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Testimony

In This Section

The Potential Impacts on Commercial Transportation of Recent State and Local Legislation that Allow Recreational and Medical Marijuana Use

STATEMENT OF

PATRICE M. KELLY
ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL POLICY AND COMPLIANCE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

before the

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 31, 2014

 

Chairman Mica, Ranking Member Connolly, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the potential impacts on commercial transportation of recent state and local legislation that allow recreational and medical marijuana use. The transportation industry drug and alcohol testing program for commercial operations is a critical element of the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) safety mission.  Pilots, truck drivers, subway operators, mariners, pipeline controllers, airline mechanics, locomotive engineers, motor coach drivers and school bus drivers – among others – have a tremendous responsibility to the public, and we cannot let their performance be compromised by drugs or alcohol.  Today, I will provide you with a brief history of our program, the scope of its application, and finally, an explanation of our policy regarding the use of marijuana for medical or recreational purposes by individuals who work in federally-regulated transportation industries.

The DOT drug and alcohol testing program was first established in 1988 following the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) development and implementation of drug and alcohol testing for federal employees.  The DOT program was initiated in response to transportation industry fatal accidents that occurred due to illegal drug use.  In 1991, Congress enacted the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 (OTETA), which required the DOT to expand the application of its program to include mass transit, and modify its regulations to address the statutory requirements.

The DOT program always has required transportation industry employers to have drug and alcohol testing programs that require their employees to be removed from performing safety-sensitive duties immediately if they have violated drug and alcohol testing rules.  Throughout the history of our program, and consistent with Congress’ direction in OTETA, we have relied on HHS for its technical and scientific expertise for determining the types of drugs for which we may test, the testing methodology we must use in our program, and the integrity of the HHS’ certified laboratories in testing the specimens and reporting results.  As a result of OTETA, we are limited to testing for the controlled substances included in HHS’ Mandatory Guidelines. Currently, those substances include Schedule I, illegal drugs, and Schedule II, legally prescribed drugs, as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act. The drugs and classes of drugs for which we test are:  cocaine, opiates, amphetamines, phencyclidine, and marijuana. The mere presence of these drugs in an employee’s system at or above the threshold levels set by HHS for the Federal Drug-Free Workplace Program, if reported as positive by a Medical Review Officer, is a violation of our drug testing program and requires employers to take immediate action to remove the employee from performing safety sensitive duties until that employee successfully completes treatment and additional testing.

Specifically, an employee who tests positive or refuses to submit to testing cannot return to the performance of safety-sensitive functions for any DOT-regulated employer until that employee successfully completes the return-to-duty process.  This includes an evaluation by a Substance Abuse Professional, successful completion of any recommended education and/or treatment, and a negative result on a return-to-duty test.  To ensure the employee remains in compliance once he or she returns to work, the DOT requires that the employer continues to monitor the employee through unannounced drug testing conducted under direct observation. The rate and length of time at which the employee is subject to this testing is determined by a Substance Abuse Professional and may range from a minimum of 6 tests in 12 months, to any number of tests over a 5-year period.

Currently, there are approximately 5 million DOT-regulated safety-sensitive employees that are subject to our drug and alcohol testing program. These include approximately 3.9 million employees regulated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; 450,000 employees regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration; 111,300 employees regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration; 290,000 employees regulated by the Federal Transit Administration; 190,000 employees regulated by the Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration; and 150,000 employees regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard.  Although the U.S. Coast Guard is no longer a part of the DOT, it continues to follow the Department’s drug and alcohol testing program requirements through a Memorandum of Understanding.

The Department’s policy on the use of Schedule I controlled substances has remained unchanged since our program began in 1988:  there is no legitimate explanation, medical or otherwise, for the presence of a Schedule I controlled substance (such as marijuana) in an employee’s system.  With respect to marijuana use specifically, we have repeatedly cautioned Medical Review Officers against considering “innocent” ingestion and exposure defenses by individuals.  In 2000, the DOT amended its regulations to specifically prohibit Medical Review Officers from considering “innocent,” or unknowing, ingestion and exposure defenses as legitimate medical explanations from individuals who test positive for Schedule I controlled substances.  In December 2009, following the Department of Justice’s issuance of  guidance for Federal prosecutors in states that enacted laws authorizing the use of “medical marijuana,” we issued a reminder to our regulated entities that under the DOT drug testing program, medical marijuana use authorized under state or local law is not a valid medical explanation for a transportation employee’s positive drug test result.

Although there has been recent movement by some states to allow recreational use of marijuana by their citizens, the DOT program does not, and will not, authorize the use of Schedule I controlled substances, including marijuana, for any reason by any individual conducting safety-sensitive duties in the transportation industry.  In December 2012, we issued a notice explaining that state and local government initiatives allowing the use of recreational marijuana will have no bearing on the Department of Transportation’s drug testing program, nor any individual subject to such testing. It remains unacceptable for any safety‐sensitive employee subject to drug testing under the Department of Transportation’s drug testing regulations to use marijuana and continue to perform safety-sensitive duties in the federally regulated transportation industries.

Chairman Mica, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you or your colleagues may have.

 

Federal, State and Local Partnerships to Accelerate Transportation Benefits

STATEMENT OF

ROY KIENITZ
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING ON

“Federal, State and Local Partnerships to Accelerate Transportation Benefits”

MARCH 11, 2010

 

Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to appear before the Committee today to discuss activities of the U.S. Department of Transportation that facilitate Federal, State and local partnerships to accelerate major transportation projects around the country.

My testimony will focus primarily on three innovative approaches to transportation investment that either currently support this objective or could support it. However, before discussing these approaches, I would like to discuss some of the challenges that we face in responding to the tremendous demand for transportation investment that we encounter around the country, even with the innovative tools that are currently available.

On Friday, February 19, I traveled with Secretary LaHood to Los Angeles. While there, Secretary LaHood and I had the opportunity to meet with Chairman Boxer, Mayor Villaraigosa and other State and local leaders to learn about the Los Angeles “30/10” program, an ambitious multi-billion dollar initiative to accelerate 12 major transit projects so they can be built in 10 years instead of 30.

The 30/10 program includes the Westside subway extension, the Regional Connector light rail in downtown, the Green Line connection to LAX and extension to the South Bay, the Foothill Extension of the Metro Gold Line, the Crenshaw corridor transit project, the Expo light rail line on the Westside Phase 2, the San Fernando Valley 405 Corridor Connection, the Orange Line Canoga Extension, the West Santa Ana Branch Corridor, the San Fernando Valley North-South Rapidways and the Eastside Extension to El Monte or Whittier. A total of $5.2 billion is available for the program from the locally approved Measure R and other sources, but additional funds will be required from the private sector, the Federal Government and other partners.

The 30/10 program may well be at the vanguard of transit planning and system development; similar programmatic approaches to solving regional transportation challenges are likely coming. In this model, plans are assembled for many projects and all of the projects are accelerated. Denver, Colorado, is another good example of a major city that has developed a full transit capital program comprised of multiple major projects and is approaching project development and delivery in an accelerated fashion, rather than project-by-project.

The Department’s most significant discretionary transit capital program, the New Starts program, typically evaluates and funds projects on a project-by-project basis, but could be adapted to evaluate and fund a system of projects in an integrated way. The Department is ready to support ambitious local initiatives like the 30/10 program, which would compete on their merits with other projects in the funding queue based on project justification, local financial commitment and the readiness of the sponsors to initiate the project.

The Department has additional resources to help deliver some of the individual projects that make up integrated system projects. We are working on solutions in Denver and look forward to working with Los Angeles, too. My testimony is going to focus on three of the Department’s most innovative programs, or proposals, that are available to help deliver the projects in Los Angeles, as well as other major transportation projects.

First, one of the Department’s most successful programs over the last decade has been the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 (TIFIA) program, which provides credit assistance for major transportation projects around the country. The program offers direct loans, loan guarantees or lines of credit for up to a third of a project’s eligible costs, with favorable repayment terms that make financing cheaper and encourage co-investment.

Second, the Department’s Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) Discretionary Grant program, authorized under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided a unique and unprecedented opportunity for the Department to encourage multi-jurisdictional and/or multi-stakeholder planning, and leverage substantial co-investment from public and private sector partners. The vast majority of the TIGER projects involved multiple levels of planning and/or multiple layers of funding.

Lastly, President Obama’s budget for Fiscal Year 2011 provides $4 billion for a new National Infrastructure Innovation and Finance Fund (the I-Fund), which will invest in high-value projects of regional or national significance. The I-Fund would have flexibility to choose projects with demonstrable merit from around the country and provide a variety of financial products – grants, loans, or a combination – to best fit a project’s needs.

TIFIA, TIGER and the I-Fund respond to the difficulty States and local governments face in funding major projects of regional or national significance through traditional formula fund programs on a pay-as-you-go basis. By encouraging multi-jurisdictional and multi-stakeholder planning at the regional and national level, and by encouraging substantial levels of co-investment from a variety of public and private sector partners, these programs are reshaping the landscape for investment in major transportation projects.

Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA)

The TIFIA program provides credit assistance for up to one-third of the eligible costs of qualified surface transportation projects of regional and national significance. Eligibility is open to large-scale, surface transportation projects—highway, transit, railroad, intermodal freight, and port access—with eligible costs exceeding $50 million. TIFIA credit assistance is available for State and local governments, transit agencies, railroad companies, special authorities, special districts, and private entities.

The primary goal of the TIFIA program is to use Federal funds in a way that promotes new and innovative models for more efficiently financing and managing large transportation projects (e.g. Public-Private Partnership agreements), catalyzes regional or national planning efforts, and attracts substantial private and other non-Federal co-investment for critical improvements to the Nation's surface transportation system. The program achieves this goal by providing a number of flexible and favorable financing terms to help fill market gaps in financing plans. Because TIFIA is a Federal credit program and because it requires co-investors for at least two-thirds of project costs, TIFIA is also able to drive total investments that are a multiple of the actual Federal budget resources the program consumes.

While TIFIA has proven to be an extremely useful tool for financing toll roads and other user-backed transportation projects, it is also considering capital investment programs in other modes that are traditionally less reliant on user fees, such as transit. For transit projects, sales taxes and/or other revenue streams related to transit-oriented development can be leveraged to repay project financing sources.

For example, most recently, TIFIA provided a $171 million loan for the Transbay Transit Center, a major passenger transportation hub connecting San Francisco with other Bay Area communities and the rest of California. This is the first transit center of its kind, a “Grand Central” terminal connecting local, regional and national travel options, to be financed with a direct TIFIA loan, and represents a milestone in the program’s development. The TIFIA loan for the Transbay Terminal Center reflects the variety of ways the Department can use innovative programs to demonstrate efficient transportation infrastructure finance and execution around the country.

The TIFIA office is evaluating loans expected to close in the near term that may consume a large portion of its current resources. A full year appropriation for FY 2010 (based on FY 2009 funding levels) would make more funds available to fund additional projects.

Project sponsors submitted thirty-nine letters of interest for FY 2010 credit assistance in response to the March 1, 2010 deadline established in a Notice of Funding Availability.  The letters of interest represent a range of different project types, including six transit projects, thirty-one highway and bridge projects, and one freight intermodal project.   Project sponsors requested almost $13 billion in TIFIA credit assistance to support over $41 billion in total project costs, significantly more capacity than TIFIA’s budget resources can support.  

TIGER Discretionary Grant Program

The TIGER program represents one of the Department’s most ambitious efforts to date to leverage Federal investment. The program catalyzed local, regional and National planning and facilitated substantial co-investment by the public and private sectors to help deliver 51 major transportation projects across the country. Among the factors that make this program a success are its ability to fund the full host of surface transportation projects (not just particular modes) and its ability to provide this funding to any State or local project sponsor. The program’s flexibility allowed it to fund an unprecedented number of innovative and creative projects that the Federal Government would otherwise find difficult if not impossible to fund.

For example, the TIGER program allowed the Federal Government to invest in major freight rail and maritime port initiatives spanning multiple states and involving multiple stakeholders. This is unique, as the Federal Government does not have any other single program authorized to make similar investments.

One initiative will invest in freight rail capacity projects on a major corridor running across Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Maryland, providing substantial new capacity and enhanced efficiency for goods movement from the East Coast to the Midwest. Similarly, the TIGER program is investing in the CREATE program of freight rail projects in Chicago, and in intermodal freight rail facilities in Alabama and Tennessee. The CREATE program is an extremely well-coordinated effort among Federal, State, local and private stakeholders to streamline freight movement through Chicago, arguably the most significant freight bottleneck in the country. The investments in Tennessee and Alabama are the first pieces of a much broader initiative to improve freight capacity and efficiency from the Gulf Coast to the Mid-Atlantic, a major goods movement corridor currently underserved by freight rail.

The TIGER program provides funds for the public benefits of these projects – increased freight rail capacity and efficiency, reduced emissions and fuel consumption, and the potential to reduce highway maintenance costs and congestion. The TIGER funding also provides a powerful incentive for the relevant States and the private railroads to engage in comprehensive regional and National planning and invest their own resources to leverage the Federal investment. Each of these investments is matched with significant State, local or private funds, which will provide a substantial portion of the overall investment.

The competitive nature of the TIGER program also helps spur cooperation among a variety of project sponsors and encourages them to leverage as many sources of funding as they can muster to demonstrate that they can make Federal dollars go further. The TIGER program is also funding a number of intermodal passenger transit facilities, which require extensive planning among local and regional transportation providers and users, and may integrate funding from multiple sources.

The Department also used the TIGER program to provide four “TIFIA Challenge Grants.” For these four projects, major highway projects in Arkansas, Colorado, South Carolina and North Carolina, the Department offered the applicant a $10 million grant, or the opportunity to use the $10 million as budget authority to support a larger investment in the form of a TIFIA loan. For the project sponsors, a TIFIA loan may be a unique opportunity to catalyze an innovative financing strategy that had not previously been considered, or thought feasible.

For the Department, providing TIFIA Challenge Grants is a first step in a new direction. The Department aims to get the best possible return out of each Federal investment it makes, and is excited about the opportunity to proactively work with sponsors on major infrastructure projects that demonstrate significant transportation benefits. The Department has many resources available to support co-investment in these projects, including technical and professional staff with relevant experience in innovative financing, and can help develop creative solutions for getting projects done.

National Infrastructure Innovation and Finance Fund (I-Fund)

President Obama’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2011 provides $4 billion for the new I-Fund, which would give the Department additional flexibility to support high-value projects of regional or national significance. The I-Fund would allow the Department to select projects with demonstrable merit from around the country and provide a variety of financial products – grants, loans or a combination – to best fit a project’s needs.

The I-Fund signals a shift in the Federal Government’s model for transportation investment and would allow the Department to expand on current practices in the TIFIA and TIGER programs that encourage collaboration among, and co-investment by, non-Federal stakeholders, including States, municipalities, and private partners.

Conclusion

The Federal Government has many programs that facilitate and encourage State, local and private co-investment in transportation projects. Of particular note are the TIFIA program, the TIGER Discretionary Grant program and the proposed National Infrastructure Innovation and Finance Fund. These programs reflect an acknowledgement that the Federal Government needs to take a more active role in supporting major transportation projects with targeted grants and credit assistance.

The Department’s experience over the last year with TIGER and TIFIA is that competitive national programs facilitate creative and innovative approaches at the State and local level to leverage substantial revenue for major transportation investments.

Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these important matters. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Strengthening Intermodal Connections and Improving Freight Mobility

STATEMENT OF

ROY KIENITZ
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION, HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

STRENGTHENING INTERMODAL CONNECTIONS AND IMPROVING FREIGHT MOBILITY

MARCH 17, 2010

Chairman Olver, Ranking Member Latham, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss strengthening intermodal connections and improving freight mobility. I am joined here by my colleagues from four key modal administrations at DOT –Victor Mendez from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Anne Ferro from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), Joe Szabo from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and David Matsuda from the Maritime Administration (MARAD), which jointly play a key role in improving the infrastructure, operational efficiency, and safety of the freight transportation industry.

Secretary LaHood has decided to focus on five key strategic goals as priorities in our national transportation policy – economic competitiveness, safety, state of good repair, livability, and environmental sustainability. Our policy on freight transportation grows out of our focus on these five key strategic goals. We want a freight policy that will allow us to target our investments on projects that are most effective in allowing us to achieve these goals.

Unfortunately, our national transportation policy has often failed to target funding toward investments that will be most effective in achieving these goals.

Developing an effective freight transportation policy has been hampered in the past by the “stovepiped” approach to transportation funding that is written into our transportation authorizing statutes. Expenditures for each freight transportation mode are generally dependent upon the revenues produced by each mode’s separate trust fund. Some modes have no source of public funding at all, even when investments in those modes would produce substantial public benefits. The result is that a truly outcome-oriented transportation investment policy – where the outcomes include the strategic goals I mentioned earlier – has been impossible, because investments have been dictated by where the funding came from, rather than where the investments could have the greatest impact on the desired outcomes.

Some of our freight transportation modes operate on publicly-owned rights-of-way, while others operate on privately-owned rights-of-way. Some rely for their investment revenues entirely on payments by users, while others rely on a mix of user charges and general fund tax revenues. Private-sector modes like railroads that rely primarily on user charges inevitably must charge their users higher prices to produce the revenues needed to provide investment funds. This in turn generates pressures for more stringent rate regulation, which unfortunately would adversely affect needed infrastructure investments. Privately-owned carriers that are responsible for building and maintaining their own infrastructure inevitably take a more cautious approach to investing in infrastructure expansion, since those investments become a fixed charge on their balance sheet that must generate a sufficient flow of income to offset the expense. Underinvestment in privately-owned infrastructure compared with publicly-owned infrastructure can produce system performance deficiencies in the intermodal movement of freight.

Whether freight infrastructure is publicly-owned or privately-owned, it produces a mix of public and private benefits. Shippers and other customers of the freight transportation system derive private benefits from freight transportation, and the Nation as a whole derives public benefits from our freight transportation infrastructure, whether that infrastructure is publicly or privately owned. Freight that moves on more energy-efficient modes – whether the right-of-way is publicly or privately owned – enhances our energy independence and reduces adverse climate change effects. Freight that moves on a lower-cost right-of-way – whether publicly or privately owned – enhances our economic competitiveness by preserving capital for hiring and additional capital investments. The most sensible freight transportation policy will be one that directs transportation infrastructure investment to where it will have the greatest impact on our desired outcomes, regardless of whether those modes are publicly or privately owned, or whether they have their own source of trust fund revenues.

Moreover, even when funding is available for freight transportation projects, the project selection process may give less priority to some projects that would be appropriate in meeting the Nation’s strategic goals. For example, intermodal freight connectors can be a valuable part of our Nation’s transportation system, providing critical connections between our ports and rail systems and the highway network that is usually needed to deliver freight to its final destinations. Intermodal freight connectors are often short, averaging less than two miles in length, and constitute less than 1 percent of the total highway network. They are often local – county or city streets – that generally have lower design standards than mainline highway routes.

They get a lot of wear and require more frequent maintenance. They serve heavy truck volumes moving between intermodal freight terminals and the mainline highway network, primarily in major metropolitan areas. They typically provide this service in older, industrialized, and other mixed-land-use areas where there are often physical constraints or undesirable community impacts. But because intermodal connectors are often quite short, and because local planning agencies may not be aware of their role in the larger transportation network, they are often overlooked in the planning and funding process.

The Obama Administration, with the help of this Committee, has taken several steps to work toward a more effective freight policy. First, we articulated the transportation goals that we are trying to achieve – enhancing economic competitiveness, advancing safety, improving the state-of-good-repair of our infrastructure, fostering livable communities, and achieving environmental sustainability. Second, the Recovery Act (thanks to this Committee) provided us with the opportunity to carry out a program of discretionary surface transportation infrastructure grants – which we called “TIGER Grants,” that allowed us to target our transportation infrastructure investments on projects that would most successfully advance these goals. Third, in awarding these TIGER Grants, we required applicants to provide the best economic analysis available on how their proposed projects would actually advance these goals, so that we would have some assurance that the projects we selected would actually achieve the goals we laid out. Fourth, we have taken advantage of other statutory authority, such as the TIFIA program and the Private Activity Bond program, to provide funding for other projects that achieve these goals by improving intermodal freight connections. Finally, we have proposed carrying this approach forward into the future, both in 2010, with the $600 million National Infrastructure Investments program, and in 2011 and subsequent years with our proposed National Infrastructure and Innovation Finance Fund.

The TIGER Grant Program allowed us to fund a number of worthwhile freight projects that in some cases would not have been eligible under existing federal programs. In New Bedford, Massachusetts, for example, we are funding the replacement of two badly deteriorated freight railroad bridges that are part of the intermodal connection between the Port of New Bedford and the Nation’s freight railroad system. In Chicago, we are funding part of the CREATE project, which will have a nationwide impact on freight flows by streamlining the freight connection between western railroads and eastern railroads in the City of Chicago. In California, we are funding a critical interchange near the Otay Mesa Port of Entry at the Mexican border, which is the largest freight border crossing between California and Mexico. In Michigan, we are funding the reconstruction of the Black River Bridge, which carries a substantial portion of the Nation’s trade with Canada near the international crossing over the St. Clair River. In Mississippi, we are funding the Gulfport Rail Intermodal Improvements project. And in Rhode Island we are funding the redevelopment of the Port of Davisville on Quonset Point. Altogether, about $555 million – over one-third of the funding we provided – was for primarily freight projects. This is in addition to over $275 million in highway projects that will benefit both freight and passenger transportation.

We have also made use of TIFIA funding to support investments in freight transportation projects. Two years ago, for example, we provided a $341 million loan for the Port of Miami tunnel, and we have also provided a $66 million loan for the Louisiana State Route 1 reconstruction project that plays a critical role in supplying Gulf of Mexico oil platforms. The Private Activity Bond program authorized in SAFETEA-LU has also allowed us to support two rail-trucking intermodal facilities in Illinois that will streamline the intermodal connection between rail and highway movement of freight.

In carrying out the TIGER Grant program, we required applicants to explain clearly – and, if possible, measure – how their proposed project would achieve the goals of the program. For larger projects, we required a full benefit-cost analysis. This has allowed us to target our funding toward the projects with the greatest payoffs. We estimate that the National Gateway Freight Rail Corridor, for example, will have benefits equal to almost six times its costs. The CREATE project will have a similarly high ratio of benefits to costs. This analysis requirement increases the confidence of the American people that their funds will be well-spent. While some project applicants had difficulty in complying with this requirement, we were impressed with the quality of the analysis that many of these project applicants provided. We believe that this requirement for economic analysis of proposed projects is essential to ensuring that the investments we make have the greatest possible impact on achieving our goals.

We are currently developing the guidance for the National Infrastructure Investments program funded in the FY2010 appropriations act. This program has somewhat different requirements from the TIGER Grant program, so the guidance will be revised to take into account those new features. But the central focus of this program will remain the same – an outcome-oriented, performance-based program that focuses funding on investments in whichever modes are most effective in achieving our national transportation goals, and that relies on the best economic analysis and professional judgment available to identify projects that promise the biggest returns on our investment. Similarly, the National Infrastructure Innovation and Finance Fund that we are proposing in our FY2011 budget request would provide funding for projects in whichever mode of transportation allows us to achieve our transportation goals in the most cost-effective way. And it will base its project selection on economic analysis to ensure that we get the maximum possible return on our investment.

The Obama Administration will continue to seek better ways to use freight transportation investments to achieve our transportation goals. One feature of our freight transportation policy that we will continue to emphasize is the reliance on partnerships between the federal government, state and local governments, and private sector partners. Our TIGER Grant projects typically were funded partly from state and local grants, partly with federal grants, and often with private sector investments as well. These partnerships are based on the concept that the private-sector user of such facilities pays for the portion of the project that returns private benefits, and the public sector funds the portions of the project that produce public benefits (in terms of reduced congestion, pollution, noise, and delay). The Crescent Corridor and National Gateway projects are excellent examples of public/private partnerships, in which the private railroads have made substantial investments.

Since intermodal facilities carry flows of privately-owned freight, seeking contributions to the cost of their improvement from private users can prove an effective strategy. In the TIFIA and Private Activity Bond programs cited above, the Department of Transportation provided loans or provided authority to borrow private funds at tax-exempt interest rates. These loans were repaid with revenues from users. This model can be equally effective on a state or local scale. A public entity (perhaps a port, a public terminal operator, or a local jurisdiction) can make funds available and assume most or all of the business risk of an investment in improvements to a freight facility. Users will pay the investment back through charges based on the volume of freight moved. Perhaps the most familiar example of this strategy is the Alameda Corridor, a rail link between the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach and the national rail network. The corridor was funded with a mix of bonds, direct funding from the ports, and Federal and state contributions. All containers moving on the corridor are assessed a fee which is used to cover dispatching, maintenance, and bond repayment costs.

A less familiar example is the Shellpot Bridge, south of Wilmington, Delaware. This bridge is on a freight rail route that bypasses downtown Wilmington and provides access to the Port of Wilmington. When the owner of the bridge, Norfolk Southern Railway, was reluctant to spend scarce capital funds on its rehabilitation, the State of Delaware agreed to make the money available – if the railroad would agree to pay a toll charge for each railroad car using the bridge. Five years into a 20-year agreement between the State and the railroad, more rail cars than anticipated are moving over the route, and it appears the State will recoup its investment with interest. Meanwhile, the railroad pays a per-car charge, rather than having to add the cost of the bridge to its capital investment base – thus converting a fixed charge into a variable cost.

One troubling problem is the need for better freight transportation data. The outcome-oriented, performance-based approach to transportation investment that we have emphasized relies on good freight transportation data to make possible the economic analysis of the benefits of freight transportation projects. At present there are major gaps in freight data availability. For example, imports and exports are recorded in the Journal of Commerce’s PIERS (Port Import/Export Recording Service) database, but inland movements of imports are not tracked separately. Data are lacking on many truck movements within metropolitan areas. Records of freight moved by rail in intermodal service often identify commodities as “FAK” (freight, all kinds) without further detail. The Commodity Flow Survey, on which we rely for data on freight flows, doesn’t cover some categories of freight, and has too small a sample size to provide detailed commodity-specific data for many metropolitan areas. Without good data on freight movements, it is difficult to distinguish good freight projects from bad ones.

We also plan to make more extensive use of information technology to improve the performance of the freight system. For example, we monitor the speed and travel time reliability of two-thirds of the Interstate System through a cooperative arrangement with the trucking industry through which we receive GPS data from over 500,000 trucks. We are working with shippers in Kansas City to minimize unproductive truck traffic in their urban core through a pilot program that improves information sharing. Information technologies can allow freight connectors to be used more efficiently by allowing drivers to be informed of gate queues, railroad crossing closings, road conditions and delays, best route information, and the availability of loads. Information exchange has been a key element in the success of intermodal transportation. The efficient exchange of shipment data between carriers at transfer points is as important as the hand-off of the cargo itself. The internet is evolving as a popular tool for gathering and providing information on container shipments. Websites such as “eModal” and “First” can increase freight mobility on access roads to ports by sharing information with harbor truckers on congestion areas, road closures, and container availability for pick-up. One port provides real-time surveillance video of its gate on its website so truck dispatchers can gauge the waiting time at the gate. A substantial amount of truck traffic to and from intermodal facilities is picking up and returning empty containers. The internet can be used to directly connect an importer with an exporter in need of an empty container. This allows a trucker to deliver an empty container directly to the exporter after unloading its contents at the importer’s warehouse, eliminating the intermediary truck trip to the container depot.

ITS is also being deployed to help carriers and shippers track shipments on intermodal connectors. Improved information on the location of cargoes can help shippers and consignees manage inventories to reduce costs, improve en route cargo security, and help government to make more effective decisions on transportation investments.

We are also working to reduce the adverse environmental and livability impacts of freight movements. As the volume of freight movements grows, noise, vibration, and pollution impacts on adjacent communities will become more severe. Too often, local communities feel that they are exposed to all the negative livability impacts of freight movements, while many of the benefits accrue to freight shippers and communities elsewhere. Recent controversies over the siting and operation of highway/rail waste transfer facilities and intermodal terminals in several states have brought this concern into sharp focus. Carefully targeted investments in freight infrastructure can reduce impacts on local communities, as well as improving environmental sustainability by enabling cargo to move on more fuel-efficient modes such as rail and water.

The Maritime Administration has developed “Marine View” (or “MarView”), an integrated data-driven environment that provides essential information to support the strategic requirements of the U.S. Marine Transportation System. MarView provides the ability to fuse data to create models and simulations for scenario planning in the event of a crisis and provides the ability to run economic impact scenarios, on-demand forecasting, as well as capacity planning and mitigation strategies to react to emergency situations. With over 2500 links to transportation data sources, MarView can quickly provide data to enhance economic decision-making for transportation planning.

Better information on freight flows, targeted improvements to intermodal connectors, and the use of information technology to limit bottlenecks and speed freight flows can benefit planners, shippers, and communities alike. The goal of our efforts is a system of freight movement that is more economically efficient, more environmentally friendly, and more sustainable than the one we have today.

I also want to mention Secretary LaHood’s effort over the last couple of months to engage a diverse range of freight stakeholders through the Department’s Surface Transportation Reauthorization Outreach Tour. One recurring theme of these discussions has been that the effective and efficient movement of freight is a critical element in promoting and sustaining regional and national economic competiveness. As participants have highlighted, while freight policy has been a significant issue in America since the days of President Lincoln (when the first railroads were being constructed to connect communities and economic markets across the country), today we are faced with a new set of freight-related challenges that must be addressed in order to secure our economic competiveness.

As noted by virtually all these stakeholders, a coherent federal freight plan must be developed that addresses these issues – including aging infrastructure, increased congestion, growing long-term port demand, and climate change concerns. However, as they have pointed out, a robust freight plan alone will not suffice; rather, increased flexibility in terms of funding mechanisms is needed to allow us to take action. As one participant noted, while the recent TIGER Discretionary Program has provided substantial federal funding for vital freight projects, in general freight is left out of traditional funding structures. Thus, the question now is how the freight funding momentum generated by the TIGER awards will be maintained going forward. Freight stakeholders emphasized the need to ensure a continuing funding stream for the full range of freight transportation projects, and continued encouragement of public-private partnerships within the freight sector.

In addition to these outreach sessions, the Secretary hosted a two-day Port Summit in San Diego to hear directly from the Nation’s Port Directors on transportation policy issues that affect our port system and freight movements. The Summit provided a forum to discuss specific port development issues and the upcoming transportation reauthorization.  The results of the Summit are now being formalized into policy recommendations.

While this hearing does not focus primarily on these agencies’ budget requests, I do want to highlight a few of the key priorities in their proposed budgets.

  • As part of the Department’s Livability Initiative, for example, FHWA’s budget provides $200 million in highway funding for a competitive livability program to assist states and local and tribal governments in integrating transportation, land use, and conservation of natural resources in urban and rural communities.
  • FMCSA will spend $13 million on a new operating enforcement approach – Comprehensive Safety Analysis – to improve the allocation of resources to enforcement, monitoring, and training. This includes $7 million for increased staffing for safety enforcement and compliance operations.
  • FRA will provide $1 billion for high-speed passenger rail and $1.6 billion for Amtrak – while these expenditures are targeted at passenger rail, they will expand the overall capacity of the rail system and benefit freight rail as well as passenger rail.
  • MARAD will administer $57 million this year to fund start-up marine highway services. These funds will form the basis for development of a Marine Highway Program to complement other transportation modes, increase transportation efficiencies, and enhance the environment. MARAD is also administering $120 million in TIGER Grants to improve port efficiencies, including the movement of freight through the ports and along America’s Marine Highway. 

We would be happy to respond to any questions that you have either on freight issues or on the budgets of these agencies.

The Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) into the National Airspace System (NAS): Fulfilling Imminent Operational and Training Requirements

STATEMENT OF

HANK KRAKOWSKI,
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
ACCOMPANIED BY
JOHN ALLEN,
DIRECTOR,
FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE,
OFFICE OF AVIATION SAFETY,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

FIELD HEARING ON

THE INTEGRATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UASs) INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS): FULFILLING IMMINENT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS,

SEPTEMBER 13, 2010.

 

Chairman Dorgan, Senator Conrad, Congressman Pomeroy:

Thank you for inviting the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to this hearing.  Accompanying me today is John Allen, Director of the Flight Standards Service in the Office of Aviation Safety at the FAA.  Together, we have distinct yet related duties in carrying out the FAA’s mission to ensure the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS).  Mr. Allen’s organization is charged with setting and enforcing the safety standards for aircraft operators and airmen.  My role as the head of the Air Traffic Organization is to oversee the nation’s air traffic control system, to move flights safely and efficiently, while also overseeing the capital programs and the modernization of the system.

As the most complex airspace in the world, the NAS encompasses an average of over 100,000 aviation operations per day, including commercial air traffic, cargo operations, business jets, etc.  Additionally, there are over 238,000 general aviation aircraft that represent a wide range of sophistication and capabilities that may enter the system at any time.  There are over 500 air traffic control facilities, more than 12,000 air navigation facilities, and over 19,000 airports, not to mention the thousands of other communications, surveillance, weather reporting, and other aviation support facilities.  With this volume of traffic and high degree of complexity, the FAA maintains an extremely safe airspace through diligent oversight and the strong commitment to our safety mission.

With regard to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), the FAA sets the parameters for where a UAS may be operated and how those operations may be conducted safely in the NAS.  Our main focus when evaluating UAS operations in the NAS is to avoid any situations in which a UAS would endanger other users of the NAS or compromise the safety of persons or property on the ground.  The FAA acknowledges the great potential of UASs in national defense and homeland security, and as such, we strive to accommodate the needs of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for UAS operations, always with safety as our top priority. 

When new aviation technology becomes available, we must determine if the technology itself is safe and that it can be operated safely.  Whether the technology is to be used by pilots, operators or air traffic controllers, we determine the risks associated with putting that technology into the NAS.  Once the known risks are mitigated, we move forward with integration in stages, assessing safety at each incremental step along the way.  Unforeseen developments, changing needs, technological improvements, and human factors all play a role in allowing operations within the civil airspace system.

The FAA is using this same methodology to manage the integration of the new UAS technology into the NAS.  While UASs offer a promising new technology, the limited safety and operational data available to date does not yet support expedited or full integration into the NAS.  Because current available data is insufficient to allow unfettered integration of UASs into the NAS—where the public travels every day—the FAA must continue to move forward deliberately and cautiously, in accordance with our safety mandate. 

Because the airspace is a finite resource, and in order for us to carry out our safety mission, the FAA has developed a few avenues through which UAS operators may gain access to the NAS.  First, the FAA has a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) process.  This is the avenue by which public users (government agencies, including Federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as state universities) that wish to fly a UAS can gain access to the NAS, provided that the risks of flying the unmanned aircraft in the civil airspace can be appropriately mitigated.  Risk mitigations required to grant a COA frequently include special provisions unique to the requested type of operation.  For example, the applicant may be restricted to a defined airspace and/or operating during certain times of the day.  The UAS may be required to have a transponder if it is to be flown in a certain type of airspace.  A ground observer or accompanying “chase” aircraft may be required to act as the “eyes” of the UAS.  Other safety enhancements may be required, depending on the nature of the proposed operation.

The FAA may also set aside airspace for an operator’s exclusive use to segregate the dangerous activity or protect something on the ground, when needed.  Some of these exclusive use areas are known as Restricted, Warning or Prohibited Areas.  The DoD conducts most of its training in such airspace.  In order to set aside Restricted or Prohibited Area airspace, the FAA would need to undertake rulemaking to define the parameters of that airspace.  This is typically a time-consuming process that would also include environmental reviews that could impact the proposed airspace.

Civil UAS operators must apply for a Special Airworthiness Certificate – Experimental Category to gain access to the NAS.  This avenue allows the civil users to operate UAS for research and development, demonstrations, and crew training.  The Special Airworthiness Certificate – Experimental Category does not permit carriage of persons or property for compensation or hire.  Thus, commercial UAS operations in the U.S. are not permitted at this time. 

We are working with our partners in government and the private sector to advance the development of UAS and the ultimate integration into the NAS.  First, in accordance with Section 1036 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009, Public Law 110-417, the DoD and FAA have formed an Executive Committee (ExCom) to focus on conflict resolution and identification of the range of policy, technical, and procedural concerns arising from the integration of UASs into the NAS.  Other ExCom members include DHS and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to capture more broadly other Federal agency efforts and equities in the ExCom.  The mission of this multi-agency UAS ExCom is to increase, and ultimately enable routine, access of Federal public UAS operations in the NAS to support the operational, training, developmental, and research requirements of the member agencies.  All of these partner agencies are working to ensure that each department and agency is putting the proper focus and resources to continue to lead the world in the integration of UAS. 

The ExCom’s work has also facilitated the work of the Red River Task Force (RRTF), the interagency working group that was established to work on issues regarding the basing of UAS at Grand Forks Air Force Base (RDR).  With the ExCom’s work and the RRTF’s work running in parallel, the FAA is able to support more easily and fully the DoD’s needs at RDR.  One of the RRTF’s first tasks was to establish two separate tracks for DoD’s goals at RDR:  one would be an aeronautical proposal that would involve establishment of a new restricted area(s), while the other would be a broader menu of operational options that could be used either as a stand-alone solution or as a layered approach for the operation of UASs at RDR.  We have done this in numerous places and continue to streamline the approval process.

Currently, the FAA is working with the DoD to determine and evaluate the scope and details of its operational needs at RDR.  In addition, the RRTF has examined 18 option sets that can provide short, mid- and long-term solutions to UAS NAS access at RDR.  The FAA continues to be committed to working with the DoD on matters relating to UAS operations at RDR in a manner consistent with our safety mission.

Unmanned aircraft systems are a promising new technology, but one that was originally and primarily designed for military purposes.  Although the technology incorporated into UASs has advanced, their safety record warrants caution.  As we attempt to integrate these aircraft into the NAS, we will continue to look at any risks that UASs pose to the traveling public as well as the risk to persons or property on the ground.  As the agency charged with overseeing the safety of our skies, the FAA seeks to balance our partner agencies’ security, defense, and other public needs with the safety of the NAS.  We look forward to continuing our work with our partners and the Congress to do just that.

Chairman Dorgan, Senator Conrad, Congressman Pomeroy, this concludes our prepared remarks.  We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.

 

DOT's Role in the Airline Industry's Ongoing Restructuring

Statement of

Susan L. Kurland
Assistant Secretary for Aviation & International Affairs
U.S. Department of Transportation

before the

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, & TRANSPORTATION
U.S.  SENATE

June 17, 2010

 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and Members of the Committee:

Introduction

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the current and future state of the airline industry and the role of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in the industry’s ongoing restructuring.  This hearing is in response to the proposed United/Continental merger, a potential combination that has understandably captured the interest of this Committee and the American people. 

State of the Airline Industry

Let me begin with a brief overview of the state of the airline industry to provide an understanding of the economic environment in which this transaction has been proposed.  In the more than 30 years since deregulation, market forces have shaped airline fares and services.  During that time, the industry adjusted to a deregulated environment and changing market conditions, facing the expected – fluctuations in supply and demand – but also the unexpected – terrorist attacks, epidemics, and now, with volcanic ash, a natural disaster.  Through the various business cycles, carriers have taken steps to cut costs, manage capacity, and cope with volatile fuel prices.  Many have adapted well, but not all have succeeded, with an unfortunate number having to file for bankruptcy protection and several exiting the industry altogether. 

Following several consecutive years of losses from 2001 to 2005, the industry returned to modest profitability in 2006 and 2007, only to confront rapidly increasing fuel costs and then a global recession.  2008 and 2009 were some of the most challenging years in the history of U.S. aviation, primarily because the global recession helped push operating revenues for the nine largest U.S. airlines down an unprecedented 17% year-over-year.  While costs also increased significantly during the first quarter of 2010, airline revenues continue to rebound in large part on the basis of increased passenger volumes.

Each one of the nine largest U.S. carriers increased their revenue, year-over-year, despite the fact that all but one of them decreased or held capacity constant.  For the first quarter, the nine largest airlines, whose revenue totaled nearly $27 billion, collectively earned a small operating profit of $17 million, excluding special items.   While modest, that represented a substantial improvement from the total operating loss of over $1 billion during the first quarter of 2009. 

For the second quarter of 2010, most analysts are predicting stronger results, as passenger and shipper demand that vanished during the height of the global recession is returning across all sectors for all carriers.  The turn-around from this time last year is encouraging. 

Consumers have reaped enormous benefits in the more than 30 years since airline deregulation.  During this period, air transportation has been transformed from a luxury that few could afford, to a service that provides average families and small businesses of America with affordable access to destinations across the globe.  Adjusted for inflation, air fares have continued to decline throughout the deregulated era, as new carriers, particularly low cost carriers, have entered the market and business models of new entrants and incumbent carriers alike have adapted to meet changing consumer needs and brought innovations and efficiencies to the marketplace.  In expanding consumer and business access from local to global, air transportation has become an important driver of economic progress for the citizens and companies of this increasingly mobile nation. 

We foresee the industry continuing to evolve along several basic trends.  First, carriers, while conscious of costs, are aggressively pursuing new sources of revenue.  Second, over time, low-cost carriers have expanded significantly.  Third, legacy carriers are continuing to seek ways to become more efficient producers, including through stronger alliance partnerships. 

DOT’s Authority to Review Merger Transactions

I am sure you understand that I cannot discuss the specifics of the proposed United/Continental merger, or any proposed transaction that is before us for review.  However, I would like to shed some light on DOT’s role in the review of an airline merger. 

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has the lead role in reviewing proposed airline mergers, given its statutory authority to enforce the antitrust laws.  Utilizing its special aviation expertise, DOT typically examines the proposed merger and shares its analysis and views with the Antitrust Division.  This practice is consistent with Congress’ determination that the deregulated airline industry should generally be subject to the same application of the antitrust laws as other unregulated industries.  Each transaction we review is considered on a case-by-case basis consistent with anti-trust principles and practice.

The purpose of our antitrust laws is to ensure that consumers receive the benefits of competition, and this is the prism through which the Department analyzes airline mergers.   I can therefore assure you that the Department is committed to fostering an environment that embraces competition and provides consumers with the price and service benefits that competition brings. 

We also recognize that the airline industry is very dynamic. Cyclical economic conditions, the competitive environment, infrastructure access and capacity, and industry innovation all need to be taken into account to allow the industry to adapt to rapidly changing economic conditions.

Should  DOJ decide not to challenge a particular transaction on antitrust grounds, DOT would then consider a wide range of  follow-on issues that fall within its jurisdiction, including international route transfers, economic fitness, code-sharing, and possible unfair or deceptive practices.    

As to international routes, the carriers would be expected to apply for DOT approval of a route transfer to consolidate the international routes they individually hold under one certificate as part of the merger process.  By statute (49 U.S.C. 41105), DOT may approve a transfer of such routes only if we find that it is consistent with the public interest.  As part of that analysis we must examine the transfer's impact on the viability of each airline party to the transaction, competition in the domestic airline industry, and the trade position of the United States in the international air transportation market. 

We would only decide an international route transfer case after we had established a formal record and given all interested persons the opportunity to comment.  If DOT determines that the transfer would be contrary to the public interest on competitive grounds or for another reason, DOT could disapprove the transfer in whole or in part.  Alternatively, DOT may condition its approval on requirements that would protect the public interest.    

Because a proposed merger of major carriers would involve a significant change in the structure of at least one of the existing carriers, DOT would institute a fitness review of airline management, financials and compliance disposition. 

While the transfer application is pending, the merging carriers could request that DOT grant them an exemption from the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 41105 to allow them to consummate the merger at their own risk pending DOT’s decision on their transfer application.  DOT has sometimes approved such exemption requests in the past, conditioned upon the air carriers remaining separate and independently operated entities under common ownership until the transfer application case is decided. 

DOT may also review any code-share arrangements concluded between the merging carriers.  In DOT’s experience, code-share arrangements would likely be necessary during the early phases of integration after the transaction is closed.  

Finally, at DOT, we take our responsibility for consumer protection seriously. For example, if carriers in pursuing or implementing a merger were to engage in unfair or deceptive practices, we would not hesitate to act to protect affected consumers based on our 49 U.S.C. 41712 authority.

Conclusion

Airlines are the circulatory system of national and global communities – linking friends and family, suppliers and producers, retailers and manufacturers, facilitating business partnerships, and fostering educational and cultural exchanges of all types.  Every American has both a personal and an economic interest in access to safe and affordable air travel.  It is therefore easy to understand why so many people take an interest in airline mergers. 

Our consideration of aviation economic policy focuses on what is best for a healthy and a competitive industry, for its workers, and for the communities and consumers that it serves.   Our goal must be to strike what is often a very difficult balance in the face of a complex and dynamically changing industry.  Importantly, in doing so we must also consider the longer term, collective impact on all stakeholders, most importantly America’s traveling public.  

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony.  I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

 

DOT's Role Regarding Operations at the Two Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority airports, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport

STATEMENT OF

SUSAN L. KURLAND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AVIATION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

September 16, 2010

 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, Chairman Dorgan, Ranking Member DeMint, and Members of the Subcommittee --

Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Transportation’s role regarding operations at the two Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority airports, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and Washington Dulles International Airport.  With me today is Mike Sammartino, Director of System Operations for the Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Control System Command Center. 

For many years, Congress has shown a unique interest in the metropolitan Washington airports.  In 1940, Congress authorized the Federal Government to acquire a tract of land near the Capitol and construct what is now Reagan National.  As of 1959, the newly-created Federal Aviation Administration took over the operation of that airport.  Shortly afterwards, Congress determined that a second major airport, Washington Dulles International Airport, should be established to serve the Washington, DC region and be owned and operated by the FAA. Dulles opened in 1962.  These are the only two major commercial airports that have been authorized and established by Congress. 

In December, 1984, an advisory commission established by then-Secretary of Transportation Dole found that the two airports were well managed by the FAA but needed extensive capital improvements, in order to respond to the growing commercial and air travel needs of the region, and that those improvements could not be financed by the federal government alone.  The commission recommended that Congress transfer control of the airports to a Congressionally-approved regional authority that would have the authority to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance capital improvements at the airports.  In April and December of 1985, respectively, Virginia and the District of Columbia each enacted legislation creating a regional authority to acquire Reagan National and Dulles airports from the federal government.

Also in 1985, the Department of Transportation transmitted a legislative proposal for transfer of the airports that was consistent with the advisory commission report, and legislation was enacted in October, 1986 that authorized the transfer of the airports to the regional authority, known as the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA).   The transfer was executed by means of a 50-year long-term lease, which was subsequently amended to extend until 2067.  The Congressional purpose was to “achieve local control, management, operation, and development of these important transportation assets.”  Key among Congress’s findings was that “the United States government has a continuing but limited interest in the operation of the 2 federally owned airports,” and that “operation of the [two airports] by an independent local authority will facilitate timely improvements at both airports to meet the growing demand of interstate air transportation occasioned by the Airline Deregulation Act.”

The Transfer Act also employed two important and unique operational constraints at National—the “slot” rule and the “perimeter” rule.  Congress  applied the High Density Slot Rule (HDR) to Reagan National by prohibiting MWAA from either increasing or decreasing the number of instrument flight rule takeoffs and landings authorized by the HDR as of October 1986, or imposing a passenger cap there.  Second, Congress prohibited an air carrier from operating nonstop air transportation from National and another airport more than 1,250 statute miles away.  Reagan National is the only commercial airport in the United States at which Congress has imposed such constraints.    

By incorporating FAA’s existing rules into MWAA’s operation of Reagan National, each flight operation must have a slot from the Federal Aviation Administration, with the total number of takeoffs and landings limited to 48 commercial slots per hour, of which 11 are for commuter aircraft, during an 18-hour period from 6:00 am to midnight.  Further, 12 additional slots per hour are available to general aviation or other aircraft that do not operate on a scheduled basis, such as military or corporate aircraft. 

Given Congress’ unique interest in and attention to operations at Reagan National Airport, the Department of Transportation – consistently through many administrations – has deferred to the Congress on how best to address issues such as capacity and congestion.  Accordingly, the Department of Transportation has taken no position as to whether the perimeter rule should be modified or terminated altogether, or whether the airport should add more flights. 

We can, however, state, as we have in the past, that FAA’s traffic programs and procedures can  accommodate some increase in commercial operations at Reagan National, within the existing cap, with the precise number of additional flights that can be accommodated dependent on the fleet mix and the runway use that would be required.  

The Department has also focused on its role as steward of the specific statutory requirements that apply to Reagan National Airport and the Congressional goals and objectives that underlie them.  Accordingly, we have sought to ensure that there is continuing compliance with the laws and principles established by Congress, as well as to implement new statutory requirements.  In that role, the Department, for example, is currently conducting a carrier selection proceeding for two open slot exemptions, and recently proposed a limited divestiture of slots in connection with a major proposed transaction between US Airways and Delta involving a swap of slot holdings at Reagan National and LaGuardia airports.

Slot Exemptions

In 2000, with enactment of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR-21”), Congress mandated that the Department grant exemptions to the slot rules to allow for expanded operations at Reagan National.  At that time, it directed that the Secretary award 12 slot exemptions for service beyond the perimeter, and 12 more within the perimeter.  It also specified the criteria that the Department of Transportation was to apply in making these awards, which included promoting air transportation by new entrant air carriers, protecting the interests of smaller airports and communities, and, for the within-perimeter exemptions, producing maximum competitive benefits, including low fares.

In 2003, Congress expanded the slot exemption program with the Vision 100 – Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act.  It added 12 more beyond-perimeter exemptions, to a total of 24, and 8 more within-perimeter ones, to a total of 20.  Together, the two statutes effectively added an average of three commercial slots per hour, or about 5% to the total slot operations.  

In implementing its authority under the two statutes, DOT awarded exemptions that brought nonstop DCA service to large beyond-perimeter hubs such as Seattle, Los Angeles and Las Vegas.  Within the perimeter, the awards have improved competition and brought low fares to hubs like Atlanta and Fort Lauderdale, while bringing new nonstop service to smaller communities such as Jackson, MS, Chattanooga, TN, and Akron-Canton, OH.    

Congress also specified that, unlike HDR slots, these exemptions cannot be bought, sold, or leased, so they must be used by the slot exemption holder for service to the particular destinations for which they were awarded.  Because of forfeitures or withdrawals arising due to mergers and acquisitions, or the unexpected underperformance of a market, DOT sometimes must conduct reallocation proceedings.  We have one such proceeding currently underway, affecting two exemptions originally awarded to Midwest Airlines for service to Kansas City.  That airline has now ceased to exist as a carrier after its acquisition by Republic Airways.  We have solicited applications for these two exemptions, with carriers being invited to propose service that they believe would fit the statutory criteria (which could of course include service to Kansas City as well as other destinations). Since this is an ongoing proceeding, it would not be appropriate for me to address the substance of the matters involved, but I can assure you that we will consider each application on its merits, and in accordance with the selection criteria that Congress has set out. 

The Proposed US Airways/Delta “Slot Swap”

On May 4, Secretary LaHood and FAA Administrator Babbitt jointly issued a final notice on an application by Delta and US Airways to exchange certain slot holdings at Reagan National and LaGuardia Airports.  That application was occasioned by the need for a waiver from buy-sell limitations in the LaGuardia Order before the transaction could proceed.  The carriers’ proposal in primary part was to exchange 125 US Airways’ slot pairs at LaGuardia for 42 Delta slot pairs at Reagan National.  We reviewed the slot swaps as a single, unified transaction, because we found the LaGuardia slots purchase and sale would not occur without the Reagan National slots purchase and sale, and vice versa.   We granted the carriers’ petition for a waiver from the limitations in the LaGuardia Order  subject to the condition that the carriers divest themselves of  a number of slot pairs at LGA and DCA.   The slot divestitures, to be made to new entrants and limited incumbent carriers, would have enabled both airports to preserve competition and provide greater public benefits and increased efficiencies. The carriers opted not to accept the Department’s conditions.

In the course of our analysis of that proposed transaction, we observed a number of characteristics concerning service at Reagan National that may be of interest to the Committee.  We found that:

            • Reagan National is a relatively high-fare airport, having the third highest fare premium of the 121 city markets that were examined;    

            • For a large portion of passengers, especially time-sensitive passengers, the three airports in the Baltimore-Washington metropolitan areas are not effective substitutes for each other, with price competition from Thurgood Marshall Baltimore-Washington Airport and Dulles International Airport not effectively disciplining the fares at Reagan National;

            • There is a relatively low level of competition afforded by low cost carriers at Reagan National, with only 3.3 per cent of the slots held by them; and

            • Barriers to entry continue to exist at the airport, in particular as the secondary slot market has not facilitated the degree of new competition by either new entrants or limited incumbents as originally envisaged.

On-Time Statistics 

As you may know, the Department compiles and publishes data showing on-time performance at the nations’ major airports, and on this score Reagan National and Dulles fare reasonably well compared to other large hub airports.  From January through June of 2010, 84.2% of the departures from Reagan were on-time, and 81.4% of those from Dulles.  The average on-time performance at large hubs over the same time period was 79.1%.  

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me stress again that the Department has long recognized that Congress has maintained a strong interest in capacity, congestion, and operational issues at the MWAA airports, particularly Reagan National. 

We look forward to continuing cooperation with the Congress, and with the Airports Authority, in assuring that Reagan National and Dulles provide our Nation’s capital with gateways that are safe, modern, convenient, and affordable.

This concludes my prepared remarks.  I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to offer these comments to you on behalf of the Department, and I will be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

 

Response by Toyota and NHTSA to Incidents of Sudden Unintended Acceleration

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE RAY LAHOOD
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
SUBCOMMITEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Hearing on

RESPONSE BY TOYOTA AND NHTSA TO
INCIDENTS OF SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION 

February 23, 2010

 

Chairman Stupak, Ranking Minority Member Walden, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important issue of Toyota’s recent safety recalls and the broader issue of sudden unintended acceleration.

Transportation safety is the Department’s highest priority. We understand the level of concern about the safety of Toyota vehicles, particularly with regard to unintended acceleration. I would like to explain the recent recalls, the role that NHTSA played in ensuring the recalls occurred, and the actions NHTSA is taking to identify any additional safety defects that might cause unintended acceleration.

The recent Toyota recalls related to unintended acceleration involve two issues: first, accelerator pedal entrapment by floor mats, which can lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds; and second, accelerator pedals sticking or returning slowly after being depressed, which occurs at a variety of throttle positions but, to the best of our knowledge, is more likely to occur at low throttle positions more readily controlled by the vehicle’s brakes.

Before I discuss the details of these two recalls and NHTSA’s investigations, I want to clarify what owners of vehicles affected by these recalls should do. To avoid pedal entrapment, remove all floor mats from the driver’s side of your vehicle until you receive the repair for this problem from a Toyota dealer. If you do not remove the mat, make sure that it is always securely anchored in place on the retaining hooks and that no other mats are ever stacked on top of it. If your vehicle is covered by the “sticky pedal” recall, pay special attention to your gas pedal. If the pedal is harder to depress or slower to return after releasing it, this could be a precursor to a sticky pedal. If your pedal shows those symptoms you should contact a Toyota dealer immediately. If your accelerator becomes stuck for any reason, steadily apply the brake, put the car in neutral, bring it to a stop in a safe place, and call your dealer.

Pedal Entrapment

Of the two big recalls, the far more serious problem, in our view, is pedal entrapment by floor mats. We are aware of five deaths that have occurred due to this problem, including a tragedy near San Diego last August that claimed four lives. We have the greatest sympathy for the loved ones of those members of the Saylor and Lastrella families who died in that crash.

Pedal entrapment involves a situation in which the driver intends to accelerate quickly (such as when passing another car or entering a freeway) and depresses the accelerator pedal toward the floor of the vehicle. When pushed far enough the pedal becomes entrapped by the floor mat in full open throttle position. Once the pedal is entrapped, the vehicle will continue to accelerate well in excess of the driver’s intent unless the driver can overcome that situation. Given the very high speeds involved and the firmness with which the mat is holding the pedal at full throttle, these are the most dangerous situations we are aware of that come under the broad heading of unintended acceleration. It is very important to note that, even on the recalled vehicles, entrapment by the mat can occur only if the floor mat is out of position because it is not secured, one floor mat is stacked on top of another floor mat, or a floor mat is used that is not intended for use on the vehicle and is inappropriate due to its shape or dimensions.

NHTSA first became aware of this phenomenon in Toyota’s Lexus ES350 in 2007 and quickly opened an investigation in March of that year. NHTSA acted based on five complaints from vehicle owners. No related fatalities had been reported at the time the investigation began, but there had been three crashes allegedly related to pedal entrapment by the floor mat. At the time, the problem seemed most likely to occur in Lexus ES350 vehicles where a thick, all-weather floor mat offered as an option by Toyota was used. The shape of these floor mats and a raised portion forming a ridge made them particularly likely to entrap the pedal if not properly secured. So far as NHTSA knew at that time, the accelerator pedals themselves were functioning as designed and the problem centered on the way the pedal could be entrapped by these floor mats under certain conditions.

NHTSA escalated the investigation to an engineering analysis five months later, in August 2007. Shortly before that, a fatal crash involving a Camry occurred that was apparently caused by entrapment. In September 2007, Toyota announced a recall of the all-weather mats in Lexus and Camry vehicles. The remedy was to have the dealers remove the mats and provide a re-designed mat that was shaped in a way that addressed the entrapment risk even if the re-designed mat was improperly anchored.

At the time of the 2007 recall, NHTSA also issued a safety advisory, directed especially to owners of the recalled vehicles but also to all drivers, warning of the serious dangers of not properly anchoring mats or stacking mats on top of each other. At that time NHTSA believed that the recall and removal of the most problematic mats, the improved design of the replacement mats, and education of the public and dealers about the proper use of mats would substantially eliminate the known risk related to pedal entrapment.

NHTSA continued to monitor the situation and became aware of a post-recall crash involving one of the recalled mats that the owner had not removed. Fortunately, that was not a fatal crash but did result in serious injury. In light of that crash and indications that consumer response to this recall was too low, NHTSA urged Toyota to re-notify vehicle owners, which Toyota did in January 2009.

Eight months later, when the San Diego fatal crash occurred on August 28, 2009, NHTSA immediately began to investigate the circumstances of the crash. NHTSA investigators and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department examined the wreckage of the vehicle and concluded that the likely cause was excessive speed due to entrapment of the accelerator pedal by the floor mat. The vehicle was a Toyota Lexus ES350 on loan from a Toyota dealer for the day. The floor mat in the vehicle was designed for a Toyota Lexus RX SUV and was much longer than the mat that would have been proper for the Lexus ES350. At the time NHTSA investigators viewed the wreckage, the accelerator pedal was still fused to the floor mat, apparently melted in that position by the heat of the fire that followed the crash. Combining that observation with the circumstances known to have occurred immediately prior to the crash, including extremely high speeds and the driver’s inability to control the speed, NHTSA concluded that the excessive speed was caused by pedal entrapment. Supporting this conclusion was the fact that another customer of the dealership had used the same vehicle just three days earlier and complained of unintended, high-speed acceleration caused by the pedal having been trapped by the mat until he was able to stop the vehicle and free the pedal.

The San Diego tragedy made clear that the entrapment problem could occur in unexpected ways and that recalling the worst performing mats and educating drivers and dealers about not using unsecured, improper, or stacked mats was not going to adequately address the risk. Apparently not even all Toyota dealers were mindful of the need to ensure proper mats and mat anchorage to avoid entrapment.

As a consequence, NHTSA began to explore additional remedial options. The agency continued to review all relevant data to identify any reports that might be linked to similar entrapment in other Toyota vehicles. NHTSA became focused on the pedal design of a number of Toyota vehicles, not because of any known malfunction in their operation but because their shape tended to make entrapment more likely when floor mats are out of position or stacked. NHTSA prepared to open an investigation on the pedal design. At the same time, the agency informed Toyota that the company needed to address this risk promptly as a vehicle defect issue, and requested that Toyota conduct a recall. Toyota responded to NHTSA by announcing a recall to replace or re-shape the pedals in 3.8 million vehicles and sent its official notice of the recall to NHTSA on October 5, 2009.

NHTSA pressed the company to include as part of its recall the addition of a feature called brake override (which some call “smart pedal”) technology on models that have keyless ignition systems. With brake override, the vehicle control system gives priority to the signal from the brake pedal and returns the engine to idle when it detects the brake being applied while the accelerator is applied. NHTSA discovered in its investigation of pedal entrapment incidents that in some situations drivers of vehicles with keyless ignition systems did not know that, in Toyota vehicles, they could shut off their engines when in motion only by depressing the dashboard ignition button and holding it for three seconds. The owners were familiar with shutting off the vehicle when it was stopped, which requires holding the button for just one second or less. NHTSA thought it was especially important to ensure that in those vehicles with keyless ignition the driver had the benefit of brake override. Many other manufacturers use this technology and Toyota uses it in newly produced vehicles. The recall Toyota announced in October adhered to NHTSA’s request.

NHTSA continued to monitor incoming reports involving relevant incidents. In January, NHTSA told Toyota that its review of other Toyota vehicles indicated that they needed to be included in the pedal entrapment recall. Toyota responded by adding 1.1 million vehicles to the pedal entrapment recall on January 27, 2010.

Under the law, manufacturers have an obligation to notify NHTSA within five days of determining that a defect or noncompliance exists. When manufacturers voluntarily initiate recalls without waiting for NHTSA to order a recall, the process protects the public most quickly. NHTSA can order manufacturers to do recalls but only after initiating a formal investigation, completing its investigation, and following administrative procedures that include a public hearing and opportunities for the manufacturer to file detailed responses. Even after the NHTSA Administrator issues an order directing a recall, the manufacturer can avoid doing the recall until NHTSA proves its case in court. In such a case, the agency has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a vehicle defect exists and that it creates an unreasonable risk to safety. As a result, recalls occur most quickly when a manufacturer announces the recall without waiting for NHTSA to open and complete an investigation. That is what happened here—because of the pressure NHTSA applied.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query, which is a detailed request for information about when Toyota learned about the defect addressed by this recall. The information Toyota will provide in response to this request will help NHTSA determine whether Toyota’s initiation of the recall met its obligation to notify NHTSA quickly. If NHTSA determines that Toyota did not meet that obligation, NHTSA may seek civil penalties from Toyota for that failure. Those penalties could be as high as $16,375,000 for a related series of violations.

CTS Pedals Sticking

I want to turn now to the “sticky pedal” recall that was initiated in January of this year. NHTSA is not currently aware of any injuries or deaths definitively linked to this problem. Unlike the pedal entrapment recall, which concerns the shape of the pedal that makes it more susceptible to entrapment by an external object (the floor mat), this recall involves the internal working of the pedal assembly. Another distinguishing factor is that the pedal entrapment situations involve instances of full acceleration that are initially intended by the driver, while this problem, to the best of our knowledge, generally involves occurrences at lower power levels where the car continues to accelerate because the pedal does not return upward, or returns slowly, when the driver lessens pressure on the pedal.

The affected pedals are manufactured by CTS Corporation, which is based in Elkhart, Indiana. Some Toyota vehicle owners have complained of certain symptoms in vehicles equipped with those pedals. Those symptoms include a feeling that it is harder than normal to depress the pedal or that, when depressed, it is slower to return. In some circumstances, the situation can involve the pedal not returning at all from the position to which it was depressed. At this time, we understand that this problem is mechanical in nature and does not involve a flaw in the electronic signal being sent from the pedal sensor to the throttle.

In November 2009, NHTSA received several Toyota field reports concerning incidents in which pedals were slow to return or sticking in a number of different Toyota models from various model years. The reports did not indicate a root cause of the symptoms drivers were experiencing. NHTSA reviewed those reports as part of its screening for possible defect trends. Before NHTSA had decided whether or not to open an investigation, Toyota contacted the agency on January 16 about the specific problem it had identified with the CTS pedal. NHTSA told the company it needed a full explanation immediately. Toyota met with NHTSA on January 19 and demonstrated what it thought to be the mechanical problem with the CTS pedals. Based on the information presented by Toyota about the nature of the problem and Toyota’s experience with it, NHTSA told the company it expected very prompt action. Two days later, on January 21, Toyota announced the recall, covering some 2.3 million vehicles (many of which are also covered by the pedal entrapment recall and will receive both remedies). Toyota has had the supplier produce a new pedal with a different design that the company believes addresses the issue of excessive friction. The company has also devised an interim remedy to eliminate the safety risk by altering the pedal while new ones are being manufactured. Toyota informed NHTSA that it ceased production of new vehicles in the models affected by this recall so that it could begin to supply the new pedals being produced for the assembly line to dealers for installation in existing vehicles.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query about this recall. NHTSA has also begun an investigation to determine whether these particular CTS pedals have been installed in vehicles other than those recalled by Toyota, including those made by other manufacturers. NHTSA will soon receive relevant information from CTS and evaluate it.

Other Instances of Unintended or Excessive Acceleration

NHTSA receives more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every year concerning perceived safety problems with their vehicles. NHTSA reviews every complaint promptly and, if it appears to contain any evidence related to a safety defect trend, the reviewers begin to track that trend for possible investigation. Among those complaints in recent years have been many allegations of unintended or excessive acceleration on vehicles made by Toyota. Of course, during that same period NHTSA has received thousands of complaints containing such allegations concerning the vehicles made by most major vehicle manufacturers.

The agency has also received several petitions requesting that NHTSA investigate unintended acceleration in various Toyota vehicles. When a member of the public petitions NHTSA to investigate a possible defect, NHTSA examines all information submitted by the petitioner as well as all other information relevant to the particular problem cited by the petitioner. Even where NHTSA denies a defect petition, it does so only after conducting so thorough an examination of the issue that it has effectively done a preliminary investigation. Generally, NHTSA will visit the petitioners, interview them about their experiences, examine their vehicles and vehicle history, drive the vehicles, and search the NHTSA data bases for complaints similar to the experiences petitioners had. In some situations NHTSA will conduct more extensive testing of a vehicle of the same make and model as that of the petitioner.

The information NHTSA has received from consumers concerning unintended or excessive acceleration in vehicles can be divided into general categories that include: engine surging that lasts only a second or two; unintended acceleration from a stopped position or very low speed that results in quick movement over a short distance and sometimes results in crashing into an object; and events that begin at high speeds because the driver intended to accelerate quickly and continue for a sustained period of many seconds or minutes beyond what the driver intended. The possible causes of these events that NHTSA has been able to identify include mechanical problems with the accelerator; obstruction of the accelerator by another object; or human error (pressing the wrong pedal).

NHTSA has carefully reviewed all of the information provided by Toyota consumers in complaints filed with the agency to try to find causes for what they were experiencing. NHTSA also reviews Early Warning Reporting information submitted by the manufacturer and other sources of information, including insurance company submissions. For the high-speed events that last for many seconds or minutes, the only cause NHTSA has been able to establish thus far is entrapment of the pedal by a floor mat. The only exception to this has may have been a recent event in New Jersey that apparently did not involve floor mat entrapment but apparently did involve a stuck CTS pedal. Fortunately, the driver was able to bring the vehicle under control and drive it to a dealership. As discussed, the pedal entrapment issue in the recalled vehicles will presumably be resolved by the recall announced in October. The problem experienced in New Jersey will presumably be addressed by the recall of the CTS pedals announced in January.

NHTSA does not contend that the two recalls will fully resolve all concerns about unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. However, with one exception, NHTSA has not been able to establish a vehicle-based cause for unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles not covered by those two recalls. The exception was a recall of the model year 2004 Sienna vans in 2009 due to a defective trim panel that could, if loosened during servicing, entrap the accelerator at full throttle. That recall also arose from a NHTSA investigation.

NHTSA initiated a Recall Query on February 16 to ascertain whether Toyota has been completely forthcoming with the agency concerning all possible defects in its vehicles that may be causing unintended acceleration. NHTSA will closely review the documents Toyota submits to determine whether the company has additional information not yet shared with the agency that may cast light on possible defects that cause the problem.

Some consumers and others believe that Toyota’s electronic throttle control (ETC) systems, and perhaps such systems in other manufacturers’ vehicles, are susceptible to electro-magnetic interference (EMI) that can theoretically cause unintended acceleration by resulting in incorrect signals to the engine. These types of electronic systems are commonly used by all major vehicle manufacturers. To date, we have not identified any particular crash or unsafe occurrence that can clearly be attributed to such a phenomenon. NHTSA opened an investigation on Toyota’s ETC system in 2004, focused on short duration events, and could not find any safety defects in that system at the time. NHTSA looked at short duration events where no brake application was alleged in this investigation so as to screen out events that could have been caused by driver error, to ensure the agency could find a vehicle-based defect if it existed. In 2008, in wrapping up the floor mat investigation, NHTSA went on to look for additional possible causes of unintended acceleration in the Lexus ES350. That work included some limited electronic and magnetic testing but did not reveal a flaw in the ETC system. Since 1980, NHTSA has conducted 141 investigations on throttle control issues in vehicles made by various manufacturers, some of which involved electronic throttles and some the more traditional mechanical throttle systems.

However, to be absolutely sure that the agency is aware of all potential defects, NHTSA is conducting a review of the general subject of possible EMI effects on ETC systems. We have begun by talking to Toyota and other major manufacturers about the design of their systems and how, through failure modes and effects analysis and other standard techniques, they have taken the possible effects of EMI into account in designing those systems. This is a review of the technological issue, not a defect investigation. However, if any of this activity gives us any reason to believe that a defect may exist in Toyota or other vehicles related to EMI effects on ETC systems, we will open a defect investigation. When we have completed these discussions we will decide whether to conduct any additional research projects that might shed further light on the possible role of EMI effects on various electronic components in vehicles that are safety-related.

Other Pending Toyota Investigations

NHTSA has a total of 44 pending defect investigations concerning various manufacturers and a wide range of issues. Of those, five concern Toyota. One of the Toyota investigations is the Recall Query on sudden acceleration discussed above. Two others have gained wide attention and are summarized here.

NHTSA opened an investigation on February 4, 2010, concerning a braking problem on the model year 2010 Prius. The problem involves a momentary loss of braking when the vehicle hits a pothole, bump, or other uneven surface. NHTSA had received more than 100 complaints about the problem, including four alleged crashes involving two injuries. Five days after NHTSA opened its investigation, on February 9, Toyota announced a recall designed to address this problem. NHTSA will closely monitor its implementation. The recall involves over 148,000 vehicles sold in this country, including the model year 2010 Prius and the 2010 Lexus HS250H. While awaiting an appointment to have their vehicles remedied, owners who experience any braking problems should immediately contact their dealers, and all drivers of these cars should allow extra stopping distance until the problem is fixed.

On February 18, NHTSA opened an investigation concerning approximately 487,000 model year 2009 and 2010 Toyota Corolla and Matrix vehicles. The issue concerns the steering becoming unresponsive or loose at highway speeds. NHTSA had received 168 complaints alleging eight crashes (none fatal) at the time this investigation was opened.

As a final note, I would like to make clear that NHTSA has a very aggressive enforcement program that searches constantly for safety defects and noncompliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. In just the last three years, NHTSA investigations have resulted in 524 recalls in which 23.5 million vehicles were recalled so that safety problems could be fixed. In addition, several million items of motor vehicle equipment (including imported tires, child seats, and motorcycle helmets) were recalled to correct safety problems.

In summary, NHTSA has acted to ensure Toyota recalls on the issues related to unintended acceleration on which we have had evidence indicating the presence of a vehicle defect, i.e., pedal entrapment and sticky accelerators. We stand ready to ensure prompt action on any additional defects that we have reason to believe are present.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

 

Toyota Gas Pedals: Is the Public at Risk?

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE RAY LAHOOD
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Hearing on

"Toyota Gas Pedals: Is the Public at Risk?"

February 24, 2010

 

Chairman Towns, Ranking Minority Member Issa, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important issue of Toyota’s recent safety recalls and the broader issue of sudden unintended acceleration.

Transportation safety is the Department’s highest priority. We understand the level of concern about the safety of Toyota vehicles, particularly with regard to unintended acceleration. I would like to explain the recent recalls, the role that NHTSA played in ensuring the recalls occurred, and the actions NHTSA is taking to identify any additional safety defects that might cause unintended acceleration.

The recent Toyota recalls related to unintended acceleration involve two issues: first, accelerator pedal entrapment by floor mats, which can lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds; and second, accelerator pedals sticking or returning slowly after being depressed, which occurs at a variety of throttle positions but, to the best of our knowledge, is more likely to occur at low throttle positions more readily controlled by the vehicle’s brakes.

Before I discuss the details of these two recalls and NHTSA’s investigations, I want to clarify what owners of vehicles affected by these recalls should do. To avoid pedal entrapment, remove all floor mats from the driver’s side of your vehicle until you receive the repair for this problem from a Toyota dealer. If you do not remove the mat, make sure that it is always securely anchored in place on the retaining hooks and that no other mats are ever stacked on top of it. If your vehicle is covered by the “sticky pedal” recall, pay special attention to your gas pedal. If the pedal is harder to depress or slower to return after releasing it, this could be a precursor to a sticky pedal. If your pedal shows those symptoms you should contact a Toyota dealer immediately. If your accelerator becomes stuck for any reason, steadily apply the brake, put the car in neutral, bring it to a stop in a safe place, and call your dealer.

Pedal Entrapment

Of the two big recalls, the far more serious problem, in our view, is pedal entrapment by floor mats. We are aware of five deaths that have occurred due to this problem, including a tragedy near San Diego last August that claimed four lives. We have the greatest sympathy for the loved ones of those members of the Saylor and Lastrella families who died in that crash.

Pedal entrapment involves a situation in which the driver intends to accelerate quickly (such as when passing another car or entering a freeway) and depresses the accelerator pedal toward the floor of the vehicle. When pushed far enough the pedal becomes entrapped by the floor mat in full open throttle position. Once the pedal is entrapped, the vehicle will continue to accelerate well in excess of the driver’s intent unless the driver can overcome that situation. Given the very high speeds involved and the firmness with which the mat is holding the pedal at full throttle, these are the most dangerous situations we are aware of that come under the broad heading of unintended acceleration. It is very important to note that, even on the recalled vehicles, entrapment by the mat can occur only if the floor mat is out of position because it is not secured, one floor mat is stacked on top of another floor mat, or a floor mat is used that is not intended for use on the vehicle and is inappropriate due to its shape or dimensions.

NHTSA first became aware of this phenomenon in Toyota’s Lexus ES350 in 2007 and quickly opened an investigation in March of that year. NHTSA acted based on five complaints from vehicle owners. No related fatalities had been reported at the time the investigation began, but there had been three crashes allegedly related to pedal entrapment by the floor mat. At the time, the problem seemed most likely to occur in Lexus ES350 vehicles where a thick, all-weather floor mat offered as an option by Toyota was used. The shape of these floor mats and a raised portion forming a ridge made them particularly likely to entrap the pedal if not properly secured. So far as NHTSA knew at that time, the accelerator pedals themselves were functioning as designed and the problem centered on the way the pedal could be entrapped by these floor mats under certain conditions.

NHTSA escalated the investigation to an engineering analysis five months later, in August 2007. Shortly before that, a fatal crash involving a Camry occurred that was apparently caused by entrapment. In September 2007, Toyota announced a recall of the all-weather mats in Lexus and Camry vehicles. The remedy was to have the dealers remove the mats and provide a re-designed mat that was shaped in a way that addressed the entrapment risk even if the re-designed mat was improperly anchored.

At the time of the 2007 recall, NHTSA also issued a safety advisory, directed especially to owners of the recalled vehicles but also to all drivers, warning of the serious dangers of not properly anchoring mats or stacking mats on top of each other. At that time NHTSA believed that the recall and removal of the most problematic mats, the improved design of the replacement mats, and education of the public and dealers about the proper use of mats would substantially eliminate the known risk related to pedal entrapment.

NHTSA continued to monitor the situation and became aware of a post-recall crash involving one of the recalled mats that the owner had not removed. Fortunately, that was not a fatal crash but did result in serious injury. In light of that crash and indications that consumer response to this recall was too low, NHTSA urged Toyota to re-notify vehicle owners, which Toyota did in January 2009.

Eight months later, when the San Diego fatal crash occurred on August 28, 2009, NHTSA immediately began to investigate the circumstances of the crash. NHTSA investigators and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department examined the wreckage of the vehicle and concluded that the likely cause was excessive speed due to entrapment of the accelerator pedal by the floor mat. The vehicle was a Toyota Lexus ES350 on loan from a Toyota dealer for the day. The floor mat in the vehicle was designed for a Toyota Lexus RX SUV and was much longer than the mat that would have been proper for the Lexus ES350. At the time NHTSA investigators viewed the wreckage, the accelerator pedal was still fused to the floor mat, apparently melted in that position by the heat of the fire that followed the crash. Combining that observation with the circumstances known to have occurred immediately prior to the crash, including extremely high speeds and the driver’s inability to control the speed, NHTSA concluded that the excessive speed was caused by pedal entrapment. Supporting this conclusion was the fact that another customer of the dealership had used the same vehicle just three days earlier and complained of unintended, high-speed acceleration caused by the pedal having been trapped by the mat until he was able to stop the vehicle and free the pedal.

The San Diego tragedy made clear that the entrapment problem could occur in unexpected ways and that recalling the worst performing mats and educating drivers and dealers about not using unsecured, improper, or stacked mats was not going to adequately address the risk. Apparently not even all Toyota dealers were mindful of the need to ensure proper mats and mat anchorage to avoid entrapment.

As a consequence, NHTSA began to explore additional remedial options. The agency continued to review all relevant data to identify any reports that might be linked to similar entrapment in other Toyota vehicles. NHTSA became focused on the pedal design of a number of Toyota vehicles, not because of any known malfunction in their operation but because their shape tended to make entrapment more likely when floor mats are out of position or stacked. NHTSA prepared to open an investigation on the pedal design. At the same time, the agency informed Toyota that the company needed to address this risk promptly as a vehicle defect issue, and requested that Toyota conduct a recall. Toyota responded to NHTSA by announcing a recall to replace or re-shape the pedals in 3.8 million vehicles and sent its official notice of the recall to NHTSA on October 5, 2009.

NHTSA pressed the company to include as part of its recall the addition of a feature called brake override (which some call “smart pedal”) technology on models that have keyless ignition systems. With brake override, the vehicle control system gives priority to the signal from the brake pedal and returns the engine to idle when it detects the brake being applied while the accelerator is applied. NHTSA discovered in its investigation of pedal entrapment incidents that in some situations drivers of vehicles with keyless ignition systems did not know that, in Toyota vehicles, they could shut off their engines when in motion only by depressing the dashboard ignition button and holding it for three seconds. The owners were familiar with shutting off the vehicle when it was stopped, which requires holding the button for just one second or less. NHTSA thought it was especially important to ensure that in those vehicles with keyless ignition the driver had the benefit of brake override. Many other manufacturers use this technology and Toyota uses it in newly produced vehicles. The recall Toyota announced in October adhered to NHTSA’s request.

NHTSA continued to monitor incoming reports involving relevant incidents. In January, NHTSA told Toyota that its review of other Toyota vehicles indicated that they needed to be included in the pedal entrapment recall. Toyota responded by adding 1.1 million vehicles to the pedal entrapment recall on January 27, 2010.

Under the law, manufacturers have an obligation to notify NHTSA within five days of determining that a defect or noncompliance exists. When manufacturers voluntarily initiate recalls without waiting for NHTSA to order a recall, the process protects the public most quickly. NHTSA can order manufacturers to do recalls but only after initiating a formal investigation, completing its investigation, and following administrative procedures that include a public hearing and opportunities for the manufacturer to file detailed responses. Even after the NHTSA Administrator issues an order directing a recall, the manufacturer can avoid doing the recall until NHTSA proves its case in court. In such a case, the agency has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a vehicle defect exists and that it creates an unreasonable risk to safety. As a result, recalls occur most quickly when a manufacturer announces the recall without waiting for NHTSA to open and complete an investigation. That is what happened here—because of the pressure NHTSA applied.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query, which is a detailed request for information about when Toyota learned about the defect addressed by this recall. The information Toyota will provide in response to this request will help NHTSA determine whether Toyota’s initiation of the recall met its obligation to notify NHTSA quickly. If NHTSA determines that Toyota did not meet that obligation, NHTSA may seek civil penalties from Toyota for that failure. Those penalties could be as high as $16,375,000 for a related series of violations.

CTS Pedals Sticking

I want to turn now to the “sticky pedal” recall that was initiated in January of this year. NHTSA is not currently aware of any injuries or deaths definitively linked to this problem. Unlike the pedal entrapment recall, which concerns the shape of the pedal that makes it more susceptible to entrapment by an external object (the floor mat), this recall involves the internal working of the pedal assembly. Another distinguishing factor is that the pedal entrapment situations involve instances of full acceleration that are initially intended by the driver, while this problem, to the best of our knowledge, generally involves occurrences at lower power levels where the car continues to accelerate because the pedal does not return upward, or returns slowly, when the driver lessens pressure on the pedal.

The affected pedals are manufactured by CTS Corporation, which is based in Elkhart, Indiana. Some Toyota vehicle owners have complained of certain symptoms in vehicles equipped with those pedals. Those symptoms include a feeling that it is harder than normal to depress the pedal or that, when depressed, it is slower to return. In some circumstances, the situation can involve the pedal not returning at all from the position to which it was depressed. At this time, we understand that this problem is mechanical in nature and does not involve a flaw in the electronic signal being sent from the pedal sensor to the throttle.

In November 2009, NHTSA received several Toyota field reports concerning incidents in which pedals were slow to return or sticking in a number of different Toyota models from various model years. The reports did not indicate a root cause of the symptoms drivers were experiencing. NHTSA reviewed those reports as part of its screening for possible defect trends. Before NHTSA had decided whether or not to open an investigation, Toyota contacted the agency on January 16 about the specific problem it had identified with the CTS pedal. NHTSA told the company it needed a full explanation immediately. Toyota met with NHTSA on January 19 and demonstrated what it thought to be the mechanical problem with the CTS pedals. Based on the information presented by Toyota about the nature of the problem and Toyota’s experience with it, NHTSA told the company it expected very prompt action. Two days later, on January 21, Toyota announced the recall, covering some 2.3 million vehicles (many of which are also covered by the pedal entrapment recall and will receive both remedies). Toyota has had the supplier produce a new pedal with a different design that the company believes addresses the issue of excessive friction. The company has also devised an interim remedy to eliminate the safety risk by altering the pedal while new ones are being manufactured. Toyota informed NHTSA that it ceased production of new vehicles in the models affected by this recall so that it could begin to supply the new pedals being produced for the assembly line to dealers for installation in existing vehicles.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query about this recall. NHTSA has also begun an investigation to determine whether these particular CTS pedals have been installed in vehicles other than those recalled by Toyota, including those made by other manufacturers. NHTSA will soon receive relevant information from CTS and evaluate it.

Other Instances of Unintended or Excessive Acceleration

NHTSA receives more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every year concerning perceived safety problems with their vehicles. NHTSA reviews every complaint promptly and, if it appears to contain any evidence related to a safety defect trend, the reviewers begin to track that trend for possible investigation. Among those complaints in recent years have been many allegations of unintended or excessive acceleration on vehicles made by Toyota. Of course, during that same period NHTSA has received thousands of complaints containing such allegations concerning the vehicles made by most major vehicle manufacturers.

The agency has also received several petitions requesting that NHTSA investigate unintended acceleration in various Toyota vehicles. When a member of the public petitions NHTSA to investigate a possible defect, NHTSA examines all information submitted by the petitioner as well as all other information relevant to the particular problem cited by the petitioner. Even where NHTSA denies a defect petition, it does so only after conducting so thorough an examination of the issue that it has effectively done a preliminary investigation. Generally, NHTSA will visit the petitioners, interview them about their experiences, examine their vehicles and vehicle history, drive the vehicles, and search the NHTSA data bases for complaints similar to the experiences petitioners had. In some situations NHTSA will conduct more extensive testing of a vehicle of the same make and model as that of the petitioner.

The information NHTSA has received from consumers concerning unintended or excessive acceleration in vehicles can be divided into general categories that include: engine surging that lasts only a second or two; unintended acceleration from a stopped position or very low speed that results in quick movement over a short distance and sometimes results in crashing into an object; and events that begin at high speeds because the driver intended to accelerate quickly and continue for a sustained period of many seconds or minutes beyond what the driver intended. The possible causes of these events that NHTSA has been able to identify include mechanical problems with the accelerator; obstruction of the accelerator by another object; or human error (pressing the wrong pedal).

NHTSA has carefully reviewed all of the information provided by Toyota consumers in complaints filed with the agency to try to find causes for what they were experiencing. NHTSA also reviews Early Warning Reporting information submitted by the manufacturer and other sources of information, including insurance company submissions. For the high-speed events that last for many seconds or minutes, the only cause NHTSA has been able to establish thus far is entrapment of the pedal by a floor mat. The only exception to this has may have been a recent event in New Jersey that apparently did not involve floor mat entrapment but apparently did involve a stuck CTS pedal. Fortunately, the driver was able to bring the vehicle under control and drive it to a dealership. As discussed, the pedal entrapment issue in the recalled vehicles will presumably be resolved by the recall announced in October. The problem experienced in New Jersey will presumably be addressed by the recall of the CTS pedals announced in January.

NHTSA does not contend that the two recalls will fully resolve all concerns about unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. However, with one exception, NHTSA has not been able to establish a vehicle-based cause for unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles not covered by those two recalls. The exception was a recall of the model year 2004 Sienna vans in 2009 due to a defective trim panel that could, if loosened during servicing, entrap the accelerator at full throttle. That recall also arose from a NHTSA investigation.

NHTSA initiated a Recall Query on February 16 to ascertain whether Toyota has been completely forthcoming with the agency concerning all possible defects in its vehicles that may be causing unintended acceleration. NHTSA will closely review the documents Toyota submits to determine whether the company has additional information not yet shared with the agency that may cast light on possible defects that cause the problem.

Some consumers and others believe that Toyota’s electronic throttle control (ETC) systems, and perhaps such systems in other manufacturers’ vehicles, are susceptible to electro-magnetic interference (EMI) that can theoretically cause unintended acceleration by resulting in incorrect signals to the engine. These types of electronic systems are commonly used by all major vehicle manufacturers. To date, we have not identified any particular crash or unsafe occurrence that can clearly be attributed to such a phenomenon. NHTSA opened an investigation on Toyota’s ETC system in 2004, focused on short duration events, and could not find any safety defects in that system at the time. NHTSA looked at short duration events where no brake application was alleged in this investigation so as to screen out events that could have been caused by driver error, to ensure the agency could find a vehicle-based defect if it existed. In 2008, in wrapping up the floor mat investigation, NHTSA went on to look for additional possible causes of unintended acceleration in the Lexus ES350. That work included some limited electronic and magnetic testing but did not reveal a flaw in the ETC system. Since 1980, NHTSA has conducted 141 investigations on throttle control issues in vehicles made by various manufacturers, some of which involved electronic throttles and some the more traditional mechanical throttle systems.

However, to be absolutely sure that the agency is aware of all potential defects, NHTSA is conducting a review of the general subject of possible EMI effects on ETC systems. We have begun by talking to Toyota and other major manufacturers about the design of their systems and how, through failure modes and effects analysis and other standard techniques, they have taken the possible effects of EMI into account in designing those systems. This is a review of the technological issue, not a defect investigation. However, if any of this activity gives us any reason to believe that a defect may exist in Toyota or other vehicles related to EMI effects on ETC systems, we will open a defect investigation. When we have completed these discussions we will decide whether to conduct any additional research projects that might shed further light on the possible role of EMI effects on various electronic components in vehicles that are safety-related.

Other Pending Toyota Investigations

NHTSA has a total of 44 pending defect investigations concerning various manufacturers and a wide range of issues. Of those, five concern Toyota. One of the Toyota investigations is the Recall Query on sudden acceleration discussed above. Two others have gained wide attention and are summarized here.

NHTSA opened an investigation on February 4, 2010, concerning a braking problem on the model year 2010 Prius. The problem involves a momentary loss of braking when the vehicle hits a pothole, bump, or other uneven surface. NHTSA had received more than 100 complaints about the problem, including four alleged crashes involving two injuries. Five days after NHTSA opened its investigation, on February 9, Toyota announced a recall designed to address this problem. NHTSA will closely monitor its implementation. The recall involves over 148,000 vehicles sold in this country, including the model year 2010 Prius and the 2010 Lexus HS250H. While awaiting an appointment to have their vehicles remedied, owners who experience any braking problems should immediately contact their dealers, and all drivers of these cars should allow extra stopping distance until the problem is fixed.

On February 18, NHTSA opened an investigation concerning approximately 487,000 model year 2009 and 2010 Toyota Corolla and Matrix vehicles. The issue concerns the steering becoming unresponsive or loose at highway speeds. NHTSA had received 168 complaints alleging eight crashes (none fatal) at the time this investigation was opened.

As a final note, I would like to make clear that NHTSA has a very aggressive enforcement program that searches constantly for safety defects and noncompliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. In just the last three years, NHTSA investigations have resulted in 524 recalls in which 23.5 million vehicles were recalled so that safety problems could be fixed. In addition, several million items of motor vehicle equipment (including imported tires, child seats, and motorcycle helmets) were recalled to correct safety problems.

In summary, NHTSA has acted to ensure Toyota recalls on the issues related to unintended acceleration on which we have had evidence indicating the presence of a vehicle defect, i.e., pedal entrapment and sticky accelerators. We stand ready to ensure prompt action on any additional defects that we have reason to believe are present.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

 

Toyota’s Recalls and the Government’s Response

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE RAY LAHOOD
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION
U.S. SENATE

Hearing on

"Toyota’s Recalls and the Government’s Response"

March 2, 2010

 

Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Minority Member Hutchison, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important issue of Toyota’s recent safety recalls and the broader issue of sudden unintended acceleration. With me today is David Strickland, Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

Transportation safety is the Department’s highest priority. We understand the level of concern about the safety of Toyota vehicles, particularly with regard to unintended acceleration. I would like to explain the recent recalls, the role that NHTSA played in ensuring the recalls occurred, and the actions NHTSA is taking to identify any additional safety defects that might cause unintended acceleration.

The recent Toyota recalls related to unintended acceleration involve two issues: first, accelerator pedal entrapment by floor mats, which can lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds; and second, accelerator pedals sticking or returning slowly after being depressed, which occurs at a variety of throttle positions but, to the best of our knowledge, is more likely to occur at low throttle positions more readily controlled by the vehicle’s brakes.

Before I discuss the details of these two recalls and NHTSA’s investigations, I want to clarify what owners of vehicles affected by these recalls should do. To avoid pedal entrapment, remove all floor mats from the driver’s side of your vehicle until you receive the repair for this problem from a Toyota dealer. If you do not remove the mat, make sure that it is always securely anchored in place on the retaining hooks and that no other mats are ever stacked on top of it. If your vehicle is covered by the “sticky pedal” recall, pay special attention to your gas pedal. If the pedal is harder to depress or slower to return after releasing it, this could be a precursor to a sticky pedal. If your pedal shows those symptoms you should contact a Toyota dealer immediately. If your accelerator becomes stuck for any reason, steadily apply the brake, put the car in neutral, bring it to a stop in a safe place, and call your dealer.

Pedal Entrapment

Of the two big recalls, the far more serious problem, in our view, is pedal entrapment by floor mats. We are aware of five deaths that have occurred due to this problem, including a tragedy near San Diego last August that claimed four lives. We have the greatest sympathy for the loved ones of those members of the Saylor and Lastrella families who died in that crash.

Pedal entrapment involves a situation in which the driver intends to accelerate quickly (such as when passing another car or entering a freeway) and depresses the accelerator pedal toward the floor of the vehicle. When pushed far enough the pedal becomes entrapped by the floor mat in full open throttle position. Once the pedal is entrapped, the vehicle will continue to accelerate well in excess of the driver’s intent unless the driver can overcome that situation. Given the very high speeds involved and the firmness with which the mat is holding the pedal at full throttle, these are the most dangerous situations we are aware of that come under the broad heading of unintended acceleration. It is very important to note that, even on the recalled vehicles, entrapment by the mat can occur only if the floor mat is out of position because it is not secured, one floor mat is stacked on top of another floor mat, or a floor mat is used that is not intended for use on the vehicle and is inappropriate due to its shape or dimensions.

NHTSA first became aware of this phenomenon in Toyota’s Lexus ES350 in 2007 and quickly opened an investigation in March of that year. NHTSA acted based on five complaints from vehicle owners. No related fatalities had been reported at the time the investigation began, but there had been three crashes allegedly related to pedal entrapment by the floor mat. At the time, the problem seemed most likely to occur in Lexus ES350 vehicles where a thick, all-weather floor mat offered as an option by Toyota was used. The shape of these floor mats and a raised portion forming a ridge made them particularly likely to entrap the pedal if not properly secured. So far as NHTSA knew at that time, the accelerator pedals themselves were functioning as designed and the problem centered on the way the pedal could be entrapped by these floor mats under certain conditions.

NHTSA escalated the investigation to an engineering analysis five months later, in August 2007. Shortly before that, a fatal crash involving a Camry occurred that was apparently caused by entrapment. In September 2007, Toyota announced a recall of the all-weather mats in Lexus and Camry vehicles. The remedy was to have the dealers remove the mats and provide a re-designed mat that was shaped in a way that addressed the entrapment risk even if the re-designed mat was improperly anchored.

At the time of the 2007 recall, NHTSA also issued a safety advisory, directed especially to owners of the recalled vehicles but also to all drivers, warning of the serious dangers of not properly anchoring mats or stacking mats on top of each other. At that time NHTSA believed that the recall and removal of the most problematic mats, the improved design of the replacement mats, and education of the public and dealers about the proper use of mats would substantially eliminate the known risk related to pedal entrapment.

NHTSA continued to monitor the situation and became aware of a post-recall crash involving one of the recalled mats that the owner had not removed. Fortunately, that was not a fatal crash but did result in serious injury. In light of that crash and indications that consumer response to this recall was too low, NHTSA urged Toyota to re-notify vehicle owners, which Toyota did in January 2009.

Eight months later, when the San Diego fatal crash occurred on August 28, 2009, NHTSA immediately began to investigate the circumstances of the crash. NHTSA investigators and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department examined the wreckage of the vehicle and concluded that the likely cause was excessive speed due to entrapment of the accelerator pedal by the floor mat. The vehicle was a Toyota Lexus ES350 on loan from a Toyota dealer for the day. The floor mat in the vehicle was designed for a Toyota Lexus RX SUV and was much longer than the mat that would have been proper for the Lexus ES350. At the time NHTSA investigators viewed the wreckage, the accelerator pedal was still fused to the floor mat, apparently melted in that position by the heat of the fire that followed the crash. Combining that observation with the circumstances known to have occurred immediately prior to the crash, including extremely high speeds and the driver’s inability to control the speed, NHTSA concluded that the excessive speed was caused by pedal entrapment. Supporting this conclusion was the fact that another customer of the dealership had used the same vehicle just three days earlier and complained of unintended, high-speed acceleration caused by the pedal having been trapped by the mat until he was able to stop the vehicle and free the pedal.

The San Diego tragedy made clear that the entrapment problem could occur in unexpected ways and that recalling the worst performing mats and educating drivers and dealers about not using unsecured, improper, or stacked mats was not going to adequately address the risk. Apparently not even all Toyota dealers were mindful of the need to ensure proper mats and mat anchorage to avoid entrapment.

As a consequence, NHTSA began to explore additional remedial options. The agency continued to review all relevant data to identify any reports that might be linked to similar entrapment in other Toyota vehicles. NHTSA became focused on the pedal design of a number of Toyota vehicles, not because of any known malfunction in their operation but because their shape tended to make entrapment more likely when floor mats are out of position or stacked. NHTSA prepared to open an investigation on the pedal design. At the same time, the agency informed Toyota that the company needed to address this risk promptly as a vehicle defect issue, and requested that Toyota conduct a recall. Toyota responded to NHTSA by announcing a recall to replace or re-shape the pedals in 3.8 million vehicles and sent its official notice of the recall to NHTSA on October 5, 2009.

NHTSA pressed the company to include as part of its recall the addition of a feature called brake override (which some call “smart pedal”) technology on models that have keyless ignition systems. With brake override, the vehicle control system gives priority to the signal from the brake pedal and returns the engine to idle when it detects the brake being applied while the accelerator is applied. NHTSA discovered in its investigation of pedal entrapment incidents that in some situations drivers of vehicles with keyless ignition systems did not know that, in Toyota vehicles, they could shut off their engines when in motion only by depressing the dashboard ignition button and holding it for three seconds. The owners were familiar with shutting off the vehicle when it was stopped, which requires holding the button for just one second or less. NHTSA thought it was especially important to ensure that in those vehicles with keyless ignition the driver had the benefit of brake override. Many other manufacturers use this technology and Toyota uses it in newly produced vehicles. The recall Toyota announced in October adhered to NHTSA’s request.

NHTSA continued to monitor incoming reports involving relevant incidents. In January, NHTSA told Toyota that its review of other Toyota vehicles indicated that they needed to be included in the pedal entrapment recall. Toyota responded by adding 1.1 million vehicles to the pedal entrapment recall on January 27, 2010.

Under the law, manufacturers have an obligation to notify NHTSA within five days of determining that a defect or noncompliance exists. When manufacturers voluntarily initiate recalls without waiting for NHTSA to order a recall, the process protects the public most quickly. NHTSA can order manufacturers to do recalls but only after initiating a formal investigation, completing its investigation, and following administrative procedures that include a public hearing and opportunities for the manufacturer to file detailed responses. Even after the NHTSA Administrator issues an order directing a recall, the manufacturer can avoid doing the recall until NHTSA proves its case in court. In such a case, the agency has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a vehicle defect exists and that it creates an unreasonable risk to safety. As a result, recalls occur most quickly when a manufacturer announces the recall without waiting for NHTSA to open and complete an investigation. That is what happened here—because of the pressure NHTSA applied.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query, which is a detailed request for information about when Toyota learned about the defect addressed by this recall. The information Toyota will provide in response to this request will help NHTSA determine whether Toyota’s initiation of the recall met its obligation to notify NHTSA quickly. If NHTSA determines that Toyota did not meet that obligation, NHTSA may seek civil penalties from Toyota for that failure. Those penalties could be as high as $16,375,000 for a related series of violations.

CTS Pedals Sticking

I want to turn now to the “sticky pedal” recall that was initiated in January of this year. NHTSA is not currently aware of any injuries or deaths definitively linked to this problem. Unlike the pedal entrapment recall, which concerns the shape of the pedal that makes it more susceptible to entrapment by an external object (the floor mat), this recall involves the internal working of the pedal assembly. Another distinguishing factor is that the pedal entrapment situations involve instances of full acceleration that are initially intended by the driver, while this problem, to the best of our knowledge, generally involves occurrences at lower power levels where the car continues to accelerate because the pedal does not return upward, or returns slowly, when the driver lessens pressure on the pedal.

The affected pedals are manufactured by CTS Corporation, which is based in Elkhart, Indiana. Some Toyota vehicle owners have complained of certain symptoms in vehicles equipped with those pedals. Those symptoms include a feeling that it is harder than normal to depress the pedal or that, when depressed, it is slower to return. In some circumstances, the situation can involve the pedal not returning at all from the position to which it was depressed. At this time, we understand that this problem is mechanical in nature and does not involve a flaw in the electronic signal being sent from the pedal sensor to the throttle.

In November 2009, NHTSA received several Toyota field reports concerning incidents in which pedals were slow to return or sticking in a number of different Toyota models from various model years. The reports did not indicate a root cause of the symptoms drivers were experiencing. NHTSA reviewed those reports as part of its screening for possible defect trends. Before NHTSA had decided whether or not to open an investigation, Toyota contacted the agency on January 16 about the specific problem it had identified with the CTS pedal. NHTSA told the company it needed a full explanation immediately. Toyota met with NHTSA on January 19 and demonstrated what it thought to be the mechanical problem with the CTS pedals. Based on the information presented by Toyota about the nature of the problem and Toyota’s experience with it, NHTSA told the company it expected very prompt action. Two days later, on January 21, Toyota announced the recall, covering some 2.3 million vehicles (many of which are also covered by the pedal entrapment recall and will receive both remedies). Toyota has had the supplier produce a new pedal with a different design that the company believes addresses the issue of excessive friction. The company has also devised an interim remedy to eliminate the safety risk by altering the pedal while new ones are being manufactured. Toyota informed NHTSA that it ceased production of new vehicles in the models affected by this recall so that it could begin to supply the new pedals being produced for the assembly line to dealers for installation in existing vehicles.

On February 16, NHTSA sent Toyota a Timeliness Query about this recall. NHTSA has also begun an investigation to determine whether these particular CTS pedals have been installed in vehicles other than those recalled by Toyota, including those made by other manufacturers. NHTSA will soon receive relevant information from CTS and evaluate it.

Other Instances of Unintended or Excessive Acceleration

NHTSA receives more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every year concerning perceived safety problems with their vehicles. NHTSA reviews every complaint promptly and, if it appears to contain any evidence related to a safety defect trend, the reviewers begin to track that trend for possible investigation. Among those complaints in recent years have been many allegations of unintended or excessive acceleration on vehicles made by Toyota. Of course, during that same period NHTSA has received thousands of complaints containing such allegations concerning the vehicles made by most major vehicle manufacturers.

The agency has also received several petitions requesting that NHTSA investigate unintended acceleration in various Toyota vehicles. When a member of the public petitions NHTSA to investigate a possible defect, NHTSA examines all information submitted by the petitioner as well as all other information relevant to the particular problem cited by the petitioner. Even where NHTSA denies a defect petition, it does so only after conducting so thorough an examination of the issue that it has effectively done a preliminary investigation. Generally, NHTSA will visit the petitioners, interview them about their experiences, examine their vehicles and vehicle history, drive the vehicles, and search the NHTSA data bases for complaints similar to the experiences petitioners had. In some situations NHTSA will conduct more extensive testing of a vehicle of the same make and model as that of the petitioner.

The information NHTSA has received from consumers concerning unintended or excessive acceleration in vehicles can be divided into general categories that include: engine surging that lasts only a second or two; unintended acceleration from a stopped position or very low speed that results in quick movement over a short distance and sometimes results in crashing into an object; and events that begin at high speeds because the driver intended to accelerate quickly and continue for a sustained period of many seconds or minutes beyond what the driver intended. The possible causes of these events that NHTSA has been able to identify include mechanical problems with the accelerator; obstruction of the accelerator by another object; or human error (pressing the wrong pedal).

NHTSA has carefully reviewed all of the information provided by Toyota consumers in complaints filed with the agency to try to find causes for what they were experiencing. NHTSA also reviews Early Warning Reporting information submitted by the manufacturer and other sources of information, including insurance company submissions. For the high-speed events that last for many seconds or minutes, the only cause NHTSA has been able to establish thus far is entrapment of the pedal by a floor mat. The only exception to this has may have been a recent event in New Jersey that apparently did not involve floor mat entrapment but apparently did involve a stuck CTS pedal. Fortunately, the driver was able to bring the vehicle under control and drive it to a dealership. As discussed, the pedal entrapment issue in the recalled vehicles will presumably be resolved by the recall announced in October. The problem experienced in New Jersey will presumably be addressed by the recall of the CTS pedals announced in January.

NHTSA does not contend that the two recalls will fully resolve all concerns about unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. However, with one exception, NHTSA has not been able to establish a vehicle-based cause for unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles not covered by those two recalls. The exception was a recall of the model year 2004 Sienna vans in 2009 due to a defective trim panel that could, if loosened during servicing, entrap the accelerator at full throttle. That recall also arose from a NHTSA investigation.

NHTSA initiated a Recall Query on February 16 to ascertain whether Toyota has been completely forthcoming with the agency concerning all possible defects in its vehicles that may be causing unintended acceleration. NHTSA will closely review the documents Toyota submits to determine whether the company has additional information not yet shared with the agency that may cast light on possible defects that cause the problem.

Some consumers and others believe that Toyota’s electronic throttle control (ETC) systems, and perhaps such systems in other manufacturers’ vehicles, are susceptible to inherent design flaws or electro-magnetic interference (EMI) that can theoretically cause unintended acceleration by resulting in incorrect signals to the engine. These types of electronic systems are commonly used by all major vehicle manufacturers. To date, we have not identified any particular crash or unsafe occurrence that can clearly be attributed to such a flaw or the EMI phenomenon in Toyota’s vehicles. NHTSA opened an investigation on Toyota’s ETC system in 2004, focused on short duration events, and could not find any safety defects in that system at the time. NHTSA looked at short duration events where no brake application was alleged in this investigation so as to screen out events that could have been caused by driver error, to ensure the agency could find a vehicle-based defect if it existed. In 2008, in wrapping up the floor mat investigation, NHTSA went on to look for additional possible causes of unintended acceleration in the Lexus ES350. That work included some limited electronic and magnetic testing but did not reveal a flaw in the ETC system. Since 1980, NHTSA has conducted 141 investigations on throttle control issues in vehicles made by various manufacturers, some of which involved electronic throttles and some the more traditional mechanical throttle systems.

However, to be absolutely sure that the agency is aware of all potential defects, NHTSA is conducting a review of the general subject of possible design flaws in ETC systems and the possible effects of EMI effects on those systems. We have begun by talking to Toyota and other major manufacturers about the design of their systems and how, through failure modes and effects analysis and other standard techniques, they have taken the possible effects of EMI into account in designing those systems. We have just recently received information about another theory concerning a possible design flaw in the Toyota ETC system. We will explore all relevant information in this examination. To be clear, this is a review of the technological issues, not a defect investigation. However, if any of this activity gives us any reason to believe that a defect may exist in Toyota or other vehicles related to design flaws in or EMI effects on ETC systems, we will open a defect investigation. When we have completed these discussions we will decide whether to conduct any additional research projects that might shed further light on the effectiveness of manufacturers’ safety control strategies concerning their ETC systems, including the possible role of EMI effects on various electronic.

Other Pending Toyota Investigations

NHTSA has a total of 44 pending defect investigations concerning various manufacturers and a wide range of issues. Of those, five concern Toyota. One of the Toyota investigations is the Recall Query on sudden acceleration discussed above. Two others have gained wide attention and are summarized here.

NHTSA opened an investigation on February 4, 2010, concerning a braking problem on the model year 2010 Prius. The problem involves a momentary loss of braking when the vehicle hits a pothole, bump, or other uneven surface. NHTSA had received more than 100 complaints about the problem, including four alleged crashes involving two injuries. Five days after NHTSA opened its investigation, on February 9, Toyota announced a recall designed to address this problem. NHTSA will closely monitor its implementation. The recall involves over 148,000 vehicles sold in this country, including the model year 2010 Prius and the 2010 Lexus HS250H. While awaiting an appointment to have their vehicles remedied, owners who experience any braking problems should immediately contact their dealers, and all drivers of these cars should allow extra stopping distance until the problem is fixed.

On February 18, NHTSA opened an investigation concerning approximately 487,000 model year 2009 and 2010 Toyota Corolla and Matrix vehicles. The issue concerns the steering becoming unresponsive or loose at highway speeds. NHTSA had received 168 complaints alleging eight crashes (none fatal) at the time this investigation was opened.

As a final note, I would like to make clear that NHTSA has a very aggressive enforcement program that searches constantly for safety defects and noncompliance with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. In just the last three years, NHTSA investigations have resulted in 524 recalls in which 23.5 million vehicles were recalled so that safety problems could be fixed. In addition, several million items of motor vehicle equipment (including imported tires, child seats, and motorcycle helmets) were recalled to correct safety problems.

In summary, NHTSA has acted to ensure Toyota recalls on the issues related to unintended acceleration on which we have had evidence indicating the presence of a vehicle defect, i.e., pedal entrapment and sticky accelerators. We stand ready to ensure prompt action on any additional defects that we have reason to believe are present.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.

 

DOT's Accomplishments in Implementing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act)

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE RAY LAHOOD
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

July 27, 2010

 

         Chairman Oberstar, Ranking Member Mica and Members of the Committee I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) accomplishments in implementing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the Recovery Act).  For the past 18 months, we have been hard at work at the Department of Transportation ensuring that these funds are used to put American’s back to work -- while at the same time addressing America’s transportation infrastructure needs.  Today, I would like to highlight some of these accomplishments and their impact on the lives of individual Americans.

         First, I want to assure all of you that the Recovery Act funding provided for transportation infrastructure projects is “out the door” and making a difference. Of the $48.1 billion provided in the Act to support transportation improvement projects, nearly $38 billion of these funds has been obligated on more than 14,800 highway, transit, aviation, and shipyard projects in every State of the Union, the District of Columbia, and several of the U.S. territories.    Just over $16 billion – or 33% of these funds -- has already been disbursed to repay States and local authorities for project expenses.  The remaining funds provided are for America’s historic High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail program and projects funded through the $1.5 billion Discretionary Grants announced last February.  Groundbreakings for several of these projects have already occurred and more are slated to begin this summer.

Last summer, many of the early Recovery Act projects were in the planning stages or were just getting underway.  But as the 2010 construction season has moved into full force, we truly are experiencing a “summer of recovery” in the transportation sector.  By the end of this summer, Recovery Act funding will have repaired more than 30,000 miles of roads, highways, and bridges making travel safer and improving mobility for families and commuters everywhere.  We are upgrading, renovating, and repairing hundreds of airports by bringing runways, towers, and terminals up to 21st Century standards.  Recovery Act funds are helping to increase capacity and efficiency at key ports such as Portland, Oregon and Toledo, Ohio, in major thoroughfares like I-405 in Los Angeles, and airports like Denver International. These improvements to our transportation infrastructure will yield benefits for travelers for years to come.

         But this is just part of the story… the Recovery Act is also about jobs.  The past few weeks, we have been engaged in direct conversations with Recovery Act project recipients.  Specifically, these are the folks who are “on the ground” working on individual transportation projects.  We have been listening to their stories, and hearing about the impact these projects are having every day. The people we’ve spoken with have told us about the importance of their projects not only to safety, and the state of good repair of the transportation systems, but also to their employees and their communities as a whole.  In Beech Grove Indiana, the rehabilitation and return to service of dozens of Amtrak train cars saved 77 jobs and led to the Beech Grove Maintenance Facility hiring more than 100 additional employees to keep up with the increased production.  This saved several employees’ homes from foreclosure, ensured that others could continue to put food on the table, and enabled parents to have the resources they needed to send their kids to summer camp. 

          It also started an economic ripple effect.  In Bear, Delaware, not far from the Amtrak car restoration facility, there is a restaurant called Capelli’s.  A year ago the owner, Tracy Capelli, had to reduce her workforce by 10 employees, and was seriously considering closing the restaurant.  Then the Amtrak car restoration project began ramping up to restore and return to service more cars which allowed the facility to hire more than 50 new workers, nearly all of which had been laid off by the auto industry.  Tracy says those new workers are the reason her restaurant is still open today.  Thanks to the Recovery Act, Capelli’s now serves meals to the Bear facility workers and the near-by community every day, and Tracy is planning to hire a dozen new workers for the fall season.   

         For many, the Recovery Act has meant the difference between being unemployed and having a paying job.  Bill Montgomery is a Senior Superintendent at Swinerton Builders.  He works on a Recovery Act project at Palm Springs International Airport in California, building the new air traffic control tower that will improve safety for air passengers, help to reduce congestion and delays, and provide a better work environment for the FAA controllers. Mr. Montgomery is convinced that he would be unemployed if it weren't for the Recovery Act.  He said, "Every time you complete a project, you're concerned about whether you have another project to go to.  The Recovery money is fueling that next job."

         Then there is Rhea Mayolo who is raising three children in Preston, Maryland.  Before the Recovery Act, she was just trying to make ends meet, working two jobs and living off food stamps and energy assistance.  Now, she's a consultant helping to oversee the expansion of Maryland 404, the main gateway road to Ocean City, Maryland.  When asked about the Recovery Act, she said, "I came from nothing, and now I have a job that is a future for me.  Not just a job, it's an actual career.  And I love it."

Trevor Eickhoff also credits the Recovery Act with helping him to stay employed.  He is a project engineer with Archer Western Contractors in Dallas, Texas.  He is working on the Woodall Rodgers Freeway Deck Park, an innovative livability project that will create over five acres of green space and connect Dallas' Uptown, Downtown, and Arts Districts.  He considers himself "walking proof" of the success of the Recovery Act: "I'm 25 years old with a mortgage, and I'm still working."

These are just a few examples of where Americans are back at work because Recovery Act projects are providing jobs.   Since the beginning of the Recovery Act, we have been measuring the number of jobs resulting from transportation projects and it continues to grow.  We estimate that the Department of Transportation’s share of Recovery Act investments has generated 160,000 jobs (based on one person working for a full-year) so far, and that that number will grow quickly over the course of this summer.  That number represents the total number of jobs, including jobs created in supplier industries and in consumer goods industries when workers go out and spend their paychecks.  If we look just at what we call the “direct jobs” – jobs created on the transportation job-site – we estimate that about 41,700 people are at work each and every day on Transportation Recovery Act projects.  While I am pleased with the progress we have made in this first 18 months of implementing the Recovery Act, there is still much more that needs to be done.  During our Summer of Recovery, we are witnessing many of the larger Recovery Act projects getting underway.  In the last three months alone, Federal Highway Administrator Victor Mendez, Deputy Secretary John Porcari, and I have visited 21 projects in States throughout America.  In each of these cities, I have had the chance to talk with project employees and hear how the Recovery Act has touched their lives.  Their stories are truly amazing.

As we look ahead, work is continuing on our effort to establish America’s historic high speed passenger rail program.  So far, three individual projects are underway and we expect a ground breaking in Maine to occur in August. The Federal Railroad Administration has already obligated close to $175 million for High Speed Rail, initiating work on several major corridors, including Tampa-Orlando (FL), Charlotte-Raleigh (NC), and Milwaukee-Madison (WI). This is the first step in building this new industry that will deliver expanded and improved passenger transportation, economic recovery, and many other public benefits.

Projects funded through our Discretionary Grant program (TIGER I Grants) are also accelerating rapidly.  The Department announced 51 TIGER Discretionary Grant awards on February 17, 2010.  These innovative, multi-modal grants are creating jobs and demonstrating how transportation investments help achieve key national objectives, like economic competitiveness and sustainability, among others.  The Department is using the program's limited funds to foster substantial co-investment from state and local governments and the private sector and to encourage broad partnerships for well-planned and well-coordinated projects.

         The Office of the Secretary and the relevant modal administrations are entering into grant agreements and obligating funds on a rolling basis.  Currently, two projects have started construction, a rural road safety project in Pine Ridge, South Dakota, and a state-of-good-repair road project, on the Beartooth Highway, in Wyoming.  The next groundbreaking is expected to be in Seattle, where the Mercer Corridor project will get underway in August.  By the end of this construction season, we anticipate that another sixteen or so TIGER Discretionary Grant projects will have started construction.  One of the Department's key initiatives with respect to the TIGER Discretionary Grant program is working with each of the grantees to develop a performance measurement plan for its project. 

While technically not part of the Recovery Act funding, the Department is gearing up to evaluate applications for the $600 million in TIGER II Discretionary Grant funds authorized under the FY 2010 Appropriations Act.  Yesterday, July 26, was the deadline for submitting pre-applications for this program, and the deadline for submitting TIGER II applications is August 23, 2010.  The number of pre-applications we received demonstrates the continued robust interest in a program like this.  

         The TIGER programs have provided opportunities for the Department to do many innovative things that have little precedent in traditional Federal transportation investment programs.  We have applied rigorous analytics to a multi-modal project evaluation process and are working towards real, sustained performance measurement.  As we break down modal silos within the Department and working with other Federal agencies to better align and integrate our public service efforts, we are focused on demonstrating substantial value for every taxpayer dollar we invest. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to share the Department’s accomplishments in meeting the goals of the Recovery Act.  I will be happy to answer your questions.