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Examining the State of Rail Safety in the Aftermath of the Derailment in East Palestine, Ohio

Written Statement of Amit Bose, Administrator Federal Railroad Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation

Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

U.S. House of Representatives

Examining the State of Rail Safety in the Aftermath of the Derailment in East Palestine, Ohio

July 23, 2024

Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Wilson, and members of the subcommittee – thank you for the opportunity to testify today on improving railroad safety.

At the outset, I want to take a moment to remember Representative Donald M. Payne, Jr. He was an avid champion for making our freight and passenger rail systems safe, reliable, and accessible to everyone. I join his family, friends, colleagues, and staff in remembering him fondly.

Today, I am pleased to join you to discuss rail safety. At the Federal Railroad Administration, we work every day to advance safety - the agency’s core mission - through the work of FRA’s safety professionals, partnerships with stakeholders, and investments in rail projects around the country.

Last week, FRA published findings following our investigation of the Norfolk Southern (NS) derailment in East Palestine. U.S. DOT safety personnel were on the ground within hours of the derailment, and have been investigating the incident and compliance with rail safety regulations. As indicated in our publicly available report, consistent with the findings of the National Transportation Safety Board, FRA found that a roller bearing overheated and failed, causing the derailment. FRA also determined that NS’s procedures and inadequate staffing for communicating information from the hot bearing detectors to the train crew may have contributed to the accident. And FRA, in consultation with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, concluded that the use of a general-purpose DOT 111 specification tank car to transport butyl acrylate contributed to the severity of the accident.

In response to the derailment, Secretary Buttigieg laid out a three-part push, pressing the major railroads and inviting Congress to join us in efforts to increase freight rail safety and hold railroads accountable. For over a year, DOT has continued those calls and urged Congress to pass comprehensive railroad safety legislation, while concurrently taking important and urgent actions within our authorities to make freight rail safer and protect the American public.

For instance, earlier this year FRA issued final rules to require emergency escape breathing apparatuses for trains carrying hazardous materials, and to establish minimum safety requirements for train crew size. FRA also conducted 7,500 focused inspections along high- hazard flammable train routes, and began collecting train length data from Class I freight railroads to better understand the complexities associated with railroads operating increasingly longer trains. FRA has deployed billions in federal grants for rail improvement and safety projects around the country, including funding 63 projects addressing more than 400 grade crossings nationwide through BIL’s new Railroad Crossing Elimination (RCE) Grant Program, and began collecting information from rail employees about close calls they experience on the job through pilots of the confidential close call reporting system (C3RS) at two Class I freight railroads. And work remains underway with FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory Committee’s Work Group focused on wayside detector policies, procedures, and practices.

It is therefore encouraging to see renewed, bipartisan interest in this chamber for legislation that would add to the safety actions FRA has already undertaken. I am pleased to see elected leaders on both sides of the aisle pushing the railroads to improve rail safety. While FRA will continue using its existing authorities, we need Congress to do its part.

Because the truth is that the Class I freight railroads’ safety performance has stagnated over the last decade – and by some measures, deteriorated. Despite assertions to the contrary, derailment rates for our nation’s largest rail companies have not significantly improved. In fact, in the case of yard derailments, data show that the rate in 2023 was 51 percent higher compared to ten years ago. While the deterioration in derailment rates has not been uniform – recent data shows one Class I freight railroad experienced a 34 percent reduction in the rate of derailments during 2023 – the overall rate of accidents not at grade crossings has been rising slowly throughout the decade, peaking in 2022.

I want to unequivocally cut through two of industry’s consistent claims. First, while the industry often notes that derailments are less common than they were a quarter of a century ago, when we consider the significant changes in rail technology and operations, it is the last decade that provides the more meaningful and timely measure. It is also appropriate to use rates per million miles versus total incidents, as it normalizes for changes in the volume of traffic on the Nation’s railways. And over the last decade, we have not seen any meaningful improvement in derailment rates.

Secondly, while not all derailments are equal in seriousness – and certainly few rise to the level of the East Palestine, Ohio derailment in terms of severity and impact – yard derailments should not be taken lightly or likened to “fender benders.” In 2023, three Class I freight employees on duty lost their lives in rail yard accidents, while a separate incident resulted in an explosion at Bailey Yard in North Platte that forced local residents to evacuate their homes. And, earlier this month, on July 6, a conductor lost his life in a rail yard accident. Since July of last year, FRA has issued four Safety Bulletins, each describing circumstances resulting in railroad worker fatalities in rail yards.

FRA believes this is neither acceptable nor inevitable. The public and communities across the country do not think so. That is why FRA has been using our available tools to push the rail industry to do better.

As I noted earlier, this Administration has finalized several rules to improve freight and passenger rail safety, including final rules to require emergency escape breathing apparatuses for trains carrying hazardous materials, and to establish minimum safety requirements for train crew size. FRA also issued two final rules ensuring that dispatchers and signal employees receive the preparation and training they need to meet the demands of their safety-sensitive jobs; FRA now requires railroads to implement FRA-approved certification programs so that these workers are trained for success. We also finalized a rule requiring railroads to develop Fatigue Risk Management Programs in consultation with their workforce, as fatigue remains a problem in this 24/7 industry.

Those are five rules this Administration has delivered to improve safety. And yet in every instance except one, the railroad industry has either sued to block them or filed petitions for reconsideration. Those lawsuits and petitions not only inject uncertainty into enacting these commonsense safety measures that help safeguard your constituents; they also force us to redirect federal resources that could be working to advance new safety measures – including those that this Subcommittee and Congress have directed FRA to issue.

FRA also acts on emergent issues by issuing Safety Advisories and Bulletins to raise awareness to accidents, conditions, or other events that FRA safety professionals believe require prompt attention of the industry. Since the East Palestine derailment, FRA has issued 9 advisories and 10 bulletins to urge industry action on hot bearing wayside detectors; highlighting the complexities of operating long trains and the need to properly sequence a train’s cars and locomotives to help train crews safely operate trains that can be miles-long; addressing the dangers of shove movements, switching cars, close clearances, and roadway maintenance machines; and recommending railroads properly prepare for severe weather, among others.

FRA is also conducting comprehensive safety assessments of all Class I freight railroads, using interviews, observations, and focused inspections to measure their safety cultures. FRA issued its assessment of NS’s safety culture last year, and will soon issue an assessment on our review of BNSF.

The railroad industry is not static, and neither is safety. A continued reassessment of practices new safety proposals, and other actions are necessary to improve safety. While FRA has made progress improving rail safety, all too often it has been despite an industry seeking to preserve the status quo and record profits. History has shown us that, unfortunately, major freight railroads, and many in Congress, are not just willing but eager to settle for the current state of railroad safety in this country. Like the American public, FRA and the Department of Transportation think that is unacceptable.

In this safety journey, industry behavior is as important as government action. I urge you and your colleagues in both chambers to act quickly on commonsense measures to enhance rail safety across the board. I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee today, and I am prepared to answer any questions you may have.

Oversight and Examination of Railroad Grade Crossing Elimination and Safety

Written Statement of Amit Bose, Administrator
Federal Railroad Administration

U.S. Department of Transportation
Before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

U.S. House of Representatives
“Oversight and Examination of Railroad Grade
Crossing Elimination and Safety”

January 18, 2024

Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, and members of the subcommittee – thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for your support for improving safety at highway-rail grade crossings.

Safety is core to the mission of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). We accomplish that mission with the work of our safety professionals, partnerships with stakeholders, and investments in projects.

Safety professionals cover every discipline of railroad operations and represent a majority of FRA’s workforce. For example, across the United States, FRA grade crossing safety inspectors inspect grade crossings; perform critical outreach work to educate the public; and work with railroads, state departments of transportation, and communities to ensure compliance with FRA safety regulations. As part of its commitment to safety, FRA has nearly doubled its Grade Crossing and Trespasser Outreach Division to 48 staff in the past two years.

FRA partners with railroads, States, and local government to promote grade crossing safety. That work is data driven. For example, when communities in Birmingham, AL; Hammond, IN; and Houston, TX reported high numbers of blocked crossings to FRA’s Public Blocked Crossing Incident Reporter, FRA engaged with those cities to show that a combination of technology, changes to railroad operations, and public outreach to pedestrians and drivers can reduce the impacts of blocked crossings. FRA ensures that railroads comply with safety regulations, enforce their own operating rules, and take seriously their responsibility to local communities. In addition, FRA partners with the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and others to ensure the safety of people and goods at our Nation’s highway-rail grade crossings.

The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) presents an historic opportunity for the Biden-Harris Administration to invest in rail safety and mobility projects to better the lives of Americans who live near or travel along America’s rail lines. Congress demonstrated its commitment to grade crossing safety and bolstering our nation’s rail network when it passed the BIL, creating several new rail investment programs and reauthorizing others. In particular, the Railroad Crossing Elimination (RCE) Grant Program provides funding to enhance the health and safety of communities, eliminate highway-rail and pathway-rail grade crossings that are frequently blocked by trains, reduce the impacts that freight movement and railroad operations may have on communities, and improve the mobility of people and goods. Additionally, highway-rail crossing improvement projects are eligible for funding under the Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) Grant Program.

This funding answers a real need. In 2022, there were more than 2,200 highway-rail crossing collisions in the United States. FRA received 30,749 blocked crossing reports submitted to FRA’s public complaint portal identifying 22,473 blocked highway-rail grade crossing events. In 2022, the top 5 states by number of blocked crossing reports submitted were in order: Texas with 6,508 (21%), Ohio 3,575 (12%); Illinois 2,952 (10%); Indiana 2,533 (8%); and Tennessee 1,483 (5%).

Unsurprisingly, the BIL rail programs to date have received widespread demand. For example, FRA released the first RCE Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) in June 2022, and it was oversubscribed more than 4 to 1, with 153 eligible applications submitted from 41 States, requesting more than $2.3 billion in funds. FRA has invested in regionally focused outreach teams to provide grant-related technical assistance to potential applicants to help meet this demand efficiently when we make available future BIL funds provided under Advance Appropriations and funded under the annual authorization amounts.

In June 2023, FRA announced the first selections under the RCE Grant Program with 63 projects in 32 States receiving more than $570 million. These awards address more than 400 at-grade crossings nationwide, improve safety, eliminate grade crossings through grade separations and closures, improve existing at-grade crossings, and enhance mobility of people and goods, benefiting railroads and communities.

For example, FRA awarded the West Belt Improvement Project in the City of Houston. Houston’s East End is one of many communities across the country that FRA has worked closely with to address grade crossing safety. I personally visited Houston in August 2022 to launch a focused grade crossing inspection and returned six months later to share the outcomes. FRA, Union Pacific Railroad, BNSF Railway, and the City of Houston partnered to identify crossings, for which the railroads issued strict orders to avoid blocking, resulting in nearly a 40% reduction in reports of blocked crossings in Houston. In June 2023, I announced the award of an RCE grant to the City of Houston to construct four underpasses and close four at-grade crossings to eliminate seven existing at-grade crossings.

Other cities are pursuing comprehensive grade crossing safety efforts. The Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency (CREATE) program serves as an example of a public-private partnership in Chicago; it includes 25 new roadway overpasses or underpasses and six new rail overpasses or underpasses. Additionally, FRA and the U.S. Department of Transportation have awarded nearly $45 million in Florida to Brightline Trains, LLC; Florida Department of Transportation; Broward MPO; and cities along the route for projects specifically related to trespassers and grade crossing safety.

The dedicated funding of the RCE Grant Program and the other programs under the BIL is one of many ways President Biden’s Investing in America agenda will make a difference in people’s daily lives by improving safety and convenience and creating good-paying jobs to rebuild our Nation’s infrastructure.

Thank you again for having me here today and for your continued support. I look forward to answering your questions.

Tracking Toward Zero: Improving Grade Crossing Safety and Addressing Community Concerns

Statement of Karl Alexy, Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Chief Safety Officer
Federal Railroad Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation

Before the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Subcommittee on Railroads Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

Tracking Toward Zero: Improving Grade Crossing Safety and Addressing Community Concerns

February 5, 2020

Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford, and Members of the Committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today regarding highway-rail grade crossing safety.  The mission of FRA is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the future.  As such, safety is FRA’s top priority.   

Railroads are a vital transportation link in our Nation’s economy – transporting freight and passengers in a manner not achievable by other modes of transportation. 

The safety of rail operations over highway-rail grade crossings and trespassing on railroad rights-of-way are two critical issues that FRA recognizes continue to impact and concern communities.  As FRA Administrator Ronald Batory has previously discussed with this Committee, trespassing on railroad property is the leading cause of all rail-related deaths in the United States.  Grade crossing incidents are the second.  Together these types of accidents account for 97 percent of all fatalities along the nation’s railroad rights-of-way.  Over the past thirty years grade crossing fatalities have decreased by over sixty percent, but it is not enough. FRA believes these accidents, and resulting injuries and fatalities are preventable.  Thus, improving grade crossing safety and preventing trespassing on railroad rights-of-way are top priorities for FRA. 

Grade crossing safety and trespassing prevention are separate and distinct issues, yet they share two common factors.  First, both are singularly a function of human behavior.  A motorist may decide to disregard active grade crossing warning devices at a highway-rail grade crossing and maneuver around lowered gates or past flashing lights and enter a crossing, or a pedestrian seeking a shortcut to a destination on the opposite side of a set of railroad tracks may cut across those tracks.  In other cases, individuals are not sufficiently careful or may make poor judgements, or motorists may experience mechanical breakdowns or encounter physical obstructions when attempting to cross railroad tracks.  Second, of the stakeholders - railroads, communities, individuals, and regulators -- none can solve these issues on its own.  We need all stakeholders to take action to prioritize, prevent, and address these issues.  Railroads need to be cognizant of how their operations affect the communities through which they operate.  Local law enforcement officials need to prioritize, to the extent possible, enforcement of vehicle traffic signals at highway-rail grade crossings and trespassing laws, and strict prosecution of resulting citations.  Individual community members need to be aware of the consequences of not complying with grade crossing warning signals or of trespassing on railroad rights-of-way.

As Administrator Batory shared in his June 2019 testimony to this Committee, FRA is focused on leading, promoting, and strengthening efforts among all stakeholders to increase awareness of grade crossing safety issues, the dangers of trespassing on railroad rights-of-way, and existing and potential trespassing prevention strategies.  With our current focus, we are well underway with implementing FRA’s National Strategy to Prevent Trespassing on Railroad Property which FRA developed in 2018More recently, in November 2019, FRA developed and began implementation of a Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety Business Plan.  These efforts are complementary and focus generally on five strategic areas: 

  1. Enhancing our collaborations with and outreach to all affected stakeholders;
  2. Leveraging data to apply our resources most effectively;
  3. Oversight and enforcement of the rail industry, and engagement of state and local governments, and law enforcement, particularly in trespass “hot-spots” or near accident-prone areas;
  4. Supporting research designed to improve rail safety; and
  5. Existing funding opportunities to support implementation of proven strategies and testing of new approaches and technologies.

FRA has worked to enhance the agency’s collaborations with and outreach to stakeholders on both grade crossing safety and trespass prevention issues through a series of listening sessions, summits, symposiums, targeted social media campaigns, and community site visits.  FRA works with railroads, state and local governments, law enforcement officials, signal equipment manufacturers and technology companies, trade and advocacy groups, as well as DOT experts outside of FRA, to identify the most effective methods of improving grade crossing safety and preventing trespassing on railroad property.

FRA’s safety program has historically been and continues to be data-driven.  Highway-rail grade crossing safety and trespassing prevention are no exceptions, but as I noted earlier, both issues are highly dependent not only on FRA data and actions, but on the involvement of all affected stakeholders.  Accordingly, FRA has amplified its efforts to improve the quality of its data and to ensure data related to grade crossing safety and trespassing incidents is available and accessible to all stakeholders.  For example, FRA has created and maintains numerous data visualization tools (e.g., dashboards, maps) which enable the agency and our stakeholders to better monitor and analyze key safety metrics over time.  Meanwhile, FRA is using analytical tools to gain a better understanding of factors affecting grade crossing safety and trespassing issues (e.g., from system-level overviews to localized detail).  FRA is also seeking new and unconventional data sources and voluntary methods of sharing data among stakeholders to identify leading indicators of both grade crossing and trespassing risk factors. 

Utilizing available data, FRA is identifying accident-prone areas and trespass “hot-spots” and engaging railroads operating in those areas, as well as the relevant state and local government and law enforcement officials, to seek potential local solutions to the risks.

The Grade Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention research program conducts research to improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings and along the railroad rights-of-way.  The program develops, tests, and evaluates technologies and engineering solutions, and collects and analyzes data to measure the effectiveness in improving grade crossing safety.  FRA is currently supporting research in several technologies that have the potential to reduce grade crossing accidents, including GIS mapping, use of drones, in-vehicle auditory alerts, intelligent crossing assessment, and first responder blocked crossing notifications.  The research outcomes, reports, and best practices will continue to be published on the FRA website and presented at industry related conferences and workshops.  FRA currently uses an online research repository to store and maintain research reports and will introduce a search engine to facilitate access to these reports. 

To complement FRA’s safety oversight and research initiatives, Secretary Elaine L. Chao and Administrator Batory have prioritized investment in grade crossing improvements through the Department’s various grant programs.  Under this Administration, in addition to grade crossing formula funding administered by the Federal Highway Administration’s Section 130 program, over 500 individual grade crossings have been made safer through FRA grant selections, most of this through the Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) grant program.  The Department’s Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) and Infrastructure for Rebuilding America (INFRA) grant programs have also provided significant investment in grade crossing safety nationwide.

Regarding trespassing, FRA issued two Notices of Funding Opportunities (NOFO) for law enforcement agencies to address railroad trespassing enforcement.  In response to the first NOFO, FRA awarded almost $200,000 to four law enforcement agencies.  Preliminary findings demonstrate a significant reduction in trespassing incidents in these four local jurisdictions. Applications in response to the second NOFO are currently under review.  Looking forward, FRA expects to make its fiscal year 2020 grant funding available to prospective applicants in the near future.  We encourage your states and communities to apply for these forthcoming funding opportunities so they can work with FRA and continue to make grade crossings safer and reduce trespasser incidents.

Trespassing Prevention

Trespassing on railroad property can be defined as accessing private railroad property anywhere other than at a designated pedestrian or roadway crossing.  Trespassing on private railroad property is illegal and poses a grave threat to the individual trespasser’s safety and to the safety of railroad employees.  Although this is a matter of common sense, each year, more than 500 people are killed and nearly as many injured, while trespassing on railroad property.

Implementation of FRA’s National Trespassing Prevention Strategy is well underway.  To date, FRA has consistently achieved the milestones set forth in the Strategy and the agency will provide a specific update on its progress implementing the Strategy later this year.. To highlight some of the successes of the Strategy to date, I note:

  • FRA field teams have conducted 171 trespassing site visits and outreach presentations since October of 2018. 
  • FRA developed a Trespass and Suicide Dashboard that allows users to visually interact with trespass and suicide data collected by FRA.  The Dashboard is designed to provide key information to enable analysis of the data, including where trespassing incidents have occurred both nationally and locally, what railroads are involved in the trespassing incidents, and key factual details surrounding the trespassing incidents (e.g., trespasser age, day of week, time of day, physical act before casualty, and the event that caused the casualty).  Although FRA’s field teams use this information to evaluate local conditions and track overall trends, the dashboard is available online for all stakeholders to use.
  • Regional FRA teams are working with individual communities identified as “hot-spots” for trespassing incidents to understand the root causes of the incidents and assist in the development of local solutions.
  • FRA issued an approximately $160,000 Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) grant to the Florida Department of Transportation to pilot drone technology, closed circuit television with remote monitoring, and a geographic information system spatial analysis to aid and leverage local law enforcement trespassing enforcement efforts.
  • FRA has worked with the leaders of the 10-counties in the United States with the most trespassing incidents to participate in Railroad Trespassing and Grade Crossing Technology Summits throughout the country in 2020. 

Grade Crossing

Similar to trespassing, human behavior plays a primary role in grade crossing accidents.  For example, a driver may choose to maneuver around lowered gates at an active crossing, or a driver may fail to look both ways to ensure the track is clear before attempting to cross a passive crossing (a passive crossing is a crossing with no train-activated warning devices). 

Throughout the past year, FRA held a series of six grade crossing technology listening sessions.  Those listening sessions involved a diverse range of stakeholders, including rail industry members, state and local governments (including law enforcement officials), trade and advocacy groups, as well as signal equipment and automobile manufacturers and technology companies, and culminated in a Grade Crossing Symposium in November, 2019.  The Symposium provided a forum for all stakeholders to share what they learned during the listening sessions and collaborate on issues and experiences in implementing both low-tech and high-tech grade crossing solutions and best practices that have been successful on a local level to reduce grade crossing accidents as well as strategies for overcoming barrier to implementation and funding sources.  FRA plans to continue this collaboration and outreach with stakeholders by holding additional grade crossing summits during 2020 to engage locally with stakeholders.

As I noted earlier, in November 2019, FRA issued its Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Business Plan as a complement to FRA’s Trespassing Prevention Strategy.  This Business Plan describes the actions FRA will take over the next three years to support the implementation of technology to improve grade crossing safety.  The Business Plan outlines FRA’s technological approach to grade crossing safety and emphasizes FRA’s continued desire to FRA to work with all stakeholders to discover new and innovative ways to use technology to mitigate and eliminate grade crossing collisions.  FRA recognizes the costs to communities to implement technologies at grade crossings, and accordingly, one focus of the Business Plan is identifying available funding opportunities through existing programs at FRA and other DOT modes (e.g., the Federal Highway Administration). 

In addition to developing the Business Plan, since Administrator Batory last testified before this Committee in June 2019, FRA has taken several additional actions to address and engage stakeholders in grade crossing safety issues, including actions to ensure the safety of railroad operations in quiet zones.  Examples of these actions include:

  • In November 2019, FRA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) responding to the FAST Act’s mandate to require 40 States and the District of Columbia to develop and implement highway-rail grade crossing action plans.  Consistent with the statutory mandate, the NPRM also proposed to require the ten States previously required to develop highway-rail grade crossing actions plans to update their plans and submit reports to FRA describing the actions they have taken to implement them.  FRA is currently reviewing comments received in response to the NPRM and anticipates publication of a Final Rule in the summer.
  • Observing an increase in accidents at grade crossings within quiet zones, in December 2019, FRA wrote to all public authorities with quiet zones in which multiple accidents occurred in 2018 to remind those entities of the importance of ensuring their quiet zones comply with the conditions of approval.  To ensure future compliance, FRA implemented a standard operating procedure to inspect all established quiet zones (currently 907) on a three-year or less interval and to inspect newly established quiet zones within the first 60 days. 

Additionally, the Risk Reduction and System Safety Program rules will require railroads to analyze how trespasser prevention technology and highway-rail grade crossing technology may help mitigate identified risks.  Once these rules are published and implemented, FRA anticipates that the required analysis will provide railroads a framework for utilizing technology to combat risks associated with grade crossings and trespassers.

In addition to grade crossing safety and trespassing prevention, the FRA is engaged with the railroads and state and local officials to address the sometimes impactful effects of railroad operations on communities. 

In May, noting an increase in the number of blocked crossing complaints FRA was receiving, Administrator Batory wrote to the Chief Executive Officers and senior leadership of the Class I railroads and major railroad holding companies regarding the impacts to quality of life associated with blocked crossings.  Administrator Batory specifically requested that each railroad take action to minimize the occurrence of blocked crossings and redouble their efforts to work with states and local communities to advance the safety and efficiency of both railroad and highway transportation. In December, I wrote to all 736 railroads operating in the United States, reiterating Administrator Batory’s requests.

On December 20, 2019 FRA launched a new online portal to collect data regarding the scope of blocked crossings issues across the country.  The portal allows the public and public safety officials to submit reports of blocked crossings and specifically requests information on the location of the blocked crossing, and the time, duration, and impacts of the blocked crossing.  This information will provide FRA with more standardized data on instances of blocked crossings throughout the United States and FRA will analyze the data and publicly share it with all affected stakeholders to help inform the development of local solutions to reduce and prevent incidents of trains blocking crossings. 

Conclusion

FRA will continue to effectively implement its National Strategy to Prevent Trespassing on Railroad Property and carry out its Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety Business Plan.  The agency remains committed to continuing to lead, promote, and strengthen efforts among all stakeholders to increase awareness of grade crossing safety issues, the potential consequences of trespassing on railroad rights-of-way, and existing and potential trespassing prevention strategies.

The State of the Rail Workforce

Statement of Ronald L. Batory, Administrator
Federal Railroad Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation

Before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
 The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

The State of the Rail Workforce

June 20, 2019

Chairman Lipinski, Ranking Member Crawford. and Members of the Committee . . .

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today to discuss rail safety and the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) role in ensuring the safety and efficiency of our nation’s rail system.  The mission of FRA is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the future.  With Secretary Elaine L. Chao’s leadership, FRA executes its mission in many ways.  FRA enforces critical safety regulations and partners with industry to develop and promote both regulatory and non-regulatory solutions to safety issues.  FRA also seeks to manage federal investments in rail infrastructure in a cost-effective and efficient manner, and pursues research and development to advance innovative technologies and best practices in railroad operations and maintenance.  With a cadre of almost 400 railroad safety inspectors across the nation, FRA not only conducts traditional safety inspections and investigations, but FRA inspectors also forge strong collaborative relationships with railroad employees and seek opportunities to partner with those employees to ensure the safest rail working environment possible.

In recent years, we have seen great advances in railroad safety – both the train accident rate and the railroad employee injury rate have declined.  Despite these advances, rail accidents and employee injuries do occur.  FRA considers one rail accident or one employee injury one too many.  As the demand for both freight and passenger rail transportation in the U.S. grows, FRA recognizes its responsibility to ensure rail operations are the safest they can be, not only for the traveling public and the communities through which railroads operate, but also for the highly skilled employees who work diligently on the rail system every day. 

Safety is FRA’s top priority.  FRA believes safety and innovation go hand-in-hand.  From implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC) technology, to proactively addressing safety risks through our voluntary close call reporting program, to initiatives addressing the persistent challenges of grade crossing safety and the prevention of trespassers on railroad property, FRA believes both people and technology play critical roles. 

FRA addresses safety risks using a risk-based, proactive approach, focusing resources on the top safety issues while continuing innovative research to further advancements in rail technology and investing in rail infrastructure.  Last week, FRA announced the selection of $326 million in grant funds under the Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements grant program, with significant investments directed towards grade crossing, track, signal, and bridge improvements.

Today, I would like to highlight the top safety issues FRA is prioritizing PTC, trespassing prevention, grade crossing safety, and FRA’s Close Call Reporting Program (commonly referred to as C3RS).

Positive Train Control

Railroads’ successful implementation of PTC remains at the top of our agenda.  As I’ve said before, implementation of PTC in rail operations represents the most fundamental change in rail safety technology in a century.  PTC uses industry-designed emerging technologies to monitor speed and automatically stop trains to prevent specific human-error accidents.  With the Secretary’s leadership, we have prioritized grant programs for PTC and helped railroads make significant progress towards full PTC implementation on the required main lines.  As of March 31, 2019, PTC systems were in operation on over 48,000 of the nearly 58,000 route miles subject to the statutory mandate – with the majority of implementation occurring in the last two years.  All 41 railroads subject to the statutory mandate complied with the December 31, 2018, requirements prescribed under the PTC Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015.  Specifically, four host railroads fully implemented FRA-certified and interoperable PTC systems on their required mainlines by December 31, 2018, and the other 37 railroads sufficiently demonstrated they met, and in many cases exceeded, the six statutory criteria necessary to qualify for an alternative schedule and sequence to reach full implementation by December 31, 2020.   

With approximately 20 months remaining until the statutory deadline, the Department and FRA will continue to provide extensive technical assistance and perform comprehensive oversight, to both host and tenant railroads, and hold each railroad accountable for the timely implementation of an interoperable PTC system on all lines subject to the statutory mandate.  Following the series of PTC symposia held throughout 2018, FRA has already held two of six collaboration sessions planned in 2019-2020.  These sessions bring together stakeholders to share best practices and jointly address key challenges.  FRA PTC field staff continue to prioritize technical assistance based on each of the 37 host railroads’ risks to full implementation, with a specific focus on testing, revenue service demonstration and interoperability.   In support of our FRA PTC field staff, and to support railroads interoperability challenges, this summer FRA plans to meet with each of the 101 Class II and III tenant railroads required to implement PTC by their host railroad to offer technical assistance with respect to PTC system implementation. 

Trespassing Prevention and Grade Crossing

Also at the top of FRA’s agenda is the prevention of trespassing incidents on railroad property and increasing grade crossing safety.  Trespassing on railroad property is the leading cause of all rail-related deaths in the United States.  Grade crossing incidents are the second.  Together, over the past 10 years, they have accounted for more than 95% of all rail-related fatalities.  One of my top objectives this year is to lead, promote, and strengthen efforts among all public, private, and government stakeholders to increase awareness of grade crossing safety issues and trespasser prevention strategies.  Preventing trespassing and improving grade crossing safety is critical not only to save the lives of those involved, but also to help ensure railroad employees do not needlessly have to suffer the severe psychological and emotional consequences such incidents may cause.

Trespassing Prevention

Last year, at Congress’s direction, FRA developed a national strategy to prevent trespassing incidents.  FRA’s strategy recognizes that trespassing is a complex problem and solutions will necessarily differ based on localized circumstances.  FRA identified the top 10 U.S. counties with the most railroad trespasser casualties in recent years.

FRA’s strategy focuses on four strategic areas: (1) data gathering and analysis; (2) community site visits; (3) funding; and (4) partnerships with affected stakeholders.  Success of our national strategy, however, depends on meaningful input and participation by all stakeholders – including State and local governments, railroads, labor organizations, and the public – as well as the availability of funding.

FRA intends to hold trespasser prevention summits in each of the top 10 counties identified.  The summits will include local community leaders, law enforcement, the railroads operating in and through the county, the public, and FRA, with the goal of identifying trespassing hotspots within the community, developing local improvement recommendations for trespass mitigation and fatality prevention, assisting with trespasser prevention outreach campaigns, and ensuring all stakeholders are equipped with the necessary information on the availability and process for applying for various forms of FRA grants and other funding. 

Improving Grade Crossing Safety

Highway-rail grade crossing incidents are the second leading cause of rail-related deaths, accounting for approximately 30 percent of all rail-related fatalities and are the top cause of all railroad accidents.  Increasing grade crossing safety will not only reduce the number of fatalities, but it will also improve the safety and efficiency of the rail transportation network.  FRA expects the risk of highway-rail grade crossing incidents to grow as both train and highway traffic increases during the next decade.

In October of last year, the Department hosted the first Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention Summit.  The event brought together safety advocates, railroads, labor organizations, law enforcement, and both Canadian and U.S. transportation officials to exchange ideas and begin developing best practices on implementing a coordinated national response to the growing problem of trespassing incidents on railroad property and to increase grade crossing safety.  At the conclusion of the Summit, FRA committed to hosting a series of listening sessions to identify technology to improve the functioning of grade crossing warning systems and safety, as well as barriers to implementation.

This past spring, FRA hosted those listening sessions.  We brought together railroads, labor organizations, signal equipment manufacturers, trade and advocacy groups, technology companies, and representatives from federal, state, and local governments to discuss ways of improving grade crossing safety through technology.  Participants discussed demonstrated and emerging technologies that could be used to improve grade crossing safety and ideas for needed regulatory changes to help field new grade crossing technology.  Ideas included both highly complex technological improvements and lower tech improvements.  FRA is using all the information and ideas gathered through this symposium to develop a three-year plan to improve grade crossing safety.  We will hold a follow-up symposium this fall to continue the dialogue with all stakeholders.  We will continue to collaborate with our modal partners including the Federal Highway Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, to provide ongoing assistance to all stakeholders, and develop and promote new tools and resources to support grade crossing safety.

Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS)

C3RS is a voluntary FRA program enabling participating railroads’ and their employees to improve the safety culture of their organizations and to proactively identify and address safety issues before accidents occur.  For properly reported and qualifying close calls, employees are protected from company discipline, and both employees and railroads are protected from FRA enforcement.  Root cause analysis is conducted on individual close call events, and collectively, safety hazards are identified.  Railroads are then empowered to develop solutions to proactively mitigate or eliminate the identified hazards, thus avoiding the costs and often devastating consequences of an accident or incident.

FRA first piloted the C3RS program in 2007 with the train, yard, and engine craft employees of 4 railroads.  Since then, the program has grown to 15 railroads with over 23,000 employees involved from all crafts. 

On participating railroads, several tangible safety improvements have resulted from the C3RS program thus far.  Most notably, derailments caused by human factors are down 41 percent and derailments caused by run-through switches are down 50 percent.  The program has also led to more qualitative benefits such as improved collaboration between labor and management on safety improvements, and in several instances, the discovery of multiple factors playing a role in a single event, leading to more systemic corrective actions.  This level of collaboration and data analysis is often stifled in the traditional environment of railroad discipline.

FRA is actively working to increase railroad and employee participation in the program and to identify alternative funding sources for the program.  Specifically, FRA is evaluating ways to allow industry to provide funding for the program and how to potentially leverage machine learning technology to effectively automate the processing of close call reports in the future. 

Going forward, FRA is prioritizing the expansion of the C3RS program, along with other industry partnerships designed to ensure a transparent sharing of information among all stakeholders and enabling the effective identification, analysis, and mitigation or elimination of risks throughout the rail operating environment.


Conclusion

FRA has a responsibility to the public, to railroad employees, and to railroads themselves to lead industry to the next generation of safety improvements.  FRA is committed to continuing to work with all stakeholders to achieve this new level of safety.  This next generation of safety improvements will necessarily involve change.  One constant that will remain, however, is FRA’s commitment to working with all stakeholders to achieve this new level of safety.  FRA recognizes the unique position of railroad employees in ensuring safety both now and in the future.  FRA safety inspectors are “on the ground” throughout the United States.  While they are responsible for conducting periodic inspections for compliance with FRA’s safety regulations and conducting accident investigations, they are also prime points of contact for railroad employees to share any concerns, suggestions, or ideas related to railroad safety.  FRA has long-established processes and procedures in place to ensure the anonymity of any individual sharing safety concerns with the agency.

I believe that with clear and open communication and a commitment to safety among all stakeholders – including FRA, railroad employees, and railroad management – our nation’s rail industry can become safer and stronger than ever before.

FAST Act Reauthorization: Transportation Safety

Statement of Ronald L. Batory, Administrator

Federal Railroad Administration

U.S. Department of Transportation

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation

FAST Act Reauthorization: Transportation Safety

June 19, 2019

Chairman Wicker, Ranking Member Cantwell, and Members of the Committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today to discuss rail safety and the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) role in ensuring the safety and efficiency of our nation’s rail system.  The mission of FRA is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the future.  With Secretary Elaine L. Chao’s leadership, FRA executes its mission in many ways.  FRA enforces critical safety regulations and partners with industry to develop and promote both regulatory and non-regulatory solutions to safety issues.  FRA also seeks to manage federal investments in rail infrastructure in a cost-effective and efficient manner, and pursues research and development to advance innovative technologies and best practices in railroad operations and maintenance.

In recent years, we have seen great advances in railroad safety – both the train accident rate and railroad employee injury rate have declined.  Despite these advances, grade crossing and trespasser accidents remain leading causes of rail-related deaths.  And human factor and track-caused accidents continue to occur.  As the demand for both freight and passenger rail transportation in the U.S. grows, FRA, and the railroad industry, are responsible for ensuring our rail system is the safest and most efficient network this country has ever seen.

Safety is FRA’s top priority.  FRA believes safety and innovation go hand-in-hand.  From implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC) technology, to proactively addressing safety risks through our voluntary close call reporting program, to initiatives addressing the persistent challenges of grade crossing safety and the prevention of trespassers on railroad property, FRA believes both people and technology play critical roles.

FRA addresses safety risks using a risk-based, proactive approach, focusing resources on the top safety issues while continuing innovative research to further advancements in rail technology and investing in rail infrastructure.  Last week, FRA announced the selection of $326 million in grant funds under the Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements grant program, with significant investments directed towards grade crossing, track, signal, and bridge improvements.

Today, I would like to highlight the top safety issues FRA is prioritizing PTC, trespassing prevention, grade crossing safety, and FRA’s Close Call Reporting Program (commonly referred to as C3RS).

Positive Train Control

Railroads’ successful implementation of PTC remains at the top of our agenda.  As I’ve said before, implementation of PTC in rail operations represents the most fundamental change in rail safety technology in a century.  PTC uses industry-designed emerging technologies to monitor speed and automatically stop trains to prevent specific human-error accidents.  With the Secretary’s leadership, we have prioritized grant programs for PTC and helped railroads make significant progress towards full PTC implementation on the required main lines.  As of March 31, 2019, PTC systems were in operation on over 48,000 of the nearly 58,000 route miles subject to the statutory mandate – with the majority of implementation occurring in the last two years.  All 41 railroads subject to the statutory mandate complied with the December 31, 2018, requirements prescribed under the PTC Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015.  Specifically, four host railroads fully implemented FRA-certified and interoperable PTC systems on their required mainlines by December 31, 2018, and the other 37 railroads sufficiently demonstrated they met, and in many cases exceeded, the six statutory criteria necessary to qualify for an alternative schedule and sequence to reach full implementation by December 31, 2020.

With approximately 20 months remaining until the statutory deadline, the Department and FRA will continue to provide extensive technical assistance and perform comprehensive oversight, to both host and tenant railroads, and hold each railroad accountable for the timely implementation of an interoperable PTC system on all lines subject to the statutory mandate.  Following the series of PTC symposia held throughout 2018, FRA has already held two of six collaboration sessions planned in 2019-2020.  These sessions bring together stakeholders to share best practices and jointly address key challenges.  FRA PTC field staff continue to prioritize technical assistance based on each of the 37 host railroads’ risks to full implementation, with a specific focus on testing, revenue service demonstration and interoperability. In support of our FRA PTC field staff, and to support railroads interoperability challenges, this summer FRA plans to meet with each of the 101 Class II and III tenant railroads required to implement PTC by their host railroad to offer technical assistance with respect to PTC system implementation.

Trespassing Prevention and Grade Crossing

Also at the top of FRA’s agenda is the prevention of trespassing incidents on railroad property and increasing grade crossing safety.  Trespassing on railroad property is the leading cause of all rail-related deaths in the United States.  Grade crossing incidents are the second.  Together, over the past 10 years, they have accounted for more than 95% of all rail-related fatalities.  One of my top objectives this year is to lead, promote, and strengthen efforts among all public, private, and government stakeholders to increase awareness of grade crossing safety issues and trespasser prevention strategies.

Trespassing Prevention

Last year, at Congress’s direction, FRA developed a national strategy to prevent trespassing incidents.  FRA’s strategy recognizes that trespassing is a complex problem and solutions will necessarily differ based on localized circumstances.  FRA identified the top 10 U.S. counties with the most railroad trespasser casualties in recent years.

FRA’s strategy focuses on four strategic areas: (1) data gathering and analysis; (2) community site visits; (3) funding; and (4) partnerships with affected stakeholders.  Success of our national strategy, however, depends on meaningful input and participation by all stakeholders – including State and local governments, railroads, labor organizations, and the public – as well as the availability of funding.

FRA intends to hold trespasser prevention summits in each of the top 10 counties identified.  The summits will include local community leaders, law enforcement, the railroads operating in and through the county, the public, and FRA, with the goal of identifying trespassing hotspots within the community, developing local improvement recommendations for trespass mitigation and fatality prevention, assisting with trespasser prevention outreach campaigns, and ensuring all stakeholders are equipped with the necessary information on the availability and process for applying for various forms of FRA grants and other funding.

Improving Grade Crossing Safety

Highway-rail grade crossing incidents are the second leading cause of rail-related deaths, accounting for approximately 30 percent of all rail-related fatalities and are the top cause of all railroad accidents.  Increasing grade crossing safety will not only reduce the number of fatalities, but it will also improve the safety and efficiency of the rail transportation network.  FRA expects the risk of highway-rail grade crossing incidents to grow as both train and highway traffic increases during the next decade.

In October of last year, the Department hosted the first Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention Summit.  The event brought together safety advocates, railroads, labor organizations, law enforcement, and both Canadian and U.S. transportation officials to exchange ideas and begin developing best practices on implementing a coordinated national response to the growing problem of trespassing incidents on railroad property and to increase grade crossing safety.  At the conclusion of the Summit, FRA committed to hosting a series of listening sessions to identify technology to improve the functioning of grade crossing warning systems and safety, as well as barriers to implementation.

This past spring, FRA hosted those listening sessions.  We brought together railroads, labor organizations, signal equipment manufacturers, trade and advocacy groups, technology companies, and representatives from federal, state, and local governments to discuss ways of improving grade crossing safety through technology.  Participants discussed demonstrated and emerging technologies that could be used to improve grade crossing safety and ideas for needed regulatory changes to help field new grade crossing technology.  Ideas included both highly complex technological improvements and lower tech improvements.  FRA is using all the information and ideas gathered through this symposium to develop a three-year plan to improve grade crossing safety.  We will hold a follow-up symposium this fall to continue the dialogue with all stakeholders.  We will continue to collaborate with our modal partners including the Federal Highway Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, to provide ongoing assistance to all stakeholders, and develop and promote new tools and resources to support grade crossing safety.

Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS)

C3RS is a voluntary FRA program enabling participating railroads’ and their employees to improve the safety culture of their organizations and to proactively identify and address safety issues before accidents occur.  For properly reported and qualifying close calls, employees are protected from company discipline, and both employees and railroads are protected from FRA enforcement.  Root cause analysis is conducted on individual close call events, and collectively, safety hazards are identified. Railroads are then empowered to develop solutions to proactively mitigate or eliminate the identified hazards, thus avoiding the costs and often devastating consequences of an accident or incident.

FRA first piloted the C3RS program in 2007 with the train, yard, and engine craft employees of 4 railroads.  Since then, the program has grown to 15 railroads with over 23,000 employees involved from all crafts.

On participating railroads, several tangible safety improvements have resulted from the C3RS program thus far.  Most notably, derailments caused by human factors are down 41 percent and derailments caused by run-through switches are down 50 percent.  The program has also led to more qualitative benefits such as improved collaboration between labor and management on safety improvements, and in several instances, the discovery of multiple factors playing a role in a single event, leading to more systemic corrective actions.  This level of collaboration and data analysis is often stifled in the traditional environment of railroad discipline.

FRA is actively working to increase railroad and employee participation in the program and to identify alternative funding sources for the program.  Specifically, FRA is evaluating ways to allow industry to provide funding for the program and how to potentially leverage machine learning technology to effectively automate the processing of close call reports in the future.

Going forward, FRA is prioritizing the expansion of the C3RS program, along with other industry partnerships designed to ensure a transparent sharing of information among all stakeholders and enabling the effective identification, analysis, and mitigation or elimination of risks throughout the rail operating environment.

Conclusion

FRA has a responsibility to the public, to railroad employees, and to railroads themselves to lead industry to the next generation of safety improvements.  FRA is committed to continuing to work with all stakeholders to achieve this new level of safety.

PTC Update: Are Railroads on Track to Meet the Impending Deadline?

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RONALD L. BATORY
ADMINISTRATOR
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation
United States Senate

“PTC Update: Are Railroads on Track to Meet the Impending Deadline?”

October 3, 2018

Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and provide the committee with an update on railroads’ implementation of positive train control (PTC) systems.

As we approach critical deadlines for railroads’ implementation of PTC systems, myself, and the men and women that serve at FRA remain committed to working with the railroads and its supply industry to ensure the full implementation of this important rail-safety technology in a timely manner.

I. PTC Mandate

Railroads’ implementation of PTC systems has been, and remains, at the top of our agenda. PTC systems represent the most fundamental change in rail safety technology since the introduction of Automatic Train Control in the 1920s. As mandated by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), each Class I railroad and entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger service must implement an FRA-certified PTC system on (1) its main lines over which 5 million or more gross tons of annual traffic are transported if the main line carries poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials, and (2) its main lines over which intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation is regularly provided. Under RSIA, railroads were originally required to complete implementation by December 31, 2015. Approximately two months before that deadline, the House and Senate overwhelmingly passed, and the President signed, the Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015 (PTCEI Act), extending the deadline for full PTC system implementation to December 31, 2018.

In addition, under the PTCEI Act, Congress permits a railroad to request FRA’s approval of an “alternative schedule” with a deadline extending beyond December 31, 2018, but no later than December 31, 2020, for full PTC system implementation. The law requires FRA to approve a railroad’s alternative schedule with a deadline that is as soon as practicable, but not later than December 31, 2020, if a railroad submits a written request to FRA that demonstrates it has met the statutory criteria to qualify for such an alternative schedule. Currently, 41 railroads are required by statute to implement PTC systems: all 7 Class I freight railroads; 30 commuter and intercity passenger railroads, including the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); and 4 short line and terminal railroads. The technology is required to be implemented on approximately 58,000 route miles of the 140,000-mile railroad network.

While railroads are making progress, FRA expects that most railroads will need to request an alternative schedule to complete testing, obtain PTC System Certification, meet the statutory interoperability requirements, and fully implement PTC systems on all main lines required to be governed by PTC systems. FRA continues to take a proactive approach to help railroads acquire, install, test, and fully implement certified PTC systems as soon as possible.

At the direction of Secretary Elaine L. Chao, FRA senior leadership met individually with executives from each of the 41 railroads in January and February of this year. In May and June, we also held follow-up meetings with the twelve railroads identified as at risk, as of Quarter 1 of 2018, of not meeting the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for FRA’s approval of an alternative schedule. Railroads have generally been candid in detailing the challenges and obstacles confronting their properties. During the meetings, we sought to objectively evaluate each railroad’s PTC deployment status, and learn what remaining steps each railroad needs to take to meet the deadline or satisfy the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for an alternative schedule.

During these meetings and throughout our conversations with the railroads, they commonly conveyed the following ongoing challenges:

  • There is a competitive yet limited number of PTC system vendors and suppliers. Unusually weighted demand and supply has constrained the timely serving of all 41 railroads and their tenant railroads;
  • As reliability and stability of PTC systems is still immature, railroads are experiencing significant technical issues with both PTC system hardware and PTC system software that often take considerable time to diagnose and resolve, impacting current operations;
  • Host railroads (totaling 36) noted that many tenant railroads (estimated at 250+) that operate on main lines requiring PTC system implementation have made variable, and often unknown, progress equipping locomotives with operational PTC technology, while some tenant railroads report that their host railroads are not providing opportunity for testing. FRA is initiating efforts to synchronize the coordination among the host and tenant railroads;
  • Railroads have only recently begun testing PTC systems for interoperability;
  • Many commuter railroads stated that negotiating legal agreements with certain vendors and suppliers often took time to complete, given various insurance, liability, and State law issues;
  • Absence of consistent leadership at several railroads, regardless of leadership quality, weakened the “sense of urgency” and the focus on PTC system implementation at some entities subject to the statutory mandate; and
  • Railroads noted concern about FRA’s review and approval cycle, given the surge in submissions requiring FRA approval in 2018–2020.

By law, it is the railroads’ responsibility to implement PTC systems, but FRA is facilitating railroad and supplier collaboration to hasten, and urge, implementation. We have also met individually with PTC system component suppliers to learn more about their capacity to meet the high demand of railroads to achieve timely implementation.

This summer FRA hosted three PTC symposia for the 41 railroads mandated to implement PTC systems. Each of the day-long sessions brought together railroad safety officials and FRA’s PTC experts to ensure that each and every railroad subject to the mandate is aware of its obligations and is equipped to meet the Congressionally mandated deadline. The first symposium discussed industry questions and focused on requirements for the December 31, 2018 statutory deadline. The second focused on best practices for testing PTC systems on the general rail system, including field testing, revenue service demonstration (RSD), and interoperability testing. The third focused on lessons learned and best practices for PTC Safety Plans, which are required for host railroads to obtain PTC System Certification and achieve full system implementation. As FRA tracks railroads’ progress, additional symposia on PTC may be offered, as new challenges arise.

II. PTC Status Update

Since April 1, 2016, FRA has been closely tracking and displaying on its website individual railroads’ self-reported PTC system implementation status. FRA’s PTC Dashboard tracks railroads’ progress toward full implementation on a quarterly basis, including the number and percentage of locomotives equipped and PTC operable, track segments completed, radio towers installed, training completed, spectrum acquisition, route miles in RSD, whether the railroad has obtained PTC System Certification, route miles in PTC operation, and more recently, interoperability between host railroads and tenant railroads. In addition, FRA tracks, on a quarterly basis, the progress each railroad has made toward meeting the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for FRA’s approval of an alternative schedule.

Based on railroads’ most recent Quarter 2 reports (with data current as of June 30, 2018), PTC systems are in operation on 35,487 route miles, which is approximately 66 percent of the freight railroads’ route miles that are required to be governed by a PTC system. Passenger railroads have made less progress, with PTC systems in operation on 975 route miles, which is approximately 24 percent of the required route miles. Notably, PTC systems are being operated in RSD on an additional 1,103 freight railroad route miles and an additional 140 commuter railroad route miles, as of Quarter 2. Fifteen railroads report they have completed installation of all hardware necessary for PTC system implementation, and twelve other railroads have installed between 95 and 99 percent of the PTC system hardware identified in their PTC Implementation Plans, as of June 30, 2018. All but one railroad, whose PTC systems use spectrum, reported they have acquired sufficient spectrum. In addition, 14 railroads have initiated sufficient RSD or met substitute criteria, which is also one of the six statutory criteria needed to qualify for an alternative schedule.

The most recent data also shows a reduction in the number of railroads at risk of not qualifying for an alternative schedule, from twelve railroads as of Quarter 1 of 2018, to nine railroads as of Quarter 2. FRA generally considers any railroad that had installed less than 90 percent of its PTC system hardware as of June 30, 2018, to be most at risk of failing to qualify for an alternative schedule. Installation of all PTC system hardware is only an initial phase of implementing a PTC system and only one of the six statutory criteria required to qualify for an alternative schedule to complete full PTC system implementation after December 31, 2018.

In addition to the letters of concern from April and June 2018, on approximately August 24th, I sent letters to the following nine railroads that were at risk, as of Quarter 2 of 2018, of both missing the statutory implementation deadline, and failing to qualify for an alternative schedule: Altamont Corridor Express, Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Central Florida Rail Corridor (SunRail), Maryland Area Regional Commuter (MARC), New Jersey Transit, New Mexico Rail Runner Express, Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain), South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (Tri-Rail), and Trinity Railway Express. This assessment was based on railroads’ self-reported progress as of June 30, 2018 (Quarterly PTC Progress Reports for Quarter 2 of 2018). In September, I also sent similar letters expressing concern to the relevant state departments of transportation and governors.

FRA is working closely with all 41 railroads subject to the PTC mandate, and FRA is actively engaging in frequent communication and providing additional on-site technical assistance to the at-risk railroads. Of course, all railroads subject to the mandate must pay careful attention to the requirements for an alternative schedule if they will not achieve full PTC system implementation by December 31, 2018, and must continue vigilantly working toward prompt PTC system implementation.

As of September 25, 2018, three Class I railroads and one commuter railroad have submitted formal written notifications requesting FRA’s approval of an alternative schedule, pursuant to the PTCEI Act’s procedural requirements. On September 5, 2018, FRA approved BNSF Railway’s request for an alternative schedule, based on its supporting documentation related to the six statutory criteria necessary to qualify for an alternative schedule. FRA is committed to complying with the PTCEI Act’s mandated review and decision period, requiring FRA to issue a decision not later than 90 days from receipt of a railroad’s written request for FRA’s approval of an alternative schedule. In addition, in the interim, within 45 days of receipt of a railroad’s written request, the PTCEI Act requires FRA to provide the railroad, if applicable, with: (1) a written notification of any deficiencies that would prevent approval of the railroad’s alternative schedule and (2) an opportunity to correct the deficiencies before the 90-day period expires. If a railroad demonstrates it has met all six applicable statutory criteria, under the PTCEI Act, FRA shall approve the railroad’s alternative schedule for fully implementing a PTC system as soon as practicable, but no later than December 31, 2020.

FRA has encouraged railroads to submit any formal requests for FRA’s approval of an alternative schedule, with the required supporting documentation, as soon as they meet the six statutory criteria and are eligible to submit the formal request required under the PTCEI Act.

III. Grant Funding and Financial Assistance

PTC technology is designed to provide important safety improvements, but these systems come with significant costs, both in terms of immediate acquisition and increased operations and maintenance costs. Industry estimates PTC acquisition will exceed $14 billion, and maintenance will cost 10 to 20 percent of annual capital costs. Since 2008, FRA has awarded approximately $961 million in grant funding to support railroads’ implementation of PTC systems. FRA also supported the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) with its evaluation and selection of approximately $197 million in grant funding awarded to 17 commuter and intercity passenger railroads and state and local governments for installation of PTC systems, which were announced on May 31, 2017. More recently, on August 24, FRA selected 28 PTC projects, including 13 commuter rail projects not usually eligible for FRA funding, to receive $203.7 million under the Fiscal Year 2018 Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) grant program. Given that applications for this funding were due July 2, I would note that FRA worked tremendously hard to evaluate the applications and make selections. Our hard work allowed us to make the grant announcements two months after receipt of the applications. This process can typically take up to six months or longer to complete.

Currently, FRA has two open funding opportunities that can further aid railroads, states, and other stakeholders with implementing PTC as well as other important safety and infrastructure needs: $318.4 million under the broader Fiscal Year 2018 CRISI program, and $46.3 million for the remaining funding under the PTC-specific Fiscal Year 2018 CRISI program, applications for both funding opportunities are due October 12, 2018. And finally, FRA is evaluating applications submitted under the $65.2 million Fiscal Year 2017 CRISI and $4.8 million Fiscal Year 2017 Restoration & Enhancements grant programs, and will be making selection announcements in the near future.

In total, the sources of the approximately $1.16 billion in FRA and FTA grant funding for PTC are:

  • $475 million from FRA’s High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program;
  • $197 million in Section 3028 of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) funding;
  • $204 million in CRISI grant funding;
  • $0.3 million in a Special Transportation Circumstances Grant;
  • $142 million in annual capital grant funding to Amtrak;
  • $86 million from FRA’s Railroad Safety Technology Grant Program;
  • $52 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act grant funding to Amtrak; and
  • $2 million in Research and Development grants.

Additionally, in May 2015, FRA issued a $967.1 million loan to Metropolitan Transportation Authority for Long Island Rail Road’s and Metro-North Railroad’s implementation of PTC systems. And on December 8, 2017, the Build America Bureau closed on a $162 million Transportation and Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act loan and a $220 million Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing loan to be issued to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority for PTC system implementation.

In sum, thanks to the funding provided by Congress, the Department has made available over $2.5 billion in grants and loans since 2008. This amounts to nearly 20 percent of industry estimates for PTC implementation costs.

IV. Enforcement of the PTC Implementation Mandate

FRA is committed to helping ensure that railroads implement PTC systems as safely and expeditiously as possible, in accordance with the congressional mandate. FRA is authorized to assess monetary civil penalties against any railroad that fails to implement a PTC system by the applicable statutory deadline (either December 31, 2018, or, if a railroad has an approved alternative schedule, the applicable date not later than December 31, 2020). FRA’s civil penalty schedule recommends, as guidance, a $16,000 civil penalty for a failure to timely complete PTC implementation on a track segment where it is required. For any violation of a Federal rail safety statute, regulation, or order, however, the current statutory minimum civil penalty FRA may assess is $853, and the ordinary statutory maximum is $27,904. FRA may assess a civil penalty for each day the non-compliance continues, but FRA may elect to take enforcement action on a one-time basis or each month, quarter, year, or other interval of time during which the noncompliance continues. FRA is currently considering all options, within the framework established by law, to determine what type of enforcement action will be most effective and appropriate under the circumstances. Our goal is to ensure any enforcement action compels a railroad to fully implement its PTC system as efficiently and safely as possible.

Also, I would like to note that in June and July 2018, FRA initiated enforcement action against each of the 13 railroads that failed to complete one or more of the end-of-2017 hardware installation milestones and/or spectrum acquisition milestones the railroad established in its PTC Implementation Plan. Consistent with FRA’s commitment to ensuring railroads comply with the statutory mandate, including interim requirements, FRA’s Notice of Probable Violation to each of the 13 railroads proposed the maximum civil penalty for this type of interim violation—i.e., a one-time civil penalty of $27,904.

Since this Administration took office, railroads have made significant progress toward installing and implementing PTC systems. From Quarter 1 of 2017 to Quarter 2 of 2018, railroads increased the total amount of installed PTC system hardware from 77 percent to 97 percent.

As of June 30, 2018, PTC systems are either in RSD or in operation on approximately 37,705 route miles (i.e., 65 percent) of the nearly 58,000 route miles that are subject to the statutory mandate.

Moving forward, FRA will continue to support and facilitate railroads’ implementation of PTC technology by utilizing the tools afforded by Congress and providing extensive technical assistance and guidance to railroads and suppliers. We remain vigilant in harnessing and leveraging all the personnel, financial, and other resources available to help expedite railroads’ implementation efforts. We appreciate the Committee’s support for our critical programs, and we welcome your continued partnership to advance rail safety and service. I look forward to your questions.

The State of Positive Train Control Implementation in the United States

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF RONALD L. BATORY

ADMINISTRATOR

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Before the

House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

United States House of Representatives

“The State of Positive Train Control Implementation in the United States”

September 13, 2018

Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today to discuss positive train control (PTC). I come to my position as Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) with 45 years of experience in the railroad industry, rising to become the President and Chief Operating Officer of a significant freight rail carrier in the United States. Throughout my career, I have been focused on continually improving safety performance, and I bring this same commitment to my current position as Administrator of the FRA.

As we approach critical deadlines for railroads’ implementation of PTC systems, myself, and the men and women that serve at FRA remain committed to working with the railroads and its supply industry to ensure the full implementation of this important rail-safety technology in a timely manner.

  1. PTC Mandate

Railroads’ implementation of PTC systems has been, and remains, at the top of our agenda. PTC systems represent the most fundamental change in rail safety technology since the introduction of Automatic Train Control in the 1920s. As mandated by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA), each Class I railroad and entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger service must implement an FRA-certified PTC system on (1) its main lines over which 5 million or more gross tons of annual traffic are transported if the main line carries poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials, and (2) its main lines over which intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation is regularly provided. Under RSIA, railroads were originally required to complete implementation by December 31, 2015. Approximately two months before that deadline, the House and Senate overwhelmingly passed, and the President signed, the Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015 (PTCEI Act), extending the deadline for full PTC system implementation to December 31, 2018.

In addition, under the PTCEI Act, Congress permits a railroad to request FRA’s approval of an “alternative schedule” with a deadline extending beyond December 31, 2018, but no later than December 31, 2020, for full PTC system implementation. The law requires FRA to approve a railroad’s alternative schedule with a deadline that is as soon as practicable, but not later than December 31, 2020, if a railroad submits a written request to FRA that demonstrates it has met the statutory criteria to qualify for such an alternative schedule. Currently, 41 railroads are required by statute to implement PTC systems: all 7 Class I freight railroads; 30 commuter and intercity passenger railroads, including the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); and 4 short line and terminal railroads. The technology is required to be implemented on approximately 58,000 route miles of the 140,000-mile railroad network.

While railroads are making progress, FRA expects that most railroads will need to request an alternative schedule to complete testing, obtain PTC System Certification, meet the statutory interoperability requirements, and fully implement PTC systems on all main lines required to be governed by PTC systems. FRA continues to take a proactive approach to help railroads acquire, install, test, and fully implement certified PTC systems as soon as possible.

At the direction of Secretary Elaine L. Chao, FRA senior leadership met individually with executives from each of the 41 railroads in January and February of this year. In May and June, we also held follow-up meetings with the twelve railroads identified as at risk, as of Quarter 1 of 2018, of not meeting the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for FRA’s approval of an alternative schedule. Railroads have generally been candid in detailing the challenges and obstacles confronting their properties. During the meetings, we sought to objectively evaluate each railroad’s PTC deployment status, and learn what remaining steps each railroad needs to take to meet the deadline or satisfy the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for an alternative schedule.

During these meetings and throughout our conversations with the railroads, they commonly conveyed the following ongoing challenges:

• There is a competitive yet limited number of PTC system vendors and suppliers. Unusually weighted demand and supply has constrained the timely serving of all 41 railroads and their tenant railroads;

 • As reliability and stability of PTC systems is still immature, railroads are experiencing significant technical issues with both PTC system hardware and PTC system software that often take considerable time to diagnose and resolve, impacting current operations;

• Host railroads (totaling 36) noted that many tenant railroads (estimated at 250+) that operate on main lines requiring PTC system implementation have made variable, and often unknown, progress equipping locomotives with operational PTC technology, while some tenant railroads report that their host railroads are not providing opportunity for testing. FRA is initiating efforts to synchronize the coordination among the host and tenant railroads;

• Railroads have only recently begun testing PTC systems for interoperability;

• Many commuter railroads stated that negotiating legal agreements with certain vendors and suppliers often took time to complete, given various insurance, liability, and State law issues;

• Absence of consistent leadership at several railroads, regardless of leadership quality, weakened the “sense of urgency” and the focus on PTC system implementation at some entities subject to the statutory mandate; and

• Railroads noted concern about FRA’s review and approval cycle, given the surge in submissions requiring FRA approval in 2018–2020.

By law, it is the railroads’ responsibility to implement PTC systems, but FRA is facilitating railroad and supplier collaboration to hasten, and urge, implementation. We have also met individually with PTC system component suppliers to learn more about their capacity to meet the high demand of railroads to achieve timely implementation.

This summer FRA hosted three PTC symposia for the 41 railroads mandated to implement PTC systems. Each of the day-long sessions brought together railroad safety officials and FRA’s PTC experts to ensure that each and every railroad subject to the mandate is aware of its obligations and is equipped to meet the Congressionally mandated deadline. The first symposium discussed industry questions and focused on requirements for the December 31, 2018 statutory deadline. The second focused on best practices for testing PTC systems on the general rail system, including field testing, revenue service demonstration (RSD), and interoperability testing. The third focused on lessons learned and best practices for PTC Safety Plans, which are required for host railroads to obtain PTC System Certification and achieve full system implementation.  As FRA tracks railroads’ progress, additional  symposia on PTC may be offered, as new challenges arise.

  1. PTC Status Update

Since April 1, 2016, FRA has been closely tracking and displaying on its website individual railroads’ self-reported PTC system implementation status. FRA’s PTC Dashboard tracks railroads’ progress toward full implementation on a quarterly basis, including the number and percentage of locomotives equipped and PTC operable, track segments completed, radio towers installed, training completed, spectrum acquisition, route miles in RSD, whether the railroad has obtained PTC System Certification, route miles in PTC operation, and more recently, interoperability between host railroads and tenant railroads. In addition, FRA tracks, on a quarterly basis, the progress each railroad has made toward meeting the statutory criteria necessary to qualify for FRA’s approval of an alternative schedule.

Based on railroads’ most recent Quarter 2 reports (with data current as of June 30, 2018), PTC systems are in operation on 35,487 route miles, which is approximately 66 percent of the freight railroads’ route miles that are required to be governed by a PTC system. Passenger railroads have made less progress, with PTC systems in operation on 975 route miles, which is approximately 24 percent of the required route miles. Notably, PTC systems are being operated in RSD on an additional 1,103 freight railroad route miles and an additional 140 commuter railroad route miles, as of Quarter 2. Fifteen railroads report they have completed installation of all hardware necessary for PTC system implementation, and twelve other railroads have installed between 95 and 99 percent of the PTC system hardware identified in their PTC Implementation Plans, as of June 30, 2018. All but one railroad, whose PTC systems use spectrum, reported they have acquired sufficient spectrum. In addition, 14 railroads have initiated sufficient RSD or met substitute criteria, which is also one of the six statutory criteria needed to qualify for an alternative schedule.

The most recent data also showed a reduction in the number of railroads at risk of not qualifying for an alternative schedule, from twelve railroads as of Quarter 1 of 2018, to nine railroads as Quarter 2.  FRA currently considers any railroad that had installed less than 90 percent of its PTC system hardware as of June 30, 2018, to be most at risk of failing to qualify for an alternative schedule. Installation of all PTC system hardware is only an initial phase of implementing a PTC system and only one of the six statutory criteria required to qualify for an alternative schedule to complete full PTC system implementation after December 31, 2018. The nine at-risk railroads are: New Mexico Rail Runner Express (Rio Metro), Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority (CapMetro), New Jersey Transit (NJT), Altamont Corridor Express (ACE), Maryland Area Regional Commuter (MARC), Trinity Railway Express (TRE), South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (Tri-Rail), Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain) and Central Florida Rail Corridor (SunRail). 

In addition to the letters of concern from April and June 2018, on August 24th, I sent letters to the nine railroads that FRA remains concerned are at risk of both missing the statutory implementation deadline, and failing to qualify for an alternative schedule. This assessment was based on railroads’ self-reported progress as of June 30, 2018 (Quarterly PTC Progress Reports for Quarter 2 of 2018). I also sent similar letters expressing concern to the relevant state departments of transportation and Governors. FRA is working closely with all 41 railroads subject to the PTC mandate; for the nine at-risk railroads, FRA is actively engaging in frequent communication and providing additional on-site technical assistance. Of course, all railroads subject to the mandate must pay careful attention to the requirements for an alternative schedule if they will not achieve full PTC system implementation by December 31, 2018, and must continue vigilantly working toward prompt PTC system implementation.

  1. Grant Funding and Financial Assistance

PTC technology is designed to provide important safety improvements, but these systems come with significant costs, both in terms of immediate acquisition and increased operations and maintenance costs. Industry estimates PTC acquisition will exceed $14 billion, and maintenance will cost 10 to 20 percent of annual capital costs. Since 2008, FRA has awarded approximately $961 million in grant funding to support railroads’ implementation of PTC systems. FRA also supported the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) with its evaluation and selection of approximately $197 million in grant funding awarded to 17 commuter and intercity passenger railroads and state and local governments for installation of PTC systems, which were announced on May 31, 2017.  More recently, on August 24, FRA selected 28 PTC projects, including 13 commuter rail projects not usually eligible for FRA funding, to receive $203.7 million under the Fiscal Year 2018 Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) grant program. Given that applications for this funding were due July 2, I would note that FRA worked tremendously hard to evaluate the applications and make selections. Our hard work allowed us to make the grant announcements two months after receipt of the applications. This process can typically take up to six months or longer to complete.

Currently, FRA has two open funding opportunities that can further aid railroads, states, and other stakeholders with implementing PTC as well as other important safety and infrastructure needs: $318.4 million under the broader Fiscal Year 2018 CRISI program, and $46.3 million for the remaining funding under the PTC-specific Fiscal Year 2018 CRISI program. And finally, FRA is evaluating applications submitted under the $65.2 million Fiscal Year 2017 CRISI and $4.8 million Fiscal Year 2017 Restoration & Enhancements grant programs, and will be making selection announcements in the near future.   

In total, the sources of the approximately $1.16 billion in FRA and FTA grant funding for PTC are:

  • $475 million from FRA’s High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program;
  • $197 million in Section 3028 of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) funding;
  • $204 million in CRISI grant funding;
  • $0.3 million in a Special Transportation Circumstances Grant;
  • $142 million in annual capital grant funding to Amtrak;
  • $86 million from FRA’s Railroad Safety Technology Grant Program;
  • $52 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act grant funding to Amtrak; and
  • $2 million in Research and Development grants.

Additionally, in May 2015, FRA issued a $967.1 million loan to Metropolitan Transportation Authority for Long Island Rail Road’s and Metro-North Railroad’s implementation of PTC systems. And on December 8, 2017, the Build America Bureau closed on a $162 million Transportation and Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act loan and a $220 million Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing loan to be issued to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority for PTC system implementation.

In sum, thanks to the funding provided by Congress, the Department has made available over $2.5 billion in grants and loans since 2008. This amounts to nearly 20 percent of industry estimates for PTC implementation costs.

  1. Enforcement of the PTC Implementation Mandate

FRA is committed to helping ensure that railroads implement PTC systems as safely and expeditiously as possible, in accordance with the congressional mandate. FRA is authorized to assess monetary civil penalties against any railroad that fails to implement a PTC system by the applicable statutory deadline (either December 31, 2018, or, if a railroad has an approved alternative schedule, the applicable date not later than December 31, 2020). FRA’s civil penalty schedule recommends, as guidance, a $16,000 civil penalty for a failure to timely complete PTC implementation on a track segment where it is required. For any violation of a Federal rail safety statute, regulation, or order, however, the current statutory minimum civil penalty FRA may assess is $853, and the ordinary statutory maximum is $27,904. FRA may assess a civil penalty for each day the non-compliance continues, but FRA may elect to take enforcement action on a one-time basis or each month, quarter, year, or other interval of time during which the noncompliance continues. FRA is currently considering all options, within the framework established by law, to determine what type of enforcement action will be most effective and appropriate under the circumstances. Our goal is to ensure any enforcement action compels a railroad to fully implement its PTC system as efficiently and safely as possible.

Also, I would like to note that in June and July 2018, FRA initiated enforcement action against each of the 13 railroads that failed to complete one or more of the end-of-2017 hardware installation milestones and/or spectrum acquisition milestones the railroad established in its PTC Implementation Plan. Consistent with FRA’s commitment to ensuring railroads comply with the statutory mandate, including interim requirements, FRA’s Notice of Probable Violation to each of the 13 railroads proposed the maximum civil penalty for this type of interim violation—i.e., a one-time civil penalty of $27,904.

Since this Administration took office, railroads have made significant progress toward installing and implementing PTC systems. From Quarter 1 of 2017 to Quarter 2 of 2018, railroads increased the total amount of installed PTC system hardware from 77 percent to 97 percent.  As of June 30, 2018, PTC systems are either in RSD or in operation on approximately 37,705 route miles (i.e., 65 percent) of the nearly 58,000 route miles that are subject to the statutory mandate. 

Moving forward, FRA will continue to support and facilitate railroads’ implementation of PTC technology by utilizing the tools afforded by Congress and providing extensive technical assistance and guidance to railroads and suppliers. We remain vigilant in harnessing and leveraging all the personnel, financial, and other resources available to help expedite railroads’ implementation efforts. We appreciate the Subcommittee’s support for our critical programs, and we welcome your continued partnership to advance rail safety and service. I look forward to your questions.

Oversight of Positive Train Control Implementation in the United States

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF JUAN D. REYES III

CHIEF COUNSEL

OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Before the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

United States House of Representatives

“Oversight of Positive Train Control Implementation in the United States”

February 15, 2018

Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) oversight of positive train control (PTC) implementation in the United States. In light of the recent tragic passenger rail incidents, much of the nation’s time and attention has been rightly focused on ensuring that all critical safety measures are in place within our nation’s rail system. Safety is the FRA’s top priority. Our mission at the FRA is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the future. The men and women of FRA execute this important mission every day. Under the leadership of Secretary Elaine L. Chao, FRA executes this objective through developing and enforcing safety regulations, promoting non‑regulatory safety activities, investing in rail services and infrastructure, facilitating national and regional rail planning, and conducting research and development to advance innovative technology solutions.

PTC will represent the most fundamental change in rail safety technologies since the introduction of Automatic Train Control in the 1920s. PTC is a processor-based/communication-based train control system designed to prevent certain train accidents. This technology is capable of automatically controlling train speeds and movements should a train operator fail to take appropriate action for the conditions at hand. For example, PTC can force a train to a stop before it passes a signal displaying a stop indicator, or before diverging on an improperly aligned switch, thereby averting a potential collision.

Currently, 41 railroads are required to implement a PTC system, including 7 Class I freight railroads, 30 commuter and intercity passenger railroads including (Amtrak), and 4 short line and terminal railroads.[1]  These systems are being implemented on approximately 60,000 miles of the 140,000-mile railroad network.

  1. Positive Train Control Systems

As first mandated by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, each Class I railroad and each entity providing regularly scheduled, intercity or commuter rail passenger service must implement an FRA-certified PTC system on:

  • its main line over which 5 million or more gross tons of annual traffic and poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials are transported, and
  • its main line over which intercity or commuter rail service is regularly provided.

Per Federal statute and regulations, PTC systems must be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement of a train through a main line switch in the improper position.  Railroads are primarily implementing the following PTC systems in the United States: (1) the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS), which is the predominant system being implemented by Class I railroads; (2) the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES II), which is being implemented by most railroads operating on the Northeast Corridor; and (3) Enhanced Automatic Train Control (E-ATC), which is being implemented by six intercity passenger or commuter railroads.  Each of these PTC systems must be interoperable, meaning the locomotives of any host railroad and tenant railroad operating on the same main line will communicate with and respond to the PTC system, including uninterrupted movements over property boundaries.[2]  

  1. Safety Benefits of PTC Technology

The improvement in safety provided by PTC technology comes with significant costs, both in terms of immediate acquisition (industry expenditures will exceed $14 billion for PTC system implementation)[3] and increased operations and maintenance costs (estimated at approximately 15-20% of capital costs per year).

  1. Legislative History
  1. Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

On October 16, 2008, the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) was enacted, establishing the PTC system implementation mandate and the original December 31, 2015 deadline.[4]  As directed by RSIA, FRA issued regulations specifying the essential technical functionalities of PTC systems and FRA PTC certification criteria.[5] 

  1. Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015

Approximately two months before the original PTC implementation deadline of December 31, 2015, the House and Senate overwhelmingly passed the Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015 (PTCEI Act).  The legislation was signed into law on October 29, 2015.[6]  The PTCEI Act extended the deadline for full implementation of PTC systems from December 31, 2015, to at least December 31, 2018. 

The PTCEI Act requires FRA to grant a railroad a deadline extension to a date no later than December 31, 2020, if a railroad submits a written request for an extension that demonstrates it has met the statutory criteria[7] under 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(3)(B):

  • Hardware – Installed, by December 31, 2018, all PTC system hardware required for system implementation consistent with railroad’s PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP);
  • Spectrum – Acquired, by December 31, 2018, all spectrum necessary for implementation of the railroad’s PTC system;
  • Employee Training – Completed the employee training required under 49 CFR part 236, subpart I for all applicable personnel in any territory, or segment thereof, where the PTC system is currently being operated in revenue service demonstration (RSD) or revenue service;
  • Advanced Testing and/or Implementation:
    • For Class I railroads and Amtrak, the railroad has implemented a PTC system or initiated FRA-approved RSD on the majority of territories (e.g., subdivisions or districts) or route miles the railroad owns or controls that are required to have operations governed by a PTC system;
    • For other railroads (i.e., not Class I railroads or Amtrak), the railroad has initiated FRA-approved RSD on at least one territory that is required to have operations governed by a PTC system, or met any other criteria established by FRA;
  • Included in its PTCIP an alternative schedule and sequence for implementing a PTC system as soon as practicable, but no later than December 31, 2020; and
  • Certified to FRA in writing that it will be in full compliance with 49 U.S.C. § 20157 on or before the deadline in its proposed alternative schedule and sequence.[8] 

Among other requirements, the PTCEI Act also required each railroad subject to the statutory mandate to submit a Revised PTCIP to FRA by January 27, 2016, and mandated that FRA conduct reviews, at least annually, to ensure that each railroad is complying with its PTCIP, including any FRA-approved amendments.[9] 

  1. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act

Following enactment of the PTCEI Act, FRA encouraged railroads to fully implement PTC systems by December 31, 2018, despite the statutory provision that allows an extension up to 24 additional months.  However, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act subsequently enacted on December 4, 2015, explicitly prohibits FRA from requiring a railroad to submit a PTCIP with a December 31, 2018, deadline for full PTC system implementation.[10] As such, the FAST Act authorizes a railroad to submit a plan for implementation with the only deadline being December 31, 2020. If a railroad meets all statutory criteria required for a deadline extension, the PTCEI Act requires the Department to approve a railroad’s request for an extension to complete full PTC system implementation as soon as practicable but no later than December 31, 2020. The FAST Act also removed FRA’s authority to approve or disapprove the PTCIPs submitted to FRA in January 2016 pursuant to the PTCEI Act.[11]

  1. Enforcement of the PTC Implementation Mandate
  1. Future PTC Enforcement Actions

FRA is authorized to assess monetary civil penalties against any railroad that fails to implement a PTC system by the applicable statutory deadline.[12]  FRA may not assess a civil penalty against a railroad that fails to implement a PTC system by December 31, 2018, but obtains an extension to the December 31, 2018 deadline to a date no later than December 31, 2020.[13]

In general, FRA’s civil penalty schedule recommends, as guidance, a $16,000 civil penalty for a railroad’s failure to timely complete PTC system implementation on a track segment where a PTC system is required.[14]  For any violation of a Federal rail safety statute, regulation, or order under FRA’s authority, however, the statutory minimum civil penalty FRA may assess is $853, and the ordinary statutory maximum civil penalty is $27,904.[15]  FRA may assess a civil penalty for each day the non-compliance continues, but FRA may elect to take enforcement action on a one-time basis or each month, quarter, year, or other interval of time during which the non-compliance continues.[16]

With respect to future enforcement action, FRA is currently considering all options, within the framework established by Congress, and will determine what type of enforcement action will be most effective and appropriate under the circumstances, in order to ensure such action compels a railroad to fully implement its PTC system as efficiently and safely as possible. 

  1. Past PTC Enforcement Actions

As mandated by the PTCEI Act, beginning calendar year 2016, FRA must conduct compliance reviews at least annually to verify whether each railroad is complying with its PTCIP.[17]  FRA is authorized to assess civil penalties against any railroad that fails to complete the end-of-year implementation milestones the railroad established in its PTCIP, including the railroad’s end-of-2016 and end-of-2017 milestones for PTC hardware installation, spectrum acquisition, and employee training.[18] 

Twelve Closed Cases and Two Open Cases

For the first time since the RSIA, in June and July 2017, FRA issued Notices of Probable Violation against (i) seven railroads that failed to complete hardware installation milestones they scheduled to complete during calendar year 2016 in their PTCIP[19] and (ii) seven railroads that failed to submit a timely Annual PTC Progress Report (Form FRA F 6180.166, OMB Control No. 2130-0553) to FRA by the statutory March 31, 2017, deadline.[20]  Twelve railroads have paid or, at a minimum, agreed to pay the civil penalty amount and the other two cases are still being negotiated with the railroads.   

  1. FRA Efforts to Urge Timely Implementation of PTC Systems
  1. Outreach

During calendar year 2017, FRA continued to take action to ensure that railroads implement PTC systems in a timely and safe manner.  For example, FRA sent letters of concern to railroads and certain state officials regarding certain railroads’ failure to complete end-of-2016 hardware installation milestones[21] and railroads that had installed less than 50 percent of all hardware required for their PTC systems as of December 31, 2016.[22]  FRA sent letters to the state departments of transportation (DOT) of Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas and the state DOTs and state governors of California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and Texas.

On December 27, 2017, ahead of the one-year deadline for PTC implementation, Secretary Chao issued a letter, to all Class I railroads, intercity passenger railroads, and commuter railroads, stressing the urgency and importance of safely implementing PTC systems in the upcoming year and meeting the statutory deadline.  Since December 2017, FRA leadership met with the executive leadership and technical teams of each railroad subject to the statutory mandate to help ensure PTC systems are being implemented as efficiently as possible, discuss any challenges the railroads continue to experience, and the railroads’ plans for compliance with the statutory mandate. 

In addition, FRA continues to provide technical assistance throughout all phases of PTC development and implementation by providing lessons learned guidance and other technical assistance through quarterly meetings with high-risk commuter railroads to help address their issues with implementing PTC systems.  FRA participates, in and provides technical support to, several industry working groups, including the Association of American Railroad’s ACSES II Working Group, the American Public Transportation Association’s (APTA) I-ETMS Working Group for commuter railroads, and the railroad-led E-ATC Working Group.

In support of PTC Research and Development (R&D), FRA has provided technical support for railroads’ development of their PTC systems, including I-ETMS, ACSES II, E-ATC, and the Incremental Train Control System.  In addition, in cooperation with individual railroads, as well as APTA, AAR, and the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association committees, FRA is supporting, through a combination of funding and technical support, approximately 10 PTC-related research projects.

  1. Grant Funding and Financial Assistance

Since 2009, FRA awarded approximately $728 million in grant funding to support railroads’ implementation of PTC systems.  FRA staff also supported the Federal Transit Administration with its evaluation and selection of approximately $197 million in PTC grant funds to 17 commuter and intercity passenger railroads and state and local governments for installation of PTC systems, which were announced on May 31, 2017.  The sources of the approximately $925 million in grant funding are:

  • $475 million from FRA’s High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program;
  • $86 million from FRA’s Railroad Safety Technology Grant Program;
  • $51 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act grant funding to Amtrak;
  • $116 million in annual capital grant funding to Amtrak (as of November 2017); and
  • $197 million in FAST Act funding.

PTC implementation is also an eligible project cost under both the Transportation and Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) and the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) loan programs. The Department’s Build America Bureau signed two loans, $162 million TIFIA and $220 million RRIF, with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority on December 8, 2017, which provide $382 million for PTC system implementation.  In May 2015, the Department issued a $967 million RRIF loan to the Metropolitan Transportation Authority for the implementation of PTC systems on the Metro-North Commuter Railroad and Long Island Rail Road. 

Approximately $31 billion is currently available for lending under the RRIF program. Lending authority under the TIFIA program is approximately $22 billion; however, this figure is subject to available subsidy budget authority and the levels of risk associated with future loans.

In considering the loans for PTC-related projects, a total amount of $1.349 billion has been obligated since 2011.

  1. PTC Staffing and Personnel

FRA staffing to support railroads’ implementation of PTC systems consists of both full-time civil service government positions and contractor support.  Dedicated civil service positions total 15, including a staff director, PTC specialists, a project manager, a senior scientific technical advisor, an engineer, a transportation analyst, and a trial attorney.  In addition, there are 6 civil service positions providing part-time support to address specific issues.  Two PTC positions are currently open; recruitment is in process, but the unique expertise and skills needed are difficult to find.   

FRA understands that throughout 2018, there will be an increase in railroads’ requests for FRA approval of Requests for Amendments to PTCIPs, to conduct PTC field testing and conduct revenue service demonstration, and thereafter more railroads will submit PTC Safety Plans to FRA for review and approval, in order to obtain PTC System Certification.  To address these needs in a manner that supports accelerated implementation timelines, FRA has increased its PTC workforce through hiring and training, and initiated two contracts to provide additional technical assistance. 

  1. Railroads’ Progress Towards Meeting Statutory Deadline

FRA interprets “full implementation” to mean that an FRA-certified,[23] interoperable PTC system—including all hardware, software, and other components—has been fully installed and is in operation on all route miles required to have operations governed by a PTC system under 49 U.S.C. § 20157.[24]  Full implementation requires that all controlling locomotives shall be equipped with a fully operative and functioning onboard PTC apparatus, including the controlling locomotives of each railroad subject to the statutory mandate and each tenant railroad operating on a PTC-equipped track segment, except for a railroad’s controlling locomotives that qualify for an exception under 49 CFR § 236.1006.  The statutory mandate and FRA’s implementing regulations also require a PTC system to be interoperable, meaning the locomotives of any host railroad and tenant railroad operating on the same main line will communicate with and respond to the PTC system, including uninterrupted movements over property boundaries.[25]

Under this definition of “full implementation,” FRA anticipates that few, if any, of the 41 railroads currently subject to the statutory mandate will have fully implemented a PTC system by December 31, 2018.  Some railroads, most notably BNSF Railway, Union Pacific Railroad, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, and the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), will have an FRA-certified PTC system in operation on their own locomotives on all route miles required under 49 U.S.C. § 20157, on or before December 31, 2018.  However, it is unlikely that all controlling locomotives of tenant railroads operating on these PTC-equipped railroad properties will be capable of operating with the host railroad’s PTC system by that date.

  1. Challenges

During FRA’s meetings with the leadership of the 41 railroads subject to the statutory mandate, railroads commonly conveyed the following ongoing challenges:

  • There is a limited number of PTC system vendors and suppliers, all of which are significantly resource-constrained and serving all 41 railroads and their tenant railroads;
  • As reliability and stability of PTC systems is still immature, railroads are experiencing significant technical issues with both PTC system hardware and PTC system software that often take considerable time to diagnose and resolve, impacting current operations;
  • Host railroads noted that many tenant railroads that operate on main lines requiring PTC system implementation have made variable, and often unknown, progress equipping locomotives with operational PTC technology, while some tenant railroads report that their host railroads are not providing opportunity for testing;
  • Railroads have only recently begun testing PTC systems for interoperability;
  • Many commuter railroads stated that negotiating legal agreements with certain vendors and suppliers often took multiple years to complete, given various insurance, liability, and State law issues; and
  • Railroads noted concern about FRA’s approval review and approval cycle, given the surge in submissions requiring FRA approval in 2018. 
  1. Conclusion

PTC implementation is a top priority of the Department and FRA.  Railroads’ successful implementation of PTC systems is an important safety initiative for FRA. It is also an important innovation for the future of rail transportation. Given the complexity of these systems, it is imperative that railroads, suppliers, and governing bodies prioritize and focus their attention on meeting this year’s Congressional deadline. Over the last ten weeks, FRA leadership and PTC technical staff have conferred with all 41 PTC railroads individually, with the vast majority of these meetings occurring in-person here in Washington.  FRA has engaged in candid dialogue with these railroads for several years, but the recent meetings have allowed each railroad’s leadership to share PTC lessons learned, obstacles overcome and still remaining, and plans to either comply with the mandate or qualify for an extension by December 31, 2018. Many of the railroads have expressed optimism about meeting this year’s deadline. Yet, FRA acknowledges that challenges remain for railroads and their suppliers.

FRA believes that the railroads are prioritizing PTC implementation and that, with limited exceptions, a majority of the 41 railroads subject to the mandate will be able to comply with the statutory requirements for an extension by the end of this calendar year.

I appreciate the committee’s interest in our Nation’s infrastructure and, particularly, your assistance to the FRA in ensuring railroads implement this rail-safety technology in a timely manner in accordance with the laws and extensions enacted by Congress.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify. I am happy to answer any questions.

 

[1] For purposes of this total, please note that in instances where a host freight railroad is implementing a PTC system solely because of one or more tenant railroads that provide commuter rail transportation on the host railroad’s main line, FRA counts that as one railroad. 

[2]See Title 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 20157(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (a)(2)(D), (i)(3); Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) §§ 236.1003, 236.1011(a)(3).

[3]See Association of American Railroads, Positive Train Control, at 2 (March 2017), https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/Positive%20Train%20Control.pdf.

[4] Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 104(a), 122 Stat. 4848 (Oct. 16, 2008).

[5]See 49 CFR part 236, subpart I.

[6] Pub. L. No. 114-73, 129 Stat. 568, 576–82 (Oct. 29, 2015), amending 49 U.S.C. § 20157.

[7]See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(3)(A)–(D); 49 CFR § 1.89.

[8] 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(3)(B)(i)–(vii); 49 CFR § 1.89.

[9] 49 U.S.C. § (a)(1)–(2), (c)(2). 

[10] Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 11315(d), 129 Stat. 1312, 1675 (Dec. 4, 2015), amending 49 U.S.C. § 20157(g). 

[11]See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(g)(4)(A)(i)–(ii). 

[12] 49 U.S.C. § 20157(e); 49 CFR §§ 1.89, 236.1005(b)(7).

[13]See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(3)(A)–(D) (describing the extension request process and the revised deadlines). 

[14]See 49 CFR part 236, appendix A, subpart I. 

[15]See 82 Fed. Reg. 16127 (Apr. 3, 2017). 

[16]See 49 U.S.C. § 21301(a). 

[17] 49 U.S.C. § 20157(c)(2). 

[18] 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(2)(D), (e)(2). 

[19]See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(2)(D), (e)(2). 

[20]See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(c)(1), (e)(1); 49 CFR § 236.1009(a)(5).

[21] The recipients of letters about missed end-of-2016 milestone were: Amtrak; Belt Railway Company of Chicago; BNSF Railway; Canadian National Railway; Canadian Pacific Railway; Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority; CSX Transportation, Inc.; Kansas City Southern Railway; Maryland Area Regional Commuter; Nashville Regional Transportation Authority / Nashville and Eastern Railroad; New Jersey Transit; Norfolk Southern Railway; Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad (Metra); Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District; Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis; and Union Pacific Railroad. 

[22] The recipients of letters about lack of hardware installation progress were: Altamont Corridor Express; Belt Railway Company of Chicago; Canadian National Railway; Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority; Central Florida Rail Corridor; Denton County Transportation Authority; Long Island Rail Road; Maryland Area Regional Commuter; Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority; Metro-North Commuter Railroad; Nashville Regional Transportation Authority / Nashville and Eastern Railroad; New Jersey Transit; New Mexico Rail Runner Express; Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District; South Florida Regional Transportation Authority; Trinity Railway Express; and Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis.

[23] To date, based on these railroads’ PTC Safety Plans, FRA has issued conditional PTC System Certification for the I-ETMS systems of BNSF Railway, Canadian Pacific Railway, CSX Transportation, Inc., Norfolk Southern Railway, Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Union Pacific Railroad, and for Amtrak’s and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority’s ACSES II systems. 

[24] The PTCEI Act recognizes that certain PTC system failures (e.g. initialization failures, cut outs, and malfunctions) will occur during the period specified in the statute, but a railroad must both operate at an equivalent or greater level of safety than the level of safety achieved immediately prior to the use or implementation of the PTC system and comply with certain safety measures during any PTC system failures.  See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(j).

[25]See 49 U.S.C. § 20157(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (a)(2)(D), (i)(3); 49 CFR §§ 236.1003, 236.1011(a)(3).

New Rail Safety Technologies

 Statement of

Jo Strang,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Railroad Development,
Federal Railroad Administration

before the

Subcommittee on Railroads,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
U.S. House of Representatives

April 28, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of Secretary Mineta and Acting Administrator Jamison, to discuss new rail safety technologies.  Safety is our top priority, and the promise that technology holds to improve safety is compelling.  Recent statistics show that the industry as a whole is getting safer, but the spate of recent, highly publicized accidents shows that there is still room for improvement, and we must accelerate the rate of progress.  We are addressing these issues through better use of data, focusing oversight and inspection resources, and accelerating research in key areas. 

In general, the safety trends on the Nation’s railroads are favorable.  The preliminary data for calendar year 2004 show that since 2003, total  accidents/incidents are down 3.92 percent, and total employee casualties are down 8.75 percent.

However, not all trends are positive.  Improvements in the rate of train accidents have slowed, and significant accidents continue to occur.  Human factors and track continue to be the leading causes of accidents. 

FRA is committed to improving this record, and we are focusing on ways to prevent train accidents and–where they are not prevented–to mitigate their consequences.  I will focus my testimony on innovative new technologies that hold great promise to improve railroad safety.

 

Track Inspection

         

Track defects accounted for 34 percent of derailments over the last five years.  To address this accident cause, FRA has an active research program for developing and deploying enhanced track inspection systems as a preventive approach to reducing track accidents by detecting defects before they can cause an accident.

I wish to briefly describe some of the key systems for track inspection that FRA is currently developing: 

  1. Automated joint bar inspection system:  While derailments due to broken joint bars are infrequent, on some occasions they have severe consequences.  Current joint bar inspection practices rely primarily on visual inspection and, in a few cases, hand mapping with ultrasonic probes. These methods are not only time intensive; they are prone to human errors of interpretation and fail to detect all cracks.  To provide an alternative, FRA is developing a high-speed photo inspection system that will identify the presence of a joint bar in continuous welded rail (CWR), take a high-resolution, high-quality picture of the gage and field sides of the joint bar, and use pattern-recognition software to automatically detect a crack and create a report for use by the railroad.  Initial tests of this technology are promising.  The tests show that a prototype system mounted to a hi-rail vehicle and operated at speeds of 30 miles per hour was able to detect all cracked bars identified by visual inspection, as well as additional cracks undetected by the human eye. 
  1. Track geometry measurement systems: Track gage, which is the distance between the two rails, must be maintained to certain tolerances for safe rail operation.  Wide track gage is the single leading cause of derailments.  FRA actively monitors track geometry through the deployment of its full-scale measurement cars, the T-2000 and the T-16, on numerous rail routes supporting passenger and hazardous materials transportation.  Another specialized inspection car, the FRA T-18, has been deployed for inspections since January of this year.  It applies gage spreading loads to measure the dynamic gage widening (which is the short-term widening caused by the passage of heavy equipment), therefore allowing identification of spots with weak tie and rail fastener conditions, which may not be detectable by visual inspection.  Technology enhancements are continuously being added to these measurement cars to improve their inspection effectiveness, and to provide real-time analyses for better assessment of track conditions.  One example is the integration of Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation data with all detected defects to allow for accurate mapping of their location to within a few feet.  This capability facilitates further field inspection and removal of the defect.  Another is the deployment of optical and laser non-contact sensors for more accurate mapping of track geometry at much greater operating speeds.  Our T-16 car can be towed at speeds of up to 140 mph and still manage to measure track alignment, gage, cross-level, and profile once per foot.  Our T-18 represents an innovation in track inspection through the use of an independent axle for applying the gage spreading loads, which permits safer testing at faster track speeds.  Another promising technology currently under development at FRA is the development of intelligent systems for real-time assessment of the measured geometry based on a predicted response from an array of rail cars.  This capability will allow better identification of hazardous locations where a combination of near-defects can create a potential for derailment.  FRA is also developing an autonomous measurement system for mounting under a conventional rail car that can be more easily transported over the larger rail network.  This system has the capability of detecting serious track geometry defects while simultaneously sending their details to a remote location for a variety of purposes, including later repair.   We expect to test this system by September of this year.
  1. FRA has developed a new and more intuitive Track Quality Index (TQI) that can be calculated from the measured track geometry and displayed onboard the T-16 inspection car.  Basically, TQI visually depicts, in real time, the relative overall condition of track on a one-tenth of a mile basis in relation to the national average quality, thus allowing the identification of track segments of poor quality. 
  1.  Internal rail defects due to fatigue remain a serious problem because of the associated risk of sudden rail failure that typically occurs under a moving train.  Improvements in rail construction and maintenance practices through the use of more wear-resistant rail steel and the wider use of lubrication have increased the design life of the rail.  However, they have also elevated rail fatigue as the more dominant form of failure.  Recent trends in increasing freight axle loads, which are currently near 40 tons, have also exacerbated this problem.  Internal defects can only be identified by specialized ultrasonic or induction measurement cars that still cannot be operated at more than 10 miles per hour on the average. Also, with current inspection technology some defects may be misdiagnosed as to their true size or go undetected altogether.  Defects in the web or base sections of the rail are also extremely difficult to detect.  Both FRA and the Association of American Railroads (AAR) are pursuing inspection technology improvements in this area, which can increase the speed and reliability of automated track inspection cars and expand the range of defects that can be detected.  The techniques being pursued include using  laser-induced ultrasound and the use of guided waves.  Prototype sensors are currently under development with initial tests scheduled for the latter part of this year.

 

Ground Penetrating Radar

Another promising technology that FRA has identified for the diagnosis of safety-related track subsurface problems is Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR).  The study of this technology will likely result in the development of on-board sensor systems that can assess track subsurface conditions in a rapid, accurate, consistent, and reliable manner in real-time at track speed.  Currently, there is no non-destructive inspection technique available.  The goal of the project is therefore to develop an automated GPR to assess the condition of the railway track substructure (ballast, subballast and subgrade) and produce quantitative indices of track substructure condition. The GPR-derived indices will enable better maintenance and rehabilitation decision-making resulting in an improved track substructure performance.  We expect that this will result in increased safety and reduced train service interruptions through more effective use of limited maintenance and capital resources.  Ultimately, the goal of the project is to develop GPR as an important part of a comprehensive substructure maintenance management program that will lead to informed decision making for maintenance and capital improvements.  The system is intended for use on a hi-rail vehicle or a track geometry car for system-wide applicability.  The current phase of the project is to develop the hardware/software specifications for a prototype system to be installed on the FRA’s Research Platform (T-18) for field-testing in Spring 2006.  The prototype GPR system being developed will use radio frequency techniques that protect other transportation systems such as GPS from interference.

 

Positive Train Control (PTC)

PTC is an advanced train control technology that can prevent train collisions with automatic brake applications.  It also provides capabilities such as  automatic compliance with speed restrictions and enhanced protection of maintenance-of-way workers.

FRA’s final rule enabling PTC became effective on March 7, 2005.  The rule is a performance standard for PTC systems that railroads may choose to install, but does not require PTC systems to be installed.  Rather, FRA is promoting the implementation of PTC by sponsoring development of PTC technologies though partnerships with States and railroads; and by helping to provide the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System, a satellite-based navigation aid (described below) that is essential for communications-based PTC projects.

Today, Amtrak and other Northeast Corridor railroads have implemented a form of PTC that supports train speeds up to 150 miles per hour.  This system works well; however, it is expensive and does not offer some operational efficiencies that may be available with newer PTC systems. Therefore, this system does not appear to be appropriate for use outside the Northeast Corridor. 

FRA’s Office of Railroad Development is currently working on PTC projects in Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin.  The next challenge is to continue to drive down implementation costs.                

         

In addition, several freight railroads are exploring less complex “overlay” systems with a goal of increasing safety and improving operating efficiencies.  The farthest along in testing is the Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) on the Burlington Northern Santa Fe.  CSX Transportation is working towards the Communications Based Train Management System and the Alaska Railroad is also working towards implementing a PTC system on its entire territory.

A significant challenge for FRA and the railroads in developing all such systems is to ensure that they are interoperable (that is, locomotives from railroad “A” having one kind of PTC system can operate on railroad “B” which has a different PTC system).

Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS)

The Subcommittee has asked that we also address NDGPS, which is PTC’s fundamental radio navigation system.  NDGPS is a network of reference stations that monitors GPS and transmits signals to an unlimited number of users.  These signals are used by the NDGPS receiver to improve the accuracy and integrity of GPS.  When complete, there will be approximately 130 NDGPS transmitter sites in the United States; this is the basic dual-coverage network for the continental 48 States. The NDGPS system includes preexisting Coast Guard Differential GPS sites, converts 46 transmitter sites of a de-commissioned U.S. Air Force system into NDGPS sites, and builds new sites where needed.   Currently, 92 percent of the 48 contiguous States are covered with single NDGPS, and 60 percent is covered with dual coverage.  When complete, there will be dual coverage throughout the United States to ensure the signals are always available.

Currently, GPS technology has an assured accuracy of 36 meters.  Since parallel railroad tracks are only 4 meters apart, GPS accuracy does not meet our needs.  Basic NDGPS improves the accuracy to 1 to 2 meters.  Similarly, the time it takes the GPS system to recognize that a satellite is out of tolerance and notify the users can be as much as 2-4 hours.  This is referred to as “time to alarm integrity.”  Basic NDGPS improves the time to alarm integrity to 6 seconds.  So, if a GPS satellite malfunctions, the NDGPS system eliminates the bad satellite from the position solution within 6 seconds, preventing any disruption to railroad operations.   High Accuracy NDGPS, for which the Administration is not seeking funding in the Budget, would improve position accuracy to about 10 centimeters, and time to alarm integrity to 1 to 2 seconds.  High Accuracy NDGPS would enable Automated Rail Surveying and Rail Defect Detection systems to operate at rail traffic speeds while collecting valuable data that will improve the safety and efficiency of the Nation’s rail system. 

NDGPS is an enabling technology that is used in a wide variety of non-railroad applications, including precision farming, maritime navigation, surveying, map-making, plate tectonic monitoring, and weather forecasting.    Because it is an enabling technology, many Federal and State agencies and universities have been willing to contribute funding, land, and engineering resources to the program to ensure its success.  The Federal agencies that have significantly contributed to the development of NDGPS include:  the Departments of Transportation, the Air Force, the Army, Commerce, Interior, and Energy; the Tennessee Valley Authority; and the Voice of America.  The States that have partnered with FRA in the deployment of NDGPS include California, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  The NDGPS project is an excellent example of interagency cooperation and outstanding partnerships with States.

Passenger Equipment Safety

In contrast to the European rail system, traffic on the U.S. rail system is dominated by private freight traffic and produces a more rugged operating environment.  Passenger trains commonly share the same tracks with freight trains weighing 15,000 tons or more, and PTC is a rarity.  Highway-rail crossings are common in the United States; there are more than 250,000.  Commercial trucks in this country are much heavier than typical European trucks, so the risk of a highway-rail crossing collision with a subsequent derailment is greater in the U. S.  Therefore, we have sought to provide railroad passenger equipment safety standards that take into account our more rugged operating environment.

                  

FRA issued comprehensive Passenger Equipment Safety Standards in 1999.  The rule’s crashworthiness standards ensure that a passenger train has features providing a superior level of occupant protection for passengers and crew in the event of a collision or derailment.  The standards require features designed to overcome most of the known reasons for deaths and injuries in previous wrecks, such as high static end strength, corner posts, collision posts, anti-climbing mechanisms, roll-over strength, side strength, truck-to- car-body attachment, glazing, locomotive fuel tanks, and emergency exits and lighting, among others.  Further rulemaking is ongoing to cover matters left unfinished.

 FRA continues to address the crashworthiness of passenger equipment as well as enhanced passenger and crew protection through our full-scale crash test program.  Our main partners in this important research are the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and Amtrak. 

Computer models have been developed to simulate a variety of passenger rail car crash scenarios.  These models, combined with the results of crash tests and field investigations of passenger train accidents, are being used to develop strategies for increasing occupant protection.  The role of these tests is to measure and compare the crashworthiness performance of existing passenger equipment and modified designs.  

 

FRA is now testing two components of structural crashworthiness for passenger rail equipment: a crush-zone for coaches, or cars that are coupled together and a crush-zone for cab cars, or cars that would need protection if striking an object.  So far, we have completed both designs and tested the crush-zone design for the coaches. 

 

We conducted a single-car test of a Crash Energy Management (CEM) coach car on December 3, 2003.  A two-car test of CEM coach cars was conducted on February 24, 2004.  We have also just completed the cab-car crush zone design.  An existing cab car will soon be retrofitted with crush zones.  This cab car, along with coach cars similarly retrofitted, will be used in a train-to-train full-scale impact test.

The test results from the single-car and two-car impact tests show that the CEM design has superior crashworthiness performance over conventional equipment.  In the single car test of conventional equipment, the car crushed by approximately six feet, intruding into the occupied area, and lifted by about nine inches, raising the wheels of the lead truck off the rails.  Under the same single-car test conditions, the CEM car crushed about three feet, preserving the occupied area, and its wheels remained on the rails.  In the two-car test of conventional equipment, the conventional car again crushed by approximately six feet, and lifted about nine inches as it crushed; in addition, the coupled cars sawtooth-buckled, and the trucks immediately adjacent to the coupled connection derailed.  In the two-car test of CEM equipment, the cars preserved the occupant areas and remained in-line, with all of the wheels on the rails. 

In the train-to-train test of conventional equipment, the colliding cab car crushed by approximately 22 feet and overrode the locomotive.  The space for the operator’s seat and for approximately ten rows of passenger seats was lost.  Computer simulations of the train-to-train test of CEM equipment indicate that the cab car will crush by approximately three feet, and that override will be prevented.  Structural crush will be pushed back to all of the coach car crush zones, and all of the crew and passenger space will be preserved.  The train-to-train test of CEM equipment, which is planned for February 2006, expected to confirm these predictions

We are currently discussing applying the results of the CEM research and development with the industry in the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee’s Passenger Safety Working Group and in the APTA Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards Committee.  We are also working with Metrolink, a commuter railroad in southern California, to add CEM to their next car purchase, as well as the Federal Transit Administration to determine ways to create incentives for early adoption of the results of this research. 

Advances in Locomotive Crashworthiness

FRA is also actively addressing the crashworthiness of freight locomotives.  Participants in this effort include the passenger and freight railroads, rail labor organizations, and locomotive builders.  This program has:

  1. Developed computer models and testing tools to evaluate locomotive crashworthiness;
  2. Evaluated current design locomotives for crashworthiness under common accident scenarios;
  3. Considered alternative design improvements with modeling, static testing and full-scale crash testing;
  4. Verified and validated models through full-scale crash testing; and
  5. Developed means to mitigate injuries to crew.

A total of seven tests have been conducted to date, all testing specific types of accidents that could result in fatalities in regular operations.  All tests were simulated prior to the actual crash test using computer modeling.  The model predictions closely matched the actual test results.   At least in part as a result of modeling and testing, the AAR has adopted a revised standard, S-580 (December 2004), which incorporates improvements in locomotive design.

On-Board Condition Monitoring System

Another way that FRA is striving to improve railroad safety is a project to develop and demonstrate a real-time, on-board condition monitoring system  (OBCMS) for freight trains.  The objective of the system is to improve railroad safety and efficiency through continuous monitoring of mechanical components in order to detect defects before they cause derailments.  The system monitors the condition of the bearings, wheels, trucks, and brakes.  The monitoring system has been installed on five hopper cars owned by Southern Company Services.  The OBCMS is currently being operated in revenue service on a coal train operating on a Norfolk Southern route in Alabama between a coalmine northwest of Birmingham and Gaston Steam Plant in Wilsonville, Alabama.  The Southern Company test cars are also equipped with the Timken Guardian Bearing Monitoring System, which monitors the car speed as well as the vibration and temperature of the bearings.   The system features some of the latest technology in communications and railroad bearings.

Work is currently in progress to extend the capabilities of the OBCMS to include operation of mechanical devices from the locomotive.  The devices being integrated (referred to collectively as advanced components) include parking brakes, advanced couplers, angle cocks, cut-out, levers, and a cushion unit lockout mechanism to control slack in the train.  FRA has been sponsoring the development of the advanced components through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.  These components have reached the stage of development where they can be integrated with the OBCMS.  These devices will improve railroad safety and operational efficiency since they permit various mechanical functions to be controlled remotely from the locomotive instead of manually.  The OBCMS with advanced components will be installed on five freight cars for demonstration.

Hazardous Materials and Tank Car Safety

FRA is also working hard on projects intended to both reduce the likelihood that a train accident will result in a hazardous material release and to ensure that, if a release occurs, local emergency responders will be fully prepared to minimize the damage and loss of life that might occur.  The Graniteville, South Carolina, accident, which tragically resulted in at least nine deaths as the result of the release of chlorine, demonstrates the potential for serious consequences from train accidents involving tank cars carrying hazardous material.

An important component of minimizing the impact of a hazardous material release is the emergency response.  Emergency responders are trained and generally well prepared on how to locate shipping papers on trains and read placards and other hazard communication markings.  However, it may be possible for railroads to immediately distribute the necessary information electronically to all affected emergency responders upon notification of a train accident.    The emergency responders identified that information needs to be phase specific.  While information immediately available in the first 15 to 20 minutes of a response is generally sufficient, the key element is verification to ensure seamless transition into later phases.  Initial discussions with the railroads and emergency responders show both interest and willingness to pursue an improved flow of information.  All necessary information is currently available; the missing piece is communications infrastructure to support response improvement.  FRA will continue to progress this effort as rapidly as possible.

FRA is focusing on research arising from the Minot, North Dakota, accident in 2002, which resulted in one death and 11 injuries due to the release of anhydrous ammonia.  We are working with the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center and the AAR Tank Car Committee.  Current research involves a three-phase approach to assess the consequences of tank cars involved in derailments.  The first phase is development of a physics-based model to analyze the kinematics of rail cars involved in a derailment.  The second phase is development of dynamic structural analysis models.  The third phase is an assessment of the damage created by puncture and entails the application of fracture mechanics testing and analysis methods.  The modeling work is being conducted now.  Work on tank car structural integrity will also be applicable to the Macdona, Texas, accident in 2004 (which resulted in three deaths due to the release of chlorine) and to the Graniteville accident.  This research will help improve our understanding of how tank cars fail, and that knowledge will help us improve tank car design in the future. 

In addition, an explosive-resistant coating is being used to enhance the armor protection of military vehicles in Iraq.  FRA intends to evaluate it for potential use on tank cars to prevent puncture.  The material also has a self-sealing property that could be useful to seal a hole in a tank car and mitigate the severity of incidents.  The material is a spray-on polyurea coating that has exceptional strength compared to weight.  FRA is working with the tank car industry on this project.

Conclusion

Thank you for allowing me to provide this brief update on current research initiatives to improve safety in the railroad industry and on the complex, technical areas of enhanced track inspection systems, PTC, NDGPS, and railroad equipment safety.  I look forward to your comments and questions on these important subjects.

Recent Developments Concerning Amtrak’s Acela High-Speed Trains

Statement of

Robert D. Jamison
Acting Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration

before the

Subcommittee on Railroads of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
U.S. House of Representatives

May 11, 2005

 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of Secretary Mineta, to discuss recent developments concerning Amtrak’s Acela high-speed trains.  I will explain what the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) knows regarding the problems with the rotors on the Acela’s disc brakes and how we are working with Amtrak to develop a solution to those problems.  I will also touch briefly on FRA’s overall safety priorities and Amtrak’s general safety record.

 

Acela Brake Issues

 

FRA Safety Specialist Rich Thomas first detected cracks on the spokes of an Acela train’s disc brake rotors on the evening of April 14.  The detection occurred while FRA personnel were closely inspecting a trainset that had been involved in test runs.  The test runs, unrelated to the brake issue, were being conducted to ensure safe operating performance of the Acela at higher speeds in curves than are currently permitted.  While conducting a very thorough inspection of the brakes on the trainset, Specialist Thomas noticed what appeared to be rust near a very small mark on one of the rotor’s spokes.  On closer examination, the mark proved to be a crack.  Cracks on the spokes of disc brake rotors have not been a common problem.  Such an anomaly is very difficult to observe due to the location of the spokes in relation to other components of the undercarriage.  Undercarriage components can obstruct a clear view of the spokes, especially on the two discs on the outside of the axle.  (Acela trainsets have three discs per axle, which adds up to 72 discs per trainset.)   After the initial discovery of the cracks, the FRA inspectors, along with personnel from Amtrak and its Acela maintenance contractor, then inspected other trainsets.  As the inspections concluded that evening, it became clear that a significant percentage of the disc brakes had similar cracks.  After discussions with FRA personnel that night, Amtrak decided to suspend Acela service immediately on April 15 and ordered a detailed inspection of the entire Acela fleet for the presence of such cracks.

 

The good news is that these cracks were detected before they led to a catastrophic failure of the rotor with potentially very serious consequences.   Having been alerted to the problem, Amtrak then acted quickly to ensure that Acela service would not continue until the potentially hazardous condition was corrected.  My staff and I met with Amtrak President David Gunn and his staff on April 15, and again on April 20, to discuss the problem and potential solutions.  Amtrak formed a working group, consisting of its staff, its contractors who are responsible for Acela maintenance, the suppliers of the Acela equipment, and several technical experts, to determine the cause of the problem and to explore solutions to the problem.  FRA experts from our Office of Safety and our Office of Railroad Development are cooperating fully in that effort.  Amtrak has no intention of running the Acela equipment with cracks in the disc brakes, and all concerned understand that FRA will not permit that to occur.

 

As to the cause of the cracks, there is much speculation.  Some have speculated that one possible reason for the cracks in the discs is FRA’s influence over the initial design of the Acela trainsets.  In preparing to order high-speed trainsets in 1994, Amtrak sought FRA’s comments on its proposed specifications.  FRA’s comments contributed to Amtrak’s including certain design features, including crash energy management features similar to those being built into advanced European equipment during the period and strengthening the crew compartment.  Amtrak specified that the trainset be built to comply with the North American standards for buff (anti-crush) strength because the trainset was intended to operate in a North American environment where all other passenger trains (both intercity and commuter) have been built to those standards and where rail freight equipment is much larger and heavier than that encountered in most other parts of the world.  Amtrak did not seek permission from FRA to use the European buff-strength standard.  Beyond such basic safety requirements, Amtrak and its vendor were free to choose technologies and to design the train as they thought best. 

 

FRA’s Safety Program

 

Our efforts to ensure the safety of the Acela service are but one component of a comprehensive railroad safety program.  Although the railroad industry’s overall safety record is very positive and most safety trends are moving in the right direction, very serious train accidents continue to occur, and the train accident rate has not declined at an acceptable pace in recent years.  To meet these challenges, FRA is targeting its regulatory program on the most frequent causes of train accidents, focusing FRA’s oversight and inspection resources on the areas of highest risk, and accelerating research and development (R&D) efforts that have the potential to mitigate the largest risks. 

 

  1. Targeting the Leading Causes of Train Accidents

 

More than 70 percent of all train accidents arise from either human error or defective track.  Accordingly, FRA’s highest priority must be to reduce these types of accidents.  

 

   1.  Human Factors

 

Human factor accidents are now the largest category of train accidents, accounting for 40 percent of the total in 2004.  FRA’s ongoing analysis of accident trend data has revealed that a small number of particular kinds of human errors (e.g., not properly lining switches, failure to lock and latch switches, not properly conducting shoving movements) account for an inordinate number of human factor accidents.  Although these matters are addressed by each railroad’s own operating rules, FRA’s regulations do not presently address them directly.  FRA intends to take action, preferably based on consensus recommendations from its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, to address these leading causes of train accidents.  We are acting in order to heighten awareness and understanding of the problem and ensure timely application of best practices across the board to achieve substantial reductions in these types of easily preventable accidents.  We took a first step in this direction on April 14, by holding an industry symposium to exchange views on the causes and possible remedies for these human-factor accidents.

 

Important research projects are under way in support of, and to supplement, our regulatory efforts on human factors.  We have signed a memorandum of agreement to launch a new FRA-sponsored R&D pilot project with rail management and labor that will gather and analyze data on “close calls” to identify the reasons for the human failures that cause near-accidents and to develop corrective actions to remedy those human-factor causes.  Another FRA R&D project will try to develop cost-effective technological counter-measures to misaligned switches and will conduct in-depth behavioral research on why employees make such errors. 

 

            2.  Defective Track

 

The second-leading cause of train accidents is defective track.  Over the last three years, FRA embarked on an aggressive program to focus its track-related enforcement efforts on the most likely accident causes.  We are continuing these efforts, which have generally helped move the track-caused accident trend lines in the right direction.  Here, too, our R&D efforts provide a critical complement to our regulatory efforts.  Broken joint bars and broken rails account for a large number of track-caused accidents, but the precursor conditions (cracks in joint bars and internal rail flaws) that lead to these causes are not readily detected.  FRA is developing a high-speed photo inspection system that will detect joint bar defects much more efficiently than current methods allow.  FRA is also working closely with the railroad industry to improve the speed and reliability of rail flaw detection vehicles.  

 

B. National Inspection Plan

 

While our regulatory and research efforts are focused on the leading causes of train accidents, we are also focusing our inspection resources on the areas of highest risk.  FRA has recently begun phasing in a new National Inspection Plan (NIP) to improve the agency’s allocation and assignment of inspection resources.  The NIP will use sophisticated trend analyses of inspection and accident data to produce an optimal distribution of resources within each of the agency’s eight regions to minimize fatality, injury, and accident rates.  We began implementing the NIP at the end of last month in the operating practices and track disciplines, which correspond to the two leading categories of train accidents. 

 

C.  Research and Development

 

Our third area of emphasis is accelerating our R&D efforts that have the greatest potential to reduce serious safety risks.  For example, FRA is speeding up R&D efforts on the structural integrity of tank cars.  FRA also continues use its R&D program to pursue new approaches to passenger safety.  These efforts are focused on strategies to better protect the occupied volume of passenger cars and to mitigate occupant injuries, as carried out through advanced computer modeling by The Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) and through full-scale passenger car crash tests at the Technology Transportation Center near Pueblo, Colorado.  Our research is focusing on applying the principles of Crash Energy Management (CEM) to the next generation of passenger cars.  CEM seeks to protect occupants by dissipating collision forces through the use of crush-zones in the non-occupied volume of the vehicles.   

 

Amtrak’s Safety Record and FRA’s Oversight

 

FRA closely monitors all aspects of Amtrak safety, as it does for all freight and passenger railroads.  We inspect not just Amtrak’s rolling equipment but also its track, signals, and operations.  As with any other railroad, we use civil penalties and other enforcement tools when necessary to encourage compliance with our safety regulations. 

 

Amtrak’s safety record is generally quite good.  Based on preliminary data for the year 2004, Amtrak’s rate of accidents (2.8 per million train-miles) was well below the industry average of just over four accidents per million train-miles.  Contrary to the industry trend, Amtrak’s human-factor-caused accidents have fallen substantially in the last two years, comprising 20 percent of its accidents in 2004.  One major reason for this improvement was a program that Amtrak adopted two years ago, with FRA’s encouragement, to determine the root cause of major operating rule violations.  In addition, employee injury rates, particularly in Amtrak’s transportation department, improved in 2004.  FRA will continue to monitor Amtrak very closely to ensure that its generally positive safety record does not deteriorate and that any safety problems FRA discovers are promptly addressed. 

 

FRA’s Continued Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Acela Operations

 

FRA, as mentioned previously, is working very closely with Amtrak as the railroad tries to develop a long-term solution to the Acela disc brake problem.  We intend to make sure that the solution Amtrak adopts is one that fully cures the problem before Acela service resumes.  Thus far, Amtrak has been in complete agreement with us on that issue.  We will also ensure that Amtrak’s equipment inspection program for the Acela trainsets is improved so as to ensure that any such safety-critical problems are found and corrected well before they reach the dimensions that this problem had reached by the time that FRA detected it.  When the Acela service does start up again, FRA will resume its quarterly reviews of Acela mechanical issues with Amtrak.  We have used this process in the past to resolve other problems detected in the Acela trainsets. 

 

I believe that the extra effort displayed by FRA Safety Specialist Thomas and other FRA personnel involved in the current Acela brake issue may quite possibly have averted a serious accident.  Those efforts are emblematic of the dedication that FRA employees generally bring to their safety mission.  We will continue to exercise that level of effort in working with Amtrak to ensure that the resumption of Acela service is safely done.  Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions.