STATEMENT OF

HANK KRAKOWSKI,
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
AND
MARGARET GILLIGAN,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

NEXTGEN:  A REVIEW OF THE RTCA MID-TERM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE REPORT,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

OCTOBER 28, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting us here today to review the RTCA’s NextGen Mid-Term Implementation Task Force Final Report.  As you know, on January 16, 2009, we asked the RTCA to establish a government-industry Task Force to forge community-wide consensus on the recommended Task Force operational improvements to be implemented in the near-term during the transition between now and 2018.  We asked the Task Force to focus on maximizing benefits and facilitating the development of the business case for industry investment.  We are grateful to the Task Force for all of the hard work that the members have put into this report and the corresponding data and analysis

The Task Force did not attempt to re-write the NextGen Implementation Plan and assumed that the baseline programs and technologies would continue to be developed by the FAA on target.  The Task Force did look for opportunities to accelerate the transition where existing technologies could provide a “bridge” to NextGen programs that are still in development.  Over 300 people from nearly every segment of the aviation community participated in over 150 meetings to work toward a consensus set of recommendations presented in this report.  The Task Force also distinguished itself from other similarly chartered groups by limiting its set of recommendations, preferring to give greater detail to specific ways the recommendations might be implemented.  They also explicitly involved talented and seasoned financial decision-makers from the operator community, such as airline chief financial officers.  Finally, they committed to transparency and supported their decisions with solid data.

Prioritization and Continued Collaboration:

The FAA strongly agrees with two principles that the Task Force has emphasized throughout their report:  (a) the need to prioritize initiatives that can have a near-term effect on delays and efficiencies; and b) the need for continued cooperation and involvement of the industry in the execution and evolution of the plans.  With the first of these in mind, we are currently examining all of these recommendations with an eye towards understanding how we might organize and implement them in light of the agency’s various priorities, the most important of which is to implement any new measure safely. 

More precisely, we are scrutinizing the Task Force’s recommendations through the lens of our experience with the Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP), the agency’s original plan for implementing NextGen.  As the Members of this Committee are aware, the OEP provided the process through which FAA ensured successful implementation.  The most senior executives in the agency were held personally accountable for meeting OEP commitments.

The OEP process has been key to the FAA’s recent successes.  On November 20, 2008, the FAA achieved a never before attained milestone – we commissioned three runways on the same day.   These new runways at Chicago O’Hare, Seattle-Tacoma, and Washington Dulles added much needed facilities to the nation’s airport and aviation system on time and under budget.  And, in January 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) took the FAA’s modernization program off of its High Risk List for the first time since 1995.  The GAO cited the FAA's commitment to attack and fix some root causes of the air traffic control modernization problems, including cost overruns, schedule delays and performance shortfalls.  Neither one of these would have been possible without the structure of the OEP and commitment of FAA executives to the OEP.

Since 2008, the OEP plan has evolved into the NextGen Implementation Plan, which details our plans for NextGen through 2018.  The management process has grown into the NextGen Management Board and, under that, the NextGen Review Board, the governance structure that we put in place to assure successful deployment and implementation.  The NextGen Management Board is chaired by the Deputy Administrator and composed of FAA Associate Administrators, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) Chief Operating Officer, ATO Senior Vice Presidents, the Director of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), representatives of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), and other key stakeholders.  This is the agency’s senior governing body for NextGen, and consists of the highest level agency executives.  Under the Management Board, resides the NextGen Review Board, composed of FAA staff and executives, which looks at more technical issues including approving and prioritizing NextGen activities and making funding recommendations.

The FAA has been reviewing the report, and the NextGen Management Board is scheduled to meet on Monday, October 26, to discuss the Task Force’s recommendations within the greater context of the FAA’s overall work.  In doing so, we note that much of the technology and procedures that underlie the specific recommendations of the Task Force exist and are in use already.  However, they are being used in limited areas, often in their demonstration phases.  The Task Force recommends deploying these technologies and procedures more widely throughout the national airspace system (NAS) to achieve immediate, short-term relief from congestion and inefficiencies.  But before we can do that, we need to make sure that these technologies and procedures can be safely deployed elsewhere and whether deploying them throughout the system is a wise strategic decision.  The NextGen Management process is the way that the FAA is able to examine these recommendations within this context.

Our work on area navigation (RNAV) and required navigation performance (RNP) air traffic control routes is a perfect example of this.  While RNAV/RNP has been highly beneficial in many areas, the FAA has previously approached it on an ad hoc basis, responding to requests from the external aviation community.  Now that we have greater experience with the RNAV/RNP program, we are better able to use the knowledge we have gained over the past few years.  We can step back and take a deeper, strategic look at how RNAV/RNP can benefit the national airspace system as a whole.  With this strategic eye, we will be able to make better decisions as to where RNAV/RNP procedures can be implemented to maximize their effectiveness in reducing congestion and delays.

To address the second principle of the Task Force, that of the need for continued cooperation and involvement of the industry in the execution and evolution of the NextGen plans, we intend to conduct follow up work with our industry stakeholders through the Air Traffic Management Advisory Committee (ATMAC) and its workgroups.  The ATMAC is a Federal Advisory Committee of the RTCA.   Its purpose is to provide the FAA with consensus-based, recommended investment priorities that will improve the safety, capacity and/or efficiency of the NAS.  One of the great advantages of pursuing the follow on work through the ATMAC is that it will give us the continued input from industry and other stakeholders that is so essential to successful NextGen implementation.  The ATMAC’s work will complement the work of the NextGen Management Board and Review Board and bring all of the relevant perspectives together to help us make the right strategic decisions.

Confirming Our Path:

Using this combination of the NextGen Management Board, the NextGen Review Board, and the ATMAC, the FAA will be addressing each of the Task Force’s recommendations specifically and in detail in the coming months.  In the meantime, we are pleased that the Task Force reconfirms the value of the FAA’s current work.  Using the NextGen Management Board and Review Board process described above, we have already begun work in a few areas that address the Task Force’s recommendations, some of which are described below.

Airport Surface:

For example, the Task Force recommended that the FAA take steps to improve aircraft surface traffic management at airports.  The intent would be to reduce tarmac delays and enhance safety, efficiency, and situational awareness by defining and standardizing requirements, and implementing the capture and dissemination of surface operations data to controllers, ramp towers, and user operations centers.  

The FAA is in the process of addressing aircraft surface management as the Task Force recommends.  We recently accelerated the ASDE-X schedule and now project that all systems will be deployed by the fall of 2010 – one year earlier than originally anticipated.  ASDE-X enables air traffic controllers to detect potential runway conflicts by providing detailed coverage of movement on runways and taxiways.  By collecting data from a variety of sources, ASDE-X is able to track aircraft ground support equipment, maintenance vehicles, and aircraft on the airport movement area and obtain identification information from aircraft transponders.  As we accelerate this work, we are coordinating with the users to determine where and how to best use the technology to enhance the safety and efficiency of surface movements on an airport, as the Task Force recommends.  The ATMAC will be invaluable to this work as we move forward.

Metroplex:

The Task Force also recommended that we focus on relieving congestion and tarmac delays at major metropolitan area airports.  They propose accomplishing this by reducing inefficiencies at satellite airports and surrounding airspace by instituting teams that focus on quality of implementation at each location and eliminating airspace conflicts with adjacent airports.  The Task Force recommends using core capabilities of RNAV, with RNP where needed; optimized vertical profiles using vertical navigation; and use of 3 nautical mile and terminal separation rules in more airspace.

The FAA has been working towards addressing the complexities of the airspace of these metroplexes.  For instance, in Atlanta, we added additional RNAV departure lanes in 2006, which increased the capacity to and from the en route airspace.  The lanes also give users the benefit of repeatable and predictable paths.  The benefits are measurable.  Since the addition of the RNAV departure lanes, we have seen a 24% to 43% reduction in departure delays and an estimated $105 million cumulative savings in operator benefits (due to improved profiles and reduced distances).  Moreover, these procedures have improved situational awareness; there has been an 18% to 34% reduction in routine pilot/controller voice communications as well as reduced errors in voice communications.

Access to the NAS:

The Task Force recommends improving access to, and services provided at, non-OEP airports and to low altitude, non-radar airspace.  They recommend doing this by implementing more precision-based approaches and departures, along with the expansion of surveillance services to areas not currently under radar surveillance.

Along those lines, the FAA will expand the development of increased precision approaches that are intended to benefit business and general aviation users.  Known as Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance (LPV) approach procedures, these approaches enable more aircraft to more safely fly low-visibility approaches to more airports throughout the NAS.  As long as the aircraft is equipped with Wide Area Augmentation System, or WAAS, equipment (a technology that increases the accuracy and integrity of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) for aircraft navigation) or equipment of equivalent performance, the operator can take advantage of these LPV approaches.

Incentivizing Equipage:

The Task Force also examined incentives to investments in NextGen capabilities.  They briefly explored the following types of incentives: 1) providing financial incentives either in the form of low-interest loans, or direct subsidies of equipage; 2) providing a timely, unambiguous set of processes (regulations, avionics certifications, operational procedures and approvals, engineering support, etc.) to assure the realization and timelines by NAS users of a sufficient level of operational benefits that justify investments; and 3) establishing a NAS where system users who have aircraft with higher aircraft performance/capability levels get higher levels of service.  This is referred to in the FAA’s Next Generation Implementation Plan as the “Best-Equipped, Best-Served” concept.

While we need to examine various incentive options under the auspices of the NextGen management process and with the input of the ATMAC, we are particularly pleased with the “buy-in” that the Task Force has achieved from aviation operators.  For each recommendation, the Task Force was able to gain a commitment from at least one operator to invest in its implementation.  This sets the stage for the necessary equipage saturation by the operators to take advantage of all the NextGen technologies.  This helps give the airlines and other operators the framework to make choices that make sense for them under a “Best-Equipped, Best-Served” concept. 

One point that we should make with regard to “Best-Equipped, Best-Served” is that this is an extension of how the FAA operates today.  When an aircraft is equipped with the right technology, the operator can take advantage of different air traffic control procedures, depending on the level of that aircraft’s equipment.  For example, if an aircraft has the right type of equipment necessary to fly at certain high altitudes, the operator may obtain access to those higher altitudes.  These higher altitudes provide an environment for optimum jet performance.  With the NextGen “Best-Equipped, Best-Served” concept extending this paradigm to recognize different levels of equipage, operators will be able to have better access to the NAS by virtue of having the ability to fly in more sophisticated and efficient ways through the system.

Streamlining: 

The Task Force also advocates identifying the operational approval and certification issues that may impede adoption and acceleration of NextGen capabilities and implementing timely solutions to these challenges.

To address these concerns, we note that the FAA is already in the process of standing up “NextGen Branches” in our Flight Standards Regional Offices across the country.  The purpose of these NextGen Branches is to facilitate the operational approvals and implementation of these initiatives, by bringing specialty expertise in these areas to assist local flight standards district offices.

The FAA is also working on streamlining the certification approval process.  For example, we have begun to develop improvements to how we use data developed by an avionics manufacturer when those avionics are being installed.  We would do this by using the data that the manufacturer has already submitted to obtain a Technical Standard Order authorization.  This will reduce the amount of work required for the installation in the long run.

Post Task Force Follow-Up:

Finally, the Task Force recommends that to maintain the momentum created over the past seven months and to facilitate holding the community consensus intact through the implementation of the recommendations, the FAA should establish institutional mechanisms to facilitate continued transparency and collaboration.

As noted above, the FAA intends to conduct our follow up through the ATMAC, in order to ensure continued industry collaboration.  Many of the same people who serve on the ATMAC were part of the Task Force, and we look forward to their continued contributions to implementation.

As we move forward with examining and implementing the Task Force’s recommendations, we welcome Congress’ continued interest in and oversight of our work.  Both Secretary LaHood and Administrator Babbitt have committed to moving NextGen forward to heighten safety and maximize efficiency throughout our national airspace system, and we intend to see that commitment through.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our prepared remarks.  We look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

STATEMENT OF

HANK KRAKOWSKI,
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

THE HUDSON RIVER AIRSPACE AND MANAGEMENT OF UNCONTROLLED AIRSPACE CORRIDORS,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

SEPTEMBER 16, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the very sad events of August 8, 2009, and what FAA is doing to create a safer operating environment over the Hudson River. Everyone at FAA grieves with the families over the loss of life that occurred that day. When such events do occur, we redouble our efforts to make the skies safer. My colleagues at FAA and throughout the aviation industry approach this work with seriousness and urgency.

Since the investigation of the accident remains under the formal processes of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), I will not be commenting on the specifics of the accident. I will, however, share with you the immediate actions we have taken, as well as discuss some of our longer-range plans to improve safety.

The FAA’s first action was taken on August 11. We issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that reiterated our recommended best practices for conduct of flight in the airspace of the Hudson River corridor. New York airspace is very restricted by a large volume of “Class B” airspace, which is designed to provide positive protection of airliners using LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy International, and Newark Liberty International Airports. All aircraft within Class B airspace must be under positive control by air traffic controllers.

There are areas known as “VFR flyways,” where we permit aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to fly within a defined corridor and below certain altitudes without being under positive air traffic control. These VFR flyways use “see and be seen rules,” where pilots are responsible for maintaining safe distance from other aircraft. In New York, this VFR flyway is commonly called the “exclusion area,” which has existed in some form since 1971, and is bounded by the Hudson River and has a ceiling of either 1,100 feet or 1,500 feet. (See Figures 1.)

The August 11 NOTAM reiterated long-recommended practices for this VFR flyway, including speed limitations (not exceeding 140 knots) and taking precautionary measures (turning on anti-collision, position/navigation, and/or landing lights and self-announcing their position on the Hudson River frequency for all other aircraft to hear).

We recognized this was only the first step to assess and enhance the safety of Visual Flight in this area. On August 14, 2009, we chartered a New York Airspace Task Force to review the current procedures for Hudson River operations, specifically with regard to safety of flight, operations, and regulatory compliance and make recommendations to Administrator Babbitt no later than August 28 – just two weeks later. The Task Force consisted of FAA air traffic and aviation safety experts, as well as air traffic controllers representing the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) who work in this area. We also had input from key stakeholders – such as Helicopter Association International, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, and the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey. The group delivered these recommendations to Administrator Babbitt on time on August 28. We thank the Task Force members for their efforts, particularly given the short timeline. Because we believe that their recommendations will enhance the safety of this airspace, we intend to implement their recommendations via expedited rulemaking and revised letters of agreement with the area airports and operators.

The Task Force recommended eight specific safety and operational enhancements that would restructure the airspace, mandate pilot operating rules, create a new entry point into the Hudson River airspace from Teterboro, and standardize New York area charts and maps. They also recommended developing new training for pilots, air traffic controllers, and helicopter operators so they will be fully trained and ready for implementation of the new rules. One of the most significant changes would divide the airspace into altitude corridors that separate aircraft flying over the river from those operating to and from local heliports or seaplane bases. (See Figure 2.)

This new exclusionary zone would be comprised of three components:

• It would establish a uniform “floor” for the Class B airspace over the Hudson River at 1,300 feet, which would also serve as the “ceiling” for the exclusionary zone. This removes some confusing complexity that currently exists.
• Between 1,300-2,000 feet, aircraft will operate in the Class B airspace under visual flight rules but under positive air traffic control and communicate with controllers on the appropriate air traffic frequency.
• Below 1,300 feet, aircraft must use a single common radio frequency. Mandatory routes for aircraft flying up and down the river will require them to favor the “right side” of the river (i.e. the east side for northbound traffic and the west side for southbound traffic) to provide horizontal separation as well.
• Coordination of traffic and handoffs between Air Traffic Controllers at the Teterboro tower, Newark tower, and radar control will be improved.

The new rules will mandate that pilots use two specific radio frequencies – one for the Hudson River and the other for the East River. It mandates speeds of 140 knots or less and the use of anti-collision lights and landing lights in the VFR routes. The rules would also require pilots to announce their position when they reach various points up and down the river. Pilots would also be required to have charts available in the aircraft and to be familiar with and comply with the airspace rules.

The FAA also intends to propose standardized procedures for fixed-wing aircraft leaving Teterboro to enter either the Class B airspace or the exclusionary zone. The proposal would require that before an aircraft planning to enter the Class B airspace takes off, Teterboro controllers would request approval from the Newark tower for the aircraft to climb to 1,500 feet. Aircraft from Teterboro that want to enter the VFR flyway would be directed by air traffic control to fly a special route over the George Washington Bridge, which would allow them to enter the Hudson River airspace in a much less congested area.

The FAA expects the expedited rulemaking covering these issues to be completed, and have all pilot and controller training completed in time for publication of new charts and new rules by November 19^th.

The effort with New York airspace has wider implications for the national airspace system. As we implement these changes in the New York airspace and have an opportunity to analyze their effectiveness, the FAA intends to examine the other major metropolitan areas and congested corridors for similar airspace and operational risks to see if such procedures would be appropriate elsewhere. We expect this larger effort to carry well into next year.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

STATEMENT OF

HANK KRAKOWSKI,
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

ON

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MODERNIZATION. 

MARCH 25, 2009.

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the current state of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts on air traffic control modernization.  We have recently made some great strides in this area, and I am happy to report that in recognition of that, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently removed the FAA’s air traffic control modernization program from its High Risk List, its biennial update of federal programs, policies, and operations that are at “high risk” for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or in need of broad-based transformation.

The GAO added FAA air traffic control modernization to the High Risk List in 1995 due to cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls in the FAA attempts to modernize its air traffic control system.  However, the GAO has found that the FAA is making progress in “addressing most of the root cause of its past problems.”  The GAO concluded that the FAA's efforts “have yielded results, including deploying new systems across the country and incurring fewer cost overruns.” 

As positive as this news is, we are not resting on our laurels.  As you know, at the heart of the FAA’s modernization is the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).  NextGen is a wide-ranging transformation of the entire national air transportation system to meet future demand and support the economic viability of the system while reducing delays, improving safety, and protecting the environment.  NextGen will change the way the system operates – reducing congestion, noise, and emissions, expanding capacity and improving the passenger experience.  NextGen is a complex, multilayered, evolutionary process of developing and implementing new technologies and procedures.  NextGen is not a single piece of equipment or a program or a system that will instantaneously transform the air transportation system.  NextGen is an evolutionary process, and existing systems must be sustained as we transition.  NextGen builds on legacy systems to increase capability in today’s National Airspace System (NAS), adds new performance-based procedures and routes, and ultimately delivers programs that transform the NAS.  NextGen takes advantage of new technology that is similarly being used to transform our personal lives and the way we do business, such as GPS, analog-to-digital, and network to network data sharing.

NextGen goals will be realized through the development of aviation-specific applications for existing, widely-used technologies.  They will also be realized through the fostering of technological innovation in areas such as weather forecasting, data networking, and digital communications.  Hand in hand with state-of-the-art technology will be new airport infrastructure and new procedures, including the shift of certain decision-making tools and accompanying responsibility from the ground to the cockpit.

As it is implemented, NextGen will gradually allow aircraft to safely fly more closely together on more direct routes, reducing delays, and providing benefits for the environment and the economy through reductions in carbon emissions, fuel consumption, and noise.

Defining NextGen:  The Need

Although it is extremely safe, and staffed by a capable, dedicated workforce, our current air traffic control system is not scalable or flexible enough to keep up with future demand.  Our future preeminence as a nation in air transportation is not assured.  In addition to improving efficiency and creating additional capacity, NextGen is needed to provide corresponding enhancements to safety and environmental performance.  It will bring to air transportation the same twenty-first century processes that give operations in other industries greater reliability, flexibility, and predictability.

Even in the face of falling demand and reduced capacity, we’ve seen congestion continue in our busiest airspace and airports.  In February 2008, there were 1,171,721 operations, while in February 2009, there were 1,040,150 operations.  That’s a reduction of over 11 percent.  Still, while traffic is down overall, our congested airspace in New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia has seen only about a 5.5% reduction in traffic from last year to this year.

We know that we must be poised to handle future demand that will surely return as the nation’s economy improves.  In fact, the aviation sector will be an important factor in the nation’s economic recovery.  The FAA estimates that in 2006, civil aviation accounted for 11 million jobs and represented 5.6% of the Gross Domestic Product; and, according to the FAA's calculations using U.S. International Trade Commission's reported trade data statistics, at $61 billion, aerospace products and parts contributed more to the positive balance of trade than any other sector - $32 billion more than the next highest contributor.

NextGen must also help manage the constraints on the air transportation system from the environmental impacts of aircraft noise and emissions and concerns about energy usage.  Increased efficiency with NextGen operations will lead to reduced fuel consumption resulting in lower carbon emissions.  NextGen investments in engine and airframe design and alternative fuels will produce the changes needed to reduce the environmental impact of aviation.

NextGen will also increase the safety of an already exceedingly safe system.  NextGen further enables FAA’s transition from traditional forensic investigations of accidents and incidents to a prognostic approach to improving safety.  NextGen promotes the open exchange of pertinent safety information to continuously improve aviation safety.

Benefits of NextGen

NextGen is reaping the benefits originated under the Operational Evolution Plan (OEP).  Communities, airports, and the FAA continue to work together to build new runways, which provide significant capacity and operational improvements.  In Fiscal Year 2009, four runway projects have been commissioned.  On November 20th, three major new runways opened:  at Seattle-Tacoma, Washington Dulles, and Chicago O’Hare International Airports.  The Seattle runway is expected to cut local delays in half by increasing capacity in bad weather by 60 percent, while the new runway at Dulles will provide capacity for an additional 100,000 annual operations.  The new Chicago runway, which added capacity for an additional 52,300 annual operations, is a part of the greater O'Hare Modernization Program (OMP) that will reconfigure the airport's intersecting runways into a more modern, parallel layout.  The OMP will substantially reduce delays in all weather conditions and increase capacity at the airfield, allowing O'Hare to meet the region's aviation needs well into the future.  On February 12, a runway extension at Philadelphia was completed, helping reduce delays at the airport. Looking forward for the next three years, new runways will open at Charlotte and Chicago O’Hare.  Eleven other runway projects are in the planning or environmental stage at OEP airports through 2018. 

While airfield improvements offer significant capacity increases, they alone are not enough to address current problems at certain airports, or the growth in demand we expect in the future.  New technology and procedures can help us gain extra use from existing runways.

Today, capacity for closely spaced parallel runway operations (CSPO) is dramatically reduced in poor visibility conditions.  We are working on capabilities that allow for continued use of those runways in low visibility conditions by providing precise path assignments that provide safe separation between aircraft assigned on parallel paths, restoring capacity and reducing delays throughout the system.  In November 2008, we published a national order that allows us to safely reduce separation between aircraft approaching parallel runways at Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Seattle.  In good visibility Seattle’s pair of parallel runways, together, could handle roughly 60 operations per hour; poor visibility conditions cut that rate in half.  Even in poor visibility, the new order now safely allows a rate of about 52 operations per hour, a significant improvement for the airport and its users.  We are beginning to see similar benefits in Boston.

This order is a first step in a phased approach for safely increasing the use of CSPOs through a combination of procedural changes and new ground and aircraft equipment.  Down the road, new rules for CSPOs could give airports more design flexibility so that they can safely build runways more closely together, increasing their capacity within their existing boundaries, providing better service to their communities without requiring additional land.

Performance-based navigation is another building block for NextGen which we are accelerating with cooperation from industry.  Performance-based routes and procedures result in shorter distances flown, which add up to both fuel and time savings.  Fuel savings equate to reduced emissions, enhancing environmental performance.  Safety is increased as air traffic operations become more predictable. Performance-based navigation includes Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Procedures (RNP), which allow equipped aircraft to fly more direct and precise paths, reducing flight time and fuel use, as well as localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) procedures, which can increase access to airports, especially in low visibility conditions.

Advances in performance-based procedures and routes allow for optimal use of airspace.  The FAA maximizes the use of airspace, especially in congested areas, through targeted airspace and procedures enhancements.  Continuing work in the New York area includes integration of RNAV procedures, relocation and expansion of airways, airspace reconfiguration, and creation of optimal descent procedures.  In the Chicago area, the FAA is adding departure routes and changing procedures to allow for triple arrivals.  In southern Nevada, the FAA is optimizing existing airports and airspace.  Houston will also see additional departure routes and arrival procedures, along with improved procedures to avoid severe weather.

Operators like Southwest Airlines recognize the value of performance-based navigation.  The airline made the business decision early last year to equip its entire fleet for RNAV and RNP procedures. The company envisions building a network of RNP routes for their system.  Southwest believes its $175 million investment can be recouped within the next three to five years because of the operational efficiencies RNP offers.  We are currently working with Southwest on a pilot project to build RNAV/RNP routes between Texas’ Dallas Love Field and Houston Hobby airports.

Today, more than three-quarters of commercial aircraft are equipped for RNAV, and almost half of these are equipped for RNP precision procedures.  Likewise, more than 20,000 aircraft are equipped for LPVs.  This level of equipage provides an excellent opportunity for the aviation community to use what it already has to produce ever-greater benefits.  FAA has responded:  last year the agency published more than 600 performance-based navigation procedures and routes, versus our goal of almost 400.  The FAA plans to keep up this pace each year for the next four years.

Because the realization of NextGen benefits is integrally linked to how quickly the operators equip their aircraft, it is imperative that the FAA work closely with industry on NextGen deployment.  As such, the FAA has established a NextGen Implementation Task Force with RTCA, an industry association that serves as a federal advisory committee.  The task force will provide recommendations on how to move forward together on implementation. FAA’s governing principles for accelerating equipage, published in the January 2009 FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan, provide a starting point for this work.  These principles focus on mitigating the risk for early adopters of NextGen avionics, while providing the maximum operational benefits in the airspace where they’re most needed.  They also focus on international interoperability, and incentivizing the equipage of aircraft that meet evolving environmental standards.  The Task Force will deliver recommendations to the FAA in August 2009.

Our current national airspace system is safer than it has ever been.  However, new means are required to ensure this remains the case as we transform the NAS.  NextGen will continue that trend in the face of increasing traffic and the introduction of very light jets, unmanned aerial vehicles, and commercial space flights.  To continue to minimize risk as we introduce a wave of new systems and procedures over the next decade, the aviation community will continue its move to safety management systems and other aspects of proactive management, where trends are analyzed to uncover problems early on.  This allows preventive measures to be put in place before any accidents can occur. 

An important part of NAS modernization, the FAA’s Aviation Safety and Information Analysis and Sharing program (ASIAS), provides a suite of tools that extract relevant knowledge from large amounts of disparate safety information.  The FAA is partnering with NASA and major airlines for ASIAS, which helps FAA and our industry partners to monitor the effectiveness of safety enhancements.  In use today, ASIAS will ensure that the operational capabilities that produce capacity, efficiency and environmental benefits are first and foremost inherently safe.  ASIAS has already demonstrated the ability to measure the performance of safety solutions to known problems, such as Loss of Control, Controlled Flight Into Terrain, Runway Incursion, Approach, and Landing Accident Reduction.  Additionally, ASIAS has demonstrated the ability to detect new safety issues, such as terrain avoidance warning system alerts (TAWS) at mountainous terrain airports, and to identify solutions that have the potential to virtually eliminate these threats.  Between now and fiscal year 2013, the FAA intends to increase the number of databases ASIAS can access; expand ASIAS to include maintenance/air traffic information; increase membership by adding regional air carriers; increase community stakeholders to include general aviation, helicopter and military; and increase the automated search capabilities.

The primary environmental and energy issues that will significantly influence the future capacity and flexibility of the NAS are aircraft noise, air quality, global climate effects, energy availability, and water quality.  Aviation accounts for approximately three percent of direct greenhouse gas emissions, and national and international concerns about climate impacts could constrain the industry in the future, if not properly addressed.  An environmental management system approach will be used to integrate all environmental and energy considerations into core NextGen business and operational strategies. 

In 2009, we are moving forward on a research consortium called Continuous Low Emissions, Energy and Noise (CLEEN), which will allow us to work with industry to accelerate the maturation of technology that will lower energy, emissions and noise.  CLEEN also seeks to advance renewable alternative fuels for aviation.  These fuels not only improve air quality and reduce life cycle greenhouse emissions, but also enhance energy security and supplies.  FAA helped form – and is an active participant in – the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative, or CAAFI.  Alternative fuels will be the “game changer” technology that gets us closer to carbon neutrality.  Significant deliverables in the FY09-13 period include demonstrations of clean and quiet aircraft technologies that can be transitioned into new products and used to retrofit existing products, approval of generic renewable fuels for aviation, and models and guidance to improve our ability to quantify environmental costs and benefits and to optimize solutions, including those to address CO2 and non-CO2 aviation climate impacts.

Current Status

FAA is working closely with all aspects of the aviation community to make NextGen a reality sooner rather than later.  We are also leveraging the capabilities of our legacy systems to improve operations.  We’re partnering with several of the nation’s air carriers for trials and demonstrations; we’re engaging with universities like Embry Riddle.  We’re working with pilots, dispatchers, and controllers on NextGen integration and development to achieve balance in the safety and efficiency design of NextGen.  The FAA has established an integrated demonstration capability in Florida where, working with a wide range of government, university and industry partners, we are evaluating NextGen technologies.  We’re working with airport authorities, manufacturers and with government bodies and industry from around the world.  We are collaborating with Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) Working Groups, RTCA, and other industry groups to integrate stakeholder requirements into government commitments.  

Moreover, this past year, through the efforts of the JPDO, we have seen the contributions to NextGen resulting from cross-department and cross-agency cooperation increase significantly.  Through the cross-agency support provided by the JPDO and its Senior Policy Committee, we are collaborating with the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Commerce (Commerce), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  Some of our collaborations have resulted in:

• DoD established a division at JPDO to work on efficient and secure information sharing;
• The Departments of Commerce, Defense and the FAA have collaborated to deliver the first NextGen weather capability in 2013; and
• JPDO conceived and facilitated the formation of Research Transition Teams to further the effective transition of research from NASA to implementation in the FAA.

The FAA officially began its development of NextGen in fiscal year 2007 by identifying and funding two transformational programs – Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information Management (SWIM).  ADS-B is a key component of NextGen that will move air traffic control from a system based on radar to one that uses satellite-derived aircraft location data.  In addition to improved safety with traffic, weather, and flight information, the system also promises greater efficiency and flexibility for the national airspace system. Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and air traffic controllers.

ADS-B is surveillance, like radar, but offers more precision and additional services, such as weather and traffic information.  ADS-B provides air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information to help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways. When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic, thereby substantially improving safety. 

NextGen transformational programs made significant advances over the past year. ADS-B essential services have been deployed in southern Florida and are being deployed in the Gulf of Mexico, where we have never had radar coverage.  In December, FAA achieved its In-Service Decision for ADS-B essential services in southern Florida.  Achievement of this major milestone clears the way for national deployment of broadcast services.  The National Aeronautics Association recognized ADS-B last year by presenting the ADS-B team with its Collier Trophy.  This award is given yearly for “the greatest achievement in aeronautics or astronautics in America with respect to improving the performance, efficiency and safety of air or space vehicles.”  The Collier award is generally recognized as the epitome of aviation innovation and excellence.

The SWIM program, Data Communications, and NAS Voice Switch achieved major acquisition milestones, and NextGen Network Enabled Weather (NNEW) conducted demonstrations of the integration of weather data into automated decision support tools.  This is a necessary step in the realization of improved management of weather in the NAS.

An updated FAA NextGen Implementation Plan was published in January 2009.  This edition of the plan focuses on answering five fundamental questions: What does NextGen look like in 2018; what aircraft avionics are needed to support operations in 2018; what benefits will be delivered by 2018; what is the FAA specifically committed to deploy in the near-term that makes the most of existing resources; and what activities are underway to support future capabilities?

While the focus of the FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan is on the mid-term (through 2018), the plan, coupled with the NAS Enterprise Architecture, provides a picture of near-term (2009-2013) deliverables.  FAA’s near-term NextGen implementation efforts are targeted across three broad areas: airfield development, air traffic operations, and aircraft capabilities. Together, these efforts will increase capacity and operational efficiency, enhance safety, and improve our environmental performance.  We are moving forward with a dual-pronged approach: maximizing the use of untapped capabilities in today’s aircraft and ground infrastructure, while working aggressively to develop and deploy new systems and procedures that will form a foundation for more transformative capabilities that will be delivered in the mid-term.  We believe this approach allows both government and industry to extract the greatest value from existing investments, while positioning the industry to gain exponential benefits in the mid-term and beyond.

From that first investment of $109 million in 2007, and supported by sound evaluation and planning, FAA funding for NextGen grew to $202 million in fiscal year 2008 and $688 million is anticipated this fiscal year.  The Administration’s fiscal year 2010 budget includes approximately $800 million for NextGen. The January 2009 NAS Enterprise Architecture and NextGen Implementation Plan support these funding numbers. 

Along those lines, I would like to thank this Committee and the Congress for the additional $200 million in economic recovery funding that will be used for repairing and upgrading our air traffic facilities and equipment.  This will go a long way to improving our buildings and providing our workforce with the tools they need to do their jobs well.

We do have other interim efforts to enhance safety and operations, such as Runway Status Lights (RWSL).  The RWSL system integrates airport lighting equipment with approach and surface surveillance systems to provide a visual signal to pilots and vehicle operators indicating that it is unsafe to enter/cross or begin takeoff on a runway.  The system is fully automated based on inputs from surface and terminal surveillance systems.  Airport surveillance sensor inputs are processed through safety logic that commands in-pavement lights to illuminate red when there is traffic on or approaching the runway.

The RWSLs will activate either when it is unsafe to enter a runway from a taxiway (referred to as runway entrance lighting or RELs) or when it is unsafe to take off from a runway (called takeoff hold lighting or THLs).  For example, if an aircraft is landing or departing, the RELs will illuminate indicating it is unsafe for an aircraft or vehicle to go onto that runway from a taxiway.  Another example is if an aircraft starts to cross a runway when there is an aircraft ready for departure on that runway, the THLs will illuminate indicating to the pilot that it is unsafe to continue the departure.  Both RELs and THLs will automatically turn off when the system determines it to be safe.  RWSLs are red lights only; there are no green lights in RWSLs.

We currently have RWSL systems installed, one at San Diego International Airport, and the other at Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport.  Installation of RWSL systems is underway at Los Angeles International Airport and at Boston Logan International Airport.  The FAA is scheduled to install RWSL systems at 18 other airports by 2011.  In addition, we are continuing to test additional runway lights:  in Boston we are testing Runway Intersection Lighting (RIL) to guard runway intersections; and at Dallas/Ft. Worth, we are testing the enhanced Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (eFAROS) to alert landing traffic that a runway is occupied. 

Labor Issues

I know that this Committee has always been interested in how FAA has interacted with our labor unions, and I would like to address that briefly.  In his confirmation hearing before this Committee, Secretary LaHood made it very clear that resolving labor disputes was one of his top priorities for the FAA, and that he was seeking to fill the FAA Administrator position with someone who had the people skills to resolve our outstanding issues with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).  As someone who has sat on both sides of the labor debate, I fully support the Secretary’s priority on this.

Our controllers, indeed, our entire workforce, are our most valuable assets in ensuring the safety of the traveling public.  As such, we have included controllers in all phases of NextGen so far.  Controller input has come from individual controllers who have been invited to participate in NextGen development, though they were not participating as official NATCA representatives.  NATCA does have a seat on the NextGen Management Board, the governance structure that we originally put in place as our framework for achieving NextGen.  I look forward to moving ahead towards a resolution of our differences.  These have been challenging times for us, and I want to commend all the hard work that has occurred on both sides. 

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks.  Thank you again for inviting me here today to discuss FAA’s air traffic modernization program.  I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

STATEMENT OF

MARGARET GILLIGAN,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

ON

AVIATION SAFETY: PILOT FATIGUE.

DECEMBER 1, 2009.

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) efforts to mitigate pilot fatigue. Administrator Babbitt, himself a former commercial airline pilot, has made this a high-priority issue for the agency. The FAA has always been a leader in advancing measures targeted at preventing or mitigating pilot fatigue through our sponsored research, dissemination of training and educational materials, and, most significantly, through our regulatory requirements. We believe that it is critical, whenever possible, to incorporate scientific information on fatigue and human sleep physiology into regulations on flight crew scheduling. Such scientific information can help to maintain the safety margin and promote optimum crew performance and alertness during flight operations. Our task is to translate that knowledge to the operational environmental in a sound and practical way. The complexity of our current pilot flight and rest regulations, with varying standards for a number of categories of aviation operations, developed through the years as the aviation industry grew, adopted more advanced technology, and employed diverse operational strategies.

Preventing and mitigating the effects of fatigue is a shared responsibility that brings shared benefits in terms of increased safety, better working conditions and greater operational efficiencies. We at the FAA take our responsibility very seriously for investigating any threat to safety in the aviation system and establishing the regulatory framework to enhance the public's safety. To that end, we are engaged in an effort to revise and update our rules on pilot flight and rest, which I will describe in more detail below. At the same time, carriers have the responsibility to conduct their operations at the highest level of safety. That includes adopting appropriate scheduling practices that provide the pilot a clearly identified opportunity to rest. And, finally, pilots have the responsibility to take advantage of the opportunity for rest and report for their assignments well rested and ready for duty. We know that in the vast majority of cases, carriers and pilots act in a professional manner and take this shared responsibility seriously. We have a common goal to ensure that all aviation operations are conducted safely.

Current Regulations:

Current regulations place varying limits on the amount of time that a flight crewmember can fly (i.e. per day, week, month, quarter, and year), and require that a pilot be afforded a period of rest, free from obligation to the employer. Flight time limitations are based on the type of operation. For example, under current Part 121 rules, pilots in a two-pilot crew, on domestic flights, can generally fly up to eight hours per day. Their workday can extend up to 16 hours, including time on the ground between flights. In addition, there are no restrictions on flying during the middle of the night or making numerous takeoffs and landings.  In addition to daily limitations, these flight crewmembers are limited to 30 flight hours in any 7 consecutive days.

Flight crewmembers engaged in part 121 flag operations (international passenger flights), are limited to 32 flight hours in any 7 days.  Part 121 supplemental operations (typically cargo, on-demand or charter operations) have no 7 consecutive day limitations.  Flight crewmembers serving in part 121 domestic or flag operations are limited to 100 hours per calendar month while flight crewmembers serving in supplemental operations are limited to 100 flight hours in any 30 consecutive days.

These differing regulations for different types of operations are inconsistent and complex, and can be easily misunderstood, especially when a pilot can be assigned to different types of operations. The different rules developed over time, as the aviation industry changed and expanded. While such variance in the rules may have been justified when they were first adopted, these differences may no longer be valid in today's operational environment. Our rulemaking will address this.

Current rules also require that a pilot be afforded an adequate rest period. The “crew rest” elements of the regulation are designed to mitigate cumulative and acute fatigue, primarily through limitations on flight hours and defined hours of rest relative to flight hours. For example, the regulation for domestic operations outlines:

• No more than 30 flight hours in any 7 consecutive days
• At least 24 hours of consecutive rest during any 7 consecutive days
• Varying rest requirements relative to hours flown in any 24 hour period

The rule also defines rest period activities and prohibitions, and provides provisions for circumstances under which flight time limitations can be exceeded, such as in adverse weather operations. As of late 2000, an FAA legal interpretation clarified that a pilot crew member, flying under domestic flight rules, must “look back” 24 hours and find eight hours of uninterrupted rest before beginning any flight segment.

Pilots also have a regulatory responsibility to not fly when they are not fit, including being fatigued. Thus, while the carrier schedules and manages pilots within these limitations and requirements, the pilot has the responsibility to rest during the periods provided by the regulations. The FAA has long held that it is the responsibility of both the operator and the flight crewmember to prevent fatigue, not only by following the regulations, but also by acting intelligently and conscientiously while serving the traveling public. This means taking into consideration weather conditions, air traffic, health of each flight crewmember, or any other circumstances (personal problems, etc.) that might affect the flight crewmember’s alertness or judgment on a particular flight.

FAA Actions:

The FAA has initiated a number of fatigue mitigation efforts in recent years:

1995 Proposal for Pilots:In 1995, the FAA proposed a rule to change flight time and rest limits. The agency received more than 2,000 comments from the aviation community and the public. Most of those comments did not favor the rule as proposed, and there was no clear consensus on what the final rule should say. The FAA recently withdrew this proposed rule because it will be superseded by the current rulemaking effort described below.

1998 ARAC: In July 1998, the FAA Administrator asked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to work with the industry to reach a consensus and develop a new proposal. If no consensus could be reached, the FAA would continue to enforce the current regulations. In February 1999, ARAC reported that there was no consensus in the aviation community. The group offered five different proposals to update the flight and rest regulations.

1999 Federal Register Notice: In response to concerns raised by the pilot community, the FAA Administrator notified the aviation community on June 15, 1999 that it had six months to ensure that it was in full compliance with the agency’s current flight time and rest requirements. Reviews of airline scheduling practices conducted in December 1999 and discussions with pilot unions and airlines confirmed that the vast majority of pilots were receiving the amount of rest required by the FAA’s rule.

2000 FAA letter: On November 20, 2000, the FAA responded to a letter from the Allied Pilots Association that set forth specific scenarios that could affect a very small number of all commercial pilots. The FAA’s response, known as the “Whitlow Letter,” was consistent with the agency’s long-standing interpretation of the current rules. In summary, the FAA reiterated that each flight crewmember must have a minimum of eight hours of rest in any 24-hour period that includes flight time. The scheduled flight time must be calculated using the actual conditions on the day of departure regardless of whether the length of the flight is longer or shorter than the originally scheduled flight time.

2001 Federal Register Notice: The FAA published a notice in the Federal Register on May 17, 2001 to reiterate its long-standing interpretation of its pilot flight time and rest rules. The notice informed airlines and flight crewmembers of the FAA’s intent to enforce its rules in accordance with the Whitlow letter interpretation. Each flight crewmember must have a minimum of eight hours of rest in any 24-hour period that includes flight time. That calculation must be based on the actual conditions on the day of departure regardless of whether the length of the flight is longer or shorter than the originally scheduled flight time. The FAA did not anticipate that the notice would result in major disruptions to airline schedules. It stated that, beginning in November 2001, the FAA would review airline flight scheduling practices and deal stringently with violations that came to light.

2001 ATA/RAA Request: The FAA denied requests made on June 12, 2001 on behalf of the Air Transport Association (ATA) and Regional Airline Association (RAA) to stay all agency action regarding the November 20, 2000 Whitlow letter of interpretation and the May 17, 2001 Federal Register notice of the FAA’s enforcement policy regarding pilot flight time and rest. The FAA’s letter and Federal Register notice were consistent with the agency’s long-standing interpretation of the current rules. The documents were consistent with the statutory mandate to issue rules governing the maximum hours or periods of service, the use of plain language in regulations and the regulatory history of the rules. ATA subsequently petitioned for review of the Whitlow letter and the enforcement policy.

On Sept. 5, 2001 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted a motion by the ATA to stay the May 17, 2001 Federal Register notice. On May 31, 2002, the court denied ATA’s petition for review, ruling in favor of the FAA. As a result, the FAA has continued to enforce the current regulations consistent with the Whitlow letter.

2008 FAA Fatigue Symposium: In June 2008, the FAA sponsored the Fatigue Symposium: Partnerships for Solutions to encourage the aviation community to proactively address aviation fatigue management issues. Participants included the National Transportation Safety Board, the Institutes for Behavior Resources, Inc., and many of the world’s leading authorities on sleep and human performance. The symposium provided attendees with the most current information on fatigue physiology, management, and mitigation alternatives; perspectives from aviation industry experts and scientists on fatigue management; and information on the latest  fatigue mitigation initiatives and best practices.

Ultra Long-Range Flights: In 2006, the FAA worked with Delta Air Lines to develop and approve fatigue mitigation for flights between John F. Kennedy International Airport and Mumbai, India. The flights were operated for more than 16 hours with four pilots provided that the airline followed an FAA-approved plan to manage rest and mitigate the risk posed by fatigue. The mitigation, approved as an Operations Specification issued to Delta Air Lines, was specific for that city pair. Although that specific route is no longer flown by Delta, the FAA viewed Delta’s fatigue mitigation strategy as a model program.

As a result of Delta’s efforts, the FAA proposed in November 2008 to amend Delta, American, and Continental’s Operations Specifications to incorporate fatigue mitigation plans for their ultra long-range flights. Based on comments received from the three air carriers, the FAA withdrew the proposed amendments on March 12, 2009. The FAA is currently working with airlines to gather data that will help the agency enhance the safety requirements for ultra long-range flights. The agency believes that it is in the best interest of passenger and crew safety for airlines to use an FAA-approved fatigue mitigation program to reduce the risk of pilot fatigue.

Rulemaking Underway:

In June 2009, the FAA chartered the Flight and Duty Time Limitations and Rest Requirements Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) comprised of labor, industry, and FAA representatives to develop recommendations for an FAA rule based on current fatigue science and a thorough review of international approaches to the issue. The ARC was chartered to provide a forum for the U.S. aviation community to discuss current approaches to mitigate fatigue found in international standards and make recommendations on how the United States should modify its regulations. The ARC consisted of 18 members representing airline and labor associations. The members were selected based on their extensive certificate holder management and/or direct operational experience.

Specifically, the FAA asked the ARC to consider and address the following:

(1) A single approach to addressing fatigue that consolidates and replaces existing regulatory requirements for parts 121 and 135.

(2) Generally accepted principles of human physiology, performance, and alertness based on the body of fatigue science.

(3) Information on sources of aviation fatigue.

(4) Current approaches to address fatigue mitigation strategies in international standards.

(5) The incorporation of fatigue risk management systems (FRMS) into a rulemaking. An FRMS is a data-driven process and systematic method to monitor and manage safety risks associated with fatigue-related error.

The ARC met over a 6-week period beginning July 7, 2009. Early on, the FAA told the ARC members that it was very interested in the ARC’s recommendations, but that the agency retained the authority and obligation to evaluate any proposals and independently determine how best to amend the existing regulations. The agency reiterated that participation on the ARC in no way precluded them from submitting comments critical of the NPRM when it was published. On September 10, 2009, the ARC delivered its final report to the FAA.

We cannot discuss further particulars of the FAA’s rulemaking efforts at this time, however, we are working as quickly as possible to complete a draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).I will readily acknowledge that this effort has been difficult, and has taken us longer than we wanted or expected. The events of the last 15 years evidence the complexity of the issue and the strong concerns of the parties involved, and those are clear in the current rulemaking as well. At the same time, our focused effort since June demonstrates the high priority that Administrator Babbitt and I, along with the rest of the FAA team, place on overcoming these challenges and updating these regulations to enhance safety. I am confident we will get there.

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

STATEMENT OF

MARGARET GILLIGAN,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

US AIRWAYS FLIGHT 1549.

FEBRUARY 24, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) here today to discuss the events surrounding the US Airways Flight 1549 emergency landing in the Hudson River on January 15, 2009. My name is Peggy Gilligan and I am the new Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety at the FAA.

This was a truly extraordinary event in aviation history: a multiple bird ingestion that virtually simultaneously caused engine failure in both engines of a commercial airliner on takeoff, resulting in an emergency water landing with no loss of life. While the FAA does have aircraft standards and crew training and procedures in place to address these issues, the circumstances of US Airways Flight 1549 were simply unprecedented, and we, just as the rest of the world, are awed by the quick thinking and consummate professionalism of the entire crew of Flight 1549.

Because the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is still investigating the matter, my testimony today will primarily address the FAA’s efforts in three areas: first, how the FAA works with airports to reduce the probability of bird strikes; second, what the FAA standards are for aircraft to increase survivability in crashes; and third, what the FAA requires in terms of flight crew training when encountering emergency situations such as this. I also want to note the role played by FAA air traffic controllers and flight managers whenever an aircraft emergency develops, whether due, as here, to bird strikes, or some other cause.

Bird Strike Mitigation

Since 1990, the FAA has collected over 100,000 voluntary wildlife strike reports and has maintained a bird strike database. The Wildlife Services Program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) manages the database under terms of an interagency agreement with FAA. Strike reports are sent to Wildlife Services where they are edited and entered into the database. Embry-Riddle University maintains the public FAA website for bird strike data.

Currently, the database has 106,604 records from January 1990 through August 2008. The increasing number of bird strikes is a combination of better reporting and increasing bird populations. The database is available to airport operators and safety analysts and is extremely useful for determining which species are most frequently involved in strikes, seasonal patterns, and extent and type of damage from strikes.

Mandatory reporting of wildlife strikes is extremely difficult to enforce and may not necessarily increase accurate reporting. The success of the voluntary reporting system is proven by the increase in annual reports from only 1,900 reported strikes in 1990, to almost 8,000 reported strikes in 2007. Advances in wildlife strike reporting through web-based technology make it easier and faster to report strikes. Moreover, the FAA, in close partnership with the USDA, continues to educate and increase awareness through ongoing campaigns in concert with industry, conferences and participation on the national Bird Strike Committee.

The FAA has an interagency agreement with the Smithsonian Institution to analyze bird remains at the Feather Identification Laboratory (National Museum of Natural History) to determine species identifications. In 2003, the FAA purchased a DNA sequencer to assist in building a DNA library and improve the identification capability of the laboratory. Airports can mail small remains from bird strikes to the feather laboratory at the Smithsonian. The laboratory then analyzes the remains and provides the species information to the airport and the FAA Wildlife Strike Database. Species information is vital for the airports and wildlife managers when considering appropriate mitigation measures. Additionally, engineers use the data provided on species weights to test new engine designs. The Feather Identification Lab identified over 700 cases for the FAA in 2008.

Our statistics on bird strikes indicate that the closer the aircraft is to the runway, the higher the risk of a bird strike. Conversely, the risk of a substantial bird strike decreases significantly with altitude. High altitude strikes are not common, though they do occur. For instance, at 30,000 feet, there was only one reported bird strike, between 1990-2008. However, about 73% of all strikes occur within the airport environment up to 500 feet above ground. According to reports, Flight 1549 had reached an altitude of 3,200 feet when it encountered a flock of Canada geese that resulted in numerous bird strikes to the airframe and engines.

Since the data indicate that the greatest risk of bird strikes occurs at the airport, the FAA has focused its bird strike mitigation efforts at airports. By regulation, the FAA requires commercial service airports to maintain a safe operation. This includes conducting Wildlife Hazard Assessments and preparing a Wildlife Hazard Management Plan, if necessary.

Wildlife Assessment

As noted, a Wildlife Assessment is required of all commercial airports and requires consideration of wildlife attractants within 10,000 feet of an airport. FAA also recommends consideration of wildlife attractants (food, water, and habitat) within five miles of the airport, if the attractant could cause hazardous wildlife movement into or across the approach or departure airspace. The assessment considers:

• An analysis of events prompting the assessment
• Identification of wildlife species observed and their numbers, locations, and local movements
• Identification of features on or near the airport that attract wildlife
• A description of the wildlife hazards to air carrier operations
• Recommended actions for reducing wildlife hazards to air carrier operations

The Wildlife Assessment is submitted to the FAA. The agency then determines if the airport needs to develop a Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Plan.

Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Plan

Such a plan would:

• Provide measures to alleviate or eliminate wildlife hazards
• Identify persons who have authority for implementing the plan
• Identify priorities for needed habitat modification
• Identify resources for the plan
• Establish procedures to be followed during air carrier operations
• Outline wildlife control measures

Typical wildlife mitigation techniques include habitat modification, including filling in ponds and water sources, if practicable, and controlling vegetation, e.g., cutting grass high or low depending upon bird species. Airports may also use wildlife harassment tools, such as air guns, lasers, dogs, wildlife patrols, trapping and removing the wildlife, and as a last resort, exterminating the wildlife with the appropriate permits. Ongoing research into wildlife mitigation techniques continues to be explored by the USDA Wildlife Services program through an interagency agreement with the FAA.

Bird Radar Research

Additionally, in 2000, the FAA began research to determine if low cost radars can reliably detect birds at or near (within three to possibly five miles of) airports and be used to develop an airport bird strike advisory system. These systems generally work by overlaying the radar data on an airport geographic information system.

Bird detection radar may have the most promise as tools to help airport operators manage their wildlife control programs. However, as many airports routinely have birds in the area, we do not yet know if this system would be capable of providing alerts that would be operationally suitable for making specific time-critical decisions on landing or takeoff.

The research is continuing to address these operational type issues. We are conducting radar evaluations currently with two Bird Radar systems at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, two Bird Radar systems at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island in Oak Harbor, WA, and one portable research radar unit that is owned/leased by the University of Illinois, currently finishing a brief deployment at YVR (Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada). We are planning additional testing at Chicago O’Hare, Dallas-Ft. Worth, and John F. Kennedy International Airports, starting later this year. The FAA plans to collaborate with the USDA Wildlife Services program during these additional radar testing phases to determine operational suitability of this technology at airports.

Aircraft Certification and “Survivability”

In addition to our bird strike mitigation efforts, the FAA certifies all civil aircraft to meet a series of minimum standards. To receive FAA approval, an aircraft must be airworthy – that is, be designed and built to fly safely – as well as survive situations in which internal or external factors may interfere with safe operations of the aircraft. When the FAA certificated the Airbus A320, the design requirements and operating procedures took into account numerous exigencies, including: flight into a flock of birds, emergency landings on land, loss of engine power, and emergency landings in water.

Engine Bird Ingestion

The A320 involved in Flight 1549 was powered by two CFM56-5B4/P engines, which were certified to meet these requirements:

• Flocking Birds — the engine was able to ingest a flock of birds (seven 1.5 lb. birds), not lose more than ¼ of its power and continue to run for five minutes at its takeoff power setting.
• Single Bird — the engine was able to ingest a single large bird (4 lbs.) and be able to shut down safely. When a large bird is ingested, no continued operation is required – essentially, the engine is designed to shut down, e.g., with no hazardous debris or fire.

Airplane Flotation

Even though landing in water is an extremely rare occurrence, all transport category airplanes must float long enough to permit all the occupants to escape. In addition, the A320 was certified for “ditching” – that is, a prepared emergency landing in water, meeting the following requirements:

• The airplane must float in such a way that there are sufficient exits above water.
• The plane must be able to land in water and float under reasonable conditions long enough to allow evacuation of passengers into life rafts.
• Structural damage that might occur as a result of landing in water must be considered when determining the flotation characteristics.
• The airplane must carry special equipment, such as rafts, life vests and survival kits.

Certification for ditching occurs when an airplane is intended to be operated extensively on routes that are over water.

Seats

The seats on this airplane were designed to withstand 9 times the force of gravity, as are the overhead stowage compartments and other interior features. There are later standards that require dynamic testing of seats up to 16 times the force of gravity – commonly known as “16g seats;” however, these standards are not applicable to the A320.

What occurred to Flight 1549 indicates that all these standards were met. Current evidence points to engine bird ingestion of multiple Canada geese weighing on average between 6-10 lbs. each, far beyond the parameters of the birds for which the engine was designed to handle. Nonetheless, the engines reacted exactly as was intended; after the birds were ingested, they remained intact and did not shed any parts that might have damaged the aircraft fuselage; and they remained on the wing – allowing the crew to maintain flight.

Preliminary evidence indicates that the seats and all the interior structure performed very well in this accident, with minimal injuries to passengers as a direct result of the crash. Moreover, the aircraft did float – exits remained available and there was sufficient time for the successful evacuation of everyone on board.

Crew Training

In addition to our requirements for aircraft certification, Federal Aviation Regulations require all airlines to develop specific ditching procedures appropriate to their operations. Many airlines, including US Airways, tailor their training to their specific operations, with emphasis on areas of high risk. Airlines must submit these curricula to the FAA for review and approval before conducting any flight operations. Even though an airline may not spend extensive portions of its operations over water, it still has to have basic ditching training for its flight and cabin crews. Actual ditching training differs from airline to airline, based on the amount of their overwater operations.

The training is scenario based, meaning it includes a detailed dissection of an actual accident or incident and how the incident can be handled successfully. The crew is trained on all emergency procedures developed by the manufacturer, and this includes ditching. Training on handling emergencies -- crew resource management, decision making, workload management, crisis response, and situational awareness -- would be applicable to ditching through skill transfer, and that can be checked in a simulator. This scenario-based training and checking allows airlines to focus on events that are more likely to happen in actual, real-world operations.

Required ditching training includes emergency training with respect to each airplane type, model, and configuration for each required crewmember and each kind of operation that the airline proposes. All airline crewmembers must receive ditching training during their initial training and at recurrent intervals consistent with the airline’s approved training program.

US Airways flight attendants receive initial and recurrent training in ditching procedures, including:

• Cabin preparations
• Raft drills
• Passenger preparations
• Evacuations

US Airways pilots receive ditching training at their initial indoctrination with the airline using a case study of a 1970 ditching by a DC-9, then later receive A320-specific instruction during recurrent training. Areas covered include:

• Aircraft “clean-up” (configuration for ditching)
• Communications with air traffic control and cabin crewmembers
• Crew resource management
• Ditching direction, based on wind or calm, swell direction
• Post-ditching procedures, e.g., signaling, survival, first-aid

The ditching procedures are broken into segments above 10,000 feet and below 10,000 feet. Crewmembers are trained on both procedures. The above-10,000 feet procedures are focused on troubleshooting and engine restart. The below-10,000 feet procedures focus on “cleaning up” the aircraft, preparing the cabin crew for a water evacuation, setting all the equipment and switches for ditching, and communicating with air traffic control. The crew is trained to use the applicable procedure.

Flight 1549

While the FAA has been working for decades on bird strike mitigation, improving aircraft to increase passenger survivability, and training pilots and crew for emergencies, none of that should take away from the extraordinary acts of this incredible crew. From Captain Chesley Sullenberger’s strong background as a pilot and safety expert, which enabled him to control the aircraft so skillfully, to First Officer Jeffrey Skiles’ efforts to restart the engines and initiate the emergency landing checklist, to the incredible professionalism of the flight attendants, Donna Dent, Doreen Welsh, and Sheila Dail, in instructing and guiding the passengers to safety, there will probably be no more storied, heroic aviation crew in history. The fact remains that for all the training and technological advances we might make, the human element is where it can all fail, or where it can astonish us all.

Every aviator from the onset of his or her aviation training is taught these priorities in order: “aviate, navigate, communicate” – to fly the airplane, first and foremost; to navigate to a suitable emergency landing area; and to communicate with air traffic control the nature of the emergency so rescue can occur. Captain Sullenberger and his crew responded admirably to their training and their instincts and aviated, navigated, and communicated to a successful conclusion.

At this juncture, I want to make sure that I point out the equally admirable work of, Patrick Harten, the air traffic controller who communicated with Captain Sullenberger during those harrowing moments. From clearing airspace and runways for an emergency landing, to calling upon other aircraft to be additional eyes, to alerting his colleagues of the impending emergency, Mr. Harten was without doubt a crucial part of this incredible story. I also want to commend Michael Guarnieri, the air traffic controller at Teterboro, who instantly made a runway available at that airport in the event Flight 1549 was able to land there, and Robert Schmid, also at Teterboro, who did a great job of coordinating the emergency response notifications.

Our controllers are trained to respond to intense and stressful situations, as a matter of course. They have to be able to gather information from multiple sources, have constant situational awareness, and make instantaneous decisions. Every part of their training is designed to enhance each of these skills. It does not at all surprise the FAA that these controllers were so calm and professional in what was undoubtedly an incredibly pressurized situation, but once again, we are impressed with the high level of skill that these gentlemen displayed.

The incredible timeliness and efforts of the personnel on the commercial water vessels and other first responders who helped rescue the passengers and crew of Flight 1549 from the Hudson River that day was also extraordinary. From the ferries and tug boat crews to the New York City Fire and Police Departments, the combined efforts and quick thinking of all involved in getting the passengers and crew safely to shore were amazing and moving to see.

Finally, I must note that as we celebrate the outcome of Flight 1549, we also mourn the tragic loss of life on Colgan Air 3407 in Buffalo, New York. I know that the Members of this Committee will want to discuss this as soon as possible. We are fully supportive of the ongoing NTSB investigation in that case and I want to assure you that we will always strive to provide you with the timeliest information possible.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

JOINT STATEMENT OF

CHRISTA FORNAROTTO,
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AVIATION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND
NANCY LOBUE,
ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
AVIATION POLICY, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENT,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

AVIATION CONSUMER ISSUES:
EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND OUTLOOK FOR SUMMER TRAVEL,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

MAY 20, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting us here today to discuss issues facing aviation consumers and the outlook for air travel in the United States this summer.  Both the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) continue to work hard to ensure the welfare and safety of consumers.  This joint testimony will detail recent actions that each has undertaken in this effort.  Specifically, we will be discussing the status of our current consumer protection and regulatory compliance initiatives, the FAA’s on-going efforts to reduce congestion-related delays, including the actions affecting the three busy New York airports, and, finally, our work in coordination with other Federal agencies in connection with the H1N1 outbreak.

In 2007, complaints by airline consumers filed with the Department spiked sharply.  This spike was in part due to deteriorating on-time performance and incidents such as those that occurred in December 2006 and February 2007 in which passengers on-board many aircraft were stranded for hours on airport tarmacs while waiting for their flights to take off.  Since 2007, however, data reported to the Department show improvements in the quality of air service:

• In 2008, the Department received 10,643 air service complaints from consumers, compared to 13,180 complaints received in 2007.  This downward trend has continued. For the first quarter of 2009, the Department received 2,164 air service complaints, compared to 3,122 complaints received during the first quarter of 2008, and 2,887 complaints received during the first quarter of 2007. 
• The U.S. carriers reporting on-time performance data recorded an overall on-time arrival rate of 76.0 percent for January through December 2008, compared to 2007’s 73.4 percent rate.  For the first quarter of 2009, the on-time performance rate was 79.2 percent, compared to 70.8 percent during the first quarter of 2008, and 71.4 percent during the first quarter of 2007.
• The U.S. carriers reporting mishandled baggage data posted a mishandled baggage rate of 5.26 reports per 1,000 passengers in 2008, compared to 2007’s rate of 7.05.  For the first quarter of 2009, the mishandled baggage rate was 4.29, compared to 6.81 for first quarter of 2008, and 8.05 for January-March 2007.
• In 2008, the involuntary oversales (“bumping”) rate was 1.10 per 10,000 passengers, compared to 1.12 for 2007.  For the first quarter of 2009, the bumping rate was 1.31 per 10,000 passengers, compared to 1.37 for the first quarter of 2008, and 1.46 for the first quarter of 2007. 
• Despite applying a different performance standard, the number of chronically delayed flights dropped from 507 in 2007 to 244 in 2008.  In the first quarter of 2009, there were 32 chronically delayed flights compared to 79 in the first quarter of 2008 and 183 in the first quarter of 2007.  In 2008, the Department’s Office of Aviation Enforcement Proceedings (Enforcement Office) began using an expanded definition of what constituted a chronically delayed flight, i.e., a flight that was delayed more than 15 minutes on more than 70% of the flight’s operations per quarter, with a minimum of 30 operations. Previously, the Department’s standard used a minimum of 45 operations per quarter. 

Although these statistics show a trend in the right direction, they do not necessarily indicate that the underlying problems that they measure are being solved.  Rather, much of the improvement may be attributable to capacity cuts by airlines, which result in fewer planes and fewer passengers in the air.  With this in mind, the Department is committed to protecting consumers and ensuring that the quality of air service continues to improve, even when airlines return to adding capacity as the economy recovers.  To this end, more can and will be done.

We recognize that a number of steps have recently been undertaken to improve the quality of air service, including increasing the resources of the Enforcement Office, which acts as the prosecuting office for aviation consumer enforcement cases, organizing a task force to develop practices for mitigating the hardship caused by extended tarmac delays, raising the amount of civil penalties assessable for violations of certain laws and regulations protecting air travelers, improving the reporting of tarmac delays for diverted and cancelled flights, and increasing the amount of compensation for passengers who are involuntarily denied boarding.  Currently, we are reviewing the effectiveness of these steps and considering additional ones. 

In December 2008, we issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to enhance airline passenger protections by designating the operation of a chronically delayed flight as an unfair and deceptive practice and by requiring carriers to (1) adopt contingency plans for lengthy tarmac delays and to incorporate them in their contracts of carriage, (2) respond to consumer complaints, (3) publish delay data, and (4) have customer service plans, incorporate them into their contracts of carriage, and audit their compliance with their plans.  We are currently evaluating the NPRM and the comments filed in response to it and we will determine the next steps associated with this NPRM once we are through with our evaluation.

 While consumer protection is a priority for the Department, so too is congestion.  The Department shares the Committee’s longstanding concern regarding congestion, especially in the New York area.  The FAA’s key mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.  Although it is extremely safe, the current system is not performing adequately.   We saw the difficulties in air travel during the congested summer of 2007.  The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) will change the way the system operates – reducing congestion, noise, and emissions, expanding capacity and improving the passenger experience while enhancing safety.  NextGen is needed to bring to air transportation twenty-first century technology and flexibility to ensure reliability and predictability for airlines and passengers.

Even in the face of falling passenger demand and a reduced number of airline flights, we still experience congestion in our busiest airspace.  We know that we must be poised to handle future demand that will surely return as the nation’s economy improves.  FAA’s preliminary modeling of a series of NextGen capabilities shows that by 2018 total flight delays can be reduced by 35-40 percent over the current system, saving almost a billion gallons of fuel and the emissions produced. 

Secretary LaHood has made clear that delivering the capabilities of NextGen, is a key priority for him and this Administration. We also appreciate the support that this Committee, as well as Congress as a whole, has given us to move forward with NextGen.

The summer of 2007 was particularly troublesome and filled with delays, especially in the New York metropolitan region.  During the months of June – August 2007, there were 1.9 million scheduled flights nationwide – and 28% of those were delayed, according to information provided by carriers that report delay data to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS).  In the New York area it was worse: 37% of flights were delayed at LaGuardia Airport (LGA), John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) and Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), which ranked as three of the five most delayed airports in the country.  Causes of delay included over scheduling, mechanical issues for airlines, weather, late-arriving aircraft, and security difficulties. 

Nationwide, the FAA has been putting a range of solutions into place.  New runways provide significant capacity and operational improvements.  On November 20th, three major new runways opened:  at Seattle-Tacoma, Washington Dulles, and Chicago O’Hare International Airports.  The Seattle runway is expected to cut local delays in half by increasing capacity in bad weather by 60 percent, while the new runway at Dulles will provide capacity for an additional 100,000 annual operations. 

The new Chicago runway adds capacity for an additional 52,300 annual operations and is a part of the greater O'Hare Modernization Program (OMP) that reconfigures the airport's intersecting runways into a more modern, parallel layout.  The OMP  substantially reduces delays in all weather conditions and increases capacity at the airfield, allowing O'Hare to meet the region's aviation needs well into the future. 

On February 12, a runway extension at Philadelphia International Airport was completed, helping reduce delays there.  Looking forward for the next three years, new runways will open at Charlotte and Chicago O’Hare.  Eleven other runway projects are in the planning or environmental stage at Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) airports through 2018.

The FAA has been highly proactive in anticipating and planning to reduce delays nationally.  We have been monitoring airline schedules six months into the future, in order to better anticipate potential problems at the major airports before they occur and we are ready to respond with “Congestion Action Teams” to any airports where delays appear likely to increase significantly.

While the FAA also strives to maintain as efficient an air traffic system as possible, the reality is that delays are caused for many different reasons, including weather.  Increasing our ability to deliver air traffic arrivals and departures safely in bad weather is also one of the areas NextGen is poised to tackle.  We are working on capabilities that allow for continued use of parallel runways in low visibility conditions by providing precise path assignments that provide safe separation between aircraft assigned on parallel paths, restoring capacity and reducing delays throughout the system. 

We are already safely reducing separation between aircraft approaching parallel runways at Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Seattle.  In good visibility, Seattle’s pair of parallel runways, together, could handle roughly 60 operations per hour; poor visibility conditions cut that rate in half.  Even in poor visibility, these capabilities now safely allow a rate of about 52 operations per hour, a significant improvement for the airport and its users.  We are also beginning to see similar benefits in Boston.

We have already seen these improvements pay dividends.  In the summer of 2008, we saw improvements in delays.  From June – August 2008, nationwide there were 1.8 million scheduled flights, with 23% delayed, according to BTS data.  The largest share of those delays can be traced back to weather – 44%, while the remainder was caused by a combination of other factors.

As we gear up for the summer of 2009, we are continuing our work on implementing measures to minimize delays.  The economic downturn has resulted in lower passenger demand with a corresponding decline in overall operations and delays.  However, in certain congested areas, we are not seeing as much of a downtown in traffic or delays.  For example, in New York, the drop in the demand for travel has been about 5%, compared to other large hubs, such as Chicago, which is down 7.5%, and Houston which is down nearly 10%.  Consequently, the reduction in delays is not as pronounced in New York as in other parts of the country.  With the decreased operations this year, we would expect on-time performance to be higher than last summer, but will be dependent on the severity of summertime weather. 

Despite the downturn in traffic, FAA is continuing to work aggressively to implement operational and structural improvements so we are prepared to handle the inevitable up-tick in traffic in the future.  For example, the Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast system (ADS-B), a system that moves air traffic control from a system based on radar to one that uses satellite-derived aircraft location data, is in use in southern Florida and in the Gulf of Mexico, where we have never had radar coverage before.  We are now on our way to national deployment of broadcast services.    

The Department anticipates some impact to operations because of various runway construction improvements.  The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is currently in the process of working on four taxiway and utility projects at JFK that has closed a runway there for the past few weeks.  Other runway construction will necessitate runway closures at JFK from March-June 2010 and from September 16 - 29, 2010.  During the construction, three of the four runways at JFK will always be available and every effort is being made to minimize the impacts to operations during the construction project.  These efforts include the Port Authority working with the airlines and the FAA to phase the project and include strong contracting terms to make sure the project gets done on time. 

The FAA maximizes the use of airspace, especially in congested areas such as New York, through targeted airspace and procedures enhancements.  Continuing work in the New York area includes integration of precision procedures such as area navigation and required navigation performance (RNAV/RNP), relocation and expansion of airways, airspace reconfiguration, and creation of optimal descent procedures.  We have also limited scheduled operations at LGA, JFK and EWR and continue to work on the New York/New Jersey/Philadelphia (NY/NJ/PHL) Airspace Redesign, the necessary prerequisite to successful implementation of NextGen.  The FAA has also accelerated the installation of Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) at JFK, which in addition to increasing safety, has also increased surface situational awareness for controllers and airlines resulting in more efficient operations.

A number of the operational improvements we have made so far are a result of collaborative efforts derived from the New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee (NY ARC or ARC), which convened in the fall of 2007 in order to prevent a repeat of the summer 2007 in New York.  One of the products from the ARC was a list of ideas from various stakeholders that would help improve air traffic control operations, totaling 77 in all.  Of these 77, FAA has substantially completed 30.  Thirty-seven of these are ongoing, in various stages of assessment or implementation.  Two of these include the removal of a hotel and a waste facility and may be outside the FAA’s authority to control.  Of the remaining 10, seven are part of our NextGen planning and implementation, while the remaining three are dependent upon the successful completion of NY/NJ/PHL Airspace Redesign.

In our ongoing efforts to reduce delays, the FAA plans to continue to keep the limits on scheduled operations in place at LGA, JFK and EWR, while this Administration considers its next steps with regard to a long-term congestion management solution for the New York area airports.  Just last week, Secretary LaHood announced that DOT is proposing to rescind the slot auction rules that were finalized for LaGuardia, JFK and Newark last October and has promised to talk with aviation and consumer stakeholders in New York this summer about the best way to move forward.  The FAA continues to seek, develop, and implement congestion and delay solutions system-wide.  While we have a strong focus in New York because of its impact on the rest of the NAS, we continue to work to improve the safety and efficiency of the entire system nationwide.     

The recent H1N1 flu outbreak is another important issue that is getting significant attention from the Department.  Let me start by reiterating an earlier comment by Secretary LaHood:  It is safe to fly.  And one of the reasons it is safe to fly is that the Department of Transportation and the FAA, together with several other government agencies, have been working hard to ensure that our aviation system is prepared to handle the kinds of concerns raised by the recent H1N1 outbreak. 

The Department has been participating in an interagency working group led by the Homeland Security Council since 2006.  We prepared and exercised a Department-wide pandemic influenza plan. Our operating administrations also prepared and exercised their own plans.  Consequently when the 2009 H1N1 outbreak occurred, a response scheme was already in place and we were ready to take immediate action.  Even though H1N1 did not exactly follow the model that the U.S. Government had anticipated (it was a swine flu outbreak in North American rather than an avian-based influenza coming from overseas), the planning components and exercises previously conducted ensured that DOT staff could rapidly and appropriately respond as the situation warranted.  Over the weeks following the initial outbreak the measures taken and the communications initiated were scaled up and then down as more information about the virus became available.   

During the initial stages of the 2009-H1N1 outbreak, the US government opted to not conduct either entry or exit health screening of international passengers, based on CDC’s technical expertise and following advice from the World Health Organization.  Nonetheless, questions were raised regarding the airlines’ authority to deny boarding to a passenger who may have the 2009 H1N1 virus.  Airlines themselves do have the authority to refuse transport to any person who has a serious communicable disease to the extent permitted by their contract of carriage and the Department’s disability regulation.  The Department’s disability regulation allows an airline to refuse transportation on the basis of a communicable disease if the passenger’s condition is both readily transmitted under conditions of flight and represents a significant health risk to others and a less restrictive alternative than refusal to transport is not available.   Additionally, CDC has authority to quarantine inbound international passengers suspected of having specific communicable disease including any "novel influenza virus of pandemic potential.”

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.  We would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

JOINT STATEMENT OF

CHRISTA FORNAROTTO,
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AVIATION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORATION,
AND
JOHN M. ALLEN,
DIRECTOR, FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE,
OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

OVERSIGHT OF HELICOPTER MEDICAL SERVICES,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

APRIL 22, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting us here today to discuss the oversight of helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS).  Both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT) have distinct roles to play in the oversight of these important operations, and this joint testimony will describe those roles.

The testimony will first address the FAA’s role and some of the agency’s recent efforts in HEMS safety and the second portion of the testimony will focus on DOT’s economic authority as it would be affected by Representative Altmire’s bill, H.R. 978, the “Helicopter Medical Services Patient Safety, Protection and Coordination Act”.

FAA Safety Oversight

HEMS operations are a critical aviation service provided to the medical community.  A HEMS flight is often crucial to getting a critically ill or injured patient to the right medical facility as efficiently as possible, often during “the golden hour,” the minutes or hours following a trauma when rapid intervention is most beneficial and effective for the patient.  While the medical treatment aspect is obviously an essential part of a HEMS operation, the FAA’s mission is to ensure the safety of the air transportation portion of the operation.  The best medical treatment in the world will not make a difference if the patient and crew cannot be transported safely.

Accordingly, we are taking steps to enhance the safety of this growing industry.  To put this issue in context, FAA issues operating certificates to interstate carriers under parts 121 and 135 of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  Carriers may choose to operate intrastate only, but FAA operating certificates are for interstate operations.  There are currently 73 operators authorized to conduct interstate HEMS operations.  There are approximately 850 air medical transportation helicopters in service.  And, six of the 50 largest operating certificate holders in terms of number of aircraft operating under parts 121 and 135 are authorized to conduct HEMS operations.  In fact, the tenth largest air carrier in the U.S. is a HEMS operator.

As with all the sectors of the industry that we regulate, we always want to make sure that the HEMS community is operating as safely as it can.  Ideally, there would be a 0% accident rate.  Unfortunately, there was a spike in the number of fatal HEMS accidents in 2008.  From 2002 – 2007, there were 26 fatal HEMS accidents, an average of 4.3 accidents per year.  Over this time period, there were also 59 non-fatal accidents, an average of 9.8 per year.  In 2008 alone, there were 8 fatal HEMS accidents and 5 non-fatal accidents.  These 34 accidents over those seven years have resulted in 89 fatalities, 71 of whom were crewmembers.

In reviewing the circumstances and causes of these accidents, our experts noticed four common factors:

• Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)
• Loss of control of the aircraft in flight
• Inadvertent flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) resulting in loss of control
• Night operations

Upon reviewing these accidents further, the FAA identified the need for certain measures to improve the safety of these operations, including:

• Strengthening operational control, by clearly identifying the entity accountable for the safety of the operation
• Increasing pilot skill in adverse weather operations
• Applying risk assessment protocols in flight decisions
• Fostering greater collaborative decision-making between ground and flight personnel; and
• Developing a stronger safety culture in HEMS operations.

Building a stronger safety culture in this industry is essential, as these operations take place in very demanding environments.  As such, the pilot’s judgment and risk assessment is critical in the evaluation of whether an air ambulance flight request should be accepted, especially when weather or other conditions put flight delay or cancellation on the table.  This first rule never changes:  the pilot in command makes the call to “go” or “no go.”  That’s the linchpin of a safe system.  The pilot must have the ability and support from his or her management to postpone a flight when the risk to the crew and the patient is too great.  And at the same time, the pilots should take into account the assessments from ground personnel regarding conditions at the landing sites.  The FAA believes that the operator must create a safety culture and environment that promotes and supports the safety decisions and good judgment exercised by the pilots.  This safety culture is the indispensable context for enabling the use of the newest technology and maximizing the benefits of technology in flight operations.  This impact of a positive safety culture on operational safety must be recognized by the entire HEMS industry.

It is important in establishing this safety culture to differentiate between the services that HEMS operators offer from other types of emergency services that may be provided by air.  The former is an air ambulance; that is, it is an ambulance service that is provided by air transportation rather than by a ground vehicle, but from a flight safety standpoint is first and foremost, transportation.  Other air emergency services may involve search and rescue operations or emergency evacuations by air, which are operations of a different and more specific nature, and thus may require a different assessment of risk than a HEMS operation.  For example, a HEMS operator may assess that severe weather precludes picking up a particular patient at a certain time, and that the patient would be better served to be safely transported by ground.  In an emergency evacuation operation, where flood waters are rising because of inclement weather, a helicopter operation may be the only way to save people’s lives.  This entails a different assessment of the situational risks for the pilots and those being transported.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has made several recommendations to address the safety concerns specific to HEMS operations.  In response to the NTSB’s recommendations and other issues that we have seen in the HEMS industry, the FAA has taken a number of steps.  Since a formal rulemaking requires more deliberate speed, the FAA moved forward with several voluntary compliance measures in order to effect immediate safety benefits.  In particular, the FAA wanted to address raising the weather minima to higher standards.  Weather minima dictate the required horizontal visibility (in miles) and distance an aircraft must keep from clouds to engage in Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight to help ensure adequate visibility for safe flight.  The required weather minima generally vary depending on (1) the class of airspace a pilot is flying through, (2) whether the flight is during the day or at night, (3) whether the pilot is flying a helicopter or an airplane, and (4) what part of the regulations govern the flight.  The FAA also wanted to address establishing operational control/dispatch systems centers for all operators to helping flight planning and risk assessment, establishing formal risk assessment programs, and implementing new technologies.

In 2004, the FAA and industry created a joint task force, which formulated and implemented several voluntary air medical transport safety initiatives.  We brought together the Association of Air Medical Services, Helicopter Association International, the National Emergency Medical Services Pilots Association, and industry operators to set the stage for the implementation of voluntary safety programs.  From 2005 – 2006, FAA issued multiple notices, bulletins, advisory circulars, and the like, to provide guidance to the industry that would improve operational safety and promote a proactive safety culture among HEMS operators.  This guidance included creating operational risk assessment programs for HEMS, including training to all flight crews, including medical staff; amending Visual Flight Rule (VFR) weather requirements; and establishing operational control/dispatch centers.

FAA also established a special committee to develop Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS) standards.  This technology helps prevent CFIT by providing aural and visual alerts to pilots of terrain or other obstructions that may exist along a flight path.  As a result of this committee’s work, the FAA issued a technical standards order for HTAWS based on minimum operational standards in December 2008.

Because of these safety initiatives, the period from 2004 through 2007 showed a drastic reduction in helicopter air medical transport fatal accidents.  However, the upward trend in 2008 was troubling and prompted a more aggressive response.  The FAA, working again with representatives from the industry, revised the operation specification (OPSPEC) for HEMS operators to require:

• Increased weather minima for Part 135 Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight by raising ceilings and increasing visibility requirements;
• That if one segment of a HEMS operation is conducted under Part 135 VFR, all segments of the operations be conducted in accordance with the increased Part 135 weather minima as specified in the OPSPEC;
• Specific flight planning for VFR operations (e.g., a pilot must physically identify and document the highest obstacle in the planned route and plan to avoid it);

The OPSPEC also allowed for more instrument flight rule (IFR) operations by permitting pilots to use weather reporting sources that are within 15 miles of the landing location.  These requirements have been in effect since January 2009.  All of the HEMS operators are now operating in accordance with the OPSPEC.

Through the years, this evolving industry has been very responsive to improving safety.  In January 2009, the FAA conducted a survey of all HEMS operators to find out how many have implemented FAA-recommended best practices.  We found the response to be overwhelming.  Well over 80% of the operators have voluntarily adopted training programs and operational control center practices that the FAA has recommended to improve safety.  Almost 90% are using radar altimeters, while just over 40% have voluntarily equipped some or all of their fleet with HTAWS.  We expect this percentage will increase now that the HTAWS technical standards order has been published.

We recognize that relying on voluntary compliance alone is not enough to ensure safe flight operations.  In that regard, the FAA has initiated a formal rulemaking project that will address many of the HEMS initiatives and best practices put forth in the advisory circulars, orders and notices issued over the last several years, as well as the most recent revisions to the OPSPEC.  The FAA Rulemaking Council has given approval to begin drafting a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which we are aiming to have published in late 2009 or early 2010.

We appreciate both Congressman Salazar’s and Congressman Altmire’s efforts in developing their respective bills to continue to raise the bar on HEMS safety.  However, the FAA does not believe that new safety legislation is needed at this time.  Given the current regulations that govern emergency medical services flights, the voluntary safety measures already being implemented by the industry, as well as the rulemaking efforts underway, the FAA believes that the safety measures encompassed in H.R. 1201 are already being addressed.  The FAA and the Department as a whole also understand that the intent of H.R. 978 is not to infringe upon the FAA’s plenary safety authority over civil aviation.  To that end we will continue to work to ensure that there are no unintended consequences of either bill that might adversely affect HEMS safety.

Economic Regulation

There is however, another area of concern with the proposed bill.  H.R. 978 contains several provisions that seek to provide States with additional authority to regulate helicopter air ambulances.  Under current law, air ambulances are air carriers subject to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA).  The ADA phased out the government’s control over air carrier prices, routes and services, relying instead on competitive market forces.  In keeping with the statute and judicial interpretations, the Department of Transportation has found the ADA preemptive of State economic regulation of air ambulance services (as air carriers) related to prices, routes and services, but not preemptive of State regulations concerning patient medical care.  For example, while the Department has explained that State rules related to the economics of air ambulances are preempted, such as requirements for certificates of need, rate regulations, and geographic service coverage limitations, it has also noted that State regulations covering emergency medical equipment, qualifications of medical personnel, and patient care are not preempted under the ADA. 

The Department of Transportation supports the authority of States to issue FAA-compliant regulations on patient care that would affect air ambulance operations.  We recognize the interest States have in ensuring that medical professionals on board air ambulances are properly qualified and that air ambulances arrive properly equipped with the medical and communications equipment necessary to care for patients and communicate with emergency medical services (EMS) personnel on the ground.  Although State medical regulations that would affect air ambulances must always be compliant with FAA safety requirements, we believe that there is a wide range of medically-related interests that States can and currently do regulate without encroaching on the Department of Transportation’s economic authority under the ADA.  We further believe that nothing in the ADA as it exists prohibits a State from requiring compliance with medically-needed measures. The Department takes this work seriously, and fully supports the critically important work of State EMS Authorities in providing medical oversight of air ambulances.

We have strong concerns, however, that carving out statutory exemptions to the ADA for purposes of allowing States to regulate economic issues involving one segment of the aviation industry will lead to many of the same problems that Congress sought to avoid when it passed the ADA’s preemption provision over 30 years ago. For example, we are aware that many, if not most, air ambulance service providers operate in more than one State.  For this reason, we are concerned that fifty separate State regimes addressing the economic regulation of air ambulances could unnecessarily complicate the industry and hinder interstate operations.  We also believe that State regulation of the economic issues could serve to limit market entry and could ultimately have a negative effect on available services.  Market access in aviation services, generally, has been instrumental in promoting a safe, efficient and responsive industry and we believe that these same economic principles may be applicable to air ambulance services. 

Most importantly, however, we believe that before this Committee considers legislating in this area, that it consider carefully whether practical, as opposed to theoretical, problems exist with the current system governing air ambulance services.  For example, among those testifying before you today are two groups representing participants in the air ambulance industry on both the provider and State government levels.  At the Department, we have met with both of these organizations and what concerns us most is the lack of agreement, on not only the nature of the problems with the existing system, but whether any serious problems exist at all.  We recognize that there have been some recent tragedies relating to air ambulance services, but it remains unclear whether these are relatively isolated incidents or indicative of more systemic national problems.

Should Congress decide that regulating entry and capacity is appropriate for one segment of the airline industry, other sectors of the industry may seek similar protection from competition.   For this reason, we urge that the Committee move carefully with a thorough assessment of all facts relevant to this particular segment of the industry.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important subject.  We look forward to working with the Committee to address the HEMS safety issues as well as the economic concerns raised in H.R. 978.  We will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

RICHARD L. DAY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

AVIATION SAFETY: THE HUDSON RIVER MIDAIR COLLISION AND
THE SAFETY OF AIR OPERATIONS IN CONGESTED AIRSPACE,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

SEPTEMBER 15, 2009.

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the very sad events of August 8, 2009, and what FAA is doing to create a safer operating environment over the Hudson River. Everyone at FAA grieves with the families over the loss of life that occurred that day. When such events do occur, we redouble our efforts to make the skies safer. My colleagues at FAA and throughout the aviation industry approach this work with seriousness and urgency.

Since the investigation of the accident remains under the formal processes of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), I will not be commenting on the specifics of the accident. I will, however, share with you the immediate actions we have taken, as well as discuss some of our longer-range plans to improve safety.

The FAA’s first action was taken on August 11. We issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that reiterated our recommended best practices for conduct of flight in the airspace of the Hudson River corridor. New York airspace is very restricted by a large volume of “Class B” airspace, which is designed to provide positive protection of airliners using LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy International, and Newark Liberty International Airports. All aircraft within Class B airspace must be under positive control by air traffic controllers.

There are areas known as “VFR flyways,” where we permit aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to fly within a defined corridor and below certain altitudes without being under positive air traffic control. These VFR flyways use “see and be seen rules,” where pilots are responsible for maintaining safe distance from other aircraft. In New York, this VFR flyway is commonly called the “exclusion area,” which has existed in some form since 1971, and is bounded by the Hudson River and has a ceiling of either 1,100 feet or 1,500 feet. (See Figures 1.)

The August 11 NOTAM reiterated long-recommended practices for this VFR flyway, including speed limitations (not exceeding 140 knots) and taking precautionary measures (turning on anti-collision, position/navigation, and/or landing lights and self-announcing their position on the Hudson River frequency for all other aircraft to hear).

We recognized this was only the first step to assess and enhance the safety of Visual Flight in this area. On August 14, 2009, we chartered a New York Airspace Task Force to review the current procedures for Hudson River operations, specifically with regard to safety of flight, operations, and regulatory compliance and make recommendations to Administrator Babbitt no later than August 28 – just two weeks later. The Task Force consisted of FAA air traffic and aviation safety experts, as well as air traffic controllers representing the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) who work in this area. We also had input from key stakeholders – such as Helicopter Association International, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, and the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey. The group delivered these recommendations to Administrator Babbitt on time on August 28. We thank the Task Force members for their efforts, particularly given the short timeline. Because we believe that their recommendations will enhance the safety of this airspace, we intend to implement their recommendations via expedited rulemaking and revised letters of agreement with the area airports and operators.

The Task Force recommended eight specific safety and operational enhancements that would restructure the airspace, mandate pilot operating rules, create a new entry point into the Hudson River airspace from Teterboro, and standardize New York area charts and maps. They also recommended developing new training for pilots, air traffic controllers, and helicopter operators so they will be fully trained and ready for implementation of the new rules. One of the most significant changes would divide the airspace into altitude corridors that separate aircraft flying over the river from those operating to and from local heliports or seaplane bases. (See Figure 2.)

This new exclusionary zone would be comprised of three components:

• It would establish a uniform “floor” for the Class B airspace over the Hudson River at 1,300 feet, which would also serve as the “ceiling” for the exclusionary zone. This removes some confusing complexity that currently exists.
• Between 1,300-2,000 feet, aircraft will operate in the Class B airspace under visual flight rules but under positive air traffic control and communicate with controllers on the appropriate air traffic frequency.
• Below1,300 feet, aircraft must use a single common radio frequency. Mandatory routes for aircraft flying up and down the river will require them to favor the “right side” of the river (i.e. the east side for northbound traffic and the west side for southbound traffic) to provide horizontal separation as well.
• Coordination of traffic and handoffs between Air Traffic Controllers at the Teterboro tower, Newark tower, and radar control will be improved.

The new rules will mandate that pilots use two specific radio frequencies – one for the Hudson River and the other for the East River. It mandates speeds of 140 knots or less and the use of anti-collision lights and landing lights in the VFR routes. The rules would also require pilots to announce their position when they reach various points up and down the river. Pilots would also be required to have charts available in the aircraft and to be familiar with and comply with the airspace rules.

The FAA also intends to propose standardized procedures for fixed-wing aircraft leaving Teterboro to enter either the Class B airspace or the exclusionary zone. The proposal would require that before an aircraft planning to enter the Class B airspace takes off, Teterboro controllers would request approval from the Newark tower for the aircraft to climb to 1,500 feet. Aircraft from Teterboro that want to enter the VFR flyway would be directed by air traffic control to fly a special route over the George Washington Bridge, which would allow them to enter the Hudson River airspace in a much less congested area.

The FAA expects the expedited rulemaking covering these issues to be completed, and have all pilot and controller training completed in time for publication of new charts and new rules by November 19^th.

The effort with New York airspace has wider implications for the national airspace system. As we implement these changes in the New York airspace and have an opportunity to analyze their effectiveness, the FAA intends to examine the other major metropolitan areas and congested corridors for similar airspace and operational risks to see if such procedures would be appropriate elsewhere. We expect this larger effort to carry well into next year.

Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

STATEMENT OF

RICHARD L. DAY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

NEXTGEN: AREA NAVIGATION (RNAV)/REQUIRED NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE (RNP),

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

JULY 29, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s program for area navigation (RNAV) and required navigation performance (RNP) air traffic control routes. RNAV/RNP is a building block for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), and has already shown great promise in enhancing safety and efficiency in the National Airspace System (NAS).

Through NextGen, the FAA is addressing the impact of air traffic growth by increasing NAS capacity and efficiency while simultaneously improving safety, reducing environmental impacts, and increasing user access to the NAS. To achieve its NextGen goals, the FAA is implementing new Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) routes and procedures that leverage emerging technologies and aircraft navigation capabilities.

What is Performance-Based Navigation?

PBN is a framework for defining performance requirements in “navigation specifications,” that is, to specify that the avionics can function in a particular way or ways, that the pilot is appropriately trained and follows certain procedures in the cockpit. PBN can be applied to an air traffic route, instrument procedure, or defined airspace. PBN provides a basis for the design and implementation of automated flight paths as well as for airspace design and obstacle clearance. Once the required performance level is established, the aircraft’s own capability determines whether it can safely achieve the specified performance and qualify for the operation.

What Is RNAV?

Prior to satellite navigation capabilities, i.e. global positioning systems or GPS, aircraft could only navigate primarily by ground-based navigation aids, such as VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) equipment. This limited the routes that aircraft could take, depending on the location and position of those ground-based aids, and necessarily involved certain inefficiencies during flight, e.g., instead of flying a direct route, an aircraft might have to take a more circuitous route in order to navigate from ground-based point to ground-based point.

Now, with advances in technology, we are able to take advantage of space-based navigation sources that provide for additional navigational coverage. An aircraft using RNAV can fly on any desired flight path within the coverage of ground- or space-based navigational aids, within the limits of the capability of the systems onboard the aircraft, or a combination of both capabilities. As such, RNAV aircraft have better access and flexibility for point-to-point operations. This leads to the potential for flights to reduce the miles flown, save fuel, and enhance efficiency.

RNAV also helps solve operational issues. For example, an RNAV approach may be available in areas where we cannot install or maintain a ground-based navigational aid, such as in Alaska, where the terrain either does not permit the ability to install the navigational aid or the weather conditions preclude us from being able to maintain the operability of the navigational aid.

What Is RNP?

RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard performance monitoring and alerting capability. A defining characteristic of RNP operations is the ability of the aircraft navigation system to monitor the navigation performance it achieves and inform the crew if the requirement is not met during a flight operation. This onboard monitoring and alerting capability enhances the pilot’s situational awareness and can enable reduced obstacle clearance or closer route conformance without intervention by air traffic control.

Certain RNP operations require advanced features of the onboard navigation function and approved training and crew procedures. These operations must receive approvals known as Special Aircraft and Aircrew Authorization Required (SAAAR), similar to approvals required for operations to conduct Instrument Landing System Category II and III approaches. In addition to certified avionics, the flight crew must be trained and authorized to fly these complex procedures.

The attached chart shows how RNAV and RNP have improved the navigational process. See Figure 1 below. As you can see, using the current ground navaids, the aircraft has to fly from beacon to beacon, often taking an inefficient route in order to pick up the signals at the appropriate place in the air. The dotted boxes indicate the expanse of the area in the sky that the aircraft could be in as it picks up those ground-based signals. This requires our air traffic control to create larger areas of separation between aircraft, in order to maintain safety. In the RNAV and RNP routing, however, the dotted areas are far smaller, indicating that the aircraft can fly a much more precise route in the air. Additionally, the graphic illustrates the RNP “radius to turn” ability, essentially indicating how RNP enables the aircraft to make much tighter, more precise turns in the air. This is particularly useful in areas where the airspace is congested and there are multiple busy airports. The ability of the aircraft to use these “radius to turn” procedures means air traffic is easier to “deconflict,” or route in a manner that avoids other air traffic paths.

Figure 1. Performance-Based Navigation: RNAV/RNP

Benefits

RNAV and RNP capabilities facilitate more efficient design of airspace and procedures which collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity, predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced environmental impacts. Specifically, improved access and flexibility for point-to-point operations help enhance reliability and reduce delays by defining more precise terminal area procedures. They also can reduce emissions and fuel consumption.

RNAV procedures can provide benefits in all phases of flight, including departure, en route, arrival, approach, and transitional airspace. For example, Standard Terminal Arrivals (STARs) can:

• ·       Increase predictability of operations
  • ·       Reduce controller/aircraft communications
    • ·       Reduce fuel burn with more continuous vertical descents
      • ·       Reduce miles flown in Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) airspace
        • ·       Reduce interaction between dependent flows in airspace shared for adjacent airport operations.

           

          How are RNAV/RNP Procedures Created?

          RNAV/RNP procedures have been developed by the FAA, with the support of industry and MITRE, in a complex, multi-layered process. For Terminal RNAV procedures (those RNAV procedures in the airspace into an airport terminal environment), for example, there is an 18-step implementation process. See Figure 2 below.

          Figure 2. 18-Step Guidelines for Terminal RNAV Procedure Implementation

           

          Several offices within the FAA play essential roles in the development of these procedures. Their various duties are outlined below:

          Air Traffic Organization:

           

          RNAV/RNP Group

           

          ·      Serves as the lead office for implementation and integration of RNAV and RNP routes and procedures into the air traffic environment

          ·      Coordinates policy and implementation activities with industry and within FAA

          ·      Provides guidance for and expedites the development of PBN criteria and standards and implements airspace and procedure improvements

          ·      Collaborates with the U.S. and international aviation communities – government and industry – as a leader in developing PBN concepts, technical standards, operator requirements, and implementation processes to enhance safety, increase capacity, improve efficiency, and reduce the environmental impact of aviation

          ·      Provides technical and operational guidance within FAA. This group also develops and maintains processes and tools to aid the field with RNAV/RNP procedure design

           

           

          Aviation System Standards

          ·      Oversees the standard development, evaluation, and certification of airspace systems, procedures, and equipment

          ·      Designs and develops instrument flight procedures (IFPs), publishes aeronautical charts and digital products for air carrier and general aviation pilots for use throughout the United States and around the world

          ·      Provides aircraft maintenance and engineering services, operates a fleet of flight inspection aircraft for airborne evaluation of IFPs and electronic navigational signals

          Field Facilities

           

          • ·      Responsible for procedure design evaluations for airspace and procedures usage, letters of agreement, video map updates, automation coding and controller familiarization and training in accordance with the 18-step RNAV implementation process
            • ·      Responsible for designing and using the procedures operationally

               

              Aviation Safety:

               

              Flight Standards Service

               

              ·      Develops and establishes criteria for civil and military terminal instrument procedures

              ·      Develops rules, standards, policies, and criteria governing the operational aspects of en route, terminal, and instrument flight procedures (except air traffic control procedures)

              ·      Performs operational evaluations, including flight simulation, flight simulator, and in-flight testing of standards and criteria

              ·      Assesses the impact on safety and provides radar separation analysis tools

              ·      Oversees all of flight inspection policy and all instrument flight procedure development

              Aircraft Certification

               

              ·      Administers safety standards governing the design, production, and airworthiness of civil aeronautical products, such as the avionics required for RNAV/RNP

              ·      Oversees design, production, and airworthiness certification programs to ensure compliance with prescribed safety standards

              ·      Provides a safety performance management system to ensure continued operational safety of aircraft

              ·      Works with aviation authorities, manufacturers, and other stakeholders to help them successfully improve the safety of the international air transportation system

               

              Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service

               

              ·      Establishes safety standards and provides independent oversight of the Air Traffic Organization – the provider of air traffic services in the United States 

              ·      Accomplishes safety oversight in a variety of ways including:

              o      Developing and amending regulations and guidance for regulatory oversight and credentialing functions

              o      Participating in the development and harmonization of air traffic control international standards

              o      Providing regulatory oversight of the Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System

               

               

              What Is the Status of RNAV/RNP?

              Currently, we have 159 RNAV routes and 270 RNAV arrival and departure procedures implemented into the NAS and 163 RNP SAAAR approach procedures. By the end of fiscal year 2009, we anticipate that we will have an additional 48 RNAV routes, 35 RNAV arrival and departure procedures, and 29 RNP SAAAR approach procedures in place. Additionally, other PBN procedures such as Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance approaches throughout the NAS elevate the overall number of Performance Based Procedures to over 8,000.

               

              What Are the Challenges of RNAV/RNP?

              The development of RNAV/RNP procedures is a relatively young program at the FAA. The agency only began developing these procedures in 2002. Along the way, we have encountered some challenges and learned from them. We intend to apply those lessons moving forward.

               

              While we have a standard process for developing RNAV/RNP procedures in the Terminal area, we did not have a comparable process for developing procedures elsewhere in the operational environment. We believe this as an area in which we could improve, and have asked for an agency-wide mapping of all PBN processes to standardize how we develop, test, chart, and implement Performance-Based Navigation procedures. I am pleased to report that we should be starting work on that Process Mapping in the next couple of weeks.

               

              As we move forward, there are other challenges that continue to face us in the advancement of RNAV/RNP. For example:

              • ·      International Harmonization: What the FAA terms “RNP SAAAR” (defined above), the bulk of the international community refers to as “RNP AR.” As always, we want to make sure that our terms and procedures are harmonized with international standards to reduce confusion and enhance safety. As a result, we are transitioning this term to harmonize with the international community’s term. We will continue to work with our counterparts internationally in addressing these types of issues.
                • ·      Environmental Issues: While many RNAV/RNP procedures are considered “overlays,” that is, following essentially the same flight path that air traffic follows today, the implementation of some RNAV/RNP procedures will trigger the need for a detailed quantitative environmental review because the location and number of proposed flight paths may be different from what currently exists. The FAA has a strong commitment to environmental stewardship and doing our best to analyze and mitigate the impact on the public in terms of noise and emissions, while maintaining safety of the NAS. While the FAA understands the frustration felt by industry on the delay to implementation that these environmental reviews may cause at times, we take our environmental responsibilities seriously and will not compromise our environmental stewardship responsibilities for the sake of expediency.
                  • ·      Hybrid Environment: As the aviation industry moves towards equipping their aircraft to take full advantage of RNAV/RNP benefits, we are bound to see a mix of differing aircraft capabilities in the NAS, flying different types of procedures. This “hybrid environment” will certainly present additional challenges to our controllers, but we are fully confident that they will be able to handle these challenges as we deploy decision support tools, technology, and training. Because equipage remains a challenge to some in the aviation community, the FAA is committed to providing a safe environment in the NAS for all users.
                    • ·      Third-Party Development: There are several third-party vendors available who are capable of developing RNAV/RNP procedures for specific projects. We are working with two of them (Naverus and Jeppesen) to authorize them to do procedure development, flight validation, and maintenance of Public RNP SAAAR instrument approaches, under FAA supervision. However, the safety of the NAS is the FAA’s mission and responsibility. When we do use these third-party resources, FAA is committed to overseeing their work to ensure safe development and implementation into the NAS. We will not abdicate our responsibility to assure safety.

·      Prioritization of Procedures: As the benefits of RNAV/RNP become clearer to users of the NAS, we have received increasing requests to add or accelerate new RNAV/RNP procedures more widely in the NAS. The FAA certainly appreciates the validation of our work, but we caution that implementation of new procedures into the NAS must be done carefully and methodically to ensure a cohesive system. Moreover, as the RNAV/RNP program matures, we are discovering that certain procedures may provide greater benefits for industry, the flying public, and the NAS overall. Safe and effective integration of these procedures are of paramount importance to the FAA, and as such, we are working to deploy them in a manner that will maximize the benefits of RNAV/RNP.

Some of our other technical challenges are illustrated in the graphic below. See Figure 3.

Figure 3. RNAV/RNP Implementation and Challenges

• Conclusion
• As you can see, the FAA has developed a solid foundation of routes and procedures for RNAV/RNP, which serves as a platform of the enhanced safety and efficiency goals of NextGen. Since we have this foundation, we are transitioning from a site-by-site (or runway-by-runway) implementation process toward a NextGen readiness concept that would include development of an integrated system of PBN routes and procedures NAS-wide. This broader view will go further in advancing NextGen and better accommodate our intent to accelerate NextGen as much as possible. In the end this integrated approach will optimize benefits for operators, and ultimately, the traveling public. While we anticipate challenges along the way, we have learned from our work over the past few years and are prepared to meet those challenges effectively.
• Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would happy to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

RICK DAY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

CENTER WEATHER SERVICE UNITS,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT,

JULY 16, 2009.

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here to testify about the status of Center Weather Service Units (CWSU).  As this is my first opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee, I would like to take just a moment to introduce myself.  My name is Rick Day, and I am the Senior Vice President for Operations for the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Air Traffic Organization (ATO).  As Senior Vice President for Operations, I oversee the safe and efficient delivery of air traffic services provided by the FAA.  My career with the FAA began 35 years ago as an air traffic controller at the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center.  I have first hand experience relying on CWSU forecasts so it is especially fitting that in my first appearance before you I will testify about the CWSUs and their future. 

The FAA has had a longstanding, productive relationship with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS).  We want to continue to this relationship with a renewed focus of improved aviation weather forecasting.

A little history of our working relationship may be helpful.  Aviation weather forecasting services have always been integral to safe and efficient operations within the National Airspace System (NAS) and support from the NWS has been key.  The formal arrangement by which the NWS now provides aviation weather services to the Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) [1] originated with the NTSB recommendation issued on October 28, 1977, following its investigation of the crash of Southern Airways flight 242.  The NTSB recommended that FAA develop rules and procedures for the timely dissemination by air traffic controllers of all available severe weather information to inbound and outbound flightcrews in the terminal area.  To address this recommendation, the FAA entered into an Interagency Agreement with the NWS, to create CWSUs at each FAA ARTCC.

Today, CWSUs are located at each of the FAA’s 21 ARTCCs throughout the United States.  They are staffed by 84 NWS meteorologists, 16 hours a day, seven days a week.  Typically, the CWSU forecaster on duty works with the ARTCC Traffic Management Unit (TMU), providing two scheduled weather briefings and updates throughout the day.  The CWSU forecast is used in the development of the operational plan for air traffic, including runway configurations and routing traffic around significant weather.

The original Interagency Agreement with the NWS that established the CWSUs has been renewed a number of times since it was first entered into in 1978.  The current agreement will expire in September of this year but we expect to execute the agreement’s one-year extension option to continue the existing CWSU operations through September 2010. 

Over the last several years, the FAA has been exploring opportunities to improve safety and efficiency within the NAS and capitalize on technological improvements that have emerged over the last 30 years since CWSU operation began.  Technological improvements have changed the way in which weather information is generated, disseminated and used.  In addition to the change in technology, we found that the CWSUs were not providing the same level of services at all of its locations, and the services and forecasts were not standardized across the 21 locations.  There was also little collaboration or communication between the different CWSUs.  In addition, neither the FAA nor the NWS had a formal quality assurance program for CWSU products and services.  To this end, in 2005, the FAA asked the NWS to examine different service methods to provide improved, consistent and continuous (24 hours per day, seven days per week) weather support to ARTCCs.  In response to this request, the NWS submitted a restructuring proposal in October 2006.  In April 2007, the FAA declined this proposal because we were in the process of an internal requirements review.  We completed that review in late 2007.     

Following this review, we refined our requirements for services provided by the CWSUs because our existing requirements were too broad to ensure the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the services.  Also, as GAO found, FAA did not have a system in place to gather information about the effect of forecasts on delays and diversions in the NAS.

In December 2007, the FAA asked NWS to provide a new proposal based on more narrowly tailored requirements for the future weather forecasting needs and the need for performance evaluation.  Our requirements included 24-hour, 7-days-a-week staffing, standardized services to promote consistency in service delivery across the NAS as well as NAS-wide monitoring and a new Terminal Approach Control (TRACON) forecast that provided higher resolution information for 10 of our busiest TRACONs.  The FAA also asked that NWS outline three different service methods to meet these requirements using  (1) the existing CWSU configuration at 21 ARTCCs; (2) a reduced number of CWSUs; and (3) one centralized weather facility.  NWS responded with three proposals, each of which had some innovative ways to meet our requirements, however we did not accept any of them because the costs were too high for each alternative compared to the current cost of the program.     

In September 2008, the FAA advised the NWS that we preferred the single weather center solution but recognized the need for back up and requested the NWS refine their proposal.  Safety and efficiency have always been and will continue to be the driving forces behind any improvements to the CWSU service.  We received the NWS revised proposal last month.  Currently, the FAA has a team assessing the proposal and we expect to have the assessment completed in early August.

Although our assessment of the NWS proposal is not complete, with a two weather center approach, we see an opportunity to improve aviation weather forecasting services in the near term.  The agency expects the two center approach to provide finer resolution and more consistent and accurate forecasts that will improve the safety and efficiency of traffic flow through the National Airspace System 24 hours a day versus the 16 hours currently covered.  This consolidated CWSU model would also allow meteorologists monitoring the NAS to dynamically allocate resources to areas with “active” weather conditions, having the most impact on aviation operations. 

We understand that there may be some concern about providing weather services “remotely”.  We think this concern is unfounded because we have considerable experience with remote weather briefings.  Today, CWSUs provide remote support to TRACONS and select towers just as Flight Service Stations provide remote weather briefings to pilots.  In addition, providing weather services using this model is consistent with centralized weather operations used by NavCanada, Eurocontrol, and  the U.S. Department of Defense as well as the airlines.

Further, CWSUs will not be the only source of aviation weather information for FAA’s air traffic operations.  NWS would continue to have, at any one time, approximately 130 meteorologists providing meteorological watch and issuing forecasts for parts of the NAS from its weather forecast offices and the Aviation Weather Center providing terminal and enroute forecasts.  

The current requirements for the CWSUs to provide “consistent” information will also help move aviation weather services towards the FAA’s future needs envisioned for the Next Generation Air Transportation System or NextGen.  One key concept of NextGen is a common operational picture of weather information for all air traffic management decisions.  This concept is already being put into practice through the Collaborative Convective Forecast Product (CCFP).  Several years ago we asked the NWS to develop and provide the CCFP based on user feedback that there were several convective forecasts available, often providing different answers.  FAA needed a “common operational picture” of convective weather on which to build the air traffic management plan.  The CCFP provides this common forecast of convective weather.  It is developed from collaboration among meteorologists from CWSUs, the Aviation Weather Center, Meteorological Service of Canada, and the airlines.  FAA and NAS stakeholders now rely on the CCFP as the primary forecast product for NAS-wide operations planning, during the convective season.  Consistent with the NextGen Concept of Operations, we need a common operational picture of all weather elements that impact air traffic.

In the time since the GAO’s January 2008 evaluation of weather services provided by CWSUs, we have taken steps to address GAO’s recommendations for establishing standards by which to evaluate CWSU performance.  We have already established standards for participation in the development of the Convective Forecast, when convective weather is expected to occur within that specific ARTCC domain; consistency of CWSU product formats, information content, and procedures for issuance, across all CWSUs; and, provision of on site or back up daily services 16 hours per day, seven days per week.  We began base-lining these performance standards with the NWS during site evaluations we started this year.  We have also established a standard for accuracy of forecasts used in decisions for traffic management initiatives.  The metric that results from this is being developed jointly by FAA and NWS.  This metric will take a little more time to refine, but we believe that building on a developing tool called the Weather Impact Traffic Index, which translates weather and weather forecast impact on air traffic, will help us in these efforts.

As I mentioned, the NWS and the FAA are also in the process of conducting a new series of site evaluations.  As of June, we had evaluated 13 of the 21 CWSUs and expect to complete the remaining site evaluations by September.  So far, we have found what previous FAA, NWS and GAO reports have documented:  a lack of standardization in CWSU services.  Having said that, we have also found that CWSUs are well integrated into air traffic management operations.  We have also found positive dividends from new FAA and NWS initiatives.  Specifically, NWS has provided all CWSUs with a common tool set--standardized technology, collaboration and training--which is producing improved and consistent service.  The FAA has funded a hardware and software technology upgrade of the AWIPS Remote Display (the standard meteorological workstation used by the NWS) which has improved system performance and weather information availability because it provides faster, more effective manipulation of forecast data. 

In conclusion, we are very hopeful about the benefits of the NWS proposal.  However, I want to assure you that our assessment of the NWS proposal is not the final consideration prior to implementation.  Let me be clear – we will not change the current configuration until a demonstration and validation show we are able to effectively disseminate the most timely and accurate weather forecasting for the safe operation of flights in our system.  We will work with the NWS to plan, execute and evaluate the demonstration and validation to prove whether the consolidated CWSU model will be able to provide on-demand services remotely.  In addition, we understand that the Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate of the National Academy of Sciences has agreed to oversee the demonstration and validation, providing an independent assessment of the consolidated CWSU model.  We also expect the NTSB to contribute to the demonstration and validation by participating in the independent review.  Finally, during the demonstration and review, we expect to develop the data necessary to assess, in quantitative terms, the improvements we have identified.

We have an opportunity to couple the art and science of aviation weather to reduce the impact weather has on aviation and increase the safety of operations.  FAA and NWS will continue to learn and grow together as we move towards our common goal of improved aviation weather services. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks.  I would be happy to answer any questions at this time.