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Testimony

In This Section

FAA Modernization

JOINT STATEMENT OF

ROBERT STURGELL,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
AND
CHARLES LEADER,
DIRECTOR,
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION ON FAA MODERNIZATION

March 22, 2007

Good morning Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Lott, and Members of the Subcommittee.  I am Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and interim Chief Operating Officer for the Air Traffic Organization.  With me is Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).   We thank you for the opportunity to testify today about FAA modernization, and the work we are doing to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that deliver benefits to our customers today.

Modernization and moving to NextGen is inextricably linked to changes in the FAA’s financing system.  We need to establish the financing of our current and future operations based on actual costs and investment requirements that will realize tangible benefits and increasing efficiency.  The NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration, provides the necessary reforms to our financing, and puts us on the path towards fully implementing the NextGen system.

And implementing that system is imperative.  Our nation's air transportation system has become a victim of its own success.  Administrator Blakey and the FAA have taken many steps to delay this gridlock.  Since FY 2000, 13 new runways have opened, and we’ve worked with operators—through forums like Growth Without Gridlock—to find ways to squeeze extra capacity from our system.  In addition, we’ve kept our modernization projects on schedule—2006 is the third straight year that we produced good results—delivering 90 percent of our programs on time and within budget.  In fact, in FY06, 97 percent of our projects met our schedule, and 100 percent were within 10 percent of budget.

An example of how we better use the airspace is our introduction of Domestic Reduce Vertical Separation Minimums (DRVSM) in 2005.  We reduced separation minimums from 2000 feet to 1000 feet, effectively doubling the high altitude airspace, and saving airlines close to $400 million per year in fuel.

We have created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.   But we now face a serious and impending problem:  today’s system is at capacity.   While the industry downturn following the attacks of September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly.   And we have to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.

The warning signs are everywhere.   Flight delays and cancellations have reached unacceptable levels.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are placing additional stresses on the system.   If we fail to address these issues, we will suffocate the great engine of economic growth that is civil aviation.  A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015 – absent modernization, the consequences will be a total system collapse.

NextGen is about a long-term transformation of our air transportation system.  It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric systems.  However, the FAA is not waiting for 2025 to implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and increase capacity.  The FAA is currently expanding the use of procedures like Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) which collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity, predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced environmental impacts. 

RNAV operations remove the requirement for a direct link between aircraft navigation and a navigational aid NAVAID, thereby allowing aircraft better access and permitting flexibility of point-to-point operations.  By using more precise routes for take-offs and landings, RNAV enables reductions in fuel burn and emissions and increases in capacity.  FAA is expanding the implementation of RNAV procedures to additional airports.  The FAA has authorized 128 RNAV procedures at 38 airports for FY2005 and FY2006.  We will publish at least 50 additional procedures in FY2007. 

Another FAA initiative is implementing Required Navigation Performance (RNP) on a greater scale.  RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard monitoring and alerting function.  This onboard capability enhances the pilot’s situational awareness providing greater access to airports in challenging terrain.  RNP takes advantage of an airplane’s onboard navigation capability to fly a more precise flight path into an airport.  It increases access during marginal weather, thereby reducing diversions to alternate airports.  RNP reduces the overall noise footprint and aggregate emissions.  The FAA has authorized a total of 40 RNP procedures at 18 airports.  We plan to publish at least 25 RNP approach procedures in FY2007.

Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve, and plans for how to get there from here.  For NextGen, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan provide us with that picture and the plans for how to achieve it.  I will be discussing the Concept of Operations and the Enterprise Architecture later in this statement.  We are setting the stage for the long-term development of an air transportation system that will be scalable to a growing demand and the need for safer and more flexible aviation business models.  It is a new approach to the way we view the future of the system, and it demands a new level of collaboration, planning and vision.

FAA and JPDO are beginning to move from planning to implementation.  In fact, the FAA’s FY 2008 – 2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in projects and activities that directly support NextGen.  The CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the National Airspace System modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the Agency intends to accomplish during that time.  Several key NextGen technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded in the FAA’s FY08 budget request.  These technologies and programs are:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.  FAA proposes to spend $173 million on these programs in FY08.

These technologies are essential to begin the transition from today’s air traffic management system to the NextGen system of 2025.  Perhaps the most significant of these transformational technologies is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B.  ADS-B is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control.  A key element of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways.  Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.  When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic; thereby substantially improving safety. 

ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA’s Capstone program in Alaska, where GA accidents have been reduced by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped aircraft.  And UPS has been working with us on a demonstration program in Louisville using ADS-B to conduct continuous descent arrivals, where they have been able to reduce noise by 30 percent and emissions by 34 percent as a result.  One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska and Louisville will be in the Gulf of Mexico.  The FAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI), helicopter operators and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of Mexico to improve service in the Gulf.  Using ADS-B technology, helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the Gulf.

The FAA is looking at a rulemaking that would mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and is working closely with stakeholders to determine that timeline.

In today’s NAS there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed, developed, and managed connections.  The future, however, demands an infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of expanding today’s point-to-point system is simply prohibitive.  System Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need.  SWIM provides the infrastructure and services to deliver network-enabled information access across the NextGen air transportation operations.  SWIM will provide high quality, timely data to many users and applications.  By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will reduce redundancy of information and better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing.  When implemented, SWIM will contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service.  In addition, SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations.  It will also allow for better use of existing capacity en-route.

The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts lies within the digital data communications infrastructure of the future.  In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne aircraft is by voice communications.  NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications, especially in the areas of aircraft trajectory-based operations, net-centric and net-enabled information access.  Data communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned strategic traffic management.  Eventually, the majority of communications will be handled by data communications for appropriately equipped users.  It is estimated that with 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. 

The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather picture across NextGen.  Approximately 70 percent of annual national airspace system delays are attributed to weather.  The goal of this investment is to cut weather-related delays at least in half.  The weather problem is about total weather information management, and not just the state of the scientific art in weather forecasting.  The weather dissemination system today is inefficient to operate and maintain, and information gathered by one system is not easily shared with other systems.    The benefits will be uniform real-time access to key common weather parameters, common situational awareness, improved utilization of air space across all flight domains, and reduced flight delays.

The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air/ground and ground/ground voice communications in the air traffic control environment.  The switches today are very static, and our ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited.  Under the current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate and redesign the airspace.  In the future, the impacts of bad weather could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions to air traffic.  The new voice switch allows us to replace today’s rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of traffic.  Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA’s ability to implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase efficiency and improve performance.

At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them.  For the first time, FAA is requesting funding for these defining activities in the FY08 budget.  This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.  The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing in new technologies.  One demonstration will test trajectory-based concepts in the oceanic environment.  The ultimate goal is to increase predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel efficiency.  The other demonstration will accelerate the first integrated test of super density operations.  Procedures for increasing capacity at busy airports will be explored.  The demonstration should achieve near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to implement the same procedures at other locations.

It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.  The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of transformations that will truly modernize today’s system.  Let me provide a few examples of this.

In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate highways in the sky.  In the high performance airspace of the future, each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.  Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same precise information, transmitted via data communications.  Investments in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based operations.

The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic management.  The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major demand and capacity imbalances.  SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.

With NextGen the impact of weather is reduced through the use of improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of weather into automation to improve decision-making.  New capabilities in the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic restrictions.  Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments for these improvements.

We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the JPDO’s vision of the NextGen system into reality.  Because the JPDO is not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision.  The FAA is using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide their transformation to NextGen.  In the past the Operational Evolution Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA that extended ten years into the future.  The new OEP will include strategic milestones through 2025.  JPDO representatives will participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.

FAA will use the OEP to plan, execute and implement NextGen in partnership with private industry.  Required operational implementation schedules will be tracked, as well as dates by which initiatives must be funded in order to meet those schedules.

OEP will provide a single entry point for new NextGen initiatives, jointly developed by the JPDO and the FAA, to enter the FAA capital budget portfolio.  It ties these initiatives directly to the FAA budget process. 

The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing, and prototype demonstrations.  This Operational Evolution Partnership will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA’s progress towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.

Cost will be a vital factor:  we cannot create a NextGen system that is not affordable.  Requirements for the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10 billion.  Preliminary estimates suggest that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22 billion in FAA funding.  We are working to continuously refine these estimates, particularly with our users as we implement new cost-based financing mechanisms, as proposed in the NextGen Financing Act, the FAA’s  reauthorization proposal.

MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the NextGen avionics costs.  It concludes that a wide range of costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of equipage schedules.  The most probable range of total avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.  This range reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of time out of service required for equipage installation.

The importance of developing this system of the future is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering substantial consumer benefits.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet. 

Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program.  The FAA and the EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based air traffic management systems and technologies.  This coordination will address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA and Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical initiative. 

Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate for SESAR.  SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen.  They consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25 billion to $37 billion in US dollars through the year 2020.  SESAR, like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and better define the system.  However, there is an important difference in scope between SESAR and NextGen.  While SESAR focuses almost exclusively on air traffic management, NextGen takes what’s called a “curb-to-curb” approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and DoD and DHS NAS requirements.

One of the major products for the JPDO, and indeed, one of the critical elements in defining the NextGen initiative itself, is the development of the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan.  These documents define each NextGen transformed state and how to evolve to it.  They are absolutely essential to the future development of the NextGen system.

The Concept of Operations is a text description of the transformed state of NextGen.  This kind of explanation, offered in one document, is critical to developing the specific requirements and capabilities that will be necessary for our national air transportation system in 2025.  In a sense, the Concept of Operations is like an architect’s blueprints. 

However, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently with the Concept of Operations, and that’s the Enterprise Architecture.  The Enterprise Architecture provides the technical details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder’s plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its power, water, sewage, cable and internet connections to the rest of the community.  The Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of the general contractor’s work plan.  It specifies the timing and interdependencies of the research, demonstrations, and development required to achieve the NexGen system vision.

These documents, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan are essential to defining the NextGen system and will guide the future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and systems development.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are anxious to receive their feedback.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months. 

Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of users -- very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security and efficiency.  Research will continue to help us find the right balance between a centralized satellite and ground system and a totally distributed system, where aircraft “self-manage” their flight with full knowledge of their environment.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony.  We would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

The Reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Administration’s Rail Safety Program

Statement of

Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety,
Federal Railroad Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation

before the

Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
U.S. Senate

May 22, 2007

 

Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and other Members of the Subcommittee, I am very pleased to be here today, on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation and Administrator Boardman, to discuss the reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) rail safety program. 

In February, the Administration presented its rail safety reauthorization bill, the Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act.  In March, Chairman Oberstar of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure introduced the Administration bill, by request, for himself and Ranking Member Mica and the leaders of the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials.  We are very grateful, Chairman Lautenberg, that in the same month you also introduced the Administration bill, by request, for yourself and Senator Smith.  The Administration bill has been designated as H.R. 1516 and S. 918, respectively.

In addition to proposing to reauthorize FRA’s vital safety mission, this bill calls for important—and in some cases historic—substantive changes in the rail safety laws that we expect will materially improve safety.  I look forward to working with you to help secure their enactment.   

Before I discuss the major provisions of the bill, my testimony will begin with an overview of how FRA is working daily to reduce both the frequency and the severity of railroad accidents.  My testimony will then highlight the real and substantial progress FRA has made in implementing our National Rail Safety Action Plan, and I will touch on our passenger safety rulemakings and other key safety initiatives.

I.  FRA’s Railroad Safety Program

FRA is the agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) charged with carrying out the Federal railroad safety laws.  These laws provide FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, with very broad authority over every area of railroad safety.  In exercising that authority, the agency has issued and enforces a wide range of safety regulations covering a railroad network that employs more than 232,000 workers, moves more than 42 percent of all intercity freight, and provides passenger rail service to more than 500 million persons each year. 

FRA’s regulations address such topics as track, passenger equipment, locomotives, freight cars, power brakes, locomotive event recorders, signal and train control systems, maintenance of active warning devices at highway-rail grade crossings, accident reporting, alcohol and drug testing, protection of roadway workers, operating rules and practices, locomotive engineer certification, positive train control, the use of locomotive horns at grade crossings, and many other subject areas.  FRA currently has active rulemaking projects on a number of important safety topics, many of which will be described later in this testimony.  FRA also enforces the Hazardous Materials Regulations, promulgated by DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), as they pertain to rail transportation. 

FRA has an authorized inspection staff of about 400 persons nationwide, distributed across its eight regions.  In addition, about 160 inspectors employed by the approximately 30 States that participate in FRA’s State participation program also perform inspections for compliance with the Federal rail safety laws.  Each inspector is an expert in one of five safety disciplines: Track; Signal and Train Control; Motive Power and Equipment; Operating Practices; or Hazardous Materials.  FRA also has 18 full-time highway-rail grade crossing safety and trespass prevention specialist positions in the field.  Every year FRA’s inspectors conduct tens of thousands of inspections, investigate more than 100 railroad accidents, investigate thousands of complaints of specific alleged violations, develop recommendations for thousands of enforcement actions, and engage in a range of educational outreach activities on railroad safety issues, including educating the public about highway-rail grade crossing safety and the dangers of trespassing on railroad property. 

FRA closely monitors the railroad industry’s safety performance, and the agency uses the extensive data gathered to guide its accident prevention efforts.  FRA strives to continually make better use of the wealth of available data to achieve the agency’s strategic goals.  FRA also sponsors collaborative research with the railroad industry to introduce innovative technologies to improve railroad safety.  Finally, under the leadership of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FRA actively plays a supportive role in Federal efforts to secure the Nation’s railroad transportation system. 

II.  The National Rail Safety Action Plan (Action Plan)

A.  Genesis and Overview of the Action Plan

As detailed in Appendix A to my testimony, the railroad industry’s overall safety record has improved dramatically over the past few decades, and most safety trends are moving in the right direction.  However, serious train accidents still occur, and the train accident rate has not shown substantive improvement in recent years.  Moreover, several major freight and passenger train accidents in 2004 and 2005 (such as those at Macdona, Texas; Graniteville, South Carolina; and Glendale, California) raised specific concerns about railroad safety issues deserving government and industry attention. 

As a result of these concerns, in May 2005, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and FRA initiated the National Rail Safety Action Plan (Action Plan), a comprehensive and methodical approach to address critical safety issues facing the railroad industry.  The Action Plan’s goals broadly stated are:

  •     Target the most frequent, highest-risk causes of train accidents;
  •     Focus FRA’s oversight and inspection resources on areas of greatest concern; and
  •     Accelerate research efforts that have the potential to mitigate the largest risks.

The causes of train accidents are generally grouped into five categories: human factors; track and structures; equipment; signal and train control; and miscellaneous.  From 2002 through 2006, the vast majority of train accidents resulted from human factor causes or track causes.  Accordingly, human factors and track have been our primary focus to bring about further improvements in the train accident rate. 

Overall, the Action Plan includes initiatives intended to:

  •     Reduce train accidents caused by human factors;
  •     Address employee fatigue;
  •     Improve track safety;
  •     Enhance hazardous material (hazmat) safety and emergency preparedness;
  •     Strengthen FRA’s safety compliance program; and
  •     Improve highway-rail grade crossing safety.

Allow me to discuss the progress that has been made in fulfilling the Action Plan’s objectives and how that is advancing FRA’s railroad safety mission.

B.  Implementation of Action Plan Initiatives

1.  Reducing Train Accidents Caused by Human Factors

Accidents caused by human factor causes constitute the largest category of train accidents, accounting for 39 percent of all train accidents in the five years from 2002 through 2006.  Preventing such accidents is a high priority under the Action Plan.

a. Development of Rulemaking to Address Leading Causes of Human Factor Accidents

FRA has been concerned that several of the leading causes of human factor accidents are not presently covered by any specific Federal rule, and these causes can have serious consequences.  As a result, in May 2005, FRA asked its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to develop recommendations for a new human factors rule to address the leading causes of human factor accidents.  This effort helped lead to FRA’s issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in October 2006, to Federalize core railroad operating rules governing the handling of track switches, leaving cars in the clear, and shoving rail cars.  See 71 FR 60371. 

The NPRM proposes to establish greater accountability on the part of railroad management for the administration of programs of operational tests and inspections, and greater accountability on the part of railroad supervisors and employees for compliance with those railroad operating rules that are responsible for approximately half of the train accidents related to human factors.  FRA believes this will contribute positively to railroad safety, by emphasizing the importance of complying with fundamental railroad operating rules and providing FRA a more direct means of promoting compliance with those rules. 

The final rule is expected to be issued later this year, and it is intended to supersede Emergency Order No. 24, which FRA issued in October 2005, in response to an increasing number of train accidents caused by hand-operated, main track switches in non-signaled territory being left in the wrong position and the potential for catastrophic accidents, such as the one in Graniteville, SC, in January 2005, which resulted in nine deaths.  The emergency order requires special handling of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory, as well as instruction and testing of employees in railroad operating rules pertaining to such track switches, and is expected to remain in place until the final rule addressing the major causes of human factor accidents is promulgated and becomes effective. 

The final rule will complement existing FRA regulations that address other human factor causes.  For example, FRA’s regulations on alcohol and drug use by operating employees were the first such standards in American industry to incorporate chemical testing, and they have been very successful in reducing accidents resulting from the use of illicit substances.  FRA also has regulations on locomotive engineer certification, and enforces the Federal hours of service restrictions, which at present are wholly governed by statute.

b.  Launch of “Close Call” Pilot Research Project

“Close calls” are unsafe events that do not result in a reportable accident but could have done so.  FRA is working to better understand these phenomena.  In other industries, such as aviation, adoption of close-call or “near miss” reporting systems that shield the reporting employee from discipline (and the employer from punitive regulatory sanctions) has contributed to major reductions in accidents.  In March 2005, FRA completed an overarching Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with railroad labor organizations and management to develop pilot programs to document the occurrence of close calls.  Pilot programs would be established at three freight railroad sites and on one passenger railroad.  In August 2005, FRA and DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) entered into an MOU stipulating that BTS will act as a neutral party to receive the close-call reports and maintain the confidentiality of the person making the report.  By studying and closely analyzing these reports, we hope to enrich our understanding of the factors involved in such events and to discern whether there are identifiable patterns that influence safety outcomes.  

Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) signed an MOU for its North Platte Service Unit to be the first site for this project.  The first report from this site was received in February 2007, and as of April 2007, BTS is receiving approximately two reports per day from this site.  This rate of reporting close calls greatly exceeds expectations based on prior close call reporting systems, and indicates that the implementation was extremely successful at this site.  Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. (CP) and railroad labor representatives in Portage, WI, have recently produced a draft MOU to implement a close-call reporting system, and FRA anticipates that this CP site will become active by the end of September 2007.  BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and several labor unions have been exploring participation in the project as the third freight railroad site, but a final decision is still pending.  Several passenger railroads have also been considering participation in the project.  FRA anticipates that all four sites will be active by the end of FY 2008.

c.  Development and Implementation of Promising Technologies to Improve Safety through Redundant Safety Systems

Technology can be a tremendous aid to safety, providing a safety net when human beings make a mistake or become incapacitated. 

  • Positive Train Control (PTC) Systems.  PTC systems are capable of automatically preventing train collisions (with positive stop protection), preventing overspeed derailments, and protecting roadway workers within their authorities.  Recognizing the safety benefits of PTC systems, as well as their potential to improve rail efficiency by safely increasing the capacity of high-density rail lines, FRA issued a final rule in 2005 entitled, “Performance Standards for Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems.”  See 49 CFR part 236.  Earlier, FRA worked with Amtrak and other stakeholders to assist in the development of PTC systems in support of high-speed passenger rail.  The results included the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, which, combined with cab signals and automatic train control, safeguard operations up to 150 mph on the Northeast Corridor.  In addition, the Incremental Train Control System was deployed on Amtrak’s Michigan line and currently supports operations up to 95 mph (planned for 110 mph when validation and verification work is complete on the final system).
  • In January 2007, FRA approved operational use of the first PTC system intended for general use, BNSF’s Electronic Train Management System. The rail industry is actively advancing the implementation of PTC technology as other railroads—among them, UP, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS), CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), and the Alaska Railroad—are all making significant strides to develop PTC systems.  The Association of American Railroads (AAR) will play a critical role in finalizing interoperability requirements for these technologies. 
  • Switch Point Monitoring System and Other Systems.  There are steps that can be taken short of PTC to reduce accident risk in non-signalized (dark) territory.  In November 2005, FRA partnered with BNSF through a $1 million Switch Point Monitoring System pilot project to develop a low-cost system that electronically monitors, detects, and reports a misaligned switch on mainline track located in non-signaled territory.  These mechanisms are designed to provide an additional layer of protection to avert the consequences of an improperly lined switch.  The project involves the installation of wireless communication devices at 49 switches along a 174-mile section of non-signaled BNSF track between Tulsa and Avard, Oklahoma.  Train dispatchers at an operations center in Fort Worth, Texas, are monitoring the devices to detect when the hand-operated switches are set in the wrong position.  If a switch is misaligned, the dispatcher directs a train to slow down or stop until railroad crews in the field confirm it is safe to proceed.  Thus far, no unsafe failures have been reported, and BNSF plans expansion of this and similar types of systems to other non-signaled territory.  Along with the human factors rulemaking, this new switch monitoring system may prevent future train accidents such as the one at Graniteville, SC, which resulted from an improperly lined main track switch in non-signaled territory. 
  • BNSF is also demonstrating rail integrity circuits, which can detect broken rails and alert the dispatcher much in the same way as the switch point          monitoring technology.  Both of these technologies are “forward-compatible” with PTC, meaning that they can be integrated into PTC as it is deployed on the subject territories. 
  • Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Brakes.  During the 1990s, the AAR led an industry effort to develop ECP brakes, which use an electronic train line to command brake applications and releases.  ECP brakes apply uniformly and virtually instantaneously throughout the length of the train, provide health-status information on the condition of brakes on each car, respond to commands for graduated releases, and entirely avoid runaway accidents caused by depletion of train-line air pressure.  ECP brakes shorten stopping distances on the order of 40 to 60 percent, depending on train length and route conditions.  In turn, shortened stopping distances mean that some accidents that occur today might be avoided entirely and that the severity of those that do occur in the future might be reduced. 
  • FRA commissioned a study, released last year, that identified and quantified significant business benefits that could be realized with this technology through greater operational efficiencies.  The study also suggested a migration plan that would start with unit train operations, focused initially on the Powder River Basin coal service.  Since then, FRA has been working with the AAR, railroads, vendors, and the coal sector to generate momentum toward implementation of this cost-saving and, potentially, life-saving technology.  In this regard, ECP brakes are one of the key features of FRA’s Advanced Concept Train, a research-and-development prototype train specially designed and equipped with other improvements that is helping to demonstrate the potential of these new technologies across the Nation.  FRA is also planning to develop a revised set of requirements for train air brakes that are more suitable for this new technology, by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking sometime in the near future.  Until a final rule is issued amending the train air brake requirements, we remain ready to review and respond to requests for relief from railroads interested in proceeding with ECP technology. 
  • In March FRA approved a waiver request from BNSF and NS to install ECP brake systems on trains to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the technology.  While providing that proper safeguards be in place, the waiver permits trains equipped with ECP brakes to travel up to 3,500 miles without stopping to undergo certain routine brake inspections—more than double the distance allowed by current Federal regulations.  FRA will carefully monitor the railroads’ compliance with the waiver, which will enable FRA to gather extensive data, including data that could be useful in developing the rulemaking. 

2.  Addressing Fatigue

Fatigue has long been a fact of life for many railroad operating employees, given their long and often unpredictable work hours and fluctuating schedules.  Train crews may legally work an enormous number of hours in a week, month, or year.  While commuter train crews often have some predictability in their work schedules, crews of freight trains rarely do.  The long hours, irregular work/rest cycles, and lack of regular days off, combined, have a very deleterious effect on employee alertness.  Railroads are necessarily 24-hour businesses, and the effects of “circadian rhythms” challenge the alertness of even well-rested employees, particularly in the early morning hours. 

The hours of service laws, originally enacted in 1907 and last substantially amended in 1969, set certain maximum on-duty periods (generally 12 hours for operating employees) and minimum off-duty periods (generally 8 hours, or if the employee has worked 12 consecutive hours, a 10-hour off-duty period is required).  However, FRA does not believe that the limitations in those laws are adequate to effectively control fatigue.  The hours of service laws must be replaced with sound, scientifically-based regulations; later in my testimony I will discuss in detail the Administration proposal to bring about this long-overdue change.  The proposal would allow for the use of modern learning on fatigue, including research FRA accelerated under the Action Plan.

a.  Accelerate research on railroad crew work history to validate a fatigue model for possible use to improve crew scheduling.

On November 29, 2006, FRA announced the release of a study which provides a strong, scientific rationale for evaluating railroad employee work schedules to address worker fatigue.  The goal of the research was to determine if a fatigue model can accurately and reliably predict an increased risk of human error that could contribute to the occurrence of a train accident.  The study documents, for the first time, the significant circadian influence on accidents caused by human factors (there is no circadian influence on accidents not caused by human factors).  The study also documents a significant linear relationship between fatigue predicted by the model and the risk of a human factors accident.  No relationship was found between fatigue and accidents not caused by human factors.  FRA expects this information will aid the railroad industry in improving crew scheduling practices in order to reduce that risk. A model for detecting the point at which the risk of fatigue becomes hazardous could become an important part of a railroad’s fatigue management plan.  A similar approach is currently utilized by the U.S. Department of Defense.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has emphasized the role of sleep disorders in transportation accidents, and FRA recognizes that providing fatigue management information alone may not be sufficient.  In October 2004, FRA published a safety advisory in the Federal Register, urging railroads to address sleep disorders through progressive company policies.  Last September, FRA’s RSAC adopted a task to develop recommendations on medical standards for safety-critical railroad employees.  Parallel with this RSAC effort, FRA has awarded a contract to UP to conduct a sleep disorder assessment project.  Findings and recommendations from this project are anticipated to be completed later this year.  Management of sleep disorders is among the important elements of that effort, which is now well underway. 

3.  Improving Track Safety

Track-caused accidents are the second-largest category of train accidents, comprising 33 percent of all train accidents.  Some of the leading causes of track-caused accidents are difficult to detect during normal railroad inspections.  Broken joint bars, for example, are a leading cause, but the kinds of cracks in those bars that foreshadow a derailment-causing break are difficult to spot with the naked eye.  Similarly, broken rails account for some of the most serious accidents, but the internal rail flaws that lead to many of those breaks can be detected only by specialized equipment. 

a.  Demonstration of New Technology to Detect Cracks in Joint Bars

FRA is developing an automated, high-resolution video inspection system for joint bars that can be deployed on a hi-rail vehicle to detect visual cracks in joint bars without having to stop the vehicle.  In October 2005, a prototype system that inspects joint bars on both sides of each rail was successfully demonstrated.  Testing showed that the high-resolution video system detected cracks that were missed by the traditional visual inspections.  The system was then enhanced with new features to improve the reliability of joint bar detection and to add capabilities to include the Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates for each joint to facilitate future inspection and identification.  Additionally, software was developed to scan the images automatically, detect the cracked joint bar, and then send a message to the operator with an image of the broken joint bar.  The new features were implemented and the system was tested and demonstrated in the summer of 2006.  This year, FRA intends to make additional enhancements to increase the operating speed and implement a more rugged, simple, and robust detection system.

b.  Requirements for Enhanced Capability and Procedures to Detect Track Defects

FRA is also addressing joint bar cracks on the regulatory front.  As a direct result of a Congressional mandate in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) and of NTSB recommendations arising out of various accidents involving cracked joint bars, FRA published an interim final rule (IFR) in November 2005 concerning the inspection of joints in continuous welded rail (CWR) track.  Subsequently, after soliciting public comment and advice from RSAC’s Track Safety Standards Working Group, FRA issued a final rule in October 2006, which adopted portions of the IFR and made changes to other provisions.  The final rule requires track owners to develop and implement a procedure for the detailed inspection—including on-foot inspection—of CWR rail joints, to identify joint bar cracks and joint conditions that can lead to the development of these cracks.  Track owners must now also create and submit fracture reports to FRA whenever a cracked or broken joint bar is discovered in CWR track.  Based on the data that FRA will collect from the fracture reports, FRA will establish a program to review the root causes of joint bar failure.  In addition, the rule encourages railroads to develop and adopt automated methods to improve the inspection of rail joints in CWR track. 

c.  Deployment of Two Additional Automated Track Inspection Vehicles

Subtle track geometry defects, such as rails being uneven or too far apart, are difficult to identify during a typical walking or hi-rail inspection.  That is why FRA has developed automated track inspection vehicles to enhance its capability to identify problems, and ensure that they are addressed, before a train accident occurs.  In April, FRA began operating its two newest vehicles:  the T19 (which is self-propelled), and the T20 (which is locomotive-towed).  These new vehicles use a variety of technology to measure track geometry flaws. The measurements are recorded in real-time and at operating speed.  Problem areas are identified by the GPS location and shared immediately with the railroad so appropriate corrective actions can be taken in a timely manner

Along with the T16, T17 and T18, FRA now has five automated track inspection vehicles that will allow the agency to inspect nearly 100,000 track-miles each year, tripling the present capacity.  In particular, FRA will be better able to focus its automated track inspection activities on high-volume rail lines that carry hazardous materials and passenger trains as well as to improve its ability to follow up more quickly on routes where safety performance by a railroad is substandard.

4.  Improving Hazmat Safety and Emergency Response Capability

The railroad industry’s record on transporting hazmat is very good.  The industry transports nearly two million shipments of hazmat annually, ordinarily without incident.  However, the Macdona, TX accident in 2004 and the Graniteville, SC accident in 2005, which together involved 12 deaths as the result of chlorine releases, demonstrate the potential for catastrophic consequences from certain train accidents.  The agency is actively engaged in a variety of activities intended to reduce the likelihood that a tank car may be breached if an accident does occur, complementing our effort to reduce the likelihood of train accidents.  Realizing that we cannot prevent all accidents, FRA has developed initiatives to ensure that emergency responders are fully prepared to minimize the loss of life and damage when an accident or release does occur. 

It is important to emphasize that these safety initiatives are in addition to, and complement efforts by, FRA, DHS and its Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and PHMSA to provide for the security of hazmat transported by rail.  A major component of this effort has been PHMSA’s March 2003 regulation requiring each shipper and carrier of significant quantities (placardable amounts) of hazmat to adopt and comply with a security plan.  See 49 CFR § 172.800 et seq.  Last December, working closely with FRA and TSA, PHMSA published an NPRM to enhance the safety and security of certain highly hazardous materials transported by rail.  See 71 FR 76833.  Specifically, this proposal would require rail carriers of certain explosive, toxic inhalation hazard, and radioactive materials to assess the safety and security of the routes currently used for these materials and alternative routing options, and to make routing decisions based on those assessments.  The comment period for the NPRM closed February 20, 2007.  PHMSA and FRA have reviewed the comments, including comments presented at two public meetings, and are in the process of drafting a final rule.  PHMSA and FRA are coordinating with TSA to ensure regulatory consistency between the two rules. 

As Administrator Boardman testified before the Committee in January on the general topic of rail security, the safety and security of hazmat transported by rail are often intertwined.  I would be glad to update the Subcommittee on the many other security-related initiatives in this area, such as the section 333 conference on ways to minimize safety and security risks from the transportation by rail of TIH materials.  

a.  Enhancements to Emergency Response Readiness

Emergency responders presently have access to a wide variety of information regarding hazmat transported by rail.  Railroads and hazmat shippers are currently subject to the hazard-communication requirements of the Hazardous Materials Regulations.  In addition, these industries work through the American Chemistry Council’s Transcaer® (Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response) program to familiarize local emergency responders with railroad equipment and product characteristics.  PHMSA publishes the Emergency Response Guidebook, with the intention that it may be found in virtually every fire and police vehicle in the United States.

In March 2005, with FRA encouragement, the AAR amended its Recommended Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials (now Circular No. OT-55-I) to expressly state that local emergency responders, upon written request, will be provided with a list ranking the top 25 hazardous materials transported by rail through their communities.  This is an important step to allow emergency responders to plan for, and better focus their training on, the type of rail-related hazmat incidents that they could potentially encounter.

In July 2005, again with FRA encouragement, CSX and CHEMTREC (the chemical industry’s 24-hour resource center for emergency responders) entered into an agreement to conduct a pilot project to see if key information about hazmat transported by rail could be more quickly and accurately provided to first responders in the crucial first minutes of an accident or incident.  The project is designed so that if an actual hazmat rail accident or incident occurs, CHEMTREC watchstanders, who interact with emergency response personnel, will have immediate access to CSX computer files regarding the specific train, including the type of hazmat being carried and its exact position in the train consist.  CSX has advised that there has been sufficient use of the current system to begin evaluating the project.  FRA is also working through the AAR to encourage the other major railroads to participate in a similar project. 

Finally, another pilot project is underway to evaluate the use of Railinc Corporation’s Freightscope, a program that provides equipment search capabilities for hazmat shipments.  The system was installed at CHEMTREC in December 2006, and it has the potential to more rapidly provide information about hazmat shipments on shortline and regional railroads to CHEMTREC watchstanders to improve information availability and reduce delays in emergency response.  The pilot project is scheduled to last a year, and includes various tests to determine the system’s effectiveness.  Two tests have already been conducted with good results. 

b.  Improvements in Tank Car Integrity through Research and Development and Rulemaking

Prior to the August 2005 enactment of SAFETEA-LU, FRA had initiated tank car structural integrity research stemming from the circumstances of the 2002 derailment in Minot, ND, which involved the release of anhydrous ammonia from tank cars punctured during the derailment.  Current research being conducted for FRA by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center), part of DOT’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), involves a three-step process to assess the effects of various types of train accidents (e.g., a derailment or collision) on a tank car.  The first phase is the development of a physics-based model to analyze the kinematics of rail cars in a derailment.  The second phase is the development of a valid dynamic structural analysis model; and the third phase is an assessment of the damage created by a puncture and entails the application of fracture mechanics testing and analysis methods.  This research is also studying the relative strength of various types of steel used to construct tank cars. 

In addition to research on strengthening the structural integrity of the tank car to reduce the potential that a collision will result in release of a hazardous commodity, the research is also evaluating the compatibility of new designs with the existing fleet to assure that new hazards are not unintentionally introduced.  Several accident scenarios have been defined which will help focus research into improving the performance of secondary tank-to-tank impacts after an event has occurred.  Specifically, work is concentrated on increasing the energy required to puncture a tank car for impacts to the side shell or head of the tank car.  For impacts in yards, the research is evaluating technology such as pushback couplers, energy absorbers, and anti-climbing devices, designed to prevent the train from derailing.

With the assistance of this ongoing research, FRA, in conjunction with PHMSA, is working to develop new hazardous material tank car safety standards in accordance with Section 9005 of SAFETEA-LU.  We are currently consulting with railroads, shippers, and car manufacturers and have concluded three public meetings to gather information and views. 

To further these efforts, FRA signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with Dow Chemical Company, UP, and the Union Tank Car Company to participate in their Next Generation Rail Tank Car Project.  The agreement provides for extensive information-sharing and cooperation between ongoing FRA and industry research programs to improve the safety of rail shipments of hazardous commodities, including toxic inhalation hazards and high-risk gases and liquids.  Full-scale destructive testing of tank cars is also underway to establish a baseline for performance of existing cars and to help validate and refine FRA’s predictive model for tank car crashworthiness.  Two full-scale tests have been conducted to date at the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, Colorado—the first on April 11, 2007, and the second on April 26, 2007—and I would be glad to provide the Committee with additional information about this significant research. 

5.  Strengthening FRA’s Safety Compliance Program

a.  Implementation of National Inspection Plan

FRA continually seeks ways to direct its inspection and enforcement efforts toward the issues and locations most in need of attention.  To this end, FRA instituted the National Inspection Plan (NIP), an inspection and allocation program that uses predictive indicators to assist FRA in allocating inspection and enforcement activities within a given region by railroad and by State.  The NIP was fully implemented across all of FRA’s safety disciplines in March 2006.  A reduction in both the number and the rate of train accidents is expected once the NIP has had time to take its full effect and FRA refines its application in response to actual experience. 

b.  Revisions to Schedules of Civil Penalties for Safety Violations

In December 2006, FRA published proposed statements of agency policy that would amend the 25 schedules of civil penalties issued as appendixes to FRA’s safety regulations.  The proposed revisions are intended to reflect more accurately the safety risks associated with violations of the rail safety laws and regulations, as well as to make sure that the civil penalty amounts are consistent across all safety regulations. 

Although the schedules are statements of agency policy, and FRA has authority to issue the revisions without having to follow the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA has provided members and representatives of the general public an opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions before amending them.  FRA has received mixed comments on the proposals, and is currently evaluating all of the comments received in preparing final statements of agency policy. 

6.  Fostering Further Improvements in Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety

Deaths in highway-rail grade crossing accidents are the second-leading category of fatalities associated with railroading.  (Trespasser fatalities are the leading category.)  The number of grade crossing deaths has declined substantially and steadily in recent years.  However, the growth in rail and motor vehicle traffic continues to present challenges.

a.  Issuance of Safety Advisory 2005-03

In May 2005, FRA issued Safety Advisory 2005-03, which describes the respective roles of the Federal and State governments and of the railroads in grade crossing safety.  It also specifically reminds railroads of their responsibilities to report properly to FRA any accident involving a grade crossing signal failure; to maintain records relating to credible reports of grade crossing warning system malfunctions; to preserve the data from all locomotive-mounted recording devices following grade crossing accidents; and to cooperate fully with local law enforcement authorities during their investigations of such accidents.  FRA is also committed to providing technical assistance to local authorities in the investigation of crossing accidents where information or expertise within FRA control is required to complete the investigation.  FRA has extensively distributed this advisory through national law enforcement organizations and through contacts with local agencies.

b.  Development of State-Specific Grade Crossing Safety Action Plans

In June 2004, DOT and FRA issued an “Action Plan for Highway-Rail Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention” that sets forth a series of initiatives in the areas of engineering, education, and enforcement to reduce and prevent highway-rail grade crossing accidents.  As one of these initiatives, FRA began working with the State of Louisiana in March 2005 to develop its own action plan for grade crossing safety, to address high numbers of grade crossing accidents and deaths at the State level.  The action plan focuses on reducing collisions between trains and motor vehicles at grade crossings where multiple collisions have occurred.  After a cooperative effort between the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, Federal Highway Administration, FRA, and other stakeholders, the State approved the action plan in April 2006.  FRA is encouraging other States with high numbers of grade crossing accidents and deaths to do the same, and is currently working with the State of Texas to develop such a plan. 

c.  Focus on Pedestrian Safety

In addition, FRA will work within the grade crossing safety community to determine appropriate responses to pedestrian fatalities at grade crossings.  Early in 2006, the Transportation Research Board devoted an entire session of its annual meeting to pedestrian grade crossing safety issues in order to capture information on how to improve safety in this area.  Later this spring, FRA will publish a compilation of information on existing pedestrian safety devices currently being used in the Nation so that those making decisions on methods to improve pedestrian safety may have useful resource material available.

d.  Inquiry on Safety of Private Grade Crossings

In June 2006, FRA initiated an inquiry into the safety of private highway-rail grade crossings.  Approximately 10 percent of grade crossing collisions occur at privately-owned crossings.  However, there is little governmental safety oversight of these crossings, at either the State or Federal level.  As a result, in cooperation with appropriate State agencies, FRA has been soliciting oral statements at a series of public meetings throughout the Nation on issues related to the safety of private grade crossings, including current practices concerning responsibilities for safety at these crossings, the adequacy of warning devices at the crossings, and the relative merits of a more uniform approach to improving safety at private crossings.  Four meetings have been held, and the final meeting will take place in Syracuse, New York, on July 26.  FRA has also opened a public docket on these issues, so that interested parties may submit written comments for public review and consideration.  The statements made and comments received will help inform decisions on what action needs to be taken to address the safety of private grade crossings. 

C.  Passenger Rail Safety Initiatives

While the National Rail Safety Action Plan focuses on improving the safety of freight railroad operations and grade crossings, FRA has also been making important progress on the safety of railroad passengers.  Let me highlight the agency’s initiatives.

1.  Passenger Safety Rulemakings

FRA is hard at work on several rulemakings specifically designed to improve rail passenger safety.  First, as a result of consensus recommendations from RSAC, in August 2006 FRA proposed new passenger rail safety standards to improve evacuation of passengers from trains, to provide additional ways for rescuers to access the passenger car in case of an emergency, and to enhance onboard emergency communication systems.  FRA is in the process of preparing the final rule, which is expected to be issued sometime in the near future.  Moreover, a separate regulatory proposal is also in development within RSAC, focusing on passenger car emergency signage, low-location exit path marking, and emergency lighting.  That proposal is based on American Public Transportation Association (APTA) standards for passenger safety and is intended to augment current Federal requirements. 

FRA is also preparing a proposed rule to implement the RSAC’s recommendations to enhance structural strength requirements for the front of cab cars and multiple-unit locomotives.  These enhancements would include the addition of “energy deformation” requirements specified in revised APTA standards. 

2.  Gap Concerns

Recent attention has been focused on passenger safety at stations with high-level platforms where there are gaps between passenger car doorways and the platform.  On August 5, 2006, a young woman fell into a gap between the platform and the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) commuter train she was exiting from, and was ultimately struck and killed by another train.  FRA staff conducted an informal survey of standards used for determining gap distance, and found a great deal of variation in standards among commuter railroads.  Visits to station platforms at six selected railroads found considerable variations in gap length.  Setting and maintaining an acceptable gap is a complicated process affected by passenger equipment types, track maintenance, track curvature, and platform configuration.  The gap is also affected when freight trains or specialized equipment must use the same track used for passenger boarding. 

FRA has made this issue a priority.  FRA has established an RSAC task force on General Passenger Safety to specifically address safety concerns associated with issues such as platform gaps, safe boarding and debarking, and passenger casualties associated with the “second train.”  The full task force has met twice and will also address other matters directly affecting passenger safety on or around station platforms and make any necessary recommendations to FRA for regulatory action. 

3.  Passenger Safety Research and Development

Crash Energy Management (CEM) Systems.  Research has shown that passenger rail equipment crashworthiness in train-to-train collisions can be significantly increased if the equipment structure is engineered to crush in a controlled manner.  For several years, FRA has been advancing this engineering approach, termed CEM, with strong support from the Volpe Center.  First use of this concept on the North American continent was in design of Amtrak’s Acela Express trainset.  In March 2006, FRA successfully conducted a full-scale passenger train crash test at the TTC to evaluate new CEM technology that might be applied to conventional equipment.  In this test, a passenger train that had been equipped with a CEM system that included sacrificial crush zones in unoccupied spaces, pushback couplers designed to retract and absorb energy, and specially designed anti-climbers to keep the train in line, better protected the spaces intended to be occupied by passengers and train crewmembers.  Also tested were new passenger seats with special padding and new tables with crushable edges, to help prevent and mitigate passenger injuries.  Use of this integrated CEM technology is expected to save lives by more than doubling the speed at which all passengers are typically expected to survive a train crash.

  • The Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) is in the process of procuring a new fleet of cars utilizing CEM technology.  Metrolink’s procurement is being facilitated by the completed work of the CEM Working Group, specially tasked in May 2005 to develop a detailed technical specification for implementing CEM technology in passenger rail cars.  The South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (SFRTA) has joined Metrolink in procuring equipment using this specification, and FRA expects other passenger railroads to include the specification in future procurements of their own. 
  • In addition, FRA is working with APTA in developing industry-wide standards for applying CEM technology, such as push-back couplers and deformable anti-climbers, to conventional passenger cars.  To help support this effort, a full-scale impact test of a multi-level passenger car into the rigid barrier at the TTC is planned for July 2007, as testing to date has involved single-level passenger cars.  Data obtained from this test is expected to help specify the performance of multi-level passenger cars in conjunction with push-back couplers or deformable anti-climbers, or both. 
  • Rollover Rig.  In May 2006, FRA unveiled a state-of-the-art Passenger Rail Vehicle Emergency Evacuation Simulator, also known as a “Rollover Rig.”  It has the unique ability to roll a full-sized, commuter rail car up to 180 degrees, effectively turning it upside down, to simulate passenger train derailment scenarios.  The Rollover Rig is already enhancing the ability of researchers to test strategies for evacuating passenger rail cars and to evaluate the performance of emergency systems in the cars, such as emergency lighting, doors, and windows.  In addition, first responders nationwide now have a unique training tool to practice effective passenger rail rescue techniques safely when a rail car is on its side.  FRA developed the Rollover Rig at a cost of $450,000.  New Jersey Transit Rail Operations donated the commuter rail car used by the Rollover Rig, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority agreed to house, operate, and maintain the simulator at its emergency response training facility located in Landover, Maryland.

4.  Collision Hazard Analysis

“Collision Hazard Analysis” is a specific type of safety review that seeks to identify collision hazards and to develop reasonable solutions to eliminate or mitigate these hazards. Collision hazards include conditions and activities that increase the risk of collisions between trains or other on-track equipment, between trains and motor vehicles/pedestrians, or between trains and fixed objects along the right of way.  FRA strongly believes that the performance of a Collision Hazard Analysis will strengthen and support the passenger rail system safety process that grew out of the combined experience of the agency and the commuter railroads under Emergency Order No. 20.  FRA and the Volpe Center have partnered with APTA to conduct important pilot projects regarding Collision Hazard Analysis.  During the first pilot project, FRA, the Volpe Center, and APTA worked cooperatively to train and mentor a hazard analysis team at Tri-Rail, SFRTA’s commuter service, which volunteered to be the first commuter railroad to conduct this analysis.  The Tri-Rail project proved very successful and served as the model for a Collision Hazard Analysis pilot project on the Virginia Railway Express, completed last fall.  The effort was also very successful and provided further insight into the collision hazard analysis process.  Based on positive experiences on both pilot projects, FRA strongly advocates that all commuter operators undertake a Collision Hazard Analysis.  The analysis is especially useful for “New Start” rail projects where design and operational decisions can be readily influenced.

III.   ADMINISTRATION’S RAIL SAFETY BILL (H.R. 1516, S. 918)

The Administration’s rail safety reauthorization bill, the Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act, would reauthorize appropriations for FRA to carry out its rail safety mission for four years.  FRA has made a full copy of the proposal available on our web site at http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/48, including the supporting analysis for each section.  Let me take this opportunity to discuss the major provisions of the Administration bill and how they will further FRA’s safety efforts. 

A.  Authorizes Safety Risk Reduction Program and Protects Confidentiality of Risk Analyses Produced

In order to enhance the accountability of railroads in assuming full responsibility for their own safety, the bill would authorize appropriations for the addition of a safety risk reduction program to supplement FRA’s current safety activities and seeks Congressional endorsement of this pilot program.  Since rail-related accidents, injuries, and deaths are already at low levels, FRA needs to augment our traditional behavior-based and design-specification-based regulations with a robust safety risk reduction program to drive down those key measures of risk at a reasonable cost and in a practical manner. 

In the safety context, a risk reduction program is intended to make sure that the systems by which railroads operate and maintain their properties are adequate to meet or exceed safety objectives.  FRA continues to place greater emphasis on developing models of how railroads can systematically evaluate safety risks, in order to hold them more accountable for improving the safety of their operations, including implementing plans to eliminate or reduce the chance for workers to make mistakes that can lead to accidents or close calls.  A safety risk reduction program could unify previous voluntary efforts in the human factors arena while extending similar techniques to management of risk in other arenas such as track safety. 

To encourage railroads to produce thorough, as opposed to superficial, risk analyses, a companion provision in the bill would bar public disclosure by FRA of records required under the safety risk reduction program, except for Federal law enforcement purposes.  Also in order to promote the preparation of serious risk analyses by railroads, the provision would forbid discovery by private litigants in civil litigation for damages of any information compiled or collected under the program, and would forbid admission into evidence of the same information in civil litigation by private parties for damages.  An example would be a commuter railroad that undertakes a hazard analysis and has a crossover near a bridge abutment.  It is unlikely that the railroad would be able to remove the hazard (a derailment could send the cars into the fixed structure) but it could mitigate the risk by reducing speeds and training.

FRA is mindful that any restriction of public access to information may be controversial and requires careful scrutiny.  However, we are convinced that assuring confidentiality is essential to promote full disclosure by the railroads and their employees to make such programs meaningful and bring about tangible improvements in safety.   

B.  Grants Rulemaking Authority over Hours of Service

As discussed earlier, human factors cause more than a third of all train accidents, constituting the largest category of train accident causes.  Fatigue is at least a contributing factor in one of every four serious human factor train accidents.  We believe that fatigued crewmembers have played an increasing role in railroad accidents over the past decade through poor judgment, miscommunication, inattentiveness, and failure to follow procedures.  Our challenge is to ensure that crewmembers have adequate opportunity to rest, are free of disorders that can disrupt sleep, and are fully engaged in maintaining alertness.  

However, the statutory provisions that govern the hours of service of railroad train crews, dispatchers, and signal maintainers are antiquated—essentially a century old—and woefully inadequate to address present realities.  For example, under those laws, train crews may work eight hours on duty and eight hours off duty perpetually.  Engineers and conductors often work 60 to 70 hours a week, and may be called to work during the day or night, which may disrupt sleep patterns and reduce their ability to function.  See Appendix B. 

Moreover, those hours of service laws contain no substantive rulemaking authority.  The lack of regulatory authority over duty hours—authority that other DOT agencies have with respect to their modes of transportation—has precluded FRA from making use of scientific learning on this issue of sleep-wake cycles and fatigue-induced performance failures.  Behavioral science has progressed to the point that computer models can accurately predict the likely effect of given sleep and rest patterns on employee performance.  The models provide useful guidance to aid employee scheduling, and, as I discussed earlier, FRA published a validation report of one such model in 2006.  Yet, only UP is making use of a sleep model to evaluate its own crew scheduling practices.  Most railroads have yet to integrate use of such models in their operations and have refrained from making public commitments to use this capability in the future. Further, over the past 15 years, the history of attempts by rail labor and management to improve fatigue management has not been marked by sustained progress.  

We recognize that specific amendments to the hours of service laws might mitigate fatigue.  Yet, we believe that sincere attempts at short-term relief can also create constraints and unintended consequences that may limit the ability to provide optimal solutions downstream.  Treating limbo time as on-duty time, for instance, may force carriers to reduce the length of many assignments to avoid the possibility of “violations” under circumstances where safety could not be seriously compromised, and may increase the cost of any further reforms.  Hours of service issues are surprisingly complex, and they need to be properly considered within the overall context of fatigue prevention and management.  FRA is committed to making significant progress in this area, but we need the regulatory authority to do so. 

We strongly recommend that the existing hours of service laws be replaced with flexible regulations based on a modern, scientific understanding of fatigue.  Today, I am here asking for your support for legislation that will permit us to put into action what we have learned.  The Administration bill first proposes to sunset the hours of service laws, but retain their protections as interim regulations embodying their substantive provisions.  Next, the proposal calls for FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, to review the problem of fatigue with the assistance of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, and to develop as necessary new, science-based requirements that can help us reduce human factor-caused accidents and casualties.  We believe revised “benchmark” limits are needed on work hours, and requirements for rest periods, to provide simple guidance for fixed schedules, where that will suffice.

The bill would also authorize FRA to permit railroads to comply with an approved fatigue management plan as an alternative to complying with the “benchmark” limits” in the regulations.  With the tools now available, we will be able to recognize fatigue management approaches that include careful evaluation of a wide variety of more flexible work schedules by validated techniques.  In fact, we believe most safety-critical railroad employees would be protected by performance-based fatigue management programs that will enhance safety while holding down costs.  

For public and employee safety, it is time to make a long-overdue change and grant us the rulemaking authority over hours of service to directly address the major cause of far too many train accidents. 

C.  Promotes Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety

Accidents at highway-rail grade crossings account for more than a third of all rail-related fatalities.  The bill seeks to prevent highway-rail grade crossing collisions and make crossings safer through two main provisions.

1.  Requires Reports by Railroads and States to DOT on the Characteristics of Highway-Rail Grade Crossings 

Currently, reporting to the DOT National Crossing Inventory is strictly voluntary.  FRA is the custodian of the inventory and the quality of the data is only as good as what States and railroads have historically reported.  Too much data in the inventory has been outdated.  The bill would remedy this by requiring that railroads and States provide the Secretary with current information regarding the country’s approximately 230,000 highway-rail grade crossings.  Mandatory reporting would make this unique national database more up to date and complete, which would help (i) States better rank their crossings by risk and channel resources to the most dangerous crossings first, and (ii) DOT and transportation researchers identify the most promising ways to reduce crossing casualties.  The bill would therefore require initial reports on all previously unreported crossings and periodic updates on all crossings.        

2.  Fosters Introduction of New Technology to Improve Safety at Public Highway-Rail Grade Crossings

Fewer than half of the 140,000 public highway-rail grade crossings have active warning devices, which are expensive to install and maintain.  Perversely, improvements at one crossing are often cited in tort actions to prove the inadequacy of protections at another crossing.  Under the Administration bill, if the Secretary has approved a new technology to provide advance warning to highway users at a grade crossing, the Secretary’s determination preempts any State law concerning the adequacy of the technology in providing the warning.  FRA believes that this proposal would help encourage the creation and deployment of new, cost-effective technology at the Nation’s approximately 80,000 public grade crossings that still lack active warning devices.  For instance, under an FRA waiver the Twin Cites and Western Railroad Co. and its supplier successfully demonstrated a warning system designed for lower-volume roadways and rail lines using dedicated locomotives.  The system uses GPS and a data radio link between the locomotive and each crossing.  This product is now being commercialized by a major signal supplier. 

D.  Expands FRA’s Authority to Disqualify Individuals Unfit for Safety-Sensitive Service

Another provision of the bill would expand FRA’s existing disqualification authority to cover individuals who are unfit for safety-sensitive service in the railroad industry because of a violation of the Hazardous Materials Regulations related to transporting hazmat by rail.  Currently, FRA may disqualify an individual only for a violation of the rail safety laws or regulations, not the Hazardous Materials Regulations, even though violation of the Hazardous Materials Regulations may involve a greater potential accident risk or consequence (in the event of an accident).  This proposal would logically extend our disqualification authority over railroad employees and complement current initiatives to strengthen FRA’s safety compliance program. 

E.  Protects Rail Safety Regulations from Legal Attack on the Ground that They Affect Security and Repeals Statutory Requirement for DHS to Consult with DOT when Issuing Security Rules that Affect Rail Safety

The bill would also bar legal challenges to DOT safety regulations on the basis that they affect rail security.  In many cases, rail safety and security are intertwined, and part of the justification for certain DOT regulations is that they enhance rail security.  The bill would clarify the scope of the Secretary’s safety jurisdiction and help deter or quickly rebuff any challenge that DOT has exceeded its statutory authority in issuing such regulations. 

Of course, DHS would continue to exercise primary responsibility for the promulgation of rail security regulations.  In this regard, the bill would repeal the statutory provision that, when issuing security rules that affect rail safety, DHS must consult with DOT.  We believe the provision is unnecessary and confusing in light of other statutes, executive orders, and existing inter-Departmental cooperation under the DOT-DHS Memorandum of Understanding and its related annexes on rail security.

F.  Clarifies the Secretary’s Authority to Issue Temporary Waivers of Rail Safety Regulations Related to Emergencies

The bill would clarify that FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, may grant a temporary waiver without prior notice and an opportunity for public comment and hearing, if the waiver is directly related to an emergency event or needed to aid in recovery efforts and it is in the public interest and consistent with railroad safety.  While FRA’s normal practice is to set aside time for public comment and hearing on waiver petitions, this appreciably slows down issuance of waivers necessary for emergency response and recovery efforts.  Yet granting a waiver without such procedures risks legal challenge.  The provision would free FRA from this dilemma and allow the agency to support emergency response and recovery efforts by dispensing with prior notice and an opportunity for comment and hearing, and by otherwise expediting the process for granting waivers.  Further, the relief granted would be temporary (a maximum of nine months), and the normal waiver procedures would have to be followed to extend the temporary relief granted should doing so be necessary.

G.  Authorizes the Monitoring of Railroad Radio Communications

Currently, FRA is permitted to monitor railroad radio communications only in the presence of an authorized sender or receiver, such as a railroad employee.  Yet, when railroad employees know that FRA is present, they tend to be on their best safety behavior.  Therefore, FRA cannot be sure whether the level of compliance observed is normal, and we are less able to identify what are, under ordinary circumstances, the most frequent and serious instances of noncompliance.  Access to candid communications off site would yield a truer picture of compliance levels. 

The bill would address this concern by letting FRA safety inspectors monitor and record railroads’ radio communications over their dedicated frequencies outside of the presence of railroad personnel for the purpose of accident prevention (including accident investigation) and, with certain exceptions, to use the information received.  The exceptions would be that the information (1) may generally not be used as direct evidence in any administrative or judicial proceeding, and (2) may not be released under the Freedom of Information Act.  The information may, however, be used as background material for further investigation.  Nor should there be concern that the information communicated is personal information.  Railroad operating rules and procedures already require that all radio communications relate to railroad operations and prohibit railroad employees from using the radio for personal use. 

As FRA’s objective of accident prevention is ordinarily fulfilled daily by conducting safety inspections of railroad operations and enforcing the rail safety laws, monitoring of radio communications would not only help achieve that objective, but would greatly improve the efficiency of those inspections, the accuracy of the results, and the effective deployment of FRA’s limited inspection resources based on those more accurate results. 

H.  Clarifies and Relaxes the Existing Statutory Provision on Moving Certain Defective Equipment for Repair

Finally, I would like to mention that the bill would amend a complicated statutory provision that states the conditions for hauling a railroad car or locomotive with a safety appliance or power brake defect for repair without civil penalty liability, including the requirement that equipment be back-hauled to the nearest available repair point.  Back hauls required by statute can be both unsafe (because of the hazards related to switching a car out of one train and into another train), and inefficient (because the car is stopped from moving toward its destination and forced to go to a different place that is physically closer than the next forward point for repair).  The proposal would allow the equipment to be moved to the next forward point of repair under clear regulatory safeguards for moving defective equipment that are more consistent with the movement-for-repair provisions applicable to vehicles with other types of defects, such as Freight Car Safety Standards defects. 

Further, the bill would also define some key statutory terms and then provide FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, with rulemaking authority to define others.  Currently, FRA may provide only guidance on the meaning of these terms, and this has contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty about the requirements of the statute in day-to-day application.  For example, FRA has received many complaints over the years that cars have been hauled past a repair point that FRA does not consider to be a repair point.  This proposal would, therefore, help dispel such uncertainty and promote understanding and compliance with the provisions governing the safe movement of equipment with a safety appliance or power brake defect. 

The Administration’s bill does not include a provision that would revise the preemption provision at 49 U.S.C. § 20106.  While this is a very important issue, of interest to many on the Committee, I would ask that the Committee oppose the provision included as Section 3 of H.R. 1401.  This provision would overturn longstanding Supreme Court precedents, and ultimately be detrimental to railroad safety.  It would eliminate national uniformity of regulation. It was clearly the intention of Congress in enacting section 20106 to establish national uniformity of regulation, which is a fundamental keystone of the railroad safety statutes.  Railroads would instead be forced to attempt to comply with an endless number of ever changing and potentially conflicting state and local standards adopted by individual juries.  If the Committee needs further information to address this important issue, FRA staff would be glad to provide assistance.

I would like to emphasize that, while all of the provisions I have discussed are among the major provisions of the bill, there are other significant provisions I have not mentioned today that will also enhance rail safety.  These include providing FRA rail security officers with greater access to Federal, State, and local law enforcement databases, officer-protection warning systems, and communications for the purpose of performing the Administrator’s civil and administrative duties to promote safety, including security, and for other purposes authorized by law.  All of these provisions are set forth in the bill the Secretary presented in February, and I would be glad to discuss each of them in detail with you.

IV.  Conclusion

FRA’s approach to enhancing the safety of rail transportation is multifaceted.  FRA personnel strive daily to implement comprehensive initiatives for safety assurance and hazard mitigation under the National Rail Safety Action Plan to make rail operations safer for the public and the rail transportation industry.  The Administration’s Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act would enable FRA not only to continue these efforts but to enhance safety systematically in many ways.  I look forward to working with the Subcommittee to bring about the enactment of the Administration’s bill, and to help make our Nation’s railroad system ever safer.  Thank you. 

Appendix A

The Railroad Industry’s Safety Record

The railroad industry’s overall safety record is very positive, and most safety trends are moving in the right direction.  While not even a single death or injury is acceptable, progress is continually being made in the effort to improve railroad safety.  This improvement is demonstrated by an analysis of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) database of railroad reports of accidents and incidents that have occurred over the nearly three decades from 1978 through 2006.  See 49 CFR part 225.   (The worst year for rail safety in recent decades was 1978, and 2006 is the last complete year for which preliminary data are available.)  Between 1978 and 2006, the total number of rail-related accidents and incidents has fallen from 90,653 to 12,940, an all-time low representing a decline of 86 percent.  Between 1978 and 2006, total rail-related fatalities have declined from 1,646 to 913, a reduction of 44 percent.  From 1978 to 2006, total employee cases (fatal and nonfatal) have dropped from 65,193 to 5,065, the record low; this represents a decline of 92 percent.  In the same period, total employee deaths have fallen from 122 in 1978 to 16 in 2006, a decrease of 87 percent.

Contributing to this generally improving safety record has been a 74-percent decline in train accidents since 1978 (a total of 2,864 train accidents in 2006, compared to 10,991 in 1978), even though rail traffic has increased.  (Total train-miles were up by 8.5 percent from 1978 to 2006.)  In addition, the year 2006 saw only 28 train accidents out of the 2,834 reported in which a hazardous material was released, with a total of only 69 hazardous material cars releasing some amount of product, despite about 1.7 million movements of hazardous materials by rail.

In other words, over the last almost three decades, the number and rate of train accidents, total deaths arising from rail operations, employee fatalities and injuries, and hazardous materials releases all have fallen dramatically.  In most categories, these improvements have been most rapid in the 1980s, and tapered off in the late 1990s.  Causes of the improvements have included a much more profitable economic climate for freight railroads following deregulation in 1980 under the Staggers Act (which led to substantially greater investment in plant and equipment), enhanced safety awareness and safety program implementation on the part of railroads and their employees, and FRA’s safety monitoring and standard setting (most of FRA’s safety rules were issued during this period).  In addition, rail remains an extremely safe mode of transportation for passengers.  Since 1978, more than 11.2 billion passengers have traveled by rail, based on reports filed with FRA each month.  The number of rail passengers has steadily increased over the years, and since 2000 has averaged more than 500 million per year.  Although 12 passengers died in train collisions and derailments in 2005, none did in 2006.  On a passenger-mile basis, with an average about 15.5 billion passenger-miles per year since the year 2000, rail travel is about as safe as scheduled airlines and intercity bus transportation and is far safer than private motor vehicle travel.  Rail passenger accidents–while always to be avoided–have a very high passenger survival rate.

As indicated previously, not all of the major safety indicators are positive.  Grade crossing and rail trespasser incidents continue to cause a large proportion of the deaths associated with railroading.  Grade crossing and rail trespassing deaths accounted for 97 percent of the 913 total rail-related deaths in 2006.  In recent years, rail trespasser deaths have replaced grade crossing fatalities as the largest category of rail-related deaths.  In 2006, 525 persons died while on railroad property without authorization, and 365 persons lost their lives in grade crossing accidents.  Further, significant train accidents continue to occur, and the train accident rate per million train-miles has not declined at an acceptable pace in recent years.  It actually rose slightly in 2003 and 2004 (to 4.05 and 4.38, respectively) compared to that in 2002 (3.76), although it dropped in 2005 (to 4.1) and 2006 (to 3.54). 

The causes of train accidents are generally grouped into five categories:  human factors; track and structures; equipment; signal and train control; and miscellaneous.  The great majority of train accidents are caused by human factors and track.  In recent years, most of the serious events involving train collisions or derailments resulting in release of hazardous material, or harm to rail passengers, have resulted from human factor or track causes.  Accordingly, the National Rail Safety Action Plan makes human factors and track the major target areas for improving the train accident rate.

                                                                                                            Appendix B

Scientific Learning Demonstrating Inadequacy of Hours of Service Laws

The following four examples illustrate some of the ways in which the existing hours of service statutory regime fails to reflect the latest scholarship on the subject of fatigue.

First, current scientific information indicates that to feel well rested most people need approximately eight hours of sleep per night.  The current hours of service laws require a minimum off-duty period of only 10 hours if an employee in train and engine service has worked 12 consecutive hours in the previous 24-hour period.  If an employee works 11 hours and 59 minutes or less, the laws require a minimum rest period of only eight hours.  Very few employees work 12 consecutive hours; therefore, most may legally be called back to duty with only eight hours off duty.  During that off-duty time, the employee must travel to and from work and attend to personal needs such as bathing and eating.  Crew-calling practices allow the employee to be called as little as two hours prior to the beginning of the next duty period.  Given these circumstances, it is certain that the current law permits employees to work with less than eight hours of sleep per night. 

An FRA study of locomotive engineers’ sleep and work patterns found that the average locomotive engineer obtained 7.13 hours of sleep per night.[1]  Another FRA study of train handling performance conducted on a highly realistic locomotive simulator by locomotive engineers working under schedules that conformed with the hours of service laws[2] found that engineers who worked ten hours and had 12 hours off duty, slept an average of only 6.1 hours.  A similar group of engineers who also worked ten hours, but had only 9.3 hours off duty, slept an average of only 4.6 hours.  Again, most people need about eight hours of sleep per night; therefore, for most people, the amount of sleep these engineers received was insufficient even though their schedules fully conformed with the hours of service laws.

Second, scientific information also shows that the quantity and quality of sleep vary with the time of day.  Most people sleep best at night; however, the current hours of service laws do not take the time of day when sleep can occur into account.  Under those laws, engineers who quit work at dawn and have to sleep during the daytime, when it is harder to sleep, get the same minimum eight or ten hours off as engineers who quit work in the evening and have the relative luxury of sleeping at night.  The study by Pollard referenced earlier found that engineers, in fact, obtain the least sleep if their on-duty period ends between 5:00 a.m. and noon.           

Third, most mammals, including human beings, have an approximately 24-hour sleep-wake cycle known as a “circadian rhythm.”  Rapid changes in the circadian pattern of sleep and wakefulness disrupt many physiological functions such as hormone releases, digestion, and temperature regulation.  Human function can be affected, performance may be impaired, and a general feeling of debility may occur until realignment is achieved.  The maximum work periods and minimum off-duty periods specified in the current hours of service laws force sleep-wake cycles into a less-than-24-hour pattern that is highly unnatural and very difficult to adapt to.  Jet lag when flying east is the most commonly experienced syndrome similar to the experience of consistently working on a less-than-24-hour cycle.

Fourth, recent studies “suggest that sleep loss (less than 7 hours per night) may have wide-ranging effects on the cardiovascular, endocrine, immune, and nervous systems, including the following:

  • Obesity in adults . . .
  • Diabetes and impaired glucose tolerance
  • Cardiovascular disease and hypertension
  • Anxiety symptoms
  • Depressed mood
  • Alcohol use[.]”[3]

In other words, sleep loss, which the current hours of service regime permits railroad operating employees to suffer, contributes not only to the safety risk of fatigue, but also to a gamut of heath risks, including the risk of serious health problems such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and hypertension.


[1] Pollard, J. K. 1996.  Locomotive engineer’s activity diary.  Report Number DOT/FRA/RRP-96/02.

[2] Thomas, G. R., Raslear, T. G., and Kuehn, G. I.  1997.  The effects of work schedule on train handling performance and sleep of locomotive engineers: A simulator study.  Report Number DOT/FRA/ORD-97-09.

[3] Institute of Medicine of the National Academies. Sleep Disorders and Sleep Deprivation: an Unmet Public Health Problem (2006), p. 59.

The President’s Fiscal Year 2018 Budget Request for Transportation

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE ELAINE L. CHAO
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION, HOUSING, AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
AND RELATED AGENCIES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 15, 2017

 

Introduction

Chairman Diaz-Balart, Ranking Member Price, and members of the Subcommittee thank you for the opportunity to meet today to discuss the President’s Fiscal Year 2018 Budget request for Transportation.  I am deeply honored to serve as the 18th Secretary of Transportation, and I look forward to working with all of you to address America’s transportation needs.  I know that together, we share a commitment to ensuring our transportation systems are safe, effective, and ready to adapt to new technologies. 

The President’s FY 2018 Budget represents a bold change of course for our Nation and challenges all of us to rethink the way we are setting our priorities.  It calls on us to reexamine our current spending and our continuing commitment to programs that may not be meeting their intended purpose, have outlasted their usefulness, or simply need to be replaced with new initiatives that will better address our requirements for the future.  Some funding reductions are in recognition that our resources are limited and that we have an obligation to future generations to keep our spending under control.

The President’s Budget requests $76 billion to support transportation programs in FY 2018.  The request fully funds surface transportation programs included in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act and provides levels of funding for the majority of other Transportation programs roughly in line with FY 2016 levels.   But just as important, the budget promises a renewed focus on the state of our infrastructure -- targeting ways to streamline approvals, encourage cost-sharing, and prioritize projects with the greatest value to Americans.

A New Infrastructure Initiative

Our transportation infrastructure is aging.  We need a focused approach to address this problem.  The President proposes to tackle these problems by seeking long-term reforms on how infrastructure projects are regulated, funded, delivered, and maintained.  The President’s plan proposes reforms that will incentivize additional state, local, and private funding and will ensure that Federal funding is leveraged to maximize and significantly increase total infrastructure investment.  The President has identified a total Federal commitment of $200 billion for infrastructure improvements.  These resources will work in tandem with reforms so that progress can be achieved quickly. 

While transportation specific infrastructure needs will be a key element of the President’s plan, the entire initiative will encompass other Federal programs as well.  The infrastructure plan will involve 13 Federal Departments and Agencies working in concert to address the following key principles:

  • Make targeted Federal investments on the most transformative projects.  These will be high priority projects from the perspective of the Nation or the region, or projects that will change the nature of how infrastructure is designed, built, and maintained.
     
  • Encourage states, localities, and tribes to take their own action to improve their infrastructure.  Because Federal resources are not unlimited, and the needs are great, waiting for Washington to fund repair and renovation projects only delays the improvements even longer.  State and local efforts can be helped by streamlined Federal permitting and regulatory processes.
     
  • The private sector has capital that could and should be utilized to improve our infrastructure.  We can make Federal and state dollars stretch further by leveraging, and we can tap into the management benefits offered by the private sector, such as procurement methods, market discipline, and long-term maintenance protocols.  The Administration does not believe public-private partnerships are the answer to all infrastructure needs, but they can play a much stronger role in fixing America’s infrastructure.
     
  • We should also align infrastructure investment with the entities best suited to carry it out and maintain it.  The Administration will look for opportunities to divest from certain functions that the private sector could do more effectively.  The Federal government can also be more efficient about disposing of underused capital assets, ensuring that those assets are put to their best use.

With these reforms and principles in mind, I am confident that the Federal Departments and Agencies working together will be successful in developing an infrastructure improvement initiative that will achieve the President’s vision.

Charting a New Course

The President’s call for reforms includes changes affecting some of our traditional transportation programs.  One of these areas is the Federal Transit Administration’s Capital Investment Grants program.   The Capital Investments Grants program supports projects that have primarily local direct benefits.  While the President’s Budget honors commitments to projects with existing full funding grant agreements, it does not recommend funding for new projects.  The Administration is reexamining programs where significant Federal resources are spent on activities that have primarily local benefits – including what fiscal and other tools might be the most appropriate to encourage investment in those jurisdictions.   

Along the same lines, the President’s budget request does not include funding for the discretionary portion of the Essential Air Service (EAS).  EAS was originally proposed as a temporary program nearly 40 years ago at about $50 million.  Today, two budgetary accounts are funding the EAS program at a total cost of $280 million.  Yet, many EAS flights are not full and have high subsidy costs per passenger, calling into question the affordability of this program.  But this poses a conundrum for all of us, because we recognize how critical the EAS program is to rural areas.

To address this situation, the President’s Budget requests support for a redesigned program  known as the Transportation Aviation Assistance to Remote Areas (TAARA) program.  This new program will be funded exclusively by mandatory overflight fees at $119 million.  By reworking the old EAS program, we will help reset the path for remote air assistance going forward.  The objective is to sustain air service to rural locations most in need, and to establish relevant objective criteria for making those determinations.

Funding for Amtrak’s long distance routes is another area where Federal investments do not match the level of usage.  Amtrak’s long distance services are used by a relatively small number of passengers.  These trains are very expensive to operate and maintain; and account for much of Amtrak’s operating losses.  The President’s budget recognizes this is an area with a low return on investment and instead asks us to concentrate our resources on other portions of Amtrak’s system. 

The President also recommends an end to the Transportation Investments Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grant program at a savings of nearly $500 million.  With the passage of the FAST Act and the creation of a new competitive grant program, the Department has other opportunities for funding those projects that have nationally or regionally significant characteristics.  Grant programs that meet the objectives of the new infrastructure initiative will also be considered for future investments.

FAA Modernization

The President’s FY 2018 budget also includes a bold shift in the operational model used for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  First, I would like to recognize the dedicated individuals of the FAA who safely and efficiently guide thousands of aircraft carrying millions of passengers and tons of cargo to destinations around the country.  However, while the FAA has established a tremendous safety record while operating the world’s most complex air traffic system, it has been hindered by the continued use of old technology.

After billions of dollars invested and years of effort to modernize our air traffic control system, our air traffic controllers are still dependent on paper strips to manage the airspace.  And while we have stayed stuck in an old-fashioned approach, many other countries throughout the world have successfully implemented new models for delivering safe and reliable air traffic control services using non-governmental structures.  The President’s budget request asks Congress to enact FAA modernization legislation based on the principles he has just announced.  This legislation would, begin a multi-year modernization effort that will transfer the day-to-day air traffic control services provided today by FAA to a new non-government cooperative.  The Federal government would retain its role in regulating aviation safety, just like it does for all other modes of transportation.  As we begin this modernization effort, we will be working to structure the new organization around the following principles:

  • A non-profit, non-governmental cooperative is the best model to deliver air traffic services in a safe, efficient, and innovative manner.
     
  • A board of directors that represents all users of the National Airspace System will better align air traffic services to customer demands.  No one stakeholder group would control the Board.
      
  • A fee structure would be put in place to allow aviation users to pay the cost of the services of the air navigation provider with the understanding that the provider would not charge any more than necessary to recover its costs.  Any surplus would be plowed back in to the entity; there are no shareholders that would profit.     

When completed, this modernization effort will deliver an organization that uses modern business tools and management flexibilities that are comparable to those used in the private sector.  This flexibility would speed up the implementation of new, state-of-the-art technology for air traffic control that will allow for greater precision in managing the airspace, thus enhancing safety and alleviating flight delays that have become an increasingly aggravating element of air travel.  The Nation that invented air travel should surely do better. 

Thank you again, for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the President’s Fiscal Year 2018 budget.  I will be happy to answer your questions.

****

 

Improving Air Service to Small and Rural Communities

STATEMENT OF

ANDREW B. STEINBERG

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

AVIATION and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION

UNITED STATES SENATE

on

Improving Air Service to Small and Rural Communities

 

July 17, 2007

 

 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to this hearing.  I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you and the Subcommittee two programs administered by the Department of Transportation that affect air service to small communities, namely the Essential Air Service (EAS) program and the Small Community Air Service Development Program.  I can assure you that the Department is committed to implementing its small community air service programs in the best and most efficient manner and thereby help smaller communities meet the challenges that they face in obtaining and retaining air service. 

 

It is clear that air service in this country has changed dramatically over the past several years.  Many of these changes have been very positive.  The growth of low-fare carriers, for example, has made affordable air transportation available to millions of people across the country.  The number of air travelers has expanded dramatically, as hundreds of passengers have taken advantage of the low fares that have become more widely available.  While this is a good development overall for consumers, we recognize that it can create new challenges for some small communities.  With a greater number of service choices available, particularly those involving lower fares, many consumers are willing to drive to places with a broader array of air service options, making it more difficult for some individual airports to sustain their own traffic levels.  There are, for example, some communities receiving EAS assistance within ready driving distance of two or three major airports.  This can result in a struggling community airport, but not necessarily consumers who lack access to the national air transportation system.  Let me give you an example, just a few years ago Utica, New York generated about 24,000 passengers a year and was served profitably without EAS subsidy.  Then Southwest began flying to Albany and JetBlue started service to Syracuse-- both of which are near to Utica.  The number of passengers using Utica airport fell to 3,500, and the federal government was paying over $1 million in EAS subsidy in attempt to compete with low-fare, jet service in nearby cities.  The subsidy per passenger finally exceeded the $200 statutorily-determined ceiling thus ending the community’s eligibility for EAS. 

 

Another challenge is the change in aircraft used by carriers that serve small communities.  Many commuter carriers have been replacing their 19-seat aircraft with 30-seat aircraft, due to the increased costs of operating the smaller planes and larger carriers’ reluctance to offer code sharing on 19-seaters.  This trend began at least 10 years ago and has continued.  There are now fewer and fewer 19-seat aircraft in operation as many carriers have upgauged to 30-seat aircraft, and, in some cases, even regional jets.  As a result, many small communities that cannot support this larger size of aircraft are being left without air service.  Additionally, the rise in the cost of aviation fuel has made all carriers more cost-conscious and more selective in initiating new service and maintaining service where yields and traffic are low.  Also, some changes have occurred in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Many consumers, leisure and business, have changed their travel patterns and carriers have altered the structure of their airline services in both large and small markets.  

 

The recent financial difficulties of the network carriers have contributed to the dearth of air service to small communities.  As network-airlines have worked hard to cut costs and become more efficient in order to weather very difficult economic conditions, they have resorted to canceling service on their thinnest routes—many of which are small communities.  Thus in the long-term, an important factor for comprehensive air transportation in the United States is the sound financial health of network airlines. 

 

The challenge that we face is one of adjusting the programs, to the extent we are able, to account for these changes in an efficient and effective manner, giving appropriate and balanced recognition to the reasonable needs of the communities, the carriers, the consumers, and the taxpaying public at large.   Mr. Chairman, I do not use the word “challenge” lightly.  All of us -- the federal government that manages programs affecting service at small communities, as well as the States and the communities themselves -- need to reexamine the way we approach small community air service. 

 

We at the Department of Transportation have recognized for a while now that the way the federal government helps small communities has not kept pace with the changes in the industry and the way service is now provided in this country.  For that reason, we have initiated some important reevaluations of the programs that we manage.  I want to share with you today what we have done and are doing to address this issue.

 

As you know, the Department administers two programs dealing with air service at small communities.  The EAS program provides subsidies to air carriers to provide air service at certain statutorily mandated communities.  The Small Community Air Service Development Program, which was established by Congress in 2000 under the AIR-21 legislation, provides federal grants-in-aid to help small communities address their air service and airfare issues.  While initially established as a pilot program, it was reauthorized through FY 2008 in Vision 100.

 

 

 

Essential Air Service Program

 

Let me first address the EAS program.  The laws governing our administration of the EAS program have not changed significantly since its inception 28 years ago, notwithstanding the dramatic changes that have taken place in the airline industry.  As currently structured, the EAS program acts only as a safety net for small communities receiving subsidized air service by providing threshold levels of air service.  While ensuring some service, this approach does little to help communities attract self-sustaining unsubsidized air service, as evidenced by the fact that once a community receives subsidized air service it is rare for an air carrier to come in offering to provide unsubsidized air service.  

 

The goal of our proposed changes to the EAS program is to focus the program’s resources on the most isolated communities, i.e., those with the fewest driving alternatives.  Our current proposal to accomplish this is quite different from those made in past years.  The first change we propose is to cap EAS communities at those that currently receive subsidized air service.  Second, we would rank all the subsidized communities by isolation, i.e., by driving miles to the nearest large or medium hub airport, with the most isolated getting service first.  Last, we are proposing a maximum $50 million funding level. 

 

Congress has also recognized the need for reform and created a few pilot programs in Vision 100.  One program is the Community Flexibility Pilot Program.  It allows up to ten communities to receive a grant equal to two years’ worth of subsidy in exchange for their forgoing their EAS for ten years.  The funds would have to be used for a project on the airport property or to improve the facilities for general aviation, but no communities have volunteered for that program.  Another program is the Alternate Essential Air Service Program.  The thrust of this program is that, instead of paying an air carrier to serve a community as we typically do under EAS, communities could apply to receive the funds directly -- provided that they have a plan as to exactly how they would use the funds to the benefit of the communities’ access to air service.  The law gives great flexibility in that regard.  For example, funds could be used for smaller aircraft but more frequent service, for on-demand air taxi service, for on-demand surface transportation, for regionalized service, or to purchase an aircraft to be used to serve the community.  The Department issued an order establishing that program in the summer of 2004, but to date no communities have applied.  I cannot tell you for sure why, but my guess is that part of it is that it is just human nature to resist both risk and change. 

 

With regard to the EAS program, it is important to note the continued growth of the program’s size and cost to taxpayers over time.  As a point of reference, before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Department was paying subsidy for 107 communities (including 32 in Alaska).  We are now subsidizing service at 145 communities (including 41 in Alaska).   Further, EAS is often viewed as an absolute entitlement whether the communities invest any time and effort in supporting the service or not.  We have proposed reforms to EAS to better focus its resources on the most isolated communities. 

 

 

 

Small Community Air Service Development Program

 

The Department is now in its sixth year of administering the Small Community Air Service Development Program (Small Community Program).  Under the law, the Department can make a maximum of 40 grants in each fiscal year to address air service and airfare issues, although no more than four grants each year can be in any one State.  Until 2006, Congress had provided $20 million in each year for this program.  In 2006, the funding for the program was $10 million, and the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (P.L. 110-5), provides the Department with $10 million in Fiscal Year 2007 to administer the Small Community Program.  On February 26, the Department issued a Request for Proposals for 2007 applications and proposals are due April 27. 

 

Given the many and varying priorities facing the Department, this program was not accommodated within the President’s 2008 Budget.  Nonetheless, it is important to note the extensive support that the Department provides for small airports in terms of supporting the infrastructure that make any service possible.  In the last two years (FY2005 and FY2006), the FAA has provided over $4 billion in grants for small airports, or nearly 2/3 of the Airport Improvement Program (AIP).  Furthermore, the Department's reauthorization proposal would continue to direct AIP to small airports.  The reauthorization proposal would also add new AIP eligibility for ADS-B ground stations and expanded eligibility for revenue producing projects at small airports that will help their financial stability.

 

With respect to the Small Community Program, the Department has made many awards to communities throughout the country and authorized a wide variety of projects, seeking to address the diverse types of problems presented and test different ideas about how to solve them.  Some of these projects include a new business model to provide ground handling for carriers at the airport to reduce station costs, seed money for a new airline to provide regional service, expansion of low-fare services, a ground service transportation alternative for access to the Nation’s air transportation system, aggressive marketing and promotional campaigns to increase ridership at airports, and revenue guarantees, subsidies, and other financial incentives to reduce the risk to airlines of initiating or expanding service at a community.  For the most part, these projects extend over a period of two to four years.

 

This program differs from the traditional EAS program in a number of respects.  First, the funds go to the communities rather than directly to an airline serving the community.  Second, the financial assistance is not limited to air carrier subsidy, but can be used for a number of other efforts to enhance a community’s service, including advertising and promotional activities, studies, and ground service initiatives.  Third, communities design their own solutions to their air service and airfare problems and seek financial assistance under the program to help them implement their plans. 

 

Over the past five years, the Department has made more than 180 grant awards.  Overall, more than 90% of the grant recipients have implemented their authorized projects. 

 

For example, new services have been inaugurated at many communities; others have received increased frequencies or service with larger aircraft.  Several communities have begun targeted and comprehensive marketing campaigns to increase use of the service at the local airport and to attract additional air carrier service.  We have been monitoring the progress of all of the communities as they proceed with the implementation of their projects.   However, because the majority of the projects involve activities over a two-to-four-year period, and many communities have sought and received extensions for their grants, only now are some of them at the point of completion. 

 

As you know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded a review of the Small Community Program in 2005.  GAO too recognized that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions as to the effectiveness of the Small Community Program in helping communities address their service issues because many grant projects are still in process.  Of the grant projects that had been completed, the GAO concluded that the results were mixed because not all of the grants resulted in improvements that were achieved and sustained after the grant funding was exhausted. 

 

In this regard, since the end of March 2007, the Department’s Inspector General (IG) has been reviewing the outcomes of the limited number of projects that have been completed to date.  Evaluation of the program will consist of two phases including a quantitative and qualitative analysis of a selected sample of all completed projects.

 

The Federal Government, however, is only one piece of the equation.  States and communities will also need to review their air service in the context of the changed industry structure and service patterns to seek fresh, new solutions to maximize their air service potential, including regional and intermodal approaches and expansion of public/private partnerships to meet these challenges. 

 

The fundamental problem with air service to many small communities is insufficient demand to justify scheduled service purely on market terms.  However, recent technological advances may offer a new market solution to the problems of small community air service.  The most dramatic innovation is the Very Light Jet (or VLJ) which represents a breakthrough in jet aircraft operating economics.  Another very important innovation is information-technology that allows demand for air service to be aggregated over the internet.   The combination of VLJ with internet-enabled information technology could potentially facilitate the provision of on-demand, jet air taxi service at these small communities.  Companies such as DayJet have already begun operations employing these technologies. 

 

In that regard, our office looks forward to continuing discussions with your staff on finding ways to better enable the marketplace to supply air service to small communities.  We have discussed a range of ideas that carriers could consider, including  new  per-seat, on-demand service business models using the new generation of very light jets (VLJ) as well as alternative ways to create market-based incentives for airlines to add and sustain service to small communities.  

 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me reaffirm the Department’s commitment to implementing the DOT’s small community air service programs in the best and most efficient manner.  We look forward to working with you and the members of this subcommittee and the full committee as we continue to work toward these objectives.  Thank you again.  This concludes my prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer any of your questions.

 

 

The Future of Air Traffic Control Modernization

JOINT STATEMENT OF

ROBERT STURGELL,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
AND
CHARLES LEADER,
DIRECTOR,
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

ON

THE FUTURE OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MODERNIZATION

May 9, 2007

 

Good morning Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee.  I am Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and interim Chief Operating Officer for the Air Traffic Organization.  With me is Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).   We thank you for the opportunity to testify today about modernization of FAA’s Air Traffic Control System (ATC), and the work we are doing to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that deliver benefits to our customers today.

Reforming FAA’s financing system will better enable the modernization of the FAA’s Air Traffic Control System and transformation to NextGen.  Congress mandated in Vision 100 the establishment of the Air Traffic Organization (ATO).  Since the establishment of the ATO in 2003, we have required air traffic leadership to establish metrics for performance.  These metrics are also reflected in our budget preparation and execution, and are based on the cost of doing business.  We need to continue these practices as we establish the financing of our current and future operations- based on actual costs and investment requirements that will translate to tangible benefits and increasing efficiency for our nation’s air transportation system.  The NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration, provides the necessary reforms to our financing to allow for a reliable funding stream as we continue on the path towards the implementation of the NextGen system.

And implementing that system is imperative.  Our nation's air transportation system has become a victim of its own success.  Administrator Blakey and the FAA have taken many steps to delay this gridlock.  Since FY 2000, 13 new runways have opened, and we’ve worked with operators—through forums like Growth Without Gridlock—to find ways to squeeze extra capacity from our system.  In addition, we’ve kept our modernization projects on schedule—2006 is the third straight year that we produced good results.  As we reported in our Flight Plan, in FY 2006, 100 percent of our critical acquisitions were within 10 percent of budget and 97.4 percent were on schedule.

To get to the future, we need to prepare now.  The actions of today are necessary for us to continue on a progressive path of solutions to address the current and future demands of the aviation industry and the flying public.

We have created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.   But we now face a serious and impending problem:  today’s system is at capacity.   While the industry downturn following the attacks of September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly.   And we have to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.

Flight delays have increased each of the last three fiscal years, and cancellations remain at an unacceptable level.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are placing additional stresses on the system.  A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015 – absent modernization.

NextGen is a steady, deliberate, and highly collaborative undertaking, aimed at the long-term transformation of our air transportation system.  It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric systems.  The FAA is not waiting for 2025 to implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and increase capacity.  We are moving forward now with technologies and procedures which have two purposes;  one, to improve efficiency, increase capacity and reduce congestion in the present system; and, two, to provide the foundation to build upon for further improvements in NextGen.  The FAA is currently expanding the use of procedures like Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP), which collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity, predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced environmental impacts. 

RNAV operations remove the requirement for a direct link between aircraft navigation and a ground-based navigational aid, thereby allowing aircraft better access and permitting flexibility of point-to-point operations.  By using more precise routes for take-offs and landings, RNAV enables reductions in fuel burn and emissions and increases in capacity.  FAA is expanding the implementation of RNAV procedures to additional airports.  The FAA has authorized 128 RNAV procedures at 38 airports for FY2005 and FY2006.  We will publish at least 50 additional procedures in FY2007. 

An example of how we better use the airspace is our introduction of Domestic Reduce Vertical Separation Minimums (DRVSM) in 2005.  We reduced separation minimums from 2000 feet to 1000 feet, effectively doubling the high altitude airspace, and saving airlines close to $400 million per year in fuel.

Another FAA initiative is implementing Required Navigation Performance (RNP) on a greater scale.  RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard monitoring and alerting function.  This onboard capability enhances the pilot’s situational awareness providing greater access to airports in challenging terrain.  RNP takes advantage of an airplane’s onboard navigation capability to fly a more precise flight path into an airport.  It increases access during marginal weather, thereby reducing diversions to alternate airports.  RNP reduces the overall noise footprint and aggregate emissions.  The FAA has authorized a total of 40 RNP procedures at 18 airports.  We plan to publish at least 25 RNP approach procedures in FY2007.

Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve, and plans for how to get there from here.  For NextGen, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan provide us with that picture and the plans for how to achieve it.  We will be discussing the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan later in this statement.  We are setting the stage for the long-term development of an air transportation system that will be scalable to a growing demand and the need for safer and more flexible aviation business models.  It is a new approach to the way we view the future of the system, and it demands a new level of collaboration, planning and vision.

The unique structure of the NextGen initiative, setting up an inter-agency office to coordinate the efforts of the federal partners, while also bringing in the private sector as a full partner from the very beginning, will be instrumental in the success of NextGen.  Indeed, it is our expectation that this new structure will help us avoid some of the problems that FAA has experienced in previous modernization efforts. 

NextGen, while representing a continuum of research, investment and implementation activities, can be broken out into three major phases.  Each one represents a key period in NextGen’s development.  The first phase focuses on the development and implementation of certain key NextGen foundational technologies and capabilities.  These initiatives represent our current programs.  This phase also includes the essential research and development needed to support the next two phases.  The second phase builds upon this foundation to begin critical implementation of NextGen capabilities.  This is when many aircraft in the fleet will begin to operate using on-board NextGen tools.  This will allow greater expansion of RNP/RNAV procedures, net-enabled weather, advanced data communications, and the development of critical infrastructure for Trajectory-Based Operations.  The third phase will be maturation of our core NextGen capabilities into an operational nationwide system.  This will allow aviation services to be managed and operated in a way that achieves the NextGen transformation across the entire air transportation system.

FAA and JPDO are beginning to move from planning to implementation.  In fact, the FAA’s FY 2008 – 2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in projects and activities that directly support NextGen.  The CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the National Airspace System modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the Agency intends to accomplish during that time.  Several key NextGen technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded in the FAA’s FY08 budget request.  These technologies and programs are:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.

These technologies are essential to begin the transition from today’s air traffic control system to the NextGen system of 2025.  One important transformational technology is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B.  ADS-B is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control.  A key element of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways.  Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.  When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic, thereby substantially improving safety. 

ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA’s Capstone program in Alaska, where GA accidents have been reduced by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped aircraft.  And UPS has been working with us on a demonstration program in Louisville using ADS-B to conduct continuous descent arrivals, where they have been able to reduce noise by 30 percent and emissions by 34 percent as a result.  One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska and Louisville will be in the Gulf of Mexico.  The FAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI), helicopter operators, and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of Mexico to improve service in the Gulf.  Using ADS-B technology, helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the Gulf.

The FAA is considering a rulemaking that would mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and is working closely with stakeholders to determine a timeline.

In today’s NAS, there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed, developed, and managed connections.  The future, however, demands an infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of expanding today’s point-to-point system is simply prohibitive.  System Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need.  As many major national and international corporations have done with their own technological systems, SWIM will provide for NextGen the infrastructure and services to deliver network-enabled information access across air transportation operations, and high quality, timely data to many users and applications.  By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing, eliminating redundant information and providing information where it is needed.  When implemented, the efficiencies provided by SWIM will contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service.  In addition, SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations.  It will also allow for better use of existing capacity en-route.   While transparent to the flying public, these are efficiencies that will benefit the consumer and the aviation industry.

The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts lies within the digital data communications infrastructure of the future.  In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne aircraft is by voice communications.  NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications, especially in the areas of aircraft trajectory-based operations, net-centric and net-enabled information access.  Data communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned strategic traffic management.  Eventually, the majority of communications will be handled by data communications for appropriately equipped users.  It is estimated that with 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. 

Approximately 70 percent of annual national airspace system delays are attributed to weather.  The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather picture across NextGen.  The goal of this investment is to cut weather-related delays at least in half by improving the integration and dissemination of aviation weather information.  The benefits will be uniform real-time access to key common weather parameters, common situational awareness, improved utilization of air space across all flight domains, and reduced flight delays.

The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air/ground and ground/ground voice communications in the air traffic control environment.  The switches today are static, and our ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited.  Under the current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate and redesign the airspace.  In the future, the impacts of bad weather could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions to air traffic.  The new voice switch allows us to replace today’s rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of traffic.  Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA’s ability to implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase efficiency and improve performance.

At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them.  For the first time, FAA is requesting funding for these defining activities in the FY08 budget.  This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.  The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing in new technologies.  One demonstration will test trajectory-based concepts in the oceanic environment.  The ultimate goal is to increase predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel efficiency.  The other demonstration will accelerate the first integrated test of super density operations.  Procedures for increasing capacity at busy airports will be explored.  The demonstration should achieve near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to implement the same procedures at other locations.

It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.  The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of transformations that will truly modernize today’s system.  Let me provide a few examples of this.

In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate highways in the sky.  In the high performance airspace of the future, each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.  Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same precise information, transmitted via data communications.  Investments in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based operations.

The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic management.  The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major demand and capacity imbalances.  SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.

With NextGen the impact of weather is reduced through the use of improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of weather into automation to improve decision-making.  New capabilities in the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic restrictions.  Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments for these improvements.

We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the JPDO’s vision of the NextGen system into reality.  Because the JPDO is not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision.  The FAA is using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide their transformation to NextGen.  In the past the Operational Evolution Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA that extended ten years into the future.  The new OEP will include strategic milestones through 2025.  JPDO representatives will participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.

FAA will use the OEP to plan, execute and implement NextGen in partnership with private industry.  Required operational implementation schedules will be tracked, as well as dates by which initiatives must be funded in order to meet those schedules.

OEP will provide a single entry point for new NextGen initiatives, jointly developed by the JPDO and the FAA, to enter the FAA capital budget portfolio.  It ties these initiatives directly to the FAA budget process.  Beginning in fiscal year 2008 and continuing in 2009, the FAA worked closely with the JPDO in budget formulation utilizing JPDO budget guidance.  For the fiscal year 2009 budget formulation, the FAA is using a Review Board under the auspices of the OEP Associates Group, which includes the Director of JPDO, to review and prioritize NextGen initiatives based on the JPDO Concept of Operations, JPDO roadmaps, and the NAS Enterprise Architecture.

The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing, and prototype demonstrations.  This Operational Evolution Partnership will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA’s progress towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.

Cost will be a vital factor:  we cannot create a NextGen system that is not affordable.  Requirements for the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10 billion.  Preliminary estimates by FAA, JPDO and the Research, Engineering, and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC) suggest that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22 billion in FAA funding.  We are working with our users to continuously refine these estimates.

MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the NextGen avionics costs.  It concludes that a wide range of costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of equipage schedules.  MITRE concluded that the most probable range of total avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.  This range reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of time out of service required for equipage installation.

The importance of developing this system of the future is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering substantial consumer benefits.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet. 

Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program.  The FAA and the EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based air traffic management systems and technologies.  This coordination will address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA and Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical initiative. 

Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate for SESAR.  SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen.  They consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25 billion to $37 billion in US dollars through the year 2020.  SESAR, like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and better define the system.  However, there is an important difference in scope between SESAR and NextGen.  While SESAR focuses almost exclusively on air traffic management, NextGen takes what’s called a “curb-to-curb” approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and DoD and DHS NAS requirements.

One of the major products for the JPDO, and indeed, one of the critical elements in defining the NextGen initiative itself, is the development of the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan.  These documents define each NextGen transformed state and how to evolve to it.  They are absolutely essential to the future development of the NextGen system.

The Concept of Operations is a text description of the transformed state of NextGen.  This kind of explanation, offered in one document, is critical to developing the specific requirements and capabilities that will be necessary for our national air transportation system in 2025.  In a sense, the Concept of Operations is like an architect’s blueprints. 

However, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently with the Concept of Operations, and that’s the Enterprise Architecture.  The Enterprise Architecture provides the technical details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder’s plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its power, water, sewage, cable and internet connections to the rest of the community.  The Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of the general contractor’s work plan.  It specifies the timing and interdependencies of multi-agency activities required to achieve the NexGen system vision.

These documents, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan are essential to defining the NextGen system and will guide the future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and systems development.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are anxious to receive their feedback.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months. 

Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a more automated system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of users -- very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security and efficiency.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony.  We would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

 

FAA Modernization

JOINT STATEMENT OF

ROBERT STURGELL,
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
AND
CHARLES LEADER,
DIRECTOR,
JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE,

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

ON

FAA MODERNIZATION

March 22, 2007

Good morning Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Lott, and Members of the Subcommittee.  I am Robert Sturgell, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and interim Chief Operating Officer for the Air Traffic Organization.  With me is Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).   We thank you for the opportunity to testify today about FAA modernization, and the work we are doing to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that deliver benefits to our customers today.

Modernization and moving to NextGen is inextricably linked to changes in the FAA’s financing system.  We need to establish the financing of our current and future operations based on actual costs and investment requirements that will realize tangible benefits and increasing efficiency.  The NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration, provides the necessary reforms to our financing, and puts us on the path towards fully implementing the NextGen system.

And implementing that system is imperative.  Our nation's air transportation system has become a victim of its own success.  Administrator Blakey and the FAA have taken many steps to delay this gridlock.  Since FY 2000, 13 new runways have opened, and we’ve worked with operators—through forums like Growth Without Gridlock—to find ways to squeeze extra capacity from our system.  In addition, we’ve kept our modernization projects on schedule—2006 is the third straight year that we produced good results—delivering 90 percent of our programs on time and within budget.  In fact, in FY06, 97 percent of our projects met our schedule, and 100 percent were within 10 percent of budget.

An example of how we better use the airspace is our introduction of Domestic Reduce Vertical Separation Minimums (DRVSM) in 2005.  We reduced separation minimums from 2000 feet to 1000 feet, effectively doubling the high altitude airspace, and saving airlines close to $400 million per year in fuel.

We have created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.   But we now face a serious and impending problem:  today’s system is at capacity.   While the industry downturn following the attacks of September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly.   And we have to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.

The warning signs are everywhere.   Flight delays and cancellations have reached unacceptable levels.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are placing additional stresses on the system.   If we fail to address these issues, we will suffocate the great engine of economic growth that is civil aviation.  A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015 – absent modernization, the consequences will be a total system collapse.

NextGen is about a long-term transformation of our air transportation system.  It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric systems.  However, the FAA is not waiting for 2025 to implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and increase capacity.  The FAA is currently expanding the use of procedures like Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) which collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity, predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced environmental impacts. 

RNAV operations remove the requirement for a direct link between aircraft navigation and a navigational aid NAVAID, thereby allowing aircraft better access and permitting flexibility of point-to-point operations.  By using more precise routes for take-offs and landings, RNAV enables reductions in fuel burn and emissions and increases in capacity.  FAA is expanding the implementation of RNAV procedures to additional airports.  The FAA has authorized 128 RNAV procedures at 38 airports for FY2005 and FY2006.  We will publish at least 50 additional procedures in FY2007. 

Another FAA initiative is implementing Required Navigation Performance (RNP) on a greater scale.  RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard monitoring and alerting function.  This onboard capability enhances the pilot’s situational awareness providing greater access to airports in challenging terrain.  RNP takes advantage of an airplane’s onboard navigation capability to fly a more precise flight path into an airport.  It increases access during marginal weather, thereby reducing diversions to alternate airports.  RNP reduces the overall noise footprint and aggregate emissions.  The FAA has authorized a total of 40 RNP procedures at 18 airports.  We plan to publish at least 25 RNP approach procedures in FY2007.

Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve, and plans for how to get there from here.  For NextGen, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan provide us with that picture and the plans for how to achieve it.  I will be discussing the Concept of Operations and the Enterprise Architecture later in this statement.  We are setting the stage for the long-term development of an air transportation system that will be scalable to a growing demand and the need for safer and more flexible aviation business models.  It is a new approach to the way we view the future of the system, and it demands a new level of collaboration, planning and vision.

FAA and JPDO are beginning to move from planning to implementation.  In fact, the FAA’s FY 2008 – 2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in projects and activities that directly support NextGen.  The CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the National Airspace System modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the Agency intends to accomplish during that time.  Several key NextGen technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded in the FAA’s FY08 budget request.  These technologies and programs are:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations and Infrastructure Development.  FAA proposes to spend $173 million on these programs in FY08.

These technologies are essential to begin the transition from today’s air traffic management system to the NextGen system of 2025.  Perhaps the most significant of these transformational technologies is Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B.  ADS-B is, quite simply, the future of air traffic control.  A key element of the NextGen system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and on runways.  Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.  When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic; thereby substantially improving safety. 

ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA’s Capstone program in Alaska, where GA accidents have been reduced by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped aircraft.  And UPS has been working with us on a demonstration program in Louisville using ADS-B to conduct continuous descent arrivals, where they have been able to reduce noise by 30 percent and emissions by 34 percent as a result.  One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska and Louisville will be in the Gulf of Mexico.  The FAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI), helicopter operators and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of Mexico to improve service in the Gulf.  Using ADS-B technology, helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the Gulf.       

The FAA is looking at a rulemaking that would mandate the avionics necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and is working closely with stakeholders to determine that timeline.

In today’s NAS there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed, developed, and managed connections.  The future, however, demands an infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of expanding today’s point-to-point system is simply prohibitive.  System Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need.  SWIM provides the infrastructure and services to deliver network-enabled information access across the NextGen air transportation operations.  SWIM will provide high quality, timely data to many users and applications.  By reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will reduce redundancy of information and better facilitate multi-agency information-sharing.  When implemented, SWIM will contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service.  In addition, SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations.  It will also allow for better use of existing capacity en-route.

The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts lies within the digital data communications infrastructure of the future.  In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne aircraft is by voice communications.  NextGen transformation cannot be realized through today’s voice-only communications, especially in the areas of aircraft trajectory-based operations, net-centric and net-enabled information access.  Data communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned strategic traffic management.  Eventually, the majority of communications will be handled by data communications for appropriately equipped users.  It is estimated that with 70 percent of aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. 

The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather picture across NextGen.  Approximately 70 percent of annual national airspace system delays are attributed to weather.  The goal of this investment is to cut weather-related delays at least in half.  The weather problem is about total weather information management, and not just the state of the scientific art in weather forecasting.  The weather dissemination system today is inefficient to operate and maintain, and information gathered by one system is not easily shared with other systems.    The benefits will be uniform real-time access to key common weather parameters, common situational awareness, improved utilization of air space across all flight domains, and reduced flight delays.

The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air/ground and ground/ground voice communications in the air traffic control environment.  The switches today are very static, and our ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited.  Under the current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate and redesign the airspace.  In the future, the impacts of bad weather could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions to air traffic.  The new voice switch allows us to replace today’s rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of traffic.  Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA’s ability to implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase efficiency and improve performance.

At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define operational concepts and the technologies that will support them.  For the first time, FAA is requesting funding for these defining activities in the FY08 budget.  This funding will support two demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.  The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing in new technologies.  One demonstration will test trajectory-based concepts in the oceanic environment.  The ultimate goal is to increase predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel efficiency.  The other demonstration will accelerate the first integrated test of super density operations.  Procedures for increasing capacity at busy airports will be explored.  The demonstration should achieve near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to implement the same procedures at other locations.

It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.  The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of transformations that will truly modernize today’s system.  Let me provide a few examples of this.

In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate highways in the sky.  In the high performance airspace of the future, each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.  Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same precise information, transmitted via data communications.  Investments in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based operations.

The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic management.  The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major demand and capacity imbalances.  SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.

With NextGen the impact of weather is reduced through the use of improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of weather into automation to improve decision-making.  New capabilities in the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic restrictions.  Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments for these improvements.

We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the JPDO’s vision of the NextGen system into reality.  Because the JPDO is not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision.  The FAA is using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide their transformation to NextGen.  In the past the Operational Evolution Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA that extended ten years into the future.  The new OEP will include strategic milestones through 2025.  JPDO representatives will participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.

FAA will use the OEP to plan, execute and implement NextGen in partnership with private industry.  Required operational implementation schedules will be tracked, as well as dates by which initiatives must be funded in order to meet those schedules.

OEP will provide a single entry point for new NextGen initiatives, jointly developed by the JPDO and the FAA, to enter the FAA capital budget portfolio.  It ties these initiatives directly to the FAA budget process. 

The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing, and prototype demonstrations.  This Operational Evolution Partnership will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA’s progress towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.

Cost will be a vital factor:  we cannot create a NextGen system that is not affordable.  Requirements for the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10 billion.  Preliminary estimates suggest that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22 billion in FAA funding.  We are working to continuously refine these estimates, particularly with our users as we implement new cost-based financing mechanisms, as proposed in the NextGen Financing Act, the FAA’s  reauthorization proposal.

MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the NextGen avionics costs.  It concludes that a wide range of costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of equipage schedules.  The most probable range of total avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.  This range reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the amount of time out of service required for equipage installation.

The importance of developing this system of the future is also quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well underway.  This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the United States.  Creating a modernized, global system that provides interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering substantial consumer benefits.  Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet. 

Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program.  The FAA and the EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based air traffic management systems and technologies.  This coordination will address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA and Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical initiative. 

Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate for SESAR.  SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen.  They consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25 billion to $37 billion in US dollars through the year 2020.  SESAR, like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and better define the system.  However, there is an important difference in scope between SESAR and NextGen.  While SESAR focuses almost exclusively on air traffic management, NextGen takes what’s called a “curb-to-curb” approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and DoD and DHS NAS requirements.

One of the major products for the JPDO, and indeed, one of the critical elements in defining the NextGen initiative itself, is the development of the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan.  These documents define each NextGen transformed state and how to evolve to it.  They are absolutely essential to the future development of the NextGen system.

The Concept of Operations is a text description of the transformed state of NextGen.  This kind of explanation, offered in one document, is critical to developing the specific requirements and capabilities that will be necessary for our national air transportation system in 2025.  In a sense, the Concept of Operations is like an architect’s blueprints. 

However, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently with the Concept of Operations, and that’s the Enterprise Architecture.  The Enterprise Architecture provides the technical details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder’s plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its power, water, sewage, cable and internet connections to the rest of the community.  The Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of the general contractor’s work plan.  It specifies the timing and interdependencies of the research, demonstrations, and development required to achieve the NexGen system vision.

These documents, the Concept of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work Plan are essential to defining the NextGen system and will guide the future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and systems development.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are anxious to receive their feedback.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months. 

Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of users -- very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security and efficiency.  Research will continue to help us find the right balance between a centralized satellite and ground system and a totally distributed system, where aircraft “self-manage” their flight with full knowledge of their environment.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony.  We would be happy to answer any questions the Committee may have.

The Reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) Rail Safety Program

Statement of

Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety,
Federal Railroad Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation

before the

Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
U.S. Senate

May 22, 2007

 

Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Smith, and other Members of the Subcommittee, I am very pleased to be here today, on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation and Administrator Boardman, to discuss the reauthorization of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) rail safety program. 

In February, the Administration presented its rail safety reauthorization bill, the Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act.  In March, Chairman Oberstar of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure introduced the Administration bill, by request, for himself and Ranking Member Mica and the leaders of the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials.  We are very grateful, Chairman Lautenberg, that in the same month you also introduced the Administration bill, by request, for yourself and Senator Smith.  The Administration bill has been designated as H.R. 1516 and S. 918, respectively.

In addition to proposing to reauthorize FRA’s vital safety mission, this bill calls for important—and in some cases historic—substantive changes in the rail safety laws that we expect will materially improve safety.  I look forward to working with you to help secure their enactment.   

Before I discuss the major provisions of the bill, my testimony will begin with an overview of how FRA is working daily to reduce both the frequency and the severity of railroad accidents.  My testimony will then highlight the real and substantial progress FRA has made in implementing our National Rail Safety Action Plan, and I will touch on our passenger safety rulemakings and other key safety initiatives.

I.  FRA’s Railroad Safety Program

FRA is the agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) charged with carrying out the Federal railroad safety laws.  These laws provide FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, with very broad authority over every area of railroad safety.  In exercising that authority, the agency has issued and enforces a wide range of safety regulations covering a railroad network that employs more than 232,000 workers, moves more than 42 percent of all intercity freight, and provides passenger rail service to more than 500 million persons each year. 

FRA’s regulations address such topics as track, passenger equipment, locomotives, freight cars, power brakes, locomotive event recorders, signal and train control systems, maintenance of active warning devices at highway-rail grade crossings, accident reporting, alcohol and drug testing, protection of roadway workers, operating rules and practices, locomotive engineer certification, positive train control, the use of locomotive horns at grade crossings, and many other subject areas.  FRA currently has active rulemaking projects on a number of important safety topics, many of which will be described later in this testimony.  FRA also enforces the Hazardous Materials Regulations, promulgated by DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), as they pertain to rail transportation. 

FRA has an authorized inspection staff of about 400 persons nationwide, distributed across its eight regions.  In addition, about 160 inspectors employed by the approximately 30 States that participate in FRA’s State participation program also perform inspections for compliance with the Federal rail safety laws.  Each inspector is an expert in one of five safety disciplines: Track; Signal and Train Control; Motive Power and Equipment; Operating Practices; or Hazardous Materials.  FRA also has 18 full-time highway-rail grade crossing safety and trespass prevention specialist positions in the field.  Every year FRA’s inspectors conduct tens of thousands of inspections, investigate more than 100 railroad accidents, investigate thousands of complaints of specific alleged violations, develop recommendations for thousands of enforcement actions, and engage in a range of educational outreach activities on railroad safety issues, including educating the public about highway-rail grade crossing safety and the dangers of trespassing on railroad property. 

FRA closely monitors the railroad industry’s safety performance, and the agency uses the extensive data gathered to guide its accident prevention efforts.  FRA strives to continually make better use of the wealth of available data to achieve the agency’s strategic goals.  FRA also sponsors collaborative research with the railroad industry to introduce innovative technologies to improve railroad safety.  Finally, under the leadership of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FRA actively plays a supportive role in Federal efforts to secure the Nation’s railroad transportation system. 

II.  The National Rail Safety Action Plan (Action Plan)

A.  Genesis and Overview of the Action Plan

As detailed in Appendix A to my testimony, the railroad industry’s overall safety record has improved dramatically over the past few decades, and most safety trends are moving in the right direction.  However, serious train accidents still occur, and the train accident rate has not shown substantive improvement in recent years.  Moreover, several major freight and passenger train accidents in 2004 and 2005 (such as those at Macdona, Texas; Graniteville, South Carolina; and Glendale, California) raised specific concerns about railroad safety issues deserving government and industry attention. 

As a result of these concerns, in May 2005, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and FRA initiated the National Rail Safety Action Plan (Action Plan), a comprehensive and methodical approach to address critical safety issues facing the railroad industry.  The Action Plan’s goals broadly stated are:

  •     Target the most frequent, highest-risk causes of train accidents;
  •     Focus FRA’s oversight and inspection resources on areas of greatest concern; and
  •     Accelerate research efforts that have the potential to mitigate the largest risks.

The causes of train accidents are generally grouped into five categories: human factors; track and structures; equipment; signal and train control; and miscellaneous.  From 2002 through 2006, the vast majority of train accidents resulted from human factor causes or track causes.  Accordingly, human factors and track have been our primary focus to bring about further improvements in the train accident rate. 

Overall, the Action Plan includes initiatives intended to:

  •     Reduce train accidents caused by human factors;
  •     Address employee fatigue;
  •     Improve track safety;
  •     Enhance hazardous material (hazmat) safety and emergency preparedness;
  •     Strengthen FRA’s safety compliance program; and
  •     Improve highway-rail grade crossing safety.

Allow me to discuss the progress that has been made in fulfilling the Action Plan’s objectives and how that is advancing FRA’s railroad safety mission.

B.  Implementation of Action Plan Initiatives

1.  Reducing Train Accidents Caused by Human Factors

Accidents caused by human factor causes constitute the largest category of train accidents, accounting for 39 percent of all train accidents in the five years from 2002 through 2006.  Preventing such accidents is a high priority under the Action Plan.

a. Development of Rulemaking to Address Leading Causes of Human Factor Accidents

FRA has been concerned that several of the leading causes of human factor accidents are not presently covered by any specific Federal rule, and these causes can have serious consequences.  As a result, in May 2005, FRA asked its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to develop recommendations for a new human factors rule to address the leading causes of human factor accidents.  This effort helped lead to FRA’s issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in October 2006, to Federalize core railroad operating rules governing the handling of track switches, leaving cars in the clear, and shoving rail cars.  See 71 FR 60371. 

The NPRM proposes to establish greater accountability on the part of railroad management for the administration of programs of operational tests and inspections, and greater accountability on the part of railroad supervisors and employees for compliance with those railroad operating rules that are responsible for approximately half of the train accidents related to human factors.  FRA believes this will contribute positively to railroad safety, by emphasizing the importance of complying with fundamental railroad operating rules and providing FRA a more direct means of promoting compliance with those rules. 

The final rule is expected to be issued later this year, and it is intended to supersede Emergency Order No. 24, which FRA issued in October 2005, in response to an increasing number of train accidents caused by hand-operated, main track switches in non-signaled territory being left in the wrong position and the potential for catastrophic accidents, such as the one in Graniteville, SC, in January 2005, which resulted in nine deaths.  The emergency order requires special handling of hand-operated main track switches in non-signaled territory, as well as instruction and testing of employees in railroad operating rules pertaining to such track switches, and is expected to remain in place until the final rule addressing the major causes of human factor accidents is promulgated and becomes effective. 

The final rule will complement existing FRA regulations that address other human factor causes.  For example, FRA’s regulations on alcohol and drug use by operating employees were the first such standards in American industry to incorporate chemical testing, and they have been very successful in reducing accidents resulting from the use of illicit substances.  FRA also has regulations on locomotive engineer certification, and enforces the Federal hours of service restrictions, which at present are wholly governed by statute.

b.  Launch of “Close Call” Pilot Research Project

"Close calls" are unsafe events that do not result in a reportable accident but could have done so.  FRA is working to better understand these phenomena.  In other industries, such as aviation, adoption of close-call or “near miss” reporting systems that shield the reporting employee from discipline (and the employer from punitive regulatory sanctions) has contributed to major reductions in accidents.  In March 2005, FRA completed an overarching Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with railroad labor organizations and management to develop pilot programs to document the occurrence of close calls.  Pilot programs would be established at three freight railroad sites and on one passenger railroad.  In August 2005, FRA and DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) entered into an MOU stipulating that BTS will act as a neutral party to receive the close-call reports and maintain the confidentiality of the person making the report.  By studying and closely analyzing these reports, we hope to enrich our understanding of the factors involved in such events and to discern whether there are identifiable patterns that influence safety outcomes.  

Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) signed an MOU for its North Platte Service Unit to be the first site for this project.  The first report from this site was received in February 2007, and as of April 2007, BTS is receiving approximately two reports per day from this site.  This rate of reporting close calls greatly exceeds expectations based on prior close call reporting systems, and indicates that the implementation was extremely successful at this site.  Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. (CP) and railroad labor representatives in Portage, WI, have recently produced a draft MOU to implement a close-call reporting system, and FRA anticipates that this CP site will become active by the end of September 2007.  BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) and several labor unions have been exploring participation in the project as the third freight railroad site, but a final decision is still pending.  Several passenger railroads have also been considering participation in the project.  FRA anticipates that all four sites will be active by the end of FY 2008.

c.  Development and Implementation of Promising Technologies to Improve Safety through Redundant Safety Systems.    Technology can be a tremendous aid to safety, providing a safety net when human beings make a mistake or become incapacitated. 

  • Positive Train Control (PTC) Systems.  PTC systems are capable of automatically preventing train collisions (with positive stop protection), preventing overspeed derailments, and protecting roadway workers within their authorities.  Recognizing the safety benefits of PTC systems, as well as their potential to improve rail efficiency by safely increasing the capacity of high-density rail lines, FRA issued a final rule in 2005 entitled, “Performance Standards for Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems.”  See 49 CFR part 236.  Earlier, FRA worked with Amtrak and other stakeholders to assist in the development of PTC systems in support of high-speed passenger rail.  The results included the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System, which, combined with cab signals and automatic train control, safeguard operations up to 150 mph on the Northeast Corridor.  In addition, the Incremental Train Control System was deployed on Amtrak’s Michigan line and currently supports operations up to 95 mph (planned for 110 mph when validation and verification work is complete on the final system).
  • In January 2007, FRA approved operational use of the first PTC system intended for general use, BNSF’s Electronic Train Management System. The rail industry is actively advancing the implementation of PTC technology as other railroads—among them, UP, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS), CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), and the Alaska Railroad—are all making significant strides to develop PTC systems.  The Association of American Railroads (AAR) will play a critical role in finalizing interoperability requirements for these technologies. 
  • Switch Point Monitoring System and Other Systems.  There are steps that can be taken short of PTC to reduce accident risk in non-signalized (dark) territory.  In November 2005, FRA partnered with BNSF through a $1 million Switch Point Monitoring System pilot project to develop a low-cost system that electronically monitors, detects, and reports a misaligned switch on mainline track located in non-signaled territory.  These mechanisms are designed to provide an additional layer of protection to avert the consequences of an improperly lined switch.  The project involves the installation of wireless communication devices at 49 switches along a 174-mile section of non-signaled BNSF track between Tulsa and Avard, Oklahoma.  Train dispatchers at an operations center in Fort Worth, Texas, are monitoring the devices to detect when the hand-operated switches are set in the wrong position.  If a switch is misaligned, the dispatcher directs a train to slow down or stop until railroad crews in the field confirm it is safe to proceed.  Thus far, no unsafe failures have been reported, and BNSF plans expansion of this and similar types of systems to other non-signaled territory.  Along with the human factors rulemaking, this new switch monitoring system may prevent future train accidents such as the one at Graniteville, SC, which resulted from an improperly lined main track switch in non-signaled territory. 
  • BNSF is also demonstrating rail integrity circuits, which can detect broken rails and alert the dispatcher much in the same way as the switch point monitoring technology.  Both of these technologies are “forward-compatible” with PTC, meaning that they can be integrated into PTC as it is deployed on the subject territories. 
  • Electronically Controlled Pneumatic (ECP) Brakes.  During the 1990s, the AAR led an industry effort to develop ECP brakes, which use an electronic train line to command brake applications and releases.  ECP brakes apply uniformly and virtually instantaneously throughout the length of the train, provide health-status information on the condition of brakes on each car, respond to commands for graduated releases, and entirely avoid runaway accidents caused by depletion of train-line air pressure.  ECP brakes shorten stopping distances on the order of 40 to 60 percent, depending on train length and route conditions.  In turn, shortened stopping distances mean that some accidents that occur today might be avoided entirely and that the severity of those that do occur in the future might be reduced. 
  • FRA commissioned a study, released last year, that identified and quantified significant business benefits that could be realized with this technology through greater operational efficiencies.  The study also suggested a migration plan that would start with unit train operations, focused initially on the Powder River Basin coal service.  Since then, FRA has been working with the AAR, railroads, vendors, and the coal sector to generate momentum toward implementation of this cost-saving and, potentially, life-saving technology.  In this regard, ECP brakes are one of the key features of FRA’s Advanced Concept Train, a research-and-development prototype train specially designed and equipped with other improvements that is helping to demonstrate the potential of these new technologies across the Nation.  FRA is also planning to develop a revised set of requirements for train air brakes that are more suitable for this new technology, by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking sometime in the near future.  Until a final rule is issued amending the train air brake requirements, we remain ready to review and respond to requests for relief from railroads interested in proceeding with ECP technology. 
  • In March FRA approved a waiver request from BNSF and NS to install ECP brake systems on trains to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the technology.  While providing that proper safeguards be in place, the waiver permits trains equipped with ECP brakes to travel up to 3,500 miles without stopping to undergo certain routine brake inspections—more than double the distance allowed by current Federal regulations.  FRA will carefully monitor the railroads’ compliance with the waiver, which will enable FRA to gather extensive data, including data that could be useful in developing the rulemaking. 

2.  Addressing Fatigue

Fatigue has long been a fact of life for many railroad operating employees, given their long and often unpredictable work hours and fluctuating schedules.  Train crews may legally work an enormous number of hours in a week, month, or year.  While commuter train crews often have some predictability in their work schedules, crews of freight trains rarely do.  The long hours, irregular work/rest cycles, and lack of regular days off, combined, have a very deleterious effect on employee alertness.  Railroads are necessarily 24-hour businesses, and the effects of “circadian rhythms” challenge the alertness of even well-rested employees, particularly in the early morning hours. 

The hours of service laws, originally enacted in 1907 and last substantially amended in 1969, set certain maximum on-duty periods (generally 12 hours for operating employees) and minimum off-duty periods (generally 8 hours, or if the employee has worked 12 consecutive hours, a 10-hour off-duty period is required).  However, FRA does not believe that the limitations in those laws are adequate to effectively control fatigue.  The hours of service laws must be replaced with sound, scientifically-based regulations; later in my testimony I will discuss in detail the Administration proposal to bring about this long-overdue change.  The proposal would allow for the use of modern learning on fatigue, including research FRA accelerated under the Action Plan.

a.  Accelerate research on railroad crew work history to validate a fatigue model for possible use to improve crew scheduling.

On November 29, 2006, FRA announced the release of a study which provides a strong, scientific rationale for evaluating railroad employee work schedules to address worker fatigue.  The goal of the research was to determine if a fatigue model can accurately and reliably predict an increased risk of human error that could contribute to the occurrence of a train accident.  The study documents, for the first time, the significant circadian influence on accidents caused by human factors (there is no circadian influence on accidents not caused by human factors).  The study also documents a significant linear relationship between fatigue predicted by the model and the risk of a human factors accident.  No relationship was found between fatigue and accidents not caused by human factors.  FRA expects this information will aid the railroad industry in improving crew scheduling practices in order to reduce that risk. A model for detecting the point at which the risk of fatigue becomes hazardous could become an important part of a railroad’s fatigue management plan.  A similar approach is currently utilized by the U.S. Department of Defense.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has emphasized the role of sleep disorders in transportation accidents, and FRA recognizes that providing fatigue management information alone may not be sufficient.  In October 2004, FRA published a safety advisory in the Federal Register, urging railroads to address sleep disorders through progressive company policies.  Last September, FRA’s RSAC adopted a task to develop recommendations on medical standards for safety-critical railroad employees.  Parallel with this RSAC effort, FRA has awarded a contract to UP to conduct a sleep disorder assessment project.  Findings and recommendations from this project are anticipated to be completed later this year.  Management of sleep disorders is among the important elements of that effort, which is now well underway. 

3.  Improving Track Safety

Track-caused accidents are the second-largest category of train accidents, comprising 33 percent of all train accidents.  Some of the leading causes of track-caused accidents are difficult to detect during normal railroad inspections.  Broken joint bars, for example, are a leading cause, but the kinds of cracks in those bars that foreshadow a derailment-causing break are difficult to spot with the naked eye.  Similarly, broken rails account for some of the most serious accidents, but the internal rail flaws that lead to many of those breaks can be detected only by specialized equipment. 

a.  Demonstration of New Technology to Detect Cracks in Joint Bars

FRA is developing an automated, high-resolution video inspection system for joint bars that can be deployed on a hi-rail vehicle to detect visual cracks in joint bars without having to stop the vehicle.  In October 2005, a prototype system that inspects joint bars on both sides of each rail was successfully demonstrated.  Testing showed that the high-resolution video system detected cracks that were missed by the traditional visual inspections.  The system was then enhanced with new features to improve the reliability of joint bar detection and to add capabilities to include the Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates for each joint to facilitate future inspection and identification.  Additionally, software was developed to scan the images automatically, detect the cracked joint bar, and then send a message to the operator with an image of the broken joint bar.  The new features were implemented and the system was tested and demonstrated in the summer of 2006.  This year, FRA intends to make additional enhancements to increase the operating speed and implement a more rugged, simple, and robust detection system.

b.  Requirements for Enhanced Capability and Procedures to Detect Track Defects

FRA is also addressing joint bar cracks on the regulatory front.  As a direct result of a Congressional mandate in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) and of NTSB recommendations arising out of various accidents involving cracked joint bars, FRA published an interim final rule (IFR) in November 2005 concerning the inspection of joints in continuous welded rail (CWR) track.  Subsequently, after soliciting public comment and advice from RSAC’s Track Safety Standards Working Group, FRA issued a final rule in October 2006, which adopted portions of the IFR and made changes to other provisions.  The final rule requires track owners to develop and implement a procedure for the detailed inspection—including on-foot inspection—of CWR rail joints, to identify joint bar cracks and joint conditions that can lead to the development of these cracks.  Track owners must now also create and submit fracture reports to FRA whenever a cracked or broken joint bar is discovered in CWR track.  Based on the data that FRA will collect from the fracture reports, FRA will establish a program to review the root causes of joint bar failure.  In addition, the rule encourages railroads to develop and adopt automated methods to improve the inspection of rail joints in CWR track.   

c.  Deployment of Two Additional Automated Track Inspection Vehicles

Subtle track geometry defects, such as rails being uneven or too far apart, are difficult to identify during a typical walking or hi-rail inspection.  That is why FRA has developed automated track inspection vehicles to enhance its capability to identify problems, and ensure that they are addressed, before a train accident occurs.  In April, FRA began operating its two newest vehicles:  the T19 (which is self-propelled), and the T20 (which is locomotive-towed).  These new vehicles use a variety of technology to measure track geometry flaws. The measurements are recorded in real-time and at operating speed.  Problem areas are identified by the GPS location and shared immediately with the railroad so appropriate corrective actions can be taken in a timely manner

Along with the T16, T17 and T18, FRA now has five automated track inspection vehicles that will allow the agency to inspect nearly 100,000 track-miles each year, tripling the present capacity.  In particular, FRA will be better able to focus its automated track inspection activities on high-volume rail lines that carry hazardous materials and passenger trains as well as to improve its ability to follow up more quickly on routes where safety performance by a railroad is substandard.

4.  Improving Hazmat Safety and Emergency Response Capability

The railroad industry’s record on transporting hazmat is very good.  The industry transports nearly two million shipments of hazmat annually, ordinarily without incident.  However, the Macdona, TX accident in 2004 and the Graniteville, SC accident in 2005, which together involved 12 deaths as the result of chlorine releases, demonstrate the potential for catastrophic consequences from certain train accidents.  The agency is actively engaged in a variety of activities intended to reduce the likelihood that a tank car may be breached if an accident does occur, complementing our effort to reduce the likelihood of train accidents.  Realizing that we cannot prevent all accidents, FRA has developed initiatives to ensure that emergency responders are fully prepared to minimize the loss of life and damage when an accident or release does occur. 

It is important to emphasize that these safety initiatives are in addition to, and complement efforts by, FRA, DHS and its Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and PHMSA to provide for the security of hazmat transported by rail.  A major component of this effort has been PHMSA’s March 2003 regulation requiring each shipper and carrier of significant quantities (placardable amounts) of hazmat to adopt and comply with a security plan.  See 49 CFR § 172.800 et seq.  Last December, working closely with FRA and TSA, PHMSA published an NPRM to enhance the safety and security of certain highly hazardous materials transported by rail.  See 71 FR 76833.  Specifically, this proposal would require rail carriers of certain explosive, toxic inhalation hazard, and radioactive materials to assess the safety and security of the routes currently used for these materials and alternative routing options, and to make routing decisions based on those assessments.  The comment period for the NPRM closed February 20, 2007.  PHMSA and FRA have reviewed the comments, including comments presented at two public meetings, and are in the process of drafting a final rule.  PHMSA and FRA are coordinating with TSA to ensure regulatory consistency between the two rules. 

As Administrator Boardman testified before the Committee in January on the general topic of rail security, the safety and security of hazmat transported by rail are often intertwined.  I would be glad to update the Subcommittee on the many other security-related initiatives in this area, such as the section 333 conference on ways to minimize safety and security risks from the transportation by rail of TIH materials.  

a.  Enhancements to Emergency Response Readiness

Emergency responders presently have access to a wide variety of information regarding hazmat transported by rail.  Railroads and hazmat shippers are currently subject to the hazard-communication requirements of the Hazardous Materials Regulations.  In addition, these industries work through the American Chemistry Council’s Transcaer® (Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response) program to familiarize local emergency responders with railroad equipment and product characteristics.  PHMSA publishes the Emergency Response Guidebook, with the intention that it may be found in virtually every fire and police vehicle in the United States.

In March 2005, with FRA encouragement, the AAR amended its Recommended Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials (now Circular No. OT-55-I) to expressly state that local emergency responders, upon written request, will be provided with a list ranking the top 25 hazardous materials transported by rail through their communities.  This is an important step to allow emergency responders to plan for, and better focus their training on, the type of rail-related hazmat incidents that they could potentially encounter.

In July 2005, again with FRA encouragement, CSX and CHEMTREC (the chemical industry’s 24-hour resource center for emergency responders) entered into an agreement to conduct a pilot project to see if key information about hazmat transported by rail could be more quickly and accurately provided to first responders in the crucial first minutes of an accident or incident.  The project is designed so that if an actual hazmat rail accident or incident occurs, CHEMTREC watchstanders, who interact with emergency response personnel, will have immediate access to CSX computer files regarding the specific train, including the type of hazmat being carried and its exact position in the train consist.  CSX has advised that there has been sufficient use of the current system to begin evaluating the project.  FRA is also working through the AAR to encourage the other major railroads to participate in a similar project. 

Finally, another pilot project is underway to evaluate the use of Railinc Corporation’s Freightscope, a program that provides equipment search capabilities for hazmat shipments.  The system was installed at CHEMTREC in December 2006, and it has the potential to more rapidly provide information about hazmat shipments on shortline and regional railroads to CHEMTREC watchstanders to improve information availability and reduce delays in emergency response.  The pilot project is scheduled to last a year, and includes various tests to determine the system’s effectiveness.  Two tests have already been conducted with good results. 

b.  Improvements in Tank Car Integrity through Research and Development and Rulemaking

Prior to the August 2005 enactment of SAFETEA-LU, FRA had initiated tank car structural integrity research stemming from the circumstances of the 2002 derailment in Minot, ND, which involved the release of anhydrous ammonia from tank cars punctured during the derailment.  Current research being conducted for FRA by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center), part of DOT’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA), involves a three-step process to assess the effects of various types of train accidents (e.g., a derailment or collision) on a tank car.  The first phase is the development of a physics-based model to analyze the kinematics of rail cars in a derailment.  The second phase is the development of a valid dynamic structural analysis model; and the third phase is an assessment of the damage created by a puncture and entails the application of fracture mechanics testing and analysis methods.  This research is also studying the relative strength of various types of steel used to construct tank cars. 

In addition to research on strengthening the structural integrity of the tank car to reduce the potential that a collision will result in release of a hazardous commodity, the research is also evaluating the compatibility of new designs with the existing fleet to assure that new hazards are not unintentionally introduced.  Several accident scenarios have been defined which will help focus research into improving the performance of secondary tank-to-tank impacts after an event has occurred.  Specifically, work is concentrated on increasing the energy required to puncture a tank car for impacts to the side shell or head of the tank car.  For impacts in yards, the research is evaluating technology such as pushback couplers, energy absorbers, and anti-climbing devices, designed to prevent the train from derailing.

With the assistance of this ongoing research, FRA, in conjunction with PHMSA, is working to develop new hazardous material tank car safety standards in accordance with Section 9005 of SAFETEA-LU.  We are currently consulting with railroads, shippers, and car manufacturers and have concluded three public meetings to gather information and views. 

To further these efforts, FRA signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with Dow Chemical Company, UP, and the Union Tank Car Company to participate in their Next Generation Rail Tank Car Project.  The agreement provides for extensive information-sharing and cooperation between ongoing FRA and industry research programs to improve the safety of rail shipments of hazardous commodities, including toxic inhalation hazards and high-risk gases and liquids.  Full-scale destructive testing of tank cars is also underway to establish a baseline for performance of existing cars and to help validate and refine FRA’s predictive model for tank car crashworthiness.  Two full-scale tests have been conducted to date at the Transportation Technology Center (TTC) in Pueblo, Colorado—the first on April 11, 2007, and the second on April 26, 2007—and I would be glad to provide the Committee with additional information about this significant research. 

5.  Strengthening FRA’s Safety Compliance Program

a.  Implementation of National Inspection Plan

FRA continually seeks ways to direct its inspection and enforcement efforts toward the issues and locations most in need of attention.  To this end, FRA instituted the National Inspection Plan (NIP), an inspection and allocation program that uses predictive indicators to assist FRA in allocating inspection and enforcement activities within a given region by railroad and by State.  The NIP was fully implemented across all of FRA’s safety disciplines in March 2006.  A reduction in both the number and the rate of train accidents is expected once the NIP has had time to take its full effect and FRA refines its application in response to actual experience. 

b.  Revisions to Schedules of Civil Penalties for Safety Violations

In December 2006, FRA published proposed statements of agency policy that would amend the 25 schedules of civil penalties issued as appendixes to FRA’s safety regulations.  The proposed revisions are intended to reflect more accurately the safety risks associated with violations of the rail safety laws and regulations, as well as to make sure that the civil penalty amounts are consistent across all safety regulations. 

Although the schedules are statements of agency policy, and FRA has authority to issue the revisions without having to follow the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, FRA has provided members and representatives of the general public an opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions before amending them.  FRA has received mixed comments on the proposals, and is currently evaluating all of the comments received in preparing final statements of agency policy. 

6.  Fostering Further Improvements in Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety

Deaths in highway-rail grade crossing accidents are the second-leading category of fatalities associated with railroading.  (Trespasser fatalities are the leading category.)  The number of grade crossing deaths has declined substantially and steadily in recent years.  However, the growth in rail and motor vehicle traffic continues to present challenges.

a.  Issuance of Safety Advisory 2005-03

In May 2005, FRA issued Safety Advisory 2005-03, which describes the respective roles of the Federal and State governments and of the railroads in grade crossing safety.  It also specifically reminds railroads of their responsibilities to report properly to FRA any accident involving a grade crossing signal failure; to maintain records relating to credible reports of grade crossing warning system malfunctions; to preserve the data from all locomotive-mounted recording devices following grade crossing accidents; and to cooperate fully with local law enforcement authorities during their investigations of such accidents.  FRA is also committed to providing technical assistance to local authorities in the investigation of crossing accidents where information or expertise within FRA control is required to complete the investigation.  FRA has extensively distributed this advisory through national law enforcement organizations and through contacts with local agencies.

b.  Development of State-Specific Grade Crossing Safety Action Plans

In June 2004, DOT and FRA issued an “Action Plan for Highway-Rail Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention” that sets forth a series of initiatives in the areas of engineering, education, and enforcement to reduce and prevent highway-rail grade crossing accidents.  As one of these initiatives, FRA began working with the State of Louisiana in March 2005 to develop its own action plan for grade crossing safety, to address high numbers of grade crossing accidents and deaths at the State level.  The action plan focuses on reducing collisions between trains and motor vehicles at grade crossings where multiple collisions have occurred.  After a cooperative effort between the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, Federal Highway Administration, FRA, and other stakeholders, the State approved the action plan in April 2006.  FRA is encouraging other States with high numbers of grade crossing accidents and deaths to do the same, and is currently working with the State of Texas to develop such a plan. 

c.  Focus on Pedestrian Safety

In addition, FRA will work within the grade crossing safety community to determine appropriate responses to pedestrian fatalities at grade crossings.  Early in 2006, the Transportation Research Board devoted an entire session of its annual meeting to pedestrian grade crossing safety issues in order to capture information on how to improve safety in this area.  Later this spring, FRA will publish a compilation of information on existing pedestrian safety devices currently being used in the Nation so that those making decisions on methods to improve pedestrian safety may have useful resource material available.

d.  Inquiry on Safety of Private Grade Crossings

In June 2006, FRA initiated an inquiry into the safety of private highway-rail grade crossings.  Approximately 10 percent of grade crossing collisions occur at privately-owned crossings.  However, there is little governmental safety oversight of these crossings, at either the State or Federal level.  As a result, in cooperation with appropriate State agencies, FRA has been soliciting oral statements at a series of public meetings throughout the Nation on issues related to the safety of private grade crossings, including current practices concerning responsibilities for safety at these crossings, the adequacy of warning devices at the crossings, and the relative merits of a more uniform approach to improving safety at private crossings.  Four meetings have been held, and the final meeting will take place in Syracuse, New York, on July 26.  FRA has also opened a public docket on these issues, so that interested parties may submit written comments for public review and consideration.  The statements made and comments received will help inform decisions on what action needs to be taken to address the safety of private grade crossings. 

C.  Passenger Rail Safety Initiatives

While the National Rail Safety Action Plan focuses on improving the safety of freight railroad operations and grade crossings, FRA has also been making important progress on the safety of railroad passengers.  Let me highlight the agency’s initiatives.

1.  Passenger Safety Rulemakings

FRA is hard at work on several rulemakings specifically designed to improve rail passenger safety.  First, as a result of consensus recommendations from RSAC, in August 2006 FRA proposed new passenger rail safety standards to improve evacuation of passengers from trains, to provide additional ways for rescuers to access the passenger car in case of an emergency, and to enhance onboard emergency communication systems.  FRA is in the process of preparing the final rule, which is expected to be issued sometime in the near future.  Moreover, a separate regulatory proposal is also in development within RSAC, focusing on passenger car emergency signage, low-location exit path marking, and emergency lighting.  That proposal is based on American Public Transportation Association (APTA) standards for passenger safety and is intended to augment current Federal requirements. 

FRA is also preparing a proposed rule to implement the RSAC’s recommendations to enhance structural strength requirements for the front of cab cars and multiple-unit locomotives.  These enhancements would include the addition of “energy deformation” requirements specified in revised APTA standards. 

2.  Gap Concerns

Recent attention has been focused on passenger safety at stations with high-level platforms where there are gaps between passenger car doorways and the platform.  On August 5, 2006, a young woman fell into a gap between the platform and the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) commuter train she was exiting from, and was ultimately struck and killed by another train.  FRA staff conducted an informal survey of standards used for determining gap distance, and found a great deal of variation in standards among commuter railroads.  Visits to station platforms at six selected railroads found considerable variations in gap length.  Setting and maintaining an acceptable gap is a complicated process affected by passenger equipment types, track maintenance, track curvature, and platform configuration.  The gap is also affected when freight trains or specialized equipment must use the same track used for passenger boarding. 

FRA has made this issue a priority.  FRA has established an RSAC task force on General Passenger Safety to specifically address safety concerns associated with issues such as platform gaps, safe boarding and debarking, and passenger casualties associated with the “second train.”  The full task force has met twice and will also address other matters directly affecting passenger safety on or around station platforms and make any necessary recommendations to FRA for regulatory action. 

3.  Passenger Safety Research and Development

Crash Energy Management (CEM) Systems.  Research has shown that passenger rail equipment crashworthiness in train-to-train collisions can be significantly increased if the equipment structure is engineered to crush in a controlled manner.  For several years, FRA has been advancing this engineering approach, termed CEM, with strong support from the Volpe Center.  First use of this concept on the North American continent was in design of Amtrak’s Acela Express trainset.  In March 2006, FRA successfully conducted a full-scale passenger train crash test at the TTC to evaluate new CEM technology that might be applied to conventional equipment.  In this test, a passenger train that had been equipped with a CEM system that included sacrificial crush zones in unoccupied spaces, pushback couplers designed to retract and absorb energy, and specially designed anti-climbers to keep the train in line, better protected the spaces intended to be occupied by passengers and train crewmembers.  Also tested were new passenger seats with special padding and new tables with crushable edges, to help prevent and mitigate passenger injuries.  Use of this integrated CEM technology is expected to save lives by more than doubling the speed at which all passengers are typically expected to survive a train crash.

  • The Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) is in the process of procuring a new fleet of cars utilizing CEM technology.  Metrolink’s procurement is being facilitated by the completed work of the CEM Working Group, specially tasked in May 2005 to develop a detailed technical specification for implementing CEM technology in passenger rail cars.  The South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (SFRTA) has joined Metrolink in procuring equipment using this specification, and FRA expects other passenger railroads to include the specification in future procurements of their own. 
  • In addition, FRA is working with APTA in developing industry-wide standards for applying CEM technology, such as push-back couplers and deformable anti-climbers, to conventional passenger cars.  To help support this effort, a full-scale impact test of a multi-level passenger car into the rigid barrier at the TTC is planned for July 2007, as testing to date has involved single-level passenger cars.  Data obtained from this test is expected to help specify the performance of multi-level passenger cars in conjunction with push-back couplers or deformable anti-climbers, or both. 
  • Rollover Rig.  In May 2006, FRA unveiled a state-of-the-art Passenger Rail Vehicle Emergency Evacuation Simulator, also known as a “Rollover Rig.”  It has the unique ability to roll a full-sized, commuter rail car up to 180 degrees, effectively turning it upside down, to simulate passenger train derailment scenarios.  The Rollover Rig is already enhancing the ability of researchers to test strategies for evacuating passenger rail cars and to evaluate the performance of emergency systems in the cars, such as emergency lighting, doors, and windows.  In addition, first responders nationwide now have a unique training tool to practice effective passenger rail rescue techniques safely when a rail car is on its side.  FRA developed the Rollover Rig at a cost of $450,000.  New Jersey Transit Rail Operations donated the commuter rail car used by the Rollover Rig, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority agreed to house, operate, and maintain the simulator at its emergency response training facility located in Landover, Maryland.

4.  Collision Hazard Analysis

"Collision Hazard Analysis" is a specific type of safety review that seeks to identify collision hazards and to develop reasonable solutions to eliminate or mitigate these hazards. Collision hazards include conditions and activities that increase the risk of collisions between trains or other on-track equipment, between trains and motor vehicles/pedestrians, or between trains and fixed objects along the right of way.  FRA strongly believes that the performance of a Collision Hazard Analysis will strengthen and support the passenger rail system safety process that grew out of the combined experience of the agency and the commuter railroads under Emergency Order No. 20.  FRA and the Volpe Center have partnered with APTA to conduct important pilot projects regarding Collision Hazard Analysis.  During the first pilot project, FRA, the Volpe Center, and APTA worked cooperatively to train and mentor a hazard analysis team at Tri-Rail, SFRTA’s commuter service, which volunteered to be the first commuter railroad to conduct this analysis.  The Tri-Rail project proved very successful and served as the model for a Collision Hazard Analysis pilot project on the Virginia Railway Express, completed last fall.  The effort was also very successful and provided further insight into the collision hazard analysis process.  Based on positive experiences on both pilot projects, FRA strongly advocates that all commuter operators undertake a Collision Hazard Analysis.  The analysis is especially useful for “New Start” rail projects where design and operational decisions can be readily influenced.

III.   ADMINISTRATION’S RAIL SAFETY BILL (H.R. 1516, S. 918)

The Administration’s rail safety reauthorization bill, the Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act, would reauthorize appropriations for FRA to carry out its rail safety mission for four years.  FRA has made a full copy of the proposal available on our web site at http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/48, including the supporting analysis for each section.  Let me take this opportunity to discuss the major provisions of the Administration bill and how they will further FRA’s safety efforts. 

A.  Authorizes Safety Risk Reduction Program and Protects Confidentiality of Risk Analyses Produced

In order to enhance the accountability of railroads in assuming full responsibility for their own safety, the bill would authorize appropriations for the addition of a safety risk reduction program to supplement FRA’s current safety activities and seeks Congressional endorsement of this pilot program.  Since rail-related accidents, injuries, and deaths are already at low levels, FRA needs to augment our traditional behavior-based and design-specification-based regulations with a robust safety risk reduction program to drive down those key measures of risk at a reasonable cost and in a practical manner. 

In the safety context, a risk reduction program is intended to make sure that the systems by which railroads operate and maintain their properties are adequate to meet or exceed safety objectives.  FRA continues to place greater emphasis on developing models of how railroads can systematically evaluate safety risks, in order to hold them more accountable for improving the safety of their operations, including implementing plans to eliminate or reduce the chance for workers to make mistakes that can lead to accidents or close calls.  A safety risk reduction program could unify previous voluntary efforts in the human factors arena while extending similar techniques to management of risk in other arenas such as track safety. 

To encourage railroads to produce thorough, as opposed to superficial, risk analyses, a companion provision in the bill would bar public disclosure by FRA of records required under the safety risk reduction program, except for Federal law enforcement purposes.  Also in order to promote the preparation of serious risk analyses by railroads, the provision would forbid discovery by private litigants in civil litigation for damages of any information compiled or collected under the program, and would forbid admission into evidence of the same information in civil litigation by private parties for damages.  An example would be a commuter railroad that undertakes a hazard analysis and has a crossover near a bridge abutment.  It is unlikely that the railroad would be able to remove the hazard (a derailment could send the cars into the fixed structure) but it could mitigate the risk by reducing speeds and training.

FRA is mindful that any restriction of public access to information may be controversial and requires careful scrutiny.  However, we are convinced that assuring confidentiality is essential to promote full disclosure by the railroads and their employees to make such programs meaningful and bring about tangible improvements in safety.   

B.  Grants Rulemaking Authority over Hours of Service

As discussed earlier, human factors cause more than a third of all train accidents, constituting the largest category of train accident causes.  Fatigue is at least a contributing factor in one of every four serious human factor train accidents.  We believe that fatigued crewmembers have played an increasing role in railroad accidents over the past decade through poor judgment, miscommunication, inattentiveness, and failure to follow procedures.  Our challenge is to ensure that crewmembers have adequate opportunity to rest, are free of disorders that can disrupt sleep, and are fully engaged in maintaining alertness.  

However, the statutory provisions that govern the hours of service of railroad train crews, dispatchers, and signal maintainers are antiquated—essentially a century old—and woefully inadequate to address present realities.  For example, under those laws, train crews may work eight hours on duty and eight hours off duty perpetually.  Engineers and conductors often work 60 to 70 hours a week, and may be called to work during the day or night, which may disrupt sleep patterns and reduce their ability to function.  See Appendix B. 

Moreover, those hours of service laws contain no substantive rulemaking authority.  The lack of regulatory authority over duty hours—authority that other DOT agencies have with respect to their modes of transportation—has precluded FRA from making use of scientific learning on this issue of sleep-wake cycles and fatigue-induced performance failures.  Behavioral science has progressed to the point that computer models can accurately predict the likely effect of given sleep and rest patterns on employee performance.  The models provide useful guidance to aid employee scheduling, and, as I discussed earlier, FRA published a validation report of one such model in 2006.  Yet, only UP is making use of a sleep model to evaluate its own crew scheduling practices.  Most railroads have yet to integrate use of such models in their operations and have refrained from making public commitments to use this capability in the future. Further, over the past 15 years, the history of attempts by rail labor and management to improve fatigue management has not been marked by sustained progress.  

We recognize that specific amendments to the hours of service laws might mitigate fatigue.  Yet, we believe that sincere attempts at short-term relief can also create constraints and unintended consequences that may limit the ability to provide optimal solutions downstream.  Treating limbo time as on-duty time, for instance, may force carriers to reduce the length of many assignments to avoid the possibility of “violations” under circumstances where safety could not be seriously compromised, and may increase the cost of any further reforms.  Hours of service issues are surprisingly complex, and they need to be properly considered within the overall context of fatigue prevention and management.  FRA is committed to making significant progress in this area, but we need the regulatory authority to do so. 

We strongly recommend that the existing hours of service laws be replaced with flexible regulations based on a modern, scientific understanding of fatigue.  Today, I am here asking for your support for legislation that will permit us to put into action what we have learned.  The Administration bill first proposes to sunset the hours of service laws, but retain their protections as interim regulations embodying their substantive provisions.  Next, the proposal calls for FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, to review the problem of fatigue with the assistance of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee, and to develop as necessary new, science-based requirements that can help us reduce human factor-caused accidents and casualties.  We believe revised “benchmark” limits are needed on work hours, and requirements for rest periods, to provide simple guidance for fixed schedules, where that will suffice.

The bill would also authorize FRA to permit railroads to comply with an approved fatigue management plan as an alternative to complying with the “benchmark” limits” in the regulations.  With the tools now available, we will be able to recognize fatigue management approaches that include careful evaluation of a wide variety of more flexible work schedules by validated techniques.  In fact, we believe most safety-critical railroad employees would be protected by performance-based fatigue management programs that will enhance safety while holding down costs.  

For public and employee safety, it is time to make a long-overdue change and grant us the rulemaking authority over hours of service to directly address the major cause of far too many train accidents. 

C.  Promotes Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety

Accidents at highway-rail grade crossings account for more than a third of all rail-related fatalities.  The bill seeks to prevent highway-rail grade crossing collisions and make crossings safer through two main provisions.

1.  Requires Reports by Railroads and States to DOT on the Characteristics of Highway-Rail Grade Crossings 

Currently, reporting to the DOT National Crossing Inventory is strictly voluntary.  FRA is the custodian of the inventory and the quality of the data is only as good as what States and railroads have historically reported.  Too much data in the inventory has been outdated.  The bill would remedy this by requiring that railroads and States provide the Secretary with current information regarding the country’s approximately 230,000 highway-rail grade crossings.  Mandatory reporting would make this unique national database more up to date and complete, which would help (i) States better rank their crossings by risk and channel resources to the most dangerous crossings first, and (ii) DOT and transportation researchers identify the most promising ways to reduce crossing casualties.  The bill would therefore require initial reports on all previously unreported crossings and periodic updates on all crossings.        

2.  Fosters Introduction of New Technology to Improve Safety at Public Highway-Rail Grade Crossings 

Fewer than half of the 140,000 public highway-rail grade crossings have active warning devices, which are expensive to install and maintain.  Perversely, improvements at one crossing are often cited in tort actions to prove the inadequacy of protections at another crossing.  Under the Administration bill, if the Secretary has approved a new technology to provide advance warning to highway users at a grade crossing, the Secretary’s determination preempts any State law concerning the adequacy of the technology in providing the warning.  FRA believes that this proposal would help encourage the creation and deployment of new, cost-effective technology at the Nation’s approximately 80,000 public grade crossings that still lack active warning devices.  For instance, under an FRA waiver the Twin Cites and Western Railroad Co. and its supplier successfully demonstrated a warning system designed for lower-volume roadways and rail lines using dedicated locomotives.  The system uses GPS and a data radio link between the locomotive and each crossing.  This product is now being commercialized by a major signal supplier. 

D.  Expands FRA’s Authority to Disqualify Individuals Unfit for Safety-Sensitive Service

Another provision of the bill would expand FRA’s existing disqualification authority to cover individuals who are unfit for safety-sensitive service in the railroad industry because of a violation of the Hazardous Materials Regulations related to transporting hazmat by rail.  Currently, FRA may disqualify an individual only for a violation of the rail safety laws or regulations, not the Hazardous Materials Regulations, even though violation of the Hazardous Materials Regulations may involve a greater potential accident risk or consequence (in the event of an accident).  This proposal would logically extend our disqualification authority over railroad employees and complement current initiatives to strengthen FRA’s safety compliance program. 

E.  Protects Rail Safety Regulations from Legal Attack on the Ground that They Affect Security and Repeals Statutory Requirement for DHS to Consult with DOT when Issuing Security Rules that Affect Rail Safety

The bill would also bar legal challenges to DOT safety regulations on the basis that they affect rail security.  In many cases, rail safety and security are intertwined, and part of the justification for certain DOT regulations is that they enhance rail security.  The bill would clarify the scope of the Secretary’s safety jurisdiction and help deter or quickly rebuff any challenge that DOT has exceeded its statutory authority in issuing such regulations. 

Of course, DHS would continue to exercise primary responsibility for the promulgation of rail security regulations.  In this regard, the bill would repeal the statutory provision that, when issuing security rules that affect rail safety, DHS must consult with DOT.  We believe the provision is unnecessary and confusing in light of other statutes, executive orders, and existing inter-Departmental cooperation under the DOT-DHS Memorandum of Understanding and its related annexes on rail security.

F.  Clarifies the Secretary’s Authority to Issue Temporary Waivers of Rail Safety Regulations Related to Emergencies

The bill would clarify that FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, may grant a temporary waiver without prior notice and an opportunity for public comment and hearing, if the waiver is directly related to an emergency event or needed to aid in recovery efforts and it is in the public interest and consistent with railroad safety.  While FRA’s normal practice is to set aside time for public comment and hearing on waiver petitions, this appreciably slows down issuance of waivers necessary for emergency response and recovery efforts.  Yet granting a waiver without such procedures risks legal challenge.  The provision would free FRA from this dilemma and allow the agency to support emergency response and recovery efforts by dispensing with prior notice and an opportunity for comment and hearing, and by otherwise expediting the process for granting waivers.  Further, the relief granted would be temporary (a maximum of nine months), and the normal waiver procedures would have to be followed to extend the temporary relief granted should doing so be necessary.

G.  Authorizes the Monitoring of Railroad Radio Communications

Currently, FRA is permitted to monitor railroad radio communications only in the presence of an authorized sender or receiver, such as a railroad employee.  Yet, when railroad employees know that FRA is present, they tend to be on their best safety behavior.  Therefore, FRA cannot be sure whether the level of compliance observed is normal, and we are less able to identify what are, under ordinary circumstances, the most frequent and serious instances of noncompliance.  Access to candid communications off site would yield a truer picture of compliance levels. 

The bill would address this concern by letting FRA safety inspectors monitor and record railroads’ radio communications over their dedicated frequencies outside of the presence of railroad personnel for the purpose of accident prevention (including accident investigation) and, with certain exceptions, to use the information received.  The exceptions would be that the information (1) may generally not be used as direct evidence in any administrative or judicial proceeding, and (2) may not be released under the Freedom of Information Act.  The information may, however, be used as background material for further investigation.  Nor should there be concern that the information communicated is personal information.  Railroad operating rules and procedures already require that all radio communications relate to railroad operations and prohibit railroad employees from using the radio for personal use. 

As FRA’s objective of accident prevention is ordinarily fulfilled daily by conducting safety inspections of railroad operations and enforcing the rail safety laws, monitoring of radio communications would not only help achieve that objective, but would greatly improve the efficiency of those inspections, the accuracy of the results, and the effective deployment of FRA’s limited inspection resources based on those more accurate results. 

H.  Clarifies and Relaxes the Existing Statutory Provision on Moving Certain Defective Equipment for Repair

Finally, I would like to mention that the bill would amend a complicated statutory provision that states the conditions for hauling a railroad car or locomotive with a safety appliance or power brake defect for repair without civil penalty liability, including the requirement that equipment be back-hauled to the nearest available repair point.  Back hauls required by statute can be both unsafe (because of the hazards related to switching a car out of one train and into another train), and inefficient (because the car is stopped from moving toward its destination and forced to go to a different place that is physically closer than the next forward point for repair).  The proposal would allow the equipment to be moved to the next forward point of repair under clear regulatory safeguards for moving defective equipment that are more consistent with the movement-for-repair provisions applicable to vehicles with other types of defects, such as Freight Car Safety Standards defects. 

Further, the bill would also define some key statutory terms and then provide FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, with rulemaking authority to define others.  Currently, FRA may provide only guidance on the meaning of these terms, and this has contributed to an atmosphere of uncertainty about the requirements of the statute in day-to-day application.  For example, FRA has received many complaints over the years that cars have been hauled past a repair point that FRA does not consider to be a repair point.  This proposal would, therefore, help dispel such uncertainty and promote understanding and compliance with the provisions governing the safe movement of equipment with a safety appliance or power brake defect. 

The Administration’s bill does not include a provision that would revise the preemption provision at 49 U.S.C. § 20106.  While this is a very important issue, of interest to many on the Committee, I would ask that the Committee oppose the provision included as Section 3 of H.R. 1401.  This provision would overturn longstanding Supreme Court precedents, and ultimately be detrimental to railroad safety.  It would eliminate national uniformity of regulation. It was clearly the intention of Congress in enacting section 20106 to establish national uniformity of regulation, which is a fundamental keystone of the railroad safety statutes.  Railroads would instead be forced to attempt to comply with an endless number of ever changing and potentially conflicting state and local standards adopted by individual juries.  If the Committee needs further information to address this important issue, FRA staff would be glad to provide assistance.

I would like to emphasize that, while all of the provisions I have discussed are among the major provisions of the bill, there are other significant provisions I have not mentioned today that will also enhance rail safety.  These include providing FRA rail security officers with greater access to Federal, State, and local law enforcement databases, officer-protection warning systems, and communications for the purpose of performing the Administrator’s civil and administrative duties to promote safety, including security, and for other purposes authorized by law.  All of these provisions are set forth in the bill the Secretary presented in February, and I would be glad to discuss each of them in detail with you.

IV.  Conclusion

FRA’s approach to enhancing the safety of rail transportation is multifaceted.  FRA personnel strive daily to implement comprehensive initiatives for safety assurance and hazard mitigation under the National Rail Safety Action Plan to make rail operations safer for the public and the rail transportation industry.  The Administration’s Federal Railroad Safety Accountability and Improvement Act would enable FRA not only to continue these efforts but to enhance safety systematically in many ways.  I look forward to working with the Subcommittee to bring about the enactment of the Administration’s bill, and to help make our Nation’s railroad system ever safer.  Thank you. 

Appendix A

The Railroad Industry’s Safety Record

The railroad industry’s overall safety record is very positive, and most safety trends are moving in the right direction.  While not even a single death or injury is acceptable, progress is continually being made in the effort to improve railroad safety.  This improvement is demonstrated by an analysis of the Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) database of railroad reports of accidents and incidents that have occurred over the nearly three decades from 1978 through 2006.  See 49 CFR part 225.   (The worst year for rail safety in recent decades was 1978, and 2006 is the last complete year for which preliminary data are available.)  Between 1978 and 2006, the total number of rail-related accidents and incidents has fallen from 90,653 to 12,940, an all-time low representing a decline of 86 percent.  Between 1978 and 2006, total rail-related fatalities have declined from 1,646 to 913, a reduction of 44 percent.  From 1978 to 2006, total employee cases (fatal and nonfatal) have dropped from 65,193 to 5,065, the record low; this represents a decline of 92 percent.  In the same period, total employee deaths have fallen from 122 in 1978 to 16 in 2006, a decrease of 87 percent.

Contributing to this generally improving safety record has been a 74-percent decline in train accidents since 1978 (a total of 2,864 train accidents in 2006, compared to 10,991 in 1978), even though rail traffic has increased.  (Total train-miles were up by 8.5 percent from 1978 to 2006.)  In addition, the year 2006 saw only 28 train accidents out of the 2,834 reported in which a hazardous material was released, with a total of only 69 hazardous material cars releasing some amount of product, despite about 1.7 million movements of hazardous materials by rail.

In other words, over the last almost three decades, the number and rate of train accidents, total deaths arising from rail operations, employee fatalities and injuries, and hazardous materials releases all have fallen dramatically.  In most categories, these improvements have been most rapid in the 1980s, and tapered off in the late 1990s.  Causes of the improvements have included a much more profitable economic climate for freight railroads following deregulation in 1980 under the Staggers Act (which led to substantially greater investment in plant and equipment), enhanced safety awareness and safety program implementation on the part of railroads and their employees, and FRA’s safety monitoring and standard setting (most of FRA’s safety rules were issued during this period).  In addition, rail remains an extremely safe mode of transportation for passengers.  Since 1978, more than 11.2 billion passengers have traveled by rail, based on reports filed with FRA each month.  The number of rail passengers has steadily increased over the years, and since 2000 has averaged more than 500 million per year.  Although 12 passengers died in train collisions and derailments in 2005, none did in 2006.  On a passenger-mile basis, with an average about 15.5 billion passenger-miles per year since the year 2000, rail travel is about as safe as scheduled airlines and intercity bus transportation and is far safer than private motor vehicle travel.  Rail passenger accidents–while always to be avoided–have a very high passenger survival rate.

As indicated previously, not all of the major safety indicators are positive.  Grade crossing and rail trespasser incidents continue to cause a large proportion of the deaths associated with railroading.  Grade crossing and rail trespassing deaths accounted for 97 percent of the 913 total rail-related deaths in 2006.  In recent years, rail trespasser deaths have replaced grade crossing fatalities as the largest category of rail-related deaths.  In 2006, 525 persons died while on railroad property without authorization, and 365 persons lost their lives in grade crossing accidents.  Further, significant train accidents continue to occur, and the train accident rate per million train-miles has not declined at an acceptable pace in recent years.  It actually rose slightly in 2003 and 2004 (to 4.05 and 4.38, respectively) compared to that in 2002 (3.76), although it dropped in 2005 (to 4.1) and 2006 (to 3.54). 

The causes of train accidents are generally grouped into five categories:  human factors; track and structures; equipment; signal and train control; and miscellaneous.  The great majority of train accidents are caused by human factors and track.  In recent years, most of the serious events involving train collisions or derailments resulting in release of hazardous material, or harm to rail passengers, have resulted from human factor or track causes.  Accordingly, the National Rail Safety Action Plan makes human factors and track the major target areas for improving the train accident rate.

                                                                                                            Appendix B

                                              Scientific Learning Demonstrating Inadequacy of Hours of Service Laws

The following four examples illustrate some of the ways in which the existing hours of service statutory regime fails to reflect the latest scholarship on the subject of fatigue.

First, current scientific information indicates that to feel well rested most people need approximately eight hours of sleep per night.  The current hours of service laws require a minimum off-duty period of only 10 hours if an employee in train and engine service has worked 12 consecutive hours in the previous 24-hour period.  If an employee works 11 hours and 59 minutes or less, the laws require a minimum rest period of only eight hours.  Very few employees work 12 consecutive hours; therefore, most may legally be called back to duty with only eight hours off duty.  During that off-duty time, the employee must travel to and from work and attend to personal needs such as bathing and eating.  Crew-calling practices allow the employee to be called as little as two hours prior to the beginning of the next duty period.  Given these circumstances, it is certain that the current law permits employees to work with less than eight hours of sleep per night. 

An FRA study of locomotive engineers’ sleep and work patterns found that the average locomotive engineer obtained 7.13 hours of sleep per night.[1]  Another FRA study of train handling performance conducted on a highly realistic locomotive simulator by locomotive engineers working under schedules that conformed with the hours of service laws[2] found that engineers who worked ten hours and had 12 hours off duty, slept an average of only 6.1 hours.  A similar group of engineers who also worked ten hours, but had only 9.3 hours off duty, slept an average of only 4.6 hours.  Again, most people need about eight hours of sleep per night; therefore, for most people, the amount of sleep these engineers received was insufficient even though their schedules fully conformed with the hours of service laws.

Second, scientific information also shows that the quantity and quality of sleep vary with the time of day.  Most people sleep best at night; however, the current hours of service laws do not take the time of day when sleep can occur into account.  Under those laws, engineers who quit work at dawn and have to sleep during the daytime, when it is harder to sleep, get the same minimum eight or ten hours off as engineers who quit work in the evening and have the relative luxury of sleeping at night.  The study by Pollard referenced earlier found that engineers, in fact, obtain the least sleep if their on-duty period ends between 5:00 a.m. and noon.       

Third, most mammals, including human beings, have an approximately 24-hour sleep-wake cycle known as a “circadian rhythm.”  Rapid changes in the circadian pattern of sleep and wakefulness disrupt many physiological functions such as hormone releases, digestion, and temperature regulation.  Human function can be affected, performance may be impaired, and a general feeling of debility may occur until realignment is achieved.  The maximum work periods and minimum off-duty periods specified in the current hours of service laws force sleep-wake cycles into a less-than-24-hour pattern that is highly unnatural and very difficult to adapt to.  Jet lag when flying east is the most commonly experienced syndrome similar to the experience of consistently working on a less-than-24-hour cycle.

Fourth, recent studies “suggest that sleep loss (less than 7 hours per night) may have wide-ranging effects on the cardiovascular, endocrine, immune, and nervous systems, including the following:

  • Obesity in adults . . .
  • Diabetes and impaired glucose tolerance
  • Cardiovascular disease and hypertension
  • Anxiety symptoms
  • Depressed mood
  • Alcohol use[.]”[3]

In other words, sleep loss, which the current hours of service regime permits railroad operating employees to suffer, contributes not only to the safety risk of fatigue, but also to a gamut of heath risks, including the risk of serious health problems such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and hypertension.

 

[1] Pollard, J. K. 1996.  Locomotive engineer’s activity diary.  Report Number DOT/FRA/RRP-96/02.

[2] Thomas, G. R., Raslear, T. G., and Kuehn, G. I.  1997.  The effects of work schedule on train handling performance and sleep of locomotive engineers: A simulator study.  Report Number DOT/FRA/ORD-97-09.

[3] Institute of Medicine of the National Academies. Sleep Disorders and Sleep Deprivation: an Unmet Public Health Problem (2006), p. 59.

Improving Air Service to Small and Rural Communities

STATEMENT OF

ANDREW B. STEINBERG
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AVIATION and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE

on

Improving Air Service to Small and Rural Communities

July 17, 2007

 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to this hearing.  I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you and the Subcommittee two programs administered by the Department of Transportation that affect air service to small communities, namely the Essential Air Service (EAS) program and the Small Community Air Service Development Program.  I can assure you that the Department is committed to implementing its small community air service programs in the best and most efficient manner and thereby help smaller communities meet the challenges that they face in obtaining and retaining air service. 

It is clear that air service in this country has changed dramatically over the past several years.  Many of these changes have been very positive.  The growth of low-fare carriers, for example, has made affordable air transportation available to millions of people across the country.  The number of air travelers has expanded dramatically, as hundreds of passengers have taken advantage of the low fares that have become more widely available.  While this is a good development overall for consumers, we recognize that it can create new challenges for some small communities.  With a greater number of service choices available, particularly those involving lower fares, many consumers are willing to drive to places with a broader array of air service options, making it more difficult for some individual airports to sustain their own traffic levels.  There are, for example, some communities receiving EAS assistance within ready driving distance of two or three major airports.  This can result in a struggling community airport, but not necessarily consumers who lack access to the national air transportation system.  Let me give you an example, just a few years ago Utica, New York generated about 24,000 passengers a year and was served profitably without EAS subsidy.  Then Southwest began flying to Albany and JetBlue started service to Syracuse-- both of which are near to Utica.  The number of passengers using Utica airport fell to 3,500, and the federal government was paying over $1 million in EAS subsidy in attempt to compete with low-fare, jet service in nearby cities.  The subsidy per passenger finally exceeded the $200 statutorily-determined ceiling thus ending the community’s eligibility for EAS. 

Another challenge is the change in aircraft used by carriers that serve small communities.  Many commuter carriers have been replacing their 19-seat aircraft with 30-seat aircraft, due to the increased costs of operating the smaller planes and larger carriers’ reluctance to offer code sharing on 19-seaters.  This trend began at least 10 years ago and has continued.  There are now fewer and fewer 19-seat aircraft in operation as many carriers have upgauged to 30-seat aircraft, and, in some cases, even regional jets.  As a result, many small communities that cannot support this larger size of aircraft are being left without air service.  Additionally, the rise in the cost of aviation fuel has made all carriers more cost-conscious and more selective in initiating new service and maintaining service where yields and traffic are low.  Also, some changes have occurred in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Many consumers, leisure and business, have changed their travel patterns and carriers have altered the structure of their airline services in both large and small markets.  

The recent financial difficulties of the network carriers have contributed to the dearth of air service to small communities.  As network-airlines have worked hard to cut costs and become more efficient in order to weather very difficult economic conditions, they have resorted to canceling service on their thinnest routes—many of which are small communities.  Thus in the long-term, an important factor for comprehensive air transportation in the United States is the sound financial health of network airlines. 

The challenge that we face is one of adjusting the programs, to the extent we are able, to account for these changes in an efficient and effective manner, giving appropriate and balanced recognition to the reasonable needs of the communities, the carriers, the consumers, and the taxpaying public at large.   Mr. Chairman, I do not use the word “challenge” lightly.  All of us -- the federal government that manages programs affecting service at small communities, as well as the States and the communities themselves -- need to reexamine the way we approach small community air service. 

We at the Department of Transportation have recognized for a while now that the way the federal government helps small communities has not kept pace with the changes in the industry and the way service is now provided in this country.  For that reason, we have initiated some important reevaluations of the programs that we manage.  I want to share with you today what we have done and are doing to address this issue.

As you know, the Department administers two programs dealing with air service at small communities.  The EAS program provides subsidies to air carriers to provide air service at certain statutorily mandated communities.  The Small Community Air Service Development Program, which was established by Congress in 2000 under the AIR-21 legislation, provides federal grants-in-aid to help small communities address their air service and airfare issues.  While initially established as a pilot program, it was reauthorized through FY 2008 in Vision 100.

Essential Air Service Program

Let me first address the EAS program.  The laws governing our administration of the EAS program have not changed significantly since its inception 28 years ago, notwithstanding the dramatic changes that have taken place in the airline industry.  As currently structured, the EAS program acts only as a safety net for small communities receiving subsidized air service by providing threshold levels of air service.  While ensuring some service, this approach does little to help communities attract self-sustaining unsubsidized air service, as evidenced by the fact that once a community receives subsidized air service it is rare for an air carrier to come in offering to provide unsubsidized air service.  

The goal of our proposed changes to the EAS program is to focus the program’s resources on the most isolated communities, i.e., those with the fewest driving alternatives.  Our current proposal to accomplish this is quite different from those made in past years.  The first change we propose is to cap EAS communities at those that currently receive subsidized air service.  Second, we would rank all the subsidized communities by isolation, i.e., by driving miles to the nearest large or medium hub airport, with the most isolated getting service first.  Last, we are proposing a maximum $50 million funding level. 

Congress has also recognized the need for reform and created a few pilot programs in Vision 100.  One program is the Community Flexibility Pilot Program.  It allows up to ten communities to receive a grant equal to two years’ worth of subsidy in exchange for their forgoing their EAS for ten years.  The funds would have to be used for a project on the airport property or to improve the facilities for general aviation, but no communities have volunteered for that program.  Another program is the Alternate Essential Air Service Program.  The thrust of this program is that, instead of paying an air carrier to serve a community as we typically do under EAS, communities could apply to receive the funds directly -- provided that they have a plan as to exactly how they would use the funds to the benefit of the communities’ access to air service.  The law gives great flexibility in that regard.  For example, funds could be used for smaller aircraft but more frequent service, for on-demand air taxi service, for on-demand surface transportation, for regionalized service, or to purchase an aircraft to be used to serve the community.  The Department issued an order establishing that program in the summer of 2004, but to date no communities have applied.  I cannot tell you for sure why, but my guess is that part of it is that it is just human nature to resist both risk and change. 

With regard to the EAS program, it is important to note the continued growth of the program’s size and cost to taxpayers over time.  As a point of reference, before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Department was paying subsidy for 107 communities (including 32 in Alaska).  We are now subsidizing service at 145 communities (including 41 in Alaska).   Further, EAS is often viewed as an absolute entitlement whether the communities invest any time and effort in supporting the service or not.  We have proposed reforms to EAS to better focus its resources on the most isolated communities. 

Small Community Air Service Development Program

The Department is now in its sixth year of administering the Small Community Air Service Development Program (Small Community Program).  Under the law, the Department can make a maximum of 40 grants in each fiscal year to address air service and airfare issues, although no more than four grants each year can be in any one State.  Until 2006, Congress had provided $20 million in each year for this program.  In 2006, the funding for the program was $10 million, and the Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (P.L. 110-5), provides the Department with $10 million in Fiscal Year 2007 to administer the Small Community Program.  On February 26, the Department issued a Request for Proposals for 2007 applications and proposals are due April 27. 

Given the many and varying priorities facing the Department, this program was not accommodated within the President’s 2008 Budget.  Nonetheless, it is important to note the extensive support that the Department provides for small airports in terms of supporting the infrastructure that make any service possible.  In the last two years (FY2005 and FY2006), the FAA has provided over $4 billion in grants for small airports, or nearly 2/3 of the Airport Improvement Program (AIP).  Furthermore, the Department's reauthorization proposal would continue to direct AIP to small airports.  The reauthorization proposal would also add new AIP eligibility for ADS-B ground stations and expanded eligibility for revenue producing projects at small airports that will help their financial stability.

With respect to the Small Community Program, the Department has made many awards to communities throughout the country and authorized a wide variety of projects, seeking to address the diverse types of problems presented and test different ideas about how to solve them.  Some of these projects include a new business model to provide ground handling for carriers at the airport to reduce station costs, seed money for a new airline to provide regional service, expansion of low-fare services, a ground service transportation alternative for access to the Nation’s air transportation system, aggressive marketing and promotional campaigns to increase ridership at airports, and revenue guarantees, subsidies, and other financial incentives to reduce the risk to airlines of initiating or expanding service at a community.  For the most part, these projects extend over a period of two to four years.

This program differs from the traditional EAS program in a number of respects.  First, the funds go to the communities rather than directly to an airline serving the community.  Second, the financial assistance is not limited to air carrier subsidy, but can be used for a number of other efforts to enhance a community’s service, including advertising and promotional activities, studies, and ground service initiatives.  Third, communities design their own solutions to their air service and airfare problems and seek financial assistance under the program to help them implement their plans. 

Over the past five years, the Department has made more than 180 grant awards.  Overall, more than 90% of the grant recipients have implemented their authorized projects. 

For example, new services have been inaugurated at many communities; others have received increased frequencies or service with larger aircraft.  Several communities have begun targeted and comprehensive marketing campaigns to increase use of the service at the local airport and to attract additional air carrier service.  We have been monitoring the progress of all of the communities as they proceed with the implementation of their projects.   However, because the majority of the projects involve activities over a two-to-four-year period, and many communities have sought and received extensions for their grants, only now are some of them at the point of completion. 

As you know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded a review of the Small Community Program in 2005.  GAO too recognized that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions as to the effectiveness of the Small Community Program in helping communities address their service issues because many grant projects are still in process.  Of the grant projects that had been completed, the GAO concluded that the results were mixed because not all of the grants resulted in improvements that were achieved and sustained after the grant funding was exhausted. 

In this regard, since the end of March 2007, the Department’s Inspector General (IG) has been reviewing the outcomes of the limited number of projects that have been completed to date.  Evaluation of the program will consist of two phases including a quantitative and qualitative analysis of a selected sample of all completed projects.

The Federal Government, however, is only one piece of the equation.  States and communities will also need to review their air service in the context of the changed industry structure and service patterns to seek fresh, new solutions to maximize their air service potential, including regional and intermodal approaches and expansion of public/private partnerships to meet these challenges. 

The fundamental problem with air service to many small communities is insufficient demand to justify scheduled service purely on market terms.  However, recent technological advances may offer a new market solution to the problems of small community air service.  The most dramatic innovation is the Very Light Jet (or VLJ) which represents a breakthrough in jet aircraft operating economics.  Another very important innovation is information-technology that allows demand for air service to be aggregated over the internet.   The combination of VLJ with internet-enabled information technology could potentially facilitate the provision of on-demand, jet air taxi service at these small communities.  Companies such as DayJet have already begun operations employing these technologies. 

In that regard, our office looks forward to continuing discussions with your staff on finding ways to better enable the marketplace to supply air service to small communities.  We have discussed a range of ideas that carriers could consider, including  new  per-seat, on-demand service business models using the new generation of very light jets (VLJ) as well as alternative ways to create market-based incentives for airlines to add and sustain service to small communities.                                             

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me reaffirm the Department’s commitment to implementing the DOT’s small community air service programs in the best and most efficient manner.  We look forward to working with you and the members of this subcommittee and the full committee as we continue to work toward these objectives.  Thank you again.  This concludes my prepared statement.  I will be happy to answer any of your questions.

 

Aviation Consumer Issues

STATEMENT OF

ANDREW B. STEINBERG
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AVIATION and INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTITIVES
COMMITTEE
ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

on

AVIATION CONSUMER ISSUES

April 20, 2007

 

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to this hearing.  I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Department of Transportation.

I want to emphasize to the Committee at the outset of my statement that the issue prompting this hearing today, which involves the treatment of consumers by airlines during extended on-ground flight delays, commonly referred to as tarmac delays, is being taken seriously by the Department, as evidenced by our prompt action following the recent incidents, which I will discuss shortly.  Before I discuss that action, however, I would like to give you a broad overview of our authority to regulate in matters involving airline consumer protection, including tarmac delays, and our continuing efforts to ensure that passenger carriers meet their obligations to consumers.

Since deregulation of the airline industry nearly 30 years ago, the Department – as well as its predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Board – has sought to balance the public interest in protecting consumers from unreasonable practices with our statutory mandate to permit market forces to operate to the maximum extent possible in order to determine what services are best provided the public by airlines.  When action has been required, we have tried, wherever possible, to implement measures to enhance the functioning of the marketplace, such as publishing carrier performance data, or requiring the airlines themselves to disclose data to consumers that may be of use in making their choices of which carriers to use.  We continue to believe this approach to be the proper one.

The cornerstone provision for DOT’s consumer protection program covering all economic regulatory matters, as opposed to those involving safety, is section 41712 of title 49 of the U.S. Code, which broadly prohibits unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition in air transportation.  The Secretary’s Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings (Enforcement Office) acts as the prosecuting office for aviation consumer enforcement cases, including those involving unfair and deceptive practices.  That office may act on its own initiative, and it also reviews formal third-party complaints alleging violations of the statute or the Department’s consumer protection rules and either dismisses them or pursues enforcement action.  It also has the authority to enter into settlements relating to those cases.  Section 41712 is enforceable in its own right, but violations can be difficult to demonstrate.  Even if a prosecution is ultimately successful, such cases are resource intensive, time consuming, and of limited precedential value because each is highly dependent on its own set of facts.  That section is more important as the basis for DOT rulemaking and policy making, where the public interest dictates, to define the extent of its statutory reach.  For example, section 41712 provides the statutory basis for our airline full fare advertising and oversales compensation rules.

The Aviation Consumer Protection Division, within the Enforcement Office, handles all consumer complaints and inquiries involving economic regulatory matters and works with airlines and other companies to resolve informal consumer complaints relating to air transportation.  Complaints filed with that division are often helpful to us in reviewing specific problem areas or industry trends that may need to be addressed through administrative action.  That division also investigates apparent violations of consumer protection requirements, refers matters to the Enforcement Office where appropriate, and performs consumer protection rulemaking functions.  In addition, the Aviation Consumer Protection Division has significant public information, education, and outreach programs, including publications that provide general air travel consumer information, such as the Department’s monthly Air Travel Consumer Report.   That report summarizes data filed with DOT by carriers on flight delays, mishandled baggage, and denied boardings, and also lists by carrier the number of complaints registered in a variety of areas, including baggage, refunds, and flight irregularities.  Complaints filed with the Department over the past several years have trended downward from a high of about 23,000 in calendar year 2000, with about 8,300 being filed with us last year.  However, complaint numbers are starting to increase this year.

Let me now touch upon the incidents of this past winter involving airline passengers being trapped for many hours on aircraft on the ground.  The most highly-publicized events included serious service disruptions and lengthy tarmac delays experienced by American Airlines in late December of last year after severe weather hit the Southwest.  Also, more recently, JetBlue Airways experienced severe flight irregularities and lengthy on-ground delays on Valentine’s Day and the days that followed during a period of adverse weather in the Northeast.  Although American and JetBlue received extensive media attention, virtually all carriers have had problems related to customer service, including, on rare occasion, flights that experience long tarmac delays.          

Secretary Peters and the Department were troubled by incidents like these, particularly to the extent that food, water, and other basic needs were not being met by the airlines.  That is why we were pleased to see that the airlines involved in these specific incidents appeared to be taking substantial corrective actions.  In response to its December incident, American Airlines reportedly instituted new guidelines, which included limiting tarmac delays to no more than 4 hours.  JetBlue very publicly accepted responsibility for its shortcomings and took a number of steps to address its customers’ concerns.  Significantly, it adopted what it termed a “Customer Bill of Rights,” by which it promises to (1) provide passengers on lengthy on-board delays with food, water, and medical care, if necessary; (2) compensate passengers for extended tarmac delays; and (3) set a time limit of 5 hours on the maximum duration of any tarmac delay.  This policy has been widely disseminated and made available to the public on the carrier’s web site.  Importantly, JetBlue incorporated its bill of rights into its contract of carriage, providing passengers a legally binding avenue of redress if the carrier fails to follow through on its promises.

Although extended tarmac delays are statistically rare (as I’ll discuss in a moment), airlines must have adequate plans in place to deal with these situations as they arise.  Clearly, stranding hundreds of passengers aboard aircraft sitting on tarmacs for as many as nine hours is not acceptable, and incidents like these raise serious concerns about planning for such events.  Passenger carriers should do everything possible to ensure that situations like these do not occur again.

The Department strongly prefers that the airlines address customer service issues rather than the federal government, but sometimes outside action may be necessary.  That is why Secretary Peters formally asked the Department’s Inspector General (IG) to conduct an investigation into these incidents and further requested that the IG examine how all the major airlines are doing on the commitment they made nearly eight years ago to ensure that the basic needs of passengers are met during long ground delays.  After the IG’s review, we will consider what, if any, further action is appropriate.  This review will also look at whether any “best practices” exist that can afford an opportunity for all carriers to learn from these experiences and ensure they are not repeated.

It is important to keep the issue of tarmac delays in context.  Our Aviation Consumer Protection Division records complaints concerning the number of unreasonable tarmac delays, which have ranged from 753 during the year 2000 to just over 100 last year.  Tarmac delay complaints have not only generally decreased in absolute numbers over the years, but importantly, the number of such complaints as a percentage of total complaints has decreased from 3.2 percent in the year 2000 to only 1.3 percent last year.

Separately, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics collects data regarding taxi-out times for the 20 largest airlines.  With regard to recent tarmac delays, our statistics show that in 2006, out of a total of more than 7.14 million flights, just under 1,300 (1,295) were delayed more than three hours in taking off after leaving the gate.  Excluding flights that were diverted or ultimately canceled (our reporting requirements do not capture data on delays associated with such flights), this means that less than two hundredths of one percent (0.018 percent) of all these flights experienced tarmac delays in excess of three hours after leaving the gate.  Last year, your chances of being on the tarmac for more than five hours after leaving the gate were about 1 in 200,000.  

Of course, we recognize that statistics mean nothing to the passengers who are themselves the victims of unreasonable tarmac delays and therefore statistics cannot be the sole factor to consider in determining what, if anything, we should do to address tarmac delays.  Indeed, the Department is of the firm belief that each carrier should, at a minimum, make clear what passengers can expect with regard to extended ground delays and, in particular, should have in place comprehensive plans to ensure that efforts will be made to get passengers off an aircraft when ground delays, involving either departing or arriving flights, are expected to extend beyond a reasonable period of time.

What the Secretary has asked the Inspector General to do is a challenging task.  I assure the Committee that the Department will review the report carefully and, if necessary, take appropriate actions to ensure that airlines are adequately protecting consumers in relation to the possibility of extended on-ground delays.

As policymakers consider these incidents, it is important to understand that airline networks in the 21st century are extremely complex operations involving myriad operational, mechanical, safety, regulatory, and other constraints.  Unlike many other service industries and despite technological advances, air transportation is still a complicated process that requires close coordination among many different organizations, including various divisions of an airline, an airport, the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Air Traffic Organization, and many ground service and maintenance providers.  As we have seen, when complex airline operating systems are interrupted by weather or other irregularities, a breakdown in the business or operational practices anywhere in the system can have significant ripple effects from which it becomes increasingly difficult to recover. 

Given this complexity, we believe the facts must be better understood before determining what, if any, action by the government is warranted.  We empathize with passengers delayed on airplanes for long periods of time.  We also empathize with passengers who want to get to their destinations and -- despite weather-induced delays -- would like airlines to make every effort to get them there as quickly as possible.  We first need to understand better the root causes of extended tarmac delays and determine whether the causes are specific to an individual airline’s business and operational procedures or more systemic in scope.  That is why we asked the IG to investigate with a view toward not only understanding the issues, but also exploring industry best practices that may address them. 

A discussion of what today’s aviation passenger faces in our current system would not be complete without a discussion of our plans for transforming the system to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).  I know this Committee has scheduled a hearing for next week on the work of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), but it is worth a brief mention here because unless we lay the foundation today for NextGen, airline passengers will encounter untold delays and service disruptions in the future.  If an overloaded system begins to grind to a halt, it will matter little how well airlines handle customer service.

We already see the impact of the effects of increased demand for service on the air transportation system.  Last year stands as one of the worst on record for delays, with about one in four flights of the 20 largest carriers arriving late.  This year is looking no better.  In February, only 67.3 percent of the domestic flights by those carriers arrived on time, making it the 5th worst month for on-time performance since 1995.  Looking well down the road, we predict delays will increase 62 percent by 2014 without NextGen.  There is simply no way we can overcome congestion of this magnitude without transforming the air traffic management system.  Other issues, ranging from environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security, are placing additional stress on the system.  It’s a sobering picture.  Without NextGen, some parts of the system will “freeze” first.  Then other areas will follow.  The system will reach its absolute breaking point, and our customers, especially the passengers, will be the ones who suffer. 

The people whom we serve—our customers—don’t deserve to be mired in congestion.  Investing now in NextGen systems will avoid that outcome.  We must replace our outdated air traffic control architecture with a 21st Century automated satellite-based air transportation system.  Such a system will safely handle dramatic increases in the number and type of aircraft using our skies, without being overwhelmed by congestion.  The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of Operations for public comment on February 28th.  It is now available on the JPDO website for review and comment by aviation stakeholders.  The NextGen Enterprise Architecture and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few months.  These documents provide us with that picture of where we want to go and the plans for how to achieve it. 

As you know, the Administration believes that the current funding system is out of step with critical future needs.  Without a rational funding mechanism that is tied to costs and future infrastructure development needs, the best laid plans for the NextGen system could be wasted, and long delays, on the ground and in the air, will only get worse.  In other words, passenger well-being in the future depends on what the federal government does now as much as what the airlines do.  I know you have already held hearings on the specifics of our funding proposal, so I won’t repeat them here.  I would, however, like to emphasize the urgent need for a more equitable system of fees that more accurately reflects the true cost of services that various types of users actually consume.

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.  I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

The State of the U.S. Airline Industry

Statement of

Andrew B. Steinberg
Assistant Secretary for Aviation & International Affairs
U.S. Department of Transportation

before the

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

January 24, 2007

Mr. Chairman, Co-Chairman Stevens, and Members of the Committee:

Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the state of the U.S. airline industry, the role of the federal government in the industry’s ongoing restructuring, and the prospect of consolidation.    This is an important and timely hearing.   Although I cannot discuss the specifics of any potential merger transaction, I can shed some light on our outlook for the industry, the role of consolidation in the context of a deregulated business, and the process the Department of Transportation will use in reviewing an airline merger should a transaction be presented to us.  

State of the U.S. Airline Industry: Short-term recovery, long-term challenges

Let me begin with the state of the airline industry.  The U.S. airline industry remains in the midst of an historic restructuring.  Over the last five years, U.S. network airlines have reduced their annualized mainline costs excluding fuel by more than 25%, or nearly $20 billion. While some of the cost savings were the product of identifying greater operational efficiencies, most of the savings were generated by renegotiation of existing contractual arrangements with creditors, aircraft lessors, suppliers and airline employees and achieved either through the bankruptcy process itself or under threat of bankruptcy.  22 percent of industry capacity is still operated in bankruptcy – down from a high of 46 percent in 2005 but still substantial by any measure.  The result is that several carriers that were on the precipice of liquidation just five years ago now have much lower cost structures that should allow them to return to profitability over the short term.    

The financial crisis that necessitated this massive restructuring and the sacrifices of our largest airlines and their employees was produced by the confluence of intense competition, structural conditions in the industry, and a series of exogenous events that temporarily depressed air travel demand or increased costs (e.g., the September 11th terrorist attacks, the war on terror, greater security burdens, SARS, and much higher fuel prices).  During this difficult period certain sectors of the industry fared relatively better than the network airlines, including low cost and regional carriers and cargo/express operators.  

In addition to geopolitical challenges, the industry has also found pricing to be increasingly competitive.  Low cost carriers (LCC’s) increased their share of the market from 23 percent to 30 percent during this time period, bringing prices down on many origin-destination routes (“city-pairs”) to the benefit of air travel consumers.  At the same time, the percentage of business travelers willing to pay substantially higher “walk up” or unrestricted fares has steadily fallen.  These trends have been enhanced by the growth of the Internet as a mainstream marketing and distribution channel, creating an environment of nearly perfect price information for both leisure and business travelers, further curtailing the ability of network carriers to charge significantly higher prices to the most time-sensitive passengers.   As a result, average yields fell from 14.2 cents per revenue passenger mile (RPM) in 2000 to 11.1 cents in 2005, before bouncing back to 12.4 cents in 2006.  To put that in more understandable terms, the decline means that the price of a ticket for an industry-average, 882-mile trip has declined from $125 to $109.

This decline in average fares came despite the dramatic increase in the price of jet fuel over the past 18 months.   Prior to their recent moderation, fuel prices more than doubled from approximately $1.03/gal jet kerosene in mid-2004 to over $2.23/gal in mid-2005 and remained near $1.91/gal throughout much of 2006.  Jet kerosene is now $1.62/gal in the spot market, brought down by the very recent declines in the price of crude oil from which jet kerosene is derived.  Fuel is now either the first or second largest expense category depending on the airline, representing on average about 26 percent of cost.   Each one-cent increase in the price of a gallon of fuel translates into an additional $193 million annual expense for the industry.  U.S. airlines have responded to the challenge of high and increasing fuel prices with operational and technological changes that have cut fuel consumption during the past 5 years, resulting in cost savings for the airlines, and cuts in emissions that benefit the environment.  Nevertheless, fuel prices present a major challenge to the health of the industry in an environment in which airlines are obviously not able to pass on the full brunt of these higher costs to their customers.  In effect, the growth in the fuel expense burden has masked the tremendous progress made by network carriers in cutting their costs to levels that are much more competitive with low-cost/low-fare carriers.   Thus, on the positive side, if the very recent moderation in fuel prices continues, the industry is poised to reap material financial benefit in the short term, although again it is unlikely they would realize the full benefit of such savings.   Overall, fuel price uncertainty will continue to motivate industry-wide cost discipline. 

Airlines have focused on six areas of cost reductions:

  • Labor – Taking a clear view of the necessity of cost reductions, labor and management have negotiated contracts that have generated major savings.  In some cases, those reductions have been imposed through the bankruptcy process.  U.S. network carriers have reduced their annualized labor costs by over $11 billion over the last five years.   
  • Fuel – Fuel saving initiatives such as single-engine taxiing, more efficient fuel-reserve practices, and installation of winglets have resulted in significant cost savings.
  •  IT/Reservations/Customer Service – Technology-driven enhancements to airline websites and self-service kiosks have not only reduced the cost of bookings and passenger handling, but have also improved the ability of carriers to generate additional revenue at the airport from passengers willing to trade-up to premium services such as service class upgrades, one-day admission to airport lounges, or even exit-row seating. 
  • External Distribution/Commissions – The airlines renegotiated contracts with global distributions systems (GDS), further reduced travel agent commissions, and successfully induced travelers to book directly with carrier websites, which have resulted in substantial annualized air carrier savings.  GDS booking fees have declined approximately 15 percent since mid-2003. 
  • Fleet/Maintenance – Fleet rationalization continues at a number of airlines both inside and outside of bankruptcy.  Carriers are retiring older, maintenance-intensive, fuel-guzzling fleets with new aircraft that in many cases allow for common type-ratings, thus reducing training, spares, and maintenance expense.  
  • Pension – Bankruptcy has allowed several carriers to significantly reduce pension expenses.  Furthermore, recent pension legislation will lessen funding requirements, thereby improving cash flow.   The result has been to shift to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) an increasingly large burden of funding the pensions of airline workers.  According to the PBGC, airline pensions today represent at least 38 percent of PBGC claims -- but airlines paid just 2.6  percent of premiums.

For 2006, according to Wall Street analysts, the industry will record its first annual profit since 2000, estimated to be $2 billion on revenues of nearly $123 billion, for an approximate return on sales of 2%.  The industry is also forecast to post profits this year, estimated to be approximately $6 billion on revenues of approximately $128 billion, or a 5 percent return.    Over the short-term, network airlines are expected to maintain capacity and cost control.  If the recent moderation in fuel prices continues, airlines will reap even more financial benefits from the structural changes made in their business models.

It is also important to note that over the last several years the significant and ongoing expansion in the scope of low cost carrier operations within the domestic market has not only resulted in lower fares, but has substantially expanded the availability of those low fare offerings much more broadly than ever before.  Consumers in many markets where deeply discounted fares were either unavailable or offered with very limited capacity now have a low cost carrier option---and, of course, this service has had the effect of reducing the fares that network carriers offer in these markets as well.   The price discipline created by a plethora of LCC offerings is pervasive.

Short-term prospects for the industry this year appear quite favorable based on the following factors:

  • Positive revenue trends due to slower domestic capacity growth and very strong demand.
  • Higher average yields in part due to less capacity pressure from low-cost carriers.
  • Strong economic growth in the United States.
  • Continued cost discipline.
  • Improved balance sheets with encouraging levels of current free cash flow.
  • Recent decline in fuel prices.

With a favorable supply-demand dynamic in place for the domestic airline industry, we expect the positive revenue trend to continue in the near-term.  On the supply side of the equation, network carrier available seat miles (ASMs) are expected to increase no more than 3 percent, with the bulk of the growth in international markets.  In fact, network domestic capacity is expected to decline.  Most capacity increases will come from greater aircraft utilization, another sign of improved productivity.  Conversely, according to analysts, domestic ASM growth for the low-cost carriers will continue growing over 10 percent, resulting in continuing share gains for LCCs in the domestic market.  Overall, industry-wide domestic capacity is projected to increase 2.6 percent.  On the demand side of the equation, load factors have reached record levels, enhancing the effectiveness of airline revenue management systems, which should enable the network carriers in particular to improve the fare mix and thus overall revenues.

Over the long term, however, the outlook for the U.S. airline industry is more uncertain.   The  industry faces persistent structural problems that must be addressed if we are to avoid facing another wave of bankruptcies in the next economic downtown, and if the industry is to take full advantage of the very substantial progress made in lowering unit costs.  These problems are discussed below:     

First, many network carriers remain highly leveraged despite shedding significant debt while in or under the threat of bankruptcy.  

Second, the two biggest inputs into the industry’s cost structure – fuel and labor – are by no means fixed and thus the lower-cost foundation supporting breakeven results in 2006 and modest profitability in 2007 is impermanent.  With respect to labor costs, history suggests that organized groups will gradually seek to recoup the wage rate reductions acceded to in economic downturns and will do so at the earliest stages of industry recovery, which we are now seeing.  With respect to fuel, given the airlines’ inability to pass on the full impact of higher fuel prices to their customers, their bottom line remains quite sensitive to fluctuations.

Third, several of the biggest and most important international markets still have unnecessary constraints on competition – including the United Kingdom, China, Japan, and several countries in Latin America – that effectively protect foreign airlines and raise costs for U.S. carriers and consumers.

Fourth, cross-border investment restrictions artificially raise the cost of capital to U.S. carriers.  Those restrictions also prevent U.S. carriers from optimizing their business models and taking advantage in international flying of their inherent network strength (a result of operating out of the world’s single largest aviation market) and their newly minted, lower cost structures. 

Fifth, the continuous cycle of domestic bankruptcies has required U.S. carriers to reduce capital expenditures substantially in order to bolster beleaguered balance sheets.   This has meant delaying much needed investments in fleet renewal, new technologies, and product enhancements to remain competitive.  This deficiency is becoming increasingly serious, especially as our carriers must vie with foreign rivals that have surged ahead in making such investments.

Finally, any discussion of the structural challenges facing the U.S. airline industry must also include mention of the apparent effects of the bankruptcy process not only on those firms that are forced to seek protection under the bankruptcy code, but also on the rest of the industry that attempts to operate without those protections.  Respected airline industry analysts have frequently observed that the airline industry is, paradoxically, relatively easy to enter and hard to leave – sometimes characterizing this phenomenon as an “exit barrier” for failed firms that is the inadvertent consequence of the Chapter 11 reorganization process.   They point out that airline stakeholders (lenders, suppliers and employees) – any one of whom could singly cause an air carrier’s demise – rarely force such an outcome and instead trade in old contractual arrangements and debt for new ones.  And the net result of those decisions is, perversely enough, that those carriers who manage to avoid bankruptcy eventually find themselves at a serious competitive disadvantage. 

The airline industry is particularly susceptible to this phenomenon because the business is highly responsive to economic cycles.  Just as most network airlines are now expected to turn an operating profit, most lost substantial sums in the last several years; when one carrier finds itself in trouble, typically most others do.   Consequently, when one firm falls behind on its aircraft lease payments, its lessors may lack the economic leverage to reclaim assets (because they cannot redeploy them profitably elsewhere) – and thus don’t.   This is compounded by the ability of airlines operating in Chapter 11 to win significant savings on their leases and postpone reconfirmation of leases, allowing bankrupt airline managers to ‘time’ the bottom of the market and gain a capital cost advantage over their competitors.  Airports that are reliant on large airline tenants face a similar bargaining dynamic in difficult financial times for the industry and must also make concessions that keep failing companies afloat.    Organized labor usually makes the same decision; that it is better to keep their employer alive even at much lower wage rates than suffer the job and retirement benefit losses of failure. Similarly, the liquidation of an airline will ordinarily leave a debtor far worse off than a restructuring in bankruptcy – even one in which creditors get relatively little on the dollar -- because even the prospect of a major airline shutting down will practically halt ticket sales, forcing assets to be sold at “fire sale” prices.  Yet precisely because of the underlying volatility of the industry, the airlines in effect offer a huge “option value” to their stakeholders; that is, the risk of continuing to invest in or extend credit to a bankrupt or near-bankrupt airline is outweighed by the potential reward if the company should survive.  All of this ensures that even failing airlines will almost always have access to capital, thus perpetuating the cycle of failure.  

While these structural conditions cloud the long-term outlook for airlines, once they are addressed, the industry can more easily meet the public’s expectation of low fares, reliable service for smaller communities, and innovative product offerings that are competitive in a global marketplace.  Indeed, the role of international markets and the growth opportunities they now present for U.S. network airlines should not be underestimated.  I am confident that if we can avoid another cycle of bankruptcies, there is every reason to expect U.S. airlines to succeed in exploiting their advantages to profit from the tremendous growth opportunities offered by the liberalization of international aviation markets through “open skies” agreements.  And ultimately, this will redound to the benefit of U.S. consumers in the form of more service to more destinations at lower fares. 

Role of Government:   Consolidation in the context of complete deregulation

These observations about the short- and long-term state of the airline industry necessarily implicate the question of the appropriate role of government in the industry’s ongoing restructuring.  By deregulating the airline industry in 1978, Congress set the U.S. Government permanently on the path away from intervention in the marketplace.   This was a wise choice.  The Department of Transportation has long believed that deregulation has been a success in producing widespread service with low fares, while achieving a spectacular safety record.  The American people continue to enjoy the most abundant, most reliable, safest, and most affordable air transportation in our Nation's history.  Noting the success of airline deregulation, Congress went on to deregulate motor carriers, railroads, electricity, energy, telecommunications, and financial services.   As governments around the world have increasingly opted for market-based approaches, deregulation has become the default policy of the global economy.

As we examine developments in the airline industry and consider the appropriate policy response toward them, the Department of Transportation strives to apply a “value-added” test for regulatory burdens.  Simply put, at a time when the industry is buffeted by so many forces – some attributable to the marketplace, some to geopolitical challenges – government needs to ensure that each of its regulatory requirements continues to serve a valid public purpose, and the interests of the American people and the U.S. economy.   

The Bush Administration has been applying that test rigorously, and finding ways to reduce further the regulatory burden while protecting the traveling public.  For example, we eased the requirements on airports relating to the filing of competition plans.  We repealed in their entirety DOT’s 20-year-old regulations governing the use of computer reservation systems.  We created an expedited, simplified procedure to award “route integration authority” for five years to all U.S. carriers who apply for it.  We have eased tariff filing requirements for the airlines of countries with which the U.S. enjoys a liberal aviation relationship. And we simplified the requirement for disclosure of code-share and long-term wet lease arrangements in print advertising.

Our efforts to get unnecessary government constraints out of the way of innovation are further evidenced by our persistent pursuit of liberalized bilateral air services agreements, adhering to the open skies model wherever possible.  Working with the Department of State, and with the support of other agencies, we now have over 70 open skies partners.  The U.S. government has thereby created new commercial opportunities for U.S. carriers while bringing the benefits of affordable air travel across the world to American consumers and to foreign citizens desirous of spending money here. 

We need to fully understand the problems affecting airlines and should take advantage of the current environment – in which the domestic airline industry appears to be in the midst of a robust cyclical recovery – by completing the work of deregulation.  If we want a sustained recovery and the benefits that will bring to consumers we need to ensure that government does not purposefully or inadvertently prevent the industry from undertaking the restructuring demanded by market forces.   This may necessitate a reexamination of regulatory and policy assumptions in key areas like bankruptcy, pension funding, labor relations, and aviation infrastructure financing and development.  Our policies in each of these areas undoubtedly come with burdens and benefits not only for the flying public, but also for taxpayers, investors, and employees.  We need to better understand the aggregate impact of these policies and ensure that they do not inadvertently create obstacles to an efficient and competitive industry in the long run. 

This same philosophy will inform the Department’s approach to larger policy questions involving the issue of “consolidation.”  The history of deregulation has shown quite clearly that American travelers and shippers can support a mix of carrier types with different business models.  The challenge we face is to ensure that our regulatory regime does not stand in the way of marketplace forces that would otherwise result in new entry, business combinations, asset sales or even exit.  In a dynamic market, new entry acts as a force that disciplines incumbents and thus ideally fosters innovation and efficiency.  Just as new entrant firms must be afforded competitive access to satisfy marketplace demands, we must allow failing firms to exit the business if market forces decide that assets should be reallocated to more efficient firms.  This is a natural consequence of a deregulated industry and the mechanism by which market forces ensure that the needs of American travelers and shippers are met in the most efficient way possible.

Industry consolidation – regardless of the sector – fundamentally occurs in three different ways – through the combination of firms, through asset sales or through the exit of failed companies.  Business combinations are not necessarily an elixir for any industry, much less the domestic airline business.  Merging two air carriers is a demanding and extremely complex endeavor that requires effectively combining route networks, information technology systems, aircraft fleets, and perhaps most daunting, two different work forces.  As a result of these many complexities, mergers usually fail in the airline industry, but some don’t, and we should be open to both possibilities.

Completing the work of deregulation – the centerpiece of our policy – means better understanding the role that applying our competition laws has played, if any, in impeding market forces that may benefit the public interest.   In this context, it is important to emphasize that the Department of Transportation must fulfill a broader set of statutory policy objectives than does competition law.   While protecting the interest of U.S. consumers in having access to low airfares remains paramount, Congress has also instructed the Secretary of Transportation, in carrying out the Department’s responsibilities to consider other important goals:  including the use of marketplace forces to encourage efficient and well-managed air carriers to earn adequate profits and attract capital, to ensure that consumers in all regions of the United States have access to affordable, regularly scheduled air service, to promote a viable, privately-owned United States air transport industry, and to strengthen the competitive position of air carriers to at least ensure equality with foreign air carriers.    Our analysis of a proposed merger will necessarily be informed by all these considerations.

However, before I leave this discussion on the role of government, I want to note that there is an important area where government can, and must, play a major role in driving change and innovation.  Infrastructure constraints, and the resulting congestion problems are a significant long-term difficultly facing the airline industry.  Congestion problems are widespread: travelers are delayed, airlines incur additional costs, and economic activity reliant on air service is slowed.  Air traffic is expected to approximately triple by 2025 and, without action, congestion will become crippling. 

In order to address this problem, the Department of Transportation is working along side several other federal agencies including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, NASA, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop the Next Generational Air Transportation System, what is known as “NextGen”.  These efforts, spearheaded by the Federal Aviation Administration, are being coordinated through the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), which is staffed by officials from all of these agencies. 

NextGen promises to revolutionize the way in which air traffic moves by using networked information, satellite-based navigation, enhanced aircraft capabilities, new flight procedures, and automation among other things.   These technologies will allow more efficient use of physical aviation infrastructure, thus boosting the capacity our system and facilitating greater economic growth.  We believe that, in creating NextGen, the federal government is contributing an essential element to the long-term success of the U.S. airline industry.

DOT’s Role in the Review of Merger Transactions

Now that I’ve provided some insight into our perspective, let me explain how the review process within the Department might transpire should any proposed transaction move forward.  

In addition to requiring bankruptcy court approval, the proposed merger would be reviewed by both the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation.  The Antitrust Division is responsible for determining whether the transaction will be challenged under the antitrust laws.  The Department of Transportation would conduct its own competitive analysis of the proposed merger and by practice will submit its views and findings to the Antitrust Division privately. 

DOT would also consider a wide range of public interest issues involving, among other things, route transfers, economic fitness, code-sharing, and possible unfair or deceptive practices.  In practice, we would not formally consider such issues until the Antitrust Division advised us that it did not intend to challenge the transaction.  

If a proposed transaction involved the acquisition of international routes, consummating the merger might entail the transfer of certificate authority to a new entity.  By statute, 49 U.S.C. 41105, we may approve a transfer only if we find that it is consistent with the public interest.  We must analyze the transfer's impact on the viability of each airline party to the transaction, competition in the domestic airline industry, and the trade position of the United States in the international air transportation market.  As a practical matter, transfers are important only when the acquired airline holds route authority in limited-entry markets.   We would only decide whether to approve the transfer after we had established a formal record and given all interested persons the opportunity to comment.  Our discussions with the Antitrust Division on a proposed merger would likely include a discussion of the competitive effects of the transfer of any international routes.  If the Department determines that the transfer would be contrary to the public interest on competitive grounds or for another reason, the Department could disapprove the transfer in whole or part. Alternatively, the Department may condition its approval on requirements that would protect the public interest.    

Usually, a proposed merger will result in a new corporate entity under new ownership, and when that is the case, the Department would conduct a fitness review, including a review of airline management, financials and compliance disposition. The Department would also review any code-share arrangements concluded between the merging carriers under 49 U.S.C. 41720.  In the Department’s experience, code-share arrangements would likely be necessary during the early phases of integration post-merger.   Meanwhile, the Department would also have to evaluate the impact of a merger on any domestic marketing agreements or international alliances.   As U.S. airlines participate in all three worldwide alliances, some of which enjoy antitrust immunity from the Department and some of which don’t, we would need to review how the changes in alliance memberships affect airline competition.

The Department has the obligation under 49 U.S.C. 41712 to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices by airlines.  In carrying out that responsibility, we could, if appropriate, review the proposed merger's arrangements to protect the rights of consumers.  For example, it could be necessary to assess whether the merging airlines plan to give consumers reasonable notice and an opportunity to adjust to any changes in the frequent flyer programs.

Conclusion

The issue of “consolidation” should thus be understood in the broader context of allowing deregulation to address the airline industry’s problems.  An industry that is truly subject to marketplace forces will often go through phases of restructuring or consolidation.  This can occur in a variety of forms – not necessarily just mergers and acquisitions.  The airline industry is very dynamic.  Thus government policy should evolve in parallel constantly taking into account in rapidly changing economic conditions, competitive environment, and industry innovation.  The government, absent a clear and convincing need to protect the traveling public, should not stand in the way of market forces acting to address structural problems within the industry.

To be sure, mergers are not a panacea for the industry’s long-term problems.   Because of the complexity of integrating different labor forces and fleets, many mergers in the airline industry have failed to fully achieve their creators’ objectives.    But we should not assume that having fewer network carriers necessarily translates into detriment to consumers.   To the contrary, an industry populated by several successful firms could contain intense and diverse forms of competition as we can see in other industries, such as the cargo/express delivery business in which a few large firms compete vigorously not only on price but also on product innovation.

Let me be clear, however.  My remarks today should not be interpreted as an endorsement or rejection of any particular transaction or combination of transactions, or of mergers as the optimal way to address the structural conditions that have impeded innovation.  Each proposed transaction must and will be considered on a case-by-base basis.  The airline industry should be held to the same antitrust standards as every other industry and certainly there will be transactions that fail to satisfy a rigorous antitrust test.  But as the Department of Transportation examines such transactions, it will do so with a variety of statutory policy objectives in mind, not the least of which is our obligation to ensure a viable airline industry that can meet the transportation needs of the American people.

Thank you, and I would be pleased to take any questions.