JULY 21, 2005

Chairman Davis, Congressman Waxman, Members of the Committee:

My name is Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and I’m pleased to appear before you today to discuss how air traffic is controlled in restricted airspace and how the government manages and coordinates air defense.  FAA has always worked to ensure that our nation’s airspace is managed efficiently, effectively, and, most importantly, safely.  Prior to September 11^th, FAA’s air traffic management focused primarily on improving communications with users of the national airspace system (NAS) to manage the dynamic weather, traffic, and airport capacity issues that arose to maximize capacity and efficiency without compromising safety.  Since September 11^th, the FAA has redoubled our efforts to improve communications with our counterpart agencies to ensure that we can respond to the dynamic security issues that may arise at any time.

As security has become a greater focus of managing air traffic, and responsibility for security has been concentrated in the Department of Homeland Security, it is appropriate that a clarification of who controls the airspace, under what circumstances and why should be reviewed and explained.  The FAA was created in 1958 to provide a centralized focus for aviation, replacing an ineffective system of diffused authorities that had evolved over time.  Prior to 1958, the functions of the FAA  were splintered – the Civil Aeronautics Authority under the Department of Commerce possessed day-to-day air traffic control responsibilities; the Civil Aeronautics Board possessed accident investigation and safety regulatory responsibilities; and an Airways Modernization Board had responsibility for planning and developing a system of air navigation facilities; and an interagency Air Coordinating Committee had, until shortly before, reviewed all matters involving the use of airspace.  It was clear that this approach to managing the national airspace was inefficient and ineffectual. 

The legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAAct) makes clear that Congress wanted one independent agency with “plenary authority” over the nation’s airspace.  Legislative history notes that the bill to create the FAA is intended to address two fundamental deficiencies in the Federal Government’s aviation responsibilities, one of which was a “lack of clear statutory authority for centralized airspace management.”  The report stated that, “the bill proposes to vest in a single Administrator plenary authority for airspace management.  If such authority is once again fractionalized and made subject to committee or panel decision, the evil will be continued.”  The “evil” that the report alludes to included the problems that developed before 1958 when it was not clear who, i.e., a particular civilian agency or the military, had the sole authority over air traffic, airspace and other aviation safety issues.  These problems led to aviation accidents, including midair collisions.

Although Congress passed various statutory amendments, including those relating to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, during and after the formation of the Department of Homeland Defense and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), it did not alter the FAA’s status.  The current statutory framework for the Administrator’s airspace authority and the accompanying legislative history confirm that the FAA continues to be the sole authority for airspace management, air traffic regulatory authority, and use of airspace.  

Even in circumstances that potentially affect the national defense, whereby the Secretary of Defense has an interest in articulating the views of the military, it is the Administrator – in consultation with the Secretary of Defense – who decides to establish areas in the airspace that are necessary for national defense.  Section 40107(b) of title 49, United States Code, provides that in the event of war, the President may transfer to the Secretary of Defense (by executive order) a duty, power, activity, or facility of the FAA.  Executive Order 1161, dated July 7, 1964, directs the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation to prepare and develop plans, procedures, policies, programs and courses of action in anticipation of the probable transfer of the FAA to the DOD in the event of war.  Furthermore, both Departments are instructed that consistent with the above and in the event of war, these provisions are to be accomplished smoothly and rapidly.  To that end, the FAA and the DOD entered into several MOUs setting forth agreements on certain procedures and policies for military exercises and missions.  FAA and various parts of the military entered into subsequent MOUs to address a variety of air traffic control issues to accommodate military training operations and military missions.  Unlike the statutory provision of § 40107(b), which explicitly provide for the transfer of a duty, power, activity or facility of the FAA to the military in the event of war, no such provision exists in regard to the transfer of any duty, power, activity or facility from the FAA to any other agency or entity. 

With respect to airspace security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works closely with, consults and coordinates with FAA as appropriate, but it has no authority to circumvent FAA’s operational control.  It is vital that FAA defer to TSA’s security expertise in order to facilitate executing security enhancing aviation procedures as necessary.  It is equally important that TSA defer to FAA’s operational and safety expertise in order to provide to TSA the required support in the manner that is safest for all operators in the NAS.  Section 114(g) of title 49, United States Code, clearly underscores that TSA’s security role does not preempt or supersede the FAA’s own safety and security authority.

It is important to acknowledge and preserve the respective roles and expertise among the DoD, TSA, and FAA.  It is equally important that we coordinate our actions and activities together to provide maximum effectiveness.

Recognizing the need to delineate clear lines of authority and responsibility and establish open communication, the FAA and various other agencies have entered into a number of agreements and/or memoranda of understanding.  By establishing cooperative interagency relationships that emphasize organizational capabilities, we are improving service to and relationships with each other, other Federal, State, and local agencies, non-governmental stakeholders, and the American public and Tribal Nations.  These agreements define strategic relationships with an aim towards identifying and leveraging respective core competencies, capabilities, resources, and authorities to enhance the safety and security of aviation and commercial space transportation in the United States; to promote efficiency of government and reduce overall costs; to minimize the adverse economic and regulatory impact of measures required of the public and regulated entities; and to achieve national performance security goals for the National Airspace System. 

The greatest evidence of the open sharing of information and joint decision making efforts amongst the various agencies as it relates to aviation is the operation of the “DEN,” the Domestic Events Network.  The DEN is a 24/7 operational center that links the Transportation Security Administration, United States Secret Service, Federal Marshall Service and other components of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, North American Air Defense Command, U.S. Park Police, U.S. Capitol Police, local law enforcement agencies, and others as needed.  It is set up to respond to emergency situations quickly – in real time.  It is set up so that operational personnel and political appointees in many agencies can be tied together quickly to share information and rapidly decide on a course of action. 

While the DEN monitors events nationwide, the majority of restricted airspace violations occur in and around the Washington, D.C. area.  Although there is restricted airspace throughout the country depending on events that are occurring, nowhere is the airspace more regulated on an ongoing basis than here in Washington.  Unidentified aircraft operating in restricted airspace are taken very seriously.  FAA is a member of the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC), a group comprised of representatives of security and military agencies to ensure that, in the event of a threat from an unidentified aircraft, coordinated action can be taken to appropriately address the threat and keep the region safe.

An analysis of what happened on May 11, 2005 will serve as a good example of how FAA interacts with other agencies when an unidentified aircraft approaches Washington, D.C.  At 11:28 a.m., FAA and the NCRCC became aware of an aircraft entering restricted airspace from the northeast, approximately 44 miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA).  The FAA’s watch officer for key communications working with the DEN, contacted the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (Potomac TRACON), which confirmed to participating NCRCC agencies that the aircraft was not in communication with air traffic control, had not filed a flight plan and that its transponder was transmitting a generic, rather than a unique code, which essentially meant that FAA did not know who the aircraft was.  At this point, the aircraft was considered to be a track of interest (TOI).  Because the aircraft was flying just within and parallel to the northern boundary of the restricted zone, it was not considered an immediate threat and, while it was monitored closely, no intercept action was taken at this point. 

The aircraft subsequently turned southbound toward the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), the second restricted zone surrounding the Capitol.  This information was communicated on the DEN to the participating NCRCC agencies.  At this point, the Customs and Border Protection Office of Marine Operations (AMO) ordered the launch of its Blackhawk helicopter and Citation jet aircraft from DCA.  In addition, two F-16 aircraft were scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base.  The AMO Blackhawk initially intercepted the aircraft about 10 miles north of the Capitol.  When the aircraft continued to proceed south toward the Capitol, the F-16s moved in to intercept.  The aircraft was visually identified as a high-winged, single-engine Cessna-type aircraft. 

Attempts by the Blackhawk helicopter to signal to the pilots of the Cessna and get them to communicate on an emergency frequency were initially unsuccessful.  At noon, the Department of Defense authorized the F-16 pilots to use flares.  The flares were dispensed when the aircraft was 6.7 miles from DCA.  At this time, the Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol Police made the decision to evacuate the White House and the Capitol, respectively.  The Blackhawk continued to signal to the pilots to get them to communicate with them.  Ultimately, the Cessna pilots were able to make contact with the AMO Citation on an emergency frequency and the Cessna turned west.  The Cessna proceeded through the prohibited airspace over the Naval Observatory with the F-16s in escort.  As the aircraft exited the FRZ, the Blackhawk joined the escort north.

The Potomac TRACON reported on the DEN that the pilots were in communication with air traffic controllers at 12:22 p.m.  The pilots reported to the controllers that they had been instructed to proceed to the airport in Frederick, Maryland.  Escorted by the Blackhawk and the F-16s, the aircraft exited restricted airspace at 12:25 p.m. and landed in Frederick at 12:39 p.m.  During the flight, Potomac TRACON controllers communicated with the pilots several times to tell them how far they were from the airport and to warn them to look for other VFR traffic.  Upon landing, the occupants of the aircraft were taken into custody by the FBI, Secret Service, and Maryland state authorities for questioning. 

In this instance, we consider the interaction of the agencies to have worked as intended.  The communication and interface that took place during this incident were an improvement over the interagency communication that took place during the incident last June involving the Governor of Kentucky’s plane which, on approach to DCA, was known to FAA controllers, but appeared as an unidentified aircraft to the other members of the NCRCC.  By contrast, on May 11th, the decision to evacuate the Capitol and the White House was made by the U.S. Capitol Police and the Secret Service based on the accurate information that an unknown aircraft operator had penetrated restricted airspace and the FRZ, was heading toward the Capitol, and was not immediately responding to the intercept.  Once the aircraft changed direction away from the areas of concern, an all clear was announced.  All agencies in the NCRCC learned from the June 2004 event and, as a result, today, both FAA controllers and NCRCC members are seeing and acting on the same information.

It is always appropriate for the Federal Government to review incidents, such as the one that occurred on May 11^th in order to determine if improvements in how these incursions are handled can be made.  Toward this end, I am aware that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has prepared a report at the request of Chairman Davis on the management improvements that are needed throughout government to address violations of restricted airspace.  As I’ve noted, FAA takes these incursions very seriously.  We will continue to work with GAO, other federal agencies and Congress to improve airspace security through better coordination, clarification of information and definitions, and development of protocols to share our available information (including data on violations) with eligible recipients. 

Finally, I think it is important to note that, although we must continue to be vigilant with respect to these incursions, to date, the overwhelming majority of incursions into restricted airspace around in the Washington, D.C. area were made inadvertently.  Of the restricted airspace violations made since September 11^th, there was only one instance in which the pilot was found to have penetrated the restricted area intentionally.  This violation resulted in the FAA revoking the pilot’s certificate.  The combination of better pilot education, dissemination of information on airspace restrictions, and enforcement against violators is having an impact on the number of violations taking place.  We are open to any recommendations GAO makes to further improve the security of flight restricted zones.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement.  I will be happy to answer your questions at this time.

before the

Subcommittee on Railroads,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
U.S. House of Representatives

April 28, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of Secretary Mineta and Acting Administrator Jamison, to discuss new rail safety technologies.  Safety is our top priority, and the promise that technology holds to improve safety is compelling.  Recent statistics show that the industry as a whole is getting safer, but the spate of recent, highly publicized accidents shows that there is still room for improvement, and we must accelerate the rate of progress.  We are addressing these issues through better use of data, focusing oversight and inspection resources, and accelerating research in key areas. 

In general, the safety trends on the Nation’s railroads are favorable.  The preliminary data for calendar year 2004 show that since 2003, total  accidents/incidents are down 3.92 percent, and total employee casualties are down 8.75 percent.

However, not all trends are positive.  Improvements in the rate of train accidents have slowed, and significant accidents continue to occur.  Human factors and track continue to be the leading causes of accidents. 

FRA is committed to improving this record, and we are focusing on ways to prevent train accidents and–where they are not prevented–to mitigate their consequences.  I will focus my testimony on innovative new technologies that hold great promise to improve railroad safety.

Track Inspection

Track defects accounted for 34 percent of derailments over the last five years.  To address this accident cause, FRA has an active research program for developing and deploying enhanced track inspection systems as a preventive approach to reducing track accidents by detecting defects before they can cause an accident.

I wish to briefly describe some of the key systems for track inspection that FRA is currently developing: 

1. Automated joint bar inspection system:  While derailments due to broken joint bars are infrequent, on some occasions they have severe consequences.  Current joint bar inspection practices rely primarily on visual inspection and, in a few cases, hand mapping with ultrasonic probes. These methods are not only time intensive; they are prone to human errors of interpretation and fail to detect all cracks.  To provide an alternative, FRA is developing a high-speed photo inspection system that will identify the presence of a joint bar in continuous welded rail (CWR), take a high-resolution, high-quality picture of the gage and field sides of the joint bar, and use pattern-recognition software to automatically detect a crack and create a report for use by the railroad.  Initial tests of this technology are promising.  The tests show that a prototype system mounted to a hi-rail vehicle and operated at speeds of 30 miles per hour was able to detect all cracked bars identified by visual inspection, as well as additional cracks undetected by the human eye. 

2. Track geometry measurement systems: Track gage, which is the distance between the two rails, must be maintained to certain tolerances for safe rail operation.  Wide track gage is the single leading cause of derailments.  FRA actively monitors track geometry through the deployment of its full-scale measurement cars, the T-2000 and the T-16, on numerous rail routes supporting passenger and hazardous materials transportation.  Another specialized inspection car, the FRA T-18, has been deployed for inspections since January of this year.  It applies gage spreading loads to measure the dynamic gage widening (which is the short-term widening caused by the passage of heavy equipment), therefore allowing identification of spots with weak tie and rail fastener conditions, which may not be detectable by visual inspection.  Technology enhancements are continuously being added to these measurement cars to improve their inspection effectiveness, and to provide real-time analyses for better assessment of track conditions.  One example is the integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation data with all detected defects to allow for accurate mapping of their location to within a few feet.  This capability facilitates further field inspection and removal of the defect.  Another is the deployment of optical and laser non-contact sensors for more accurate mapping of track geometry at much greater operating speeds.  Our T-16 car can be towed at speeds of up to 140 mph and still manage to measure track alignment, gage, cross-level, and profile once per foot.  Our T-18 represents an innovation in track inspection through the use of an independent axle for applying the gage spreading loads, which permits safer testing at faster track speeds.  Another promising technology currently under development at FRA is the development of intelligent systems for real-time assessment of the measured geometry based on a predicted response from an array of rail cars.  This capability will allow better identification of hazardous locations where a combination of near-defects can create a potential for derailment.  FRA is also developing an autonomous measurement system for mounting under a conventional rail car that can be more easily transported over the larger rail network.  This system has the capability of detecting serious track geometry defects while simultaneously sending their details to a remote location for a variety of purposes, including later repair.   We expect to test this system by September of this year.

3. FRA has developed a new and more intuitive Track Quality Index (TQI) that can be calculated from the measured track geometry and displayed onboard the T-16 inspection car.  Basically, TQI visually depicts, in real time, the relative overall condition of track on a one-tenth of a mile basis in relation to the national average quality, thus allowing the identification of track segments of poor quality. 

4.  Internal rail defects due to fatigue remain a serious problem because of the associated risk of sudden rail failure that typically occurs under a moving train.  Improvements in rail construction and maintenance practices through the use of more wear-resistant rail steel and the wider use of lubrication have increased the design life of the rail.  However, they have also elevated rail fatigue as the more dominant form of failure.  Recent trends in increasing freight axle loads, which are currently near 40 tons, have also exacerbated this problem.  Internal defects can only be identified by specialized ultrasonic or induction measurement cars that still cannot be operated at more than 10 miles per hour on the average. Also, with current inspection technology some defects may be misdiagnosed as to their true size or go undetected altogether.  Defects in the web or base sections of the rail are also extremely difficult to detect.  Both FRA and the Association of American Railroads (AAR) are pursuing inspection technology improvements in this area, which can increase the speed and reliability of automated track inspection cars and expand the range of defects that can be detected.  The techniques being pursued include using  laser-induced ultrasound and the use of guided waves.  Prototype sensors are currently under development with initial tests scheduled for the latter part of this year.

Ground Penetrating Radar

Another promising technology that FRA has identified for the diagnosis of safety-related track subsurface problems is Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR).  The study of this technology will likely result in the development of on-board sensor systems that can assess track subsurface conditions in a rapid, accurate, consistent, and reliable manner in real-time at track speed.  Currently, there is no non-destructive inspection technique available.  The goal of the project is therefore to develop an automated GPR to assess the condition of the railway track substructure (ballast, subballast and subgrade) and produce quantitative indices of track substructure condition. The GPR-derived indices will enable better maintenance and rehabilitation decision-making resulting in an improved track substructure performance.  We expect that this will result in increased safety and reduced train service interruptions through more effective use of limited maintenance and capital resources.  Ultimately, the goal of the project is to develop GPR as an important part of a comprehensive substructure maintenance management program that will lead to informed decision making for maintenance and capital improvements.  The system is intended for use on a hi-rail vehicle or a track geometry car for system-wide applicability.  The current phase of the project is to develop the hardware/software specifications for a prototype system to be installed on the FRA’s Research Platform (T-18) for field-testing in Spring 2006.  The prototype GPR system being developed will use radio frequency techniques that protect other transportation systems such as GPS from interference.

Positive Train Control (PTC)

PTC is an advanced train control technology that can prevent train collisions with automatic brake applications.  It also provides capabilities such as  automatic compliance with speed restrictions and enhanced protection of maintenance-of-way workers.

FRA’s final rule enabling PTC became effective on March 7, 2005.  The rule is a performance standard for PTC systems that railroads may choose to install, but does not require PTC systems to be installed.  Rather, FRA is promoting the implementation of PTC by sponsoring development of PTC technologies though partnerships with States and railroads; and by helping to provide the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System, a satellite-based navigation aid (described below) that is essential for communications-based PTC projects.

Today, Amtrak and other Northeast Corridor railroads have implemented a form of PTC that supports train speeds up to 150 miles per hour.  This system works well; however, it is expensive and does not offer some operational efficiencies that may be available with newer PTC systems. Therefore, this system does not appear to be appropriate for use outside the Northeast Corridor. 

FRA’s Office of Railroad Development is currently working on PTC projects in Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin.  The next challenge is to continue to drive down implementation costs.                

In addition, several freight railroads are exploring less complex “overlay” systems with a goal of increasing safety and improving operating efficiencies.  The farthest along in testing is the Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) on the Burlington Northern Santa Fe.  CSX Transportation is working towards the Communications Based Train Management System and the Alaska Railroad is also working towards implementing a PTC system on its entire territory.

A significant challenge for FRA and the railroads in developing all such systems is to ensure that they are interoperable (that is, locomotives from railroad “A” having one kind of PTC system can operate on railroad “B” which has a different PTC system).

Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS)

The Subcommittee has asked that we also address NDGPS, which is PTC’s fundamental radio navigation system.  NDGPS is a network of reference stations that monitors GPS and transmits signals to an unlimited number of users.  These signals are used by the NDGPS receiver to improve the accuracy and integrity of GPS.  When complete, there will be approximately 130 NDGPS transmitter sites in the United States; this is the basic dual-coverage network for the continental 48 States. The NDGPS system includes preexisting Coast Guard Differential GPS sites, converts 46 transmitter sites of a de-commissioned U.S. Air Force system into NDGPS sites, and builds new sites where needed.   Currently, 92 percent of the 48 contiguous States are covered with single NDGPS, and 60 percent is covered with dual coverage.  When complete, there will be dual coverage throughout the United States to ensure the signals are always available.

Currently, GPS technology has an assured accuracy of 36 meters.  Since parallel railroad tracks are only 4 meters apart, GPS accuracy does not meet our needs.  Basic NDGPS improves the accuracy to 1 to 2 meters.  Similarly, the time it takes the GPS system to recognize that a satellite is out of tolerance and notify the users can be as much as 2-4 hours.  This is referred to as “time to alarm integrity.”  Basic NDGPS improves the time to alarm integrity to 6 seconds.  So, if a GPS satellite malfunctions, the NDGPS system eliminates the bad satellite from the position solution within 6 seconds, preventing any disruption to railroad operations.   High Accuracy NDGPS, for which the Administration is not seeking funding in the Budget, would improve position accuracy to about 10 centimeters, and time to alarm integrity to 1 to 2 seconds.  High Accuracy NDGPS would enable Automated Rail Surveying and Rail Defect Detection systems to operate at rail traffic speeds while collecting valuable data that will improve the safety and efficiency of the Nation’s rail system. 

NDGPS is an enabling technology that is used in a wide variety of non-railroad applications, including precision farming, maritime navigation, surveying, map-making, plate tectonic monitoring, and weather forecasting.    Because it is an enabling technology, many Federal and State agencies and universities have been willing to contribute funding, land, and engineering resources to the program to ensure its success.  The Federal agencies that have significantly contributed to the development of NDGPS include:  the Departments of Transportation, the Air Force, the Army, Commerce, Interior, and Energy; the Tennessee Valley Authority; and the Voice of America.  The States that have partnered with FRA in the deployment of NDGPS include California, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  The NDGPS project is an excellent example of interagency cooperation and outstanding partnerships with States.

Passenger Equipment Safety

In contrast to the European rail system, traffic on the U.S. rail system is dominated by private freight traffic and produces a more rugged operating environment.  Passenger trains commonly share the same tracks with freight trains weighing 15,000 tons or more, and PTC is a rarity.  Highway-rail crossings are common in the United States; there are more than 250,000.  Commercial trucks in this country are much heavier than typical European trucks, so the risk of a highway-rail crossing collision with a subsequent derailment is greater in the U. S.  Therefore, we have sought to provide railroad passenger equipment safety standards that take into account our more rugged operating environment.

FRA issued comprehensive Passenger Equipment Safety Standards in 1999.  The rule’s crashworthiness standards ensure that a passenger train has features providing a superior level of occupant protection for passengers and crew in the event of a collision or derailment.  The standards require features designed to overcome most of the known reasons for deaths and injuries in previous wrecks, such as high static end strength, corner posts, collision posts, anti-climbing mechanisms, roll-over strength, side strength, truck-to- car-body attachment, glazing, locomotive fuel tanks, and emergency exits and lighting, among others.  Further rulemaking is ongoing to cover matters left unfinished.

 FRA continues to address the crashworthiness of passenger equipment as well as enhanced passenger and crew protection through our full-scale crash test program.  Our main partners in this important research are the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and Amtrak. 

Computer models have been developed to simulate a variety of passenger rail car crash scenarios.  These models, combined with the results of crash tests and field investigations of passenger train accidents, are being used to develop strategies for increasing occupant protection.  The role of these tests is to measure and compare the crashworthiness performance of existing passenger equipment and modified designs.  

FRA is now testing two components of structural crashworthiness for passenger rail equipment: a crush-zone for coaches, or cars that are coupled together and a crush-zone for cab cars, or cars that would need protection if striking an object.  So far, we have completed both designs and tested the crush-zone design for the coaches. 

We conducted a single-car test of a Crash Energy Management (CEM) coach car on December 3, 2003.  A two-car test of CEM coach cars was conducted on February 24, 2004.  We have also just completed the cab-car crush zone design.  An existing cab car will soon be retrofitted with crush zones.  This cab car, along with coach cars similarly retrofitted, will be used in a train-to-train full-scale impact test.

The test results from the single-car and two-car impact tests show that the CEM design has superior crashworthiness performance over conventional equipment.  In the single car test of conventional equipment, the car crushed by approximately six feet, intruding into the occupied area, and lifted by about nine inches, raising the wheels of the lead truck off the rails.  Under the same single-car test conditions, the CEM car crushed about three feet, preserving the occupied area, and its wheels remained on the rails.  In the two-car test of conventional equipment, the conventional car again crushed by approximately six feet, and lifted about nine inches as it crushed; in addition, the coupled cars sawtooth-buckled, and the trucks immediately adjacent to the coupled connection derailed.  In the two-car test of CEM equipment, the cars preserved the occupant areas and remained in-line, with all of the wheels on the rails. 

In the train-to-train test of conventional equipment, the colliding cab car crushed by approximately 22 feet and overrode the locomotive.  The space for the operator’s seat and for approximately ten rows of passenger seats was lost.  Computer simulations of the train-to-train test of CEM equipment indicate that the cab car will crush by approximately three feet, and that override will be prevented.  Structural crush will be pushed back to all of the coach car crush zones, and all of the crew and passenger space will be preserved.  The train-to-train test of CEM equipment, which is planned for February 2006, expected to confirm these predictions. 

We are currently discussing applying the results of the CEM research and development with the industry in the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee’s Passenger Safety Working Group and in the APTA Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards Committee.  We are also working with Metrolink, a commuter railroad in southern California, to add CEM to their next car purchase, as well as the Federal Transit Administration to determine ways to create incentives for early adoption of the results of this research. 

Advances in Locomotive Crashworthiness

FRA is also actively addressing the crashworthiness of freight locomotives.  Participants in this effort include the passenger and freight railroads, rail labor organizations, and locomotive builders.  This program has:

1. Developed computer models and testing tools to evaluate locomotive crashworthiness;
2. Evaluated current design locomotives for crashworthiness under common accident scenarios;
3. Considered alternative design improvements with modeling, static testing and full-scale crash testing;
4. Verified and validated models through full-scale crash testing; and
5. Developed means to mitigate injuries to crew.

A total of seven tests have been conducted to date, all testing specific types of accidents that could result in fatalities in regular operations.  All tests were simulated prior to the actual crash test using computer modeling.  The model predictions closely matched the actual test results.   At least in part as a result of modeling and testing, the AAR has adopted a revised standard, S-580 (December 2004), which incorporates improvements in locomotive design.

On-Board Condition Monitoring System

Another way that FRA is striving to improve railroad safety is a project to develop and demonstrate a real-time, on-board condition monitoring system  (OBCMS) for freight trains.  The objective of the system is to improve railroad safety and efficiency through continuous monitoring of mechanical components in order to detect defects before they cause derailments.  The system monitors the condition of the bearings, wheels, trucks, and brakes.  The monitoring system has been installed on five hopper cars owned by Southern Company Services.  The OBCMS is currently being operated in revenue service on a coal train operating on a Norfolk Southern route in Alabama between a coalmine northwest of Birmingham and Gaston Steam Plant in Wilsonville, Alabama.  The Southern Company test cars are also equipped with the Timken Guardian Bearing Monitoring System, which monitors the car speed as well as the vibration and temperature of the bearings.   The system features some of the latest technology in communications and railroad bearings.

Work is currently in progress to extend the capabilities of the OBCMS to include operation of mechanical devices from the locomotive.  The devices being integrated (referred to collectively as advanced components) include parking brakes, advanced couplers, angle cocks, cut-out, levers, and a cushion unit lockout mechanism to control slack in the train.  FRA has been sponsoring the development of the advanced components through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.  These components have reached the stage of development where they can be integrated with the OBCMS.  These devices will improve railroad safety and operational efficiency since they permit various mechanical functions to be controlled remotely from the locomotive instead of manually.  The OBCMS with advanced components will be installed on five freight cars for demonstration.

Hazardous Materials and Tank Car Safety

FRA is also working hard on projects intended to both reduce the likelihood that a train accident will result in a hazardous material release and to ensure that, if a release occurs, local emergency responders will be fully prepared to minimize the damage and loss of life that might occur.  The Graniteville, South Carolina, accident, which tragically resulted in at least nine deaths as the result of the release of chlorine, demonstrates the potential for serious consequences from train accidents involving tank cars carrying hazardous material.

An important component of minimizing the impact of a hazardous material release is the emergency response.  Emergency responders are trained and generally well prepared on how to locate shipping papers on trains and read placards and other hazard communication markings.  However, it may be possible for railroads to immediately distribute the necessary information electronically to all affected emergency responders upon notification of a train accident.    The emergency responders identified that information needs to be phase specific.  While information immediately available in the first 15 to 20 minutes of a response is generally sufficient, the key element is verification to ensure seamless transition into later phases.  Initial discussions with the railroads and emergency responders show both interest and willingness to pursue an improved flow of information.  All necessary information is currently available; the missing piece is communications infrastructure to support response improvement.  FRA will continue to progress this effort as rapidly as possible.

FRA is focusing on research arising from the Minot, North Dakota, accident in 2002, which resulted in one death and 11 injuries due to the release of anhydrous ammonia.  We are working with the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center and the AAR Tank Car Committee.  Current research involves a three-phase approach to assess the consequences of tank cars involved in derailments.  The first phase is development of a physics-based model to analyze the kinematics of rail cars involved in a derailment.  The second phase is development of dynamic structural analysis models.  The third phase is an assessment of the damage created by puncture and entails the application of fracture mechanics testing and analysis methods.  The modeling work is being conducted now.  Work on tank car structural integrity will also be applicable to the Macdona, Texas, accident in 2004 (which resulted in three deaths due to the release of chlorine) and to the Graniteville accident.  This research will help improve our understanding of how tank cars fail, and that knowledge will help us improve tank car design in the future. 

In addition, an explosive-resistant coating is being used to enhance the armor protection of military vehicles in Iraq.  FRA intends to evaluate it for potential use on tank cars to prevent puncture.  The material also has a self-sealing property that could be useful to seal a hole in a tank car and mitigate the severity of incidents.  The material is a spray-on polyurea coating that has exceptional strength compared to weight.  FRA is working with the tank car industry on this project.

Conclusion

Thank you for allowing me to provide this brief update on current research initiatives to improve safety in the railroad industry and on the complex, technical areas of enhanced track inspection systems, PTC, NDGPS, and railroad equipment safety.  I look forward to your comments and questions on these important subjects.

before the

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate

November 15, 2005

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss the efforts of the Administration and the U.S. Department of Transportation on policy options for encouraging alternative automotive fuel technologies.  This is a matter of great importance to the economy and to our national energy security.

Back in 1985, 73 percent of the petroleum consumed in America came from domestic sources.  Since then, American gasoline consumption has increased by about a third, while domestic crude production has dropped, resulting in a dramatic rise in oil imports.  Today, only about 35 percent of the crude oil used in U.S. refineries is from domestic sources, and our dependence on foreign oil is increasing.  This change did not happen overnight, and many of the strategies to address our oil dependence must look to the long term.

In 2003, President Bush announced a bold initiative to begin the transition to a hydrogen economy.  This initiative spans a range of technologies, aimed at developing commercially viable hydrogen-powered vehicles, hydrogen production systems with carbon sequestration, and hydrogen infrastructure.  The initiative’s goal is to ensure the long-term energy security of America by making vehicles powered by hydrogen fuel cells a practical and cost-effective choice for large numbers of Americans by the year 2020.  This is the Administration’s long-term vision.

The Department of Energy is primarily responsible for hydrogen production and storage technology, fuel cell development, and light duty vehicle development.

The Department of Energy and the Department of Transportation share responsibility for codes and standards development.   DOT, under its statutory authorities, is primarily responsible for ensuring the safety of hydrogen vehicles and infrastructure, and for developing the regulations and standards that ensure that safety.  DOT is also responsible for ensuring that hydrogen vehicles can be integrated into the larger transportation system.   Some of the specific responsibilities within DOT:

• The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) concentrates its efforts on ensuring that hydrogen vehicles are safe.
• The Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) coordinates the Department’s Hydrogen Working Group, and represents the Department on the National Science and Technology Council and as a member on the Interagency Working Group on Hydrogen exploring hydrogen delivery infrastructure needs.  A multi-modal team will develop advice for first responders for vehicle crashes and hazardous material cleanup crews at vehicle crash sites, and for safe infrastructure location and permitting.  RITA is also conducting multi-modal safety research, covering vehicles, hazardous materials transport, and fixed infrastructure. 
• The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration is developing guidelines for the operation, fueling, inspection, and maintenance of hydrogen systems in commercial vehicles.
• The Federal Transit Administration, in partnership with key stakeholders, leads a broad-based national effort focused on fuel cell buses.
• The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) oversees the safety and security of hydrogen delivery by pipeline, rail, and truck, including existing technologies such as high pressure cylinders and emerging technologies such as metal hydrides.  PHMSA will continue to provide advice for first responders to hydrogen and other hazardous materials incidents.

Coordinated codes and standards work is critical to the success of the entire hydrogen venture.  Although widespread use of hydrogen-powered vehicles is more than a decade away, there are prototype vehicles on public roads now.  Safety is essential to the broad public acceptance of any new technology.  Manufacturers of both vehicles and infrastructure will need to know which regulatory standards they must meet before designing systems for mass production and widespread deployment.

We know that hydrogen technology development and deployment will take time.  That is why the Administration is also committed to programs that will provide nearer term results.  These include:

• Rulemakings for light trucks under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program.  In 2002, the Congress granted Secretary Mineta’s request to resume rule-making under CAFE.  NHTSA’s rulemaking covering Model Years 2005-2007 vehicles is expected to save 3.6 billion gallons of fuel over the life of the regulated vehicles.  For model year 2008-2011 vehicles, we have proposed an innovative new approach:  basing light truck fuel economy standards on vehicle size.  This approach will yield greater fuel savings for the driving public while enhancing safety and reducing compliance costs.
• Tax credits for energy-efficient hybrid, clean diesel, and advanced internal combustion engine vehicles created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005;

• The renewable fuels standard incorporated into the Energy Policy Act;
• The extension of the renewable fuels CAFE credit under the Alternative Motor Fuels Act, enacted in the Energy Policy Act;
•  Multiple “clean fuels” programs for heavy vehicles incorporated into the Energy Policy Act and the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:  A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).  Many of these clean fuels provisions explicitly permit funding for alternative fuel vehicles.
• Alternative fuel vehicles and infrastructure continue to be eligible under the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) Program, as reauthorized under SAFETEA-LU.  Under CMAQ, the Federal Highway Administration and Federal Transit Administration are pursuing a program to reduce truck and heavy vehicle idling, in cooperation with the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency.
• Programs to mitigate fuel-sapping congestion through encouraging high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes, congestion pricing, public-private partnerships, deployment of intelligent transportation systems; and support for transit and para-transit systems and other private vehicle alternatives.

As this portfolio suggests, we view vehicles as elements in a larger transportation system.  While improved vehicles are critical to reducing fuel consumption, viewing vehicles together with roads, technology, and alternative transport modes offers important synergies.  As we begin to develop ways for vehicles to communicate with the roads and with each other, emerging transportation systems will grow in efficiency and safety.

While reducing automotive fuel consumption presents a difficult and long-standing challenge, today we have certain advantages.  We are living in a period of rapid innovation in automotive technology.  While today’s vehicles may look very much like the vehicles of twenty years ago, many aspects of engine operation are now controlled by microprocessors.  Automakers have several technological options for improving vehicle fuel economy without reducing performance, including clean diesel engines and hybrid vehicles.  In the next few years, we should see increased potential for advanced hybrids and advanced internal combustion engines.

Due to recent increases in fuel prices, consumers are placing a higher value on fuel economy today than in the recent past.  This creates the market conditions under which advanced vehicles that offer improved fuel economy can be successful in the marketplace.   We believe that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s proposed light truck rulemaking will also encourage manufacturers to adopt more advanced fuel-saving technologies.

Biofuels offer an alternative approach to reducing our near-term dependence on imported fuels.  All of the current and near-term advanced automotive technologies that we are considering today, including hybrids, can use biofuel blends.  Historically, despite a range of incentives, high transportation costs limited the scale of fuel ethanol plants and tended to concentrate ethanol use in regional markets in the Midwest and California.  However, at present, conditions are better than ever for the expansion of renewable fuels in the transportation sector.  

• The renewable fuels standard enacted by Congress in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandates a near-doubling of ethanol use in gasoline by 2012, to 7.5 billion gallons (489,000 barrels per day).  According to the Energy Information Administration, 2004 U.S. gasoline consumption was about 9.1 million barrels per day; 2004 fuel ethanol production was 3.4 billion gallons (202,000 barrels per day).
• The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 greatly simplified the long-standing ethanol excise tax credit, offering ethanol blenders a credit of $0.51 for each gallon of ethanol blended into gasoline.  Biodiesel from waste oils is eligible for a $0.50 per gallon tax credit (through 2008) and biodiesel from virgin agricultural materials is eligible for a $1.00 per gallon tax credit.         
• High petroleum prices and the Federal excise tax credit have greatly improved the competitiveness of alcohol fuels and biodiesel.
• The Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the CAFE credit provisions of Alternative Motor Fuels Act have created a fleet of more than 4 million “ethanol ready” vehicles that can use E85 ethanol blends at their owners’ discretion, and essentially all gasoline vehicles sold in the United States can use up to 10 percent ethanol blended in gasoline without affecting their manufacturers’ warranties.
• There is widespread commercial interest in expanding production of both ethanol and biodiesel.  The Renewable Fuels Association reports that there are 92 ethanol plants in the United States, with current fuel ethanol capacity of 4.2 billion gallons per year, and that 1.4 billion gallons per year of additional capacity are currently under construction, (including 23 new plants and expansions of existing facilities).  Biodiesel production has advanced in recent years, although it is not nearly as well established as ethanol.  The National Biodiesel Board indicates that 2004 production was 25 million gallons (1,600 barrels per day) and they expect 2005 production to triple to 75 million gallons (4,800 barrels per day).  The Federal Transit Administration has a small program to test biodiesel on transit buses in Missouri.  There is interesting research underway on biodiesel as well.  A recent article in Science described a new, less energy-intensive method for making biodiesel that would permit ethanol plants to switch between making ethanol and biodiesel, and opens a potential pathway for generating biodiesel from plant wastes."
• The Energy Policy Act extended the Federal tax credit for small ethanol and biodiesel producers.  Small producers (less than 60 million gallons per year) can receive a tax credit of $0.10 per gallon for the first 15 million gallons of annual production.

In addition, the Energy Policy Act contains incentives for production of cellulosic ethanol, which, if the technology can be made economical, offers the opportunity to convert low value crop residues into fuel-grade ethanol.  Biodiesel can be made from waste oils in low volumes (limited by feedstock availability), and from a range of oilseeds in potentially larger volumes.

Biofuel usage is expanding rapidly.  Widespread commercialization of cellulosic ethanol would have a positive impact.  Essentially all motor vehicles on the road today can use biofuels in blends of less than 10 percent.  There may be continuing commercial and economic barriers to expanding biofuel production.  The commercial conditions under which biofuels are produced and consumed have changed greatly.  In the coming months, the ways in which fuel producers and consumers will adapt to the new situation created by recent legislation and the continued high fuel prices will become clearer. 

Reducing our Nation’s dependence on oil cannot be accomplished by any one simple act.  The Administration’s efforts recognize that there are actions all of us can take today and in the near term, and there are other actions and revolutionary new technologies that require a long-term commitment for successful deployment.  The Department of Transportation is pleased to play a vital role in these in these important and ongoing efforts, ensuring public safety in transportation while helping innovative technologies roll out on America’s roads.

This concludes my statement.  I will be glad to answer your questions.

OF

JEFFREY N. SHANE
UNDERSECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION FOR POLICY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

APRIL 14, 2005

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Secretary Mineta I would like to thank you and the distinguished members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to discuss the Next Generation Air Transportation System – or “Next Generation” – initiative.  This initiative is one that Secretary Mineta has taken a strong personal interest in, which is why he asked me to be here today to discuss what we have achieved thus far and how we can work with Congress to transform our nation’s air transportation system.

Recognizing our Future Needs

FAA’s Chief Operating Officer Russell Chew’s testimony notes that the FAA and its Air Traffic Organization are doing all that is possible in the short term to increase the capacity of our current air transportation system.  These efforts include:  building new runways; redesigning airspace to wring out more capacity from the current system; working with industry to help increase operational efficiency; and examining ways to manage demand more effectively at our most congested airports.

In the longer term, however, we know that these short- and mid-term efforts will simply not be enough.  The recent FAA aviation forecast provides further evidence that our current system, already coming under stress in some areas, will be stretched to its limit as future demands continue to grow.  Passenger totals are expected to exceed one billion by 2015, and we project up to a tripling of passengers, operations and cargo by the year 2025.  As Secretary Mineta said in a speech before the Aero Club in January 2004:  “The changes that are coming are too big, too fundamental for incremental adaptations of the infrastructure.  We need to modernize and transform our air transportation system – starting right now.”

I don’t need to tell any of you – who all depend so regularly on air transportation – how critical it is to our economy and to our quality of life to have a safe, secure and efficient national aviation system.  As noted in the report of the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, consumers could lose as much as $30B annually if people and products cannot reach their destinations within the time periods we expect today.  The truth is that air transportation has become part of the very fabric of our nation’s economy, and we simply must not allow delays in the system to limit our future growth potential.

The importance of developing such a future system is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States at this critical time for our nation’s aerospace industry.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the industry, fueling new efficiencies and consumer benefits.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet. 

VISION 100 and Creation of the JPDO

In recognition of these challenges, the 108th Congress and President Bush took the first critical step toward transforming our air transportation system by passing and signing into law the Vision 100 – Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L.108-176), which provides for the development and implementation of an integrated plan for the Next Generation system.  The law also provided for the creation within the FAA of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) to develop the Integrated National Plan that guides the development of this system and manages the work associated with it.

Under the leadership of Administrator Blakey and with her strong support, the JPDO now serves as a focal point for coordinating the research related to air transportation for agencies across the federal government, including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense and Homeland Security; NASA; and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.  Early on, we realized that an initiative of this magnitude and complexity could never be successfully completed by DOT alone, especially in a post-9/11 context.  We sought support from others, and they delivered.  NASA has been a close partner from the beginning, helping to fund the JPDO and contributing several staff members, including its Deputy Director, and all the other agencies involved have provided invaluable support to the JPDO that has helped us establish a strong, collaborative atmosphere.

Another special feature of this initiative is the high-level participation from each of these organizations.  Secretary Mineta chairs a Senior Policy Committee made up of Deputy Secretary-level officials from these organizations that direct the effort and will be responsible for its ultimate success or failure.  These individuals have been highly engaged from the outset, and we are grateful for their continued support. 

A successful transformation will also require a close partnership with the research community, industry and other stakeholders.  The JPDO is establishing a formal structure, which I will describe later in my testimony, to manage these relationships and in doing so ensure a full public-private partnership.
 

The first product of the JPDO – the Integrated National Plan – was delivered to Congress in December 2004 and can be viewed at www.jpdo.aero.  This strategic business plan lays out a common vision for the Next Generation system, establishes benchmarks for success, and creates a structure by which we can design and implement the changes we need to make.  It will be continually updated and expanded each year going forward as we further define the exact specifications and requirements of the Next Generation system.

The Way Forward and the Roadmap to Success

With that as a backdrop, let me now talk about the way forward.  Our overarching goal in the Next Generation initiative is to develop a system that will be flexible enough to accommodate very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned air vehicles, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, and to handle up to three times the number of operations that the current system does with no diminution in safety, security and efficiency.  Additionally, this system will still need to accommodate the needs of the Department of Defense for flights within this flexible system while providing available Special Use Airspace to meet current and future training requirements.
 

To coordinate research, development, and implementation efforts that will take us to the Next Generation system, the Integrated National Plan sets out eight major strategies.  These strategies focus on those aspects of aviation that hold the keys to capacity and efficiency improvements – airport infrastructure, security, a more agile air traffic system, shared situational awareness, safety, environmental concerns, weather and global harmonization of equipage and operations.  For each strategy, there is an Integrated Product Team to refine the actions needed to make the Next Generation system a reality.  Each agency involved in the initiative leads at least one of these Teams.  These Teams will work closely with our stakeholders to ensure that they have an early window into our thinking and that we take full advantage of their expertise every step of the way.

What truly sets this new structure apart is that it eliminates duplication of effort and gets everyone involved in aviation across the federal government working toward a common goal – creation of a Next Generation system.  Moreover, we are using the JPDO process to bring agencies together as we develop the Integrated National Plan in more detail to ensure that all of the different parts of the future system are fully understood and addressed from the outset.

This process ensures full coordination of research across agency lines and between government and the private sector in ways that have not been done in the past.  The fact is that we already have a sizable amount of resources being spent each year on air transportation related research.  By better coordinating our actions, avoiding duplication and tying these activities together through a long-term, integrated national plan we can maximize the benefits of those public and private investments and target our limited resources more effectively.

Getting Stakeholders Involved

Given the JPDO’s unique structure and mission and the Bush Administration’s commitment to develop innovative public-private partnerships, the JPDO is employing a blend of traditional and non-traditional mechanisms to help foster and expand our outreach process.

Existing federal advisory committees will be used to ensure all plans and decisions receive broad review and public comment.  These committees include senior-level executives from across industry empowered to provide advice on strategy and transition issues.  Let me stress in the strongest possible terms that existing federal advisory committees with an interest in air transportation will continue to play a strong advisory role for the Next Generation system. 

We are especially grateful, however, to Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, who agreed to chair a new subcommittee of the FAA’s Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC) focused exclusively on providing high-level advice on development of the Next Generation system.  Dr. Hamre and his colleagues have already made enormous contributions to this effort.

In addition to this high-level advice however, we also want to make sure that the preliminary technical plans we propose have the benefit of private sector expertise before they are delivered to these bodies for review.  We need the best minds in America across both the public and private sectors working on the task of creating a Next Generation system.

To achieve this, we have entered into an agreement with the Aerospace Industries Association’s National Center for Advanced Technologies to establish a Next Generation Air Transportation System Institute (the “Institute”) that will allow stakeholders to get directly involved in the transformation process.  And while AIA will host the Institute, it will also be co-chaired by the presidents of the Air Traffic Control Association and the Air Transport Association and open for participation by all segments of the industry.

This Institute will provide assistance directly to the JPDO in a number of important areas.  For example, it will help populate the eight Integrated Product Teams that will develop the more detailed action plans for achieving the Next Generation system.  We want to ensure that the right industry experts are there to participate in deliberations of the Teams in order to provide their unique expertise.  Using requirements laid out by each of the Teams, the Institute will solicit expressions of interest from industry representatives and then select the most qualified participants.  The Institute will also be called upon to perform specific research in areas identified by the JPDO as critical for implementing the Integrated National Plan.

Next Steps

The JPDO has a very ambitious schedule for this year with a number of important deliverables.  Since the December 2004 publication of the Integrated National Plan, the Integrated Product Teams have begun to add detail to their individual contributions to the Next Generation system and set out the actions – system modernization, research and development, policy issues for resolution – that will be required to achieve that portion of our vision. 

The office will also more fully develop the metrics we will use to measure the benefits of the Next Generation system and our performance in delivering those benefits.  These more detailed plans can then be included in the second edition of the Integrated National Plan to be delivered to Congress later this year and through the President’s FY07 budget submission.

Perhaps most importantly, over the next three years the JPDO and its member agencies will move from planning to actual implementation in creating a Next Generation system.  The first step in this direction will be through demonstration projects currently under development.  These demonstrations will seek to apply some of the key elements we see in the future system – like shared situational awareness – and test their applicability and readiness for use in the Next Generation system.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, the Next Generation Air Transportation System initiative is unprecedented in its scope, complexity and the challenges it will face.  Far from being a turn-key operation, it will require years of hard work, managing risk and unparalleled coordination among the many federal agencies and stakeholders involved.  The process has now begun in earnest, however, and by aligning our resources and activities through the JPDO, I am confident we will succeed.  We will, of course, need strong support from members of Congress, and we therefore look forward to working with all of you on this critical endeavor.  Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE

April 5, 2005

Chairman Lott, Senator Inouye, and members of the subcommittee.  Thank you for inviting me today to discuss the successes the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has had in enhancing safety on our nation’s highways, particularly as they relate to the safe operation of commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) and their operators.  I last appeared before this committee in June 2003, just one month after my confirmation hearing.  Nearly two years later, I am pleased to report that CMV safety has greatly improved during my tenure as Administrator.

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION OVERVIEW

As Secretary Mineta has said many times, safety is the centerpiece of the Administration’s Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act (SAFETEA).  FMCSA is committed to that goal.  Our agency was conceived out of the need for stronger CMV safety – it is our mandate.  More than that, our agency consists of a group of dedicated professionals to whom safety is the highest priority.  Toward that goal, FMCSA is working to reduce the unnecessary loss of life on our nation’s highways.  FMCSA is committed to achieving the Department’s highway safety goal of reducing the fatality rate in all motor vehicle crashes by 41 percent from 1998 to 2008.  Our part of that goal is to reduce commercial vehicle crash fatalities to 1.65 fatalities per 100 million miles of truck travel.  Achieving our safety goal will be challenging, as commercial vehicle miles traveled are increasing at a rate faster than that of passenger cars.  I am pleased to report that the FY 2003 CMV fatality rate of 2.3 is the lowest recorded since the Department initiated tracking in 1975.

Safety improvements like these cannot be accomplished without sound programs and adequate enforcement across all levels of government.  Enforcement is the cornerstone of motor carrier safety.  In FY 2004, Federal and State safety enforcement operations that ensured compliance with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations included the following:  more than 25,000 new entrant safety audits; over 11,000 safety compliance reviews; and nearly 3 million roadside inspections.  As a result, FMCSA initiated more than 5,000 enforcement cases.  In 2003, an Office of Management and Budget assessment found that FMCSA has achieved reductions in the large truck fatality rate in each of the past five years and is on track to achieve its ambitious long-term safety goals.

The Administration’s SAFETEA proposal, transmitted to Congress in 2003 and updated in adjustments this February, proposes important advances to our motor carrier safety program.  I am pleased that items we believe critical for safety continue to be addressed by your Committee.  They include: the penalty for denial of access to records, increased penalties for out-of-service violations, and safety fitness.  We have also been working with Committee staff on some of our SAFETEA adjustments, specifically patterns of safety violations by motor carrier management and intrastate operations of interstate motor carriers, and we appreciate their willingness to work with us to increase safety in these areas.

However, in order for FMCSA to fully achieve its safety mission, we ask the Committee to address the following issues: the codification of the existing hours of service rule for interstate CMV drivers, Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) improvements, the safety and security of the Southern Border, increasing penalties for unscrupulous household goods brokers, establishment of the medical review board and medical registry, mandatory fuel surcharge, and hazardous materials transportation safety.

HOURS OF SERVICE

With regard to hours of service, I would like to report on the progress made since the most recent extension of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21^st Century (TEA-21), on September 30, 2004. In the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2004, Part V, Congress provided that the current hours-of-service rule will stay in effect until the Agency publishes a final rule addressing the factors in the July 2004 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, or September 30, 2005, whichever is earlier.

I established a dedicated hours-of-service task force that reports directly to me.  This task force consists of some of the most highly respected professionals in our agency.  Its work has already proved exceptional – since its creation the task force has issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the new rule and is on track to meet the September deadline.  However, the new rule, like the old rule, will not please everyone.  I am concerned that the revised rule will open the Agency and the Department to the same kinds of legal challenges we have experienced already. These challenges keep the industry and others in a constant state of uncertainty.  For this reason, the Administration seeks the inclusion of language in the Senate reauthorization bill that will make the 2003 rule permanent and allow FMCSA the opportunity to revise the rule, if necessary. 

Another issue of concern is the number of proposed exemptions to the hours of service rule.   The old rule on hours of service contained statutory exemptions for various industries.  These exemptions have been retained in the new rule.  New blanket statutory exemptions for various industries increase the likelihood that tired drivers will be on the roads endangering the driving public.         

Overall, these exemptions compromise safety.  They create enforcement problems, hamper accurate recordkeeping, encourage other industries to seek exemptions, and dilute the objective of providing drivers a more regular schedule to coincide with circadian rhythms.  As Administrator of the Agency, I am charged with fulfilling its mandate of improving the safety of these drivers and the traveling public with whom they interact.  Exemptions to the hours of service rule without data and research to support the exemptions hamper the Agency’s ability to fulfill our safety mission.

CDL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

            Another important initiative is the Commercial Driver’s License improvement program.  Critical to the safety and security of the United States, the CDL grant program is the latest in a series of efforts by our agency to improve and enhance the effectiveness of the CDL program.  Since implementation of the CDL program in 1986, FMCSA has promulgated regulations addressing State compliance with the CDL requirements, initiated judicial outreach, expanded State CDL compliance review, and most recently developed a CDL anti-fraud program.  In 2004, FMCSA conducted 16 compliance reviews of State CDL programs, strengthened oversight of annual State self-certification of CDL programs and allocated $22 million in grant funding for States to address compliance, fraud, and security issues. 

Also in 2004, FMCSA organized a working group of motor vehicle administrators and law enforcement staff to address anti-fraud initiatives.  The group has made several recommendations to eventually be included in a model law enforcement program for preventing CDL fraud.  This program, when fully implemented, will establish a framework for motor vehicle and law enforcement agencies to work collaboratively in addressing CDL fraud.

FMCSA is also partnering with the Office of Inspector General (OIG) to coordinate CDL fraud investigations by providing CDL-specific investigative expertise to State agencies, and where warranted, Federal prosecution for criminal violations.  With FMCSA’s assistance, the OIG is preparing training materials for their field investigators to assist in CDL-related investigations. 

Finally, the CDL compliance review program now includes a specific anti-fraud component.  The agency has included anti-fraud priorities as an eligible funding activity for CDL improvement grant funds.  Not only has FMCSA elevated fraud issues with States during CDL compliance reviews and with CDL grant awards but also will continue to emphasize fraud awareness training to State law enforcement and motor vehicle personnel. 

HOUSEHOLD GOODS ENFORCEMENT

            The Administration has requested greater enforcement of violations by movers of household goods (HHG).  I know that the Chairman and members of this Committee have noticed an increase in consumer complaints about household goods carriers.  The Administration’s proposal establishes more visible enforcement through increased investigations and expanded outreach.  Our efforts seek to increase consumer awareness and help citizens make better-informed decisions when moving across State lines.  Additionally, we seek authority for State Attorneys General to enforce Federal household goods regulations against interstate carriers.  We believe this authority will help reduce abusive practices and makes sure there is consistency in enforcement across the country by having one set of regulations rather than many state regulations.

            For FY 2005, FMCSA is conducting strike force activity in States where we have seen the highest level of complaints, with a goal of 300 investigations.  These states are Florida, New York, New Jersey, and California.  Since the beginning of the fiscal year, the Agency has conducted over 100 investigations, three times as many as in FY 2004, and is on target to meet its annual goal.  FMCSA used the $1.3 million appropriated to hire Federal employees to investigate HHG complaints and to conduct concentrated strike force activities, bringing together investigators from throughout the country to operate in a specific area for a short period of time.  Currently, the Agency has 10 full-time safety investigators devoted to HHG enforcement and we have trained an additional 37 investigators to support this effort.  Our agency is committed to eradicating this threat to American consumers.

MEDICAL REVIEW BOARD

Another important aspect of our reauthorization proposal is the creation of a standing medical review board to provide the Agency with expert medical advice on driver qualification standards and guidelines, medical examiner education, and research, thereby enhancing our ability to adopt medically sound and up to date regulations.  In the past, we have assembled expert medical specialists on an ad hoc basis to review the standards and guidelines for qualifying truck and bus drivers. Many of the standards in place now were adopted in the 1970s or earlier.  A standing review board will greatly enhance the Agency’s ability to adopt regulations that reflect current medical advances.  Establishment of a medical registry would respond to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which issued eight safety recommendations in September 2001, requiring that FMCSA establish comprehensive standards for qualifying medical providers and conducting medical qualification exams. 

Last Congress, S. 1072 established a medical review board based on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) model for pilot standards. Neither FMCSA nor FAA believes the FAA model to be an appropriate one for CMV drivers.  The sheer number of drivers and differences in the age and health characteristics of the driver population make this model an untenable one for FMCSA.  The FAA has 6,000 authorized aviation medical examiners to perform yearly exams on approximately 270,000 pilots.  FMCSA estimates that approximately 300,000 medical examiners perform exams on approximately 6.4 million CMV drivers on a biennial basis.  While I appreciate the Committee’s inclusion of the medical registry provision, I urge the Committee to rework the review board model and provide adequate funding to maximize our ability to set appropriate medical standards for CMV drivers.

SAFETY AND SECURITY AT THE SOUTHERN BORDER

            The Administration is committed to implementing fully the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) land transportation provisions.  In June 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Administration’s favor in a suit that would have required environmental analyses of the rules.  The most recent Inspector General audit for NAFTA implementation, released in January 2005, stated: “FMCSA has sufficient staff, facilities, equipment and procedures in place to substantially meet the eight Section 350 provisions for Mexican long haul trucks.”

            In preparation for allowing Mexican carriers beyond the commercial zones and in response to the mandates of Section 350 of the FY 2002 DOT Appropriations Act, FMCSA has deployed 274 inspectors, auditors, and investigators along the border to process these carriers.  FMCSA has provided funds to the four southern Border States to hire additional inspectors and construct inspection facilities.  As of December 10, 2004, 693 Mexican carriers have applied for authority to operate beyond the commercial zones.  Of the 693 applications, 314 are ready for the mandated safety audit.

            One of the requirements in Section 350 of the FY 2002 DOT Appropriations Act, which has been adopted in all subsequent DOT appropriations acts, makes the inspection procedures and decal of a non-governmental organization mandatory for Mexican CMVs.  In one of the Administration’s SAFETEA Adjustments, we propose that the required inspection decal be issued or approved by the Secretary of Transportation.  We feel that this is an important function for which the Federal Government should be responsible.

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION

            FMCSA has implemented a comprehensive Hazardous Materials (HM) Security Program to improve the secure transportation of hazardous materials on our highways and protect the country from the threat of terrorism.  The program includes an enforcement/compliance component as well as an outreach component.

            A major element of the FMCSA HM Security Program involves FMCSA’s new HM Permit Program.  Carriers of extremely high-hazard materials are required to obtain a permit from FMCSA.  This permit is contingent upon the carrier’s developing and maintaining a satisfactory security program that meets the requirements of the HM Regulations and includes a communication component for permitted loads.  FMCSA will validate the adequacy of the security plan for 1,200 carriers during FY 2006 using a Security Contact Review (SCR).  The SCR includes an in-depth assessment of the adequacy of a carrier’s security plan and its implementation as well as security training, communication requirements, and other requirements of the HM permit program.

MANDATORY FUEL SURCHARGE

The Nation has benefited enormously from our economic deregulation of the transportation industry.  In the last 25 years, the free market for motor carrier services in particular has made important contributions to the growth and efficiency of our economy and helped to sustain its remarkable ability to create new jobs.  Although the price of diesel fuel has risen sharply in the past few years, the allocation of those costs among the buyers and sellers of transportation is best accomplished through the working of the marketplace, not by government prescription.  The mandatory fuel surcharge for truckload transportation prescribed by section 4139 of H.R. 3 would insinuate government into commercial relationships in a way that is ill-advised and that would reverse a quarter-century of U.S. economic policy.  For these reasons, the Administration strongly urges the members of this Committee, and other Senators, not to include language supporting a fuel surcharge in its reauthorization bill.

REGULATORY BACKLOG

            Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to report that FMCSA’s progress has been steady and our future is bright.  One aspect of our progress of which I am particularly proud is how we have addressed our Congressional regulatory and reporting requirements.  When I began as Administrator, there was a tremendous regulatory backlog.  During my tenure, I have reduced this backlog by over 40%.  I have met with your staff to update them on our progress.  I ask that no mandated rulemakings be added to the Committee’s bill.  FMCSA needs to be able to set rulemaking priorities based on safety, not mandated timelines.

CONCLUSION

            I wish to thank you for inviting me to discuss the achievements FMCSA has made toward reducing fatalities and injuries on our nation’s highways. This reauthorization represents the first opportunity for our five-year old agency to step forward, stand on its own, and chart our course.  I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

JULY 14, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Costello and Members of the Subcommittee:

It is a pleasure to be here this morning to review for the Subcommittee the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) policy and rules regarding the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs), including cell phones, on aircraft and how those may be affected by a proposed rulemaking by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to relax their ban on the use of certain cell phones on aircraft.  I welcome the opportunity to appear here today with my colleagues from the FCC, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), to discuss our respective roles and responsibilities, as well as with my colleague from the RTCA, Inc., whose organization has greatly contributed to the understanding of the operational effects of PEDs. 

Before providing you with a brief outline of responsibilities, I would like to emphasize at the outset that, regardless of the final outcome of the FCC’s proposed rulemaking, the FAA’s safety regulations regarding portable electronic devices onboard aircraft will remain in place. 

In order to prevent potential interference with aircraft communications and navigation equipment, the FAA has regulations[1] that prohibit the use of portable electronic devices, with some limited, specified exceptions, onboard a U.S. air carrier aircraft or any other U.S. registered aircraft operating under instrument flight rules (IFR).  The specific exceptions to the rule are for portable voice recorders, hearing aids, heart pacemakers, and electric shavers.  Use of those devices is allowed.  Our regulation also provides an additional, more general, exception one that is relevant to today’s discussion:  if an aircraft operator has determined that a portable electronic device will not interfere with the navigation or communication systems of the aircraft on which the PED will be used, the operator may permit use of the PED onboard that aircraft.  This general exception sounds deceptively simple, but I assure you it is quite complex in this era where the old cable and pulley flight control systems on many aircraft have been replaced by modern “fly-by-wire” aircraft equipped with analog and digital technology that translate pilot control input to the aircraft control surfaces electronically (wires / circuit boards).  These advanced avionics depend on clear signal communications onboard aircraft.  Air carriers routinely provide information to the FAA about their electromagnetic studies. 

We commissioned a Federal Advisory Committee under the auspices of RTCA, Inc., to study radio frequency emission and interference issues.  During the first phase of their study, they issued a report in 1996 as well as procedures for air carriers to use in making a determination about whether a PED interferes with onboard navigation or communication systems.  The RTCA is continuing to investigate the use of new technologies onboard aircraft and we expect this phase to extend to the end of next year. My colleague here today will provide more details about their work with not only the FAA, but with the aviation community and the PED industry. 

To understand the issues that PEDs pose for the aircraft environment and, therefore, the underlying reason for our safety regulations, one needs to understand the basic problem:  electromagnetic interference.  All electronic devices send out electromagnetic waves.  The power and frequency of these waves depends on the type of device and its physical condition; that is, whether it’s been damaged or repaired or “souped up.”  PEDs can be categorized more simply into two kinds:  intentional and unintentional transmitters.  Intentional transmitters work by using radio signals to talk or transfer data to another device or service provider.  These are devices such as cell phones, two-way pagers, wireless modems, built in WiFi devices[2], remote control toys, walkie-talkies and many other things.  Basically, if the device “talks” to another device without physically being connected by a wire, it is probably an intentional transmitter.  Unintentional transmitters are all other electronic devices, which include such things as electronic games, laptop computers and Personal Data Assistants (PDAs)—at least the ones that do not use wireless technologies.  Unintentional transmitters give off electromagnetic waves whenever they operate.  The power level of these waves vary depending on the device and complexity of the device’s circuitry.

Modern avionics on aircraft transmit and receive radio signals to communicate with onboard systems, with other aircraft, air traffic control and ground stations.  These onboard systems are used for navigation, communication, surveillance, and security and can be affected by the radio signals or electromagnetic waves transmitted intentionally or unintentionally by PEDs.  The chance of this occurring is greater with intentional transmitters such as cell phones.  Additionally, radio signals originating external to an aircraft may combine with signals produced inside the cabin, resulting in a higher probability of interference to the aircraft avionics or flight control systems.  To prevent possible interference affecting an aircraft’s navigation and communication systems during the critical phases of flight, such as take-off and landing (e.g. when the aircraft is below 10,000 feet), we recommend that air carriers prohibit the operation of any PED (including cell phones) during these times[3].

Cell phones are different from other PEDs on aircraft in that they can interfere with the cellular networks on the ground.  For this reason, in 1991, the FCC issued a rule that prohibited the use of certain cell phones on aircraft during flight.  As I understand it, under the FCC rules, while an air carrier may permit passengers to use their cell phones while an aircraft is on the ground, passengers must turn off their phones once the aircraft has left the gate. 

As my colleague will testify this morning, the FCC now believes that, with advances in cell phone technology since 1991, their rule banning 800 MHz cell phone use in flight, may not be needed in order to protect the terrestrial or ground based cellular networks.  In February, they published an NPRM that proposed to lift the ban on the use of 800 MHz cell phones while airborne if such phones are operating at their lowest frequency power under control of onboard equipment, e.g. a “pico cell,” which is installed on the aircraft and acts as a controller for onboard callers.  In this scenario, the pico cell would manage the power levels of the cell phones that would potentially solve the FCC’s concern with interference with ground-based cell phone communications.  We are not aware of any current technology that restricts emissions to the confines of the particular aircraft with such an installation.

The FAA and the FCC coordinated closely during the development of the FCC’s proposed rulemaking action so that the public would be apprised of our respective roles.  The FAA supports the FCC’s action in examining these issues and seeking public comment.  The NPRM notice clearly notes throughout the document that whatever the outcome of the FCC’s proposal, use of cell phones onboard aircraft is still subject to FAA’s safety regulation and air carrier policies.  This rulemaking action by the FCC has generated substantial public comment, and I will defer to my colleague to review for you the proposal and the status of their action. 

What I do want to emphasize is that the FAA is not changing its rules.  We will certainly continue to work with the FCC and any other agencies that have roles to play to ensure that the public is well aware of the prerequisites for using cell phones or any other PED while in flight.  If an air carrier elects to permit cell phone usage (or other PED) onboard during flight, they must determine that the use of that particular model phone won’t interfere with the navigation or communication systems onboard the specific type of aircraft on which the phone will be used.  That’s a substantial challenge with ever-changing cell phone technology on the one hand, and, on the other, increasingly advanced and complex aircraft technology as the national airspace system moves to satellite navigation.  The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a critical enabler of new procedures and must be protected from increased background noise as well as direct interference. 

The GPS received signal is at a very low level.  The proper operation of GPS receivers can be disrupted by a relatively low level signal generated by an undesired signal source.  Nevertheless, if an air carrier is willing to take the time and incur the expense of testing and verifying that the cell phone usage presents no in-flight interference problems, our rules allow an air carrier to permit such devices. 

Most airlines now prohibit the use of intentional transmitters such as cell phones during flight.  However, we have recently worked with a couple of carriers who have allowed the use of PED technology under our rule on certain aircraft.  The first instance involved a proposal by American Airlines and Qualcomm for a one-time test in July 2004 of the use of a Qualcomm cell phone onboard a Boeing MD-80 aircraft with a pico cell that was brought on board for the test (i.e. it was not permanently installed on the aircraft).  The test was successful in that it provided data for the airline and the cell phone providers to analyze and further study.  For example, it showed that the pico cell would control the strength of cell phone emissions but that it would only allow so many people onboard to use their cell phone at any one time due to the capacity limit of the pico cell.  In the second instance, last month we approved the installation of equipment that will allow United Airlines and Verizon to permit the use of WiFi wireless internet connection onboard Boeing 757 aircraft during flight after the aircraft reaches cruising altitude.  Under this system, a passenger may use a laptop computer or other device with an 802.11 ethernet card to connect to a server onboard the aircraft that directs the communication to a ground-based internet provider.  Using this technology, a passenger could not only surf the internet but could also use a voice-over internet protocol (IP) connection with a headset to make phone calls over the internet.  Also, we understand that Airbus, last September, demonstrated an airborne pico cell using the European GSM mobile phone technology on an Airbus A320. 

It remains to be seen if carriers will seek approvals for use of more PEDs on other types of aircraft.  Should the FCC relax its rule regarding the use of 800 MHz cell phones, it could provide an impetus for air carriers to permit the use of a variety of cell phones (or other PEDs) in flight.  If that’s the case and if an air carrier has met our safety requirements, the carrier may permit such use, with procedures to help passengers be aware of exactly what phones may be used and under what conditions. 

We will also closely monitor what potential effects that wider use of cell phones or other PEDs in flight might have on new satellite navigation procedures and aircraft capabilities to take advantage of such procedures.  That means we have to be careful to protect the more advanced onboard technology from harmful interference from PEDs.  For example, there is potential that such interference could reduce the number of GPS satellites that an aircraft could “see” and therefore reduce the accuracy of the GPS signal.  The FAA takes this into consideration in requirements for the GPS accuracy expected for navigation procedures.  The navigation procedures are also designed with missed-approach procedures for alternative navigation capability.

This potential to provide passengers with new communication technologies also raises the issue of what FCC Commissioner Copps refers to as the “annoying-seatmate issue.”  This is largely a social issue, albeit one with potential safety implications.  Other modes of transportation are also dealing with the issue of cell phone use by passengers.  For example, Amtrak designates “quiet cars” for passengers who do not want to be disturbed by cell phones. 

We expect that air carriers will have to sort this out, weighing the pros and cons—but inflight cell phone use could also present unique safety and security concerns.  DOJ is here today to address the security aspects of this issue.  We will continue to work with our colleagues as these issues are examined.  What effect in-flight cell phone use may have on pilot workload or interference with a flight attendant’s safety duties due to incidents of passenger “air rage” is an unknown at this point.  However, it’s not hard to imagine a scenario where use of cell phones by several passengers in the confined space of an aircraft cabin could lead to conflicts.  We are concerned that, should cell phone use be permitted, flight attendants might be distracted from their critical safety duties and responsibilities if they are increasingly required to deal with irate passengers.  This will be one of the issues that we will continue to assess and monitor if cell phone technology proliferates onboard aircraft. 

Mr. Chairman, I trust this information about our program is helpful.  Safety is the FAA’s highest priority and we will continue to enforce and maintain our regulatory oversight on the use of all PEDs, including cell phones, onboard aircraft.  

That concludes my testimony.  I would be happy to answer any questions that you or the other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

MARCH 15, 2005

Chairman Mica, Congressman Costello, and Members of the Subcommittee,

Good morning, it is a pleasure to be here today as the Subcommittee on Aviation explores an important issue for aviation safety—the focusing of lasers on cockpits of aircraft and helicopters.  I am Nick Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and this morning, I would like to provide an overview of how hand-held lasers are regulated, the potential of catastrophic events from the irradiation of a cockpit, and what the FAA is doing to protect air crew members from these incidents. 

With me today is Dr. Van Nakagawara, a Research Optometrist and Vision Research Team Leader at the FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, popularly known as CAMI.  Dr. Nakagawara is the lead author of a study entitled, “The Effects of Laser Illumination on Operational and Visual Performance of Pilots During Final Approach,” which was published in June 2004.

In recent years, LASER (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) devices have become less expensive and more commonplace.  Lasers are used in supermarket scanners, CD and DVD players, construction and surveying instruments, laser pointers for presentations, and for other medical and industrial purposes.  Also, lasers are often used outdoors as part of orchestrated laser light shows at theme parks, casinos, and special events.

The issue of how lasers affect pilots and whether they pose a threat to aviation safety has received media attention recently.  The aviation safety issue is very straightforward.  Obviously, pilots use their eyes to obtain the vast majority (approximately 80%) of all the information needed to safely fly an aircraft.  Operation of an aircraft at night presents additional visual challenges.  Exposure to relatively bright light such as a laser, when the eye is adapted to low-light levels, can result in temporary visual impairment.  Visual effects can last from several seconds to several minutes.  The three most common physiological effects associated with exposure to bright lights are:  1) glare, 2) flash-blindness, and 3) afterimage.

The principal concern for pilots is the possibility of being illuminated with a laser during terminal operations, which include approach, landing and take-off.  Pilots conducting low-altitude operations at night are particularly vulnerable to accidental or malicious laser illumination. 

Let me state at the outset that, to date, no accidents have been attributed to the illumination of air crew members by lasers.  While a few of these incidents have resulted in reported eye injury, no civilian pilot has had any permanent visual impairment as a result of laser exposure.  However, given the considerable number of reported laser incidents—over 400 since 1990—and approximately 112 incidents since November 2004, the potential for an aviation accident does exist.

I want to emphasize that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assures us that they have no information that would suggest that any of these incidents is in any way related to terrorist activity.  Some incidents have made national news.  One such incident occurred in December when a father and daughter allegedly were experimenting with a new laser pointer to test its capabilities.  The man allegedly pointed it at an aircraft on its final approach, and then, two days later, at a helicopter.  The helicopter was operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department, who were searching for the suspect in the earlier laser incident, when it was illuminated.  The helicopter was able to identify the location based on the earlier complaint, and the man was arrested.

FAA’s role in the issues surrounding the use of lasers rests with our mandate to ensure aviation safety.  There are other entities who are investigating this issue from a security perspective, and it is important for everyone to understand the various roles and responsibilities.  The FAA has no authority to either regulate lasers or take enforcement action against individuals who illuminate aircraft cockpits.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has authority to regulate light-emitting products and electronic product radiation.  With respect to the enforcement issue, federal, state and local law enforcement entities have the authority to prosecute individuals who recklessly illuminate aircraft cockpits.  Certainly, FAA has an important role in working with these entities to ensure aviation safety, but our role is not a primary one. 

The FDA regulates lasers under their “Performance Standards for Light-Emitting Products.”  This FDA standard utilizes the American National Standard Institute (ANSI Z136.1) recommended Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) of 2.5 milliwatts per centimeter squared for continuous wave lasers, which is applied to the previously established Normal Flight Zone to prevent ocular tissue damage in all navigable airspace.  The MPE is used to calculate the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance (NOHD), which is the distance of a laser beam beyond which an individual may be exposed without risk of ocular tissue damage. 

Based in part on historical laser safety data and military research on vision performance loss from laser exposure, the FAA issued a revised FAA Order 7400.2 on December 31, 2002, which includes new guidelines for Flight Safe Exposure Limits (FSELs) in specific zones of navigable airspace associated with airport terminal operations.   The revised FAA Order 7400.2 establishes four specific zones:  1) the Laser Free Flight Zone; 2) the Critical Flight Zone; 3) the Sensitive Flight Zone; and 4) the Normal Flight Zone.  The Laser Free Flight Zone includes airspace in the immediate proximity of the airport, up to and including 2,000 feet above ground level, extending two nautical miles in all directions measured from the runway centerline.  The Critical Flight Zone includes the space outside the Laser Free Flight Zone to a distance of 10 nautical miles from the Airport Reference Point to 10,000 feet above ground level.  Virtually all of the lasing incidents to date have occurred in the Critical Flight Zone.  The parameters of the Sensitive Flight Zone include airspace outside the critical flight zones that authorities (e.g., FAA, local departments of aviation, military) have identified that must be protected from the potential effects of laser emissions.  The Normal Flight Zone includes all navigable airspace not defined by the Laser Free, Critical, or Sensitive Flight Zones.

The necessity of establishing Laser Free Zones around airports is documented in the results of a study done by CAMI and published in June 2004.  The study consisted of subjecting 34 pilots to four eye-safe levels of visible laser light during four final approach maneuvers in a flight simulator.  All test subjects were volunteers who participated after giving informed consent.  Subjective responses were solicited after each trial and during an exit interview, and the pilots were asked to rate the affect the laser exposure had on their ability to operate the aircraft and on their visual performance. 

Approximately 75 percent of the responses solicited from subjects indicated they had experienced adverse visual effects resulting in some degree of operational difficulty when illuminated by laser radiation during final approach maneuvers at or below 100 feet above ground level.  Even at the lowest level of laser exposure, two-thirds of the responses indicated that the subjects experienced glare, flash-blindness, or afterimages.  However, it is important to note that all subjects were able to maintain operational control, and safely land the plane or successfully execute a missed approach.  Significantly, none of the actual lasing incidents against aircraft to date have occurred within these parameters.

In response to the recent increase in reports of pilots being illuminated with lasers, and as a result of the findings in the CAMI report, Secretary Mineta announced on January 12, 2005, a new FAA policy designed to protect air crews and passengers, and to discourage future laser incidents.  Secretary Mineta directed the FAA to distribute an Advisory Circular, AC 70-02, which contains new guidelines to give pilots, air traffic controllers, and law enforcement timely information about laser incidents.  The new guidelines will help pilots identify areas where lasers have been sighted; will assist controllers in reporting laser incidents; and will give law enforcement officers the information as quickly as possible in order to investigate and prosecute those persons who put aircraft at risk. 

As of January 19, 2005, all pilots are now requested to immediately report any laser sightings to air traffic controllers, who will then be required to share these reports through the Federal Domestic Events Network.  Once these laser incidents are posted on the network, air traffic controllers will work with law enforcement entities to identify the source of the lasers, with the goal of assisting police in locating the scene of the lasing incident swiftly, and hopefully, apprehending the person responsible.  As Secretary Mineta said when announcing this new policy, “We must act now, before someone’s reckless actions lead to a terrible and tragic incident.”

At the present time, there is no system or device that can be installed on aircraft or given to pilots and crew to protect them from these incidents without possibly affecting operational performance.  The U.S. Military has dedicated a great deal of time and research to finding ways of protecting their pilots from an enemy’s use of lasers to impair pilot performance during military flight operations.  Their efforts have established that there is no easy answer to this problem.  For example, efforts to develop pilot goggles that will screen out all the wavelengths of visible lasers, and thereby prevent any adverse affects from exposure to them, have proven to have limited practical application and may even be potentially hazardous to flight safety.  Screening out the wavelengths that produce red and green light (the most common colors of lasers) would also impair the pilot’s ability to read the instruments in current cockpits, which are often displayed in either green or magenta.  The goggles can also impair the pilot’s vision by reducing the amount of visible light.  Both of these results are unacceptable.  Consequently, other initiatives that call for installing filters or screens on cockpit windscreens to intercept or deflect lasers could similarly result in an unacceptable reduction of critical visibility for safe flight.  Protecting pilots from the real, but remote, risk of being illuminated by a commercially available laser powerful enough to cause an accident cannot be accomplished by a solution that could create an even more dangerous operating condition.  We at the FAA are working with the Department of Defense to explore technologies and protocols that may provide protection for pilots and air crews, while not impairing their ability to safely operate their aircraft.

An alternative solution may be an operational one.  We are hopeful that by obtaining and evaluating more information on the affects and risks of laser illumination, FAA might, at some point, be in a position to develop protocols for pilots to follow to best mitigate the affects of a laser, much as we have for other operational challenges.  Examples of these protocols for flight crews include:  shielding their eyes to the maximum extent possible, yet consistent with aircraft control and safety; avoiding flight within areas of reported on-going unauthorized laser activity; and avoiding areas, if practicable, where an incident has just been reported and a warning broadcasted.  Other measures could include obtaining authorization to deviate from the last assigned clearance in the event laser activity is encountered, and expediting the reporting of incidents to the appropriate air traffic control facility.

In the interim, the FAA will continue to partner with the Department of Homeland Security to better define the threat posed by laser devices and identify countermeasures to minimize the risk to aviation safety.  We will also work collaboratively with Department of Defense scientists to determine whether any of their research could have practical applications to the civil aviation arena.  It is our hope that the Advisory Circular the Secretary announced earlier this year will result in an improvement in the ability of state and local government to prosecute individuals who intentionally attempt to focus lasers on aircraft.  Aggressive enforcement will hopefully discourage reckless laser use.  The FAA will also continue working with the FDA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission to improve product labeling and better educate the general public concerning the potential harm from the inappropriate use of lasers.  Improved labels and better education represent the best means of raising awareness among the public in the short term.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

THE HONORABLE JEFFREY W. RUNGE, M.D.
ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 23, 2005

Chairman Stearns, Congresswoman Schakowsky, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss reauthorization of the motor vehicle safety programs of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 

I want to express my appreciation for this Subcommittee’s longstanding support of motor vehicle safety programs. Transportation safety is a top priority for Secretary Mineta and President Bush.  Your work has allowed NHTSA to advance motor vehicle safety.  We are grateful to this Subcommittee for its continuing leadership and for scheduling this hearing.

             NHTSA’s mission is to save lives and prevent injuries.  Motor vehicle crashes are responsible for 95 percent of all transportation-related deaths and 99 percent of all transportation-related injuries. They are the leading cause of death for Americans in the age group 3 through 33.  In 2003, the last year for which we have complete data, 42,643 people were killed in motor vehicle crashes.  The economic costs associated with these crashes also seriously impact the Nation’s fiscal health.  The annual cost to our economy of all motor vehicle crashes is  $230.6 billion in Year 2000 dollars, or 2.3 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.

The motor vehicle safety law vests NHTSA with the authority and responsibility to issue motor vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and equipment that are performance-based, objective, practicable, and repeatable, and that advance real world safety.  These standards reduce the number of motor vehicle crashes and minimize the consequences of crashes that do occur.

The safety improvements in vehicles have been significant since NHTSA’s inception in the 1960s.  We estimate that total lives saved by vehicle technologies number about 330,000, over half of which are attributable to safety belts.  Today, there is much agency and public attention devoted to vehicle safety standards, yet over 90 percent of crashes are caused by human factors, such as inattention, speeding and physiologic impairment.  The largest gains in highway safety yet to be realized are in the human factors area, including how drivers interact with their vehicles.  Relatively few lives will be saved in the future by continuing a traditional focus on vehicle crashworthiness.  We must devote our agency’s resources where they can reduce the safety problem most effectively.  And we must prioritize our rulemaking and research activities in accordance with that principle.  To do otherwise would be irresponsible stewardship of public resources and the public’s welfare.

When I came before this committee last year, I spoke of the publication, in 2003, of the first ever NHTSA multi-year vehicle safety rulemaking priority plan.  Early this year we updated the plan, and it now sets forth the agency's rulemaking goals through 2009.  The rulemaking and supporting research priorities were defined through extensive discussions within the agency, taking into account the views we have heard over several recent years at public meetings and in response to rulemaking notices and requests for comment.  We prioritized potential new rules and upgrades of existing rules according to the size and severity of the problems they address, and the best educated estimates of the cost and effectiveness.  The agency works closely with Congress and the public to define our priorities. 

We intend for our rulemaking priority plan to be a living document, and will continue to update it annually.  In addition, we are committed to reviewing all Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards systematically over a 7-year cycle.  We decided that such a review is needed in light of changing technology, vehicle fleet composition, safety concerns and other issues that may require changes to a standard.  Our regulatory reviews are in keeping with the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act, to ensure that our rulemaking actions produce measurable safety outcomes.

Because of this careful process, and the need to make these decisions based on current data, the Administration is opposed to legislatively mandated rulemaking actions that displace deliberative research and regulatory actions.  The process that we have developed will produce the best and most cost-effective solutions to our most critical safety needs.  The imposition of deadlines and mandated requirements can preclude the completion of necessary research and force premature judgments or the adoption of incomplete or only partially developed solutions. 

Furthermore, we have seen proposed mandates with technical elements that have not proven viable.  Several decades of vehicle safety rulemaking have demonstrated that quality data and research produce regulations that are technically sound, practicable, objective, and repeatable.  Our rulemaking priority plan was carefully considered, in the context of concomitant research needs, and I ask for your support in our pursuit of its objectives.

The overall safety priorities set by our agency at the outset of this Administration are increasing safety belt use, reducing impaired driving, addressing vehicle crash incompatibility, reducing rollovers, and enhancing our data systems.  In 2003, we carefully studied these objectives and developed and published a roadmap for achieving them.  This Subcommittee has jurisdiction over the motor vehicle safety law, which is central to our objective of reducing deaths and injuries associated with crash incompatibility and rollover.

NHTSA’s priority rulemakings for the immediate future include enhanced side crash protection, preventing occupant ejection in rollovers, electronic stability control systems, and upgrading our standards relating to roof crush and door locks.  Our longer-term research priorities include a number of potential advances in crash avoidance driver-assist technologies and addressing vehicle incompatibility in frontal crashes.  We have integrated our rulemaking priority plan and our research plan to ensure that, as rulemaking becomes necessary to advance safety in the future, we have the research to support it.

In all of our efforts, we recognize the vital role that complete and precise data play in identifying safety problems.  With that in mind, we have evaluated the important advances that electronic data recorders can add to our crash data and our ability to assess safety needs and benefits, and we are completing a final rule to address these devices that we intend to publish this Fall.

I would like to turn, now, to a discussion of some of the specific actions we are taking in accord with our rulemaking priority plan, against the backdrop of the safety problems we must address.

  Of the 33,471 passenger vehicle occupants killed in 2003, more than 9,000 were killed in side impacts.  In side impacts involving two-passenger vehicles, an occupant of the struck vehicle was about 8 times more likely to have been killed than an occupant of the striking vehicle.  It’s not hard to see why preventing deaths and injuries in side-impact crashes is one of our highest priorities.

In May 2004, we published a notice of proposed rulemaking to upgrade our side-impact standard.  We estimate that this upgrade will prevent many hundreds of deaths annually in these types of crashes.  We are now developing the final rule and hope to publish it in early 2006.

The growing popularity over the past ten years of light trucks, vans, and utility vehicles (LTVs) has changed the mix of vehicles in the fleet and the safety picture.  More vehicle occupants are being killed in crashes between passenger cars and light trucks than in crashes involving only passenger cars.  Passenger car occupants are over three and one-half times more likely to die than LTV occupants in crashes between the two vehicle types, both in front-to-front and in side impact crashes.

NHTSA’s 2003 integrated project team plan outlined our strategy of addressing the issue of compatibility through partner-protection, self-protection, lighting/glare and reforms to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy program.  We expect our upgraded side impact standard to provide increased protection for occupants in vehicles struck by other vehicles, and NHTSA is conducting research to determine good measures of vehicle compatibility and alternative test barriers to improve protection of occupants of struck vehicles.

 Rollover crashes account for a substantial percentage of the fatal crashes in the country.  Even though only 2.5 percent of crashes are rollovers, over 10,000 people die each year in rollovers.  This is almost a third of all passenger vehicle occupant fatalities and about 60 percent of sport utility vehicle (SUV) occupant fatalities.  The data show that nearly half of all rollover deaths are the result of ejection from a vehicle, and nearly all of these occupants are unbelted. 

 We added dynamic testing of vehicles as part of our rollover resistance rating system in accordance with the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act.  Testing and reporting of those results began with 2004 model year vehicles as part of our New Car Assessment Program (NCAP).  

We have already noticed improvements in vehicle designs and in safety ratings.  Manufacturers strive to obtain high safety ratings under NCAP, because so many consumers rely on this information in making their vehicle purchasing decisions.  We have seen an increase in vehicle manufacturers using NHTSA’s star-rating information in their product advertising.  An informed public will be an effective catalyst for improved rollover resistance.  NHTSA’s new web site, www.safercar.gov, enhances the consumer’s access to this safety information.  

            To improve the crashworthiness of vehicles that do roll over in a crash, we are working on improved ejection mitigation and roof crush protection.  Even as NHTSA is upgrading our side impact standard, all of the major automobile manufacturers have committed over time to ensure that their vehicles meet certain testing criteria for side impacts.  Those testing criteria are intended to encourage the installation of side airbag curtains that protect against brain injury in side impact crashes.  An additional benefit of many side airbag curtains is that they prevent potentially lethal ejections.    

            In addition to the attention we are giving our rollover and compatibility priorities, we also intend to bring to Congress some additional important safety initiatives.  We believe the Secretary of Transportation should be authorized to participate and cooperate in international activities to enhance motor vehicle and traffic safety.  This would provide for NHTSA’s participation and cooperation in international activities aimed at developing the best possible global safety research and technical regulations.   Through participation in these international efforts, the United States will combine its motor vehicle safety initiatives with those of other countries, to ensure a comprehensive approach to motor vehicle safety and to promote cost-effective deployment of safety technologies. 

A second area is our need to expand activities in crash prevention and severity reduction.  The most significant vehicle safety initiatives in the future will be based on technology that avoids crashes, rather than our traditional emphasis on crashworthiness.  This would include evaluations of crash avoidance technologies such as electronic stability control, telematics, alternative braking, vision enhancement systems, lane keeping systems, and collision avoidance systems.     

We anticipate that our research into these and other driver assistance technologies will reach significantly beyond the scope of current agency research and development activities.  The rapid advances in these technologies will radically change the design and performance of automobiles over the next 10 years and, coupled with the aging driver population, present unique research challenges in human factors engineering.  Our goal is to hasten the introduction of vehicle-based driver assistance technologies into the marketplace while ensuring their safe performance across all demographics, through the development of standards, voluntary guidelines, and consumer information.  In doing so, we will have to be mindful that with the proliferation of new technologies comes the potential for increased driver distraction.

A third area is our need to engage in research and development in fuel integrity of hydrogen powered vehicles.  This includes risk assessment studies and the development of test and evaluation procedures, performance criteria, and suitable countermeasures.

This safety initiative would support the President’s Hydrogen Fuel Initiative and the FreedomCAR Program.  In particular, the research program would investigate the safety of the power train, the vehicle fuel container and delivery system, the onboard refueling system, and the full vehicle system performance.  This research would evaluate leak detection systems, determine the effectiveness of safety systems, assess fire potential and flammability, and evaluate external hazards to these systems.  The onboard refueling system related research and performance tests would evaluate fuel leakage, examine sparking and grounding conditions of the refueling system, and examine conditions under which fire could occur.

I would like to take a moment now to highlight NHTSA’s important and continuing role in the delivery of Emergency Medical Services (EMS).  For more than 3 decades, longer than any other Federal agency, NHTSA has been the Federal Government’s leader for EMS.  Our first Administrator, Dr. William Haddon, had a vision for EMS systems before they existed, and recognized that caring for the injured would be essential to decreasing the number of highway deaths.  He also realized, as we still do today, that the only sustainable EMS system is one that addresses all emergencies.  As EMS grew to include caring for people with non-traffic-related injuries, NHTSA created an informal Federal interagency EMS structure, partnering with the Departments of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security, and national EMS organizations to provide the leadership, coordination, and policy guidance to enhance the national EMS system.

The needs of a comprehensive EMS system surpass the expertise or funding of any one agency.  This is why I urge you to adopt the Administration’s proposal, as contained in the Senate’s version of H.R. 3, which would create a formal, ongoing mechanism with the authority to coordinate Federal EMS activities.  Such a committee, dubbed “FICEMS” (for Federal Interagency Committee on Emergency Medical Services) would not only allow, but require EMS to continue to tap the expertise and the resources of multiple departments.

Creating FICEMS avoids duplication, assures consistency of mission, and maximizes the use of limited resources.  Through the proposed EMS grant program, which is also in the Senate bill, each State’s EMS office would receive formula grant funds for improving the capacity of the entire EMS system.  This would not duplicate funding provided by other agencies, but would be the primary funding to support the basic EMS infrastructure that these segments utilize.

Since 1966, NHTSA and the Department of Transportation have been at the forefront of the Federal Government’s efforts to support every portion of the EMS system.  I ask members of this Committee to continue NHTSA’s commitment to EMS for the next decades.

            Finally, I want to bring up a topic that is not within the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee, yet vital to saving lives.  There is a provision in the Senate version of H.R. 3 that will save over 1,200 lives a year, and do it faster and cheaper than any other proposal you will consider in this Congress, and perhaps in this decade.  If the intent of this hearing is to hear what can NHTSA do now that will immediately save lives, this is a provision I strongly urge the House to adopt.

I am referring to the Administration’s proposal, passed by the Senate but not in the House bill, which would provide incentives to the States to enact primary safety belt laws or reach 90 percent safety belt usage.  Why are primary safety belt laws important?  Because States that enact a primary safety belt law can expect to see their safety belt use numbers rise by approximately 11 percentage points practically overnight.  If all States adopted a primary belt law, we would prevent 1,275 deaths and 17,000 serious injuries every year.  No other safety proposal I am aware of before Congress would save more than 1,200 people annually at practically no cost.

            Consider that NHTSA recently completed the 15 rulemakings related to the TREAD Act.  The actions associated with that law cost consumers $1.2 billion and took years to promulgate.  In total, that law will save 120 lives annually.  In comparison, if the remaining States enacted a primary belt law, we would save ten times as many lives annually, by utilizing a device already in the car, at no cost to the consumer.

            It is one of the paradoxes of Congressional jurisdiction that this committee oversees the equipping of safety belts in vehicles, but not their use.  There is no benefit to equipping vehicles with safety belts unless they are worn.  I want to stress that this proposal provides incentives to the States, not sanctions.  No State would be penalized for not adopting a primary belt law.

            Mr. Chairman, if the members of this Subcommittee want to save lives and do it now, and I know every Member here shares that goal, I urge you and your colleagues to adopt the Senate language for primary belt incentives.  No vehicle mandate, no elaborate rulemaking, no public relations campaign would save as many lives as Congress giving the States an incentive to pass primary belt laws.

I urge this Subcommittee to support all of these important safety initiatives and our rulemaking goals as outlined in our priority plan.  I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.

THE HONORABLE JEFFREY W. RUNGE, M.D.
ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

Before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE

April 5, 2005

Chairman Lott, Senator Inouye, Members of the Subcommittee:  Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Administration’s proposal to reauthorize our highway safety programs in the “Safe, Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003” or “SAFETEA.”  My staff and I look forward to working with this Subcommittee and the rest of the Senate to shape the proposals that will reauthorize our programs and address the highway safety challenges facing the Nation.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) mission is to save lives and prevent injuries.  Motor vehicle crashes are responsible for 95 percent of all transportation-related deaths and 99 percent of all transportation-related injuries.  They are the leading cause of death for Americans for every age from 3 through 33.  Although we are seeing improvements in vehicle crash worthiness and crash avoidance technologies, the numbers of fatalities and injuries on our highways remain staggering.  In 2003, the last year for which we have complete data, an estimated 42,643 people were killed in motor vehicle crashes.  This number represents a slight decrease of 362 fatalities from 2002 (43,005), but we need to continue and accelerate that downward trend.   

The economic costs associated with these crashes seriously impact the Nation’s fiscal health.  The annual cost to our economy of all motor vehicle crashes is $230.6 billion in Year 2000 dollars, or 2.3 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.  This translates into an average of $820 for every person living in the United States.  Included in this figure is $81 billion in lost productivity, $32.6 billion in medical expenses, and $59 billion in property damage.  The average cost to care for a critically injured survivor is estimated at $1.1 million over a lifetime, a figure that does not begin to account for the physical and psychological suffering of the victims and their families. 

The fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in 2003 was at an all-time low of 1.48.  Secretary Mineta has set a goal of reducing this rate even further, to no more than 1.0 fatality for every 100 million VMT by 2008.  President Bush and Secretary Mineta have made reducing highway fatalities the number one priority for the Department of Transportation and for the reauthorization of NHTSA’s programs. 

As the statistics indicate, traffic safety constitutes a major public health problem.  But unlike a number of the complex issues facing the Nation Washington today, we have at least one highly effective and simple remedy to combat highway deaths and injuries.  Wearing safety belts is the single most effective step individuals can take to save their lives.  Buckling up is not a complex vaccine, doesn’t have unwanted side effects and doesn’t cost any money. It’s simple, it works and it’s lifesaving.

Safety belt use cuts the risk of death in a severe crash in half.  Most passenger vehicle occupants killed in motor vehicle crashes are unrestrained.  If safety belt use were to increase from the 2004 national average of 80 percent to 90 percent—an achievable goal—nearly 2,700 lives would be saved each year.  For every 1 percentage point increase in safety belt use—that is 2.8 million more people buckling up—we would save hundreds of lives, suffer significantly fewer injuries, and reduce economic costs by hundreds of millions of dollars a year.

States recognize these lifesaving benefits, and have enacted safety belt laws.  However, as of March 2005, only 21 States plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have primary laws, which allow police officers to stop and issue citations to motorists upon observation that they are not buckled up.  Other safety belt laws, known as secondary laws, do not allow such citations unless a motorist is stopped for another offense.  In 2004, belt use in States with primary safety belt laws averaged 84 percent, 11 points higher than in States with secondary laws—a statistically significant difference.  If all States enacted primary safety belt laws, we would prevent 1,275 deaths and 17,000 serious injuries annually.  Enacting a primary safety belt law is the single most effective action a State with a secondary law can take to decrease highway deaths and injuries.

            The Administration’s SAFETEA proposal builds on the tremendous successes of previous surface transportation legislation by taking some important next steps.  I’d like to highlight one very important component of this proposal that creates a strong incentive for States to enact primary safety belt laws or achieve high safety belt use rates, while at the same time streamlining NHTSA’s grant programs to make them more performance-based.

The Administration's SAFETEA proposal, transmitted to Congress in 2003 and adjusted this February, proposes a major consolidation of NHTSA highway safety grant programs that would provide authorizations over the 6-year period to fund the basic formula grant program to the States under Section 402, but add two important new elements—a Safety Belt Performance Grant and a General Performance Grant.  

The Safety Belt Performance Grant provides up to $100 million each year to reward States for passing primary safety belt laws or achieving 90 percent safety belt use rates in two consecutive years.  Under our proposal, a State that has already enacted a primary safety belt use law for all passenger motor vehicles (effective by December 31, 2002) would receive a grant equal to 2 ½ 2.5 times the amount of its FY 2003 formula grant for highway safety.  A State that enacts a new primary belt law or achieves 90 percent belt use for two consecutive years will receive a grant equal to five times the amount of its FY 2003 formula grant for highway safety.  This significant incentive is intended to prompt State action needed to save lives.  States achieve high levels of belt use through primary safety belt laws, public education using paid and earned media, and high visibility law enforcement programs, such as the Click it or Ticket campaign.

A State that receives a Safety Belt Performance Grant for the enactment of a primary safety belt law can elect to use all of those funds for a wide-range wide range of highway safety programs, including infrastructure investments eligible under the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Highway Safety Improvement Program in accordance with the State’s Comprehensive Strategic Highway Safety Plan. 

Under another provision of the Safety Belt Performance Grant, a State can receive additional grants by improving its safety belt use rates.  This incentive, alone, would provide up to $182 million over the 6-year authorization period.  Any State that receives a grant for improved safety belt use rates is permitted to use up to 50 percent of those funds for activities eligible under the new Highway Safety Improvement Program. 

The six-year General Performance Grant component of our consolidated highway safety grant program not only eases the administrative burdens of the States but also rewards States with increased Federal funds for measurable improvements in their safety performance in the areas of overall motor vehicle fatalities, alcohol-related fatalities, and motorcycle, bicycle, and pedestrian crash fatalities.  Any State that receives a General Performance Grant is permitted to use up to 50 percent of those funds for activities eligible under the new Highway Safety Improvement Program. 

These grants reflect a different approach to addressing the Nation’s substantial highway safety problems.  While formulating the Department’s reauthorization proposal, the FHWA and NHTSA embraced the guiding principle that States should receive resources to address their own, unique transportation safety issues, should be strongly encouraged to increase their safety belt use rates—the single most effective means of decreasing deaths and injuries—and should be rewarded for performance with increased funds and greater flexibility to spend those funds on either infrastructure safety or behavioral safety programs. 

But with the flexibility comes the accountability.  States will be held accountable for setting realistic and appropriate performance goals, devising corresponding plans, and ultimately improving performance and achieving the goals.

These guiding principles of flexibility and accountability underlie all aspects of the Administration’s highway safety reauthorization proposal.  In fact, our Nation’s governors speak with one voice on this issue – and they all want maximum flexibility to distribute highway safety funds where the need is the greatest. 

Mr. Chairman, the single most important safety measure Congress could pass this decade is SAFETEA's proposal to provide incentive grants for States to pass primary belt laws.  As the Nation’s chief highway safety official, I urge you to pass a bill that gives States the strongest incentives possible to enact primary belt laws.  No vehicle safety mandate, no elaborate rulemaking, no public relations campaign that NHTSA could undertake would have the life-saving impact of Congress providing meaningful incentives to the States to pass primary belt laws.

I’d like to give you a brief overview of some of the other provisions of our SAFETEA proposal transmitted to Congress in 2003.          

SAFETEA would establish a new core highway safety infrastructure program, in place of the existing Surface Transportation Program safety set-aside.  This new FHWA program, called the Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), would more than double funding over comparable TEA-21 levels, providing more funds for safety projects over the 6-year authorization period.  In addition to increased funding, States would be encouraged and assisted in their efforts to formulate comprehensive highway safety plans.  Those States with such comprehensive plans could flex up to 50 percent of their HSIP funds for behavioral safety programs. 

SAFETEA also is designed to help the States deter impaired driving.  Reducing the number of impaired drivers on our roadways is a complex task requiring interconnected strategies and programs.  In 2003, an estimated 17,013 people died in alcohol-related crashes (40 percent of the total fatalities for the year), a 29-percent reduction from the 23,833 alcohol-related fatalities in 1988, and a decline of 3 percent over 2002.  Our data show that 2003 was the first year since 1999 that the number of alcohol-related fatalities decreased.  The proportion of traffic deaths of individuals with a blood-alcohol content above .08—the legal limit in every State—was highest in 2003 for 21-24 year olds, at 32 percent, followed by 25-34 year olds, at 27 percent. 

A component of our revised Section 402 program would focus significant resources on a small number of States with particularly severe impaired driving problems by creating a new $50-million-a-year impaired driving discretionary grant program.  The grant program would include support for up to 10 States with an especially high number of alcohol-related fatalities and a high rate of alcohol-related fatalities relative to vehicle miles traveled and population.  A team of outside experts would conduct detailed reviews of the impaired driving systems of these States to assist them in developing a strategic plan for improving programs and reducing impaired driving-related fatalities and injuries.  Additional support would be provided for training, for technical assistance in the prosecution and adjudication of driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases, and to help licensing and criminal justice authorities close legal loopholes. 

NHTSA believes that this targeted State grant program and supporting activities, together with continued nationwide use of high-visibility enforcement and paid and earned media campaigns, would lead to a continuation of the downward trend in alcohol-related fatalities.  Also, through the comprehensive safety planning process, all States could elect to use a significant amount of their FHWA Highway Safety Infrastructure funding, in addition to their consolidated highway safety program funds, to address impaired driving.

SAFETEA’s highway safety title includes a key provision to authorize a comprehensive national motor vehicle crash causation survey to enable us to determine the factors responsible for the most frequent causes of crashes on the Nation’s roads.  This comprehensive survey would be funded at $10 million a year out of the funds authorized for our highway safety research and development program.  The last comprehensive update of crash causation data was generated in the 1970s.  Congress has recognized the importance of this survey and so far has appropriated $14 million for this effort.  Appropriations have been used to develop protocols and methodology, procure equipment, hire and train new researchers, establish data collection methodology and structure and begin field data collection. 

            SAFETEA also would create a new $50-million-a-year incentive grant program that builds upon a TEA-21 program to encourage States to improve their traffic records data.  Accurate State traffic safety data are critical to identifying local safety issues, applying focused safety countermeasures, and evaluating the effectiveness of countermeasures. Improvements are needed for police reports, driver licensing, vehicle registration, and citation/court data to provide essential information.  Additionally, deficiencies in data negatively impact national databases including the Fatality Analysis Reporting System, General Estimates System, National Driver Register, Highway Safety Information System, and Commercial Driver License Information System.

            For the past 20 years, Federal support for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) has been both scarce and uncoordinated.  As a result, the capacity of this critical public service has seen little growth, and support for EMS has been spread among a number of agencies throughout the Federal government, including NHTSA.  Except for NHTSA, most of the support offered by these agencies has focused only on specific system functions, rather than on overall system capacity, and has been inconsistent and ineffectively coordinated.

            SAFETEA would establish a new $10-million-a-year $10 million-a-year State formula grant program to support EMS systems development, including 9-1-1 nationwide, and would provide for a Federal Interagency Committee on EMS to strengthen intergovernmental coordination of EMS with NHTSA providing staff support.  The States would administer the grant program through their State EMS offices and coordinate it with their highway safety offices.  Enactment of this section would result in comprehensive support for EMS systems, and improved emergency response capacity nationwide. 

            SAFETEA also would provide a total of over $500 million for NHTSA’s highway safety research and development program.  This program supports State highway safety behavioral programs and activities by developing and demonstrating innovative safety countermeasures and by collecting and disseminating essential data on highway safety.  The results of our Section 403 research provide the scientific basis for highway safety programs that States and local communities can tailor to their own needs, ensuring that precious tax dollars are spent only on programs that are effective.  The States are encouraged to use these effective programs for their ongoing safety programs and activities.  

Highway safety behavioral research focuses on human factors that influence driver and pedestrian behavior and on environmental conditions that affect safety.  This research addresses a wide range of safety problems through various initiatives, such as impaired driving programs, safety belt and child safety seat programs and related enforcement mobilizations, pedestrian, bicycle, and motorcycle safety initiatives, enforcement and justice services, speed management, aggressive driving countermeasures, emergency medical services, fatigue and inattention countermeasures, and data collection and analysis efforts.  These efforts have produced a variety of scientifically sound data and results. 

            Finally, SAFETEA would provide a total of over $23 million for the National Driver Register.  This system facilitates the exchange of driver licensing information on problem drivers among the States and various Federal agencies to aid in making decisions concerning driver licensing, driver improvement, and driver employment and transportation safety. 

Overall, SAFETEA is a groundbreaking proposal that offers States more flexibility than they have ever had before in how they spend their Federal-aid safety dollars.  It reduces State administrative burdens by consolidating multiple categorical grant programs into one.  It would reward States for accomplishing easily measurable goals and encourage them to take the most effective steps to save lives.  It is exactly the kind of proposal that is needed to more effectively address the tragic problem of highway fatalities. 

On the motor vehicle safety side of NHTSA's mission, we focus our efforts on actions offering the greatest potential for saving lives and preventing injury.  In 2003, we published the first ever NHTSA multi-year vehicle safety rulemaking priorities and supporting research plan.  It sets forth the agency's rulemaking goals for 2003 through 2006.  We have transmitted to Congress the January 2005 update of the plan, which covers the years 2005 through 2009. 

In addition, we are committed to reviewing all Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards systematically over a 7-year cycle.  NHTSA is a data-driven and science-driven agency, and we decided that such a review is needed in light of changing technology, vehicle fleet composition, safety concerns and other issues that may require changes to a standard.  Our regulatory reviews are in keeping with the goals of the Government Performance and Results Act, to ensure that our rulemaking actions produce measurable safety outcomes.  Several decades of vehicle safety rulemaking have demonstrated that quality data and research produce regulations that are technically sound, practicable, objective, and repeatable.  Our rulemaking priorities plan was crafted with these principles in mind.

NHTSA’s priority rulemakings for the immediate future include enhanced side crash protection; improved rollover crash protection through advanced prevention technologies, reduced occupant ejection, and upgraded roof crush protection; reduction in light vehicle tire failures; and shorter stopping distances for heavy trucks. Our longer-term priorities include research and rulemaking decisions to address vehicle “aggressivity” toward other vehicles; improved visibility through enhanced mirrors and other technologies; reduction in crashes associated with driver distraction; improved heavy truck tires; ensuring the safety of hydrogen, fuel cell, and alternative-fueled vehicles; and advancing crash avoidance technologies, such as driver-assist systems.  We have integrated our rulemaking priorities plan and our supporting research plan to ensure that research is available when needed to conduct rulemakings that advance safety.

I would ask the Subcommittee not to include rulemaking mandates in your bill to reauthorize NHTSA's programs.  Mandates take away NHTSA's ability to prioritize its work based on its most important safety priorities, to revise those priorities as circumstances change, and to have the time needed to ensure that our regulations are based on sound science.  Mandates that dictate timelines and the regulatory approach impair our ability to provide the public with the best safety solutions.

 Mr. Chairman, the Secretary named the Administration's proposal "SAFETEA" for a very good reason.  This Subcommittee literally has the power to save thousands of lives in the years to come at no cost to the consumer.  I urge you to support the Administration's SAFETEA proposal, and especially to give the States the necessary incentives to pass primary belt laws.  It is worth repeating that nothing Congress will do in this bill will have a greater and a more lasting impact on safety. 

Thank you for your consideration of my views.  I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Statement of

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rosen
General Counsel,
U.S. Department of Transportation

Before the

Subcommittee on Railroads
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives

September 21, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the continued urgent need for reform of intercity passenger rail service.

Introduction

Our economy’s ability to move hundreds of millions of people annually within our Country is one its essential characteristics.  Airplanes, buses, cars and trucks, ships, and trains all contribute to the mobility that Americans demand and deserve.  Intercity passenger rail is a small but potentially important part of that, which is why the Administration wants to save and improve it.

Amtrak, however, presents all of us with a problem:  Amtrak’s revenues from ticket sales this year will not cover even 50% of the company’s expenditures; indeed, Amtrak’s operating loss alone will exceed $550 million.  At the same time, Amtrak’s debts exceed $3.5 billion, or roughly triple its annual ticket sales.  Were Amtrak an airline, a bus company, or a cruise ship company, it would be facing either (a) a need for prompt and fundamental business changes, or (b) bankruptcy.  It should surprise no one, therefore, that the Administration has sought prompt and fundamental change in Amtrak and the overall system of intercity passenger rail.  Without that change, intercity passenger rail will fail to realize its potential as an important element of the Nation’s transportation system.

Earlier this year, the Administration issued a clarion call for change, and Secretary Mineta has repeatedly called for reform and improvement of our system of intercity passenger rail nationwide.  (Secretary Mineta’s speeches on this topic are available at: http://www.dot.gov/affairs/ostind05.htm )  In response, some interesting things have happened.  Perhaps most significantly, Amtrak itself has acknowledged the urgent need for real reform, and issued a “Strategic Reform Initiative” plan that borrows major elements of the Administration’s proposals.  Within the Congress, the Senate Commerce Committee’s rail subcommittee has voted out the Passenger Rail Improvement Act (S.1516).  The bill undertakes certain specific reforms, such as addressing the poor performance of Amtrak’s long-distance trains.  In addition, the Senate Appropriations committee’s transportation subcommittee has reported a bill whose funding terms would preclude Amtrak from subsidizing losses on food service and luxury first-class sleeper cars for vacationers and others.  However, overall, the reforms considered by Congress are not as comprehensive or as critical as those proposed by the Administration.

Secretary Mineta remains convinced that fundamental change in the way we support intercity passenger rail service is not only necessary but inevitable.  The Administration is pleased that Amtrak and some in Congress have acknowledged the Administration’s call to action.  At the same time, we still have a way to go to achieve the fundamental legislative reforms that are needed.  The status quo, in which federal taxpayers have been called upon to pay Amtrak’s escalating losses year after year, cannot continue.   Proposals to reauthorize Amtrak as it is, coupled with greater taxpayer subsidies, are both unwise and unrealistic.  They would jeopardize the future of intercity passenger rail, rather than improve it.  By contrast, H.R. 1713 embodies the key principles of intercity passenger rail reform, and it is my hope that today’s hearing will become the start of this Subcommittee’s embracing the preservation, reform, and enhancement of intercity passenger rail in accord with those principles.

First and foremost, it is essential to recognize that the passenger rail service model created in 1970 is no longer viable.  Amtrak operates a legacy system of routes incapable of adapting to market forces and demographic changes in an environment where every other mode of transportation does so to survive.  Over the last three decades, America’s transportation system as a whole—our system of roads, airports, waterways, transit lines, and the mostly private operators who use them—has grown tremendously.  It provides excellent mobility, connectivity, and efficiency that have undergirded our economic growth.   Sadly, intercity passenger rail has been a different story.  Whatever one thinks of Amtrak or passenger rail more generally, this mode of transportation demands ever increasing taxpayer subsidies while consistently failing to meet the lowest of expectations.

1. RIDING THE RAILS:  AMTRAK’S PAST AND PRESENT.

Congress created Amtrak in 1970 as a private corporation in a restructuring of the larger rail industry, which was in a state of major financial distress.  In that restructuring, freight railroads ceased providing passenger service altogether.  Instead, for the first time, there would be a single national provider of intercity passenger rail service to replace the multiple regional systems that reflected the areas covered by each of the freight railroads’ route systems.   The intent was that the national monopoly would reinvigorate passenger rail by permitting Amtrak to consolidate operations and achieve efficiencies that, after a very brief period of Federal assistance, would preserve and expand intercity passenger rail service as a for-profit company. 

By now we know that the Congress’s hopes and expectations in creating Amtrak have never been realized.   Intercity passenger rail service has not been reinvigorated.  The Department of Transportation (DOT) expects that each and every one of Amtrak’s 15 long-distance trains will this year lose money on a fully allocated cost basis, even excluding depreciation and interest.   On a per passenger basis, with depreciation and interest, the loss for long-distance trains ranged from $47 per passenger to $466 per passenger in FY 2004.  But the long-distance trains are not alone:  with depreciation and interest included, every one of Amtrak’s 43 regularly scheduled routes loses money.  After 34 years and $29 billion in Federal subsidies, intercity passenger rail’s financial performance has not improved, service and on-time performance are below expectations, and passenger rail’s market share relative to other modes has continued to erode.  Last year’s so-called “record” Amtrak ridership amounted to a one-half of one percent share of the total intercity passenger transportation market.  Airlines alone carry more U.S. passengers in three weeks than Amtrak does in a year.

That also belies one of the frequent arguments of today’s defenders of the 1970 model– that the Federal government supposedly subsidizes other modes of transportation at a greater rate than Amtrak.  In fact, FY 2005’s appropriated subsidy of $1.207 billion represented approximately 9 percent of the total discretionary Federal funds for the Department of Transportation.  In other words, 9 percent of the Department’s funds go for one-half of one percent of the market. The argument also passes quickly over another important fact:  highways, transit and aviation are, unlike rail, funded substantially by true user fees and also by state and local investments.  (Even ardent rail proponents evince little interest in a Federal passenger rail ticket tax, and no such tax or user fees exist currently.)  Perhaps most importantly, however, the argument overlooks that federal financial support for roads, airports, and transit goes to infrastructureand not to operations.  In other modes of transportation, federal aid goes to highway and airport infrastructure, for example, but federal taxpayers are not regularly asked to write annual billion dollar checks to private trucking companies, private bus companies, private automobile commuters and vacationers,  nor even to private airlines, although the taxpayers have regularly done so with regard to Amtrak.

In considering where we are with Amtrak, it is useful to consider the varied things that Amtrak presently does to understand that recent appropriations to this private company have not been limited to rail infrastructure, but also go into actual train operations.   Generally, Amtrak’s business can be grouped into activities relating to (1) rail infrastructure, (2) corridor train operations, and (3) long-distance train service.

            Rail Infrastructure

Due to historical circumstances, Amtrak owns its own right of way and rail infrastructure along most of the Northeast Corridor (NEC), except in Massachusetts and part of Connecticut where the infrastructure is state owned.  Amtrak also owns some infrastructure in Michigan, as well as train stations in a number of states.  Otherwise, Amtrak mostly operates trains on rail infrastructure owned by others.

Within the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak controls the infrastructure not only for its own use, but for use by numerous other railroads and transit agencies.  These other users of the NEC pay Amtrak for access and associated services, such as train dispatching.   In total, trains operated by other users on the NEC actually exceed the number of trains operated by Amtrak itself on the NEC.

Because of the way the 1970 model of intercity passenger rail was organized, maintenance and development of infrastructure throughout the entire NEC has been left to Amtrak.  Federal infrastructure dollars are allocated by a single private corporation, Amtrak, instead of by state, local, or even federal transportation planning officials.

Corridor Services

When viewed from the operational perspective of moving passengers, and the distance they are moved (passenger-miles), Amtrak can be seen as providing two types of services:  “corridor services” of approximately 100-500 miles and frequently under contract to States in which these corridors are located; and “long-distance”, primarily leisure travel services.  Approximately twenty million people, or 80 percent of all Amtrak riders in 2004, traveled on a corridor service.  Within the category of corridor services, there are two different types:  services on the Northeast corridor, where Amtrak operates on its own track and infrastructure, and services on other state corridors, where Amtrak operates on track and infrastructure owned and controlled by others.

NORTHEAST CORRIDOR.  The largest portion of Amtrak corridor trips are on the Washington—New York City – Boston Northeast Corridor (NEC).  If one looks only at NEC train operations--separate from the heavily subsidized NEC infrastructure--this is the one area where Amtrak trains operate at something close to a breakeven basis, or at least could do so if the company sought that objective.

OTHER CORRIDORS.  In addition to the NEC main line, Amtrak operates trains for corridor service in fifteen other states.

In 2004, a total of approximately eight million people (i.e., about one-third of the total Amtrak ridership) traveled on these additional corridor routes.  In many instances, these corridors are subsidized in part by States.  State operating subsidies for these trains totaled ten percent of the combined Federal and State funding of Amtrak.   However, States have not borne the full cost of these routes, and some States that have corridor trains have not paid anything at all, thereby producing issues of equity among the States, as well as market uncertainties about how travelers value the services.  In the aggregate, on a fully-allocated basis, the non-NEC corridor trains (including both corridor and extended corridor service) had an average operating subsidy of $28 per passenger in FY 2004.

Long-Distance Services

Amtrak’s fifteen long-distance trains have seen declining revenues and ridership--and increasing costs--over the last ten years.  DOT refers to these services as Transcontinental (more than one night), Overnight (one night) or extended corridor (greater than 500 miles, but with no sleeping accommodations).  Amtrak presently operates fifteen such trains.[1]  Amtrak has continued to lose long-distance trip customers to an airline industry that is offering a low cost, high quality service, and to automobile drivers who choose to use convenient and accessible highways rather than fixed rail.  Amtrak has had little or no success responding to this competition.  As Amtrak’s presence in this segment of the intercity transportation market has dwindled, Federal subsidies per passenger have continued to grow.   In FY 2004, the average passenger on a long-distance train received a subsidy of approximately $214 per trip on a fully-allocated basis,[2] up from $158 in the year 2000 – a 35 percent increase quintupling the 7-percent inflation over the same period. 

Fully Allocated Losses of Long-Distance Passenger Trains, FY 2004

(Source: Amtrak Route Profitability System)

Moreover, as DOT’s Inspector General recently determined, passengers in Amtrak’s first-class cabins of its long distance trains are actually more heavily-subsidized than coach passengers, with first-class subsidies per trip of up to $660 per passenger.   Nonetheless, these long-distance trains have had considerable difficulty with regard to on-time departures and arrivals: 

On-Time Performance of Long-Distance Trains, FY 2004

Overall, the picture of where things stand in intercity passenger rail service is far from what was hoped for when Amtrak was created in 1970.  In short, while service and ridership erode, Amtrak continues to require extraordinary and ever-increasing subsidies from federal taxpayers, a great many of whom enjoy little if any benefit from Amtrak’s services.  These continuing and increasing subsidies are not only wholly inconsistent with Congress’s intent in 1970 that Amtrak be a “for-profit corporation,” but they also flout Congress’ clear call for an end to operating subsidies in the 1997 Amtrak Reform Act.

COMMUTER RAIL.  Amtrak also has contracts to operate trains for transit agencies and state governments.  These are: Connecticut Department of Transportation Shore Line East (SLE/CONNDOT), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), New Jersey Transit (NJT), Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), Delaware Transit Corporation (DELDOT), Maryland Transit Administration (MARC), Virginia Railway Express (VRE), Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (METRA), Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) Metrolink, North San Diego Country Transit District Coaster Commuter Rail Service, Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (CALTRAIN), Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit), and Altamont Commuter Express Authority (ACE).  While commuter agencies periodically have the ability to replace Amtrak, as was done in Boston and in southern California, these local transit contracts have been used by Amtrak management from time to time to threaten Congress with a commuter shutdown if Amtrak’s requests for taxpayer funding of intercity trains are not met.

II.        RECENT HISTORY AND THE CALL TO CHANGE.

During the last decade, there has been an increasing recognition that the 1970 model of intercity passenger rail had some very serious problems.   Congress sought to redress some of those in the 1997 Amtrak Reform Act.  Unfortunately, the reforms embodied in the 1997 Act did not prove sufficient to solve the problems. 

Many of the reforms in the 1997 Act empowered Amtrak to improve its own performance and removed impediments to its doing so.   After passage of the 1997 Act, Amtrak’s then-management repeatedly reported that it was it on a “glide path” to self-sufficiency by 2002.   That did not happen.   The problems worsened, and it became increasingly clear that they were not solely the result of business misjudgments, but also involved inherent flaws in the 1970 model.

Instead of a successful “glide path” to self-sufficiency by 2002, Secretary Mineta was greeted with some unwelcome surprises in his initial experiences with Amtrak during the current Administration.  Early in 2001, instead of Amtrak being months from self-sufficiency as reported, Amtrak’s then-management advised that Amtrak would be insolvent within two weeks unless DOT subordinated the interest of U.S. taxpayers to a foreign bank so that Amtrak could mortgage its rights to use the platforms at Pennsylvania Station in New York City.  Within a year, Amtrak had lurched to yet another financial crisis, informing the Secretary that if the Department and Congress did not provide the company another $300 million, it would be insolvent within two weeks and would shut down commuter and intercity services.  In response, to obtain time to assess and identify more long term reforms, DOT provided Amtrak a $100 million loan under the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing Program, and Congress provided the remaining $205 million through a supplemental appropriation.

These crises highlighted fundamental problems, some of which needed immediate action by Amtrak, and some of which were revealed to be inherent to the 1970 business model and in need of legislative change.  Among the most urgent for Amtrak itself was the state of its financial books and records.  Indeed, it took independent auditors almost all of FY 2002 to close their audit of Amtrak’s FY 2001 financial performance.  That audit required $200 million in net audit adjustments and found 5 material weaknesses and 12 reportable conditions that needed to be addressed to fix the problems with Amtrak’s accounting practices.  It also revealed that Amtrak had taken on almost $3 billion in new debt in order to pay for (1) costly overruns of poorly managed capital improvements, (2) an unsuccessful foray into the express package business, and (3) day-to-day operational expenses.

Since 2002, Amtrak’s record-keeping has improved.  In 2005, the independent audit was completed in March instead of September and no material weaknesses were found.  While Amtrak’s auditors still find significant areas for improvement, they comment favorably on developments over the last three years.

Through participation on the Amtrak Board, and through changes to the appropriations process that enabled stronger Federal Railroad Administration oversight of the grant process to Amtrak, Secretary Mineta and DOT have sought a variety of improvements that Amtrak could make on its own.  That process continues and is ongoing. 

But notwithstanding the very significant improvements and a much-enhanced and valuable involvement of the Amtrak Board, fundamental difficulties continue to confront Amtrak because the 1970 model of intercity passenger rail is a framework that is flawed.  Amtrak continues to spend dramatically more money than the revenues it generates, and this year is actually spending at a pace greater than the appropriation from Congress.

As shown by the two charts below, the structural problem in Amtrak’s condition is long-term, and is getting worse, not better. 

Further adding to Amtrak’s deterioration is that the company’s debt increased massively in the late 1990’s, from $1.7 billion in 1997 to $4.8 billion by 2002 (with $3.8 billion non-defeased), without adequately increased passenger revenues to pay the debt service.   Because of this increased debt, Amtrak’s repayment requirements (principal and interest) are forecast to be approximately $273 million in FY 2005 (up from $111 million in 1997), and Amtrak finds itself unable to borrow any more money, even for short-term needs.  Amtrak and some others have recently suggested (as in the 1980s) that  the company again be absolved from this debt by the federal taxpayers’ assumption of all of it, instead of the federal appropriation covering only 40 percent of Amtrak expenses during the last two fiscal years.  Amtrak would give the federal government nothing in return.  That is unacceptable to the Administration.   Likewise, some have suggested empowering Amtrak to issue new debt, or authorizing others to do so for Amtrak’s benefit, in the form of taxpayer-financed tax credit bonds or something similar.   That would be just another back-door subsidy to Amtrak that would be unacceptable to the Administration. 

Passenger rail is already the most heavily subsidized form of intercity passenger transportation.  When viewed on a per-passenger mile basis, analysis by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics indicates that the aggregate federal expenditure for intercity passenger rail is 30 times greater than for commercial aviation.  Likewise, the intercity bus industry, where there are no comprehensive or dedicated subsidies, carries as many as 350 million passengers annually (according to Eno Foundation estimates)—fourteen times Amtrak’s ridership. Although not comprehensive or directed,  the Federal Transit Administration under 49 U.S.C. section 5311(f) provides for grants for supporting rural intercity bus service, but that grant program amounted to approximately $22 million in FY 2004, which is obviously minor compared to the taxpayer burden for Amtrak each year.

What is more clear now than ever is that the basic business model through which we provide intercity passenger rail service in this country--a single, nationwide monopoly called Amtrak--is unworkable and is not adequately positioned to respond to the changing transportation needs of this country.  Massive increases in funding to merely slow a downward spiral are neither sustainable nor justifiable.  At the same time, doing nothing at all will eventually result in a business failure and a lost opportunity for intercity passenger rail for this country.  A change is needed.

As I noted earlier, Amtrak has received more than $29 billion in taxpayer subsidies, including more than $1 billion in each of the last two years, despite the 1997 Amtrak Reform Act, which precluded operating subsidies after 2002.  In 2003 and again this year, the Administration sent to Congress the President’s Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act.  This proposal would align passenger rail programs with the model through which we fund other transportation modes. Under that model, the States work in partnership with the Federal government in owning, operating, and maintaining transportation facilities and services.  H.R. 1713 provides clear and compelling  principles of intercity passenger rail reform that should be embraced by those who sincerely want to save intercity passenger rail nationwide.

III.       REFORM AND PRESERVATION OF INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL

As we have stated in the past, the Administration supports the availability of intercity passenger rail, but with a different vision than the model that exists today.  Secretary Mineta has repeatedly set out the fundamental principles needed to reform intercity passenger rail and place this form of transportation on a sound footing.   These principles are:

• Establish a long–term partnership between States and the Federal Government to support intercity passenger rail:  Partnerships between the States and the Federal Government for the planning, decision-making and capital investment in transportation have been one valuable element in the success of Federal programs for highways and transit to date.  The States, through their multi-modal planning mechanisms, are in a much better position to determine their intercity mobility needs and which form of investment makes the most sense in meeting these needs than a sole supplier company in Washington, D.C.   State-supported intercity passenger rail services in places like the states of Washington, North Carolina, California, and Wisconsin have been one of the bright spots for intercity passenger rail ridership.  

• Require that Amtrak transition to a pure operating company:  Amtrak today is both an operating company and the owner and maintainer of significant infrastructure that forms a key component of the intercity and commuter transportation systems of eight states in the Northeast, as well as many stations and other facilities that have local or regional transportation importance.  These are two very different functions.  By having them both reside in the same entity, the company is faced with conflicting priorities, which the company has found difficult, if not impossible, to balance.  Infrastructure decisions have depended on Amtrak decisions, rather than those of the States and localities who are largely responsible for such planning in other transportation modes such as highways, airports, and transit.  Amtrak, and the nation’s transportation system, would be better off with Amtrak able to focus on one thing--operating trains--and doing it well. 

• Create a system driven by sound economics:  One of the flaws of the 1970 model is that intercity passenger rail has sometimes been defined by politics, habit and fear of change.  That is one reason that some routes have high subsidies, such as the $466 per passenger subsidy in FY 2004 on the Los Angeles to Orlando Sunset Limited.  Intercity passenger rail needs to serve the markets where there is an identifiable demand that intercity passenger rail can meet.  It cannot and should not try to serve every market regardless of the cost and regardless of the revenue.  Just as with other transportation modes and other successful businesses in general, intercity passenger rail needs to have the dexterity to recognize changing business patterns and demand, and that sometimes the services of yesterday are not needed or justified today or tomorrow.  Intercity passenger rail service needs to be designed to cost-effectively meet and support the transportation needs of the traveling public and sponsoring public authorities.

• Introduce carefully managed competition to provide higher quality rail services at reasonable prices:  For the last 34 years under the 1970 model, intercity passenger rail service has not been subject to the discipline of the market place.  On corridor services, for example, States do not have any alternative but to have Amtrak operate the intercity service.  This has resulted in a service that is more costly than one would expect in a competitive situation, and which often has not been responsive to changing transportation patterns, demands or expectations.  In a free market economy, competition leads to improved cost effectiveness, higher quality and innovation, elements that have been sorely lacking in intercity passenger rail for the past generation.  Transition to competition is never easy, but it is necessary for the public to get the service it demands and deserves.

• Create an effective public partnership, after a reasonable transition, to manage the capital assets of the Northeast Corridor:  The Washington-New York City-Boston Northeast Corridor main line is the most heavily utilized rail route in the country, forming an essential link for intercity passenger and freight transportation and commuter access to the major cities of the Northeast.  By some measures, such as the number of persons per day that use this infrastructure, Amtrak is a minority user of this infrastructure – particularly in urban areas.   Transportation services on this corridor need to be insulated from the unpredictable consequences of Amtrak’s own finances and needs at any given time.  At least initially, the ownership of these assets should be in the public sector, and management and control of this asset should reflect significant input from the States that depend on the Northeast Corridor for passenger and freight mobility.

These are the principles that should be used to evaluate any legislative proposal regarding Amtrak and intercity passenger rail generally.  It is encouraging that Amtrak itself has embraced several (but not all) of them in its Strategic Initiative plan.  It is encouraging that certain subcommittees of the Congress have embraced at least some of them in legislative proposals.   Unfortunately, to date, no legislation has adopted all of the principles or enacted all of what is needed.  There is more work to do, and the Secretary and I would be gratified if this Subcommittee would pursue the principles, goals, and proposals set out in H.R. 1713.

As Secretary Mineta and I have regularly stated, DOT stands ready to work with Congress to discuss and fashion the specifics of legislation in ways that will successfully reform intercity passenger rail for the future.  The time for reform is now.  We need true reform legislation during the 109^th Congress.

Conclusion

Without reform, Amtrak is not sustainable at its current level of funding or at any level Amtrak is likely to receive in these difficult budgetary times.  Moreover, history tells us that merely throwing money at the 1970 model of intercity passenger rail without addressing the problems that have been identified in the subsequent years does not result in any long-term improvements in Amtrak’s finances or quality of service.

The Administration intends to continue to pursue reform.  Secretary Mineta and I will work diligently with Amtrak’s other Board members and management to make necessary changes at Amtrak itself, including those outlined in Amtrak’s Strategic Reform Initiatives.  More broadly, we look forward to working with this Subcommittee and with Congress to implement reform and enhancement of intercity passenger rail.  Thank you for the opportunity to share our perspective today.  I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

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