additional air carrier services.  We have been monitoring the progress of all of the communities as they proceed with the implementation of their projects.   However, because the majority of the projects involve activities over a two-to-four-year period, only now are some of them at the point of completion. 

One test of success will be if the improvements achieved are sustained when the grant projects have concluded.  As more grant awards are completed, we will review the results of those grants to determine if they can offer greater insight into helping smaller communities with their air service challenges.  An important goal of the Small Community Program is to find solutions to air service and airfare problems that could serve as models for other small communities. 

As you know, the GAO recently concluded a review of the Small Community Program.  They too have recognized that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions as to the effectiveness of the Small Community Program in helping communities address their service issues because many grant projects are still in process.  Of the grant projects that had been completed, the GAO concluded that the results were mixed because not all of the grants resulted in improvements that were achieved and sustained after the grant funding was exhausted. 

The GAO noted that nearly 80 grants were scheduled to be completed by the end of this year and they recommended that the Department review the results of these grants before the program is considered for reauthorization beyond 2008.  The Department concurred with GAO’s recommendation and indicated that it would conduct such a review before the reauthorization process.  In conjunction with that analysis, we hope to learn not only from the projects that succeeded, but also from those that did not.  Both will inform our review of the program and the guidance that we may be able to develop for the benefit of small communities overall from a larger group of completed grants under this relatively new program.

The Federal Government, however, is only one piece of the equation.  States and communities will also need to review their air service in the context of the changed industry structure and service patterns to seek fresh, new solutions to maximize their air service potential, including regional and intermodal approaches and expansion of public/private partnerships to meet these challenges.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me reaffirm the Department’s commitment to implementing the DOT’s small community air service programs in the best and most efficient manner.  We look forward to working with you and the members of this subcommittee and the full committee as we continue to work toward these objectives.  Thank you again.  This concludes my prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer any of your questions.

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE NORMAN Y. MINETA
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

REFORMING CAFE STANDARDS FOR PASSENGER CARS

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 3, 2006

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear before this committee today to discuss reforming corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for passenger cars.

            Last week, the President asked Congress for the authority to reform the structure of the current CAFE program for passenger cars for the first time in the program’s 30-year history.  This is an important step to reduce America’s dependence on foreign oil, and is consistent with President Bush’s call to replace more than 5 million barrels per day of oil imports by the year 2025.  Currently, passenger cars account for 23 percent of domestic oil consumption.

Mr. Chairman, this Administration has a good record on improving CAFE.  Members may recall that in 2001, at my request, Congress ended the six-year freeze on CAFE rulemaking.  Later that year, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) completed a report, at Congress’s request, that was highly critical of the current CAFE program.  Among the criticisms contained in the NAS report was the contention that the CAFE program probably had cost between 1,300 and 2,600 lives in one calendar year alone (1993) because it encourages automakers to build smaller vehicles in order to “average out” fuel savings across their fleets.  The chair of the committee wrote, “…no matter what Congress decides regarding specific fuel economy targets, our committee is adamant that changes should be made to shore up deficiencies in the program.”  To correct these longstanding safety and other deficiencies in the CAFE program, I sent a letter to Congress in February 2002 urging passage of legislation to provide the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) with the statutory authority to reform the CAFE program.

            On March 29, DOT completed its second light truck CAFE rulemaking in the past four years by replacing the one-size-fits-all system with an innovative size-based system.  Allow me to explain why this reformed system that bases fuel economy standards on a vehicle’s size is superior to the current “one-size-fits-all” approach. 

• First, a size-based system preserves vehicle choice:  Instead of forcing manufacturers to produce smaller vehicles for purposes of regulatory compliance, this approach takes the manufacturers’ own product mix projections and then applies separate fuel economy targets to each vehicle based on its dimensions.  Under a size-based system, automakers will still be able to build the cars consumers want, but those cars will have to be more fuel efficient across the board.
• Second, a size-based system eliminates the perverse incentives for manufacturers to produce smaller and more dangerous vehicles instead of introducing fuel-saving technologies.
• Third, a size-based system ensures that all manufacturers are introducing fuel-saving technologies, not only the manufacturers of larger vehicles.

These new light truck standards will lead to a safer, more efficient CAFE program and will save a record 10.7 billion gallons of fuel.  This rule also included large sport utility vehicles (SUVs), such as the Hummer H2, under CAFE for the first time.  All told, this Administration will have raised CAFE standards for light trucks for seven consecutive years, from 2005 to 2011.

            Today, following our successful overhaul of the light truck CAFE program and consistent with the recommendations of the NAS, we have the capacity to establish a far more precise, efficient, and safe CAFE program for passenger cars, but we do not have the legal authority to do it.

            The passenger car fuel economy standard was set in law at 27.5 miles per gallon in the original 1975 CAFE statute.  Some of the more senior Members may recall that the 27.5 miles per gallon standard was arrived at by simply doubling what the average fuel economy was in 1975.  The passenger car standard was not then, and certainly is not now, based on sound science or economics.

The original statute did not authorize DOT to change the way the standard applied to different size cars.  Neither Congress nor DOT has ever increased the passenger car standard beyond the level set in the original statute.  So it is important that if we embark on this course, we do it right to avoid compromising safety and to avoid causing economic damage and job loss.

            If we are given the authority to reform the CAFE system for passenger cars, we can improve fuel efficiency by requiring manufacturers to apply fuel saving technologies rather than giving them an incentive to build smaller cars.  Based on the automakers’ confidential product plans, our experts at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) can objectively measure how much fuel saving technology we can require before the costs outweigh the benefits.  This method of formulating a fuel economy standard is objective and subject to review during the rulemaking process.  It is also far more likely to produce an optimal result than if Congress were to prescribe a standard in a statute.

            The President and I are committed to improving fuel economy across the board through an open regulatory process built upon sound science and economics, but we will not accept an arbitrary statutory increase under the current passenger car system.

Mr. Chairman, I know that whenever CAFE is debated, it can turn divisive.   When the original CAFE statute was debated, I was a freshman Member of Congress.  I recall well the debates of the 1970s on how best to conserve fuel and what the impacts would be on the economy.  I remind Members that CAFE reform will not be without cost.   And I am aware that certain automakers are having a rough time financially, and that thousands of hard-working Americans have lost their jobs through no fault of their own because of these financial difficulties. 

Mr. Chairman, the President did not ask lightly for this authority.  But this Administration has already made great strides in improving fuel economy for light trucks.  We have the expertise and experience to boost fuel economy responsibly without needlessly sacrificing safety or American jobs.  I now respectfully ask for the authority to achieve similar gains for the passenger car fleet.

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE NORMAN Y. MINETA
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, TREASURY,
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE JUDICIARY, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

March 7, 2006

          Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Administration’s fiscal year 2007 budget request for the U.S. Department of Transportation.  The President’s request totals $65.6 billion in budgetary resources, which will support major investments in transportation nationwide that are vital to the health of our economy and the American way of life.

            Nearly $16 billion, or more than 24 percent, of the total request for the Department will support transportation safety – my top priority.  Statistics show our past safety efforts are paying off.  Our early estimates show in 2005 the highway fatality rate reached an historic low of 1.43 fatalities per 100 million vehicle-miles traveled.  Still, annual highway deaths continue to hover around 43,000 - a number that is still too high.  

            Our transportation network is the backbone of the strongest and most dynamic economy in the world.  The President’s budget request continues record investments in our Nation’s transportation infrastructure, as well as supporting research and technology.  At the same time, the budget reflects the recognition that our funding mechanisms are outdated.  There is a growing consensus that traditional gasoline taxes and airline ticket taxes are not adequate to the task of supporting 21st Century transportation needs.  We must explore new and innovative ways to provide more reliable transportation services while focusing on costs.  Consequently, the 2007 budget introduces alternative financing ideas that may provide possible funding options for our resource needs in the future.

SURFACE TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS

            Last summer, the "Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:  A Legacy for Users" (SAFETEA-LU) reauthorized our surface transportation programs through FY 2009, providing a record $286 billion investment and a continued focus on improvements in highway safety.  The President's 2007 budget plan for the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Transit Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reflects the funding envisioned in SAFETEA-LU.  The budget provides $815 million for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, along with $521 million for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, to improve safety on our Nation’s highways.  The budget also proposes a record $8.9 billion Federal investment in public transportation.  This funding for the Federal Transit Administration will help achieve common-sense transit solutions, especially for the elderly, persons with disabilities, and in rural areas where 40 percent of counties have no public transportation. 

            Even though SAFETEA-LU has just recently passed, we are already thinking about new ways to fund surface transportation programs in the future.  That is why the 2007 budget plan proposes a $100 million pilot program to evaluate innovative ways to finance and manage major portions of highway systems.  Grants under this pilot program will allow the Federal Government to partner with up to five States that want to test fees, tolls, and other approaches on a broad scale – either statewide or across an urban area and its suburbs.  We will see how the public accepts these approaches, how well they raise revenue, and whether they are indeed more effective in reducing traffic congestion.  The lessons learned from this pilot program, as well as the work done by the Congressionally created commissions on the future of the Highway Trust Fund, will help inform future decisions on financing surface transportation needs.  The timing is important.  By the end of the 2007 budget year, only two years will remain before SAFETEA-LU expires.

FEDERAL AVIATION PROGRAMS

            Approaching even more quickly is reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the taxes that finance the Aviation Trust Fund, which expire at the end of FY 2007.  Currently, our primary funding source for the FAA is tied to the price of an airline ticket.  But there is general consensus that our growing aviation system needs a more stable and predictable revenue stream – one that creates a more direct relationship between revenues collected and services provided.  Soon, the Bush Administration will propose a reauthorization plan that will include a solid, forward-looking financing proposal for the Aviation Trust Fund.

            The President's 2007 budget plan provides $13.7 billion to fund aviation.  Of this request, $8.4 billion will address the FAA’s operational needs and support hiring needed safety inspectors and air traffic controllers.  The President's budget also includes nearly $2.8 billion for Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, which were instrumental in helping restore service last year to several Gulf Coast airports shut down by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  The 2007 AIP request is sufficient to address construction needs for all currently planned runways.

            The demand for air transportation continues to rise, placing more burdens on our current systems.  To address future needs, the FAA is partnering with other Federal agencies in planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS).  This multi-agency effort is exploring new ways to manage air transportation through the use of modern technology.  As a first step, the 2007 budget provides funding for this effort, including $80 million to support FAA's deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).  ADS-B will replace current radar systems and provide more accurate surveillance coverage.  In addition, the budget provides $24 million for System Wide Information Management, which will make a network-enabled air traffic system possible, improving safety, efficiency, and security.  These are the building blocks of the Next Generation initiative, which will transform the way that America flies.

INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL

            The budget also promotes continued transformation of intercity passenger rail in America.  In last year’s budget, the Administration demanded reform.  America needs a sustainable framework for convenient, high-quality passenger rail service, and over the past year both Amtrak and the Congress have responded.  Amtrak developed a strategic reform plan that seeks to restructure the company and introduce route competition.  Through the FY 2006 appropriation, Congress included measures to address Amtrak’s money-losing sleeper car and food and beverage services, among other efficiency measures.  Together, these reforms will help Amtrak realize meaningful savings this year, and therefore reduce its need for federal subsidies.

            In recognition of this progress – and with the expectation that we will see much more by the end of FY 2006 – the President’s FY 2007 budget requests $900 million to help Amtrak make the transition to a new and better model of intercity passenger rail.  Of this amount, $500 million will provide for capital needs and maintenance of existing infrastructure, including the Northeast Corridor.  The remaining $400 million will fund new "Efficiency Incentive Grants" tied directly to continued progress toward reform.  In addition, our plan assumes continuation of the legislative initiative begun in 2006 that would assess fees for capital investment and maintenance costs by transit agencies for their use of the Northeast Corridor.  We recognize that this budget will require Amtrak to accelerate its efforts to address its costs, but we believe the recommendations recently made by the Government Accountability Office and the Department of Transportation Inspector General, as well as the company's own strategic plan, provide a roadmap for success.  While much work remains to address Amtrak’s serious and well-documented problems, we believe the FY 2007 budget will encourage progress and promote efforts to move to a more sustainable system.

MARITIME PROGRAMS

            The President's plan includes $154 million to fully fund the Maritime Administration's Maritime Security Program.  This fleet of 60 active, militarily useful vessels manned by U.S. mariners is critical to the support of our troops abroad.  The President's budget also includes $62 million for the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, of which $15 million is for capital investment improvements at the Academy.

RESEARCH, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY

            Approximately 15 months ago, Congress enacted the Department of Transportation’s reorganization proposal to create the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA).

            PHMSA is responsible for the safety of almost one-third of all products shipped each year and two-thirds of all energy products consumed.  This includes the packaging, shipment, and handling of all hazardous materials by highway, rail, water, and air, as well as the movement of energy products by pipeline.  The 2007 budget provides $149 million for PHMSA’s operations, including $75.7 million for pipeline safety, $27.2 million for hazardous materials safety, and $28.2 million for emergency preparedness grants.

            RITA has brought new energy and a focus on the Department’s research efforts, and is working to expedite the implementation of cross-cutting, innovative transportation technologies.  The President’s 2007 budget request includes $8.2 million in direct funding, plus an additional $27 million from the Highway Trust Fund for the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, to continue these efforts.  In addition, RITA will undertake over $300 million in transportation-related research, education, and technology application on a reimbursable basis.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONHEADQUARTERSBUILDING

            Finally, I want to highlight the FY 2007 President’s budget request of $59.4 million for the new Department of Transportation headquarters building project.  The goal is to complete the consolidation of the Department’s headquarters’ operating functions, excluding the FAA, into a facility at the Southeast Federal Center in FY 2007.  The requested funds will cover DOT’s tenant-related costs, including security and telecommunications equipment and the infrastructure to support it.  The end result will be a facility that provides modern office technology, enhanced communications, a quality work environment, and updated security systems for more than 5,000 Federal workers.

            The President’s budget request reflects a fiscally responsible plan for the Department of Transportation to help America meet its 21^st Century transportation needs.  To ensure that the Department is exercising sound stewardship over the financial resources entrusted to us, we continue to focus on program performance to maximize efficiency and create a results-oriented Government.  Together with the Congress, and with our public- and private-sector partners, we are revolutionizing transportation to keep America moving.

            Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today.  I look forward to working closely with all of you, and with the entire Congress, as you consider the FY 2007 President’s budget request.  I will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. 

* * * * *

Statement of

John E. Jamian
Acting Maritime Administrator
U.S. Department of Transportation
Maritime Administration

Hearing on

Transforming the Navy

Before the

Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives

April 6, 2006

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement regarding the Maritime Administration.  The mission of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Maritime Administration (MARAD) is to strengthen the U.S. maritime transportation system - including infrastructure, industry and labor - to meet the economic and national security needs of the nation.  MARAD programs promote the development and maintenance of an adequate, well-balanced United States merchant marine, sufficient to carry all of the nation’s domestic waterborne commerce and a substantial portion of its foreign waterborne commerce.  MARAD vessels serve as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency.  MARAD also seeks to ensure that the United States maintains adequate shipbuilding and repair services as well as efficient ports and intermodal connections between our water and land transportation systems.

I cannot stress enough the importance of our mission.  The United States, as the world’s largest trading nation, accounts for nearly 20% of the world’s oceanborne trade.  Foreign trade and domestic cargo are conservatively estimated to grow at an annual compounded rate of 3.3%.  This growth in cargo tonnage will double the throughput that the Marine Transportation System (MTS) will be required to handle by 2020.   This is no small amount since the MTS handled nearly 2.3 billion tons of waterborne cargo in 1999, including 1.2 billion tons of international cargo and 1.1 billion tons of domestic cargo.

Thus in today’s world, ensuring the security of American ports is even more important.  This includes maintaining and upgrading our port and intermodal transportation infrastructure to meet the needs of a competitive global industry, by continuing development and implementation of the MTS Initiative, which consists of waterways, ports, and their intermodal connections.  MARAD coordinates its efforts with other Federal entities that have responsibilities for maritime transportation including the Committee on the Marine Transportation System, which is a White House cabinet-level committee.  We are also working very closely with industry to identify system requirements through the MTS National Advisory Committee, which advises the Secretary of Transportation. 

MARAD both serves and defends America.  In this regard, MARAD maintains a fleet of cargo ships ready to serve in case of conflict or national emergency, known as the Ready Reserve Force (RRF).  When activated, these ships operate under an agreement with Department of Defense (DoD).  The Military Sealift Command (MSC) assumes operational control (OPCON) of the vessels on behalf of USTRANSCOM.  OPCON means that MSC controls the ship’s schedule and cargo, MARAD retains management of the vessel through a ship manager contract.  Forty RRF ships supported the initial deployment of our Armed Forces in Iraq, providing nearly 13,000 operational days of service including transporting troops and supplies in support of our military.

Specifically, the RRF is a fleet of documented cargo vessels owned by the U.S. Government and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation.  By statute, DOT/MARAD is required to contract with commercial ship managers to maintain, operate and crew RRF vessels.  Pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the DoD, the RRF is maintained by DOT in a readiness status to support DoD contingencies.  Ship repairs are acquired by MARAD’s ship managers under approved commercial purchasing systems.  Best value and competition are significant considerations.

In the early 1980s, the U.S. Navy started “Afloat Prepositioning” to improve the response time for the delivery of urgently needed equipment and supplies to a theater of operation.  Since the mid-1990s, MARAD has had as many as 11 vessels supporting the Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF) in locations such as the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, Diego Garcia, Saipan and Guam.

Some Members of the Committee have expressed interest in the operating procedures of the SS CHESAPEAKE, SS PETERSBURG, and SS CAPE JACOB.  I would like to briefly discuss those procedures.  These three MARAD vessels are part of the APF, are owned and operated by MARAD, and are provided to the DoD under the MOU.

The tankers, CHESAPEAKE and PETERSBURG, are each equipped with Offshore Petroleum Discharge Systems (OPDS) and have unique capabilities not found on commercial tankers.  The OPDS was designed to deliver petroleum products to military forces in areas where port facilities are damaged or nonexistent.  Within 48 hours of arrival on station, OPDS can be installed and begin pumping 1.2 million gallons of petroleum product per day from up to four miles offshore and at water depths up to 200 feet.  The tankers can remain on station pumping continuously for up to 180 days and be replenished by normal commercial tankers.

The CHESAPEAKE and PETERSBURG have provided pre-positioned fuel for the Defense Logistic Agency and, within 24 hours of notification, can be en route to a crisis area with the ability to deploy OPDS upon arrival.  Since being in APF service, these vessels provided support for Operation Iraqi Freedom for approximately 60 days.  Additionally, they are utilized by U.S. and allied forces for military exercises and military training.     

The CAPE JACOB has been with the APF since arriving in Diego Garcia in 1998.  It is the last of four C4-S-1u Class vessels maintained by MARAD.  The primary mission of the CAPE JACOB is as a floating ammunition dump, forward deployed in support of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).  Its secondary mission is to transfer the ammunition at sea using the Modular Cargo Delivery System (MCDS).  

The MCDS is a mechanized cargo transfer unit that acts as a combination elevator and winch, hoisting pallets of ordnance into the air and then across wire lines strung between two ships steaming side-by-side.  Two MCDS units are installed on the CAPE JACOB.  The ship can also conduct vertical replenishment with helicopters picking up pallets from the "helo" deck and transferring them onto another ship.  In 2003, after supporting the Navy during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom for 202 days, the CAPE JACOB was deployed to support USPACOM.

It is MARAD’s mission to promote all aspects of the American maritime industry.  Consequently, 95 percent of the repairs to the RRF fleet have been performed in U.S. shipyards.  Federal law requires that naval vessels and vessels under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Navy homeported in the United States be repaired in the United States or Guam.  As a U.S. District Court ruled in December 2005, RRF vessels do not fall within the scope of that statute.  Recognizing the importance of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, MARAD’s contracts regarding RRF vessels still require that repairs be made in U.S. shipyards except for emergency, or mission essential repairs, or for pre-positioned ships which are deployed overseas, or for any vessel forward deployed outside of the United States.

For example in 2005, repairs to the PETERSBURG were made in Singapore in order to ensure its continued readiness.  The PETERSBURG, a very large, OPDS tanker pre-positioned in Guam, was dry-docked in Singapore in August 2005.  Shipyards in both Hawaii and Guam were unable to perform the repairs during the required performance period.  Specifically, Guam Shipyard’s dry-dock was unavailable until November 2005 and could not complete work until February 2006, which would have resulted in the PETERSBURG being unavailable for its specialized mission for over five months.  In addition to being unavailable during the required performance period, Guam Shipyard’s bid was three times more than the successful offeror.

In closing, I would like to call to the Committee’s attention the DOT and MARAD’s activation of RRF ships and training ships as part of our nation's response to the devastation hurled at the entire Gulf Coast Region by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  This unprecedented activation by Secretary Mineta in concurrence with Secretary Rumsfeld demonstrated that when called, MARAD and our ships were ready.

MARAD's ships provided the people of the stricken Gulf Coast with urgently needed supplies, clean water, electricity generation and oil-spill cleanup assistance, as well as food and shelter for rescue and recovery workers.  In all, 11 MARAD ships provided 270,000 meals and 83,165 berth nights for recovery workers and evacuees. The last of the ships left the Gulf Coast area the first week of March, 2006; some of those ships are already in service supporting our armed forces.  Others have returned to their regular duties as training ships at State maritime academies, while some returned to their homeports to be held in reserve until they are needed again.

Unquestionably, MARAD's RRF has lived up to the term “ready” -- and just as importantly the Ready Reserve Force has proven to be a cost-effective program for the United States.

Thank you for offering me the opportunity to provide this statement for the record.  I am happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

Statement Of

Stacey L. Gerard
Acting Assistant Administrator/Chief Safety Officer
Pipeline And Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
U.S. Department Of Transportation

Before The

Subcommittee On Energy and Air Quality
Committee On Energy and Commerce
United States House Of Representatives

April 27, 2006

Good morning, Mr. Chairman.  Thank you for inviting the Department to testify today before your Subcommittee to provide you and the other members an update on the successes of the Department’s pipeline safety program.  Our Acting Administrator Brigham McCown regrets he cannot be here today as he is on previously scheduled annual military duty as a reserve officer in the U.S. Navy.  I am Stacey Gerard. I currently serve in dual roles as the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) Acting Assistant Administrator/Chief Safety Officer as well as the agency’s Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.

This opportunity to discuss our progress in improving the safety and reliability of the Nation’s pipeline infrastructure is welcome.  The 2.3 million miles of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines carry nearly two-thirds of the energy consumed by our Nation and as such, it is easy to see why our pipelines are in fact, our energy highways.  It is also important for me to stress that as a mode of transportation, our pipelines remain the safest and most efficient way to transport the enormous quantities of natural gas and hazardous liquids America uses each day. 

We greatly appreciate this Subcommittee’s attention to our efforts in advancing pipeline safety.  We are achieving results – pipeline accidents with severe consequences to people are trending steadily downward.  There has been an increase in the total of all reported accidents in the recent past.  Although we are watching these numbers closely, I can report that we believe this data reflects normal variations in year-to-year reporting, and also reflects damage caused by last year’s hurricanes.  Higher fuel prices also mean that smaller spills now qualify for reporting under the property damage criteria.

Under Secretary Mineta’s leadership, PHMSA has succeeded in achieving every mandate set forth in the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act (PSIA) of 2002, and the agency has done so in a timely manner.  This testimony today will provide an update on the progress report given 18 months ago.

Demographic changes taking place in our country require us to be increasingly vigilant.  Urbanization of previously rural areas is placing people closer to pipelines.  Expansion and development also means more construction activity near pipelines.  It should come as no surprise therefore that third party excavation damage is a leading cause of pipeline accidents.

Encroachment on areas containing pipelines increases the potential for pipeline accidents, which although infrequent, can have tragic consequences.  We have stepped up our efforts to address third party damage because of greater congestion in our underground infrastructure and the potential to save lives.  Managing the risk to pipelines is more difficult because the underground is increasingly crowded with the installation of new fiber optics and telecommunications infrastructure central to our way of life. 

Our record as a regulator and overseer of public safety is important to us.  Safety is, and remains the Administration’s top priority when it comes to regulating the pipeline industry.  In addition to addressing the many mandates of the PSIA, PHMSA has eliminated most of a 12-year backlog of outstanding mandates and recommendations from the Congress, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  Over the past five years, the agency has responded positively to 46 NTSB safety recommendations and is working to close the three recommendations remaining from the pre-2002 environment.  The GAO recently closed eight pipeline safety recommendations─ six in enforcement, and two in research and development. 

Just last month, we published the final rule to define and regulate natural gas gathering lines. 

Through rulemaking we are actively addressing our last outstanding mandate, protecting unusually sensitive areas from risks posed by rural liquid gathering lines and low stress transmission pipelines.  This rule is relevant to the low stress transmission pipeline that failed recently on the North Slope of Alaska.  We issued a corrective action order soon after to ensure safety and environmental protection of that and two similar lines nearby.  We are making good progress with the remediation of the failed line, are working closely with Alaska State agencies, and will be holding a public workshop in June to address these and other important issues.

We will hold a public workshop in June to review our concepts for the rural gathering line rulemaking.  The June workshop will focus on leak detection, operator qualification, maintenance, defining applicability criteria, buffer zones from important environmental areas, and implementation timeframes.

Stronger oversight has been an important strategy in strengthening pipeline safety.  In the past 12 years, the agency has added 60 additional inspectors to PHMSA’s pipeline safety staff, up from 28 inspectors in 1994.  PHMSA’s state agency partners employ over 400 additional inspectors who oversee 90 percent of the infrastructure and contribute 50 percent of the total costs.  This Federal-State partnership is crucial to the agency’s success. 

PHMSA is fulfilling its plan to improve the safety, reliability, and environmental performance of the Nation’s energy transportation pipeline network.  Our plan includes a multi-phase strategy which leaves no stone unturned in identifying and addressing pipeline risks.  To manage the risks inherent in pipeline transportation, PHMSA has been building a new, more comprehensive and informed approach to pipeline safety consistent with the PSIA.

This plan, discussed 18 months ago, is based on improving pipeline performance by: (1) managing risk; (2) sharing responsibility; and (3) providing effective stewardship. 

I.  We Are Implementing A Plan To Manage Risk

We have raised the bar on safety.  By collecting and using better information about pipelines, today we know more about pipelines, the world they traverse, and the consequences of a pipeline failure. 

By strengthening our ability to better collect and analyze data, we can better characterize safety issues and highlight pipeline operators with performance concerns.  We have also strengthened our regulations and oversight to respond to problems.

1.  Higher Standards

We have raised the standards for pipeline safety across the board through requirements for integrity management, operator qualification, public education and 19 other regulations, and incorporated 68 new national consensus safety standards.

2.  Better States’ Partnership

We have strengthened our partnerships with State pipeline safety agencies through increased policy collaboration, better training, shared databases, and a distributed information network to facilitate communication.  In partnership with our State inspectors, we are working hard to deliver better oversight in accordance with higher standards.

3.  Stronger Enforcement

We have taken advantage of higher penalty authority and have institutionalized a tough-but-fair approach to enforcement.  We are imposing and collecting larger penalties, while guiding pipeline operators to enhance higher performance.  We also coordinated much more effectively with other Federal agencies, including the Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency.  We have identified several performance measures to track the impact of our enforcement efforts, such as the severity of inspection findings.  Compared to 2003, the first year when higher penalty authority was available, we doubled the civil penalties proposed in 2004 and tripled them in 2005.  For calendar year 2005, the proposed penalties amounted to over $4,000,000.  For the period from calendar year 2003 to 2005, PHMSA has closed 56 percent of the penalty cases and collected 94 percent of penalties we proposed. 

4. Better Technology

To improve the technology available to assess and repair pipelines, we have invested over $22 million in technology research and development since 2002 and leveraged an additional $26 million in investments from the private sector.  These investments have jump-started more than 80 projects across the country and have already generated eight new patent applications.

5.   Greater Resources

DOT has requested, and the Congress has appropriated, 24.5 percent more resources since 2002 to help implement the plan to improve pipeline safety.

II. Sharing Responsibility ─ Preparing Partners

Advancing pipeline safety in the face of growing construction in our communities is a big task and we need help to succeed. 

We have identified clear roles for others at the Federal, State, and local levels of government and citizens to help us and they are responding.  These roles range from environmental and emergency planning to better zoning and management of land use near pipelines, to helping prevent damage and permitting repairs to pipelines, to citizens taking safety actions to protect themselves.

Our pipeline safety communications program provides crucial knowledge about the pipeline system to our various stakeholders, including our citizens, which enables them to share responsibility for continuously improving safety.  PHMSA has invested over $5 million since the passage of the PSIA to bring meaningful information to the public regarding pipeline operator performance.  We recognize that by “going local,” we are better able to affect pipeline safety where it matters most─ in the neighborhoods where our Nation’s citizens work, play and live.

III.   Effective Stewardship 

Our role has evolved in response to a dynamic environment.  The energy pipeline infrastructure in the United States represents a $31 billion investment.  These energy highways also transport the essential fuels needed to produce a myriad of goods and services in our economy and make millions of jobs possible.

The agency’s relationship with the industry it regulates has proved vital in the timely understanding of operational problems caused by natural disasters and our ability to rapidly respond.  During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, PHMSA moved quickly to assess interruptions in energy product transportation and facilitated rapid restoration of supply.  By working with our sister agencies and pipeline operators, DOT was responsible for returning our pipeline infrastructure to full operating capability within days of each storm’s passing. 

From our vantage point as safety regulators over the entire industry, we have a unique knowledge of this infrastructure.  By what we know, we can inform other agencies to help with energy capacity planning as well as economic and security considerations. 

IV.  Responding to the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002

The Congress recognized the critical importance of pipelines to our Nation’s vitality when it passed the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002.  Under Secretary Mineta’s leadership, PHMSA has aggressively responded to these new mandates. 

1.  Integrity Management

Since last appearing before this Committee in June 2004, PHMSA is now enforcing regulation of integrity management programs for both hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission operators.  PHMSA and its State partners have completed comprehensive inspections of large hazardous liquid operators who are assessing and repairing nearly 80 percent of the Nation’s hazardous liquid pipelines, resulting in the elimination of over 20,000 time sensitive pipeline defects.  Our hazardous liquid integrity inspections address, among other safety issues, the adequacy of placement of emergency flow restricting devices and the adequacy of the leak detection systems.  We worked with 46 percent of operators inspected to improve their preventive and mitigation measures. 

PHMSA has now completed 13 percent of gas transmission integrity management inspections, providing supplemental protections for approximately two-thirds of American communities living along natural gas pipelines.  We expect eventually that nearly 60 percent of the natural gas transmission pipeline mileage will be similarly assessed and repaired. 

In June 2005, the Administration submitted our plan to Congress to strengthen the safety of gas distribution pipeline systems through use of integrity management principles.  We work closely with the State Utility Commissions who have jurisdiction over distribution systems and the ultimate authority to decide what additional protections to require and what costs to pass on to consumers.  We are following the guidance provided in the February 16, 2005 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners’ “Resolution on Distribution Integrity Management” in implementing this safety plan which urges a performance based approach that leaves states flexibility. PHMSA began work with the Gas Piping Technology Committee to develop consensus guidance to accompany the agency rulemaking that is underway.

2. Operator Qualification

Our regulations require operators of gas and hazardous liquid pipelines to conduct programs to qualify individuals who perform certain safety-related tasks on pipelines.  In early 2003, we developed a standard to evaluate the adequacy of operators’ programs, as required by the PSIA.  We also issued a Direct Final Rule that codifies the new mandated requirements concerning personnel training, notice of program changes, government review and verification of programs, and use of on-the-job performance as a qualification method.

We completed all reviews of interstate operators’ qualification programs and met the 2005 statutory deadline.  States have made similar progress.  Our report to the Congress is due December 2006.  We held two public meetings to seek more comprehensive information from states, the public and the pipeline industry to produce an informative final product. 

We are considering some additional improvements in our regulations.  We plan to incorporate in our enforcement approach improved consensus standards for the qualification of pipeline operators for safety critical functions.

As required by the PSIA, we conducted a controller certification pilot program to evaluate how best to further assure pipeline controllers have and maintain adequate qualification for their required job tasks.  We reviewed information on training and qualification programs from a variety of resources, including programs of other industries, the NTSB, operators, trade associations, public interest groups, system vendors, and simulator specialists.  We have completed our assessment and will hold a public workshop in June to share our findings. This workshop will focus on alarms, shift change procedures, roles controllers play, fatigue, recognition of abnormal events, and validation of adequacy of control processes.

3.  Public Education and Mapping

Working with others, we are raising the quality of public education operators provide, as well as what we provide.  First we oversaw operators’ self assessments required in the PSIA and determined considerable improvement was needed.  We called for a new consensus standard for public education and stakeholders responded by creating one that significantly raised the bar.  The NTSB acted to close all its recommendations on public education.  We conducted four nationwide, webcast public meetings on this standard to build effective public awareness programs.  Currently, we are developing a clearinghouse to review and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of more than 2,200 public safety and education programs established locally by the pipeline industry. 

We have enlisted State fire marshals to help bring information and guidance to communities across America and build an understanding of pipeline safety and first responder needs.  In less than 15 months, we made great strides in advancing our fire service training curriculum.  We have provided training to approximately 5,000 trainers in 31 States and distributed over 13,000 textbooks, 5,000 instructor guides and 6,000 training videos.  The first-of-its-kind pipeline accident response training and public education program for first responders will help pipeline operators to identify high consequence areas in communities and provide an understanding of liquefied natural gas operations.

We are improving our efforts to reach the public by preparing local officials to be public education resources within communities and providing additional resources for citizens to learn how they can protect themselves and pipelines.  Our community assistance and technical services staff provide information to citizens and advise local officials to guide their decisions about local land use.  We also utilize the efficiency of the World Wide Web to give citizens and other stakeholders instant access to community specific pipeline information with our newly established stakeholder communications website.  

We completed the base structure of the National Pipeline Mapping System in 2003, and keep it up to date with improvements.  We recently made the system available for public web searches on contact information of pipeline companies and made other web improvements to help the public access general information on pipelines and operator performance.  We provide more sensitive mapping information to Federal, State and local governments through a password-protected application.  This information is restricted by jurisdiction and cannot be released outside of the requesting agency.

Working with the pipeline industry and State agencies, we annually hold about 15 public meetings per year to acquaint citizens and public officials with essential safety information to make informed decisions about living safely with and minimizing damage to pipelines. 

4.  Damage Prevention

Helping communities know how they can live safely with pipelines by preventing damage to pipelines is a very important goal.  We cannot succeed without enlisting the help of State and local officials and the full range of public safety stakeholders who share an interest in protecting all underground infrastructure. 

We work with the Common Ground Alliance (CGA) on all damage prevention efforts, leading many stakeholders to share responsibility for damage prevention.  We are now planning to implement the most important new tool in our assault on third-party damage to pipelines, three-digit dialing, required in the PSIA.  The Federal Communications Commission responded favorably to our request for a single three-digit number usable for “one call” anywhere in the U.S.  Three-digit dialing of “811” provides a single uniform action that all Americans can take to improve safety.  Since 2002, our partnership with the CGA has helped us address nine NTSB recommendations in preventing damage to pipelines. 

We also worked with CGA to create 44 new regional CGAs to help communities implement damage prevention best practices across all underground facilities.  These alliances provide synergy in the “underground” among other utilities, railroads, insurance companies, public works and other municipal organizations, to implement best safety actions.  The CGA highlights best practices of leading States such as Minnesota, Virginia, Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts in identifying and enforcing the elements of an effective damage prevention program for other States to follow.  These States’ enforcement against all who violate their laws led to a 50 percent decrease in damages in just a few years.  Strengthening enforcement is one of many important best practices we promote through the CGA and with our state partners and we believe all states can achieve similar results.

5.  Research and Development

Over the past three years, PHMSA has built a research and development (R&D) program that has funded 80 projects at a cumulative expense of nearly $50 million to address better diagnostic tools, testing of unpiggable pipes, stronger materials, improved pipeline locating and mapping, prevention of outside force damage, and leak detection.     

We are focused on near-term technology development needs.  We support technology demonstrations such as remote sensing of gas leaks and internal inspection of unpiggable pipes.

We are maximizing the return on our R&D investment by coordinating activities within and with other Federal agencies such as the Department of Commerce, National Institutes of Standards and Technology and the Department of Interior.  

6. Interagency Efforts to Implement Section 16 of the PSIA

Since our last testimony, we have designed and are testing a web-based environmental permit review process to: (a) provide early electronic notification of proposed pipeline repairs to Federal agencies, and solicit State and local agencies involved in the review process for pipeline repairs and (b) expedite coordination and approval of recommended best practices for operators to use to manage environmental damage when repairing their pipelines in environmentally important areas.  This process meets the requirements of the PSIA by ensuring all environmental laws are addressed in the most efficient manner.  A remaining issue is timely, consistent participation by all permitting agencies.

IV. We are Achieving Results 

When we compare the years 2001-2005 to the previous five-year period of 1996-2000, the rate of hazardous liquid pipeline accidents has declined by 18 percent.  In addition, by 2005 the volume of significant oil spills decreased by 34 percent from the previous 10 year average, and the 10-year average volume of net spills for the same period decreased 36 percent.

Pipeline excavation related accidents decreased over the past ten years by 59 percent.  This outcome is largely due to the result of working with our State partners and the more than 900 volunteer members of the Common Ground Alliance who strive to foster damage prevention activities. 

In the face of ten years of increased new construction, other accident types remain relatively stable.  Accidents of most severe consequence, involving deaths and injuries are trending steadily downward.

In closing, I want to reassure the members of this Subcommittee, that the Administration, Secretary Mineta, and the hardworking men and women of PHMSA share your strong commitment to improving safety, reliability, and public confidence in our Nation’s pipeline infrastructure.

 I would be pleased to answer your questions.

##

Statement of

Bernard Cohen,
Director
Lower Manhattan Recovery Office
Federal Transit Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation

Before the

Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight
Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives

July 13, 2006

on

Lower Manhattan Transit Recovery

            Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.  I am pleased to join this panel, and to have an opportunity to testify on the progress we are making in the Lower Manhattan transportation recovery effort.  My name is Bernard Cohen, Director of the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Lower Manhattan Recovery Office (LMRO).

              The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, crippled Lower Manhattan's transportation infrastructure.  The worst of this devastation was not visible above ground. Lower Manhattan lost the PATH line from New Jersey to the World Trade Center – operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) that had carried an average of 67,000 passengers daily.  Debris from the Twin Towers crushed the PATH World Trade Center station—the gateway to New York City for so many.  Two New York City subway lines were heavily damaged, along with a major arterial highway.  Remarkably, despite the scale of this destruction, not a single life was lost on transit due to the terrorist attacks on that day.

              Shortly after 9/11, President Bush declared New York a national disaster area.  Congress appropriated $20 billion for many aspects of Lower Manhattan's recovery, out of which they budgeted $4.55 billion for transportation needs.  An additional $200 million for ferry facilities and rail infrastructure was appropriated by Congress and made part of the overall transportation recovery effort.

              That recovery effort still benefits today from sound decisions that public agencies made immediately after the President's declaration.  The most elemental of these decisions was a proactive commitment to coordination.  Nine months after the attacks, FTA established a beachhead in Lower Manhattan—a dedicated office that strengthened lines of communication and collaboration in Lower Manhattan.  FTA worked to establish "one-stop shopping" for Federal transportation funds, to ease administrative burdens on project sponsors.  Through a Memorandum of Agreement with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FTA became the lead agency to move transportation money and projects forward.

              When we became the lead agency in this effort, we formulated a straightforward but challenging mission:  to streamline transit recovery while maintaining responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars, and exceptional oversight.  Unlike other FTA-funded projects, the Lower Manhattan projects are almost entirely Federally funded, so we felt the stewardship obligation just as keenly as the imperative that we revive Lower Manhattan's transit lifelines as quickly as possible.

              We also recognized that we would have to operate simultaneously in two "time zones"—the immediate and the long term—to meet the transit needs of Lower Manhattan.

              The LMRO has now obligated most of the money entrusted to Lower Manhattan transportation.  A total of $4 billion of the $4.55 billion budget has been committed to projects.  This figure includes a reserve for each project as a prudent measure of stewardship to ensure that we have the resources in place to complete our program.   

              I am very pleased to report that all of the three major, fully-funded transit projects for which initial grants were made are under construction today.  These projects promise not only to improve service, but also to enhance dramatically the passenger convenience and visibility of transit in Lower Manhattan.  Indeed, the United States, determined to come back from the 9/11 attacks stronger than ever, resolved not just to reconstruct Lower Manhattan’s infrastructure as it existed before, but to improve upon it. The recovery presented Lower Manhattan with an opportunity to modernize and rationalize its infamous "spaghetti bowl" tangle of transit lines.  The Federal Government and Lower Manhattan have seized that opportunity. We are creating a vastly more visible, navigable, seamless, and customer-friendly system for Lower Manhattan. 

              Construction began in March of this year on the permanent World Trade Center PATH terminal.  Since 2003, FTA has awarded the Port Authority up to $2.2 billion for the PATH terminal, and project sponsors completed their environmental review in June 2005.  In addition to restoring commuter service, the project includes pedestrian connections to the Fulton Street Transit Center and the World Financial Center.  The Port Authority has engaged the renowned architect Santiago Calatrava to design the PATH terminal, which many have come to regard as the Grand Central Station of Lower Manhattan, a transit focal point.  The majestic glass and steel terminal is scheduled for completion in June 2011.

FTA has also provided a $478 million grant to develop a state of the art World Trade Center Site Security Center that will screen all vehicles for security threats and provide parking for tour buses.  This facility will ensure that vehicles servicing the buildings or parking in the Center will not be used as weapons.

              In July 2005, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) began construction of the Fulton Street Transit Center, used by 275,000 people a day.  The construction agreement between FTA and MTA provides for up to $847 million in Federal funds.  This grant will fully fund a multi-level complex of stations that will serve 12 different subway lines.  The existing maze of narrow ramps, stairs, and platforms will be transformed into a more spacious and rational configuration.  A prominent transit center will replace street entrances previously hidden inside buildings.  MTA was awarded this grant in December 2003.  The environmental review for Fulton was completed in November 2004, and completion of construction is scheduled for June 2009.

              Also in December 2003, FTA awarded MTA a grant up to $420 million for the South Ferry Terminal Station, the last station at the southern end of the IRT #1 subway line.  This project will eliminate the tight-curve platforms that prevent operators from opening the doors on the rear five cars of their trains.  It will increase the number of entrances from one to three, and make the station accessible to disabled passengers.  Construction on the terminal began in March 2005, and should be completed by April 2008.

              I should add that LMRO is also providing $287 million toward the cost of rebuilding Route 9A/West Street, the major north-south state arterial highway that runs down the West Side of Lower Manhattan.  FTA and the Federal Highway Administration have executed two Memoranda of Agreement in the last two years to provide for the transfer of funds and outline the oversight responsibilities of each agency.  This roadway project is already under construction and is scheduled to be completed by June 2009.

              Community leaders envision these transit projects as anchors of the overall recovery effort that is unfolding today, and will continue into the next decade.                    

              Over the last four years, many of our office's priorities have also been Lower Manhattan's priorities.  The economic renaissance in many respects begins with the vanguard of transit systems that can carry riders, visitors, and workers into and out of the area.  We have been the beneficiaries of a broad understanding that transportation is a first chapter in the Lower Manhattan success story.

              The LMRO has also made a priority of working collaboratively with other major players in transportation reconstruction, which was crucial in the project selection process.  FTA worked closely with a committee formed by Governor Pataki and including key city and state transportation agencies, as well as the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation.  This committee generated the initial list of transportation recovery projects from which our three projects were selected.  Because of this collaboration, we have been able to advance well-designed, well-received transit projects. In turn, the business community has responded with a burst of optimism to renovate and build in Lower Manhattan. 

              As construction progresses on the three major transit projects, Lower Manhattan has become an incubator for innovations and lessons learned that can benefit other transit systems and projects.

              Certainly, the Lower Manhattan context rewards innovation, and creative ways of doing business.  FTA adopted a novel, risk-based oversight approach to management.  We undertook formal risk assessments early in the development of each project, and tailored our oversight accordingly.  We focused on the preemption of risks rather than the mitigation of problems after the fact.  We established reserves for our projects based on our risk assessments in order to ensure that sufficient resources will be in place to complete the recovery projects.

              Throughout this entire process, the LMRO has endeavored to exercise a truly exceptional level of proactive oversight.  Specifically, this means that we have paid close attention to costs and schedules at every step.  We have given project sponsors approval to move through various phases of design and development.  We have entered into construction agreements when sponsors have been ready to begin work.  And, we have carefully scrutinized and reviewed procurement procedures and financial systems.

              We have applied the same extraordinary degree of oversight to transit security in Lower Manhattan.  FTA has been centrally involved in, and well aware of, key security design features for all of the projects, from the earliest phases of work.  Security features are being integrated into the very design of these projects.  FTA retained a consultant to review security documents that we required our project sponsors to prepare, including threat and vulnerability assessments, construction site security plans, security management plans, and design guidelines. 

              To meet environmental standards while advancing these important projects as quickly as possible, we worked closely with project sponsors to create an active environmental oversight approach.  We adapted a Cumulative Effects Analysis approach to assess the overall environmental impact of all of the transit projects in Lower Manhattan.  Our project sponsors, in turn, have made a landmark agreement to implement aggressive mitigations for those effects.  Collaborating with project sponsors, we established one single, consistent set of methodologies, data, sources, and assumptions for all of the projects.  These shared assumptions allowed for comparability across projects, and vastly shortened the time traditionally needed to prepare and review environmental documents.

              None of these was a "cookie cutter" approach.  In our environmental streamlining, risk assessment, and project oversight, we have drawn on our collective experience and our creativity to customize solutions that fit specific projects.

              The Lower Manhattan transit recovery is as much a story of building relationships as it is of building track, road, and rail.  From the start, we have focused on coordination and regular communication with state and local officials, public and private project sponsors, other Federal agencies, the business community, organizations representing the families of the victims of 9/11, and other major players in this complex undertaking. That legacy of coordination endures today in the Lower Manhattan Construction Command Center (LMCCC), which is funded largely through an FTA grant.  The LMCCC began as a voluntary collaboration among project sponsors dedicated to minimizing the negative impact of overlapping construction projects on an already-fragile community.  The LMCCC emerged from that undertaking as a formal organization that, today, coordinates construction logistics.  The LMCCC formalizes the kind of coordination that has characterized the transit recovery effort from its earliest days.

              FTA's dual focus on streamlining and stewardship has paid off.  Four years after we first established a beachhead in Lower Manhattan, we have committed the bulk of the Federal transit money to three major, popularly-acclaimed transit projects, for which construction is already well underway.  When complete, these projects will transform—even revolutionize—the transit landscape in Lower Manhattan.  They will make the transit system dramatically more iconic, secure, accessible, and customer-friendly than it was in pre-9/11 days. 

              On behalf of the entire LMRO and FTA, thank you for this opportunity to update you on our progress.  Now I'd be happy to answer any questions.

STATEMENT OF

MICHAEL A. CIRILLO,
VICE PRESIDENT FOR SYSTEM OPERATIONS SERVICES,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION OF THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

REFORMING THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT,

JULY 12, 2006.

Chairman Mica, Congressman Costello, Members of the Subcommittee:

I appear before you today to discuss the unique operational restrictions now in place at Dallas Love Field Airport (Love Field) and whether modifying those restrictions will result in a denigration of air space efficiency in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.

As background, the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 contained a legislative provision that has come to be known as the Wright Amendment.  In an effort to ensure the success of the newly opened Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), former Speaker of the House, Jim Wright, wished to included language in the bill limiting interstate service at Love Field.  As a result, the Wright Amendment prohibited non-stop service (and through-ticketing and through-service) between Dallas Love Field and cities other than those in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, subject to an exception for flights with smaller aircraft.  The Wright Amendment was subsequently modified to permit additional operations between Love Field and points in Alabama, Mississippi, Kansas, and Missouri.

The FAA has been asked if safety would be affected by permitting additional flights into and out of Love Field.  The agency has said consistently and repeatedly what I emphasize today: FAA will never compromise its safety standards to accommodate increased demand.  Our most critical mission is aviation safety, including keeping aircraft safely separated from one another.  Consequently, the only question that should be asked from an airspace perspective, is whether further modification to or elimination of the Wright Amendment would compromise efficient airspace use in the Dallas-Fort Worth area.  Based on a recent MITRE study requested by FAA, of airspace operations if the Wright Amendment is repealed, and based on FAA’s validation of MITRE’s findings, I can tell you FAA does not expect that the efficient use of airspace will be compromised.

Knowing that the debate on the Wright Amendment was ongoing, FAA contacted MITRE and asked them to assess the impact to efficiency of increased operations at both DFW and Love Field.  Results of the analysis indicate there is significant additional capacity in the Dallas–Fort Worth terminal space area.  While additional operations at these airports will make it more complicated to maintain separation between aircraft, many other regions of this country have airspace that is at least this complex.   In each case the potential conflicts are unique to the particular location.  Factors such as the number of airports in the region, the number of runways at each airport, how they are situated, and the number and type of operations conducted there are only some of the considerations that dictate how FAA controls traffic in a given region.  FAA has great flexibility in using a wide range of technologies and procedures to accommodate the air traffic needs of an area.  Some of you may remember that a couple of years ago, the number of operations at Washington Dulles International Airport (Dulles) significantly increased at a time when a new carrier initiated service at the same time airport construction had closed one runway.  FAA was able to implement traffic management initiatives to efficiently accommodate the increase in demand.

Similarly, airspace in the northeast corridor and southern Florida is quite congested, with several major airports in close proximity.  In addition, Chairman Mica recently held a field hearing in California to address his concerns that the operational challenges in that region were being met.  I cite these examples to demonstrate the nature of our business - that FAA is asked on a daily basis to control traffic and maximize airspace efficiency in a highly changeable environment characterized by congested routes, dynamic traffic and volatile weather.  Yet, by tailoring our resources to the unique demands of each situation, we have been able to do what we are asked, safely and effectively.

MITRE’s study assumed a range of operational increases.  Their conclusion, which FAA has validated, is that it would take hundreds of additional daily operations at both airports for there to be reportable volume-related delays.  It would take hundreds of more daily flights on top of that to result in what FAA would consider to be significant delays.  It should be noted that their study did not factor delays that would be attributable to weather.  While MITRE’s study was based on unconstrained operations at Love Field, actual operations under the agreement reached by the parties would in fact be somewhat constrained by a limit on the number of gates that could be used.  Given this limitation, and MITRE’s finding of no significant effect even in unconstrained conditions, we are confident that the operational increases that would result from the proposed modification to the Wright Amendment would not result in efficiency problems for the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area, or the National Airspace System (NAS). 

Even if operations in the area increase beyond what FAA anticipates, we have options to handle a significant increase in flights if necessary.  Last month, Russ Chew testified before you about some of the notable successes of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), one of which was Area Navigation (RNAV).  RNAV procedures provide flight path guidance that is incorporated into onboard aircraft avionics systems, requiring only minimal air traffic instructions.  This technology significantly reduces routine controller-pilot communications, allowing more time on frequency for pilots and controllers to handle other safety-critical flight activities.  Also, RNAV procedures use more precise routes for take-offs and landings, reducing fuel burn and time intervals between aircraft on the runways.  This creates increased air traffic efficiency, enhances safety, and may allow some increase in air traffic through put.  We currently have RNAV procedures in place for DFW, but not for Love Field.  So establishing RNAV for Love Field is one option available to us should air traffic demand increase substantially.  Should the need arise, we would also look at modifying flows and sector configurations on a larger scale.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that FAA’s commitment to safety means that we would never consider sacrificing accepted safety standards for the sake of efficiency or anything else.  If Congress decides to modify the existing unique restrictions at Love Field and impose other unique restrictions there, FAA will continue to safely separate aircraft regardless of the operational impact of the legislation.  But having looked at the anticipated impacts of  what we know is under consideration, we have no reason to believe system efficiency will be compromised.

This concludes my prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.