U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the Department of Transportation’s implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA).

I serve as the Department’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), and I also currently serve as the vice-chair of the Federal CIO Council.

The DOT Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) has operational responsibility for Departmental network and communications infrastructure, as well as providing shared services for the Office of the Secretary and the Operating Administrations (OAs) currently engaged in the Department’s Information Technology (IT) services consolidation.

FISMA compliance at DOT is moving from the intensity of the past year’s implementation activities to a more operational mode.  Our system inventory is mature, our certification and accreditation methodology is defined and we have begun oversight of the remediation of weaknesses identified over the course of the last two years.  Additionally, we have been in the process of making assessments of the Department’s on-going security posture.

Securing the IT assets of the Department of Transportation is a critical responsibility that falls to the CIO’s office.  In striving to secure those assets, many people from various areas must pull together.  The strides the Department has made over the past year occurred in large measure because of the support of Secretary Norman Y. Mineta.  His leadership and guidance combined with each and every modal administrator’s commitment are critical to the success of the Department’s efforts.

We are pleased to have achieved an A- rating on the FISMA Scorecard and note that DOT relied on teamwork across the agency; the establishment, refinement and validation of our system inventory, good communications, comprehensive training, and the support of the Inspector General throughout the year.  This last point is critical.  With our Inspector General who is engaged, involved and informed throughout the process, DOT makes sure that it approaches FISMA requirements appropriately and the end products and results are supportable. The teamwork for FISMA compliance was established through the acceptance of a single, department-wide methodology in lieu of individual approaches established by each operating administration.  That methodology allowed us to focus and work collectively on a single plan in which all participants had confidence.  This gave us the benefit of synergy, and an end greater than the sum of its parts.  If we endeavored to proceed using Agency unique approaches some agencies may have been successful, some may have faltered.  With the support of an industry recognized security subject matter expert from Titan Corporation, along with agency-wide buy-in and acceptance, DOT was able to reduce overall certification and accreditation schedules, manpower requirements, and costs.  More importantly, DOT was able to ensure accuracy, consistency and completeness of each accreditation package.

The strides made over the last year to comply with FISMA requirements were impressive.  DOT has accredited over 90% of all operational IT systems; established a program to ensure security is part of every system’s development life-cycle; significantly reduced vulnerabilities of public facing systems, and improved training and communications at all levels of the organization.

Moving forward DOT is using metrics to gauge FISMA implementation and compliance throughout the Department.  This point is important.  DOT recognizes that Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) are established from the certification and accreditation process required by FISMA and are reviewed by the Inspector General.  DOT uses these POA&Ms as a mechanism to ensure we mitigate the risks and remediate vulnerabilities identified during the C&A process, knowing full well that taking the action prescribed in the POA&M specifically will improve DOT’s overall security posture.

To address the steps DOT is taking to further strengthen IT Security:  

• DOT is coordinating and cooperating with the Department of Homeland Security on cyber exercises, reporting requirements, and critical new initiatives.  One of these initiatives is the IT Security Line of Business.  DOT is actively involved with the planning, design, and implementation of this effort.
• DOT is addressing the critical need of enterprise-wide vulnerability management.  We are implementing a Department-wide vulnerability remediation program, in part to support an established quarterly compliance review process.  The compliance reviews are used to ensure operating administrations are complying with FISMA and other important laws, such as the Privacy Act of 1974. 
• DOT is implementing baseline security configuration standards for critical software.
• DOT is consolidating its IT services.  This initiative is an important mechanism to secure DOT IT assets and infrastructure.  Each operating administration having separately maintained networks across the Department requires multiple applications of patches.  If one of those networks is vulnerable, then DOT as a whole is vulnerable.  Through consolidation of networks DOT not only significantly improves network security but we gain the added advantage of avoiding redundant costs.  Another significant benefit of the consolidation effort is a more complete view of the entire enterprise by the network operations center and the Department’s Cyber Incident Response function. Taking this thought one step further, DOT is in a better position to report to, work with, and respond to the Department of Homeland Security, especially when most needed.

More needs to be done.  The FAA’s National Airspace System is part of the National Critical Infrastructure Program.  I am working directly with FAA senior leadership and the Inspector General to ensure FAA secures and protects the important NAS systems and telecommunication infrastructure.  Ensuring the FAA constructs measurable plans of actions in conjunction with its POA&M’s, audit reports, and IG findings, with follow-through to complete its commitments, is fundamental to DOT’s ability to maintain its current FISMA scorecard rating.

Finally, the Committee asks what additional guidance, procedures or resources are needed by the agencies to improve their information security and fully comply with FISMA? 

DOT offers the following observations and suggestions:

• DOT supports the creation of an "as of date" for the annual FISMA Report to OMB.  This date would be similar to the fiscal year-end date used in preparing financial reports. The benefits of adopting an “as of date” by federal agencies and IGs, is it would create a "common point" in time for measuring the status of an agency's IT security program, e.g., systems inventory and self-assessments.  This "as of date" would eliminate timing differences between an agency's report and the IG report which may be infused by time issues.
• DOT believes existing FISMA guidance published by OMB and National Institute for Standards and Technology is adequate, but at the same time As the Vice Chair of the CIO Council, I am working towards having an annual government-wide FISMA kick-off meeting between Federal CIO Council and the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency to ensure everyone consistently interprets and applies the guidance and the auditing standards.

In conclusion, it is my observation and experience at DOT that the Department’s cyber security initiatives are working well and support DOT’s ability to safely and securely deliver critical services to our customers.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important topic and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

STATEMENT OF

JON L. JORDAN, M.D.,
FEDERAL AIR SURGEON,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE FAA’S AGE 60 COMMERCIAL PILOT RULE

JULY 19, 2005

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Age-60 rule, which provides that a pilot may not engage in what are known as part 121 operations if the pilot has reached his 60^th birthday.  Part 121 covers operations of large commercial passenger aircraft, smaller propeller aircraft with 10 or more passenger seats, and common carriage operations of all-cargo aircraft with a payload capacity of 7500 pounds.  I am accompanied today by my colleague, Jim Ballough, Director of FAA’s Flight Standards Service.

The Age-60 rule represents the FAA's best determination of the time when a general decline in health-related functions and overall cognitive and performance capabilities may begin and reach a level where a pilot's judgement and physical ability may begin to decline and therefore jeopardize safety.  Our rule means that a pilot who reaches age 60 must leave part 121 operations, but it does not mean that he or she can no longer play an important role in aviation.  Many pilots continue to work for part 121 airlines in the screening, recruitment and training of pilot applicants, serve as flight engineers, or fly in non-part 121 operations, or become flight instructors, or, fortunately for us, work as safety inspectors for the FAA.

Since its adoption in 1959, the FAA has reviewed the Age-60 rule several times to determine whether new and sufficient evidence exists to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation.  The FAA has also successfully defended the rule in several administrative and judicial challenges. 

FAA has conducted five studies on the relationship of pilot age to accidents between 1999 and 2004.  The first four studies were conducted at the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which requested in 1999 that the FAA study and provide data regarding relative accident rates based on pilot age.  The FAA's Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) conducted a four-part study.  The four studies were as follows:  1) an annotated bibliography of the scientific literature (1990-1999); 2) a re-analysis of the Chicago Tribune study data (1999) relating pilot age and accident rates; 3) an empirical analysis of accident rates by pilot age for professional pilots holding Air Transport Pilot (ATP) and Class 1 medical certificates between 1988 and 1997; and, 4) an empirical analysis of accident rates by pilot age for professional pilots holding ATP or Commercial Pilot and Class 1 or Class 2 medical certificates between 1988 and 1997.

Certain aspects of the analytic methodology used in the third and fourth studies were criticized in the open scientific literature.  In response, the first author for those studies, Dr. Dana Broach of CAMI, re-analyzed the accident rate data.  That study was published in 2004.  The 2004 study used more restrictive criteria to select which accidents to include in the analysis than were used in the previous studies.  Taken together, the criteria resulted in an “apples-to-apples” comparison of accident rates for pilots age 60-63 and younger pilots in that the accident and non-accident pilots had the same credentials, worked for the same employers, and operated complex, multi-engine commuter or larger aircraft now covered by Part 121.  As in the previous studies, the data were aggregated by age group (in five-year increments) and year, and analyzed with the same statistical technique. 

The results of the 2004 study were similar to those reported in the third and fourth empirical studies previously reported to Congress.  Overall, accident rate increased with pilot age.  The patterns of findings across the three empirical studies are similar – there appears to be a relationship between pilot age and accident rate.  The consistency of this finding across the three empirical studies suggests that changes to the Age 60 rule should be approached cautiously.

I must emphasize that before making any change to a safety rule, the FAA must be satisfied that the regulation will maintain or raise the current level of safety.  What is clear to us from reviewing public comments and relevant literature concerning the Age-60 rule is that there is no single "right answer."  What is also clear is that the question for the FAA is one of public safety and determining acceptable risk.  At this time, the FAA cannot be assured that changing the Age-60 rule will maintain or raise the level of safety. 

At some age, every individual reaches a level of increased infirmity leading to decreased reliability.  That age will vary from person to person but cannot yet be predicted in a specific individual.  While science does not absolutely dictate the age of 60 for commercial passenger pilot retirement, that age is within the age range during which sharp increases in disease mortality and morbidity occur.  Clearly, there is a progressive anatomic, physiological, and cognitive decline associated with aging, albeit variable in severity and onset among individuals.  There is no absolute, scientific formula that may be readily applied.

It is indisputable that, as people age, they experience more illnesses and disorders, and suffer more cognitive decline.  Cardiovascular disease rises with age, steeply, beginning between ages 55 and 65, and, though mortality has dropped since 1960, cardiovascular disease remains the most frequent cause of death in pilots and the general population.  With this increased incidence of cardiovascular disease in the older population, the risk for unexpected events that could be a threat to safety of flight is increased.  Cardiac events (e.g., heart attacks, heart failure) during flight have continued to occur in low but fairly consistent numbers over the years and have caused general aviation accidents.

Other health conditions are known to increase in incidence or to become more complicated with aging.  Many present greater difficulties of detection and risk assessment than do cardiovascular disease.  Among these are cerebrovascular disease; malignancies; endocrine dysfunction; neurological disorders; psychiatric disorders, including depression; and decline in sensory and motor capabilities.  There has been an increasing awareness of the more subtle adverse conditions affecting performance, such as those related to cognitive functioning.

The “Age 60 rule” has served well as a regulatory limit in the United States.  It remains the best determination that can be made of the time when a general decline in health-related functions and overall cognitive capabilities has reached a level where decrements in a pilot's performance may jeopardize safety.  The “Age 60 rule” has been repeatedly reviewed to determine whether new and sufficient evidence exists to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation.  Studies conducted to date do not present sufficient information that would address concerns about negatively impacting the current level of safety by changing the rule. 

The FAA has invited the public to provide comments on the viability of the “Age 60 rule.”  The most recent comment period was opened in September 2002 in relation to a petition for exemption to the rule filed by a coalition of U.S. pilots approaching age 60.  Nearly 7,000 comments were submitted during the month-long open comment period.  Overwhelmingly, the comments favored retaining the current “Age 60 rule.”  They cited safety and medical issues most often as reasons for retention of the current rule. 

Several U.S. Courts of Appeals have reviewed the “Age 60 rule” and studies related to the rule.  Uniformly, these courts have denied petitioners’ requests for relief from the rule.  In September 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to review FAA’s denial of a petition for exemptions from the rule.  In May 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear arguments on the same matter.

In recent years several bills to revise the age limit for airliner pilots have been introduced.  In February 2001, a bill to modify the “Age 60 rule” by increasing the age limit to age 65 was referred to the House Subcommittee on Aviation.  In March 2001, a bill to modify the “Age 60 rule” to age 63 was favorably reported by this Committee.  Neither bill was ultimately enacted.  Most recently, legislation was proposed earlier this year that would tie an age limit for air carrier pilots to Social Security retirement age eligibility. 

Modifying the long-standing baseline of age 60 in the U.S. requires that the public be shown how such modification would maintain an equivalent level of safety.  The “Age 60 rule” is a long-standing operational rule that pre-dates subsequent studies completed over the years.  None of the studies completed since implementation of the rule provide satisfactory data that conclusively supports changing the rule.  No protocols exist to reliably predict when or whether an over-age-60 pilot might experience a medical event that could jeopardize aviation safety.  With inconclusive data and no practical experience with pilots above age 60, the FAA does not agree, at this time, to modify the current age limit for airliner pilots. 

Mr. Chairman, the FAA will develop regulations in the context of what is best for public safety.  The FAA's primary mission is ensuring the safety of the National Airspace System.  We work hard to manage a growth oriented aviation system--and the constraints on the system that growth imposes--in the most efficient and safe way possible.  The FAA establishes, through our regulations, basic safety standards for aircraft and crewmembers that will ensure the safety of our traveling public.  We construct our regulations very carefully, taking into account as many factors as we can, but ultimately, always making the decision that will best enhance aviation safety.  While economic factors are certainly a part of that calculation, I am sure the Committee and our colleagues in industry would agree that safety must be the top priority.

That concludes my prepared remarks.  I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF

JON L. JORDAN, M.D., J.D.
FEDERAL AIR SURGEON,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

EFFORTS TO PREVENT PANDEMICS BY AIR TRAVEL

APRIL 6, 2005

Chairman Mica, Congressman Costello and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Jon L. Jordan, the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Federal Air Surgeon.  It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the efforts to prevent pandemics by air travel.  I recognize that this is a priority of this Subcommittee and FAA shares your concerns.  It has also been a matter of significant concern to aviation passengers and the crews that earn their living by working on commercial transport aircraft.  Secretary Mineta and Administrator Blakey both take these concerns seriously.  They are supportive of efforts to help protect the health, safety and comfort of the traveling public and cabin crews. 

The FAA and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have strengthened their relationship with the airline industry on the issues of infectious diseases and travelers’ health through the Air Transport Association’s Medical Committee.  The FAA and the CDC have become regular attendees at the meetings of the Medical Committee of the Air Transport Association.  The effectiveness of this growing partnership was demonstrated during the SARS outbreak, when the CDC and the ATA Medical Committee conducted weekly teleconferences to discuss developments, and the CDC and FAA took special care to make sure that the airline industry received notice of all updates and alerts issued by the CDC on SARS.  Presently, the CDC is exploring with the airline industry methods to improve communications in a number of areas.

An important new initiative is underway in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, (OST). OST in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services is compiling a Best Practices Manual to provide airport operators and local health authorities with assistance in responding to the threats of contagious diseases at international gateway airports.  Guidelines and other important information are being assembled from experiences at airports throughout the world, and will be used for training sessions that the CDC plans to begin this spring.  This project will result in the publication by the Department of a Best Practices Manual, which will be available to airport owners and operators and public health officials.

Considering the potential of pandemics and contagious disease transmission on airliners in general, issues inevitably arise concerning the quality of air in airliner cabins.  It is important, however, to understand that studies have indicated that many aspects of cabin air are as good as or better than the air found in office and home environments.  Air carriers have the benefit of flying at altitudes above the air pollution that is circulated into spaces on the ground that we occupy on a daily basis.

For those aircraft that recirculate some part of the cabin air, that air is typically passed through high quality filters before it returns to the cabin.  Manufacturers of new airplanes used by air carriers incorporate either High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters, similar to those used in hospital isolation areas and surgical suites, or particulate filters that are somewhat less efficient.  HEPA filters are defined by the EPA as those with a filtering efficiency of 99.97 percent.  These filters remove dust, vapors, bacteria and fungi.  HEPA filters also effectively capture some viruses.  Several airlines, in coordination with aircraft manufacturers, have even installed HEPA filters on board airplanes that did not originally incorporate them into their design.

Today, I will describe new developments related to airliner cabin air as well as FAA’s ongoing efforts in this area. 

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT

In December 2001, the National Research Council (NRC) completed a congressionally-directed study of cabin air quality.  The NRC developed ten recommendations related to cabin air quality.  FAA concurred with the intent of all of the recommendations and, for many of these recommendations, we have either completed actions that address the underlying concerns or we are in the process of addressing specific items. 

The first four NRC recommendations involve assessing the validity of current regulations related to airplane ventilation systems and potential contaminants of cabin air.  We anticipate that by the close of 2006 or early 2007, when a comprehensive study on cabin air quality being conducted by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) is completed, that substantial data will be available for our consideration that will enable us to do these assessments.

NRC Recommendation 5 addresses allergen exposure.  Allergens in the airplane cabin are a serious, potentially life-threatening issue for a small segment of the airline passenger population.  Although some air carriers do not allow pets in the cabins, FAA and DOT regulations do not prohibit animals in air carriers for two primary reasons.  We believe that most animal allergens are brought onto the airplane on the clothes of passengers rather than by animals.  Therefore, prohibiting small animals altogether would have only a modest reduction in allergen levels.  In addition, carriage of service animals in the cabin may be necessary to assist disabled travelers.  FAA issued an Advisory Circular (AC) providing information to passengers, crew, and operators on how to prepare for air travel when allergens could present a medical concern and how to respond in the case of an allergen induced medical emergency. 

The agency also issued an AC implementing NRC Recommendation 7, concerning ventilation failure or shutdowns on the ground.  We have advised air carriers to remove passengers from an airplane within 30 minutes of a ventilation failure or shutdown, as long as operational safety is not compromised.

In Recommendation 6, the NRC suggested that FAA increase efforts to provide information on health issues related to air travel to crew, passengers and health professionals.  FAA has taken significant steps to make available information and recommendations regarding air travel health and medical issues through the FAA website, and have linked our site with the CDC website, and other websites that provide health information to passengers and crews.

In Recommendations 8 and 9, NRC recommends that FAA establish a surveillance and research program for air quality and health that would provide the data to analyze the relationship between cabin air quality and health effects or complaints.  These recommendations are being addressed through research efforts by the FAA’s newly established Center of Excellence for Airliner Cabin Environment (ACER), which I discuss in detail below, and ASHRAE.  The data collected from these studies on air quality and the potential air quality correlation with health concerns will provide us with information essential to developing an implementation plan for the first four NRC recommendations.  As I mentioned earlier, FAA expects data to be available by the end of 2006 or early 2007, and thereafter, as a result of the work done both by ASHRAE and FAA’S ACER.

FAA AIR TRANSPORTATION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

FOR AIRLINER CABIN ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH

In September of 2004, the FAA announced the establishment of the Air Transportation Center of Excellence for Airliner Cabin Environment Research (ACER), headed by Auburn University.  ACER will research cabin air quality and conduct an assessment of chemical and biological threats.  Other universities taking part in the effort include Purdue University, Harvard University, Boise State University, Kansas State University, the University of California at Berkeley, and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.  The FAA will provide funding for the center and matching funds will be provided by the private sector.  

ACER will conduct a comprehensive and integrated program of research and development on the cabin environment.  The team brings the diverse expertise necessary to conduct research on the healthfulness of the cabin environment for passengers and crew, enhancement of aircraft environmental control systems, and detection and mitigation of chemical and biological threats aboard aircraft.  ACER aims to be a unique resource for airlines, equipment manufacturers, cabin crews and the traveling public, and places a major emphasis on partnerships with industry.  Among others, the University of Oregon and Oklahoma State University will contribute to this research effort.

DISINSECTION

Chemical disinsection—a term used to describe the process of ridding an airplane of insects-- has been a long-time concern, although a 1995 World Health Organization report concluded that aircraft disinsection, if performed appropriately, would not present a risk to human health.  Chemical disinsection has been significantly reduced and approximately half of the 15 countries that still require disinsection of all in-bound flights allow disinsection prior to boarding the aircraft.  The Office of the Secretary of Transportation chairs an interagency working group that is taking a lead in researching and developing means of non-chemical disinsection of aircraft.  OST’s efforts are currently focused on air curtain technology, which would prevent insects from both entering and leaving aircraft, thus eliminating the need for treatment with pesticides.  DOT is about to embark on a pilot program with Jamaica to demonstrate this technology. 

TUFTS-NEW ENGLAND MEDICAL CENTER STUDY

The Lancet published, in its March 12, 2005 issue, a study by doctors at Tufts-New England Medical Center and the Lahey Clinic Medical Center entitled, “Transmission of Infectious Diseases During Commercial Air Travel.”  The report notes that cabin air quality has been the focus of many media investigations and criticism from special interest groups and that most of this concern is associated with the perception that airborne particles are distributed throughout the entire cabin by the ventilation system.  The report states, however, that no peer-reviewed scientific work links cabin air quality and aircraft ventilation rates to heightened health risks compared with other modes of transport or with office buildings.  The report concludes that the environmental control system used in commercial aircraft seems to restrict the spread of airborne pathogens, and the perceived risk is greater than the actual risk.

CONCLUSION

In closing, on behalf of Administrator Blakey, I would like to reiterate that FAA is committed to ensuring the safest flight possible – from the safety of the operation of the aircraft to the quality of the air that passengers and crew breathe inside the cabin.  I look forward to working with the Subcommittee regarding any concerns you may have on the quality of airliner cabin air and specifically, efforts to prevent pandemics by air travel.  This concludes my testimony, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Statement of

Robert D. Jamison
Deputy Administrator
Federal Transit Administration
United States Department of Transportation

Before the

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology

Hearing on

Transit Security

July 26, 2005

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regarding the security of America’s transit systems and in particular the critical role of training and emergency preparedness.

            We are all dismayed by the tragic and despicable acts of violence in London on July 7 and July 21.  Our hearts go out to the victims, their families, and their countrymen who stood shoulder-to-shoulder with America in the wake of September 11.  July 7 was a grim reminder of how difficult it is to balance economic prosperity, freedoms, and security.  

Mass transit systems are essential to the freedom of movement that Americans cherish and enjoy.  They permit large numbers of people to travel rapidly and efficiently between home, work, and other activities on a daily basis.  To do that effectively, transit must be open and accessible. 

Every workday, transit and commuter rail systems move more than 14 million passengers in the United States.  In two weeks, transit and commuter rail systems carry more passengers than Amtrak carries in a year.  In a single month, transit and commuter rail systems carry more passengers than U.S. airlines carry in a year. 

• On a daily basis, nearly 900,000 people take the Long Island Railroad or the New York City subway to Grand Central Terminal. 

• Prior to their destruction on September 11, the World Trade Center and Fulton Street subway stations handled over 380,000 people each day -- the equivalent of the entire population of Miami, Sacramento, or Pittsburgh.

• In 2004, 251 million trips were taken on Washington DC’s Metrorail.

The very characteristics of public transit systems that make them convenient and reliable, also make providing effective security an ongoing challenge.   Each year, more than 2.7 billion passengers use over 1,000 stations to access America’s heavy rail stations.  Although passenger screening devices similar to those used in airports have been successfully tested in locations with limited access points and relatively few passengers, the widespread application of current passenger screening devices on mass transit – even on heavy rail – is unrealistic.  During peak periods in New York’s Penn Station, for example, more than 1,500 people per minute would have to be screened to maintain current levels of mobility and access.  Therefore, even as we continue to improve the security of our Nation’s transit systems, we must not lose sight of the need to improve our ability to respond to emergencies in order to save lives and minimize injuries.

FTA and America’s Transit Systems

America’s public transportation is provided by more than 6,000 locally governed and operated transit systems.  These systems range from very small bus-only operations in small and rural communities, to very large multi-modal systems in urban areas that may combine bus, light rail, subway, and commuter rail operations. 

The Federal Transit Administration provides capital funding to States and urbanized areas to develop new and extensions to existing public transportation systems, and to improve and maintain existing systems.  Smaller urbanized areas with less than 200,000 population, may use FTA formula funds for limited support of their operations.  However, FTA does not have regulatory authority over the day-to-day operations of transit agencies.

Historically, FTA has shaped the practices of transit agencies through its training programs, the development of best practices and guidance, and by conducting research that is critical to the industry.  Since September 11, we have used all of these techniques to significantly influence the security practices of transit agencies. 

Response to September 11

Immediately following September 11, 2001, FTA undertook an aggressive nationwide security program and led the initial Federal effort on transit security.  With the creation of the Transportation Security Administration in 2001 and the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, lead responsibility for the Federal Government’s activities in the area of public transit security now rests by statute with DHS.  DOT recognizes that DHS has primary responsibility for transportation security, and that DOT plays a supporting role, providing technical assistance and assisting DHS when possible with implementation of its security policies, as allowed by DOT statutory authority and available resources.  While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all transportation modes, as part of its own authority, FTA conducts non-regulatory safety and security activities, including safety and security related training, research, and demonstration projects.

With the assistance of national and international security experts, FTA identified and has focused on three important priorities:  employee training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness, and we continue to work with our DHS partners in all of these areas. 

            FTA’s initial response included conducting threat and vulnerability assessments in 37 large transit systems, 30 of which carry almost 90 percent of all transit riders.  These assessments, conducted with the full cooperation and support of every transit agency involved and at no cost to the transit agencies, formed the basis of our security efforts.  The assessments considered the entire transportation system and network in each area, not just the physical assets of one mode or site.  Each assessment identified high risk and high consequence assets; evaluated security gaps; made recommendations to reduce security risks to acceptable levels; educated transit agencies on threat and vulnerability analysis; and reviewed agencies’ emergency response plans, particularly their degree of coordination with emergency responders throughout the region. 

Based on these assessments, FTA sent technical assistance teams to 46 transit agencies, and will begin four additional technical assistance visits in the next few months.  These teams help transit agencies strengthen their security and emergency preparedness plans; implement immediate operational security improvements; and offer tailored assistance based on threat assessments.  The results have also been utilized by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess the relative risks and requirements in the transit environment.   Further, as part of a $3 million program involving 83 transit agencies, FTA funded emergency response drills conducted in conjunction with local fire, police, and other emergency responders.  

In 2002, to help guide transit agency priorities, FTA issued its Top 20 Security Action Item List to improve transit safety and security operations, particularly with regard to employee training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness.  Since that time, the implementation of these action items by the 30 largest transit agencies has been one of four core accountabilities of every FTA senior executive, and I am pleased to report that FTA has achieved its goals in this area every year. 

In addition, to address concerns identified through its threat and vulnerability assessments, FTA developed and disseminated standard protocols for responding to chemical or biological incidents in rail tunnels and transit vehicle environments.   More recently, FTA has developed Security Design Considerations for use by transit agencies as they design or redesign infrastructure, communications, access control systems, and other transit system components.  Important considerations include designing stations for easy detection, so people cannot leave objects hidden out of sight; separating public and private spaces in facilities, so that access to controls and equipment can be restricted; and designing facilities for easy decontamination and recovery operations.  FTA is incorporating security design as a component of the New Starts development and evaluation process. 

Since 9/11, FTA has also significantly improved its ability to communicate with transit agencies.  We now utilize a voice system known as Dialogics to communicate security messages verbally to the general managers and security chiefs at the 30 largest transit agencies.  This system, which requires an affirmative acknowledgement that the message has been received, has been utilized extensively by both DHS and FTA in recent weeks.  In addition, we maintain and utilize the capability to communicate electronically with the general managers and security chiefs of the 100 largest transit agencies.

We recognize that good intelligence must be America’s first line of defense against terrorism, and FTA has worked diligently with our partners to improve intelligence sharing in the transit industry.  FTA funded and worked with the American Public Transportation Association to create the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC), which is used by transit agencies throughout the country to obtain and share intelligence information that is specific to the industry.  This system provides two-way communication between the intelligence community and the transit industry, as well as transit-specific intelligence analysis.   The ST-ISAC is located at the Transportation Security Operations Center, TSA’s 24/7 communications center that provides real time data on potential threats throughout all modes of transportation.  In addition, FTA worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to enable transit agencies to participate on their local or regional FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), giving nearly all of the 30 largest transit agencies access to real-time intelligence information regarding their community and the ability to contribute information they may have regarding threats to their own operations.  

Response to London Attacks

In response to the London terror attacks, transit agencies across the country implemented “Orange Alert” protective measures, even before the threat level was officially raised.  This quick response was a direct result of the extensive work done in identifying best practices, developing security-related guidance, and working collaboratively to plan and test emergency response procedures. 

  Among the specific protective measures implemented by the 30 largest transit agencies immediately following the London attacks were:

• Deployment of  bomb-sniffing dogs to patrol transit stations;

• More frequent reminders to passengers about how to identify and report suspicious activities and behaviors;

• Deployment of transit police to the local police department command center; and

• Deployment of additional transit agency staff and law enforcement personnel to increase patrols and visibility in public areas.  

In addition, I am pleased to report that DHS and FTA worked cooperatively for the benefit and safety of transit riders across the Nation.  FTA provided input to DHS in the development of a DHS/FBI Joint Advisory regarding recommended measures for mass transit and passenger rail systems.  DHS and FTA also consulted on the alert timing, level, and actions; utilized shared communication systems to reach out immediately to our transit agency partners; and met jointly with transit agency leaders via teleconference. 

As you know, the prevention of attacks like those in London will be grounded in useful intelligence that is promptly shared with local officials.  Unfortunately, little intelligence was available prior to those attacks.

Although opportunities to improve U.S. transit system security still exist, we know that capital expenditures alone are not enough to assure security.  Perimeter fencing, securing yards, tunnels, and bridges, facial recognition technology, and even extensive use of security cameras did not and would not have prevented either the London or Madrid attacks. 

The fact is, good transit security is grounded in operations.  Reports from both Madrid and London confirm that our focus on public awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness is well-founded.   In light of that knowledge, I would like to share some additional information about our efforts in these three areas, and our plans for the coming year.

Public Awareness

            Originally, many people were concerned that efforts to share security-related information with the riding public would generate fear and depress ridership.  As a result, early efforts to increase public awareness, including FTA’s Transit Watch campaign materials, were general in nature, telling passengers to be on the look-out for suspicious individuals or activities.  Over time, however, experience and research have indicated that people feel more secure and are more capable of responding if they receive more specific security-related information. 

As a result, transit agencies now focus their public awareness efforts on the specific actions that passengers should take.  For example, one widely used public education campaign, originally developed by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, instructs passengers to ask, “Is That Your Bag?” if they see an unattended bag or package.  Another campaign, using the tag line “See Something, Say Something,” tells passengers how to contact transit officials if they see something that seems out-of-place.  Public awareness campaigns have also begun to focus more specifically on emergency evacuation procedures. 

Since September 11, the use and effectiveness of public awareness messages has significantly increased.  Washington Metro has been a leader in ensuring that detailed emergency evacuation information is more widely and openly disseminated to transit riders and the general public.   Nevertheless, in most transit systems, there is still room for improvement to ensure that the public is familiar with the operation of emergency exit doors, understands the emergency evacuation procedures for each location on their particular route, and is prepared to facilitate a prompt and effective emergency response.

 FTA will be focusing efforts to improve standard public awareness templates to help local transit agencies incorporate this important information.  In addition, FTA is developing standard protocols for the content and frequency of security announcements for each Homeland Security threat level.  Further, security and emergency preparedness messages are being developed in a variety of languages in an effort to better communicate with the diverse community of transit riders.

Employee Training

Transit employees are America’s first line of defense and will be our first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency on a transit system.  The actions taken in the critical moments immediately after an attack or an emergency can significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths that result.  Therefore, there is simply no substitute for security awareness and emergency response training for transit employees.  We must rely on – and cultivate – human capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to security threats.

The 400,000-plus transit employees throughout America are the “eyes and ears” of our most important security system.  Transit employees travel the same routes, maintain the same facilities, and see the same people every day as they go about their duties.  They are in the best position to identify unusual packages, suspicious substances, and people who are acting suspiciously.  But they need to develop an understanding of what to look for and skills in how to respond.  These skills can be acquired through rigorous emergency planning, regular emergency testing and drills, and extensive training.

FTA has developed and delivered guidance and security courses through the National Transit Institute (NTI), the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) and Johns Hopkins University (JHU).  Since September 11, over 77,000 transit agency employees from across the Nation have received security-related training.   Among the newest training courses now being offered are:

• Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction.  This course incorporates the latest in international counter-terrorism techniques to provide training to frontline transit employees.  To date, over 4,200 transit employees from 28 of the 30 largest transit agencies have taken this training.

• Strategic Counter-Terrorism for Transit Managers.   This course provides counter-terrorism management training to transit managers and transit security officials.  It offers an effective approach to security planning and the tactical deployment of law enforcement personnel.  The course will be delivered to the 30 largest transit agencies beginning in August 2005.

• Chemical/Biological Detection Protocols.   This course will provide agency-specific information for operations control personnel and train operators on chemical and biological incident management.  The course is also slated for delivery to the 30 largest transit agencies beginning in August 2005.

Despite widespread success and the significant numbers of transit agency employees who have received training, we recognize that hurdles, such as overtime costs and shift coverage, can negatively affect the ability of transit agencies to take advantage of the free training opportunities that are available through FTA.  Therefore, we are working with transit stakeholders to identify strategies that will permit as many frontline employees as possible to be trained.

Emergency Preparedness

While transit employee training is important, there is no substitute for a good emergency response plan that has been tried and tested by the full array of emergency responders in a community.  However, the threat and vulnerability assessments conducted after September 11 suggested that most transit agencies had not even established working relationships with other emergency responders. 

To assist in building these relationships and developing community-wide response plans, FTA sponsored 18 Connecting Community Forums.  These forums brought together transit, law enforcement, fire, medical, and city/county officials for three days of regional planning and response exercises  FTA will work with DHS’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness and Transportation Security Administration to hold ten additional Connecting Community Forums in the coming year that are customized to address weaknesses in those particular communities.  Two of the forums will he held in conjunction with small and/or rural transit agencies. 

To date, 77 communities have conducted full-scale emergency response drills funded by FTA.  One important condition of these grants was that the drills include the participation of local and regional police, fire and emergency response agencies.  There is no doubt that the safety and security of our communities is significantly enhanced when public transportation systems are linked to police, fire, medical and other emergency response agencies.  Community-wide planning, emergency response drills, and unified emergency command centers make this critical link effective.  FTA is currently updating its guidance on how to conduct emergency drills based on the results of the drills held to date.  In addition, we plan to provide additional grants to transit agencies to conduct full-scale drills. 

While we continue to believe that there is no substitute for practicing emergency response skills in an operating environment, we continue to look for ways to improve and practice skills more frequently and at a lower cost than full-scale community drills.  Therefore, FTA has also piloted web-based emergency drills in Boston (MBTA), Portland (Tri-Met), Seattle (Sound Transit), San Francisco (BART), Rock Island, IL (Metrolink), and Montgomery County, MD (Ride On).  This approach will provide transit agencies, particularly small and rural agencies, with a tool for conducting tabletop drills more effectively, efficiently, and affordably.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the Nation’s transit operators have responded admirably to the new threat environment.  Thanks to their efforts, transit is more secure and more prepared to respond to emergencies than it has ever been.  FTA will continue to support transit agencies throughout the Nation by providing security-related training for transit employees, materials and guidance to educate transit passengers, and improved emergency response planning and procedures.

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this important update on transit safety and security, and look forward to working with you to keep Americans safe and moving on public transportation.

Statement of

Robert D. Jamison
Acting Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration

before the

Subcommittee on Railroads of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. House of Representatives

May 11, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of Secretary Mineta, to discuss recent developments concerning Amtrak’s Acela high-speed trains.  I will explain what the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) knows regarding the problems with the rotors on the Acela’s disc brakes and how we are working with Amtrak to develop a solution to those problems.  I will also touch briefly on FRA’s overall safety priorities and Amtrak’s general safety record.

Acela Brake Issues

FRA Safety Specialist Rich Thomas first detected cracks on the spokes of an Acela train’s disc brake rotors on the evening of April 14.  The detection occurred while FRA personnel were closely inspecting a trainset that had been involved in test runs.  The test runs, unrelated to the brake issue, were being conducted to ensure safe operating performance of the Acela at higher speeds in curves than are currently permitted.  While conducting a very thorough inspection of the brakes on the trainset, Specialist Thomas noticed what appeared to be rust near a very small mark on one of the rotor’s spokes.  On closer examination, the mark proved to be a crack.  Cracks on the spokes of disc brake rotors have not been a common problem.  Such an anomaly is very difficult to observe due to the location of the spokes in relation to other components of the undercarriage.  Undercarriage components can obstruct a clear view of the spokes, especially on the two discs on the outside of the axle.  (Acela trainsets have three discs per axle, which adds up to 72 discs per trainset.)   After the initial discovery of the cracks, the FRA inspectors, along with personnel from Amtrak and its Acela maintenance contractor, then inspected other trainsets.  As the inspections concluded that evening, it became clear that a significant percentage of the disc brakes had similar cracks.  After discussions with FRA personnel that night, Amtrak decided to suspend Acela service immediately on April 15 and ordered a detailed inspection of the entire Acela fleet for the presence of such cracks.

The good news is that these cracks were detected before they led to a catastrophic failure of the rotor with potentially very serious consequences.   Having been alerted to the problem, Amtrak then acted quickly to ensure that Acela service would not continue until the potentially hazardous condition was corrected.  My staff and I met with Amtrak President David Gunn and his staff on April 15, and again on April 20, to discuss the problem and potential solutions.  Amtrak formed a working group, consisting of its staff, its contractors who are responsible for Acela maintenance, the suppliers of the Acela equipment, and several technical experts, to determine the cause of the problem and to explore solutions to the problem.  FRA experts from our Office of Safety and our Office of Railroad Development are cooperating fully in that effort.  Amtrak has no intention of running the Acela equipment with cracks in the disc brakes, and all concerned understand that FRA will not permit that to occur.

As to the cause of the cracks, there is much speculation.  Some have speculated that one possible reason for the cracks in the discs is FRA’s influence over the initial design of the Acela trainsets.  In preparing to order high-speed trainsets in 1994, Amtrak sought FRA’s comments on its proposed specifications.  FRA’s comments contributed to Amtrak’s including certain design features, including crash energy management features similar to those being built into advanced European equipment during the period and strengthening the crew compartment.  Amtrak specified that the trainset be built to comply with the North American standards for buff (anti-crush) strength because the trainset was intended to operate in a North American environment where all other passenger trains (both intercity and commuter) have been built to those standards and where rail freight equipment is much larger and heavier than that encountered in most other parts of the world.  Amtrak did not seek permission from FRA to use the European buff-strength standard.  Beyond such basic safety requirements, Amtrak and its vendor were free to choose technologies and to design the train as they thought best. 

FRA’s Safety Program

Our efforts to ensure the safety of the Acela service are but one component of a comprehensive railroad safety program.  Although the railroad industry’s overall safety record is very positive and most safety trends are moving in the right direction, very serious train accidents continue to occur, and the train accident rate has not declined at an acceptable pace in recent years.  To meet these challenges, FRA is targeting its regulatory program on the most frequent causes of train accidents, focusing FRA’s oversight and inspection resources on the areas of highest risk, and accelerating research and development (R&D) efforts that have the potential to mitigate the largest risks. 

1. Targeting the Leading Causes of Train Accidents

More than 70 percent of all train accidents arise from either human error or defective track.  Accordingly, FRA’s highest priority must be to reduce these types of accidents.  

   1.  Human Factors

Human factor accidents are now the largest category of train accidents, accounting for 40 percent of the total in 2004.  FRA’s ongoing analysis of accident trend data has revealed that a small number of particular kinds of human errors (e.g., not properly lining switches, failure to lock and latch switches, not properly conducting shoving movements) account for an inordinate number of human factor accidents.  Although these matters are addressed by each railroad’s own operating rules, FRA’s regulations do not presently address them directly.  FRA intends to take action, preferably based on consensus recommendations from its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, to address these leading causes of train accidents.  We are acting in order to heighten awareness and understanding of the problem and ensure timely application of best practices across the board to achieve substantial reductions in these types of easily preventable accidents.  We took a first step in this direction on April 14, by holding an industry symposium to exchange views on the causes and possible remedies for these human-factor accidents.

Important research projects are under way in support of, and to supplement, our regulatory efforts on human factors.  We have signed a memorandum of agreement to launch a new FRA-sponsored R&D pilot project with rail management and labor that will gather and analyze data on “close calls” to identify the reasons for the human failures that cause near-accidents and to develop corrective actions to remedy those human-factor causes.  Another FRA R&D project will try to develop cost-effective technological counter-measures to misaligned switches and will conduct in-depth behavioral research on why employees make such errors. 

            2.  Defective Track

The second-leading cause of train accidents is defective track.  Over the last three years, FRA embarked on an aggressive program to focus its track-related enforcement efforts on the most likely accident causes.  We are continuing these efforts, which have generally helped move the track-caused accident trend lines in the right direction.  Here, too, our R&D efforts provide a critical complement to our regulatory efforts.  Broken joint bars and broken rails account for a large number of track-caused accidents, but the precursor conditions (cracks in joint bars and internal rail flaws) that lead to these causes are not readily detected.  FRA is developing a high-speed photo inspection system that will detect joint bar defects much more efficiently than current methods allow.  FRA is also working closely with the railroad industry to improve the speed and reliability of rail flaw detection vehicles.  

B. National Inspection Plan

While our regulatory and research efforts are focused on the leading causes of train accidents, we are also focusing our inspection resources on the areas of highest risk.  FRA has recently begun phasing in a new National Inspection Plan (NIP) to improve the agency’s allocation and assignment of inspection resources.  The NIP will use sophisticated trend analyses of inspection and accident data to produce an optimal distribution of resources within each of the agency’s eight regions to minimize fatality, injury, and accident rates.  We began implementing the NIP at the end of last month in the operating practices and track disciplines, which correspond to the two leading categories of train accidents. 

C.  Research and Development

Our third area of emphasis is accelerating our R&D efforts that have the greatest potential to reduce serious safety risks.  For example, FRA is speeding up R&D efforts on the structural integrity of tank cars.  FRA also continues use its R&D program to pursue new approaches to passenger safety.  These efforts are focused on strategies to better protect the occupied volume of passenger cars and to mitigate occupant injuries, as carried out through advanced computer modeling by The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) and through full-scale passenger car crash tests at the Technology Transportation Center near Pueblo, Colorado.  Our research is focusing on applying the principles of Crash Energy Management (CEM) to the next generation of passenger cars.  CEM seeks to protect occupants by dissipating collision forces through the use of crush-zones in the non-occupied volume of the vehicles.   

Amtrak’s Safety Record and FRA’s Oversight

FRA closely monitors all aspects of Amtrak safety, as it does for all freight and passenger railroads.  We inspect not just Amtrak’s rolling equipment but also its track, signals, and operations.  As with any other railroad, we use civil penalties and other enforcement tools when necessary to encourage compliance with our safety regulations. 

Amtrak’s safety record is generally quite good.  Based on preliminary data for the year 2004, Amtrak’s rate of accidents (2.8 per million train-miles) was well below the industry average of just over four accidents per million train-miles.  Contrary to the industry trend, Amtrak’s human-factor-caused accidents have fallen substantially in the last two years, comprising 20 percent of its accidents in 2004.  One major reason for this improvement was a program that Amtrak adopted two years ago, with FRA’s encouragement, to determine the root cause of major operating rule violations.  In addition, employee injury rates, particularly in Amtrak’s transportation department, improved in 2004.  FRA will continue to monitor Amtrak very closely to ensure that its generally positive safety record does not deteriorate and that any safety problems FRA discovers are promptly addressed. 

FRA’s Continued Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Acela Operations

FRA, as mentioned previously, is working very closely with Amtrak as the railroad tries to develop a long-term solution to the Acela disc brake problem.  We intend to make sure that the solution Amtrak adopts is one that fully cures the problem before Acela service resumes.  Thus far, Amtrak has been in complete agreement with us on that issue.  We will also ensure that Amtrak’s equipment inspection program for the Acela trainsets is improved so as to ensure that any such safety-critical problems are found and corrected well before they reach the dimensions that this problem had reached by the time that FRA detected it.  When the Acela service does start up again, FRA will resume its quarterly reviews of Acela mechanical issues with Amtrak.  We have used this process in the past to resolve other problems detected in the Acela trainsets. 

I believe that the extra effort displayed by FRA Safety Specialist Thomas and other FRA personnel involved in the current Acela brake issue may quite possibly have averted a serious accident.  Those efforts are emblematic of the dedication that FRA employees generally bring to their safety mission.  We will continue to exercise that level of effort in working with Amtrak to ensure that the resumption of Acela service is safely done.  Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions.

STATEMENT OF

Albert S. Jacquez,
Administrator
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation

Before The

Subcommittee On Water Resources And Environment
Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 10, 2005

The U.S. Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC or Corporation), a wholly owned government corporation and an operating administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), is responsible for the operations and maintenance of the U.S. portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway between Montreal and Lake Erie.  This responsibility includes maintaining and operating the two U.S. Seaway locks located in Massena, N.Y., and vessel traffic control in areas of the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario.  In addition, the SLSDC performs trade development functions designed to enhance Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway System utilization. 

For more than 45 years, the binational St. Lawrence Seaway has served as a vital transportation corridor for the international movement of bulk and general cargoes such as steel, iron ore, grain, and coal, serving a North American region that makes up one quarter of the U.S. population and nearly half of the Canadian population.  Maritime commerce on the Great Lakes Seaway System, a critical transportation link for the continent’s agricultural and industrial heartland, generates more than 150,000 U.S. jobs, $4.3 billion in personal income, $3.4 billion in transportation-related business revenue, and $1.3 billion in federal, state, and local taxes. 

The SLSDC coordinates its activities with its Canadian counterpart, the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation (SLSMC), particularly with respect to rules and regulations, overall day-to-day operations, traffic management, navigation aids, safety, environmental programs, security, operating dates, and trade development programs.  The unique binational nature of the Seaway System requires 24-hour, year-round coordination between the two Seaway entities.

The SLSDC’s principal performance goal is to provide a safe, secure, reliable, and efficient U.S. portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway to its commercial users.  Since its opening in 1959, more than 2.4 billion metric tons of cargo has been transported through the combined sections of the St. Lawrence Seaway (Montreal-Lake Ontario and Welland Canal) with an estimated value of more than $400 billion.

The navigation season typically runs from late March to late December.  During the 2004 navigation season, the availability of the U.S. sectors of the Seaway, including the two U.S. locks maintained and operated by the SLSDC, was 99.0 percent, meeting the annual goal of 99 percent.  The majority of causes for delays were weather and vessel incidents.  Of the remaining factors that cause lockage shutdowns, the one that the SLSDC has the most control over is the proper functioning of lock equipment.  During the 2004 navigation season, delays due to malfunctioning lock equipment totaled 6 hours, 15 minutes, representing less than one-tenth of one percent of the entire navigation season.

FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2006 BUDGET ESTIMATE

The Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (SLSDC) FY 2006 proposed funding level of $17,184,000 includes an appropriation request of $8,000,000 from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF), $8,284,000 through the proposed re-establishment of U.S. Seaway commercial tolls, and $900,000 in estimated non-federal revenues.  This funding level will allow the agency to fund its 157 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) staff and continue the day-to-day operational and maintenance programs for the U.S. portion of the St. Lawrence Seaway between Montreal and Lake Erie. 

These programs include managing vessel traffic control in areas of the St. Lawrence River and Lake Ontario, and maintaining, operating, and securing the two U.S. Seaway locks located in Massena, N.Y.  In addition, the SLSDC performs trade development activities designed to enhance Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway System awareness and utilization. 

A legislative proposal to re-establish U.S. Seaway commercial tolls as a self-funding mechanism for the SLSDC will be transmitted during this Congress.  The SLSDC was a self-funded government corporation through commercial tolls from the Seaway’s inaugural season in 1959 to 1987.  Since April 1, 1987, the SLSDC has been funded primarily through an appropriation from the HMTF, coupled with its other non-federal revenues (interest income, pleasure craft tolls, concession operations, rental payments, etc.).

The FY 2006 request of $16,284,000 is $577,000 above the FY 2005 enacted level.  This change is directly attributable to:

• $520,000 increase in net personnel compensation and benefits;

• $56,000 increase in inflationary adjustments; and a

• $25,000 increase in projected General Services Administration rent for the Washington office.

Also included in this change is a $24,000 reduction in Working Capital Fund projections.  In summary, the FY 2006 budget request is a “current services” budget over the FY 2005 enacted level that provides the agency with sufficient funding to meet those increased costs that are outside the control of SLSDC management. 

The request also directly supports four of the five President’s Management Agenda initiatives (budget and performance integration, strategic management of human capital, financial performance improvement, and electronic government expansion; the SLSDC is exempt from competitive sourcing as a government corporation), the Department’s strategic goals of Global Connectivity (efficient cargo movement) and Security (transportation system recovery), as well as the SLSDC’s internal strategic goals.  These goals include safety, security, and the environment; reliability and availability; trade development; and management accountability.  The request, separated by Department strategic goals and performance measures, includes $16,034,000 in appropriated funds directed at maritime navigation programs and personnel, and $250,000 towards the SLSDC’s security and infrastructure protection activities.

U.S. SEAWAY COMMERCIAL TOLLS PROPOSAL

The President’s FY 2006 budget proposes to re-establish U.S. Seaway commercial tolls as a self-funding mechanism for the SLSDC.  Proposed legislation will be delivered to the Congress that will allow the SLSDC to collect fees to support its operations, maintenance, and capital needs.  For

FY 2006, the budget proposal calls for $8.0 million in appropriations from the HMTF, with the remaining $8.284 million derived from the collection of commercial tolls.  Beginning in 2007, the proposal calls for complete self-sufficiency.  The near 50 percent split between tolls and traditional appropriations from the HMTF in the FY 2006 request was based on an assumption that U.S. Seaway toll collections would begin with the start of the 2006 navigation season (late March / early April), which is the halfway mark of the fiscal year.

The 10-year savings credited to the authorizers would equal $170 million.  OMB will work with the Congress to reclassify these enacted fees as discretionary beginning in FY 2007.  The proposed legislation will also include additional financial flexibilities to allow the SLSDC to generate a higher level of non-federal revenues and provide additional services to its stakeholders as part of its core mission.

The Administration supports efforts to improve service delivery and believes that this proposal would enable SLSDC to function more like a private corporation.  The SLSDC’s Canadian counterpart, the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation, directly supports its operations through fees.  The Canadian SLSMC is a not-for-profit corporation managing and operating the Canadian assets of the St. Lawrence Seaway for the federal government under a long-term agreement with Transport Canada. 

U.S. tolls would only be collected in the Montreal-Lake Ontario section of the Seaway, where the SLSDC owns and operates two of the seven locks in that section in Massena, New York.  The toll levels established would be based on the type of cargo being shipped as well as a vessel charge based on the gross registered tonnage of the transiting vessels.

The reinstitution of U.S. Seaway tolls would require diplomatic coordination and collaboration with Canada as it relates to the 1959 Seaway Tariff of Tolls Agreement.  U.S. Seaway toll levels would be subject to the binational agreement and to the U.S./Canadian Seaway toll negotiations process.  These negotiations would include both the toll levels for each commodity as well as the revenue split between the two entities. 

MAJOR SLSDC PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

Concrete Replacement Project

In January 2006, the SLSDC is expected to begin the first year of work on a four-year, $6 million concrete replacement project at the two U.S. Seaway locks (first year funding provided in FY 2005; however, funding was not made available in time to complete the work in FY 2005).  The SLSDC plans to use contractors for the concrete project with SLSDC personnel providing lock covering work and stairway construction.  The $1.5 million requested for FY 2006 is already available in the agency’s base level funding. 

The replacement of deteriorated concrete has historically been one of the SLSDC’s most expensive maintenance projects dating back to the Seaway’s opening in 1959.  The majority of the concrete replacement has occurred at the U.S. Eisenhower Lock, which has had a history of concrete problems.  Between 1959 and 2003, the SLSDC expended more than $25 million on concrete replacement at the two locks during the off-season winter months, with the majority of work taking place at the Eisenhower Lock. 

Since 1991, the SLSDC has made in-house repairs to the most critical areas identified by the Corps, but further deterioration and harsh winter conditions have caused additional damage to the lock walls at Eisenhower Lock and newly-identified problems at the Snell Lock have also been targeted for replacement.  In addition to concrete deteriorating along the lower portions of the lock walls, freeze-thaw damage is significant in the lock walls at high and low pool levels at both locks.  As it deteriorates, pieces of concrete become dislodged and fall into the lock chambers.  This poses a risk to people on the decks of commercial vessels and pleasure boats. 

Due to the amount of concrete in need of replacement, the difficulties associated with accessing these areas of deteriorated concrete, and the need for in-house maintenance crews to focus on other non-concrete lock maintenance projects, it is more efficient and cost effective for outside contractors to complete the project than in-house personnel. 

The last major concrete replacement projects that utilized contractors were completed in FYs 1986 and 1987, at a total cost of $4.3 million.  The Seaway is a single-lock system, consisting of

15 individual U.S. and Canadian locks; a delay/shutdown to any one of the locks would cause a delay/shutdown of the entire waterway.  Although the SLSDC has never experienced a major lock failure, the Canadian Seaway agency suffered a lock failure at the Welland Canal in 1985, which trapped 53 vessels above the Canal for 24 days at a cost to the carriers of $24 million Canadian. 

Capital Equipment and Infrastructure Projects

Following the 2004 celebration marking the 50^th anniversary of the beginning of construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the need to ensure that the two U.S. Seaway locks are safe, reliable, and efficient becomes an even more important agency priority.  Costs for repairing, maintaining, and preserving the locks in working condition are increasing annually.  For FY 2006, the SLSDC is proposing a capital plan for equipment and projects of $1,510,000, which is an increase of

$140,000 over the FY 2005 enacted level.  This increase was offset by a proposed reduction in other operating activities.

Like any concrete-based transportation infrastructure, time, weather, and usage exact a toll on availability.  Adding to the deterioration of the lock structures are the freeze and thaw cycles resulting from the harsh winter weather conditions in Upstate New York.  The U.S. Seaway locks have never experienced a major shutdown due to lock equipment malfunctioning.  This significant accomplishment is due, in large part, to the SLSDC’s pro-active preventative maintenance program that targets lock machinery, parts, and equipment in need of inspection, repair or replacement. 

The SLSDC’s annual capital plan details equipment and projects necessary to maintain the lock infrastructure, buildings, and other property.  Each year, SLSDC engineering and maintenance teams update their plans for the next five years including a five-year capital plan for equipment and projects.  The agency’s five-year plan is based on lock inspections, projected lifecycles of parts and machinery, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 1999 Seaway lock survey and evaluation. 

SLSDC officials take advantage of the Seaway’s closure during the winter months to remove the water from the locks, inspect critical lock parts and components, and perform necessary repairs and upgrades.  Without sufficient funding to make the necessary capital replacements and improvements each year, the risk of a lock malfunction or shutdown increases.  It is vital that the SLSDC continue to complete its capital and maintenance programs, as planned, to ensure that the Seaway System remains safe, reliable, and efficient. 

Major capital expenses projected for FY 2006 include:  replacement of one of the existing original culvert valves from the 1950s ($270,000); replacement of a 20-year-old, 20-ton capacity hydraulic crane used for lock and facility maintenance activities ($240,000); repair of paved areas along the approach walls at the locks that are used by SLSDC personnel and vessel crew members for tying up vessels during transits ($170,000); and replacement of the 25-year-old rubber and oak timber fenders on the downstream miter gate at Snell Lock ($160,000).

As noted previously, the Seaway lock system, consisting of 15 U.S. and Canadian locks, is a single lock system; a delay/shutdown to any one of the locks would cause a delay/shutdown of the entire waterway.  Daily vessel operating costs can range $20,000-$25,000; these are costs incurred whether sailing, in port, or awaiting resolution of an emergency.

Foreign-Flag Vessel Inspections and Ballast Water Exams

In FY 2006, the SLSDC will continue to perform its Enhanced Seaway Inspection (ESI) program, inspecting all ocean vessels for safety and environmental protection issues in Montreal, Quebec, before they enter U.S. waters.  The SLSDC and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), in conjunction with Transport Canada and the SLSMC, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in March 1997 to develop the program of coordinated vessel inspection and enforcement activities to expedite the safe transit of shipping through the Great Lakes Seaway System.  Starting in 2002, security-related risk assessment inspections were also completed concurrently with the ESI by SLSDC marine inspectors, improving transit times for Seaway users.  Beginning July 1, 2004, in response to the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), the USCG is now performing the security portion of the inspection process in Montreal.

During the 2004 navigation season, the SLSDC achieved its internal performance goal of inspecting all ocean vessels with 224 inspections completed, all performed by SLSDC marine inspectors.  The enhanced vessel inspection program exemplifies the Department of Transportation’s goal of partnering for excellence.

The ballast water exchange program continues to be an important function of the ship inspection program.  These inspections are carried out concurrently with the ESIs, by SLSDC personnel in Montreal and by USCG and Corporation staff at Snell Lock in Massena.  These programs support the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Non-Indigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990.  During the 2004 navigation season, there were 52 ballast water exams conducted in Montreal and 32 in Massena, N.Y.

Security Activities

The SLSDC will continue to operate and maintain the St. Lawrence Seaway with a heightened awareness towards security during FY 2006.  SLSDC staff will continue to be trained and tested on the agency’s contingency measures in the event of a security or terrorist-related incident.  In addition, SLSDC staff will continue to aggressively pursue the objectives of its security program, which includes greater protection of SLSDC facilities, improved measures for employee and visitor entry into facilities, and planned contingencies for facilities/infrastructure in the event of a heightened security alert.  The SLSDC will also continue to work collaboratively with federal security and intelligence agencies as situations arise.

2004 NAVIGATION SEASON OVERVIEW

The estimated tonnage for the St. Lawrence Seaway in 2004 was 43.0 million metric tons.  This was 2.2 million metric tons or 5 percent above the 2003 level.  The increase was led by a resurgence in general cargo movements, which increased 66 percent to 4.2 million metric tons, the highest level since the 2000 season.  These high-valued commodities include processed iron and steel and steel slabs.  A robust national economy, coupled with a rebound in manufacturing and steel production in the Great Lakes region, sparked the sizable gain in general cargo.  The increase in import iron and steel products also led to increased exports of non-grain bulk commodities, including salt (up 8 percent to 2.4 million metric tons) and coke (up 23 percent to 1.3 million metric tons). In addition to cargo movements, estimated total commercial transits through the St. Lawrence Seaway were 4,060, an increase of 4 percent over 2003 levels.

Other major commodities that moved on the St. Lawrence Seaway in 2004 included iron ore (down 4 percent to 10.2 million metric tons), grain (down 4 percent to 9.3 million metric tons – due principally to lower-than-expected late season movements due to poor Canadian harvest), coal (4.2 million metric tons, equal to 2003 levels), cement (up 3 percent to 2.7 million metric tons), and stone (up 49 percent to 1.2 million metric tons).

CONCLUSION

The FY 2006 request reflects the Administration’s commitment to providing the global commercial users of the St. Lawrence Seaway with a safe, secure, efficient, and reliable transportation route.  The binational waterway serves as a vital waterborne link between major U.S. and Canadian agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial centers, including Chicago, Detroit, Toronto, Hamilton, Cleveland, Duluth, Thunder Bay, Toledo, and Milwaukee, and European, South American, and North African markets.  The Administration’s proposal to make the SLSDC a self-sufficient agency partially in FY 2006 and completely starting in FY 2007 will give the agency greater efficiencies and flexibilities to complete its core mission and operate as a business-type government corporation.

The SLSDC will continue to work towards achieving its goal of 99 percent system availability by providing a safe, secure, reliable, and efficient waterway and lock system.  This will be accomplished through its primary operational programs of winter maintenance to make capital and equipment improvements to the lock infrastructure, and efficient vessel traffic control, utilizing Automatic Identification System technologies to improve safety, security, and transit times, and vessel inspections for safety compliance.  In addition, the concrete replacement project that is expected to continue in FY 2006 is a crucial step towards ensuring that the Seaway locks are structurally sound to continue providing for the safe, efficient, and reliable transits of commercial vessels.  A reduction in the Seaway’s availability rate could result in commercial users seeking alternative transportation routes and modes to and from North America, negatively affecting Great Lakes Seaway System economic benefits while increasing road congestion, fuel imports, air emissions, and degrading quality of life issues.

Funding levels insufficient to meet legislatively-mandated personnel compensation and benefits increases and necessary maintenance and repair projects to the lock infrastructure will, at a minimum, jeopardize the SLSDC’s ability to provide its customers with a safe and reliable transportation system.  An even worse scenario would be a lock malfunction due to the agency’s inability to complete necessary and recommended improvements and replacements, causing transportation delays throughout the binational system and redirecting the waterway’s competitive customer base to other modes and routes of transportation. 

The St. Lawrence Seaway has proven its vital significance to America’s economy over almost half a century.  It is a critical marine waterway for annual movement of tens of millions of tons of bulk and general commodities into and from North America’s industrial and agricultural heartland.  The SLSDC budget request will provide the agency the necessary resources to provide a safe and efficient transportation route, while also improving the long-term structural integrity of the U.S. Seaway infrastructure, through concrete replacement and capital replacements and improvements.

I want to thank you Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member Johnson, and all the members of the subcommittee for your continued support of the Seaway System.  I look forward to working with you and am glad to respond to any questions you may have on my testimony.

* * *

STATEMENT OF

D.J. GRIBBIN
CHIEF COUNSEL
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 22, 2005

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on issues concerning the Boston Central Artery/Tunnel (CA/T) project. 

The Central Artery/Tunnel project is nearing completion.  This $14.6 billion project has been the largest, most expensive, and most complex highway project in U. S. history.  With the opening of the full I-93 southbound portion of the project in March, the Central Artery/Tunnel project is 96% complete, and substantial completion is scheduled by October of this year.

This ambitious project will provide countless benefits to the city of Boston in the way of enhancing safety, easing traffic congestion, improving mobility, providing acres of open parkland to city residents, and reconnecting communities severed by the old elevated highway.  And the Central Artery/Tunnel project has reshaped the way the Department of Transportation approaches major project oversight.  This project has taught us many important lessons in highway project management and has provided us with a solid framework for oversight of major projects in the future.  Today, I would like to share with the Committee the efforts underway within the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to ensure proper oversight on this important project, and in the areas of Oversight of Federal Funding and Cost Recovery in Major Projects, Construction and Quality Assurances, and Major Project Oversight in general. 

Before I go further, however, in response to concerns that we have heard I wish to take this opportunity to restate our conclusion that the Central Artery, including the tunnels that are part of this project, are safe for public travel.  We will not compromise on safety.  Safety is the Department of Transportation’s top priority.  Later in this statement I will describe our ongoing oversight activities that lead us to conclude that these tunnels are safe.  And, I will describe the recommendations contained in our Interim Tunnel Leak Assessment Report that will ensure the long-term safety of the CA/T tunnels and protect the public’s investment in this project.

Oversight of Federal Funds in Major Projects

Within the Federally assisted, State-administered Federal-aid highway program, FHWA responsibilities are governed by Title 23 of the United States Code.  The FHWA’s primary responsibility is to protect the Federal investment by ensuring Federal funds disbursed to the States are spent consistent with Federal requirements and national transportation policy objectives. 

In March 2000, a Federal Task Force on the Boston Central Artery/Tunnel Project, established by FHWA in response to recommendations from the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), made 34 recommendations for improved FHWA oversight activities.  Key among these were greater disclosure, the need for more timely information being made available to the public and the public oversight agencies, and the independent annual FHWA assessment of costs and revenues.  FHWA has since implemented each of the 34 Task Force recommendations.  We believe that the processes and procedures we have implemented as a result of the Inspector General’s report and the Task Force recommendations will not only keep the Central Artery/Tunnel project on track for successful completion, but have further provided a strong framework for oversight of all major projects.

Seventeen of the thirty-four Task Force recommendations dealt with items concerning the preparation of a Finance Plan.  These items included establishing a national policy on the preparation and review of Finance Plans for major projects; providing an independent cost estimate of the project by FHWA on an annual basis; providing an independent certification of the Finance Plan information by another state agency; and including contingency plans to cover potential revenue shortfalls or cost overruns. 

Finance Plan Guidance for all major projects, which incorporated all of the Task Force recommendations, was issued by FHWA on May 23, 2000.  A major milestone occurred in June 2000, when FHWA, Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA) and Massachusetts Highway Department (MHD) executed a Partnership Agreement that formally implemented the Task Force recommendations.  This agreement delineates and strengthens the oversight responsibilities of, and improves communications between, the parties.  FHWA’s November 29, 2000, acceptance of the October CA/T Finance Plan and the OIG Report issued the same day indicated that the Task Force recommendations have been completed to the satisfaction of the FHWA and the Office of the Inspector General.  Implementation of the Finance Plan Guidance is a continuing activity and is reviewed each annual update cycle.

The FY 2001 DOT Appropriations Act included an $8.549 billion Federal funding cap for the CA/T and required the Office of the Inspector General to concur in the annual Finance Plan Updates before FHWA approval.  Congress also included a requirement that the Secretary withhold obligation of Federal funds and all project approvals for the CA/T project until the Inspector General reviews the annual financial plan updates for compliance with FHWA guidance.  With the Inspector General’s concurrence, FHWA accepted the October 2003 Update of the CA/T project’s Finance Plan showing a $14.625 billion project cost estimate on June 9, 2004.  Approval of the October 2004 CA/T Finance Plan Update is pending completion of the Federal review.  Given the likelihood that the 2004 Update will be the last formal Finance Plan because the project is nearing completion, additional time for review may be required.

FHWA recognizes that providing financial oversight to major projects is an ongoing responsibility that does not end when the financial plans are approved.  As part of its oversight responsibilities concerning the CA/T, the FHWA approved the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority’s Revised Errors and Omissions Procedure and its Cost Recovery Program Action Plan in 2003, with the requirement for a quarterly status report to monitor progress in resolving more than 700 potential cost recovery items.  The MTA and the State Attorney General entered into an agreement to transfer MTA’s responsibility for the cost recovery efforts to the State Attorney General’s Office effective February 1, 2005.  Any cost recovery monies realized from the Cost Recovery Program will be shared according to the original Federal participation percentage ratio.

Construction and Quality Assurances

FHWA has a three-pronged approach to construction oversight of the CA/T Project.  This construction oversight is primarily carried out by our Massachusetts Division Office.  First, FHWA is involved at a general level to ensure that MTA and the CA/T Project have appropriate processes and procedures in place to staff and manage construction activities and ensure the quality of construction.  Some examples of this are quality control and quality assurance procedures, contract administration and financial systems to account for all monies, and audit protocols.

Second, FHWA undertakes specific reviews of the actual construction as outlined in FHWA’s Annual Construction Monitoring Plan.  The Annual Construction Monitoring Plan is developed based on the construction activities underway at the time and the knowledge of FHWA Division engineering personnel.  This annual plan prescribes the number and scope of routine inspections, phase (in-depth) inspections, and process reviews of the ongoing construction.

The third element of construction oversight is FHWA’s participation at regularly scheduled project status and issues meetings or on technical working groups.  This is another opportunity for FHWA to keep abreast of current issues and concerns, provide technical advice, promote good engineering and managerial practices, and to provide input in the evaluation and resolution of areas of concern.  Examples of these meetings include weekly meetings with CA/T Project senior staff to discuss, evaluate, and decide the course of action on major issues; area meetings; and issue resolution team meetings.

One of the recent areas of concern with the CA/T project involved leaks within the slurry wall tunnels, one of five types of tunnels constructed as part of this project.  On September 15, 2004, a breach in a Central Artery slurry wall panel allowed water to enter the northbound tunnel of I-93 for a few hours, closing down traffic lanes for repair and causing significant traffic delays.  In response, FHWA Administrator Mary Peters requested an independent FHWA engineering assessment of all tunnel leaks.  The FHWA Tunnel Leak Assessment Team conducted a leak assessment and issued its Interim Report on March 23, 2005. 

In its report, the Leak Assessment Team states that the project is appropriately addressing the tunnel leaks.  The September 15, 2004, slurry wall breach appears to be isolated to a discrete section of the tunnel and is primarily the result of poor quality control during construction, not a defective design.  The contractor responsible for this section of the tunnel has successfully installed an interim repair and has submitted a design for the permanent fix while the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority completes an investigation of all slurry wall panels.  The MTA is reviewing plans for the permanent repair and has sent plans to FHWA for review.  FHWA will approve the proposal once it is satisfied that it will fully provide for a repair that is structurally sound, is durable and watertight, is relatively maintenance-free, and minimizes disruption to nearby structures, property, and the traveling public.

As of April 13, 2005, approximately 1,600 of the 2,000 panels, or 80%, had been inspected.  102 defects have been discovered to date, of which two require major repair.  Repair of some of the minor defects was initiated on March 28, 2005.  The contractor and the management consultant will bear the costs associated with the investigation and repair of these panels.

As a result of the September 15, 2004, breach, emphasis has been placed on other low-level leaks (defined in the Leak Assessment Team’s report as leaks of lesser magnitude ranging from dampness to dripping type leaks) that the project has been fixing as a normal part of the construction of the I-93 tunnels.  The Leak Assessment Team’s Interim Report notes that the project continues to manage the tunnel leak sealing efforts in a methodical way.  The total number of points where sealant needs to be injected to complete all leak repairs is estimated to be between 1,800 and 3,585 injection points.  As of April 13, 2005, almost 1,100 low-level leaks had been sealed, and it is estimated that the project is on track to have all of the low-level leaks sealed by the October project completion date.  The cost of this work is the responsibility of the mainline tunnel contractors, not the taxpayers.  Based on the Leak Assessment Team’s analysis, adequate resources have currently been allocated to ensure this work is completed by the substantial completion date of the project, and progress is being monitored to determine if additional resources may be required in the future.  FHWA will continue to monitor these efforts and will issue a subsequent report upon completion of all repairs.

Major Project Oversight

The Central Artery/Tunnel project has pioneered many aspects of mega-project development, engineering, and construction.  As a result of the unprecedented scope and complexity of this project, FHWA has reshaped the approach we take in major project oversight.  The CA/T experience has taught us many lessons on how we must oversee major projects and has raised the bar on standards for highway project management.

Major projects present unique challenges and require a different approach to oversight than the typical Federally assisted project.  It is not uncommon for a major project to consist of hundreds of contracts over a period of a decade or more, potentially costing a significant portion of a State’s annual program.  They also differ from typical projects in that once a commitment is made to build the project, many years may separate the initial contracts and the final contracts.  This long timeframe increases the risks for cost escalation and schedule delays, which can severely impact a State’s overall program. 

To address these risks, Congress enacted legislation to require finance plans for all projects with an estimated cost of $1 billion or more.  Review and approval of finance plans and annual updates, along with project-level review and approval authority, enable us to measure and track costs over the life of major projects. 

FHWA is committed to assigning a Major Project Oversight Manager to each major project.  These managers are involved on a daily basis with the project owners and can avail themselves of the current data that are captured by the project’s accounting and management systems.  FHWA, in coordination with the Office of the Inspector General, has developed a monthly reporting system for all active and potential mega projects, which managers of major projects can use to update the status of such projects on a monthly basis. 

FHWA also has established a Major Projects Team, which provides support to the major project managers from FHWA headquarters.  The Team has developed and maintains a Resource Manual for Oversight Managers which is posted on FHWA Mega-projects website.  The Manual includes information in the areas of “Core Competencies” and “Lessons Learned,” as well as guidance for developing project management plans and estimating costs for mega-projects. 

We are ensuring that appropriate performance objectives exist for each Project Oversight Manager and are establishing a common set of personnel objectives for each manager that will clearly establish their roles and responsibilities.  To this end, the FHWA has developed a training course on project management for executives involved in the oversight of mega-projects.

Beyond these oversight activities that FHWA already has in place, the Administration’s reauthorization proposal, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA), includes several key proposals with regard to stewardship and oversight.  Many of these changes are the direct result of the suggestions offered by the Office of the Inspector General.  Among these are:

1. The establishment of an oversight program to monitor the effective and efficient use of funds authorized under Title 23 with a specific focus on financial integrity and project delivery.  Annual reviews will be performed to address elements of State’s financial management systems and project delivery systems based on risk assessments.
2. The development of standards/guidance for estimating project costs, and the periodic evaluation of State practices for estimating project costs, awarding contracts, and reducing project costs.
3. The establishment of a requirement that project management plans are submitted for projects with an estimated cost of $1 billion or more.
4. The establishment of a requirement that a finance plan be prepared for projects with an estimated cost of $100 million or more.

Additionally, FHWA is implementing a Risk Management Program that will facilitate the development of an overall agency plan for FHWA stewardship and oversight initiatives that links to high-risk areas, and, in the FY 2006 budget, FHWA is proposing to add an additional six FTEs in order to provide a dedicated project oversight manager for each active mega-project.

Conclusion

FHWA remains committed to constantly improving its oversight practices and procedures for the CA/T, and for all major projects.  We are pleased to have implemented all of the Office of the Inspector General’s recommendations, and we believe that with the Inspector General’s assistance, we have created a major projects oversight plan that will serve us well in the future.

STATEMENT OF

STACEY L. GERARD
ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR/CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE

April 5, 2005

Mr. Chairman, I am Stacey L. Gerard, the Acting Assistant Administrator/Chief Safety Officer of PHMSA, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration of the Department of Transportation.  With me is Robert McGuire, PHMSA’s Associate Administrator for the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety.   Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the Department’s ongoing efforts to improve the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials. 

Before I begin, I would like to note an important milestone.  This is the first appearance of an official of the new Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration before your Committee.   Our new organization reflects the Department’s longstanding commitment to the safety of our Nation’s pipeline infrastructure and our continuing emphasis on the safety and security of commercial shipments of hazardous materials by all modes of transport.  The importance of this new organization is underscored by the fact that our regulatory authority for safety covers 28% of the ton freight moved annually in the United States.

PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety is responsible for a comprehensive, nationwide program designed to protect the Nation from the risks to life, health, property, and the environment inherent in the commercial transportation of hazardous materials.

Hazardous materials are essential to the economy of the United States and the well-being of its people.  Hazardous materials fuel automobiles, and heat and cool homes and offices, and are used for farming and medical applications and in manufacturing, mining, and other industrial processes.   More than 3 billion tons of regulated hazardous materials – including explosive, poisonous, corrosive, flammable, and radioactive materials – are transported in this country each year.  There are over 800,000 daily shipments of hazardous materials moving by plane, train, truck, or vessel in quantities ranging from several ounces to many thousands of gallons.  These shipments frequently move through densely populated or sensitive areas where the consequences of an incident could be loss of life or serious environmental damage.  Our communities, the public, and workers engaged in hazardous materials commerce count on these shipments being safe and secure.

Safety continues to be Secretary Mineta’s highest priority, and it is the first priority for the hazardous materials safety program.  Overall, the safety record for the transportation of hazardous materials is excellent.  Over the past ten years, 221 fatalities were caused by incidents involving hazardous materials in transportation, and half of those were due to a single event, the Valujet tragedy in 1996.  While every casualty is one too many, in the context of 800,000 daily shipments, this is a remarkable record. 

Since 9/11, we have moved aggressively to recognize and address security issues associated with the commercial transportation of hazardous materials.  In the wrong hands, hazardous materials could pose a significant security threat.   Hazardous materials in transportation are frequently transported in substantial quantities and are potentially vulnerable to sabotage or misuse.  Such materials are already mobile and are frequently transported in proximity to large population centers.  Further, security of hazardous materials in the transportation environment poses unique challenges as compared to security at fixed facilities.  Finally, hazardous materials in transportation often bear clear identifiers to ensure their safe and appropriate handling during transportation and to facilitate identification and effective emergency response in the event of an accident or release.

Hazardous materials safety and security are two sides of the same coin.  Congress legislated its intent that “hazmat safety [was] to include hazmat security” when it enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  Section 1711 of that act amended the Federal hazardous materials transportation law to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce” and to provide that the Hazardous Materials Regulations “shall govern safety aspects, including security, of the transportation of hazardous material the Secretary considers appropriate.”   DOT shares responsibility for hazardous materials transportation security with the Department of Homeland Security.  The two departments consult and coordinate concerning security-related hazardous materials transportation requirements to assure that they are consistent with the overall security policy goals and objectives established by DHS and that the regulated industry is not confronted with inconsistent security regulations promulgated by multiple agencies. 

PHMSA’s hazardous materials transportation safety and security program is focused on four principal areas.  First, we have in place comprehensive regulations for the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials.  Second, we help shippers and carriers understand the regulations and how to comply with them.  Third, we identify those persons who refuse or neglect to comply with safety and security requirements and stop their illegal activities.  Finally, we assist the Nation’s response community to plan for and respond to hazardous materials transportation emergencies.  Throughout the remainder of my testimony, I will highlight actions we have taken in all of these areas to enhance hazardous materials transportation safety and security.

Regulations Development

            The Hazardous Materials Regulations – or HMR – are designed to achieve three goals:

1. To ensure that hazardous materials are packaged and handled safely during transportation;
2. To provide effective communication to transportation workers and emergency responders of the hazards of the materials being transported; and
3. To minimize the consequences of an incident should one occur.

The hazardous material regulatory system is a risk management system that is prevention-oriented and focused on identifying a safety or security hazard and reducing the probability and quantity of a hazardous material release.  We collect and analyze data on hazardous materials – incidents, regulatory actions, and enforcement activity – to determine the safety and security risks associated with the transportation of hazardous materials and the best ways to mitigate those risks.  Under the HMR, hazardous materials are categorized by analysis and experience into hazard classes and packing groups based upon the risks they present during transportation.  The HMR specify appropriate packaging and handling requirements for hazardous materials, and require a shipper to communicate the material's hazards through use of shipping papers, package marking and labeling, and vehicle placarding.    The HMR also require shippers to provide emergency response information applicable to the specific hazard or hazards of the material being transported.  Finally, the HMR mandate training requirements for persons who prepare hazardous materials for shipment or who transport hazardous materials in commerce.  The HMR also include operational requirements applicable to each mode of transportation.

            In 2003, we published a final rule to require shippers and carriers of certain highly hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans.  The security plan must include an assessment of possible transportation security risks and appropriate measures to address the assessed risks.  At a minimum, the security plan must address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security.  For personnel security, the plan must include measures to confirm information provided by job applicants for positions that involve access to and handling of the hazardous materials covered by the plan.  For unauthorized access, the plan must include measures to address the risk that unauthorized persons may gain access to materials or transport conveyances being prepared for transportation.  For en route security, the plan must include measures to address security risks during transportation, including shipments stored temporarily en route to their destinations.  The final rule also included new security awareness training requirements for all hazardous materials employees and in-depth security training requirements for employees of persons required to develop and implement security plans.

            We continue to seek ways to assure the security of hazardous materials shipments.  For example, we are working with DHS to examine ways to enhance the security of rail shipments of materials that are classified as Toxic by Inhalation (TIH).   Under the HMR, TIH materials are gases or liquids that are known or presumed on the basis of tests to be toxic to humans and to pose a hazard to health in the event of a release during transportation.  TIH materials play a vital role in our society, including purifying water supplies, fertilizing crops, providing fundamental components in manufacturing, and fueling the space shuttle.  TIH materials pose special risks during transportation because their uncontrolled release can endanger significant numbers of people.  Because of the importance of ensuring their safe and secure transportation, TIH materials are among the most stringently regulated hazardous materials.   DHS and DOT are examining the feasibility of specific security enhancements, including potential costs and benefits.  Security measures being considered include improvements to security plans, modification of methods used to identify shipments, enhanced requirements for temporary storage, strengthened tank car integrity, and implementation of tracking and communication systems.

In addition to a new focus on security issues, PHMSA’s hazardous materials regulatory program has recently finalized regulations in a number of important areas.  For example, in December 2004, we amended the HMR to prohibit the transportation of primary lithium batteries and cells as cargo on board passenger aircraft.  Primary lithium batteries and cells pose an unacceptable fire risk for passenger aircraft.  

Further, we amended the incident reporting requirements in the HMR to improve the usefulness of data collected for risk analysis and management by government and industry.  The new incident reporting regulations include a requirement for carriers to report undeclared shipments when they are discovered. 

International Standards Harmonization

The continually increasing amount of hazardous materials transported in international commerce warrants the harmonization of domestic and international transportation requirements to the greatest extent possible.  Harmonization serves to facilitate international transportation while helping to assure the protection of people, property, and the environment.   The HMR provide that both domestic and international shipments of hazardous materials may be offered for transportation and transported under provisions of international standards applicable to air or vessel transportation of hazardous materials or the Canadian hazardous materials standards.  In this way, carriers are able to train their hazmat employees in a single set of requirements for the classification, packaging, communication of hazards, handling, stowage, and the like, thereby minimizing the possibility of improperly transporting a shipment of hazardous materials because of differences in national regulations.

Basic requirements of the HMR and these international standards are based on the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.  Indeed, most national and regional regulations, such as the European road and rail regulations, are based on the UN Recommendations, as are the regulations of some of our largest trading partners, including Mexico, Canada, and Japan.  DOT represents the United States at meetings of international standards-setting organizations concerned with the safe transportation of hazardous materials with the goal of promoting a uniform, global approach to the safe transportation of hazardous materials.  Our participation is essential to ensure that U.S. interests are considered in the development of the standards issued by these organizations.

We recently completed a rulemaking to harmonize the HMR with international standards applicable to the transportation of hazardous materials by air and vessel and to the transportation of radioactive materials.  We are currently engaged in rulemaking to harmonize HMR cylinder requirements and requirements applicable to the transportation of infectious substances with international requirements.

Outreach and Training

            Developing rigorous safety regulations that protect the public and workers engaged in hazardous materials commerce is critical to safe transportation.   But regulations cannot be effective if shippers and carriers do not understand them.  Therefore, we invest significant resources to help shippers and carriers know the regulatory requirements and how to comply with them.  Our comprehensive hazardous materials website and Hazardous Materials Information System allow easy access to vital hazardous materials data and information by industry, the public, DOT employees, hazardous materials workers, and Federal and state agencies.  We also operate a toll-free hotline service every day from 9:00 am until 5:00 pm; the hotline answers over 130 calls per day.  We hold training workshops, and we develop and provide industry and the public with many publications and training modules. 

            Since 9/11, PHMSA’s hazardous materials outreach and training program has devoted substantial time and effort to assisting shippers and carriers to comply with the new security plan requirements and to generally enhance hazardous materials transportation security.  To assist hazardous materials shippers and transporters in evaluating security risks and implementing measures to reduce those risks, we developed a security template for the Risk Management Self-Evaluation Framework or RMSEF.  RMSEF is a tool we developed through a public process to assist regulators, shippers, carriers, and emergency response personnel to examine their operations and consider how they assess and manage risk.   The security template illustrates how risk management methodology can be applied to security issues.  We also developed a Hazardous Materials Transportation Security Awareness Training Module directed at law enforcement, industry, and the hazmat community.  The training module is computer-based, posted on our website and is available free of charge on CD-ROM.  To date we have distributed over 68,000 copies of the training module.  In addition, we have developed security information, including a sample security plan, to assist farmers to comply with security plan requirements.  Finally, PHMSA’s outreach staff has conducted numerous training sessions to assist the regulated community to understand and comply with hazardous materials transportation security requirements.

Enforcement

            Although training and education are valuable tools for enhancing compliance, there will always be people who, through ignorance, negligence or as a result of knowing or intentional actions, do not comply with the hazardous materials transportation safety regulations.  Compliance enforcement efforts are thus key to PHMSA’s efforts to reduce incidents that result from unsafe operations by companies or individuals who ship or transport hazardous materials or who manufacture or test hazardous materials containers and packagings.  PHMSA enforcement specialists at our headquarters and five regional offices conduct 1,900 inspections annually of hazardous materials shippers, freight forwarders, container manufacturers and packaging requalifiers.  Since the implementation of new security requirements in the HMR, our inspectors have conducted nearly 700 inspections in which the company was required to have a security plan.  To date, 57 percent of the companies are in full compliance.  We are aggressively enforcing against those who are not.  Our sister DOT operating administrations – the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and Federal Railroad Administration – together with the United States Coast Guard, also conduct modal inspections of shippers and carriers.  To further leverage our resources, we conduct joint inspections with other Federal agencies and States. 

Emergency Response

            Despite best efforts, accidents will occur.   We have a responsibility to reduce the consequences of transportation accidents involving hazardous materials.  Thus, we play a major role in assisting the emergency response community to plan for and respond to hazardous materials transportation incidents.  Every four years, PHSMA and our partners in Canada and Mexico publish an updated version of the Emergency Response Guidebook.  We developed the Guidebook for use by “first responders” – those public safety personnel first dispatched to the scene of a hazardous materials transportation incident, such as fire fighters, police, and emergency services personnel.  The Guidebook provides first responders with a guide for initial actions to be taken in those critical first minutes after an incident to protect the public and to mitigate potential consequences.  The Guidebook has been widely hailed as the single most valuable reference for initial response to hazardous materials emergencies.  We work with our Canadian and Mexican partners and with the emergency response community and hazardous materials industry to assure its continuing accuracy and utility.   To date, we have published and distributed over 2.1 million copies of the 2004 edition of the Guidebook for first responders and others responsible for handling hazardous materials transportation emergencies in the U.S.  The Guidebook is also globally recognized and in addition to the English, French and Spanish editions produced by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, it has been translated into Chinese, Dutch, German, Hebrew, Hungarian, Japanese, Korean, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, Thai and Turkish.

            We also operate a planning and training grants program to assist local responders at hazardous materials incidents.  The possible consequences of a serious incident, even if unlikely, require that all communities develop response plans and train emergency services, fire and police personnel to assure an effective response.  The importance of planning and training cannot be overemphasized.  To a great extent, we are a nation of small towns and rural communities served by largely volunteer fire departments.  In many instances, communities’ response resources already are overextended in their efforts to meet routine emergency response needs.

            Our Emergency Preparedness Grants program provides assistance to States, territories, and Indian tribes, and, through them, to local communities.  Planning grants are made for developing, improving, and implementing emergency plans.  Training grants provide for training public sector employees to respond to accidents and incidents involving hazardous materials.  Planning and training grants are funded through registration fees paid by the hazardous materials industry.  Since the program’s inception, grantees have developed or updated an average of 3,759 plans per year with HMEP planning grant funds.   Grant program funds have been used to train over 1.7 million first responders and to compile over 43,000 local hazardous materials response plans.

Hazardous Materials Program Reauthorization

            You invited me here today specifically to discuss reauthorization of the hazardous materials transportation safety program.  We hope that the Committee’s proposal will include the proposals submitted in prior years by the Administration, as did S. 1072 in the 108^th Congress.  For example, we urge you to consider reallocating responsibilities for sanitary food transportation among the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Transportation to ensure that each aspect of the food transportation safety mission is made the responsibility of the most qualified agency.  Similarly, to address the problem of undeclared hazardous materials shipments in the mail, we support measures to provide authority for the United States Postal Service to collect civil penalties and recover costs and damages for violations of its hazardous materials regulations. 

            In addition, we would support revisions to the terms under which exemptions from the HMR may be granted.  The exemptions program permits shippers and carriers to take advantage of new technologies and improved business methods by applying for permission to deviate from existing regulatory requirements.  Applicants for exemptions must demonstrate that the new technology or improved way of doing business maintains a safety level equivalent to current regulatory requirements.  The exemptions program provides an opportunity for the testing and evaluation of technological improvements in a real-world transportation environment.  Exemptions that result in demonstrated safety and efficiency benefits are frequently converted into regulations of general applicability.  We suggest a provision to change the term “exemption” to “special permit;” we believe that this change appropriately conveys that hazardous materials transportation conducted under what are now termed exemptions is required to be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions established by PHMSA.  In addition, revising the effective period for which a renewal of a special permit may be issued from two years to four years will eliminate a great deal of unnecessary industry and government processing time and will enable PHMSA staff to focus attention on significant special permit issues rather than routine renewals.

We hope you will also consider measures to enhance our ability to enforce the hazardous materials regulations and to take swift action to identify hidden shipments and remove unsafe shipments from transportation.  Hidden hazardous materials pose a significant threat to transportation workers, emergency responders, and the general public.  Moreover, it is likely that terrorists who seek to use hazardous materials to harm Americans will move those materials as hidden shipments.   Expanding our inspection authority to permit an enforcement officer to open and examine packages suspected to contain a hazardous material will help us to address the pervasive problem of undeclared hazardous materials shipments in transportation.  Authorization for enforcement officials to remove packages from transportation if the package poses an imminent safety hazard or to issue emergency orders to stop unsafe practices that present an immediate threat will materially enhance our ability to prevent unsafe movements of hazardous materials and possible accidents resulting from such unsafe movements.   And increasing the maximum civil penalty from $27,500 to $100,000 for each violation will provide us with the flexibility to assess appropriately high civil penalties in cases involving significant non-compliance with the regulations and especially those resulting in death, serious injury, or significant property or environmental damage.

We do not support proposals to revise the registration fee program that funds the Emergency Preparedness Grants program.  Specifically, we are concerned that a cap on the maximum annual registration fee, when coupled with the significant increase to the grant program being considered by both the Senate and the House, may require us to modify our current two-level fee structure and impose substantial registration fee increases on small entities.  We are also concerned that reductions in the authorization levels for elements of the grant program may limit our ability to administer that program effectively. 

Finally, we request that you consider our proposal to reduce the area of overlap between DOT’s regulation of hazardous materials transportation and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA’s) regulation of worker protection.  The Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 gave OSHA duplicative regulatory authority over hazardous materials training, handling criteria, registration, and motor carrier safety.  In consultation with OHSA, we propose to correct the extent of shared DOT/OSHA jurisdiction by eliminating dual jurisdiction over handling criteria, registration, and motor carrier safety.  DOT and OSHA would retain their respective jurisdiction over employee training, and OSHA would retain its jurisdiction over the occupational safety or health protection of employees responding to a release of hazardous materials.

Conclusion

            We look forward to working with the Members of this committee and with Congress to enhance the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials.  At the same time, we will continue to evaluate and implement additional safety and security measures, and we will continue to work with the hazardous material transportation community and our Federal, State, and local partners to maximize the contribution that hazardous materials make to our economy while minimizing their safety and security risks.  

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear today and respond to your questions and concerns.

Statement of

Jennifer L. Dorn
Administrator
Federal Transit Administration
United States Department of Transportation

Before the

U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Highways, Transit, and Pipelines

Hearing on

"Rebuilding Highway and Transit Infrastructure on the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina"

October 20, 2005

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) regarding FTA’s activities and progress in the Gulf regions affected by Hurricane Katrina.

The weekend of August 27, our nation watched with growing concern as Hurricane Katrina strengthened across the Gulf.  Although we could not prevent landfall or deflect Katrina’s course, FTA’s regional offices were actively engaged with transit agencies prior to landfall.  In Katrina’s aftermath, FTA’s response has been focused, aggressive, and ambitious.

Public transportation is a lifeline for countless Americans.  Nowhere is that more evident than in the Gulf region disaster area.  From the start of the response effort, FTA has been providing on-site and hands-on technical assistance to transit agencies.  We have focused on freeing up transit resources to support the broad response effort, and on expediting the delivery of relief funds to support transit agencies’ long-term rebuilding efforts.

As we move forward, we are dealing with two separate but related crises.  We need to restore service in communities devastated by Hurricane Katrina, and we need to expand services in communities such as Baton Rouge that have seen their populations double almost overnight with the influx of evacuees.  FTA has met--and will continue to meet--both of these goals.

In the first days after landfall, FTA helped to provide transportation into and out of hurricane-ravaged communities. FTA coordinated with transit agencies unaffected by the disaster and with our industry partners to provide buses, equipment and personnel for the immediate response. To date, over 60 transit agencies nationwide have offered free transit for evacuees.

Communication in the aftermath of Katrina was critical--and challenging. Within the first week after landfall, FTA got vital information into the hands of our grantees through phone calls, the FTA website, and informational packets with comprehensive contact information and policy guidance. Our message was clear: using public transit vehicles to restore mobility and for emergency transportation is consistent with Federal law— and an agency priority.

Before and after Katrina, our headquarters staff and regional office staff in Atlanta and Fort Worth reached out to transit authorities in the Gulf region to ascertain their operating status and offer assistance. In the first week after landfall, once the full scope of the damage was known, we began to detail over 20 staff and seven contract teams to disaster areas across the entire affected region to help local transit authorities re-establish transit service and support the recovery effort. In Louisiana, a team of FTA regional administrators, project management oversight contractors, and transit operations consultants was deployed. This FTA team produced damage assessments and assisted both urban and rural transit authorities with service restoration plans.  Similar teams have also been assisting Mississippi and Alabama. Thus, we deployed the formidable human resources of FTA where they are needed the most.

Transit has a vital role to play in the restoration of strength and vitality to hurricane-ravaged communities. Our nation’s ability to repopulate these communities and restore economies washed away by disaster will require, among other things, local transit systems to provide transportation for workers, commuters, and families—many of whom lost their only means of getting around.

With this priority in mind, we considered ways to expedite the delivery of emergency funds for transit systems to restore service. Two weeks after landfall, on September 15, FTA announced that it would allow transit agencies affected by the hurricane to make use of federal funds to buy supplies, repair equipment, or begin reconstruction without immediately having to provide local matching funds. The local match, typically 20 percent, has been deferred for many communities in the disaster area.

This means that federal dollars already designated for these areas can flow more quickly, and we can award new grants before local funds can be identified. The Mississippi Department of Transportation became the first agency to benefit from this action, as FTA gave 22 transit bus operators access to a total of $6.1 million in FY 2005 transit formula funds to buy new vehicles, pay salaries or provide other necessities that will help restore service.

Before Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans Regional Transit Authority (NORTA) provided over 50 million transit trips per year. The system sustained considerable damage and destruction to vehicles, rail, and facilities in the hurricane’s wake. An on-site assessment of NORTA’s transit facilities was not possible until September 20. On that day, at our first opportunity, an FTA team conducted an initial damage assessment, including vehicle storage and maintenance facilities. We are still honing our estimates of recapitalization costs.

        On the same day, we worked to secure a $47 million mission assignment with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for emergency relief funds for transit services in New Orleans and Baton Rouge for a period of six months. These funds will provide existing Baton Rouge residents with more transit options and give evacuees in Baton Rouge access to vital social services, jobs, and medical care. 

            It will help returning residents of New Orleans reclaim their city.  The funds will also facilitate the re-employment of NORTA workers to establish transit service in Baton Rouge, New Orleans, and surrounding parishes. We are working to address the need for intercity services between Baton Rouge and New Orleans for recovery workers and commuters. 

On October 3, we helped to secure a $1.4 million, 60-day mission assignment with FEMA for emergency transit in the three Mississippi gulf coast counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson. FTA expects to finalize an additional 60-day mission assignment of $492,000 for the three rural Mississippi counties of Pearl River, Stone, and George. These emergency funds will give residents the mobility and freedom to go grocery shopping, apply for much-needed social services, or visit a doctor. These are small steps in the re-establishment of normal, daily routines.

I want to underscore the importance of these funds for rural communities throughout the entire region affected by the disaster. Small transit agencies, non-profit providers, and many rural areas in the Gulf region have seen demand increase dramatically as thousands of evacuees have joined their communities. But, they often do not have the excess operating capacity to meet that demand. Many have also lost buses and vans to the disaster, and staff and drivers have been displaced. In some cases, evacuees are set up in temporary housing, where public transportation does not exist. Funding for emergency services will help local authorities give residents and evacuees the basic mobility they need. It is a first, vital step in the long process of rebuilding individual lives and communities.

Our priorities for the coming months are to:

• Implement FEMA mission assignments in Louisiana and Mississippi;
• Work with the Gulf states and FEMA to fund transit service in areas that have a significant number of evacuees;
• Continue to work with transit agencies to secure FEMA emergency funding assistance for assets damaged or destroyed;
• Continue our on-site technical assistance to transit agencies in four states. This assistance ranges from identifying staff to helping with bus route planning in devastated communities. And, a final goal is to:
• Engage in the planning process, as communities invite us to do so, to ensure that transportation options are part of the future planning for cities and regions.

               I am proud of the exemplary and proactive efforts of the FTA before and after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. As with any natural disaster, Hurricane Katrina mandated us as public servants to deploy the substantial resources of the government and our own common sense to help rebuild lives and communities. In the seven weeks since Katrina made landfall, FTA has met that challenge, and we will continue to do so in the coming months. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF

MICHAEL A. CIRILLO
VICE PRESIDENT, SYSTEM OPERATIONS SERVICES
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION

ON

THE MAY 11 INCIDENT THAT LED TO THE EVACUATION
OF THE US CAPITOL, WHITE HOUSE AND SUPREME COURT

JUNE 9, 2005.

Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye, Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) responsibility in matters involving general aviation security, particularly in and around the Nation’s Capital.  This includes the role FAA played with respect to the incident that occurred on May 11, 2005, which led to the evacuation of the U.S. Capitol, the White House and the Supreme Court.  I will also discuss how FAA will help implement the Administration’s recent decision to reopen Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) to general aviation on a limited basis.  It’s a pleasure to be here with my colleague from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

As you know, since September 11^th, security in and around our Nation’s Capital has changed significantly.  With respect to aviation, a number of restrictions and procedures have been put in place that were designed to protect the significant assets in this area.  At the outset, I would note that the restrictions and requirements for operating aircraft in this area are unique.  Ordinarily, a general aviation aircraft operating at low altitudes and under visual flight rules (VFR) could operate legally within the National Airspace System without filing a flight plan or communicating with air traffic control.  Flights occur all the time around the country without direct FAA control or contact.  For obvious reasons, however, that is not the case in this area.  When aircraft approach the national capital region, we want to know who they are and where they are going. 

There are two airspace zones established around the national capital region.  There is a 2,000 square mile area surrounding Washington’s three major airports known as the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).  How flights are handled heading toward or entering the ADIZ varies depending on the existing threat level, but generally aircraft operating in the zone are required to file a flight plan, be in continuous communication with air traffic control, and have a functioning transponder that transmits a discrete or uniquely identifiable code.  Within the ADIZ and extending approximately fifteen miles around the U.S. Capitol is the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ).  Additional operating requirements apply to general aviation aircraft operating within the FRZ, including applying for and receiving a TSA and FAA waiver.

Unidentified aircraft operating in restricted airspace are taken very seriously.  FAA is a member of the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), a group comprised of representatives of security and military agencies to ensure that, in the event of a threat from an unidentified aircraft, coordinated action can be taken to appropriately address the threat and keep the region safe.

An analysis of what happened on May 11, 2005 will serve as a good example of how FAA interacts with other agencies when an unidentified aircraft approaches Washington, D.C.  At 11:28 a.m., FAA and the NCRCC became aware of an aircraft entering the ADIZ from the northeast, approximately 44 miles from DCA.  The FAA’s watch officer for key communications working with the Domestic Events Network (DEN), contacted the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (Potomac TRACON), which confirmed to participating NCRCC agencies that the aircraft was not in communication with air traffic control, had not filed a flight plan and that its transponder was transmitting a generic, rather than a unique code.  At this point, the aircraft was considered to be a track of interest (TOI).  Because the aircraft was flying just within and parallel to the northern boundary of the ADIZ, it was not considered an immediate threat and, while it was monitored closely, no intercept action was taken at this point. 

The aircraft subsequently turned southbound toward the FRZ, the second restricted zone surrounding the Capitol.  This information was communicated on the DEN to the participating NCRCC agencies.  At this point, the Customs and Border Protection Office of Marine Operations (AMO) ordered the launch of its Blackhawk helicopter and Citation jet aircraft from DCA.  In addition, two F-16 aircraft were scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base.  The AMO Blackhawk initially intercepted the aircraft about 10 miles north of the Capitol.  When the aircraft continued to proceed south toward the Capitol, the F-16s moved in to intercept.  The aircraft was visually identified as a high-winged, single-engine Cessna-type aircraft. 

Attempts by the Blackhawk helicopter to signal to the pilots of the Cessna and get them to communicate on an emergency frequency were initially unsuccessful.  At noon, the Department of Defense authorized the F-16 pilots to use flares.  The flares were dispensed when the aircraft was 6.7 miles from DCA.  At this time, the Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol Police made the decision to evacuate the White House and the Capitol, respectively.  The Blackhawk continued to signal to the pilots to get them to communicate with them.  Ultimately, the Cessna pilots were able to make contact with the AMO Citation on an emergency frequency and the Cessna turned west.  The Cessna proceeded through the prohibited airspace over the Naval Observatory with the F-16s in escort.  As the aircraft exited the FRZ, the Blackhawk joined the escort north.

The Potomac TRACON reported on the DEN that the pilots were in communication with air traffic controllers at 12:22 p.m.  The pilots reported to the controllers that they had been instructed to proceed to the airport in Frederick, Maryland.  Escorted by the Blackhawk and the F-16s, the aircraft exited the ADIZ at12:25 p.m. and landed in Frederick at 12:39 p.m.  During the flight, Potomac TRACON controllers communicated with the pilots several times to tell them how far they were from the airport and to warn them to look for other VFR traffic.  There was little communication back from the pilots of the light aircraft to the controllers during the flight. 

The Secret Service sounded the all clear at the White House at 12:14 p.m. and the U.S. Capitol Police sounded the all clear at 12:40 p.m.  Upon landing, the occupants of the aircraft were taken into custody by the FBI, Secret Service, and Maryland state authorities for questioning. 

In this instance, we consider the interaction of the agencies to have worked as intended.  The communication and interface that took place during this incident were an improvement over the interagency communication that took place during the incident last June involving the Governor of Kentucky’s plane which, on approach to DCA, was known to FAA controllers, but appeared as an unidentified aircraft to the other members of the NCRCC.  By contrast, on May 11th, the decision to evacuate the Capitol and the White House was made by the U.S. Capitol Police and the Secret Service based on the accurate information that an unknown aircraft operator had penetrated the ADIZ and the FRZ, was heading toward the Capitol, and was not immediately responding to the intercept.  Once the aircraft changed direction away from the areas of concern, an all clear was announced.  All agencies in the NCRCC learned from the June 2004 event and, as a result, today, both FAA controllers and NCRCC members are seeing and acting on the same information.

After federal and state authorities questioned the occupants of the aircraft, they determined that there was no criminal intent involved in their actions and they were released.  One of the individuals, Hayden L. Sheaffer, held an FAA pilot’s license.  The other individual, Troy Donovan Martin, holds a student pilot certificate.  Although Mr. Martin was manipulating the controls of the aircraft during the entire incident in question, Mr. Sheaffer, by virtue of being the only fully certificated airman in the aircraft, was pilot-in-command of the flight.  As such, he failed to navigate properly and to check adequately for, and adhere to, airspace restrictions during the flight.  This resulted in the aircraft penetrating the Class B airspace around BWI Airport, the restricted airspace around the national capital region (both the ADIZ and the FRZ), and the prohibited airspace over the Naval Observatory without authorization and in violation of FAA regulations and procedures.  His inability to navigate adequately, his lack of knowledge of how to respond to an intercept, his failure to communicate with air traffic control despite being lost in controlled and restricted airspace, have led FAA to conclude that he lacks the qualification required to hold an airman pilot’s certificate.  Therefore, on May 20, 2005, FAA issued an emergency order revoking Mr. Sheaffer’s pilot’s license.  The emergency nature of the order means that the revocation is effective immediately.  Mr. Sheaffer appealed both the merits of the revocation and the emergency nature of the action to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).  On June 3, 2005, an NTSB administrative law judge (ALJ) sustained the emergency nature of FAA’s revocation and set a hearing date of June 15 and 16 to adjudicate the merits of the action. 

The ALJ’s ruling could be appealed to the members of the NTSB.  A final NTSB decision is appealable to the U.S. Courts of Appeal.  Because Mr. Sheaffer’s case is ongoing, I am limited in what I can discuss with respect to our investigation and subsequent enforcement action. 

While Mr. Sheaffer’s case received an extraordinary amount of media attention due to how far into the ADIZ and FRZ he penetrated and the resulting evacuations, ADIZ violations are fairly common around the D.C. area.  Most are inadvertent and the pilots do not travel very far into the restricted area.  Although not all pilot deviations have resulted in enforcement action, the FAA has taken enforcement action against approximately 600 pilots for violations of the ADIZ since the beginning of calendar year 2003.  Our sanction guidance recommends a 30 to 90 day suspension of a pilot’s license for a typical ADIZ violation.  However, that guidance does not preclude imposing a more severe sanction should the circumstances warrant.  In one case, a revocation was sustained due to the intentional nature of the violation.  The case against Mr. Sheaffer is not just an ADIZ case.  It involves his basic qualifications to hold an airman pilot certificate.

The other major security issue concerning general aviation in this area is the continued restriction in place that effectively prevents general aviation aircraft from using Reagan National Airport.  This restriction has been in place since September 11, 2001.  I know that this Committee has long supported reopening National Airport to general aviation and I am pleased to say that on May 25, 2005, the Administration, under the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA announced a plan to do just that.  As the agency that has control over the airspace, FAA’s role in implementing this plan is critical, but limited.

FAA will work with TSA and other stakeholders to solidify all procedures and requirements necessary to implement the Administration’s plan.  The FAA’s representatives at the NCRCC and the DEN will develop procedures to timely disseminate and validate information on all approved aircraft and operators.  We are working on a Web based program to streamline this process.  FAA will also be responsible for issuing advisory circulars and notices to airmen to pilots that include all new procedures put in place.  At this time, we do not anticipate that approved general aviation aircraft will be required to install special equipment beyond what would already be required.  Obviously, reintroducing general aviation to DCA will be monitored closely by all interested agencies and adjustments to the plan may be made as necessary.  We see the announcement of this plan as a significant benefit for general aviation in the DC area.

In conclusion, I would like to say that, although the May 11 incident was disturbing and resulted in an evacuation of thousands of people, causing alarm and uncertainty for a period of time, the system worked as it was designed to.  NCRCC member agencies coordinated their decisions based on accurate information that was shared in real time.  While it is always appropriate after an event such as this to review whether and to what extent the government’s responses were proper, from a coordination and communication standpoint, the FAA believes the system worked.

This concludes my statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.