STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE NICOLE R. NASON
ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

REGARDING

THE SAFETY OF CONSUMER PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE

JULY 18, 2007

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to discuss the safety of consumer products imported from the People’s Republic of China.

In 2006, 46 percent of the 306 million car, light truck and medium truck tires sold here were imported.  Ten years ago, imports constituted just 19 percent of total tire sales.  Of tires imported in 2006, 23 percent were imported from China, making China the leading country of origin for imported tires.  In 2000, Chinese tires were just six percent of imported tires.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is the federal agency responsible for setting safety standards for motor vehicles and equipment.  We are also responsible for two enforcement programs.  Our compliance program assures that vehicles and equipment comply with safety standards; our defects investigation program assures that, regardless of compliance with standards, they do not contain safety-related defects.  Protecting consumers from defective or substandard tires is one of NHTSA’s most important responsibilities, and a duty I view with the utmost seriousness.  

Every year NHTSA selects a sampling of new vehicles and equipment for compliance testing to determine whether these items meet our standards.  We crash test more than a hundred vehicles, test hundreds of tires, and conduct tests on about 100 child seat models.  Our increased testing has resulted in the number of recalls of noncompliant equipment influenced by NHTSA investigations doubling from 2005 to 2006.

In addition to testing for compliance with our standards, we also look at a wide variety of information sources to determine whether vehicles and equipment may be defective.  This Committee was instrumental in drafting the TREAD Act of 2000, which gave NHTSA much-needed authority to collect important data from manufacturers as part of its Early Warning Reporting (EWR) program.  Every quarter we receive reports on production data, death and injury claims, property damage claims, warranty claims, and field reports.  We review this data along with complaints received directly from consumers and all other available data to determine which vehicles or equipment warrant investigation.  Thus far, EWR data have proven useful in both providing the impetus for several investigations and recalls and providing supporting data for many more.

Although NHTSA’s compliance and defect investigations influence many recalls, manufacturers often undertake recalls without NHTSA’s involvement.  Manufacturers have a legal duty to report to NHTSA that a vehicle or equipment does not comply with NHTSA’s standards or when they learn that a vehicle or equipment contains a defect and determine that the defect is safety-related.  The manufacturers also have the duty to conduct a recall by notifying owners of the problem and offering to remedy the defect or noncompliance by repairing or replacing the vehicle or equipment or refunding the purchase price.

Under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Safety Act), importers of vehicles or equipment manufactured abroad are considered manufacturers.  This requirement is important because often neither NHTSA nor American consumers have effective recourse against foreign manufacturers of noncompliant or defective equipment.  Importers, therefore, have a duty to notify NHTSA of defects or noncompliance of which they are aware in the vehicles or equipment they import and to provide a remedy to the consumer.  Congress placed these duties on importers to ensure that the American public would be as protected from the possible dangers from foreign-made goods as they are from domestic goods.

In June, Foreign Tire Sales, Inc. (FTS), an importer of foreign tires, informed NHTSA that up to 450,000 tires it imported from China may be defective.  FTS then told NHTSA that the company would not be providing a remedy plan for the alleged defect (which was originally reported as “non-compliant”) because it lacked the financial resources to conduct a recall, despite a clear legal obligation to do so.  NHTSA promptly wrote to FTS to inform the company of its legal obligations as an importer to conduct the recall for the reported defective condition that FTS itself had determined to exist.  FTS subsequently stated its intention to conduct the recall and provided a remedy program.  That recall will soon be underway. 

This is the first time NHTSA is aware of an importer who has declared its financial inability to conduct a recall.  By comparison, in 2000 and 2001, Firestone conducted two recalls involving nearly 17 million tires, and Ford conducted a campaign involving an additional 13 million tires.  As recently as 2006, Firestone issued a re-notification of those recalls to ensure that any still in use were located and replaced.  Ford and Firestone took action to address the safety risk.  The law demands no less from importers.

Current law does contain financial responsibility requirements for so-called “registered importers” who import vehicles not built to comply with NHTSA standards. As amended in 1988, the Safety Act permits importation of noncompliant vehicles under certain conditions and with NHTSA approval.  For example, a registered importer who wishes to import a non-compliant vehicle must post a bond to ensure that the vehicle is appropriately modified to conform with NHTSA safety standards.   A registered importer also must demonstrate to NHTSA the capability to conduct a recall by providing evidence of being insured for that purpose.

The Safety Act contains no similar requirements for importers of motor vehicle equipment.  Present law does not contemplate the problem of an importer of compliant motor vehicle equipment who simply refuses to perform a recall of a defective product because of financial reasons.  With the growing tide of imported motor vehicle equipment, the prospect of an importer actually being financially unable to conduct a safety recall may some day pose a risk to American consumers.  Accordingly, we are studying means of addressing this problem and look forward to sharing our thoughts as the study progresses.

Mr. Chairman, we hope this hearing will serve as a reminder to all importers of motor vehicle equipment that they are financially liable under law to recall a defective or noncompliant product they import.  That is the risk importers assume in exchange for profiting on the sale of imported motor vehicle equipment.  There is no “hardship exemption” in the law, nor should there be.

NHTSA will continue to vigorously enforce our Nation’s vehicle safety standards, and ensure recalls of defective products occur when warranted. Thank you again for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the Committee’s questions.

The Honorable Nicole R. Nason
Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation

Before the

House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming

June 8, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sensenbrenner, members of the Select Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding the President’s May 14 Executive Order and the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.

In January, the President announced in the State of the Union address his “Twenty in Ten” proposal that would reduce domestic gasoline consumption by twenty percent in 2017. A key component of the President’s “Twenty in Ten” plan is to significantly boost fuel economy standards for cars and light trucks. The President’s aggressive goal to raise fuel efficiency would save up to 8.5 billion gallons of gasoline annually in 2017 and reduce consumption by 5 percent. Towards that end, the Administration forwarded draft legislation at the request of Chairmen Dingell and Boucher to grant the Secretary of Transportation the statutory authority to restructure corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) so we could then safely and responsibly raise fuel economy standards for passenger cars.

The Bush Administration has a proven record in this area. This Administration raised the CAFE standards for light trucks for seven consecutive years, from model years 2005 to 2011. The higher standards are expected to save 14 billion gallons of fuel over the life of the affected vehicles.

The saving of 14 billon gallons of fuel means that there will also be a net reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of 107 million metric tons. This is because as fuel economy is increased, the reduction in fossil fuel consumption necessarily translates into a commensurate reduction in carbon dioxide emissions.

Since the nation first decided to establish CAFE standards, fuel economy has improved and, therefore, carbon dioxide emission rates have decreased significantly. If fuel economy had not increased above the 1975 level, cars and light trucks would have pumped an additional 11 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere between 1975 and 2005. That is nearly the equivalent of emissions from all U.S. fossil fuel combustion for two years (2004 and 2005).

As important, the attribute-based structure that we have established promises that these and even greater benefits can be obtained without jeopardizing safety, without causing job loss, and without sacrificing consumer choice. Basing our reforms on the landmark 2002 study on CAFE by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), we changed the structure of the CAFE program to make it more effective, safer and fairer.

We accomplished this by using a structure that incentivizes manufacturers to add fuel-saving technologies instead of downsizing vehicles. Under an attribute-based CAFE system, fuel economy standards were restructured by basing them on a measure of vehicle size (the “footprint”) measured as the vehicle’s wheelbase times its track width. A target level of fuel economy is established for each increment in footprint. Smaller footprint light trucks have higher targets and larger ones have lower targets. Under the new standards, some light trucks will now be subject to a fuel economy target of 28.4 milers per gallon, higher than today’s standard for passenger cars. All manufacturers will be required to comply with the reformed CAFE standard by model year 2011.

This reform has a number of benefits. First, it will result in more fuel savings than under the old CAFE because now all automakers will have to make their light trucks more fuel efficient.

This reform also has the benefit of preserving consumer choice. Under the old CAFE program, an automaker generally manufactures a certain quantity of small light trucks to balance out the larger light trucks it produces to meet the standard. Our attribute-based CAFE system not only allows automakers the freedom to produce vehicles consumers want, it also benefits new vehicle buyers by having all sizes of vehicles – small, mid-size or large -- become more fuel efficient.

We also tackled what NAS described as the CAFE “safety penalty.” The NAS study estimated that CAFE was partially responsible for between 1,300 and 2,600 lives lost in one year alone, 1993. This occurred because the flat standard encouraged manufacturers to meet much of their compliance obligations by downsizing cars, which is often the cheapest way to improve fuel economy. Since our restructuring of CAFE incentivizes automakers to add fuel-saving technologies instead of downsizing vehicles, we have been able to minimize safety impacts.

Mr. Chairman, our successful effort to reform and raise CAFE for light trucks will guide the way in meeting our next challenge. In response to Massachusetts v. EPA, on May 14 the President directed EPA and the Departments of Transportation, Energy, and Agriculture to take the first steps toward regulations that would cut gasoline consumption and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, using as a starting point his “Twenty in Ten” plan to reduce U.S. gasoline consumption by 20 percent over the next ten years. The steps called for in the May 14 Executive Order will ensure coordinated efforts on regulatory actions aimed at protecting the environment with respect to greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles that proceed in a manner consistent with sound science, analysis of benefits and costs, public safety, and economic growth.

This is a complicated legal and technical matter that will take time to fully resolve, but the President has directed us to complete the regulatory process by the end of 2008. In preparing this rulemaking, we expect to propose using an attribute-based system. We have received the manufacturers’ product plans for cars, and will receive their plans for light trucks by the end of this month.

Mr. Chairman, given the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act, there are now in effect two agencies with authority to regulate motor vehicle fuel economy and carbon dioxide tailpipe emissions. While NHTSA and EPA have convened several meetings to discuss the analysis necessary to responsibly raise CAFE standards for cars and light trucks, as the President stated, our regulatory efforts are “not a substitute for effective legislation.” Accordingly, we ask Congress to enact the President’s “Twenty in Ten” proposal as the most responsible way to raise fuel economy standards, reduce our dependence on foreign oil, and cut greenhouse gas emissions while preserving autoworker jobs in the United States and protecting consumer choice and passenger safety.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE NICOLE R. NASON
ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

REGARDING

CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE

MARCH 6, 2007

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to discuss Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards (CAFE) for passenger cars.

In January, the President announced in the State of the Union address his “20 in 10” proposal that would reduce domestic gasoline consumption by twenty percent in 2017.  A key component of the President’s “20 in 10” plan is to significantly boost fuel economy standards for cars.  Towards that end, last month the Administration forwarded draft legislation at the request of Representatives Dingell and Boucher that would give the Secretary of Transportation the statutory authority to reform and raise fuel economy standards for passenger cars.

The Bush Administration already has a history of reforming and raising fuel economy for light trucks.  Consider our record: this Administration has raised the CAFE standard for light trucks for seven consecutive years, from 2005 to 2011.  Our 2006 light truck rule not only will save a record amount of fuel, it also regulates for the first time fuel economy for some of the heaviest light trucks, such as the Hummer H2.  This rule also boosted the CAFE target for some light trucks to a level that exceeds the congressionally-mandated passenger car standard of 27.5 miles per gallon.

While these are notable accomplishments, the method by which they were achieved is probably the most important.  In its landmark 2002 study on CAFE by the National Academy of Sciences, the NAS found that while the CAFE program did fulfill its original goals, it contained flaws that were preventing the program from living up to its potential.

For example, one of the NAS criticisms was that the program concentrated most of the regulatory requirements on a few full line manufacturers. This resulted in some manufacturers who produced primarily smaller vehicles not being required to make any further improvements in fuel efficiency.

Additionally, the study found that having a “one-size-fits-all” standard allowed some automakers to produce fleets that met the standard even though many of the cars in the fleets were relatively fuel inefficient.  This meant that we were, and still are, losing fuel savings from a significant part of the fleet.

Finally, and most disturbingly, the study estimated that CAFE probably had cost between 1,300 and 2,600 lives in one year alone, 1993, because the standards were structured in a way that enabled automakers to meet much of their compliance obligations by downsizing cars. 

NHTSA carefully considered the NAS study, and methodically developed a new structure for light truck CAFE standards that addressed each of these criticisms.

This new system, called “Reformed CAFE,” is based on requiring automakers to achieve improved fuel economy not by downsizing, but by adding fuel-saving technologies.  Basing CAFE standards on adding fuel-saving technology instead of downsizing vehicles has a number of benefits.  First, by setting fuel economy targets for every size of vehicle, this ensures that vehicles small, medium and large have to improve fuel economy.

Second, under Reformed CAFE there is no longer an incentive for automakers to improve their fleet average by downsizing.  Accordingly, no longer will raising the CAFE standard mean a decrease in safety.

Third, since Reformed CAFE demands greater fuel efficiency from every model of vehicle affected, every automaker will share the regulatory burden for improving fuel economy, not just a few.

Finally, the Administration’s draft bill contains a CAFE credit trading provision.  The NAS study pointed out how the current CAFE system makes it more expensive than necessary to achieve a given level of fuel economy in the vehicle fleet.  Because one company may find it less expensive than another company to increase the fuel economy of its fleet, there are further cost-savings to be gained from allowing credit trading across companies.

CAFE already allows a manufacturer to accumulate credits if its fleet mix exceeds the standard. These credits may be carried forward or “banked” and used to offset future CAFE deficits by the same manufacturer.  Credit trading is a natural extension of this framework. 

Credit trading would be purely voluntary, and we believe it will help lower the industry’s cost of complying with CAFE.

In 1975 when Congress wrote the original CAFE standard, it did so by taking the average fuel economy number for the fleet and doubling it over a ten-year period.  Today, NHTSA can perform a much more sophisticated analysis on how to determine the CAFE standard.  We can do this because we have the benefit of individualized data on the fuel-saving capabilities of each car.

Accordingly, there is no need to set an arbitrary fuel economy standard, there is no need to sacrifice safety for better fuel economy, and there is no reason why some auto companies have to shoulder nearly all the regulatory burden.  Our light truck rule demonstrated that all of these problems can be overcome.

Mr. Chairman, the President indicated in his State of the Union address his desire to raise the fuel economy standard.  We believe that having experts develop the standard, using sound science and hard data, in an open and reviewable rulemaking process, is the most responsible way to determine a new CAFE standard. 

If Congress authorizes the Secretary to reform CAFE for passenger cars, we will immediately begin a rulemaking to boost passenger car fuel economy.  If the Administration’s draft legislation is enacted soon, cars rolling off the assembly line for the 2010 model year will have to meet a higher CAFE standard.

Mr. Chairman, given NHTSA's recent experience with setting the fuel economy standard for light trucks, which comprise half the vehicle sold today, we believe we have demonstrated our capability to set balanced standards for passenger vehicles, given the authority for reform.

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE NICOLE R. NASON
ADMINISTRATOR
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

REGARDING

A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSALS  FOR THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 28, 2007

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to discuss Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards (CAFE) for passenger cars.

Last month, the President announced in the State of the Union address his “20 in 10” proposal that would reduce domestic gasoline consumption by twenty percent in 2017.  A key component of the President’s “20 in 10” plan is to significantly boost fuel economy standards for cars.  Towards that end, earlier this month, at your request  and that of Chairman Dingell, the Administration forwarded draft legislation that would give the Secretary of Transportation the statutory authority to reform and raise fuel economy standards for passenger cars.

The Bush Administration already has a history of reforming and raising fuel economy for light trucks.  Consider our record: this Administration has raised the CAFE standard for light trucks for seven consecutive years, from 2005 to 2011.  Our recent light truck rule not only will save a record amount of fuel, it also regulates for the first time fuel economy for some of the heaviest light trucks, such as the Hummer H2.  This rule also boosted the CAFE target for some light trucks to a level that exceeds the congressionally-mandated passenger car standard of 27.5 miles per gallon.

While these are notable accomplishments, the method by which they were achieved is probably the most important.  In its landmark 2002 study on CAFE by the National Academy of Sciences, the NAS found that while the CAFE program did fulfill its original goals, it contained flaws that were preventing the program from living up to its potential.

For example, one of the NAS criticisms was that the program concentrated most of the regulatory requirements on a few full line manufacturers. This resulted in some manufacturers who produced primarily smaller vehicles not being required to make any further improvements in fuel efficiency.

Additionally, the study found that having a “one-size-fits-all” standard allowed some automakers to produce fleets that met the standard even though many of the cars in the fleets were relatively fuel inefficient.  This meant that we were, and still are, losing fuel savings from a significant part of the fleet.

Finally, and most disturbingly, the study estimated that CAFE probably had cost between 1,300 and 2,600 lives in one year alone, 1993, because the standards were structured in a way that enabled automakers to meet much of their compliance obligations by downsizing cars. 

NHTSA carefully considered the NAS study, and methodically developed a new structure for light truck CAFE standards that addressed each of these criticisms.

This new system, called “Reformed CAFE,” is based on requiring automakers to achieve improved fuel economy not by downsizing, but by adding fuel-saving technologies.  Basing CAFE standards on adding fuel-saving technology instead of downsizing vehicles has a number of benefits.  First, by setting fuel economy targets for every size of vehicle, this ensures that vehicles small, medium and large have to improve fuel economy.

Second, under Reformed CAFE there is no longer an incentive for automakers to improve their fleet average by downsizing.  Accordingly, no longer will raising the CAFE standard mean a decrease in safety.

Third, since Reformed CAFE demands greater fuel efficiency from every model of vehicle affected, every automaker will share the regulatory burden for improving fuel economy, not just a few.

Finally, the Administration’s draft bill contains a CAFE credit trading provision.  The NAS study pointed out how the current CAFE system makes it more expensive than necessary to achieve a given level of fuel economy in the vehicle fleet.  Because one company may find it less expensive than another company to increase the fuel economy of its fleet, there are further cost-savings to be gained from allowing credit trading across companies.

CAFE already allows a manufacturer to accumulate credits if its fleet mix exceeds the standard. These credits may be carried forward or “banked” and used to offset future CAFE deficits by the same manufacturer.  Credit trading is a natural extension of this framework. 

Credit trading would be purely voluntary, and we believe it will help lower the industry’s cost of complying with CAFE.

In 1975 when Congress wrote the original CAFE standard, it did so by taking the average fuel economy number for the fleet and doubling it over a ten-year period.  Today, NHTSA can perform a much more sophisticated analysis on how to determine the CAFE standard.  We can do this because we have the benefit of individualized data on the fuel-saving capabilities of each car.

Accordingly, there is no need to set an arbitrary fuel economy standard, there is no need to sacrifice safety for better fuel economy, and there is no reason why some auto companies have to shoulder nearly all the regulatory burden.  Our light truck rule demonstrated that all of these problems can be overcome.

Mr. Chairman, the President indicated in his State of the Union address his desire to raise the fuel economy standard.  We believe that having experts develop the standard, using sound science and hard data, in an open and reviewable rulemaking process, is the most responsible way to determine a new CAFE standard. 

If Congress authorizes the Secretary to reform CAFE for passenger cars, we will immediately begin a rulemaking to boost passenger car fuel economy.  If the Administration’s draft legislation is enacted soon, cars rolling off the assembly line for the 2010 model year will have to meet a higher CAFE standard.

Mr. Chairman, given NHTSA's successful experience with setting the fuel economy standard for light trucks, which comprise half the vehicle sold today, we believe we have demonstrated our capability to set balanced standards for passenger vehicles, given the authority for reform.

I would be pleased to answer any questions.

TESTIMONY OF

DANIEL G. MINTZ
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORATION

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

September 20, 2007

Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn and other Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss issues relating to the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Information Technology (IT) programs, specifically those that are included on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Management Watch List, the OMB High Risk List and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) High Risk Series.

My name is Dan Mintz; I have been the Chief Information Officer (CIO) for the DOT since May 1, 2006. In that capacity, my responsibilities include serving as the Vice Chair of the DOT Investment Review Board, which oversees all major IT investments for the Department.

I came to the Government from Sun Microsystems. During my years at Sun, I managed IT programs similar in magnitude to those being discussed here today and understand the need for senior management review and oversight to ensure that all risks are properly mitigated. Many of the lessons learned during my time at Sun have helped me to more fully appreciate the issues facing DOT IT program managers and what we as a Department need to accomplish.

My testimony will address three IT investments (that are included on the Watch List and High Risk Lists) and some general information concerning one of our projects designated by GAO as High Risk. I also will share with you progress made regarding IT governance activities. Throughout these examples I will point out what I have found has worked well and not as well in improving IT performance at the Department.

OMB’s Management Watch List

Let me first start with a success story for the Department. As you are aware, every year after reviewing each agency’s portfolio, OMB evaluates the business cases for each major investment. Some become grouped as those OMB considers as “Well Planned and Managed” and the remaining ones are placed on their “Management Watch List”. In September 2006, we forwarded 47 business cases associated with our major programs to OMB for the Budget Year 2008 submission, and of those, 38 were placed on the Management Watch List. OMB’s concerns related to specific aspects of the individual investments, including Project Management, Acquisition Strategy, Security and Privacy, Risk Management, Alternatives Analysis, Enterprise Architecture, and/or Cost and Schedule Performance. Remediation plans were developed for each business case and efforts were undertaken to address the concerns. Senior managers within each Operating Administration were made aware of the concerns, and became personally involved in the resolution of all issues. The Department made steady progress in remediation efforts and by March 2007, 90 percent of those programs were remediated.

As of today, one program remains on the Management Watch List, our Combined IT Infrastructure, with program oversight residing within my immediate organization. This program is designed to help DOT accomplish economies of scale by better understanding the department-wide commitments to IT infrastructure, including the investments specific to Operating Administration field offices located throughout the country. This investment is a consolidation of 42 other smaller investments. Currently for this program to be removed from the Management Watch List, security reporting needs to be further refined. I and my staff continue to focus on developing acceptable business solutions to more effectively manage this investment.

OMB High Risk List

The Department currently has 22 IT projects on the OMB High Risk List, including 16 mission related programs and six electronic Government (eGov) investments. The current list is the result of negotiations with OMB with the exception of the Combined Infrastructure and Consolidated Grants investments which were added due to the delay in remediation efforts for Budget Year 2008. These programs are regularly briefed to DOT senior managers to address variances. Also, the Department gathers detailed information on these programs, and when determined necessary, programs are forwarded to the Departmental Investment Review Board for review. My office continues to monitor each of these programs on a monthly basis and submits quarterly reports to OMB.

I would like to highlight a number of the programs currently on the OMB High Risk List to give you an idea of the issues at hand, as well as the management attention being given. We at the Department consider these programs to be a high priority as well as high risk. I will address the following programs: the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Telecommunications Infrastructure, Consolidated Grants and FAA’s Traffic Flow Management.

FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI)

FTI is the primary means through which the FAA will obtain the telecommunications services it requires through the year 2017. Under this program, the FAA is replacing eight separate legacy networks with a single, integrated network. FTI enables the FAA to reduce the operating costs for its telecommunications enterprise. The public will benefit from the FTI program through lower operating costs and support of modernization initiatives that will increase the capacity of the U.S. civilian air traffic control system and reduce delays.

This program has had its challenges over the past years; however, I am pleased to report that after more involvement at the Departmental level, and continued commitment of the program management team, the program is back on track. Through many discussions between OMB and senior Departmental staff, this program has been restructured. Generally, over the past year this program has seen remarkable improvement in meeting cost and schedule goals. There are two major challenges facing the FTI program at this point in time: (1) Coordinating the timely disconnect of legacy services used by the Department of Defense (DoD); and (2) Designing solutions for unique FAA interfaces so that the services can be transitioned to FTI.

(1) The first challenge is important because the FAA’s ability to decommission legacy networks is contingent upon the DoD taking action in a timely manner to disconnect legacy circuits after the operational service has been cutover to FTI. The FAA is proactively engaging high-ranking DoD officials to obtain their commitment to support this effort. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) will be established between the FAA and DoD to formally document roles and responsibilities.

(2) The second challenge is important because the FAA’s ability to decommission FAA-owned components of legacy networks is dependent upon the transition of all services, including those with unique interfaces that are carried on FAA-owned legacy networks. As part of the mitigation of this risk, the FTI program has a test bed facility at the FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical Center to perform integration testing between FTI solutions and the end user systems. In addition, the FTI program has proceeded with the transition of leased legacy telecommunications services that support the unique interfaces so that the cost savings objectives of the program continue to be met while an FTI solution is developed to replace the FAA-owned portion of the legacy service.

Consolidated Grants

The Department annually awards approximately $70 billion in grants to promote fast, safe, efficient, and convenient transportation for the American people. These grants are managed using established processes and procedures which are supported by dedicated information systems throughout many of our Operating Administrations. The goal of the Consolidated Grants effort is to move DOT towards a more unified approach to grants management by integrating and consolidating current systems and processes. This program is currently on the OMB High Risk List due to fact that for Fiscal Year 2007 we were unable to complete all necessary remediation efforts by June 2007.

The primary challenge facing the Grants Consolidation effort is balancing the benefits from integration and consolidation with the ultimate requirement to successfully deliver and manage grants. There are unique challenges associated with the significant systems integration and business process re-design, especially since any delay will impact the grantees and the associated appropriated funds. Grants management systems are unique since they cross numerous functional boundaries including financial management, grant program management, appropriations and mission oriented functions. Within DOT, the effort is further complicated by a multitude of links to systems from States, localities, and other Federal systems.

The Department is working with OMB to determine the most effective and efficient way to process Departmental grants, keeping in mind the recipient constituencies and the reimbursable and non-competitive nature of our grant programs.. In response to this guidance, DOT will be performing a “fit/gap” analysis of the three major DOT grants management systems, FAA’s System of Airports Reporting (SOAR), the Federal Highway Administration’s Fiscal Management Information System (FMIS), and Federal Transit Administration’s Transportation Electronic Award Management (TEAM) system relative to the Grants Management Lines of Business Consortium Leads and will continue with any associated migration planning.

FAA Traffic Flow Management (TFM)

The Traffic Flow Management system is the Nation’s single source for capturing and distributing detailed air traffic information to the aviation community for coordinating air traffic. When severe weather, congestion and/or outages impact the National Airspace System (NAS), TFM provides timely flight data to all stakeholders and traffic management specialists to revise flight schedules and minimize system delays. Currently this program is within the acceptable 10 percent variance for both cost and schedule.

The greatest challenge confronting this program is maintaining requirement stability. Currently, requirement stability will be maintained by freezing the current legacy system, monitoring programmatic risks with monthly status meetings, and conducting monthly meetings between the modernization personnel and the enhancements team.

GAO High Risk Series

Transitioning to the GAO High Risk programs, I will address FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization which has been designated by the GAO as a high risk program since 1995. This modernization effort, which includes the acquisition of new systems and facilities, has been and will continue to be a major effort for the Department. The FAA is committed to improving processes resulting in better decision making, cost savings and achieving results. GAO is tracking FAA’s progress in the following six key areas: Acquisition Management, Cost Accounting and Estimation, Enterprise Architecture, Investment Management, Human Capital and Deployment. While some of the individual projects that make Air Traffic Control Modernization have experienced cost overruns, schedule slippages and performance shortfalls in the past, we have seen improvements over the last several years, which have been acknowledged by the GAO.

These improvements have occurred in part due to senior management’s focused attention on the modernization effort. Some of the accomplishments to date include: the formation of an Executive Management Team and supporting Project Team, development of a Project Plan and Measurement scorecard for reporting status and problems, inclusion in the FAA Flight Plan, and an objective review of accomplishments and deliverables to verify implementation. Risk mitigation efforts continue and we are working to ensure that lessons learned are systematically addressed in Agency processes and requirements. We will continue to strive for further significant measurable improvements.

I have been participating in quarterly review meetings with FAA and the GAO and can tell you first hand that this effort is making progress and senior mangers will continue to track the efforts needed to reduce risks associated with air traffic control modernization. The GAO has acknowledged that the FAA has a comprehensive, corrective action plan in place, which meets their expectations for improvement. We understand that the GAO will be looking for full implementation of all planned activities and that planned “initiatives have been monitored by the FAA and validated as being effective and sustainable”. We appreciate the GAO’s efforts with regard to air traffic control modernization and welcome its continued assessment of the FAA’s progress.

Governance Activities

Since I started at the Department, I have more fully involved the Operating Administration CIOs in all programmatic areas. I want to share another success story that relates to the re-shaping of our IT governance processes within the Department where we refocused attention on the further development of the CIO Council. The CIO Council is comprised of CIOs from all of the Operating Administrations and my staff. The Council meets monthly and periodically reviews a number of cross-cutting and other proposed IT investments. An enhanced prioritization process was recently introduced so that proposed cross-cutting IT investments are reviewed more closely based on the mission needs. As a result of these recent changes, high priority IT initiatives will have greater focus throughout the Departmental review cycle. Recommendations from the CIO Council that involve major investments are forwarded to the DOT Investment Review Board for final decisions. We are also seeing evidence of more meaningful governance processes being put into place in the Operating Administrations. While we have more work to do relating to full implementation, we are on the correct path.

Over the next few years, the Department will undertake a number of initiatives that we strongly believe will both improve ongoing program management and the way we are more effectively meeting mission needs overall.

First, we are in the process of establishing a Department-wide program management organization. The organization will establish systematic processes and requirements for a consistent approach to program management throughout the Department. I have begun activities to establish a Business and Infrastructure Transformation team which will focus on internal process improvement, project management improvement, and the initiation, oversight, and execution of internal Departmental projects.

Second, we will continue to ensure that those programs identified as High Risk and High Priority are reviewed by senior managers as well as the Investment Review Board when cost and schedule variances exceed given thresholds (i.e., 10 percent). I want to closely track the programs by focusing on trends so that issues can be addressed long before thresholds are exceeded.

Third, I am implementing a plan to effectively address both technical and functional performance. We will be creating performance milestones developed with more precise indicators tracking program success. In addition, programs will be evaluated on a continual basis to assess whether they are routinely meeting their mission goals. Part of our plan is to assist program managers in developing these milestones and performance indicators.

Fourth, we are addressing the issue of Earned Value Management. This early warning mechanism will further assist program managers in addressing risks. We need time to implement fully and successfully Earned Value Management techniques and are experiencing some challenges. We find ourselves in a similar situation as most other civilian agencies in that we are unable to fully address all of the thirty-two criteria for a certified Earned Value Management System. Currently we are trying to adequately address the surveillance and financial criteria. At this time, the Department is participating in a civilian agency and industry working group to develop a better working relationship with our service providers and to ensure that we are all working towards the same program management goals.

Finally, this year we developed an improved ranking of investments across the Department to better determine the “health of our investments” and we plan to update the results on a quarterly basis. Over time we plan to ensure our ranking process takes into account a more complete portfolio and we plan to better prepare our executives to understand the value of each investment and ensure they can make informed decisions based on business priorities. This insight will improve the investment management process overall.

Summary

In conclusion, significant progress has been made, and is continuing to be made to fully leverage information technology to meet the Department’s mission. I am convinced we are making a difference. Significant challenges remain, including the need to continue to improve our program management skills, manage project risks and continuously monitor program performance so that management can quickly and effectively mitigate issues before they become troubled investments. We must continue to extend our partnerships with industries to ensure that our transportation programs deliver quality products and services to the general public at all times and help ensure that we are adopting the proven program management practices found within both the public and private sector today.

Our experience is that when we develop transparent processes, collaborate with senior business owners and budget officials, and follow a consistent and robust project approach, we are able to keep most of the IT investments off the Management Watch List or have them quickly removed. When we do not accomplish one or more of those goals, the results are far less positive.

Because of the importance of transportation to the Nation’s economic well being, we receive attention from many sources of oversight, not only including those listed here, but the DOT Inspector General’s Office, as well as our own Departmental and Operating Administration management. Over the years we have learned to maximize the value of their input however challenging their opinion may be. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

TESTIMONY OF

DANIEL G. MINTZ
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 24, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Davis, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the important issue of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing.

My name is Dan Mintz; I have been the Chief Information Officer (CIO) for the Department of Transportation (DOT) since May 1, 2006. My responsibilities include serving as the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) and the Secretary’s lead for the Department’s Identity Theft Task Force. I came to the Government from Sun Microsystems. During my last year at Sun, I chaired a corporate-wide team that studied protection of Federal Government sensitive information within Sun’s corporate information systems. The lessons learned from that experience have been of substantial use during my time at the Department of Transportation.

The incident that I will discuss shortly that affected one of my own staff is a classic example of what the Committee has been warning about. Mr. Chairman, as early as May 2003, you said in a statement to this Committee that, “The users of file-sharing programs are predominantly teenagers. We parents and grandparents are too often left struggling to keep up.” In my staff member’s case, her teenage daughter downloaded LimeWire without informing her parents. LimeWire is a free and readily available software program that facilitates peer-to-peer file sharing. The result was that a number of Government documents were accessed remotely by a Fox News reporter.

I would like to briefly discuss the Department’s approach to security and explain the policies we have put in place relating to P2P software, provide an overview of the P2P incident involving my staff member and, finally, summarize the lessons learned and associated actions we are taking to minimize the likelihood of such incidents occurring in the future.

DOT Policy Efforts as a Result of Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and P2P Software

The Department’s Information Assurance Program has made steady progress in recent years to reinforce existing and introduce new security program measures to mitigate the impact of the potential risks posed by P2P applications and other vulnerabilities.

The Department’s FISMA score went from a C- in FY05 to a B in FY06 based on these and related steps. However, we continue to be focused on further educating, training, and improving our capabilities in cyber protection particularly as we work to support the Secretary’s goal to increase the Department’s telework capabilities and capacities.

The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) inclusion of a question in the annual FISMA reporting requirements regarding department and agency incorporation of policies and training with respect to P2P first began in the FY2005 FISMA reporting cycle.

On May 11, 2006, I issued DOT Information Technology and Information Assurance Policy Number 2006-17: Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Software Policy. This policy provided updated procedures and assigned responsibilities for ensuring protection against security incidents related to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) software applications. Complementing the issuance of this policy, the Department’s annual security awareness training program was updated to include information discussing the vulnerabilities associated with the use of P2P file sharing software as part of the annual training material.

I would like to emphasize two key provisions of our current P2P policy:

• DOT users are not authorized to install or use software applications on DOT computers and networks unless expressly authorized in writing by my office. Written authorization must be provided prior to installation of P2P software, if the need has been determined to allow the use of P2P.
• All DOT networks are monitored to identify the use of P2P software. If the use of P2P software is identified and if no written authorization exists for the use of the software, it will be removed immediately and appropriate disciplinary action should be considered.

As further background on our policy approach, the Department issued its first policy and guidelines addressing P2P file sharing applications on November 7, 2003, two years before this issue was included in the annual FISMA reporting requirements. In September, 2004, OMB issued guidelines for the use of file sharing technology. The Department’s initial policies and later updates responded to those guidelines including: creating policies, training, and implementing security controls.

DOT Efforts to Manage Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Software Usage

P2P software poses a significant risk to Departmental systems and networks as well as home computers. Others will focus on the details of how such software works and its potential impact, therefore, I will not deal with those topics here.

However, I do want to point out that peer-to-peer networks can be difficult to detect by intrusion detection systems (IDS), and most firewalls do not stop peer-to-peer traffic, because the peer node on the inside of the firewall initiates a connection to other peers. Once the internal node connects to an external network, any other peer node in the world will have access to the user’s desktop. Since the user desktop is a portal to critical DOT assets and resources, the internal peer node could provide any user in the world access to DOT systems.

Moreover, the current method of detecting P2P is through the installed base of Intrusion Detection Systems, which is less than perfect. The detection of P2P traffic using network based IDS’s generates numerous false positive alerts, because the detection approach is to look at specific ports on the network for P2P activity. Often legitimate software will utilize the same ports that P2P software is traditionally seen on, creating a false positive alert.

Security incidents at the Department are recorded and managed by the Transportation Cyber Incident Response Center (TCIRC). The TCIRC provides the Department’s IT infrastructure cyber-situational awareness. It is also the sole organization that coordinates and correlates all cyber-events with the Department of Homeland Security. The TCIRC is used by my office for major portions of FISMA compliance reviews and maintains a continuous monitoring capability to address the cyber-health and welfare of the DOT information technology (IT) systems and network.

The TCIRC treats detected P2P activity just as it does any other cyber security issue. When P2P activity is identified, the TCIRC staff use several tools in an attempt to identify the offending system. After identifying the offending system, the TCIRC works with security staff to identify the physical location of the system and take action to remove the system from the network and remove the P2P software from the system. It is current TCIRC policy that all P2P activity identified on any DOT system be reported to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). US-CERT is a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and other public and private sectors established in 2003 to help protect the nation’s Internet infrastructure.

DOT cannot restrict the use of peer-to-peer software on personal laptop or desktop computers. However, DOT policy prohibits employees and contract staff from using, processing, storing, or accessing DOT information or systems if P2P software is installed or suspected of being installed on an employee’s personal computer.

Overall, DOT maintains a constant vigilance on any cyber event that could cause harm to our networks. P2P detection is one of those events.

DOT Implementation of OMB Policies

There are two policies that OMB has issued that DOT uses to provide guidance regarding protecting and responding to breaches of personally identifiable information, M-06-16, issued June 2006, and M-07-16 issued May 2007. As part of on-going security and privacy efforts, DOT has worked to implement the requirements of OMB M-06-16 and OMB M-07-16. Specifically, we have:

• Established a departmental policy for the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) and sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII), including core requirements for encryption of SPII at rest, in transit and in store.
• Created the procedures described above for handling incidents involving the suspected or confirmed loss of personal information.
• Surveyed all IT system owners on the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards in place to protect personal information. The 2007 system survey is currently underway as part of our broad review of PII holdings.
• Deployed a best-in-class FIPS 140-2 compatible encryption solution on all Department laptops.
• Established a senior official team to respond to large-scale breaches.
• Moved to reduce the unnecessary collection and use of Social Security Numbers in programs and systems, and to mask those numbers whenever possible, if their use or collection is necessary.
• Initiated the revision of policies and procedures to reflect new requirements aimed at preventing and responding to breaches involving PII.
• Selected a solution for providing enhanced security training to all employees and contractors involved in the handling of PII and launched annual privacy awareness training.
• Used broadcast messages and other mechanisms to remind employees and contractors of new security and privacy issues and to remind them of their responsibilities to safeguard personal information.

While we have made important strides at DOT in the area of privacy and security protection, we are reminded by incidents, such as the P2P event, that we must remain vigilant about keeping employees informed of new threats as well as instituting new policies, procedures, technologies and tools to protect the data that resides on our networks.

DOT P2P Incident

My staff member, like many employees at the Department of Transportation, performs work at home. She does so because she has received approval to telework and also because there are times when she needs to perform work in the evenings or on weekends.

In about March of this year, her teenage daughter downloaded LimeWire—most likely to share music or similar files—without at the time informing her parents. In early May, a news reporter for Fox News accessed my employee’s personal computer and several Government documents.

On May 4^th, the reporter contacted my staff member by email, and informed her that he had accessed her personal computer and a number of Government-related documents. She contacted her manager, who reports to me, and we put her in touch with the DOT Office of the Inspector General (DOT OIG).

As part of their investigation, the DOT OIG performed a forensics analysis on the thousands of files on her computer, and identified approximately 93 DOT-related documents and approximately 260 National Archives-related documents, where she worked before coming to DOT in January 2007. Not all of those documents were publicly accessible at the time. The OIG has found that 30 of the approximately 93 DOT-related documents were publicly accessible at the time via LimeWire or other P2P software by virtue of residing in a “shared folder,” while 36 of the approximately 260 National Archives-related documents were in a shared folder and thus publicly accessible. None of the DOT documents identified contained sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII) about any other employee other than my staff member herself.

The DOT OIG has briefed me on their investigation and is completing a final report. Assuming nothing unexpected turns up as the DOT OIG concludes its review, we are planning to close the incident without a formal personnel action. The person in question has been an excellent and valued employee at the Department; she made a mistake. While we do not believe that disciplinary or other personnel action involving our employee is warranted, the CIO Office has assigned her a number of tasks directly related to reviewing current policies on home computer use and potential problems associated with peer-to-peer networking and providing recommendations for strengthening these policies.  In addition, the employee will assist in developing appropriate training for agency employees concerning the proper handing of SPII.

Lessons Learned

In many ways, this incident and the nature of the people involved illustrate the challenges we face and the need for continuing due diligence on all of our parts. An incident occurred involving an employee who has consistently performed well and approached her work in a professional manner, at a Department that has been improving its overall security, with policies in place that cover these issues in general and P2P specifically, and a training program that emphasizes these policies.

Yet, in this case, none of these were sufficient to prevent access to Government documents when a young family member downloaded software that she did not realize would be capable of exposing these documents to anyone else using the same or compatible software.

In response to this, the Department will be taking a number of initiatives that we strongly believe will both make the security infrastructure more robust and more aggressively make these issues more visible to DOT staff. The first three are broad initiatives dealing with the overall security organization and policy, the remainder deal with specifics relating to P2P.

First, we are performing an in-depth review of the security architecture that has now been integrated at the Department’s new headquarters building at the Southeast Federal Center (SEFC). Historically, the Department has had individually managed networks run by each Departmental agency. Administrative rights policies, hardware and software configurations, and network implementations were often inconsistent and inconsistently applied. The Department has committed to follow the recently promulgated standards for Microsoft Operating Systems put together by the Air Force, Microsoft, and OMB, and will shortly be putting in place rules and a transition strategy to simplify the overall network. This, plus the installation of centrally managed network security software, will make us better able to monitor the usage of permitted software and detect the usage of non-approved P2P software.

Second, the Federal Aviation Administration and the rest of the Department are moving to merge the two incident centers that each currently separately manages to create a single, integrated approach for Department-wide monitoring. This will make more efficient use of Departmental resources and establish an additional step in increasing the security posture to monitor these kinds of incidents.

Third, we have asked the DOT OIG to work with us in reviewing the totality of the policies that currently exist and help us determine which ones are effective and where there are gaps in the policy that need to be filled.

Fourth, we are expanding our emphasis to move employees to laptops from their more traditional desktop configurations. In this fashion, we will increase the percentage of employees who have Government owned equipment at home. And by policy and practice, all laptops are encrypted with FIPS 140-2 compatible Department of Transportation provided software. Agencies of the Department, such as the Federal Railroad Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration have already moved many of their employees to laptops. We will work with the DOT Telework Committee to identify those employees who have already been approved for telework plus those that would likely be key participants in any Continuity of Operations (COOP) event and be the first candidates to move to laptops when we perform a desktop refresh.

Fifth, we will be implementing a number of steps to improve the messaging regarding P2P to new employees and in particular those who will be involved with telework.

• We will prepare examples of home desktop configuration guides that teleworkers can use to set-up their home PC. While these will only be guidelines, it is clear that home workers are looking for advice on how to secure their systems. As a supplement to our current annual security training for all DOT employees, we will be creating telework specific training which will include information on threats facing home PCs.
• Finally, we will ask all employees upon their departure from the Department to verify that all Departmental information has been removed from the employee’s home computer.

Summary

In conclusion, it is my observation and experience at DOT that while progress has been made in managing threats stemming from P2P file sharing, we must remain vigilant about educating our employees about these dangers and developing and implementing policies, procedures and technologies aimed at safeguarding our networks and sensitive data. At the same time, we must balance this vigilance against the many positive, legitimate uses of P2P for improving government efficiency and productivity.

Finally, we need to recognize that regardless of the policies that we put in place and how we make those policies available to our employees, the continual audit of their effectiveness and continual reinforcement of our policy goals will in large part determine their effectiveness.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important topic, and I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

Statement of

Mr. Ronald Medford
Senior Associate Administrator for Vehicle Safety
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

before the

Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance and Automotive Safety
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate

regarding

Vehicle Safety and Children

February 28, 2007

Mr. Chairman, my name is Ron Medford, and I am the Senior Associate Administrator for Vehicle Safety at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).  I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss the important issue of improving vehicle safety for children.  I regret that NHTSA Administrator Nicole R. Nason could not appear before you because of a prior commitment to testify at a House subcommittee hearing.

The mission of NHTSA is to reduce fatalities and injuries on our Nation’s roads.  In 2005, the last year for which complete data are available, there were 43,443 highway-related fatalities and 2.7 million injuries. Vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for the age group of 4 to 34.

While every highway-related death is a tragedy, the loss of a child is particularly devastating. 

Administrator Nason, the mother of two young daughters herself, has made protecting children one of her top priorities.  Earlier this month, Administrator Nason hosted a public meeting with industry leaders and consumer advocates to discuss ways to increase the use of Lower Anchorages and Tethers for Children, or the LATCH system.  LATCH is a system of anchorages built into newer vehicles that is specifically designed to make it easier to properly install child seats.  This meeting came about as a result of a new survey conducted by NHTSA which found that 40 percent of parents with LATCH-equipped vehicles still rely on seat belts to secure their child seat.  The survey also found that many parents are unaware of either the existence or the importance of the LATCH system. 

As a result of this meeting, NHTSA is working with vehicle and car seat manufacturers, child seat installation instructors, and consumer advocates to develop a national education campaign to better inform parents on proper child seat installation.  Installing a child safety seat should not be a daunting task for parents, and NHTSA is committed to making LATCH better known and easier to use.\

Additionally, NHTSA is currently working to revise its ease-of-use ratings for child seats.  We believe this new rating system will serve as a strong incentive for child seat manufacturers to make proper installation of car seats easier for parents.

Another area of concern that NHTSA is active in addressing is backover crashes.  Last November, NHTSA released a comprehensive study on this problem.  This study estimated that backover crashes cause at least 183 fatalities and up to 7,419 injuries annually.  Thankfully the majority of these injuries are relatively minor, meaning that the victims are treated in the emergency room and released.

As part of this study, NHTSA tested several systems currently available to evaluate their performance and potential effectiveness in mitigating backover crashes.  Our tests found that the performance of ultrasonic and radar parking aids in detecting children behind the vehicle was typically poor.

Our study also looked at camera-based systems and found that they provide drivers with the ability to see pedestrians in the majority of rear blind spot zones.  However, we found that rain, fog or glare from the sun can significantly reduce the camera’s ability to show drivers a clear view of an object in back of the vehicle.  The cameras are also not effective at night.  Finally, our research showed that even if the camera can clearly discern the object, preventing the crash is still dependent on the driver observing the video display and reacting quickly enough.

Although our study showed that cameras have limitations in preventing backover crashes, NHTSA believes this technology holds promise.  Accordingly, we are continuing our research in this area.

Regarding the entrapment hazard posed by power windows, the Subcommittee may recall that in April 2004, NHTSA finalized a rule mandating that all vehicles sold in MY 2008 have recessed window switches to prevent their inadvertent activation.  Last year, NHTSA added to this rule pursuant to a mandate in SAFETEA-LU requiring that power window switches not only be recessed, but have to be pulled “up or out” to work.  We were pleased to be able to meet this mandate nearly a year ahead of the deadline set by Congress.  Although a child fatality due to a power window is an extremely rare occurrence (approximately one to two children a year on average) we believe that once in effect, these rules will significantly reduce the likelihood of these incidents.

Mr. Chairman, it is the worst fear of every parent to lose a child.  The good news is child safety has come a long way.  A generation ago it was not uncommon for children of all ages to be sitting anywhere in the car, completely unrestrained.  Through our educational efforts, and the passage of Anton’s Law and other similar legislation, now 98 percent of children under one year old are buckled up.

More important, these changes in law presaged a change in society towards child safety in vehicles.  Apart from being illegal in all 50 states, most parents now would never consider not buckling up their child.  This focus on child safety by parents is paying dividends, as NHTSA data shows that children nine years of age and younger have the least amount of fatalities among any age group.

NHTSA is committed to making additional safety improvements to further protect children.  Of all the lifesaving work NHTSA does, I consider this our most important duty.

Thank you for your consideration, and for this Subcommittee’s ongoing effort to improve highway safety.  I would be pleased to answer any questions.

STATEMENT OF

CHARLES LEADER,
DIRECTOR,
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

ON

JPDO AND THE NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANPORTATION SYSTEM: STATUS AND ISSUES,

MARCH 29, 2007

Good morning, Chairman Udall, Congressman Calvert, and Members of the Subcommittee.  I am Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).   I am honored to be here this morning to testify about the JPDO, and the work we are doing to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that deliver benefits to our customers today.

Moving to NextGen is inextricably linked to changes in the FAA’s financing system.  We need to establish the financing of current and future operations based on actual costs and investment requirements that will realize tangible benefits and increasing efficiency.  The NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration, provides the necessary reforms to our financing, and puts us on the path towards fully implementing the NextGen system.

And implementing that system is imperative.  Our nation's air transportation system has become a victim of its own success.  We have created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.   But we now face a serious and impending problem:  today’s system is at capacity.   While the industry downturn following the attacks of September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly.   And we have to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.

The warning signs are everywhere.   Flight delays and cancellations have reached unacceptable levels.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are placing additional stresses on the system.   If we fail to address these issues, we will suffocate the great engine of economic growth that is civil aviation.  A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015 – absent modernization, the consequences will be serious.

NextGen is about a long-term transformation of our air transportation system.  It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric systems.    Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve, and plans for how to get there from here.  That’s where the work of the Joint Planning Development Office has come in to develop, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan.  These documents provide us with that picture of where we want to go and the plans for how to achieve it. 

The Concept of Operations is a description of the transformed state of NextGen, much like what an architect’s blueprints offers a builder.  Then, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently with the Concept of Operations, and that’s the Enterprise Architecture.  The Enterprise Architecture provides the next level of technical details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder’s plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its power, water, sewage, cable, and internet connections to the rest of the community.  Finally, the Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of the general contractor’s work plan.  It specifies the timing and interdependencies of the multi-agency research, demonstrations, and development required to achieve the NexGen system vision.

This set of documents will define the NextGen system and guide the future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and systems development.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28^th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are anxious to receive their feedback.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months. 

Let me emphasize, however, that we are not waiting for 2025 to implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and increase capacity in an environmentally sound manner.  FAA and JPDO are beginning to move from planning to implementation.  In fact, the FAA’s FY 2008 – 2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in projects and activities that directly support NextGen.  The CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the National Airspace System modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the Agency intends to accomplish during that time.  Several key NextGen technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded in the FAA’s FY08 budget request.  These technologies and programs are:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.  FAA proposes to spend $173 million on these programs in FY08.

These technologies are essential to begin the transition from today’s air traffic management system to the NextGen system of 2025.  Perhaps the most significant of these transformational technologies is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B.  ADS-B is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control.  A key element of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways.  Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.  When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic; thereby substantially improving safety. 

ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA’s Capstone program in Alaska, and it has contributed to the recent reduction of GA accidents in Alaska by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped aircraft.    One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska will be in the Gulf of Mexico.  The FAA has signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI), helicopter operators and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of Mexico to improve service in the Gulf.  Using ADS-B technology, helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the Gulf.

The FAA is looking at a rulemaking that would mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and is working closely with stakeholders to determine an appropriate proposed timeline for a future NPRM.

In today’s NAS there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed, developed, and managed connections.  The future, however, demands an infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of expanding today’s point-to-point system is simply prohibitive.  System Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need.  SWIM will provide high quality, timely data to many users and applications.  By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will reduce unnecessary redundancy of information and better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing.  When implemented, SWIM will contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service.  In addition, SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations.  It will also allow for better use of existing capacity en-route.

The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts lies -- like much of our society -- in the ability to communicate large amounts of complex information in a fast, efficient, and robust manner. In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne aircraft is by voice communications -- in other words you pick up the “phone” to talk to someone else on another “phone.”  NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications, especially if you want to manage tens of thousands of aircraft flights on optimal trajectory-based routes.  Data communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned strategic traffic management.  Eventually, the majority of communications will be handled by data communications for appropriately-equipped users.  It is estimated that with 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. [FAA ATO-P Future Enroute Work Station Study, Preliminary Results, 2006] 

The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather picture to all NAS users.  Approximately 70 percent of annual national airspace system delays are attributed to weather.  The goal of this investment is to cut weather-related delays by at least 50 percent.  The weather problem is about total weather information management, and not just the state of the scientific art in weather forecasting.  The weather dissemination system today is inefficient to operate and maintain, and information gathered by one system is not easily shared with other systems.    We must integrate predictive weather information with decision support tools and provide uniform real-time access to key common weather parameters, and common situational awareness.  The benefits will be improved utilization of air space across all flight domains, and reduced flight delays.

The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air-to-ground and ground-to-ground voice communications in the air traffic control environment.  The switches today are very static, and our ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited.  Under the current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate and redesign the airspace.  In the future, the impacts of bad weather could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions to air traffic.  The new voice switch allows us to replace today’s rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of traffic.  Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA’s ability to implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase efficiency and improve performance.

At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them.  A crucial part of this activity is demonstrations of new technologies and capabilities.  In late April, we will demonstrate the use of continuous descent approaches with time metering.  We are requesting funding for additional activities related to defining operational concepts and technologies in the FY08 budget.  This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.  The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing in new technologies.  One demonstration will test trajectory-based concepts in the oceanic environment.  The ultimate goal is to increase predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel efficiency.  The other demonstration will accelerate the first integrated test of super-density operations using procedures for increasing capacity at busy airports.  This demonstration should achieve near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to implement the same procedures at other locations.

It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.  The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of transformations that will truly modernize today’s system.  Let me provide a few examples of this.

In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate highways in the sky.  In the high performance airspace of the future, each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.  Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same precise information, transmitted via data communications.  Investments in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based operations.

The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic management.  The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major demand and capacity imbalances.  SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.

With NextGen, the impact of weather is reduced through the use of improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of weather into automation to improve decision-making.  New capabilities in the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic restrictions.  Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments for these improvements.

Another vital consideration in the development of the NexGen system is successfully managing aviation’s environmental impacts.  We have set out an aggressive vision that grew out of a report to Congress that was requested under Vision 100.  Two years ago we delivered “Aviation and the Environment- A National Vision.”  Developed through the Partnership for Air Transportation Noise and Emissions Reduction (PARTNER) Center of Excellence, it brought near 40 stakeholders together: airlines, manufacturers, community groups, airports, universities, research establishments, and other government agencies to develop a common vision.  The participants agreed that the US aviation system should ensure significant impacts from noise and local emissions continue to decline, identify appropriate metrics to deal with greenhouse gas emissions, improve the relationship between airports and communities that surround them, and ensure the US remains a global leader in aviation environmental matters- even as we grow the system two to three fold.

A preliminary JPDO analysis has shown that long before we run into limits from technology, we run into constraints to capacity from noise and emissions impacts.  In fact, we potentially lose tens of billions of dollars in foregone aviation activity.  That’s why the NexGen reauthorization is so important.  It offers a number of programs that are essential if we are to meet the environmental objectives- and so foster capacity expansion and benefits it brings to the American public.  These include: demonstrating the use of new environmentally-friendly procedures; underwriting the implementation of such procedures at airports; targeting research of environmental issues at the airport level; accelerating the maturing of new noise and emission reduction technologies for use in aircraft; and exploring the use of alternative fuels to enhance supply security and environmental performance.  

We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the JPDO’s vision of the NextGen system into reality.  Because the JPDO is not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision.  The FAA is using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide their transformation to NextGen.  In the past the Operational Evolution Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA that extended ten years into the future.  The new OEP will include strategic milestones through 2025.  JPDO representatives will participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.

The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing, and prototype demonstrations.  This Operational Evolution Partnership will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA’s progress towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.

Cost will be a vital factor:  we cannot create a NextGen system that is not affordable.  Out-year funding estimates over the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10 billion.  Preliminary estimates suggest that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22 billion in funding.  We are working to continuously refine these estimates, particularly with our users as we implement new cost-based financing mechanisms, as proposed in the Next Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007, the FAA’s reauthorization proposal.

MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the NextGen avionics costs.  It concludes that a wide range of costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of equipage schedules.  The most probable range of total avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.  This range reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of time out-of-service required for equipage installation.

The importance of developing this system of the future is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering substantial consumer benefits.  The further opening of US and European markets in the recently-agreed “Open Skies” agreement reinforces this need.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet.  

Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program.  The FAA and the EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based air traffic management systems and technologies.  This coordination will address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA, and Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical initiative.  We hope to take the first steps under this agreement later this summer to lay out a roadmap of flight trials to test a number of procedures and technology that will reduce noise and emissions.

Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate for SESAR.  SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen.  They consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25 billion to $37 billion in US dollars through the year 2020.  SESAR, like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and better define the system.  However, there is an important difference in scope between SESAR and NextGen.  While SESAR focuses almost exclusively on air traffic management, NextGen takes what’s called a “curb-to-curb” approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and DoD and DHS NAS requirements.

Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of users -- very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security, environment and efficiency.  Research will continue to help us find the right balance between a centralized satellite and ground system and a totally distributed system, where aircraft “self-manage” their flight with full knowledge of their environment.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony.  I would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

Statement of 

Dennis Judycki,
Associate Administrator for Research, Development and Technology,
and
Benjamin Tang, Principal Bridge Engineer/Team Leader
Federal Highway Administration
United States Department of Transportation

Before the

Committee on Science and Technology
United States House of Representatives

Hearing on

Bridge Safety:  Next Steps to Protect the Nation's Critical Bridge Infrastructure

September 19, 2007

Mr. Chairman and Members, we are pleased to appear before you today to report on the Department of Transportation's research, development, testing, and evaluation activities, as administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), to ensure the safety of the Nation's highway bridges.  This is a very important hearing topic in the wake of the tragic collapse of the Interstate 35 West (I-35W) bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  On behalf of the Department, we extend our deepest sympathy to the loved ones of those who died and to the injured.

Minnesota Bridge Collapse

America was stunned by the collapse of the I-35W bridge at approximately 6:00 PM, Central Daylight Time, on Wednesday, August 1, 2007.  Numerous vehicles were on the bridge at the time and there were 13 fatalities and 123 people injured.  The I-35W bridge originally opened in November 1967 and became one of the critical facilities in a vital commercial and commuting corridor.  The bridge was an 8-lane, steel deck truss structure that rose 64 feet above the Mississippi River.  The main span extended to 456 feet in length to avoid putting piers in the water which would have impeded river navigation.  As of the 2004 count, an estimated 141,000 vehicles traveled per day on the bridge.

We do not yet know why the I-35W bridge failed, and the Department is working closely with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as it continues its investigation to determine the cause or causes.  In the interim, we are taking every step to reassure the public that America’s infrastructure is safe.  The Secretary of Transportation has issued two advisories to States in response to what has been learned so far, asking that States re-inspect their steel deck truss bridges and that they be mindful of the added weight construction projects may bring to bear on bridges. 

The Federal Highway Administration is assisting the NTSB in a thorough investigation, which includes a structural analysis of the bridge.  Within days of the collapse, development of a computer model based upon the original design drawings for the bridge began at FHWA's Turner Fairbank Highway Research Center in McLean, Virginia.  This model can perform simulations to determine the effect on the bridge of removing or weakening certain elements to recreate, virtually, the actual condition of the bridge just prior to and during the bridge's collapse. 

By finding elements that, if weakened or removed, result in a bridge failure similar to the actual bridge failure, the investigators' work is considerably shortened.  While examination of the physical members of the bridge being recovered from the site provides the best evidence of why the bridge collapsed, the analytical model allows the evaluation of multiple scenarios which can then be validated against the physical forensic evidence.  We are committed to accomplishing this work as quickly as possible, but it is expected to take several months.  Our experts will continue to be there, on the ground in Minneapolis, to provide assistance. We need to fully understand what happened so we can take every possible step to ensure that such a tragedy does not happen again.  Data collected at the accident scene, with the help of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 3-D laser scanning technology, is being used to assist in the investigation.

Federal, State, and local transportation agencies consider the inspection of our nearly 600,000 bridges to be of vital importance and invest significant funds in bridge inspection activities each year.  We strive to ensure that the quality of our bridge inspection program is maintained at the highest level and that our funds are utilized as effectively as possible.  On August 2, the day after the collapse, Secretary of Transportation Mary E. Peters requested the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General to conduct a rigorous assessment of the Federal-aid bridge program and the National Bridge Inspection Standards (NBIS).  

National Bridge Inspection Program

The National bridge inspection program was created in response to the collapse, in 1967, of the Silver Bridge over the Ohio River between West Virginia and Ohio, which killed 46 people.  At the time of that collapse, the exact number of highway bridges in the United States was unknown, and there was no systematic bridge inspection  program to monitor the condition of existing bridges.  In the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1968, Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation in cooperation with State highway officials to establish: (1) NBIS for the proper safety inspection of bridges, and (2) a program to train employees involved in bridge inspection to carry out the program.  As a result, the NBIS regulation was developed, a bridge inspector’s training manual was prepared, and a comprehensive training course, based on the manual, was developed to provide specialized training.  To address varying needs and circumstances, State and local standards are often even more restrictive than the national standards.

The NBIS require safety inspections at least once every 24 months for highway bridges that exceed 20 feet in total length located on public roads.  Many bridges are inspected more frequently.  However, with the express approval by FHWA of State-specific policies and criteria, some bridges can be inspected at intervals greater than 24 months.  New or newly reconstructed bridges, for example, may qualify for less frequent inspections.  Approximately 83 percent of bridges are inspected once every 24 months, 12 percent are inspected annually, and 5 percent are inspected on a 48 month cycle. 

The State transportation department (State DOT) must inspect, or cause to be inspected, all highway bridges on public roads that are fully or partially located within the State's boundaries, except for bridges owned by Federal agencies.  States may use their Highway Bridge Program funds for bridge inspection activities.  Privately owned bridges, including commercial railroad bridges and some international crossings, are not legally mandated to adhere to the NBIS requirements; however, many privately owned bridges on public roads are being inspected in accordance with the NBIS.

For bridges subject to NBIS requirements, information is collected on bridge composition and conditions and reported to FHWA, where the data is maintained in the National Bridge Inventory (NBI) database.  The NBI is essentially a database of bridge information that is "frozen" at a given point in time.  This information forms the basis of, and provides the mechanism for, the determination of the formula factor used to apportion Highway Bridge Program funds to the States.  A sufficiency rating (SR) is calculated based on the NBI data items on structural condition, functional obsolescence, and essentiality for public use.  The SR is then used programmatically to determine eligibility for rehabilitation or replacement using Highway Bridge Program funds.

Bridge inspection techniques and technologies have been continuously evolving since the NBIS were established over 30 years ago and the NBIS regulation has been updated several times as Congress has revised the inspection program and its companion program, the Highway Bridge Program (formerly Highway Bridge Replacement and Rehabilitation Program).  The most recent NBIS revision took effect in January 2005.  The bridge inspector's reference manual has been updated as well, and we have developed, through our National Highway Institute (NHI), an array of bridge inspection training courses.

There are five basic types of bridge inspections--initial, routine, in-depth, damage, and special.  The first inspection to be completed on a bridge is the “initial” inspection.  The purpose of this inspection is to provide all the structure inventory and appraisal data, to establish baseline structural conditions, and to identify and list any existing problems or any locations in the structure that may have potential problems.  The “routine” inspection is the most common type of inspection performed and is generally required every two years.  The purpose of “routine” inspections is to determine the physical and functional condition of a bridge on a regularly scheduled basis.  An “in-depth” inspection is a close-up, hands-on inspection of one or more members above or below the water level to identify potential deficiencies not readily detectable using routine inspection procedures.  A “damage” inspection is an emergency inspection conducted to assess structural damage immediately following an accident or resulting from unanticipated environmental factors or human actions.  Finally, a “special” inspection is used to monitor, on a regular basis, a known or suspected deficiency.

Safety is enhanced through these inspections and by “rating” bridge components, such as the deck, superstructure, and substructure, and by the use of non-destructive evaluation (NDE) methods and other advanced technologies.  Visual inspection is the primary method used to perform routine bridge inspections, and tools for cleaning, probing, sounding, and measuring, and visual aids are typically used.  On occasion, destructive tests are conducted to evaluate specific areas or materials of concern, or to help identify appropriate rehabilitative work.  Type, location, accessibility, and condition of a bridge, as well as type of inspection, are some of the factors that determine what methods of inspection practices are used.  When problems are detected, or during the inspection of critical areas, more advanced methods are employed.

Commonly used methods for evaluating concrete elements during “routine” inspections include mechanical sounding to identify areas of delamination (the separation of a layer of concrete from the reinforcing steel in the concrete member) and other forms of concrete degradation.  Similarly, for the “routine” inspection of steel members, methods include cleaning and scraping, and the use of dye penetrant and magnetic particle testing to identify cracking and areas of significant corrosion.

State-of-the-art methods utilized during “in-depth,” “damage,” and “special” inspections include impact echo, infrared thermography, ground penetrating radar, and strain gauges for concrete structures and elements, and ultrasonic, eddy current, radiography, acoustic emissions, strain gauges, and x-ray technology for steel structures and elements.

There are numerous other technologies under development that have the potential to substantially advance the practices used for bridge inspection.  Some of these technologies are also being developed or are in limited use by other industries, such as the aerospace and nuclear industries.  There is no one-size-fits-all approach in the use of non-destructive evaluations and testing; each technology is designed for a specific purpose and function.  Although these developing technologies have the potential to augment and advance bridge inspection practice, the challenge is to find a way to make them efficient, effective, and practical for field use.  FHWA, industry, academia, the Transportation Research Board (TRB), and State DOTs continue to investigate and improve the practicality of many of these technologies.  As a result of these efforts, a number of systems have recently become available that can assist an inspector in the identification and quantification of such things as reinforced concrete deterioration, steel tendon distress, and the displacement or rotation of critical members in a bridge.

There are also a number of monitoring systems that can be used to provide real time data and alert the bridge owner to such things as failure of load carrying members, excessive rotation or displacement of an element, overload in a member, growth of a crack, or scour around a bridge pier.  The type of information provided by these systems is either very specific and provides detailed information on isolated areas or members of the bridge, or rather generic and provides general bridge behavior information.  The most practical of these systems are being used by owners following an “in-depth” or “special” inspection, to monitor the performance of the element or the bridge, when some specific concern has been raised but the concern is not considered to be a short-term safety hazard.  However, the effectiveness and costs associated with monitoring systems must be weighed against the benefits gained.  Like any emerging technology, changes and updates in monitoring systems can become a big challenge to maintain economically over the long haul.  Today, bridges are being built to last 75 to 100 years and installing any new monitoring systems and expecting them to be durable and serviceable for such a long period has never been done before.  Monitoring systems that are available today require routine maintenance and repair, and continuous assessment to ensure that they are working correctly.  In addition, they do not eliminate the need for regular visual inspections.  In many circumstances, it is more effective to increase the inspection frequency, repair or retrofit areas of concern, or replace the structure.

Since 1994, the percentage of the Nation’s bridges that are classified as “structurally deficient” has declined from 18.7% to 12.1%.  The term "structurally deficient" is a technical engineering term used to classify bridges according to serviceability, safety, and essentiality for public use.  Bridges are considered "structurally deficient" if significant load-carrying elements are found to be in poor or worse condition due to deterioration or damage, or the adequacy of the waterway opening provided by the bridge is determined to be extremely insufficient to the point of causing intolerable traffic interruptions.  The fact that a bridge is classified as "structurally deficient" does not mean that it is unsafe for use by the public. 

These infrastructure quality numbers for bridges should, and can, be improved, but it is inaccurate to conclude that the Nation’s transportation infrastructure is unsafe.  We have quality control systems that provide surveillance over the design and construction of bridges. We have quality control systems that oversee the operations and use of our bridges.  And we have quality control over inspections of bridges to keep track of the attention that a bridge will require to stay in safe operation.  These systems have been developed over the course of many decades and are the products of the best professional judgment of many experts.  We will ensure that any findings and lessons that come out of the investigation into the I-35W bridge collapse are quickly learned and appropriate corrective actions are institutionalized to prevent any future occurrence. 

Bridge Research and Technology Programs

The current FHWA bridge research program is focused on three areas:  (1) the “Bridge of the Future,” (2) effective stewardship and management of the existing bridge infrastructure in the United States, and (3) assuring a high level of safety, security, and reliability for both new and existing highway bridges and other highway structures.

The “Bridge of the Future” is intended to be a bridge that can last for 100 years or more, and require minimal maintenance and repair--while being adaptable to changing conditions, such as increasing loads or traffic volumes.  FHWA's bridge research and technology (R&T) programs are focusing on improving the long-term performance of our Nation’s highway infrastructure in an effective yet economical way.

In the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Congress authorized and funded research in 5 program areas:  long-term bridge performance, innovative bridge delivery, high performance and innovative materials, nondestructive inspection technology, and seismic research.  The specific programs authorized by SAFETEA-LU are summarized in the following:

Long-term Bridge Performance

Long-Term Bridge Performance Program (LTBPP) – The LTBPP has been designed as a 20-year effort that will include detailed inspections and periodic evaluations and testing on a representative sample of bridges throughout the United States in order to monitor and measure their performance over an extended period of time.  The program will collect actual performance data on deterioration, corrosion, or other types of degradation; structural impacts from overloads; and the effectiveness of various maintenance and improvement strategies typically used to repair or rehabilitate bridges.  The resulting LTBPP database will provide high quality, quantitative performance data for highway bridges that will support improved designs, improved predictive models, and better bridge management systems.

Innovative Bridge Delivery

Innovative Bridge Research and Deployment (IBRD) Program – The IBRD program encourages highway agencies to more rapidly accept the use of new and innovative materials and technologies or practices in highway structure construction by promoting, demonstrating, evaluating, and documenting the application of innovative designs, materials, and construction methods in the construction, repair, and rehabilitation of bridges and other structures.  This will increase safety and durability and reduce construction time, traffic congestion, maintenance costs, and life-cycle costs of bridges. 

High Performance and Innovative Materials

High-Performance Concrete (HPC) Research and Deployment Program – The HPC program is a subset of the IBRD program.  It continues the advancement of HPC applications through targeted research that addresses needed improvements in design, fabrication, erection, and long-term performance in order to achieve the Bridge Program strategic outcomes.  HPC research focuses on material and casting issues, including improved performance criteria, lightweight concrete, curing, and test methods; structural performance concerns, including compression, shear, and fatigue behavior for both seismic and non-seismic applications; and concepts related to accelerated construction and bridge system design and performance. 

High-Performing Steel (HPS) Research and Technology Program – The HPS research and technology transfer program is focused on resolving a number of issues and concerns with the design, fabrication, erection, and long-term performance of both conventional and High Performance steels.  The program focuses research and technology transfer and education in the areas of materials and joining (for example, optimized welding processes and procedures); long-term performance (including advanced knowledge on performance limitations of weathering steels and the potential development of a 100-year shop-applied permanent steel coating system); innovative design (including testing and deployment of modular steel bridge super- and substructure systems); and fabrication and erection tools and processes.

Ultra-High-Performance Concrete (UHPC) Research and Technology– UHPC is a unique material which is reinforced with short steel fibers, but requires no conventional steel reinforcing.  Prior FHWA research on UHPC focused on basic material characterization, and the development of optimized structural systems using this very high performance, but costly, material.  Under the UHPC program, additional work will be conducted to further understand the unique structural properties of this material and assess its corrosion-resistance properties, while addressing its use in other structural components including precast bridge deck panels and prestressed I- and bulb-tee girders.

Wood Composite Research – The University of Maine is conducting a research program focused in the development and application of wood/fiber reinforced polymer (FRP) composite materials for potential use as primary structural members in highway bridges.

Nondestructive Inspection Technology

Steel Bridge Testing Program – This program is focused on the further development and deployment of advanced NDE tools that can be used to detect and quantify growing cracks in steel bridge members and welds.  As described in SAFETEA-LU, the NDE technology should ultimately be able to detect both surface and subsurface cracks, in a field environment, for flaws as small as 0.010 inches in length or depth.

Seismic Research

Seismic Research Program – The University of Nevada, Reno, and the State University of New York at Buffalo are conducting a seismic research program intended to increase the resilience of bridges and reduce earthquake-induced losses due to highway damage.

FHWA is also conducting and managing a number of other important bridge research projects in conjunction with various partners and stakeholder groups, all focused on improving the performance and durability of our Nation’s highway bridges--both those exposed to normal everyday traffic and use, and those exposed to the damaging effects of extreme natural and man-made hazards.

In addition to FHWA, there are a number of other organizations that sponsor bridge research, and a much larger group of agencies that conduct bridge R&T.  These include State DOTs, industry, other Federal agencies, and academia.  Other transportation modes also conduct limited bridge research, including the railroad industry. 

FHWA actively coordinates the National research program with our partners and stakeholders for agenda-setting, and in the conduct of research and delivery of new innovations.  Our staff participates in numerous national and international organizations and serves on committees focused on bridge research, development, and technology transfer.  We organize formal technical advisory groups and technical working groups, comprised of Federal, State, and local transportation officials; bridge engineering consultants and industry groups; and academia to assist in the design, conduct, and delivery of the program. 

An important R&T partner for FHWA is the University Transportation Centers (UTC) Program, managed by the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA).  FHWA works with the UTCs to identify opportunities for collaboration that will increase knowledge and skills among State and local highway agencies.  FHWA holds periodic workshops that bring together researchers and practitioners from FHWA, State DOTs, TRB, and UTCs to learn about each others’ interests and capabilities, new research opportunities, and technologies under development.  FHWA held an infrastructure workshop for UTCs and State DOTs at Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center in March 2007.  FHWA is working with a number of UTCs on transportation research, including the University of Tennessee, the University of Minnesota, Utah State University, Rutgers, and the University of Missouri-Rolla.  RITA also consolidates bridge technology information from all the Department's modal administrations to assist us in having the best available technologies.

State and local highway agencies learn of new technologies developed by UTCs through a variety of events sponsored by FHWA.  These include annual workshops showcasing the results of UTC research on particular topics, and numerous conferences, seminars and workshops co-sponsored with specific UTCs (for example, the “Self Consolidating Concrete Workshop” at South Dakota State University).   FHWA also utilizes its highly successful Local Technical Assistance Program (LTAP) as a mechanism for transferring technologies developed through the UTC program to State and local highway agencies, and tribal governments. 

FHWA is also an active participant with the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO ) in technology transfer such as the AASHTO Technology Implementation Group and the Joint AASHTO/ FHWA/National Cooperative Highway Research Program International Technology Exchange Program, more commonly known as the International Scanning Program.  Recent scans have included a scan on bridge management, and a follow-on scan in 2007 on Bridge Evaluation Quality Assurance.   The 2007 scan identified and explored bridge inspection processes in use in European countries.

Ultimately, a key measure of success of any highway technology depends on its acceptance by stakeholders on a national scale.  FHWA’s responsibilities for R&T include not only managing and conducting research, but also sharing the results of completed research projects, and supporting and facilitating technology and innovation deployment.  FHWA's Resource Center is a central location for obtaining highway technology deployment assistance. (The multiple services offered by the Resource Center are listed at www.fhwa.dot.gov/resourcecenter/.)  Education and training programs are provided through the FHWA NHI (www.nhi.fhwa.dot.gov).

There are a number of barriers to technology deployment that may explain the relatively slow adoption of highway technologies that appear cost effective.  Lack of information about new technologies is one barrier that may be overcome with information and outreach programs.  Long-standing familiarity with existing technologies gained through education or experience also may hamper the adoption of newer technologies.  Education and training programs provided through the NHI often help to transcend these types of barriers.

It also may be difficult for stakeholders to envision the long-range benefits of a new technology relative to initial investment costs, especially if the payback (break-even) period is long.  Even if stakeholders are aware of eventual cost savings from a more efficient or effective highway technology, they may have confidence in traditional ways of, for example, assessing pavement performance.  Demonstration projects that provide hard quantitative data can help tip the scales so that stakeholders are more willing to try and eventually regularly use innovative technologies.

Despite these efforts, technology deployment is also slowed by residual uncertainties about performance, reliability, installation, and maintenance costs; availability of the next generation of the technology; and the need for the necessary technical and physical infrastructure to support the technology in question.  These persistent barriers can be addressed with outreach programs and collaborative efforts with stakeholders--ranging from the TRB to researchers within State DOTs--as well as other incentives to enhance the cost effectiveness of new technologies.  Taken together, these initiatives often encourage earlier and broader adoption of highway technologies by increasing stakeholder familiarity with new technologies.

One such program is FHWA’s Highways For LIFE.  (http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/hfl/hflfact.cfm).  The purpose of Highways for LIFE is to advance long lasting highways using innovative technologies and practices to accomplish fast construction of efficient and safe pavements and bridges, with the overall goal of improving the driving experience for America.  The program includes demonstration construction projects, stakeholder input and involvement, technology transfer, technology partnerships, information dissemination, and monitoring and evaluation.  The innovative technologies that the Highways for LIFE program promotes include prefabricated bridge elements and systems, road safety audits, and tools and techniques for "Making Work Zones Work Better."

Perhaps the main barrier to technology deployment is the general lack of incentive mechanisms to encourage the deployment of new technologies.  We need to develop better incentive mechanisms in the way the program is designed, the way we procure, and the extent to which we rely on the private sector.

The Missouri Safe and Sound Bridge Improvement Project provides an example of a potentially innovative way to improve incentives and encourage innovation and private sector participation.

On May 25, 2007 the Department of Transportation approved a $600 million allocation of Private Activity Bonds to the Missouri DOT for the Missouri Safe and Sound Bridge Improvement Project.  The allocation will be made available to two short-listed bidders who are competing for a contract to bring 802 of Missouri’s lowest rated bridges up to satisfactory condition by December 2012 and keep them in that condition for at least 25 years.  The contract will be awarded largely on the basis of the lowest level of “availability payments” that the bidder will accept to improve and maintain the 802 bridges.  Missouri DOT will use Federal formula funds to pay the availability payments. 

SATETEA-LU authorized $15 billion in Private Activity Bonds.  These bonds provide tax-exempt financing for private firms to carry out highway and surface freight transfer projects.  This innovative financing approach will allow Missouri to complete these much needed bridge improvements more quickly and, it is hoped, at a lower cost.  Other States, including Pennsylvania and North Carolina, are also interested in this innovative approach.

Through these and other mechanisms, FHWA supports the development and implementation of innovative technology deployment practices and processes throughout the highway community.

Conclusion

The I-35W bridge collapse was both a tragedy and wake-up call to the country.  The Department's Inspector General will be monitoring all of the investigations into the collapse and reviewing our inspection and funding programs to decide and advise us what short- and long-term actions we may need to take to improve the program.  Though we will have to wait for the NTSB's report before we really know the cause of the collapse, a top-to-bottom review is underway to make sure that everything is being done to keep this kind of tragedy from occurring again.  The public deserves to know and trust that our Nation's highways are safe.

We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to give the people of this Nation the safe, efficient, and effective transportation system that they expect and deserve. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.  We will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

BRUCE JOHNSON,
VICE PRESIDENT OF TERMINAL SERVICES,
AND
STEVEN ZAIDMAN,
VICE PRESIDENT OF TECHNICAL OPERATIONS,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE FAA’S AGING ATC FACILITIES:  INVESTIGATING THE NEED TO IMPROVE FACILITIES AND WORKER CONDITIONS,

ON

JULY 24, 2007.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s efforts to improve aging air traffic control facilities and the worker conditions at those facilities.  My name is Bruce Johnson, and I am the Vice President of Terminal Services in the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization.  With me today is Steven Zaidman, the ATO’s Vice President of Technical Operations.  Improving our air traffic control facilities is one of the FAA’s greatest challenges, in breadth and in depth, and we appreciate having the opportunity to discuss it with you.  We have an extensive multi-tiered program to address our aging facilities, and we look forward to continuing our efforts as we transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System.

The Challenge

As you know, the current air traffic system is built around 1960s radar technology and is constrained by its limitations.  At the time the system was built, each air traffic facility could receive signals from only one radar.  That operational limitation required that we build more than 300 air traffic control facilities spread across the country.  That number has grown to 526 terminal and en route air traffic control facilities across the country.  Out of these, the FAA has responsibility for replacing and transitioning over 400 to NextGen.  Additionally, FAA is responsible for maintaining more than 9,000 smaller buildings and 13,000 structural towers associated with navigational aids, radars, and other components of the ATC infrastructure.  Our airspace is also divided into artificial boundaries based on the limits of legacy radar technology.

Today, radar and air traffic control automation technology permits individual facilities to handle up to 16 radars.  In the meantime, as we replace and transform these facilities, we still need to sustain them, that is, performing maintenance and repair where needed and bringing the facilities up to building code, where applicable. 

In 1999, the FAA began assessing our terminal facilities, which include Airport Traffic Control Towers and Terminal Radar Approach Control facilities (TRACON), to collect information about the condition of the facility and the costs associated with maintaining the facility.  In addition, we have a facility planning process in place that methodically analyzes each facility for potential modernization, including replacement.  As part of this planning process, we include a facility life-cycle model that will better enable us to predict the maintenance and repair costs of each facility, as it undergoes modernization or replacement.  Finally, our long range plans under our airspace redesign efforts include potential facility consolidation, which will result in better service to air travelers, better work environments for our controllers, and lower costs to the taxpayer.

Sustaining Current Facilities

As both our en route and terminal facilities age, we strive to get the most mileage out of them.  We collect and review our maintenance and repair needs annually in order to budget appropriately for them.  Once we identify what is needed, we prioritize our needs – maintenance and repairs impacting safety, as always, are our first priority, followed by waterproofing, HVAC and electrical issues, and on down the line.  High priority needs, such as a leaking roof or an air conditioner outage during the summer, are addressed immediately while lower priority needs, such as new paint and carpet, are planned through the normal budget cycle.

Additionally, we are striving to be more proactive in our approach to maintenance and repairs.  We have developed our processes to identify and process maintenance and repair issues as they arise.  When a critical need that immediately affects operation arises, we reprioritize our maintenance and repair schedule as needed to address it.  We recognize that we have a backlog of maintenance and repair, and we are taking steps to reduce that backlog.  We have completed condition assessments for various facility types to determine what repairs are needed and how to budget for them.  We have also developed systems to ensure that the highest priority backlog items are addressed first.  I am pleased to report that we are making headway on the backlog and will continue to do so over the coming years.  Finally, as we transition into NextGen, we are developing individual facility life-cycle plans, which will allow us to be more proactive in planning for sustaining our facilities over their lifespans.

Replacing Facilities

It is an unfortunate fact that some of our facilities have aged to the point where the responsible thing to do is replace them.  We have facilities in our system that have so many issues that to repair and remediate them indefinitely would be financially unsound.  We certainly appreciate that replacing an air traffic control facility is a major financial investment.  Thus, the FAA has set out criteria for facilities replacement that are intended to ensure that resources are allocated responsibly.

First, we are only replacing facilities that have a solid business case and meet fixed requirements.  When we identify a tower deficiency, we examine all of the options for addressing the issues.  In some cases, we determine that it is a better long-term solution, technologically and financially, to replace the facility.  In others, we have found that a complete replacement is unnecessary, and that we are able to update the facility sufficiently.  Thus far, 13 new sites have been commissioned from FY 2005 – FY 2006, and we have 12 sites that we plan to commission between FY 2007 – FY 2008.

Transition to NextGen

As you all know, today’s aviation system is operating at full capacity, making our transition to NextGen an absolute necessity.  As we maintain our current facilities to make the most of them, and replace them when needed, we are simultaneously working to transition facilities into NextGen by identifying where and when new technologies and equipment can be put into place.  For instance, at the Morristown, New Jersey facility, the FAA made the business decision to modernize instead of replace.  That modernization effort is currently in the design phase and scheduled to be complete in Spring 2008.

Consolidation

A key element of the FAA’s transformation into NextGen is consolidation of our facilities.  The number and specific locations of many existing FAA facilities were determined by the capabilities and limitations of 1960’s technology.  In the subsequent four decades, the available technology has vastly improved, rendering the long-existing pattern of FAA facilities no longer the best configuration.  Without consolidation, the FAA is tied to maintaining outdated facilities with outdated technology based on outdated 1960’s radar boundaries.  Further, consolidation lowers infrastructure costs, and helps improve safety and efficiency by making new technologies available for controllers.  These savings and improvements mean fewer air traffic delays and lower costs for air travelers.

The FAA has proven that we can consolidate both airspace and facilities, improving the safety of flight while at the same time saving money.  For example, in 2002, the FAA consolidated the airspace control that was formerly managed by five separate airports in the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area into one brand new facility – called the Potomac Terminal Approach Control.   Now instead of having five compartments of airspace, the FAA has a large geographic area in which the airspace was redesigned to improve the safety of operations and provide more direct routes for aircraft.  This consolidation has the additional benefit of allowing aircraft to fly at higher altitudes longer, reducing fuel consumption and the incumbent noise impacts created with low-level flight.  The Baltimore-Washington airspace consolidation has been extremely successful, saving millions of dollars in fuel, reducing carbon emissions, reducing noise exposure and reducing delays.  Facilities and airspace consolidations in New York, Atlanta, Northern California and Southern California have seen similar results. 

However, despite proven success, a provision in this Committee’s aviation reauthorization proposal, H.R. 2881, would impose a moratorium on any FAA’s consolidation plans and prohibit FAA from managing our assets.  Section 807 of H.R. 2881 would require the FAA to submit a report on our consolidation efforts, but would also allow delay tactics by communities that could postpone any consolidation efforts virtually indefinitely.

We recognize that consolidation is a highly emotional and sensitive issue, which is why the Administration proposed a process where objective recommendations would be made regarding which facilities to close, public input would be considered, Presidential review would be required, and, ultimately, congressional action would be necessary.  The provision was included in the FAA’s reauthorization proposal to augment the FAA’s current consolidation authority to include an open, public process where all concerned parties may have their say.  We believe this approach is the fairest way for the FAA to make objective, informed decisions about facility consolidation.

Not only does H.R. 2881 not include this comprehensive approach, but it would take a step backwards.  If the House provision is enacted, with its moratorium on facility closure and the decisionmaking delays it allows, the FAA would be tied to continuing to maintain outdated facilities with outdated technology.  Our transition to NextGen would be at risk, and the result would be aviation gridlock. 

The development and deployment of NextGen, by its very nature, will be a complex, challenging, and expensive technological endeavor.   It will entail a total system reengineering of our airspace and air traffic control systems without the luxury of slowing down or interrupting the growing volumes of air traffic that we see each and every day.  A provision such as section 807 that limits, or removes entirely, our discretion to determine how best to transition to NextGen according to objective safety, efficiency, and economic considerations will greatly hamper, or entirely halt, this important initiative.  The Administration’s proposal is what is needed to help us move effectively toward NextGen, and we strongly urge Congress to adopt our approach.

While we recognize that there may be disruption to a few individuals and communities with the consolidation of facilities, it is simply unrealistic to expect that a major overhaul of the nation’s air traffic control system will not result in some growing pains.  At every phase, we are taking steps to minimize worker disruption and ensure smooth transitions wherever possible.  In the case of the recent Palm Springs consolidation, we did not require anyone to relocate.  In those cases where relocation is unavoidable, workers will be offered a fully paid move and notified well in advance of the transition.  In addition, the FAA will provide appropriate training and orientation at the new facility to further ensure success.

In fact, worker conditions are always a major concern.  Maintenance and repairs, replacement of facilities, and transitioning to NextGen are all conducted with worker conditions in mind.  We have several procedures in place to protect worker safety as construction projects get underway.  Replacing facilities and NextGen technologies are primarily designed with the worker environment in mind, to make our controllers’ jobs more streamlined and efficient and provide them a safe and comfortable working environment.

Conclusion

FAA’s transition to NextGen is a lengthy, phased process, and until we achieve our final goals, we are committed to working on remedies available to us, whether that entails further maintenance and repairs or replacement of a facility.  Our multi-level approach to maintaining, improving, and replacing our aging facilities is designed to get us to NextGen without any compromise in safety and with maximum levels of efficiency.  But, time is of the essence here, and we urge the Committee not to tie our hands with regard to facilities consolidation.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony.  We thank you, Congressman Petri, and the Members of the Subcommittee once again for inviting us to testify today.  We would happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have.