WRITTEN STATEMENT

OF

CYNTHIA DOUGLASS
ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

BEFORE THE

 111th CONGRESS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 14, 2009

Introduction

Chairman Oberstar, Chairwoman Brown, Ranking Member Shuster and distinguished Members of the Committee and Subcommittee, on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, I am Cynthia Douglass, Acting Deputy Administrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).  I want to thank you for the invitation to appear today to provide an overview of PHMSA’s recent accomplishments, our current priorities and initiatives and our vision for the future of the hazardous materials transportation safety program.

PHMSA’s Approach to Hazardous Materials Safety

PHMSA is a small agency with an enormous mission.  PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety is responsible for a comprehensive, nationwide program designed to protect the nation from the risks to life, health, property, and the environment inherent in the commercial transportation of hazardous materials. 

PHMSA is the lead Federal agency in regulating the safe transport of up to 1 million daily movements of hazardous materials, totaling up to 20 % of all freight tonnage shipped each year in the United States.  Hazardous materials regulated by the Department include explosive, poisonous, corrosive, flammable, and radioactive substances.  Our work touches the lives of every American -- the energy we use in our vehicles, at work, and in our homes; and ingredients in virtually all commercial products we use, the chemicals that treat our water, fertilize our crops, create our medicines, and manufacture our clothing -- are all essential to our quality of life.  Many of these shipments require transfer between different modes of transportation.  Hazardous materials are essential to our citizens and to our economy.  

In our role as the nation’s lead hazardous material safety transportation agency, PHMSA is responsible for the development and implementation of targeted, consistent, and uniform hazardous materials regulations across all modes of transportation.  Authority for enforcing these regulations is shared with our sister safety agencies in DOT and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).   

Safety continues to be Transportation Secretary LaHood’s highest priority, and it is the first priority for the Department’s hazardous materials safety program.  Overall, the safety record of commercial hazardous materials transportation is excellent and improving.  We have seen a steady decline of serious incidents over the last 10 years, 1998-2008.

Last year, we celebrated the 100th anniversary of the hazardous materials transportation safety program, which originated with enactment of the Transportation of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act (specifically, “An Act to promote the safe transportation in interstate commerce of explosives and other dangerous articles”) on May 30, 1908.

Since 1908, the Federal program to minimize the risks associated with the commercial transportation of hazardous materials has evolved from its initial focus on the regulation of explosives to a broad and comprehensive safety and security program applicable to a wide variety of materials and articles shipped by multiple modes of transport across interstate and international boundaries, and overseen by an array of Federal and state agencies.

PHMSA’s primary goal for the Department’s hazardous materials safety program is to reduce the risks inherent in the commercial transportation of hazardous materials by all modes.  To this end, we identify and evaluate systemic risks and devise strategies to address those risks.  First, we have in place comprehensive regulations for the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials.  Second, we assist hazardous materials stakeholders to understand the hazardous materials regulations and how to comply with them.  Third, we identify those persons who refuse or neglect to comply with safety and security regulations and stop their illegal or noncompliant activities.  Finally, we assist the nation’s response community to mitigate potential hazardous materials incidents and respond to hazardous materials transportation emergencies.   

We are unique among DOT agencies in that we work across DOT Operating Administrations to ensure consistency in administering hazardous materials safety programs among the modes of transportation.  Because hazardous materials move by air, land, and water, we continuously coordinate activities with each of our DOT modal partners:  the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA); and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA).  Additionally, PHMSA works very closely with the Coast Guard. 

We also work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and USCG; Department of Labor (DOL)/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); Department of Justice (DOJ)/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); Department of Agriculture (USDA)/Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS); Department of State (DOS); Department of Defense (DOD); Department of Commerce (DOC); Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC); U.S. Postal Service (USPS); and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to achieve our safety goals.  We respond to the recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB).

In accordance with our authorizing statute, PHMSA strives to align domestic transportation requirements with international transport standards and requirements to the extent practicable.  Harmonization of domestic and international standards becomes increasingly important as the volume of hazardous materials transported in international commerce grows and the cost of conducting international commerce increases.  The harmonization of hazardous materials standards facilitates international trade by minimizing the costs and other burdens of complying with multiple or inconsistent safety requirements for transportation of hazardous materials to and from the United States.  By facilitating compliance with international standards, harmonization also tends to enhance safety for international movements, but only if the international standards themselves provide an appropriate level of safety.  To that end, PHMSA actively participates in the development of international standards for the transportation of hazardous materials, frequently advocating the adoption in international standards of improved safety requirements.  PHMSA chairs the United Nations Subcommittee of Experts on the Transportation of Dangerous Goods.  PHMSA works closely with our counterparts on the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

Enhancing Safety by Reducing Risk

The Department’s hazardous materials transportation safety program enhances safety by focusing on risk reduction in transportation.  The agency’s program is challenged to quickly identify emerging risks and develop innovative, flexible, and effective safety controls to address those risks.  We target both frequent incidents and potential high consequence accidents.   Significant safety and economic consequences flow from our decisions.

In keeping with PHMSA risk-based approach to enhancing hazardous materials transportation safety, we have identified high risk materials and operations and are developing strategies to address those risks.  In order of priority, these risks include:

• Fires onboard commercial aircraft;
• Releases of materials that are poisonous by inhalation (PIH materials), such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia from rail tank cars and tank trucks;
• Rollovers of tank trucks carrying flammable liquids such as gasoline;
• Bulk loading and unloading operations; and
• Undeclared shipments of hazardous materials.

To address the risk of fire on board commercial aircraft, we are focusing on strengthening safety controls applicable to the transportation of lithium batteries.  For example, in 2006, we issued a final rule to finalize an interim requirement prohibiting the transportation of certain lithium batteries as cargo on passenger aircraft.  The rule addressed an immediate safety threat.  PHMSA and FAA, working with fire-safety experts at FAA’s Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, found that if a shipment of primary lithium batteries caught fire in flight, current aircraft cargo fire-suppression systems would not be able to extinguish the fire.  This final rule also adopted enhanced testing, packaging, and hazard communication requirements for shipments of lithium batteries.  Based on recommendations from NTSB and our own analysis of incident data, including incidents occurring outside of transportation, we have initiated a rulemaking project to develop additional measures to enhance the safety of lithium battery shipments on aircraft as well as simplify the regulations to enable better understanding by all parties that handle lithium batteries in transportation. 

Heightening public awareness of the hazards associated with the air transportation of lithium batteries, including batteries contained in electronic devices, is a key component of a comprehensive strategy to enhance safety and reduce incidents.  Since 2007, we have been working with air carriers, battery manufacturers, air travel associations and other government agencies to educate the public about potential safety risks and measures that will reduce or eliminate those risks.

One of our visible programs to promote battery safety is the SafeTravel Web site, which includes guidance and information on how to travel safely with batteries and battery-powered devices.  We have also been working with the major airlines, travel and battery industries to provide SafeTravel information for ticketed passengers and frequent flyers, and place printed battery safety materials in seat pockets on passenger planes.  We have recorded several million hits on our SafeTravel Web site.

We are also addressing the unique safety risks posed by PIH materials which are transported in large quantities by rail and truck.  About 100,000 carloads of PIH chemicals are shipped by rail each year.  In the past year, PHMSA issued two final rules to reduce the risks posed by the rail transportation of hazardous materials.  The first, published late in 2008 in cooperation with FRA, requires rail carriers to assess routing alternatives available to transport certain explosive, radioactive and PIH materials, and based on this analysis utilize the safest and most secure routes.  The second, published January, 2009 also in cooperation with FRA, establishes more rigorous design standards for tank cars used to transport PIH materials to enhance the ability of these tank cars to survive accident conditions without loss of lading.  The standards established in this rule are intended as interim standards which will enhance the accident survivability of newly constructed PIH tank cars as compared to existing PIH tank cars, while at the same time providing tank car owners continued flexibility in car selection.  Adoption of these standards will ensure the ongoing availability of tank cars suitable for the transportation of PIH materials while PHMSA and FRA complete research and testing on advanced tank car design to validate and implement a more stringent performance standard. 

PHMSA is also taking steps to reduce the risks associated with cargo tank rollover accidents, bulk loading and unloading operations, and undeclared hazmat shipments.  Up to 2,000 cargo tank motor vehicle accidents occur each year, a third of which involve rollovers.  PHMSA, in cooperation and coordination with NHTSA and FMCSA, is examining improved training programs and electronic stability control systems as potential solutions to minimize cargo tank motor vehicle rollovers. 

Undeclared shipments of hazardous materials are predominately aerosols and flammable liquids (e.g. paint and paint related materials), as well as dry ice, perfume products and cigarette lighters.  These types of hazardous materials are a growing problem especially with the increased use of Internet auction sites like Amazon.com and product returns to large retail centers like Wal-Mart.  PHMSA strives to communicate with the operating modes to increase the awareness of undeclared shipments.

We are using a risk-based approach to develop targeted enforcement strategies to enhance compliance and reduce incidents.  Every month PHMSA’s enforcement staff develops a list of companies that present significant compliance problems based on an analysis of the number and types of violations, recent serious incidents, and other indicators of serious non-compliance.  These companies are targeted for in-depth inspection and enforcement efforts.  In addition, PHMSA established a Systems Integrity Safety Program (SISP) to identify companies with significant safety or compliance problems and provide them with targeted and focused assistance to address those problems.  Focusing our enforcement effort on the worst violators begins the process of turning them around and bringing them into compliance.

The acquiring of accurate data is the underpinning for all of the Department’s risk reductions efforts.  In October 2008, we celebrated the launch of the Hazmat Intelligence Portal (HIP), a data warehouse and business intelligence tool.  The Internet portal allows users to access hazardous materials information available from 27 separate government data bases in one easy-to-use portal.  This launch was made possible by the efforts of our industry partners and the Federal team that included the One-DOT team of FAA, FMCSA, and FRA; USCG as well as DHS/TSA.

The HIP helps us identify high risk hazardous materials shippers and carriers and focus our enforcement efforts, develop training and outreach opportunities, and prioritize and target resources using integrated and easy-to-use dashboards of information.  The HIP Team was recently awarded the 2009 Interagency Resources Management Conference (IRMCO) Award for “Outstanding Inter-Organizational Performance and Achievement.”  Sponsored by the General Services Administration the prestigious IRMCO Award is presented each year to a single individual and team who have demonstrated exceptional ability to operate across organizational boundaries to improve the Government's services to its citizens. 

Strengthening Oversight and Emergency Response Capabilities

Strengthening emergency response capabilities is a high priority for PHMSA.  We are working on a broad front with the emergency response community to ensure that it has sufficient resources to plan for and respond to hazardous materials transportation emergencies.  The focus is on the training of firefighters and preparedness of state and local communities.

PHMSA enjoys a strong partnership with the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) in addressing hazardous materials incidents.  Through a partnership with the IAFC, PHMSA has established the National Hazardous Materials Fusion Center. The National Hazardous Materials Fusion Center will provide a secure, web-based portal to serve as a data and information network for hazardous materials teams; first responders; Federal, state and local agencies; and the private sector. Through this portal, firefighters and Federal agencies will share critical information to enhance hazardous materials responder safety and improve decision-making for the prevention and mitigation of hazardous materials incidents.  With the increased production, manufacturing, and transportation of hazardous materials, with thousands more introduced each year, it is imperative that first responders have the knowledge and resources to deal with accidents effectively. 

The Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) Grants Program is the only federally funded grant program available solely for the training of responders in hazardous materials and community preparedness planning.  The program provides funding to all 50 states, U.S. territories and a number of Native American Tribes.  Funded by fees paid by hazardous materials shippers and carriers, the HMEP Grants Program provides a total of $28 million to assist state and tribal governments to develop, improve, and implement emergency plans; train public sector hazardous materials emergency response employees to respond to accidents and incidents involving hazardous materials; determine flow patterns of hazardous materials through communities; and determine the need within a state for regional hazardous materials emergency response teams.  A total of $4 million in HMEP grants were also awarded to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the International Association of Fire Fighters, the National Labor College, and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers to provide for the training of hazardous materials safety instructors and employees who handle these materials in transportation.  We are currently engaged in a comprehensive review of the HMEP Grants Program to ensure that it is effectively meeting emergency response planning and training needs and to identify ways to increase its effectiveness.  We are hoping to complete that review by later this year.

The Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) was the first tool developed to assist emergency responders in responding to hazardous materials transportation incidents.  Every four years, PHSMA and our partners in Canada and Mexico publish an updated version of the Emergency Response Guidebook.  The Guidebook provides first responders with a guide for initial actions to be taken in those critical first minutes after an incident to protect the public and to mitigate potential consequences.  Since 1980, we have published and distributed free to first responders over 11 million copies of the ERG.  PHMSA recently partnered with the National Library of Medicine to put the ERG on the Internet and to make the ERG available to emergency responders on smart phones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). 

Use of Technology to Enhance Safety

We are leveraging technology to enhance safety and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of our programs.  We are expanding our use of Internet websites and data portals, utilizing smart phones and PDAs to facilitate communications with emergency responders, and employing data warehouse and business intelligence tools to better understand hazardous materials safety risks and target strategies to address those risks.  As we embark on the program’s second century, we are committed to improving the quality, reliability, and timeliness of information guiding all parts of the safety control system, including hazard communication.  As the private sector and government agencies transition to paperless systems, adherence to longstanding paper-based requirements for hazardous materials transportation places an increasing burden on the system, contributing to freight delays and congestion.  Deploying new communication technologies holds the promise of improving safety, even as it reduces regulatory burdens and improves the performance of the transportation system.

We believe that leveraging the power of personal computing, wireless infrastructure, and web-based technologies will enhance the safety and security of the American people by reducing risk, congestion, and the potential of shipments becoming diverted, lost, or misused.

Building for the Future

Looking to the future, we will continue to explore ways to enhance system integrity, strengthen oversight and enforcement, foster healthy partnerships with emergency responders, promote the use of new technologies to improve safety and efficiency, and improve the data that is the underpinning for all of our safety programs.  Our focus is to adopt creative approaches to build a renewed safety culture in the hazardous materials transportation industry while allowing for more efficient and effective transportation of hazardous materials and reducing regulatory obstacles to the extent consistent with our safety goals. 

We have made significant progress in addressing NTSB recommendations to enhance the safety of lithium battery shipments in the air mode; improve the crashworthiness of rail tank cars; address the need for the immediate availability of information on hazardous materials shipments for transport workers and emergency responders; identify and address safety risks related to the loading and unloading of bulk hazardous materials; strengthen the crash-resistance of tube trailers (semi-trailers carrying compressed gas cylinders); minimize the risks involved with the carriage of hazardous materials in wetlines on cargo tank motor vehicles; and upgrade the safety of oxygen cylinders.  We will continue to work with NTSB to ensure the continued safe transportation of hazardous materials.

PHMSA is expanding its emergency response strategy to expand training to reach more of the 800,000 volunteer firefighters who carry the responsibility for responding to emergencies in our local communities.  We are developing new emergency response protocols in cooperation with the International Association of Fire Chiefs through the new National Hazardous Materials Fusion Center.

PHMSA is also leading the development of more stringent safety standards for the transport of dangerous goods through the UN Subcommittee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, the ICAO committee on dangerous goods, and the IMO.  With our international partners, we are pursuing initiatives to enhance the safety of lithium battery shipments, consumer and other limited quantity materials, marine pollutants, explosives transport by air, and packagings such as intermediate bulk containers.  PHMSA has published a Five-Year Plan for enhancing international standards.

PHMSA is making use of the power of new computing, wireless, and Internet technologies in the analysis of risk, understanding the incidents that have occurred, the sharing of data and information across Federal agencies that have hazardous materials responsibilities, and the planning of enforcement programs.  PHMSA has a long-term strategy for the electronic communication of hazardous materials shipping information including the transmission of emergency response information to first responders. 

PHMSA is working across many Federal and state government agencies in ensuring that the rules for the commercial transportation of hazardous materials are consistent and, consistent with risk, applied uniformly across the various modes whether in aviation, over the road, on the rails or on the water.  This arrangement has worked well for the past three decades, and we are positioned to strengthen this role even further as we look to the future. 

Closing

We look forward to working with the members of this Subcommittee, the Congress and our stakeholders as we embark on a serious and open discussion with all interested parties to further enhance the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials.

Mr. Chairman and Madam Chairwoman, I commend you and the Members of the Committee and Subcommittee for your leadership on this very important issue.  I assure the Members of this Committee that the Administration, Transportation Secretary LaHood and the dedicated men and women of PHMSA share your strong commitment to improving safety, reliability and public confidence in our nation’s safe transport of hazardous materials.

Thank you again for this opportunity today.  I am happy to take your questions.

STATEMENT OF

RICHARD L. DAY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

AVIATION SAFETY: THE HUDSON RIVER MIDAIR COLLISION AND
THE SAFETY OF AIR OPERATIONS IN CONGESTED AIRSPACE,

BEFORE THE

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY,

SEPTEMBER 15, 2009.

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the very sad events of August 8, 2009, and what FAA is doing to create a safer operating environment over the Hudson River. Everyone at FAA grieves with the families over the loss of life that occurred that day. When such events do occur, we redouble our efforts to make the skies safer. My colleagues at FAA and throughout the aviation industry approach this work with seriousness and urgency.

Since the investigation of the accident remains under the formal processes of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), I will not be commenting on the specifics of the accident. I will, however, share with you the immediate actions we have taken, as well as discuss some of our longer-range plans to improve safety.

The FAA’s first action was taken on August 11. We issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) that reiterated our recommended best practices for conduct of flight in the airspace of the Hudson River corridor. New York airspace is very restricted by a large volume of “Class B” airspace, which is designed to provide positive protection of airliners using LaGuardia, John F. Kennedy International, and Newark Liberty International Airports. All aircraft within Class B airspace must be under positive control by air traffic controllers.

There are areas known as “VFR flyways,” where we permit aircraft operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) to fly within a defined corridor and below certain altitudes without being under positive air traffic control. These VFR flyways use “see and be seen rules,” where pilots are responsible for maintaining safe distance from other aircraft. In New York, this VFR flyway is commonly called the “exclusion area,” which has existed in some form since 1971, and is bounded by the Hudson River and has a ceiling of either 1,100 feet or 1,500 feet. (See Figures 1.)

The August 11 NOTAM reiterated long-recommended practices for this VFR flyway, including speed limitations (not exceeding 140 knots) and taking precautionary measures (turning on anti-collision, position/navigation, and/or landing lights and self-announcing their position on the Hudson River frequency for all other aircraft to hear).

We recognized this was only the first step to assess and enhance the safety of Visual Flight in this area. On August 14, 2009, we chartered a New York Airspace Task Force to review the current procedures for Hudson River operations, specifically with regard to safety of flight, operations, and regulatory compliance and make recommendations to Administrator Babbitt no later than August 28 – just two weeks later. The Task Force consisted of FAA air traffic and aviation safety experts, as well as air traffic controllers representing the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) who work in this area. We also had input from key stakeholders – such as Helicopter Association International, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, and the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey. The group delivered these recommendations to Administrator Babbitt on time on August 28. We thank the Task Force members for their efforts, particularly given the short timeline. Because we believe that their recommendations will enhance the safety of this airspace, we intend to implement their recommendations via expedited rulemaking and revised letters of agreement with the area airports and operators.

The Task Force recommended eight specific safety and operational enhancements that would restructure the airspace, mandate pilot operating rules, create a new entry point into the Hudson River airspace from Teterboro, and standardize New York area charts and maps. They also recommended developing new training for pilots, air traffic controllers, and helicopter operators so they will be fully trained and ready for implementation of the new rules. One of the most significant changes would divide the airspace into altitude corridors that separate aircraft flying over the river from those operating to and from local heliports or seaplane bases. (See Figure 2.)

This new exclusionary zone would be comprised of three components:

• It would establish a uniform “floor” for the Class B airspace over the Hudson River at 1,300 feet, which would also serve as the “ceiling” for the exclusionary zone. This removes some confusing complexity that currently exists.
• Between 1,300-2,000 feet, aircraft will operate in the Class B airspace under visual flight rules but under positive air traffic control and communicate with controllers on the appropriate air traffic frequency.
• Below1,300 feet, aircraft must use a single common radio frequency. Mandatory routes for aircraft flying up and down the river will require them to favor the “right side” of the river (i.e. the east side for northbound traffic and the west side for southbound traffic) to provide horizontal separation as well.
• Coordination of traffic and handoffs between Air Traffic Controllers at the Teterboro tower, Newark tower, and radar control will be improved.

The new rules will mandate that pilots use two specific radio frequencies – one for the Hudson River and the other for the East River. It mandates speeds of 140 knots or less and the use of anti-collision lights and landing lights in the VFR routes. The rules would also require pilots to announce their position when they reach various points up and down the river. Pilots would also be required to have charts available in the aircraft and to be familiar with and comply with the airspace rules.

The FAA also intends to propose standardized procedures for fixed-wing aircraft leaving Teterboro to enter either the Class B airspace or the exclusionary zone. The proposal would require that before an aircraft planning to enter the Class B airspace takes off, Teterboro controllers would request approval from the Newark tower for the aircraft to climb to 1,500 feet. Aircraft from Teterboro that want to enter the VFR flyway would be directed by air traffic control to fly a special route over the George Washington Bridge, which would allow them to enter the Hudson River airspace in a much less congested area.

The FAA expects the expedited rulemaking covering these issues to be completed, and have all pilot and controller training completed in time for publication of new charts and new rules by November 19^th.

The effort with New York airspace has wider implications for the national airspace system. As we implement these changes in the New York airspace and have an opportunity to analyze their effectiveness, the FAA intends to examine the other major metropolitan areas and congested corridors for similar airspace and operational risks to see if such procedures would be appropriate elsewhere. We expect this larger effort to carry well into next year.

Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

STATEMENT OF

RICHARD L. DAY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

NEXTGEN: AREA NAVIGATION (RNAV)/REQUIRED NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE (RNP),

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

JULY 29, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s program for area navigation (RNAV) and required navigation performance (RNP) air traffic control routes. RNAV/RNP is a building block for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), and has already shown great promise in enhancing safety and efficiency in the National Airspace System (NAS).

Through NextGen, the FAA is addressing the impact of air traffic growth by increasing NAS capacity and efficiency while simultaneously improving safety, reducing environmental impacts, and increasing user access to the NAS. To achieve its NextGen goals, the FAA is implementing new Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) routes and procedures that leverage emerging technologies and aircraft navigation capabilities.

What is Performance-Based Navigation?

PBN is a framework for defining performance requirements in “navigation specifications,” that is, to specify that the avionics can function in a particular way or ways, that the pilot is appropriately trained and follows certain procedures in the cockpit. PBN can be applied to an air traffic route, instrument procedure, or defined airspace. PBN provides a basis for the design and implementation of automated flight paths as well as for airspace design and obstacle clearance. Once the required performance level is established, the aircraft’s own capability determines whether it can safely achieve the specified performance and qualify for the operation.

What Is RNAV?

Prior to satellite navigation capabilities, i.e. global positioning systems or GPS, aircraft could only navigate primarily by ground-based navigation aids, such as VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) equipment. This limited the routes that aircraft could take, depending on the location and position of those ground-based aids, and necessarily involved certain inefficiencies during flight, e.g., instead of flying a direct route, an aircraft might have to take a more circuitous route in order to navigate from ground-based point to ground-based point.

Now, with advances in technology, we are able to take advantage of space-based navigation sources that provide for additional navigational coverage. An aircraft using RNAV can fly on any desired flight path within the coverage of ground- or space-based navigational aids, within the limits of the capability of the systems onboard the aircraft, or a combination of both capabilities. As such, RNAV aircraft have better access and flexibility for point-to-point operations. This leads to the potential for flights to reduce the miles flown, save fuel, and enhance efficiency.

RNAV also helps solve operational issues. For example, an RNAV approach may be available in areas where we cannot install or maintain a ground-based navigational aid, such as in Alaska, where the terrain either does not permit the ability to install the navigational aid or the weather conditions preclude us from being able to maintain the operability of the navigational aid.

What Is RNP?

RNP is RNAV with the addition of an onboard performance monitoring and alerting capability. A defining characteristic of RNP operations is the ability of the aircraft navigation system to monitor the navigation performance it achieves and inform the crew if the requirement is not met during a flight operation. This onboard monitoring and alerting capability enhances the pilot’s situational awareness and can enable reduced obstacle clearance or closer route conformance without intervention by air traffic control.

Certain RNP operations require advanced features of the onboard navigation function and approved training and crew procedures. These operations must receive approvals known as Special Aircraft and Aircrew Authorization Required (SAAAR), similar to approvals required for operations to conduct Instrument Landing System Category II and III approaches. In addition to certified avionics, the flight crew must be trained and authorized to fly these complex procedures.

The attached chart shows how RNAV and RNP have improved the navigational process. See Figure 1 below. As you can see, using the current ground navaids, the aircraft has to fly from beacon to beacon, often taking an inefficient route in order to pick up the signals at the appropriate place in the air. The dotted boxes indicate the expanse of the area in the sky that the aircraft could be in as it picks up those ground-based signals. This requires our air traffic control to create larger areas of separation between aircraft, in order to maintain safety. In the RNAV and RNP routing, however, the dotted areas are far smaller, indicating that the aircraft can fly a much more precise route in the air. Additionally, the graphic illustrates the RNP “radius to turn” ability, essentially indicating how RNP enables the aircraft to make much tighter, more precise turns in the air. This is particularly useful in areas where the airspace is congested and there are multiple busy airports. The ability of the aircraft to use these “radius to turn” procedures means air traffic is easier to “deconflict,” or route in a manner that avoids other air traffic paths.

Figure 1. Performance-Based Navigation: RNAV/RNP

Benefits

RNAV and RNP capabilities facilitate more efficient design of airspace and procedures which collectively result in improved safety, access, capacity, predictability, and operational efficiency, as well as reduced environmental impacts. Specifically, improved access and flexibility for point-to-point operations help enhance reliability and reduce delays by defining more precise terminal area procedures. They also can reduce emissions and fuel consumption.

RNAV procedures can provide benefits in all phases of flight, including departure, en route, arrival, approach, and transitional airspace. For example, Standard Terminal Arrivals (STARs) can:

• ·       Increase predictability of operations
  • ·       Reduce controller/aircraft communications
    • ·       Reduce fuel burn with more continuous vertical descents
      • ·       Reduce miles flown in Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) airspace
        • ·       Reduce interaction between dependent flows in airspace shared for adjacent airport operations.

           

          How are RNAV/RNP Procedures Created?

          RNAV/RNP procedures have been developed by the FAA, with the support of industry and MITRE, in a complex, multi-layered process. For Terminal RNAV procedures (those RNAV procedures in the airspace into an airport terminal environment), for example, there is an 18-step implementation process. See Figure 2 below.

          Figure 2. 18-Step Guidelines for Terminal RNAV Procedure Implementation

           

          Several offices within the FAA play essential roles in the development of these procedures. Their various duties are outlined below:

          Air Traffic Organization:

           

          RNAV/RNP Group

           

          ·      Serves as the lead office for implementation and integration of RNAV and RNP routes and procedures into the air traffic environment

          ·      Coordinates policy and implementation activities with industry and within FAA

          ·      Provides guidance for and expedites the development of PBN criteria and standards and implements airspace and procedure improvements

          ·      Collaborates with the U.S. and international aviation communities – government and industry – as a leader in developing PBN concepts, technical standards, operator requirements, and implementation processes to enhance safety, increase capacity, improve efficiency, and reduce the environmental impact of aviation

          ·      Provides technical and operational guidance within FAA. This group also develops and maintains processes and tools to aid the field with RNAV/RNP procedure design

           

           

          Aviation System Standards

          ·      Oversees the standard development, evaluation, and certification of airspace systems, procedures, and equipment

          ·      Designs and develops instrument flight procedures (IFPs), publishes aeronautical charts and digital products for air carrier and general aviation pilots for use throughout the United States and around the world

          ·      Provides aircraft maintenance and engineering services, operates a fleet of flight inspection aircraft for airborne evaluation of IFPs and electronic navigational signals

          Field Facilities

           

          • ·      Responsible for procedure design evaluations for airspace and procedures usage, letters of agreement, video map updates, automation coding and controller familiarization and training in accordance with the 18-step RNAV implementation process
            • ·      Responsible for designing and using the procedures operationally

               

              Aviation Safety:

               

              Flight Standards Service

               

              ·      Develops and establishes criteria for civil and military terminal instrument procedures

              ·      Develops rules, standards, policies, and criteria governing the operational aspects of en route, terminal, and instrument flight procedures (except air traffic control procedures)

              ·      Performs operational evaluations, including flight simulation, flight simulator, and in-flight testing of standards and criteria

              ·      Assesses the impact on safety and provides radar separation analysis tools

              ·      Oversees all of flight inspection policy and all instrument flight procedure development

              Aircraft Certification

               

              ·      Administers safety standards governing the design, production, and airworthiness of civil aeronautical products, such as the avionics required for RNAV/RNP

              ·      Oversees design, production, and airworthiness certification programs to ensure compliance with prescribed safety standards

              ·      Provides a safety performance management system to ensure continued operational safety of aircraft

              ·      Works with aviation authorities, manufacturers, and other stakeholders to help them successfully improve the safety of the international air transportation system

               

              Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service

               

              ·      Establishes safety standards and provides independent oversight of the Air Traffic Organization – the provider of air traffic services in the United States 

              ·      Accomplishes safety oversight in a variety of ways including:

              o      Developing and amending regulations and guidance for regulatory oversight and credentialing functions

              o      Participating in the development and harmonization of air traffic control international standards

              o      Providing regulatory oversight of the Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System

               

               

              What Is the Status of RNAV/RNP?

              Currently, we have 159 RNAV routes and 270 RNAV arrival and departure procedures implemented into the NAS and 163 RNP SAAAR approach procedures. By the end of fiscal year 2009, we anticipate that we will have an additional 48 RNAV routes, 35 RNAV arrival and departure procedures, and 29 RNP SAAAR approach procedures in place. Additionally, other PBN procedures such as Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance approaches throughout the NAS elevate the overall number of Performance Based Procedures to over 8,000.

               

              What Are the Challenges of RNAV/RNP?

              The development of RNAV/RNP procedures is a relatively young program at the FAA. The agency only began developing these procedures in 2002. Along the way, we have encountered some challenges and learned from them. We intend to apply those lessons moving forward.

               

              While we have a standard process for developing RNAV/RNP procedures in the Terminal area, we did not have a comparable process for developing procedures elsewhere in the operational environment. We believe this as an area in which we could improve, and have asked for an agency-wide mapping of all PBN processes to standardize how we develop, test, chart, and implement Performance-Based Navigation procedures. I am pleased to report that we should be starting work on that Process Mapping in the next couple of weeks.

               

              As we move forward, there are other challenges that continue to face us in the advancement of RNAV/RNP. For example:

              • ·      International Harmonization: What the FAA terms “RNP SAAAR” (defined above), the bulk of the international community refers to as “RNP AR.” As always, we want to make sure that our terms and procedures are harmonized with international standards to reduce confusion and enhance safety. As a result, we are transitioning this term to harmonize with the international community’s term. We will continue to work with our counterparts internationally in addressing these types of issues.
                • ·      Environmental Issues: While many RNAV/RNP procedures are considered “overlays,” that is, following essentially the same flight path that air traffic follows today, the implementation of some RNAV/RNP procedures will trigger the need for a detailed quantitative environmental review because the location and number of proposed flight paths may be different from what currently exists. The FAA has a strong commitment to environmental stewardship and doing our best to analyze and mitigate the impact on the public in terms of noise and emissions, while maintaining safety of the NAS. While the FAA understands the frustration felt by industry on the delay to implementation that these environmental reviews may cause at times, we take our environmental responsibilities seriously and will not compromise our environmental stewardship responsibilities for the sake of expediency.
                  • ·      Hybrid Environment: As the aviation industry moves towards equipping their aircraft to take full advantage of RNAV/RNP benefits, we are bound to see a mix of differing aircraft capabilities in the NAS, flying different types of procedures. This “hybrid environment” will certainly present additional challenges to our controllers, but we are fully confident that they will be able to handle these challenges as we deploy decision support tools, technology, and training. Because equipage remains a challenge to some in the aviation community, the FAA is committed to providing a safe environment in the NAS for all users.
                    • ·      Third-Party Development: There are several third-party vendors available who are capable of developing RNAV/RNP procedures for specific projects. We are working with two of them (Naverus and Jeppesen) to authorize them to do procedure development, flight validation, and maintenance of Public RNP SAAAR instrument approaches, under FAA supervision. However, the safety of the NAS is the FAA’s mission and responsibility. When we do use these third-party resources, FAA is committed to overseeing their work to ensure safe development and implementation into the NAS. We will not abdicate our responsibility to assure safety.

·      Prioritization of Procedures: As the benefits of RNAV/RNP become clearer to users of the NAS, we have received increasing requests to add or accelerate new RNAV/RNP procedures more widely in the NAS. The FAA certainly appreciates the validation of our work, but we caution that implementation of new procedures into the NAS must be done carefully and methodically to ensure a cohesive system. Moreover, as the RNAV/RNP program matures, we are discovering that certain procedures may provide greater benefits for industry, the flying public, and the NAS overall. Safe and effective integration of these procedures are of paramount importance to the FAA, and as such, we are working to deploy them in a manner that will maximize the benefits of RNAV/RNP.

Some of our other technical challenges are illustrated in the graphic below. See Figure 3.

Figure 3. RNAV/RNP Implementation and Challenges

• Conclusion
• As you can see, the FAA has developed a solid foundation of routes and procedures for RNAV/RNP, which serves as a platform of the enhanced safety and efficiency goals of NextGen. Since we have this foundation, we are transitioning from a site-by-site (or runway-by-runway) implementation process toward a NextGen readiness concept that would include development of an integrated system of PBN routes and procedures NAS-wide. This broader view will go further in advancing NextGen and better accommodate our intent to accelerate NextGen as much as possible. In the end this integrated approach will optimize benefits for operators, and ultimately, the traveling public. While we anticipate challenges along the way, we have learned from our work over the past few years and are prepared to meet those challenges effectively.
• Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would happy to answer any questions you may have.

STATEMENT OF

RICK DAY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR OPERATIONS,
AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

CENTER WEATHER SERVICE UNITS,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT,

JULY 16, 2009.

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here to testify about the status of Center Weather Service Units (CWSU).  As this is my first opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee, I would like to take just a moment to introduce myself.  My name is Rick Day, and I am the Senior Vice President for Operations for the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Air Traffic Organization (ATO).  As Senior Vice President for Operations, I oversee the safe and efficient delivery of air traffic services provided by the FAA.  My career with the FAA began 35 years ago as an air traffic controller at the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center.  I have first hand experience relying on CWSU forecasts so it is especially fitting that in my first appearance before you I will testify about the CWSUs and their future. 

The FAA has had a longstanding, productive relationship with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS).  We want to continue to this relationship with a renewed focus of improved aviation weather forecasting.

A little history of our working relationship may be helpful.  Aviation weather forecasting services have always been integral to safe and efficient operations within the National Airspace System (NAS) and support from the NWS has been key.  The formal arrangement by which the NWS now provides aviation weather services to the Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) [1] originated with the NTSB recommendation issued on October 28, 1977, following its investigation of the crash of Southern Airways flight 242.  The NTSB recommended that FAA develop rules and procedures for the timely dissemination by air traffic controllers of all available severe weather information to inbound and outbound flightcrews in the terminal area.  To address this recommendation, the FAA entered into an Interagency Agreement with the NWS, to create CWSUs at each FAA ARTCC.

Today, CWSUs are located at each of the FAA’s 21 ARTCCs throughout the United States.  They are staffed by 84 NWS meteorologists, 16 hours a day, seven days a week.  Typically, the CWSU forecaster on duty works with the ARTCC Traffic Management Unit (TMU), providing two scheduled weather briefings and updates throughout the day.  The CWSU forecast is used in the development of the operational plan for air traffic, including runway configurations and routing traffic around significant weather.

The original Interagency Agreement with the NWS that established the CWSUs has been renewed a number of times since it was first entered into in 1978.  The current agreement will expire in September of this year but we expect to execute the agreement’s one-year extension option to continue the existing CWSU operations through September 2010. 

Over the last several years, the FAA has been exploring opportunities to improve safety and efficiency within the NAS and capitalize on technological improvements that have emerged over the last 30 years since CWSU operation began.  Technological improvements have changed the way in which weather information is generated, disseminated and used.  In addition to the change in technology, we found that the CWSUs were not providing the same level of services at all of its locations, and the services and forecasts were not standardized across the 21 locations.  There was also little collaboration or communication between the different CWSUs.  In addition, neither the FAA nor the NWS had a formal quality assurance program for CWSU products and services.  To this end, in 2005, the FAA asked the NWS to examine different service methods to provide improved, consistent and continuous (24 hours per day, seven days per week) weather support to ARTCCs.  In response to this request, the NWS submitted a restructuring proposal in October 2006.  In April 2007, the FAA declined this proposal because we were in the process of an internal requirements review.  We completed that review in late 2007.     

Following this review, we refined our requirements for services provided by the CWSUs because our existing requirements were too broad to ensure the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the services.  Also, as GAO found, FAA did not have a system in place to gather information about the effect of forecasts on delays and diversions in the NAS.

In December 2007, the FAA asked NWS to provide a new proposal based on more narrowly tailored requirements for the future weather forecasting needs and the need for performance evaluation.  Our requirements included 24-hour, 7-days-a-week staffing, standardized services to promote consistency in service delivery across the NAS as well as NAS-wide monitoring and a new Terminal Approach Control (TRACON) forecast that provided higher resolution information for 10 of our busiest TRACONs.  The FAA also asked that NWS outline three different service methods to meet these requirements using  (1) the existing CWSU configuration at 21 ARTCCs; (2) a reduced number of CWSUs; and (3) one centralized weather facility.  NWS responded with three proposals, each of which had some innovative ways to meet our requirements, however we did not accept any of them because the costs were too high for each alternative compared to the current cost of the program.     

In September 2008, the FAA advised the NWS that we preferred the single weather center solution but recognized the need for back up and requested the NWS refine their proposal.  Safety and efficiency have always been and will continue to be the driving forces behind any improvements to the CWSU service.  We received the NWS revised proposal last month.  Currently, the FAA has a team assessing the proposal and we expect to have the assessment completed in early August.

Although our assessment of the NWS proposal is not complete, with a two weather center approach, we see an opportunity to improve aviation weather forecasting services in the near term.  The agency expects the two center approach to provide finer resolution and more consistent and accurate forecasts that will improve the safety and efficiency of traffic flow through the National Airspace System 24 hours a day versus the 16 hours currently covered.  This consolidated CWSU model would also allow meteorologists monitoring the NAS to dynamically allocate resources to areas with “active” weather conditions, having the most impact on aviation operations. 

We understand that there may be some concern about providing weather services “remotely”.  We think this concern is unfounded because we have considerable experience with remote weather briefings.  Today, CWSUs provide remote support to TRACONS and select towers just as Flight Service Stations provide remote weather briefings to pilots.  In addition, providing weather services using this model is consistent with centralized weather operations used by NavCanada, Eurocontrol, and  the U.S. Department of Defense as well as the airlines.

Further, CWSUs will not be the only source of aviation weather information for FAA’s air traffic operations.  NWS would continue to have, at any one time, approximately 130 meteorologists providing meteorological watch and issuing forecasts for parts of the NAS from its weather forecast offices and the Aviation Weather Center providing terminal and enroute forecasts.  

The current requirements for the CWSUs to provide “consistent” information will also help move aviation weather services towards the FAA’s future needs envisioned for the Next Generation Air Transportation System or NextGen.  One key concept of NextGen is a common operational picture of weather information for all air traffic management decisions.  This concept is already being put into practice through the Collaborative Convective Forecast Product (CCFP).  Several years ago we asked the NWS to develop and provide the CCFP based on user feedback that there were several convective forecasts available, often providing different answers.  FAA needed a “common operational picture” of convective weather on which to build the air traffic management plan.  The CCFP provides this common forecast of convective weather.  It is developed from collaboration among meteorologists from CWSUs, the Aviation Weather Center, Meteorological Service of Canada, and the airlines.  FAA and NAS stakeholders now rely on the CCFP as the primary forecast product for NAS-wide operations planning, during the convective season.  Consistent with the NextGen Concept of Operations, we need a common operational picture of all weather elements that impact air traffic.

In the time since the GAO’s January 2008 evaluation of weather services provided by CWSUs, we have taken steps to address GAO’s recommendations for establishing standards by which to evaluate CWSU performance.  We have already established standards for participation in the development of the Convective Forecast, when convective weather is expected to occur within that specific ARTCC domain; consistency of CWSU product formats, information content, and procedures for issuance, across all CWSUs; and, provision of on site or back up daily services 16 hours per day, seven days per week.  We began base-lining these performance standards with the NWS during site evaluations we started this year.  We have also established a standard for accuracy of forecasts used in decisions for traffic management initiatives.  The metric that results from this is being developed jointly by FAA and NWS.  This metric will take a little more time to refine, but we believe that building on a developing tool called the Weather Impact Traffic Index, which translates weather and weather forecast impact on air traffic, will help us in these efforts.

As I mentioned, the NWS and the FAA are also in the process of conducting a new series of site evaluations.  As of June, we had evaluated 13 of the 21 CWSUs and expect to complete the remaining site evaluations by September.  So far, we have found what previous FAA, NWS and GAO reports have documented:  a lack of standardization in CWSU services.  Having said that, we have also found that CWSUs are well integrated into air traffic management operations.  We have also found positive dividends from new FAA and NWS initiatives.  Specifically, NWS has provided all CWSUs with a common tool set--standardized technology, collaboration and training--which is producing improved and consistent service.  The FAA has funded a hardware and software technology upgrade of the AWIPS Remote Display (the standard meteorological workstation used by the NWS) which has improved system performance and weather information availability because it provides faster, more effective manipulation of forecast data. 

In conclusion, we are very hopeful about the benefits of the NWS proposal.  However, I want to assure you that our assessment of the NWS proposal is not the final consideration prior to implementation.  Let me be clear – we will not change the current configuration until a demonstration and validation show we are able to effectively disseminate the most timely and accurate weather forecasting for the safe operation of flights in our system.  We will work with the NWS to plan, execute and evaluate the demonstration and validation to prove whether the consolidated CWSU model will be able to provide on-demand services remotely.  In addition, we understand that the Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate of the National Academy of Sciences has agreed to oversee the demonstration and validation, providing an independent assessment of the consolidated CWSU model.  We also expect the NTSB to contribute to the demonstration and validation by participating in the independent review.  Finally, during the demonstration and review, we expect to develop the data necessary to assess, in quantitative terms, the improvements we have identified.

We have an opportunity to couple the art and science of aviation weather to reduce the impact weather has on aviation and increase the safety of operations.  FAA and NWS will continue to learn and grow together as we move towards our common goal of improved aviation weather services. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Broun, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks.  I would be happy to answer any questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF

VICTORIA COX,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR NEXTGEN AND
OPERATIONS PLANNING SERVICES, AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

ON

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MODERNIZATION AND NEXTGEN:
NEAR TERM ACHIEVABLE GOALS,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

MARCH 18, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the current state of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts on air traffic control modernization and the near term goals of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). 

Defining NextGen:  The Basics

NextGen is a wide-ranging transformation of the entire national air transportation system to meet future demand and support the economic viability of the system while reducing delays, improving safety, and protecting the environment.  NextGen will change the way the system operates – reducing congestion, noise, and emissions, expanding capacity and improving the passenger experience.  NextGen is a highly complex, multilayered, long-term evolutionary process of developing and implementing new technologies and procedures.  NextGen is not a single piece of equipment or a program or a system that will instantaneously transform the air transportation system.  NextGen builds on legacy systems to increase capability in today’s National Airspace System (NAS), adds new performance-based procedures and routes, and ultimately delivers programs that transform the NAS.  NextGen takes advantage of new technology that is similarly being used to transform our personal lives and the way we do business, such as GPS, analog-to-digital, and network to network data sharing.

Defining NextGen:  The Need

Although it is extremely safe, the current system is not performing adequately. Our preeminence as a nation in air transportation is not assured.  NextGen is needed to bring to air transportation the same twenty-first century processes that give operations in other industries reliability, flexibility, and predictability.

Even in the face of falling demand and reduced capacity, we’ve seen congestion continue in our busiest airspace.  We know that we must be poised to handle future demand that will surely return as the nation’s economy improves.  In fact, the aviation sector will be an important factor in the nation’s economic recovery.  In 2006, the FAA's Air Traffic Organization reported that civil aviation accounted for 11 million jobs and represented 5.6% of the Gross Domestic Product; and, according to the FAA's calculations using U.S. International Trade Commission's reported trade data statistics, at $61 billion, aerospace products and parts contributed more to the positive balance of trade than any other sector - $32 billion more than the next highest contributor.

NextGen must also address the constraints that will be levied on the air transportation system by environmental impacts from aircraft noise and emissions and concerns about energy.  Increased efficiency with NextGen operations will lead to reduced fuel consumption resulting in lower carbon emissions.  NextGen investments in engine and airframe design and alternative fuels will produce the changes needed to reduce the environmental impact of aviation.

NextGen will also increase the safety of an already exceedingly safe system.  NextGen further enables FAA’s transition from traditional forensic investigations of accidents and incidents with a prognostic approach to improving safety.  NextGen promotes the open exchange of pertinent safety information to continuously improve aviation safety.

NextGen:  Organizational Structure

As the Members of this Committee are well aware, in December 2003, Congress enacted Vision 100 (Public Law 108-176) and established, within the FAA, the Next Generation Air Transportation System Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).  Since its founding in 2004, the JPDO has produced a national vision statement, a multi-agency research and development roadmap, a description of operational concepts to meet system performance requirements, a multi-agency enterprise architecture, and – in 2008 – an integrated work plan. 

The integrated work plan captures at a high level the NextGen planning of all the JPDO partner agencies – the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Commerce (Commerce), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  With the delivery of the integrated work plan, the JPDO has produced the major deliverables required by Vision 100.  JPDO must continue to work with the partner agencies to maintain an updated integrated plan, and agencies must move forward with implementation.

A year ago, we received several recommendations from varied sources about how we should deliver NextGen.  The Senior Policy Committee of the JPDO asked us to accelerate NextGen, to shift from concept development to execution.  Stakeholders continually asked for a single point of accountability for NextGen.  Industry wanted more focused oversight by FAA of JPDO deliverables; and most experts recognized that the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), as the operator of the national airspace system, has ultimate responsibility and accountability for NextGen implementation in that system. 

In response to these recommendations, the NextGen and Operations Planning Organization, under my leadership as a Senior Vice President in the Air Traffic Organization, was made accountable for delivering NextGen to the National Airspace System, the NAS.  I am responsible for implementation of all elements of NextGen and have authority over all matters related to FAA NextGen research, technology development, acquisition, integration, and implementation including allocation within the FAA of NextGen budgets.  My organization is made up of offices focused on NextGen delivery including the NextGen Integration and Implementation Office.  This Office manages the integration of all NextGen activities within the FAA, ensuring that the planning and programming of the NextGen portfolio is coordinated across the FAA and with external stakeholders.  It also develops and publishes the FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan and manages NextGen portfolio performance. 

The Director of the JPDO continues to provide vital assistance to the government-wide implementation of NextGen by encouraging and facilitating cooperation among partner departments and agencies and sponsoring industry participation in NextGen planning and development.  JPDO also continues to develop a long-term vision for the air transportation system and aligns the necessary cross-departmental research to support that vision. 

The FAA has maintained the NextGen Review Board and the NextGen Management Board, the governance structure that we put in place with the decision to use the successful Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) as our framework for achieving NextGen.  The NextGen Management Board is chaired by the Deputy Administrator and composed of FAA Associate Administrators, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) Chief Operating Officer, ATO Senior Vice Presidents, the Director of the JPDO and representatives of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists (PASS). This is the Agency’s senior governing body for NextGen.  The NextGen Review Board - composed of FAA executives - looks at more technical issues including approving and prioritizing NextGen activities and making funding recommendations. So, we have a structure in place designed to achieve the NextGen vision and provide a steady stream of improvements to the air transportation system.

Impact of Executive Order 13479

This Executive Order, “Transformation of the National Air Transportation System,” expressed Executive Branch support for the national air transportation system policy set forth in Vision 100.  The order outlines functions of the Secretary of Transportation and the Senior Policy Committee (SPC) and specifies mechanisms to strengthen their role and elevate accountability.  These mechanisms include establishing a staff within the DOT to support the Secretary and SPC in their NextGen duties, assuring that maximum value is obtained from the participation of the department and agency heads on the committee.  They also include establishing an advisory committee to provide advice to the Secretary and SPC on the implementation of NextGen in a safe, secure, timely, environmentally sound, efficient, and effective manner.

The Order does not change the fundamental roles and responsibilities of the JPDO.  The JPDO will continue to facilitate, coordinate and support cooperation among the partner departments and agencies.  The JPDO will continue to manage the agenda for the JPDO Board and to gain private sector input through the NextGen Institute.  The JPDO will also continue to be instrumental in the development of issues and topics for SPC attention.  Because the coordination staff serves as a liaison between the Secretary and the partnering agencies, the staff will serve as an effective and efficient means of elevating JPDO interagency issues for attention.

NextGen:  Progress to Date

The FAA officially began its development of NextGen in fiscal year 2007 by identifying and funding two transformational programs:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information Management (SWIM).  From that $109 million investment in 2007, and supported by sound evaluations and planning, FAA funding for NextGen grew to $202 million in fiscal year 2008 and $688 million this fiscal year.  The fiscal year 2010 budget includes approximately $800 million for NextGen. The detailed planning results that are published in the January 2009 National Airspace System Enterprise Architecture (NASEA) and FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan support these funding numbers.

Moreover, this past year, we have seen the contributions to NextGen resulting from cross-department and cross-agency cooperation increase significantly. Through the cross-agency support provided by the JPDO and its SPC:

• FAA established a government-wide Safety Management System standard for implementation at the agencies;
• NextGen’s collaborative weather initiative includes the active participation of Departments of Commerce, Defense and the FAA;
• FAA and NASA are working to establish a research consortium to accelerate development of lower energy, emissions, and noise technologies;
• DoD has established a net-centric division within the JPDO and is working with the FAA and other partner agencies on net-centric information sharing;
• FAA is working on integrated aviation surveillance with DoD and DHS; 
• DoD formed an office within the Air Force to act as their coordinating office for all NextGen matters;
• DoD, DHS and FAA jointly invested in a demonstration of Network Enabled Operations technology;
• FAA, NASA, DOC, and USDA endeavors to foster sustainable alternative fuels; and
• JPDO has facilitated technology transfer from NASA to FAA with the formation of Research Transition Teams.

We have continued to make significant progress in the implementation and use across the FAA of the NAS Enterprise Architecture (NASEA) as a mechanism for governing the evolution of the current NAS to NextGen.  The NASEA, published in January of this year, lays out important, detailed information, on the NAS mid-term architecture.  This mid-term focus is a key step in the FAA’s ability to move forward with NextGen implementation.  Our progress in implementing and upgrading the NASEA as part of continuous improvement initiatives was a key factor in this year’s removal of the FAA from the GAO’s High Risk List. 

Another product of the past year is the publication by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) of a report titled “Identifying the Workforce to Respond to a National Imperative…the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).”  The study behind the report was commissioned by the FAA with the objective of identifying skill sets needed by the non-operational (acquisition) workforce to design, develop, test, evaluate, integrate, and implement NextGen systems and procedures and the strategies to obtain the needed skills.  FAA is currently in the process of determining how to implement the NAPA recommendations.

Last year, FAA conducted preliminary modeling of a series of NextGen capabilities.  Preliminary results showed that by 2018 total flight delays will be reduced by 35-40 percent, saving almost a billion gallons of fuel.  This is compared to the “do nothing” case, which shows what would happen if we operate in 2018 the same way as today.  The current model includes approximately one third of the planned NextGen improvements.  As our model matures we expect that benefit values will increase.  Bottom line:  by 2018, total flight delays and fuel use will be significantly reduced, while more flights can be accommodated.

FAA is working closely with all aspects of the aviation community to make NextGen a reality.  We’re partnering with several of the nation’s air carriers for trials and demonstrations; we’re engaging with universities like Embry Riddle. The FAA has established an integrated demonstration capability in Florida where, working with a wide range of government, university and industry partners, we are evaluating NextGen technologies.  We’re working with airport authorities, manufacturers and with government bodies and industry from around the world.  We are collaborating with JPDO Working Groups, RTCA, and other industry groups to integrate stakeholder requirements into government commitments.  

NextGen transformational programs made significant advances over the past year. ADS-B has been deployed in southern Florida and is being deployed in the Gulf of Mexico, where we have never had radar coverage.  In December, FAA achieved its In-Service Decision for ADS-B in southern Florida.  Achievement of this major milestone clears the way for national deployment of broadcast services.  The National Aeronautics Association recognized ADS-B last year by presenting the ADS-B team with its Collier Trophy.  This award is given yearly for “the greatest achievement in aeronautics or astronautics in America with respect to improving the performance, efficiency and safety of air or space vehicles.”  The Collier award is generally recognized as the epitome of aviation innovation and excellence.

The SWIM program, Data Communications, and NAS Voice Switch achieved major acquisition milestones, and NextGen Network Enabled Weather (NNEW) conducted demonstrations of the integration of weather data into automated decision support tools.  This is a necessary step in the realization of improved management of weather in the NAS.

The latest version of the FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan was published in January 2009.  This edition of the plan focuses on answering five fundamental questions: What does NextGen look like in 2018; what aircraft avionics are needed to support operations in 2018; what benefits will be delivered by 2018; what is the FAA specifically committed to deploy in the near-term that makes the most of existing resources; and what activities are underway to support future capabilities?

While the focus of the FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan is on the mid-term, the plan, coupled with the NAS Enterprise Architecture, provides a picture of near-term (2009-2013) deliverables.  FAA’s near-term NextGen implementation efforts are targeted across three broad areas: airfield development, air traffic operations, and aircraft capabilities. Together, these efforts will increase capacity and operational efficiency, enhance safety, and improve our environmental performance.  We are moving forward with a dual-pronged approach: maximizing the use of untapped capabilities in today’s aircraft and ground infrastructure, while working aggressively to develop and deploy new systems and procedures that will form a foundation for more transformative capabilities that will be delivered in the mid-term.  We believe this approach allows both government and industry to extract the greatest value from existing investments, while positioning the industry to gain exponential benefits in the mid-term and beyond.

NextGen is reaping the benefits originated under the OEP.  New runways provide significant capacity and operational improvements.  In November 2008, three major new runways opened:  at Seattle-Tacoma, Washington Dulles, and Chicago O’Hare International Airports.  The Seattle runway is expected to cut local delays in half by increasing capacity in bad weather by 60 percent, while the new runway at Dulles will provide capacity for an additional 100,000 annual operations.  The new Chicago runway, which added capacity for an additional 52,300 annual operations, is a part of the greater O'Hare Modernization Program (OMP) that will reconfigure the airport's intersecting runways into a more modern, parallel layout.  The OMP will substantially reduce delays in all weather conditions and increase capacity at the airfield, allowing O'Hare to meet the region's aviation needs well into the future.  Looking forward for the next five years, the FAA has additional runway and taxiway improvement projects planned at a number of airports, including Charlotte, Dulles, Houston, Denver, Philadelphia, and, as mentioned, Chicago.

While airfield improvements offer significant capacity increases, they alone are not enough to address current problems at certain airports, or the growth in demand we expect in the future.  New technology and procedures can help us gain extra use from existing runways.

Today, capacity for closely spaced parallel runway operations (CSPO) is dramatically reduced in poor visibility conditions.  We are working on capabilities that allow for continued use of those runways in low visibility conditions by providing precise path assignments that provide safe separation between aircraft assigned on parallel paths, restoring capacity and reducing delays throughout the system.  In November 2008, we published a national order that allows us to safely reduce separation between aircraft approaching parallel runways at Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Seattle.  In good visibility Seattle’s pair of parallel runways, together, could handle roughly 60 operations per hour; poor visibility conditions cut that rate in half.  Even in poor visibility, the new order now safely allows a rate of about 52 operations per hour, a significant improvement for the airport and its users.  We are also beginning to see similar benefits in Boston.

This order is a first step in a phased approach for safely increasing the use of CSPOs through a combination of procedural changes and new ground and aircraft equipment.  Down the road, new rules for CSPOs could give airports more design flexibility so that they can safely build runways more closely together, increasing their capacity within their existing boundaries, providing better service to their communities without requiring additional land.

Performance-based navigation is another building block for NextGen.  Performance-based routes and procedures result in shorter distances flown, which add up to both fuel and time savings.  Fuel savings equate to reduced emissions, enhancing environmental performance.  Safety is increased as air traffic operations become more predictable. Performance-based navigation includes Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Procedures (RNP), which allow equipped aircraft to fly more direct and precise paths, reducing flight time and fuel use, as well as localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) procedures, which can increase access to airports, especially in low visibility conditions.

Advances in performance-based navigations procedures and routes allow for optimal use of airspace.  The FAA maximizes the use of airspace, especially in congested areas, through targeted airspace and procedures enhancements.  Continuing work in the New York area includes integration of RNAV procedures, relocation and expansion of airways, airspace reconfiguration, and creation of optimal descent procedures.  In the Chicago area, the FAA is adding departure routes and changing procedures to allow for triple arrivals.  In southern Nevada, the FAA is optimizing existing airports and airspace.  Houston will also see additional departure routes and arrival procedures, along with improved procedures to avoid severe weather.

Operators like Southwest Airlines recognize the value of performance-based navigation.  The airline made the business decision early last year to equip its entire fleet for RNAV and RNP procedures. The company envisions building a network of RNP routes for their system.  Southwest believes its $175 million investment can be recouped within the next three to five years because of the operational efficiencies RNP offers.  We are currently working with Southwest on a pilot project to build RNAV/RNP routes between Texas’ Dallas Love Field and Houston Hobby airports.

Today, more than three-quarters of commercial aircraft are equipped for RNAV, and almost half of these are equipped for RNP precision procedures.  Likewise, more than 20,000 aircraft are equipped for LPVs.  This level of equipage provides an excellent opportunity for the aviation community use what it already has to produce ever-greater benefits.  FAA has responded:  last year the agency beat its own goals, publishing more than 600 performance-based navigation procedures and routes, versus our goal of almost 400.  The FAA plans to keep up this pace each year for the next four years.

Because the realization of NextGen benefits is integrally linked to how quickly the airlines equip their aircraft, it is imperative that the FAA work closely with industry on NextGen deployment.  As such, the FAA has established a NextGen Implementation Task Force under the auspices of the Air Traffic Management Advisory Council that serves as a federal advisory committee to the Air Traffic Organization.  The task force will provide recommendations on how to move forward together on implementation. FAA’s governing principles for accelerating equipage, published in the January 2009 FAA’s NextGen Implementation Plan, provide a starting point for this work.  These principles focus on mitigating the risk for early adopters of NextGen avionics, while providing the maximum operational benefits in the airspace where they’re most needed.  They also focus on international interoperability, and incentivizing the equipage of aircraft that meet the agency’s evolving environmental standards.  The Task Force will deliver recommendations to the FAA in August 2009.

Our current national airspace system is safer than it has ever been.  However, new means are required to ensure this remains the case as we transform the NAS.  NextGen will continue that trend in the face of increasing traffic and the introduction of very light jets, unmanned aerial vehicles, and commercial space flights.  To continue to minimize risk as we introduce a wave of new systems and procedures over the next decade, the aviation community will continue its move to safety management systems and other aspects of proactive management, where trends are analyzed to uncover problems early on.  This allows preventive measures to be put in place before any accidents can occur.  An important part of NAS modernization, the FAA’s Aviation Safety and Information Analysis and Sharing program (ASIAS), provides a suite of tools that extract relevant knowledge from large amounts of disparate safety information.  ASIAS also helps FAA and our industry partners to monitor the effectiveness of safety enhancements.  In use today, ASIAS will ensure that the operational capabilities that produce capacity, efficiency and environmental benefits are first and foremost inherently safe.  ASIAS has already demonstrated the ability to measure the performance of safety solutions to known problems, such as Loss of Control, Controlled Flight Into Terrain, Runway Incursion, Approach, and Landing Accident Reduction.  Additionally, ASIAS has demonstrated the ability to detect new safety issues, such as terrain avoidance warning system alerts (TAWS) at mountainous terrain airports and identify solutions that have the potential to virtually eliminate these threats.  Between now and fiscal year 2013, the FAA intends to increase the number of databases ASIAS can access; expand ASIAS to include maintenance/air traffic information; increase membership by adding regional air carriers; increase community stakeholders to include general aviation, helicopter and military; and increase the automated search capabilities.

The primary environmental and energy issues that will significantly influence the future capacity and flexibility of the NAS are aircraft noise, air quality, global climate effects, energy availability, and water quality.  Aviation accounts for approximately three percent of direct greenhouse gas emissions, and national and international concerns about climate impacts could constrain the industry in the future, if not properly addressed.  An environmental management system approach will be used to integrate all environmental and energy considerations into core NextGen business and operational strategies. 

In 2009, we are moving forward on a research consortium called Continuous Low Emissions, Energy and Noise (CLEEN), which will allow us to work with industry to accelerate the maturation of technology that will lower energy, emissions and noise.  CLEEN also seeks to advance renewable alternative fuels for aviation.  These fuels not only improve air quality and reduce life cycle greenhouse emissions, but also enhance energy security and supplies.  FAA helped form – and is an active participant in – the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative, or CAAFI.  Alternative fuels will be the “game changer” technology that gets us closer to carbon neutrality.  Assuming funding, significant deliverables in the FY09-13 period include demonstrations of clean and quiet aircraft technologies that can be transitioned into new products and used to retrofit existing products, approval of generic renewable fuels for aviation, and models and guidance to improve our ability to quantify environmental costs and benefits and to optimize solutions, including those to address CO2 and non-CO2 aviation climate impacts.

Next Gen:  Partner Agency Progress and Plans

As noted above, the JPDO facilitates the efforts of the partner departments and agencies to develop and deliver on NextGen. 

In order to effectively manage and foster their cross-agency interactions, the FAA, NASA, and the JPDO constituted four research transition teams (RTT) during this year.  The RTTs build upon the FAA’s prior successful deployments of NASA-developed technologies, such as the Traffic Management Advisor with enhancements for major metropolitan areas and surface management tools.  These teams impact near- and far-term capabilities stretching from the en route airspace to the terminal and surface including traffic flow management.  In the near-term, the FAA is developing implementation requirements through joint demonstrations, such as Three-Dimensional Path Arrival Management, while NASA researchers are gathering data to further extend trajectory based operations through the same demonstration.  By engaging earlier in the research, the FAA and NASA are now able to synchronize their plans to insure that NASA-developed products can be sufficiently matured for mid-term implementation. And in the far-term, the FAA is providing subject matter expertise to help guide the NASA research concepts.

The FAA, NOAA, and the DoD formed a NextGen Executive Weather Panel (NEWP), with senior executive agency principals to guide and review planning, budgeting, and implementation of required NextGen weather capabilities.  The NEWP has provided continuous oversight into the development of an interagency plan to deliver an initial NextGen weather information database with an initial operational capability date of 2013, as well as an integrated strategy to incorporate the weather information directly into legacy and future NextGen systems.  Both plans will be completed this fiscal year and implementation activities have already commenced.

We are working closely with DoD and the DHS through the JPDO on a number of important initiatives.  Among them is the development of the first integrated interagency homeland air surveillance Concept of Operations, or CONOPS, the federal government has ever prepared.  The Air Force is leading the interagency CONOPS effort, with the goal of interagency coordination of capabilities for national surveillance. 

The DoD is leading the NextGen net-centric operations planning and coordination of implementation.  So far, DoD has led development of a mid-term implementation plan for an interagency net-centric capability that is aimed at implementation in the 2012 - 2016 timeframe.  They have also led the demonstration of a limited Services Oriented Architecture information capability that will serve as the foundation for a NAS-wide implementation by 2025. 

The DoD is maintaining and increasing the capabilities of the Global Positioning System (GPS), which is the foundation for NextGen navigation and surveillance.  The continued funding and integrity of the planned launch schedule of the GPS constellation is vital to the nation moving ahead with NextGen.  NextGen could benefit from the potential for greater efficiency of arriving and departing aircraft in all operating environments.  To bolster this, the DoD is actively pursuing the development of the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS). 

FAA is collaborating with the DoD and DHS to support UAS operations in North Dakota from Grand Forks AFB.  An interagency task force is developing a course of action.  All options will be examined:  procedural, technological, airspace.  The task force will also look at using existing techniques in unique ways.  The group is tasked with completing safety analysis and implementing a course of action no later than Summer 2010.

We are pursuing implementation of adaptive and predictable special use airspace.  By leveraging emerging technologies such as ADS-B, Military Airspace Data Entry, etc, the Air Force in coordination with the FAA is pursuing the ability to dynamically define airspace and activate/de-activate only that portion of published special use airspace required for a particular mission.  Additionally, the Air Force and FAA are collaborating on a concept that would allow expansion/relocation of Air Traffic Controlled Assigned Airspace (ATCAA) on a daily basis, to meet changing military training needs and freeing up unneeded airspace to enhance air traffic flow in the NAS.

Over the next few years, the FAA and DHS will develop an Integrated Risk Management System (IRM), which understands and prioritizes the threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by potential adversaries, and determines which actions can provide the greatest total risk reduction for the least impact on limited resources.  DHS also continues to develop passenger, baggage and cargo screening technologies to more effectively mitigate all known air travel threats.  The new checkpoint evolution concept, including whole body imaging and behavioral pattern recognition, will also aid threat detection.  Cargo screening processes will be enhanced with prevention and detection screening capabilities that require screening prior to entering the air transportation system.  These improvements will be accomplished by expanding and sharing the delivery of passenger, baggage and cargo security information with appropriate transportation stakeholders.

NextGen:  FAA Near-Term Deliverables (2009-2013)

FAA continues to make progress with our transformational programs.  These are the long-lead time acquisition programs.  They are progressing in the acquisition process, laying the foundation for NextGen applications and will reap benefits for years to come.  Of the five initially identified as transformational NextGen programs, ADS-B is most advanced; but all are projecting substantial advances between now and 2013.  A brief description of these programs is shown on Figure 1 (attached). 

Significant planned deliverables for the transformational programs – ADS-B, SWIM, Data Communications, NextGen Network Enable Weather and the NAS Voice Switch – are depicted in Figure 2 (attached).

The FAA is focusing on reaping maximum capability in the near term from existing equipage and infrastructure.  We are also continuing with our pre-acquisition research, analyses and technology development that support concept and requirements development and with our demonstration projects, which further advance the maturity of requirements and contribute significantly to our understanding of future benefits.  Crucial to our analysis efforts is an on-going assessment of critical gaps in FAA and cross-department NextGen architectures and planning.

JPDO completed a gap analysis of NextGen partner agency programs against the Integrated Work Plan.  It identified seven critical interagency focus areas, including various air traffic management research topics, research to mitigate environmental constraints, security risk management, and the verification and validation of complex systems.  FAA was identified as the lead for three of the focus areas, NASA for two, DHS for one, and JPDO for one.  Working with the partner agencies, the JPDO will incorporate operational improvements that address these gaps into the Integrated Work Plan and through the governance process, including the JPDO Board and SPC, will encourage partner agencies to include activities that support these operational improvements in their implementation plans and future year budgets.

FAA has completed a preliminary internal gap analysis against the mid-term NAS Enterprise Architecture that was delivered in January 2009.  This is part of an on-going assessment of critical gaps in FAA and cross-department NextGen architectures and planning.  We will deliver in Fiscal Year 2009 (anticipated August 2009 delivery), a gap analysis that includes requirements for addressing identified shortfalls.

Carefully planned and implemented pre-acquisition activities such as those described above significantly reduce risks in the development and implementation of complex systems such as NextGen. 

As we transition to NextGen over the next few years, we are anticipating noteworthy progress with these activities as depicted in Figures 3 and 4 (attached).

Conclusion

As you can see, we are working steadily and carefully to bring NextGen to fruition.  Our programs are currently on track, our partnerships are strong.  We have mapped out our course and we are moving towards our goals, and we look forward to your continued guidance and oversight as we go forward. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks.  I would be happy to answer any questions you and the Members of the Subcommittee might have.

Figure 1:  Descriptions of NextGen Transformational Programs

• Moves air traffic control from a system based on radar to one that uses satellite-derived aircraft location data
• Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to determine the aircraft’s precise position in the sky, which is combined with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and air traffic controllers
• Offers more precision and additional services than radar, such as weather and traffic information.
• When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will, for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air traffic, thereby substantially improving safety. 

• Current use of voice communication is labor intensive, time consuming, and limits the ability of the NAS to effectively meet future traffic demand
• Transitions from the current decades old analog voice system to a predominantly digital mode of communication
• Provides data transmissions directly to pilots and their flight management systems, enabling more efficient operations, including trajectory-based routing, that evolve air traffic from short-term tactical control to managing flights gate-to-gate strategically
• Supports safety-of-flight command, control and information services by providing comprehensive data connectivity, including ground automation message generation, transmission and routing
• Automates repetitive tasks, supplements voice communications with less workload-intensive data communications and enable ground systems to use real-time aircraft data to improve traffic management

• Aids in reducing weathers impact in the NAS
• Defines, develops, and provides the FAA’s portion of the inter-agency infrastructure known as the 4-Dimensional Weather Data Cube
• Will provide universal access to global aviation weather information in a SWIM-compatible network

• Replaces the current switch infrastructure of 13 different types of switches, with a single switch architecture that will meet NextGen operations, which require a more agile and flexible voice communication architecture
• Single switch will be able to be re-configured faster than today’s switches allow
• Will be network-capable to allow for the better access to voice communication assets that will be needed for future NAS operations
• Allows for NextGen operations such as load-sharing and load balancing across facilities, airspace sharing, collocations and consolidations, business continuity planning, and virtual tower operations

• Promotes the use of web services to share data between FAA systems, other agencies, and NAS users
• Leverages existing systems and networks, and will be based on technologies that have been proven to reduce cost and risk

Figure 2:  NextGen Transformational Program Deliverables

(FY09-FY13)

Automatic Dependents Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)

• Louisville Service Acceptance Test (SAT)
• Gulf of Mexico SAT
• Philadelphia SAT
• Gulf of Mexico VHF Voice Communications Initial Operating Capability

Data Communications (Data Comm)

• Draft and begin validation of standards for avionics required for Data Comm operations
• Conduct human factors and operations research to develop concept of use for Data Comm

National Airspace System (NAS) Network Enabled Weather (NNEW):

• Demonstration of interagency Net-Enabled data sharing/interoperability
• Finalize Version 2 of the Data and Service Standards for IOC products for the 4-D Weather Data Cube

NAS Voice Switch Activities (NVS):

• Finalize initial requirements document
• NVS draft Specification
• Draft NVS functional architecture
• Legacy case cost analysis

System Wide Information Management (SWIM): 

• Standards/guidance to SWIM implementing programs on SWIM Segment 1 core capabilities
• Service container software to implementing programs
• Code and test of initial Segment 1 capabilities
•  

Conduct analyses and prepare documentation for Final Investment Decision for Segment 2

ADS-B

• Juneau SAT
• Louisville Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of Surveillance Services
• Gulf of Mexico IOC for Surveillance Services
• Philadelphia IOC of Surveillance Services
• Juneau IOC of Surveillance Services
• Final Rule Published
• Critical Surveillance Services In-Service Decision for ADS-B 
• Complete installation of 340 (of 794 total) ground stations

Data Comm

• Screening Information Request (SIR) release for Data Comm Network Service provider acquisition

NNEW

• Data and service standards products that will be used at IOC for the 4-D Weather Data Cube will be mature
• Demonstration of limited 4-D Weather Data Cube functionality including fault tolerance and federation of the registry/repository

NVS

• Initial Investment Decision

SWIM: 

• Final requirements specification for Segment 2
• Final Investment Analysis for Segment 2 capabilities
• System integration and test for Aeronautical Information Management (AIM) portion of Special Use Airspace Automated Data Exchange capability
• Code and test for Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) Data Publication
• Design and prototype for Pilot Report (PIREP) Data Publication
• Code for Initial Flight Data Services
• Requirements analysis for additional Traffic Flow Management (TFM) capabilities
• Requirements definition and prototyping for Terminal Data Distribution System (TDDS)

Data Comm

• Final Investment Decision for Data Comm Network Service provider acquisition
• Contract award for Data Comm Network Service provider acquisition

NNEW:

• Service adapters for selected legacy FAA systems
• Architecture for the 4-D Weather Data Cube

NVS:

• Screening Information Request (SIR) released
• Final Investment Decision
• Contract award

SWIM:

• TFM initial flow object prototype
• ITWS integration and test
• TDDS design
• SWIM Segment 1 capability deployment – Corridor Integrated Weather System (CIWS)

Data Comm

• Final Investment Decision for En Route automation enhancements acquisition
• Task order for En Route automation enhancements acquisition awarded

NNEW:

• Installation of initial set of hardware and software for FAA’s portion of 4-D Weather Data Cube
• Demonstration of full IOC system in preparation for Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E)

NVS:

• Switch Development/Modification initiated

SWIM:

• SWIM Segment 1 capability deployment – Weather Message Switching Center Replacement (WMSCR)
• TDDS deployment

ADS-B

• Installation completed at all remaining ground stations as well as NAS-wide Deployment of Essential and Critical services

Data Comm

• Training and operations policies developed to support use of Data Comm

NNEW:

• FAA-National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 4-D Weather Data Cube OT&E
• Weather Data Cube IOC

NVS:

• Initial system deployment at selected Key site(s)
• System testing initiation

SWIM:

• SWIM Segment 1 capability deployment - AIM, En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), TDDS

Fig. 3:  Selected Other NextGen Deliverables

(FY09-FY13)

Alternative Fuel Availability Targets

• 50% FT generic blends including biomass/coal/gas (FT = Fischer-Tropsch process for gasifying material and converting it to fuels)

Gap Analysis & Requirements

High Altitude Airspace Management Program

• Five geographic Q-Route corridors and transition of national playbooks
• National transition from ground-based navaids to area navigation to support foundation for NextGen

High Altitude Airspace Management Program

Improved Special Use Airspace/ATCAA access

• Adaptive airspace trials (2009-2010)

Alternative Fuel Availability Targets

• 100% FT generic including biomass
• 50% Hydrotreated Renewable Jet fuel

High Altitude Airspace Management Program

Navigation Reference System (NRS) Expansion

• Smart expansion to support key applications and NRS/Global Area Reference System integration (2011)

High Altitude Airspace Management Program

NRS Expansion

• Full expansion (2012-2015)

Alternative Fuel Availability Targets

• 100% Hydrotreated Renewable Jet fuel
• Other Biofuel processes

Figure 4: NextGen Research & Demonstration Activities

(FY09-FY13)

3D Path Arrival Management

• This project is a first step toward 4D trajectory operations in the arrival domain. In laymen's terms, this capability at high density airport will provide a means to achieve highly accurate, predictable and fuel efficient routes which will decrease controller and pilot workload, decrease adverse environmental impacts (emissions and noise) while potentially enhancing airport throughput.  Apart from the capability itself, the major product from this project is a complete specification for a 4D trajectory synthesizer based on the NASA En route Descent Advisor which generates the route for the aircraft to fly. This route is then loaded into the aircrafts automation for execution.

4-D Flight Management System (4-D FMS)

• Demo 4-D FMS Trajectory Based Operations (TBO) to reduce pilot and Controller workload and environmental impact.

International Air Traffic Interoperability (IATI)

• Demonstrate potential benefits for oceanic trajectory optimization in terms of fuel savings and emissions reductions through partnerships and collaboration with the international aviation air navigation service providers (ANSPs), airlines and government agencies.  Initial demonstrations being conducted with the Atlantic Interoperability Initiative to Reduce Emissions (AIRE) project.  
•  

International Flight Data Object (IFDO)

• Perform research and demonstrations leading to proof of concept and early implementation of NextGen capabilities such as International Flight Data Object.

Net Enabled Operations (NEO)

• NEO is a network information technology program with a set of spiral developmental efforts (until 2012) directed at developing / leveraging an innovative, effective and efficient system-to-system operational architecture, with supporting procedures to provide the FAA and its interagency partners with an agile, highly connective network for net centric shared situational awareness.

Oceanic Trajectory Based Operations

• Demonstrate potential benefits for oceanic optimization procedures.  Partnerships and collaboration with the international aviation air navigation service providers (ANSPs), airlines and government agencies. 

Staffed NextGen Towers (SNT)

• Field demonstrations will serve to validate the SNT concept and system(s) for the two phased implementation.

Surface Trajectory-Based Operations Project

• Conduct demonstrations and operational evaluations of future NextGen surface capabilities at Memphis, New York (JFK) and Orlando airports.

Tailored Arrivals (TA)

• In the final form, a Tailored Arrival (TA) is a comprehensive method of planning, communicating, and flying highly efficient, thus environmentally friendly, arrival trajectories from cruise altitudes to the runway threshold.  Implementation of TAs at selected coastal airports is planned to occur by early FY-11.  These initial trans-oceanic arrival operations are considered to be an early implementation strategy to realize immediate operational benefits in efficiency and reduced environmental impact. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

• Utilize advanced capabilities of UAS community as test for exploring future 4-Dimension (4-D; latitude, longitude, altitude and time) trajectory based concepts and examine potential concepts for wide-spread integration of UAS into future NextGen environment.

3D Path Arrival Management

• Continue flight deck centric and air traffic control centric simulation

4-D Flight Management System (4-D FMS)

• To be determined based on development efforts
• Initial human-in-the-loop simulations

International Flight Data Object (IFDO)  

• Research and Demonstrations continues
• Potential to begin Pacific demonstrations

Net Enabled Operations (NEO)

• As determined from planning in FY-09

Oceanic Trajectory Based Operations

• Initial ADS-B In-trail Procedures, Pre-departure 4-D oceanic trajectory management, Web enabled Collaborative Trajectory Planning (CTP) and Oceanic Air space Management 

Staffed NextGen Tower

• Complete field site preparation and field demonstration

Surface Trajectory Based Operations

• Follow-on spiral demonstrations/evaluation focused on enhancements to surface 4-D Trajectory Based Operations, including taxi conformance monitoring

Tailored Arrivals (TA)

• Resolve issues surrounding implementation and begin transfer of project to implementation / operational organization

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

• Potential for 4-D TBO demonstrations in an operational environment

3D Path Arrival Management

• Complete technical transfer of decision support tools

4-D Flight Management System (4-D FMS)

• Continue proof of concept demonstration/simulation from FY-11

Net Enabled Operations (NEO)

• As determined from planning in FY-09 and FY10

Oceanic Trajectory Based Operations

• Continuing ADS-B In-trail Procedures, Pre-departure 4-D oceanic trajectory management, Web enabled Collaborative Trajectory Planning (CTP) and Oceanic Air space Management 

Staffed NextGen Tower

• To be determined

Surface Trajectory Based Operations

• Follow-on spiral demonstrations / evaluation focused on enhancements to surface 4-D Trajectory Based Operations

Tailored Arrivals (TA)

• Begin full-time operations of TAs at selected costal airports (with oceanic arrivals) around the US

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

• To be determined based on 4-D TBO demonstrations in an operational environment

3D Path Arrival Management

• Further refiner the decision support tool and support investment decision activities.  Complete concept of use document

4-D Flight Management System (4-D FMS)

• Initial implementation

Net Enabled Operations (NEO)

• As determined from planning in FY-09 and FY10

Oceanic Trajectory Based Operations

• Continuing ADS-B In-trail Procedures, Pre-departure 4-D oceanic trajectory management, Web enabled Collaborative Trajectory Planning (CTP) and Oceanic Air space Management 

Staffed NextGen Tower

• To be determined

Surface Trajectory Based Operations

• Follow-on spiral demonstrations / evaluation focused on enhancements to surface 4-D Trajectory Based Operations

Tailored Arrivals (TA)

• Begin full-time operations of TAs at selected costal airports (with oceanic arrivals) around the US

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)

• To be determined based on 4-D TBO demonstrations in an operational environment

3D Path Arrival Management

• ERAM/TMA implementation

4-D Flight Management System (4-D FMS)

• Continue proof of concept demonstration from FY-12

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF

ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
JAMES CAPONlTl

ON

PIRACY AGAINST U.S.-FLAG VESSELS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 20th, 2009

     Good morning, Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member LoBiondo and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today

to discuss the serious threat stemming from the ongoing piracy problem in the

waters off of Somalia, and the lessons learned from recent attempts at piracy affecting U.S.-flag vessels. Throughout 2008 and continuing into 2009, the global

piracy situation has grown substantially worse- particularly in an ever expanding

area off the coasts of Somalia, where more than 20,000 vessels transit the region

each year. Although the impact of piracy has been very significant, the American

public has only recently been made more aware of the situation with the attacks

on two American flag vessels, the MAERSK ALABAMA and the LIBERTY SUN –

both of which were carrying food aid for Somalia.

      Acts of piracy threaten freedom of navigation and the flow of commerce. Off

the Horn of Africa, piracy disrupts the flow of critical humanitarian supplies.

Pirates frequently demand millions of dollars in ransom for the release of

hostages, ships and cargoes. Press reports indicate that in 2008, pirates

received an estimated $30 million dollars in ransom for the release of seajacked

vessels. In 2008, 42 vessels were seized by pirates operating off the Coast of

Somalia. Globally, 889 mariners were held hostage by pirates (815 in Somalia)

as part of ransom demands. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported

that in 2008, globally, 11 mariners were murdered by pirates and another 21 are

missing and presumed dead. The IMB also reported that during the same

period, off the Horn of Africa, four mariners were killed and 14 are missing and

presumed dead.  In 2009, the number of attacks continues to rise however the success rate (except for April) has been reduced.  In total there have been more than 27 successful seajackings in 2009 with more than 476 seafarers captured.  (15 vessels are currently being held with 229 seafarers.)  One seafarer was killed by pirates last week. 

     The vessels most vulnerable to piracy attacks are those traveling slowly (with

limited speed capabilities) and with low freeboard - that is to say, there is not

much height between the water and the deck level. A primary reason for the pirates’ success is the ineffectiveness of Somalia’s government, enabling pirates to operate with virtual impunity. Further, there have been press reports opining that some local officials are on the pirates' payroll.

     The Gulf of Aden, which links the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.  An average of 50 commercial vessels transit the Gulf daily. Many of these vessels are potential targets. More than 3.3 million barrels of oil pass through

the Gulf of Aden every day. This represents 4% of the world's total daily

production and 12% of all the oil transported by water daily around the world by

sea. In addition, numerous other cargoes and container freight pass through the

Gulf daily.

     Approximately 80% of the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden carry cargo

destined to and from Europe, East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East.

However, a significant portion of cargoes is also destined to and from the United

States. In addition, U.S. citizens serve as crew or are passengers on vessels

transiting the area.

     On average, at least one U.S. commercial vessel transits the area each day.

Many of these US-flag vessels carry Department of Defense cargo bound for

Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. U.S.-flag vessels transiting the region

also carry humanitarian cargoes generated by the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) or international organizations to the Horn of Africa,

including Djibouti and Somalia and other countries in East Africa or South Asia.

     As mentioned, seajackings off the Horn of Africa significantly increased in

2008 and 2009.  Although only one-third of one percent of all the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden are seajacked, the cost and disruption to the flow of commerce overall is significant. There is also a serious risk of an environmental disaster should a vessel be damaged or sunk during a hostile attack. Press reports indicate that

several merchant mariners have been killed or are presumed dead and that hundreds, including American mariners, have been traumatized by being attacked and held hostage, and even by the uncertainties generated by the growing instability of the region.

     Ship owners and operators are also negatively affected by rising daily

operating costs due to increased insurance premiums and, in some cases, operational delays caused by longer transit times or diversions to avoid the area. In many cases, there are additional costs related to the higher wages which must be paid to crew transiting the higher risk area. Both the shipper and the consumer are ultimately affected by these higher operating costs and the delays in the supply chain.  This is particularly true where vessels are diverted around the Cape of Good

Hope in an effort to avoid the Gulf of Aden altogether, which also increases fuel

consumption and the carbon footprint of marine transportation. Higher shipping

costs likewise raise the costs of commodities for local populations.

     The United States has been a leader in promoting collaborative international

action to combat the current piracy crisis. It has been our Nation's long-standing

policy to support freedom of the seas. In July 2008, the United States took a

leadership role in the United Nations fight against piracy. This resulted in United

Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1816 which authorized countries

cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, for

which advance notification has been provided to the Secretary-General, to enter

Somali territorial waters to repress piracy. This was followed by additional

Security Council Resolutions 1838 and 1846 in the fall of 2008. In December

2008, the United States drafted UN Security Council Resolution 1851 which

authorizes countries cooperating with the TFG of Somalia to enter Somali

territory to repress piracy. This resolution was adopted by the Security Council.

     UN Security Council Resolution 1851 also encouraged the establishment of

an international cooperation mechanism -- known now as the Contact Group on

Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).  The Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was created in New York City on January 14, 2009, and currently numbers 28 nations (Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia TFG, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Yemen), and 6 international organizations (African Union, Arab League, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations Secretariat and International Maritime Organization) with seven additional countries (Canada, Cyprus, Liberia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore) pending requests to participate.  The Department of State represents the United States on the CGPCS. The CGPCS acts as a common point of contact between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast. The CGPCS

met in January at the United Nations in New York City and in Egypt in mid-

March. The CGPCS will meet again in late May.

     The CGPCS established four working groups to provide recommendations to

the CGPCS. Working Group #I is addressing activities related to military and

operational coordination and is chaired by the United Kingdom. Working Group

#2 is addressing judicial aspects of piracy and is chaired by Denmark. The

United States has the lead for Working Group #3, which focuses on shipping self awareness and interaction with industry. The Department of Transportation's

Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Coast Guard have been co-leading

this Working Group. Working Group #4 is tasked with offering recommendations

to improve diplomatic and public information efforts and is chaired by Egypt.

     The UN Security Council resolutions called for greater cooperation between

governments and industry to reduce the incidence of piracy. In January 2009,

former-Secretary of State Rice stated that, "Once a hostage situation develops,

the stakes in military operations increase. Consequently, an important part of

counter-piracy efforts must be measured in enhancing self-defense capabilities of

commercial vessels, increasing the odds of success against pirates until

warships arrive." This sentiment still holds true today, and we saw evidence of

this in the seajacking of the MAERSK ALABAMA.

     Because of its specialized knowledge, such as operation of our mobility sealift

vessels, and established relationships with U.S. and international shipping,

maritime unions, the marine insurance community and global maritime industry

associations, MARAD has considerable experience in dealing with the diverse

interests of the global maritime industry and is actively involved in the fight

against piracy. MARAD is perhaps unique among government agencies with regard

to its interest in piracy issues and its ability to assist. MARAD operates a fleet of

Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels that have transited the Gulf of Aden

region in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF). As OIF

winds down, RRF vessels may be called upon to play a significant role again in

support of the demobilization of forces, with a consequence of exposing the

vessels and crews to threats from pirate attacks.

      Further, many vessels supported by MARAD's Maritime Security Program

(MSP), participate in the Agency's Voluntary lntermodal Sealift Agreement

(VISA) and transit the Gulf of Aden on a routine basis. The MAERSK ALABAMA

is one of the 60 vessels enrolled in the MSP. MARAD also oversees government

cargoes transiting the region - particularly food aid and military cargoes that are

carried mainly aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels transiting the Gulf. Finally,

as an interface between U.S. maritime labor and the federal government, we

have great interest in protecting the welfare of U.S. mariners who sail aboard

vessels in the region.

      MARAD provides operational advice to U.S.-flag owners and operators,

including counter-piracy measures and awareness on a regular basis through

MARAD Advisories, through a comprehensive and frequently updated website,

and through MARAD’s electronic "MARVIEW” system which is available to

registered users. We have also contributed to the Maritime Safety and Security

Information System (MSSIS) for the purposes of providing more efficient piracy

related data.

     MARAD also plays a key role in the training of merchant mariners through the

development of International Maritime Organization (IMO) maritime security

courses and workforce development. Working with the U.S. Coast Guard and

IMO, Vessel Security Officer, Company Security Officer, and Facility Security

Officer courses were developed by the United States Merchant Marine Academy.

MARAD continues to certify maritime security training providers who meet the

criteria established by the U.S. Coast Guard. To date, more than 50 training

providers have been certified across the country. Efforts are also being made to

include anti-piracy and security training in the academic programs at USMMA

and the state maritime academies and to augment this training at the maritime union schools.

     In late December, the Department of State asked MARAD to assist with the

CGPCS Industry Outreach Working Group. Since 2008, MARAD has met on

numerous occasions with industry to help shape best management practices to

counter piracy and to share industry concerns with U.S. government agencies.

In late December, the National Security Council published an action plan, the

National Strategy for "Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership &

Action Plan" (CPAP). MARAD and the Department of Transportation were

actively involved in developing this Plan, and MARAD posted the CPAP on its

website for the benefit of industry.

     MARAD strongly supported the Military Sealift Command's proposal to create

and implement "Anti-Piracy Assistance Teams" (APAT) for commercial vessels. These teams consist of personnel from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and

MARAD. On a voluntary basis, these teams board U.S.-flag vessels and offer

recommendations on how to improve a vessel's physical defenses against

piracy.  The teams also review security tactics, techniques and procedures and make appropriate recommendations. To date, a number of successful APAT vessel assessments and recommendations have been completed and more are currently scheduled. We expect this process to be embraced by the international community for similar implementation.

     MARAD's continuing outreach to the maritime industry on the piracy issue

has taken many forms. In addition to leading informal meetings and participating

in international forums, MARAD has hosted several collaborative meetings with

both the American and international maritime industry community and

appropriate federal agencies. For example, in October and November 2008,

MARAD and the Department of State sponsored meetings with representatives

from the maritime industry to specifically discuss piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Participants included company security officers from major U.S. flag carriers,

including American President Lines (APL), Horizon Lines, Maersk, Intermarine,

lnteramerican Ocean Shipping, American Roll OnIRoll Off, Crowley, American

Overseas Marine, and Ocean Shipholdings. Flag states with U.S.-owned vessels

or with vessels serving strategic U.S. interests also participated, including

representatives from Denmark, Marshall Islands, Liberia and Panama. The U.S.

Navy's Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain and the United Kingdom's Maritime

Transport Office were also included. Topics specifically addressed at these

meetings were maneuvering and speed, illumination, communication, duress

terminology, armed force protection, and self-defense devices which may be

used to deter piracy.

     At the request of the maritime industry, MARAD facilitated extensive

discussions on piracy with the Department of State, Department of Defense,

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard). In November 2008,

MARAD participated in a public hearing hosted by the Coast Guard which focused on piracy initiatives being considered by the International Maritime Organization's

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). In December 2008, MARAD staff played an

instrumental role in several other international planning events related to piracy.

MARAD participated in the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee

(SCEPC) meeting held in Brussels, Belgium, which included piracy as an agenda

item. MARAD chairs the NATO Planning Board on Ocean Shipping, which

reports to the SCEPC.

     On December 2, 2008, MARAD hosted a Piracy Round Table meeting to

discuss industry "self-help" and best practices to counter piracy. This meeting

brought U.S. government agencies together with the maritime industry to develop

a mutual understanding of the problem and to develop best practices

recommendations. Members of the industry included shipping associations,

registries, carriers, marine insurance companies and representatives from the

European Union. U.S. government representatives included personnel from the

Coast Guard; Department of State; Department of Defense, Office of Naval

Intelligence; USAID; the National Security Council; and the Homeland Security

Council. MARAD established an Anti-Piracy portal on the Agency's website,

which is continuously updated. MARAD Advisories are posted on this site as are

any recent developments and key contact information.

     MARAD hosted an international maritime industry Piracy Summit on

December 11, 2008, with representatives from more than 50 industry

associations, insurers, shipping companies, and labor to encourage them to

further develop best management practices to combat piracy and to implement

these strategies. Representatives from the Department of State; the Department

of Homeland Security; Coast Guard; U.S. Transportation Command, Office of

Naval Intelligence and Military Sealift Command participated in the Summit.

     In late December, MARAD joined the Department of State for discussions in

London between representatives of European Union navies and maritime trade

associations. The purpose of these discussions was to further develop and

implement best management practices and to improve communication between

maritime companies and military forces in the Gulf of Aden region. MARAD

continues to meet with industry to finalize best management practices and share

industry concerns with government agencies.

     In early 2009, MARAD intensified its efforts in the fight against piracy to

further improve coordination between industry and the various navies

participating in the Gulf of Aden, to provide voluntary assessments of security on

U.S. vessels, to further establish best management practices to prevent

piracy and to bring industry's perspectives and ideas to the interagency process.

Additional industry meetings, UN meetings, meetings hosted by the Baltic

International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and a counter-piracy meeting held in

Dubai and hosted by the Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain, have all pursued

these objectives. Since maritime labor is uniquely vulnerable to pirate attacks,

with mariners killed or held hostage as part of ransom demands, MARAD has

included maritime labor in discussions and meetings, when feasible. The most

recent MARAD industry and interagency meeting was held on April 23rd.

     MARAD led the U.S. delegation of Working Group #3 at the meeting of the

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in March of 2009 (which was chaired by the USCG), and presented the international industry developed (and MARAD facilitated) "Best Management Practices" (BMPs) to counter piracy. MARAD also supported the dissemination of counter piracy guidance and better coordination between military and civilian operators in the region. The agency likewise provides U.S. flag projected schedules in the waters off Somalia to the National Maritime

Intelligence Center (NMIC) and vessel tracking information on U.S. flag carriers

to appropriate military authorities.

     Given limited military resources available to fully protect commercial shipping

in the waters off Somalia, there is an increasing focus on the issue of shipping

companies hiring private armed security personnel to protect their vessels while

transiting the waters off Somalia. However, there are many complicated factors

which must be addressed before the industry, as a whole, can adopt this

recommendation. These include the need to develop appropriate standards for

armed security providers, compliance with port state restrictions on arms aboard

merchant vessels entering many ports in the world, consideration of potential

escalation of violence due to the presence of arms onboard commercial vessels,

issues of safety for the crew and vessel, rules on the use of force, design

constraints of vessels to carry additional personnel, union contract issues,

insurance and liability issues and many other related factors.  Clearly, the maritime industry needs government assistance in this area to set or guide standards and measures of performance and MARAD is actively engaged with other agencies in understanding and developing the needed guidance on the use of armed security.

       On May 11, 2009, the USCG issued an updated “Maritime Security Directive” (for Ships Operating in High Risk Areas) that requires the implementation of several security protocols; many of which are similar to the BMPs noted above.  This MARSEC was developed by the USCG in close consultation with the interagency, including, MARAD.  At the request of the USCG, MARAD will participate with the USCG in reviewing vessel security plans required by the MARSEC.

     Most recently, MARAD has engaged the marine insurance industry to

determine the effects of the piracy situation on insurance rates and the effects on insurance if vessels carry armed security personnel aboard. On May 14^th, MARAD hosted a meeting of insurance representatives, the USCG, Department of State, and Military Sealift Command.  The concerns of the insurance companies were made clear.  MARAD and the USCG indicated that we will work together along with other federal agencies to develop an adequate process that enables carriers to embark armed security on board their vessels in a proper manner.  They also shared their concerns with standards, rules, and vetting of security firms, liability implications to the owner, insurer and security firm, and escalation of hostile actions that will increase risks.

    Finally, MARAD has reached out to the maritime labor community to seek ways to address the seafarer community’s interest in the human element issues associated with piracy, including training and awareness, communication.  The communication aspect is particularly important in gaining information from crews that have been released after being hostages.  Such information can contribute valuable lessons learned to further enhance security.

     Combating international piracy is no small effort. Much work has already

taken place, but much remains to be done, before international piracy can be

eliminated. Due to its unique and positive relationship with U.S.-flag and

international vessel owners, MARAD has maintained a vital role in the

development of U.S. anti-piracy policy. Additionally, through its training role,

MARAD provides a valuable service to the commercial fleet. The Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration stand ready to assist in any way possible to address piracy and any other issue that threatens the national and economic security of the United States and our allies.

     I want to thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing today. I will be

happy to answer any questions you might have.

Note:  The word “hijack” refers to the seizing of a vehicle on a roadway or highway.  The term “seajack” is a nautical term which refers to the capture of a vessel on the high seas.  (The term “skyjack” refers to the seizing of an aircraft in flight.)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF

ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
JAMES CAPONlTl

ON

PIRACY AGAINST U.S.-FLAG VESSELS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 20th, 2009

     Good morning, Chairman Cummings, Ranking Member LoBiondo and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today

to discuss the serious threat stemming from the ongoing piracy problem in the

waters off of Somalia, and the lessons learned from recent attempts at piracy affecting U.S.-flag vessels. Throughout 2008 and continuing into 2009, the global

piracy situation has grown substantially worse- particularly in an ever expanding

area off the coasts of Somalia, where more than 20,000 vessels transit the region

each year. Although the impact of piracy has been very significant, the American

public has only recently been made more aware of the situation with the attacks

on two American flag vessels, the MAERSK ALABAMA and the LIBERTY SUN –

both of which were carrying food aid for Somalia.

      Acts of piracy threaten freedom of navigation and the flow of commerce. Off

the Horn of Africa, piracy disrupts the flow of critical humanitarian supplies.

Pirates frequently demand millions of dollars in ransom for the release of

hostages, ships and cargoes. Press reports indicate that in 2008, pirates

received an estimated $30 million dollars in ransom for the release of seajacked

vessels. In 2008, 42 vessels were seized by pirates operating off the Coast of

Somalia. Globally, 889 mariners were held hostage by pirates (815 in Somalia)

as part of ransom demands. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported

that in 2008, globally, 11 mariners were murdered by pirates and another 21 are

missing and presumed dead. The IMB also reported that during the same

period, off the Horn of Africa, four mariners were killed and 14 are missing and

presumed dead.  In 2009, the number of attacks continues to rise however the success rate (except for April) has been reduced.  In total there have been more than 27 successful seajackings in 2009 with more than 476 seafarers captured.  (15 vessels are currently being held with 229 seafarers.)  One seafarer was killed by pirates last week. 

     The vessels most vulnerable to piracy attacks are those traveling slowly (with

limited speed capabilities) and with low freeboard - that is to say, there is not

much height between the water and the deck level. A primary reason for the pirates’ success is the ineffectiveness of Somalia’s government, enabling pirates to operate with virtual impunity. Further, there have been press reports opining that some local officials are on the pirates' payroll.

     The Gulf of Aden, which links the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.  An average of 50 commercial vessels transit the Gulf daily. Many of these vessels are potential targets. More than 3.3 million barrels of oil pass through

the Gulf of Aden every day. This represents 4% of the world's total daily

production and 12% of all the oil transported by water daily around the world by

sea. In addition, numerous other cargoes and container freight pass through the

Gulf daily.

     Approximately 80% of the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden carry cargo

destined to and from Europe, East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East.

However, a significant portion of cargoes is also destined to and from the United

States. In addition, U.S. citizens serve as crew or are passengers on vessels

transiting the area.

     On average, at least one U.S. commercial vessel transits the area each day.

Many of these US-flag vessels carry Department of Defense cargo bound for

Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. U.S.-flag vessels transiting the region

also carry humanitarian cargoes generated by the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) or international organizations to the Horn of Africa,

including Djibouti and Somalia and other countries in East Africa or South Asia.

     As mentioned, seajackings off the Horn of Africa significantly increased in

2008 and 2009.  Although only one-third of one percent of all the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden are seajacked, the cost and disruption to the flow of commerce overall is significant. There is also a serious risk of an environmental disaster should a vessel be damaged or sunk during a hostile attack. Press reports indicate that

several merchant mariners have been killed or are presumed dead and that hundreds, including American mariners, have been traumatized by being attacked and held hostage, and even by the uncertainties generated by the growing instability of the region.

     Ship owners and operators are also negatively affected by rising daily

operating costs due to increased insurance premiums and, in some cases, operational delays caused by longer transit times or diversions to avoid the area. In many cases, there are additional costs related to the higher wages which must be paid to crew transiting the higher risk area. Both the shipper and the consumer are ultimately affected by these higher operating costs and the delays in the supply chain.  This is particularly true where vessels are diverted around the Cape of Good

Hope in an effort to avoid the Gulf of Aden altogether, which also increases fuel

consumption and the carbon footprint of marine transportation. Higher shipping

costs likewise raise the costs of commodities for local populations.

     The United States has been a leader in promoting collaborative international

action to combat the current piracy crisis. It has been our Nation's long-standing

policy to support freedom of the seas. In July 2008, the United States took a

leadership role in the United Nations fight against piracy. This resulted in United

Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1816 which authorized countries

cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, for

which advance notification has been provided to the Secretary-General, to enter

Somali territorial waters to repress piracy. This was followed by additional

Security Council Resolutions 1838 and 1846 in the fall of 2008. In December

2008, the United States drafted UN Security Council Resolution 1851 which

authorizes countries cooperating with the TFG of Somalia to enter Somali

territory to repress piracy. This resolution was adopted by the Security Council.

     UN Security Council Resolution 1851 also encouraged the establishment of

an international cooperation mechanism -- known now as the Contact Group on

Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).  The Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was created in New York City on January 14, 2009, and currently numbers 28 nations (Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia TFG, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Yemen), and 6 international organizations (African Union, Arab League, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations Secretariat and International Maritime Organization) with seven additional countries (Canada, Cyprus, Liberia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore) pending requests to participate.  The Department of State represents the United States on the CGPCS. The CGPCS acts as a common point of contact between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast. The CGPCS

met in January at the United Nations in New York City and in Egypt in mid-

March. The CGPCS will meet again in late May.

     The CGPCS established four working groups to provide recommendations to

the CGPCS. Working Group #I is addressing activities related to military and

operational coordination and is chaired by the United Kingdom. Working Group

#2 is addressing judicial aspects of piracy and is chaired by Denmark. The

United States has the lead for Working Group #3, which focuses on shipping self awareness and interaction with industry. The Department of Transportation's

Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Coast Guard have been co-leading

this Working Group. Working Group #4 is tasked with offering recommendations

to improve diplomatic and public information efforts and is chaired by Egypt.

     The UN Security Council resolutions called for greater cooperation between

governments and industry to reduce the incidence of piracy. In January 2009,

former-Secretary of State Rice stated that, "Once a hostage situation develops,

the stakes in military operations increase. Consequently, an important part of

counter-piracy efforts must be measured in enhancing self-defense capabilities of

commercial vessels, increasing the odds of success against pirates until

warships arrive." This sentiment still holds true today, and we saw evidence of

this in the seajacking of the MAERSK ALABAMA.

     Because of its specialized knowledge, such as operation of our mobility sealift

vessels, and established relationships with U.S. and international shipping,

maritime unions, the marine insurance community and global maritime industry

associations, MARAD has considerable experience in dealing with the diverse

interests of the global maritime industry and is actively involved in the fight

against piracy. MARAD is perhaps unique among government agencies with regard

to its interest in piracy issues and its ability to assist. MARAD operates a fleet of

Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels that have transited the Gulf of Aden

region in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF). As OIF

winds down, RRF vessels may be called upon to play a significant role again in

support of the demobilization of forces, with a consequence of exposing the

vessels and crews to threats from pirate attacks.

      Further, many vessels supported by MARAD's Maritime Security Program

(MSP), participate in the Agency's Voluntary lntermodal Sealift Agreement

(VISA) and transit the Gulf of Aden on a routine basis. The MAERSK ALABAMA

is one of the 60 vessels enrolled in the MSP. MARAD also oversees government

cargoes transiting the region - particularly food aid and military cargoes that are

carried mainly aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels transiting the Gulf. Finally,

as an interface between U.S. maritime labor and the federal government, we

have great interest in protecting the welfare of U.S. mariners who sail aboard

vessels in the region.

      MARAD provides operational advice to U.S.-flag owners and operators,

including counter-piracy measures and awareness on a regular basis through

MARAD Advisories, through a comprehensive and frequently updated website,

and through MARAD’s electronic "MARVIEW” system which is available to

registered users. We have also contributed to the Maritime Safety and Security

Information System (MSSIS) for the purposes of providing more efficient piracy

related data.

     MARAD also plays a key role in the training of merchant mariners through the

development of International Maritime Organization (IMO) maritime security

courses and workforce development. Working with the U.S. Coast Guard and

IMO, Vessel Security Officer, Company Security Officer, and Facility Security

Officer courses were developed by the United States Merchant Marine Academy.

MARAD continues to certify maritime security training providers who meet the

criteria established by the U.S. Coast Guard. To date, more than 50 training

providers have been certified across the country. Efforts are also being made to

include anti-piracy and security training in the academic programs at USMMA

and the state maritime academies and to augment this training at the maritime union schools.

     In late December, the Department of State asked MARAD to assist with the

CGPCS Industry Outreach Working Group. Since 2008, MARAD has met on

numerous occasions with industry to help shape best management practices to

counter piracy and to share industry concerns with U.S. government agencies.

In late December, the National Security Council published an action plan, the

National Strategy for "Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership &

Action Plan" (CPAP). MARAD and the Department of Transportation were

actively involved in developing this Plan, and MARAD posted the CPAP on its

website for the benefit of industry.

     MARAD strongly supported the Military Sealift Command's proposal to create

and implement "Anti-Piracy Assistance Teams" (APAT) for commercial vessels. These teams consist of personnel from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and

MARAD. On a voluntary basis, these teams board U.S.-flag vessels and offer

recommendations on how to improve a vessel's physical defenses against

piracy.  The teams also review security tactics, techniques and procedures and make appropriate recommendations. To date, a number of successful APAT vessel assessments and recommendations have been completed and more are currently scheduled. We expect this process to be embraced by the international community for similar implementation.

     MARAD's continuing outreach to the maritime industry on the piracy issue

has taken many forms. In addition to leading informal meetings and participating

in international forums, MARAD has hosted several collaborative meetings with

both the American and international maritime industry community and

appropriate federal agencies. For example, in October and November 2008,

MARAD and the Department of State sponsored meetings with representatives

from the maritime industry to specifically discuss piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Participants included company security officers from major U.S. flag carriers,

including American President Lines (APL), Horizon Lines, Maersk, Intermarine,

lnteramerican Ocean Shipping, American Roll OnIRoll Off, Crowley, American

Overseas Marine, and Ocean Shipholdings. Flag states with U.S.-owned vessels

or with vessels serving strategic U.S. interests also participated, including

representatives from Denmark, Marshall Islands, Liberia and Panama. The U.S.

Navy's Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain and the United Kingdom's Maritime

Transport Office were also included. Topics specifically addressed at these

meetings were maneuvering and speed, illumination, communication, duress

terminology, armed force protection, and self-defense devices which may be

used to deter piracy.

     At the request of the maritime industry, MARAD facilitated extensive

discussions on piracy with the Department of State, Department of Defense,

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard). In November 2008,

MARAD participated in a public hearing hosted by the Coast Guard which focused on piracy initiatives being considered by the International Maritime Organization's

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). In December 2008, MARAD staff played an

instrumental role in several other international planning events related to piracy.

MARAD participated in the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee

(SCEPC) meeting held in Brussels, Belgium, which included piracy as an agenda

item. MARAD chairs the NATO Planning Board on Ocean Shipping, which

reports to the SCEPC.

     On December 2, 2008, MARAD hosted a Piracy Round Table meeting to

discuss industry "self-help" and best practices to counter piracy. This meeting

brought U.S. government agencies together with the maritime industry to develop

a mutual understanding of the problem and to develop best practices

recommendations. Members of the industry included shipping associations,

registries, carriers, marine insurance companies and representatives from the

European Union. U.S. government representatives included personnel from the

Coast Guard; Department of State; Department of Defense, Office of Naval

Intelligence; USAID; the National Security Council; and the Homeland Security

Council. MARAD established an Anti-Piracy portal on the Agency's website,

which is continuously updated. MARAD Advisories are posted on this site as are

any recent developments and key contact information.

     MARAD hosted an international maritime industry Piracy Summit on

December 11, 2008, with representatives from more than 50 industry

associations, insurers, shipping companies, and labor to encourage them to

further develop best management practices to combat piracy and to implement

these strategies. Representatives from the Department of State; the Department

of Homeland Security; Coast Guard; U.S. Transportation Command, Office of

Naval Intelligence and Military Sealift Command participated in the Summit.

     In late December, MARAD joined the Department of State for discussions in

London between representatives of European Union navies and maritime trade

associations. The purpose of these discussions was to further develop and

implement best management practices and to improve communication between

maritime companies and military forces in the Gulf of Aden region. MARAD

continues to meet with industry to finalize best management practices and share

industry concerns with government agencies.

     In early 2009, MARAD intensified its efforts in the fight against piracy to

further improve coordination between industry and the various navies

participating in the Gulf of Aden, to provide voluntary assessments of security on

U.S. vessels, to further establish best management practices to prevent

piracy and to bring industry's perspectives and ideas to the interagency process.

Additional industry meetings, UN meetings, meetings hosted by the Baltic

International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and a counter-piracy meeting held in

Dubai and hosted by the Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain, have all pursued

these objectives. Since maritime labor is uniquely vulnerable to pirate attacks,

with mariners killed or held hostage as part of ransom demands, MARAD has

included maritime labor in discussions and meetings, when feasible. The most

recent MARAD industry and interagency meeting was held on April 23rd.

     MARAD led the U.S. delegation of Working Group #3 at the meeting of the

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in March of 2009 (which was chaired by the USCG), and presented the international industry developed (and MARAD facilitated) "Best Management Practices" (BMPs) to counter piracy. MARAD also supported the dissemination of counter piracy guidance and better coordination between military and civilian operators in the region. The agency likewise provides U.S. flag projected schedules in the waters off Somalia to the National Maritime

Intelligence Center (NMIC) and vessel tracking information on U.S. flag carriers

to appropriate military authorities.

     Given limited military resources available to fully protect commercial shipping

in the waters off Somalia, there is an increasing focus on the issue of shipping

companies hiring private armed security personnel to protect their vessels while

transiting the waters off Somalia. However, there are many complicated factors

which must be addressed before the industry, as a whole, can adopt this

recommendation. These include the need to develop appropriate standards for

armed security providers, compliance with port state restrictions on arms aboard

merchant vessels entering many ports in the world, consideration of potential

escalation of violence due to the presence of arms onboard commercial vessels,

issues of safety for the crew and vessel, rules on the use of force, design

constraints of vessels to carry additional personnel, union contract issues,

insurance and liability issues and many other related factors.  Clearly, the maritime industry needs government assistance in this area to set or guide standards and measures of performance and MARAD is actively engaged with other agencies in understanding and developing the needed guidance on the use of armed security.

       On May 11, 2009, the USCG issued an updated “Maritime Security Directive” (for Ships Operating in High Risk Areas) that requires the implementation of several security protocols; many of which are similar to the BMPs noted above.  This MARSEC was developed by the USCG in close consultation with the interagency, including, MARAD.  At the request of the USCG, MARAD will participate with the USCG in reviewing vessel security plans required by the MARSEC.

     Most recently, MARAD has engaged the marine insurance industry to

determine the effects of the piracy situation on insurance rates and the effects on insurance if vessels carry armed security personnel aboard. On May 14^th, MARAD hosted a meeting of insurance representatives, the USCG, Department of State, and Military Sealift Command.  The concerns of the insurance companies were made clear.  MARAD and the USCG indicated that we will work together along with other federal agencies to develop an adequate process that enables carriers to embark armed security on board their vessels in a proper manner.  They also shared their concerns with standards, rules, and vetting of security firms, liability implications to the owner, insurer and security firm, and escalation of hostile actions that will increase risks.

    Finally, MARAD has reached out to the maritime labor community to seek ways to address the seafarer community’s interest in the human element issues associated with piracy, including training and awareness, communication.  The communication aspect is particularly important in gaining information from crews that have been released after being hostages.  Such information can contribute valuable lessons learned to further enhance security.

     Combating international piracy is no small effort. Much work has already

taken place, but much remains to be done, before international piracy can be

eliminated. Due to its unique and positive relationship with U.S.-flag and

international vessel owners, MARAD has maintained a vital role in the

development of U.S. anti-piracy policy. Additionally, through its training role,

MARAD provides a valuable service to the commercial fleet. The Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration stand ready to assist in any way possible to address piracy and any other issue that threatens the national and economic security of the United States and our allies.

     I want to thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing today. I will be

happy to answer any questions you might have.

Note:  The word “hijack” refers to the seizing of a vehicle on a roadway or highway.  The term “seajack” is a nautical term which refers to the capture of a vessel on the high seas.  (The term “skyjack” refers to the seizing of an aircraft in flight.)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF

ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
JAMES CAPONlTl

BEFORE THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

May 5, 2009

     Good morning, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain and Members of

the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today

to discuss the serious threat stemming from the ongoing piracy problem in the

waters off of Somalia. Throughout 2008 and continuing into 2009, the global

piracy situation has grown substantially worse- particularly in an ever expanding

area off the coasts of Somalia, where more than 20,000 vessels transit the region

each year. Although the impact of piracy has been very significant, the American

public has only recently been made more aware of the situation with the attacks

on two American flag vessels, the MAERSK ALABAMA and the LIBERTY SUN –

both of which were carrying food aid for Somalia.

      Acts of piracy threaten freedom of navigation and the flow of commerce. Off

the Horn of Africa, piracy disrupts the flow of critical humanitarian supplies.

Pirates frequently demand millions of dollars in ransom for the release of

hostages, ships and cargoes. Press reports indicate that in 2008, pirates

received an estimated $30 million dollars in ransom for the release of seajacked

vessels. In 2008, 42 vessels were seized by pirates operating off the Coast of

Somalia. Globally, 889 mariners were held hostage by pirates (81 5 in Somalia)

as part of ransom demands. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported

that in 2008, globally, 11 mariners were murdered by pirates and another 21 are

missing and presumed dead. The IMB also reported that during the same

period, off the Horn of Africa, four mariners were killed and 14 are missing and

presumed dead.

     The vessels most vulnerable to piracy attacks are those traveling slowly (with

limited speed capabilities) and with low freeboard -that is to say, there is not

much height between the water and the deck level. At any given time during the

past nine months, more than a dozen vessels and their crews have been held

hostage off the Somali coast. Currently, 18 commercial ships are being held for

ransom by pirates in Somalia, along with more than 300 crewmembers. One

reason for the success of seajackings and ransom taking is that the government

in Somalia is ineffective and this has enabled pirates to operate with virtual

impunity. Further, there have been press reports opining that some local officials

are on the pirates' payroll.

     The Gulf of Aden, which links the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal

with the Indian Ocean, is one of the busiest shipping choke points in the world.

An average of 50 commercial vessels transit the Gulf daily. Many of these

vessels are potential targets. More than 3.3 million barrels of oil pass through

the Gulf of Aden every day. This represents 4% of the world's total daily

production and 12% of all the oil transported by water daily around the world by

sea. In addition, numerous other cargoes and container freight pass through the

Gulf daily.

     Approximately 80% of the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden carry cargo

destined to and from Europe, East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East.

However, a significant portion of cargoes is also destined to and from the United

States. In addition, U.S. citizens serve as crew or are passengers on vessels

transiting the area.

     On average, at least one U.S. commercial vessel transits the area each day.

Many of these US-flag vessels carry Department of Defense cargo bound for

Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. U.S.-flag vessels transiting the region

also carry humanitarian cargoes generated by the U.S. Agency for International

Development,(USAID) or international organizations to the Horn of Africa,

including Djibouti, Somalia and other countries in East Africa or South Asia.

     As mentioned, seajackings off the Horn of Africa significantly increased in

2008 and 2009, with more than 150 attacks and 55 successful seajackings.

Although only one-third of one percent of all the vessels transiting the Gulf of

Aden are seajacked, the cost and disruption to the flow of commerce overall is

significant. There is also a serious risk of an environmental disaster should a

vessel be damaged or sunk during a hostile attack. Press reports indicate that

merchant mariners have been killed or are presumed dead and that hundreds,

including American mariners, have been traumatized by being attacked and held

hostage, and even by the uncertainties generated by the growing instability of the

region.

     Ship owners and operators are also negatively impacted by rising daily

operating costs due to increased insurance premiums and operational delays

caused by longer transit times or diversions to avoid the area. In many cases,

there are additional costs related to the higher wages which must be paid to crew

transiting the higher risk area. Both the shipper and the consumer are ultimately

impacted due to these higher operating costs and the delays in the supply chain.

This is particularly true where vessels are diverted around the Cape of Good

Hope in an effort to avoid the Gulf of Aden altogether, which also increases fuel

consumption and the carbon footprint of marine transportation. Higher shipping

costs also raise the costs of commodities for local populations.

     The United States has been a leader in promoting collaborative international

action to combat the current piracy crisis. It has been our Nation's long-standing

policy to support freedom of the seas. In July 2008, the United States took a

leadership role in the United Nations fight against piracy. This resulted in United

Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1816 which authorized countries

cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, for

which advance notification has been provided to the Secretary-General, to enter

Somali territorial waters to repress piracy. This was followed by additional

Security Council Resolutions 1838 and 1846 in the fall of 2008. In December

2008, the United States drafted UN Security Council Resolution 1851 which

authorizes countries cooperating with the TFG of Somalia to enter Somali

territory to repress piracy. This resolution was adopted by the Security Council.

     UN Security Council Resolution 1851 also encouraged the establishment of an international cooperation mechanism -- known now as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).  The Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia was created in New York City on January 14, 2009, and currently numbers 28 nations (Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia TFG, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen), and 6 international organizations (African Union, Arab League, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations Secretariat and International Maritime Organization) with 7 additional countries (Canada, Cyprus, Liberia, Nigeria, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore) pending requests to participate.  The Department of State represents the United States on the CGPCS. The CGPCS acts as a common point of contact between and among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast. The CGPCS met in January at the United Nations in New York City and in Egypt in mid- March. The CGPCS will meet again in late May.

     The CGPCS established four working groups to provide recommendations to

the CGPCS. Working Group #I is addressing activities related to military and

operational coordination and is chaired by the United Kingdom. Working Group

#2 is addressing judicial aspects of piracy and is chaired by Denmark. The

United States has the lead for Working Group #3, which focuses on shipping self

awareness and interaction with industry. The Department of Transportation's

Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Coast Guard have been co-leading

this Working Group. Working Group #4 is tasked with offering recommendations

to improve diplomatic and public information efforts and is chaired by Egypt.

     The UN Security Council resolutions called for greater cooperation between

governments and industry to reduce the incidence of piracy. In January 2009,

former-Secretary of State Rice stated that, "Once a hostage situation develops,

the stakes in military operations increase. Consequently, an important part of

counter-piracy efforts must be measured in enhancing self-defense capabilities of

commercial vessels, increasing the odds of success against pirates until

warships arrive." This sentiment still holds true today, and we saw evidence of

this in the seajacking of the MAERSK ALABAMA.

     Because of its specialized knowledge, such as operation of our mobility sealift

vessels, and established relationships with U.S. and international shipping,

maritime unions, the marine insurance community and global maritime industry

associations, MARAD has considerable experience in dealing with the diverse

interests of the global maritime industry and is actively involved in the fight

against piracy. We are perhaps unique among government agencies with regard

to its interest in piracy issues and its ability to assist. MARAD operates a fleet of

Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels which have transited the Gulf of Aden

region in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIFIOEF). As OIF

winds down, RRF vessels may be called upon to play a significant role again in

support of the demobilization of forces, with a consequence of exposing the

vessels and crews to threats from pirate attacks.

      Further, many vessels supported by MARAD's Maritime Security Program

(MSP), participate in the Agency's Voluntary lntermodal Sealift Agreement

(VISA) and transit the Gulf of Aden on a routine basis. The MAERSK ALABAMA

is one of the 60 vessels enrolled in the MSP. MARAD also oversees government

cargoes transiting the region - particularly food aid and military cargoes that are

carried mainly aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels transiting the Gulf. Finally,

as an interface between U.S. maritime labor and the federal government, we

have great interest in protecting the welfare of U.S. mariners who sail aboard

vessels in the region.

      MARAD provides operational advice to U.S.-flag owners and operators,

including counter-piracy measures and awareness, on a regular basis through

MARAD Advisories, through a comprehensive and frequently updated website,

and through MARAD1s electronic "MARVIEW system which is available to

registered users. We have also contributed to the Maritime Safety and Security

Information System (MSSIS) for the purposes of providing more efficient piracy

related data.

     MARAD also plays a key role in the training of merchant mariners through the

development of International Maritime Organization (IMO) maritime security

courses and workforce development. Working with the U.S. Coast Guard and

IMO, Vessel Security Officer, Company Security Officer, and Facility Security

Officer courses were developed by the United States Merchant Marine Academy.

MARAD continues to certify maritime security training providers who meet the

criteria established by the U.S. Coast Guard. To date, more than 50 training

providers have been certified across the country. Efforts are also being made to

include anti-piracy and security training in the academic programs at USMMA

and the state maritime academies.

     In late December, the Department of State asked MARAD to assist with the

CGPCS Industry Outreach Working Group. Since 2008, MARAD has met on

numerous occasions with industry to help shape best management practices to

counter piracy and to share industry concerns with U.S. government agencies.

In late December, the National Security Council published an action plan, the

National Strategy for "Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership &

Action Plan" (CPAP). MARAD and the Department of Transportation were

actively involved in developing this Plan, and MARAD posted the CPAP on its

website for the benefit of industry.

     MARAD strongly supported the Military Sealift Command's proposal to create

and implement "Anti-Piracy Assessment Teams" for commercial vessels. These

teams consist of personnel from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and

MARAD. On a voluntary basis, these teams board U.S.-flag vessels and offer

recommendations on how to improve a vessel's physical defenses against

piracy, and review security tactics, techniques and procedures. To date, a

number of successful APAT vessel assessments and recommendations have

been completed. We expect this process to be embraced by the international

community for similar implementation.

     MARAD's continuing outreach to the maritime industry on the piracy issue

has taken many forms. In addition to leading informal meetings and participating

in international forums, MARAD has hosted several collaborative meetings with

both the American and international maritime industry community and

appropriate federal agencies. For example, in October and November 2008,

MARAD and the Department of State sponsored meetings with representatives

from the maritime industry to specifically discuss piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

Participants included company security officers from major U.S. flag carriers,

including American President Lines (APL), Horizon Lines, Maersk, Intermarine,

lnteramerican Ocean Shipping, American Roll OnIRoll Off, Crowley, American

Overseas Marine, and Ocean Shipholdings. Flag states with U.S.-owned vessels

or with vessels serving strategic U.S. interests also participated, including

representatives from Denmark, Marshall Islands, Liberia and Panama. The U.S.

Navy's Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain and the United Kingdom's Maritime

Transport Office were also included. Topics specifically addressed at these

meetings were maneuvering and speed, illumination, communication, duress

terminology, armed force protection, and self-defense devices which may be

used to deter piracy.

     At the request of the maritime industry, MARAD facilitated extensive

discussions on piracy with the Department of State, Department of Defense,

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard). In November 2008,

MARAD participated in a public hearing hosted by the Coast Guard, focused on

piracy initiatives being considered by the International Maritime Organization's

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). In December 2008, MARAD staff played an

instrumental role in several other international planning events related to piracy.

MARAD participated in the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee

(SCEPC) meeting held in Brussels, Belgium, which included piracy as an agenda

item. MARAD chairs the NATO Planning Board on Ocean Shipping, which

reports to the SCEPC.

     On December 2, 2008, MARAD hosted a Piracy Round Table meeting to

discuss industry "self-help" and best practices to counter piracy. This meeting

brought U.S. government agencies together with the maritime industry to develop

a mutual understanding of the problem and to develop best practices

recommendations. Members of the industry included shipping associations,

registries, carriers, marine insurance companies and representatives from the

European Union. U.S. government representatives included personnel from the

Coast Guard; Department of State; Department of Defense, Office of Naval

Intelligence; USAID; the National Security Council; and the Homeland Security

Council. MARAD established an Anti-Piracy portal on the Agency's website,

which is continuously updated. MARAD Advisories are posted on this site as are

any recent developments and key contact information.

     MARAD hosted an international maritime industry Piracy Summit on

December 11, 2008, with representatives from more than 50 industry

associations, insurers, shipping companies, and labor to encourage them to

further develop best management practices to combat piracy and to implement

these strategies. Representatives from the Department of State; the Department

of Homeland Security; Coast Guard; U.S. Transportation Command, Office of

Naval Intelligence and Military Sealift Command participated in the Summit.

     In late December, MARAD joined the Department of State for discussions in

London between representatives of European Union navies and maritime trade

associations. The purpose of these discussions was to further develop and

implement best management practices and to improve communication between

maritime companies and military forces in the Gulf of Aden region. MARAD

continues to meet with industry to finalize best management practices and share

industry concerns with government agencies.

     In early 2009, MARAD intensified its efforts in the fight against piracy to

further improve coordination between industry and the various navies

participating in the Gulf of Aden, to provide voluntary assessments of security on

U.S. vessels, and to further establish best management practices to prevent

piracy and to bring industry's perspectives and ideas to the interagency process.

Additional industry meetings, UN meetings, meetings hosted by the Baltic

International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and a counter-piracy meeting held in

Dubai and hosted by the Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain, have all pursued

these objectives. Since maritime labor is uniquely vulnerable to pirate attacks,

with mariners killed or held hostage as part of ransom demands, MARAD has

included maritime labor in discussions and meetings, when feasible. The most

recent MARAD industry and interagency meeting was held on April 23rd.

     MARAD led the U.S. delegation of Working Group #3 at the meeting of the

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in March of 2009, and

presented the international industry developed (and MARAD facilitated) "Best

Management Practices" (BMPs) to counter piracy. MARAD also supported the

dissemination of counter piracy guidance and better coordination between

military and civilian operators in the region. The agency likewise provides U.S.

flag projected schedules in the waters off Somalia to the National Maritime

Intelligence Center (NMIC) and vessel tracking information on U.S. flag carriers

to appropriate military authorities.

     Given limited military resources available to fully protect commercial shipping

in the waters off Somalia, there is an increasing focus on the issue of shipping

companies hiring private armed security personnel to protect their vessels while

transiting the waters off Somalia. However, there are many complicated factors

which must be addressed before the industry, as a whole, can adopt this

recommendation. These include the need to develop appropriate standards for

armed security providers, compliance with port state restrictions on arms aboard

merchant vessels entering many ports in the world, and consideration of potential

escalation of violence due to the presence of arms onboard commercial vessels,

issues of safety for the crew and vessel, rules on the use of force, design

constraints of vessels to carry additional personnel, union contract issues,

insurance and liability issues and many other related factors.

     Most recently, MARAD has engaged the marine insurance industry to

determine the effects of the piracy situation on insurance rates and to determine

the effects on insurance if vessels carry armed security personnel aboard. We

will continue to work with industry to determine whether, and to what extent,

armed security might be used aboard commercial vessels in certain

circumstances.

     Combating international piracy is no small effort. Much work has already

taken place, but much remains to be done, before international piracy can be

eliminated. Due to its unique and positive relationship with U.S.-flag and

international vessel owners, MARAD has maintained a vital role in the

development of U.S. anti-piracy policy. Additionally, through its training role,

MARAD provides a valuable service to the commercial fleet. The

Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration stand ready to

assist in any way possible to address piracy and any other issue that threatens

the national and economic security of the United States and our allies.

     I want to thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing today. I will be

happy to answer any questions you might have.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF

ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
JAMES CAPONITI

BEFORE THE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

INTERNATIONAL PIRACY

FEBRUARY 4, 2009

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-committee.  I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the serious threat stemming from maritime piracy. Throughout 2008, the global piracy situation grew substantially worse– particularly in the Gulf of Aden off the Coast of Somalia. The impact of piracy has been very significant.  Acts of piracy threaten freedom of navigation and the flow of commerce.  Off the Horn of Africa, piracy disrupts the flow of critical humanitarian supplies.  Pirates frequently demand millions of dollars in ransom for the release of hostages, ships and cargoes.  The Washington Post recently reported that pirates made an estimated $30 million hijacking ships for ransom last year.  In 2008, 42 vessels were seized by pirates operating off the Coast of Somalia.  Globally, 889 mariners were held hostage (815 in Somalia) as part of ransom demands.  The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports that in 2008, globally, 11 mariners were murdered by pirates and another 21 are missing and presumed dead.  Particularly, the IMB also reports that, off the Horn of Africa, four mariners were killed and 14 are missing and presumed dead.

The vessels most vulnerable to piracy are those traveling slowly and with low freeboard – that is to say, there is not much height between the water and the deck level.  At any given time during the past six months, close to a dozen or more vessels and their crews have been held hostage off the Somali coast.  Currently, ten commercial ships are being held for ransom by pirates in Somalia, along with approximately two hundred crewmembers.  Just last Thursday, the LONGCHAMP, a German tanker, was captured in the Gulf of Aden – the third ship to be taken this month in what is one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.  The ship is registered in the Bahamas.  Its crew includes 12 Filipinos and one Indonesian.  One reason for the success of seajackings and ransom taking is that the government in Somalia is ineffective and this has enabled pirates to operate with relative impunity.  Further, there have been press reports opining that some local officials are on the pirates’ payroll. 

The Gulf of Aden, which links the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal with the Indian Ocean, is one of the busiest shipping choke points in the world. An average of 50 commercial vessels transit the Gulf daily.  Many of these vessels are potential targets.  More than 3.3 million barrels of oil pass through the Gulf of Aden every day. This represents 4% of the world’s total daily production and 12% of all the oil transported by water daily around the world by sea.  In addition, numerous other cargoes and container freight pass through the Gulf daily. 

Approximately 80% of the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden carry cargo destined to and from Europe, East Africa, South Asia, and the Far East.  However, a significant portion of cargoes is also destined to and from the United States.  In addition, U.S. citizens serve as crew or are passengers on internationally registered vessels transiting the area.

On average, at least one U.S. commercial vessel transits the area each day. Many of these US-flag vessels carry Department of Defense cargo bound for Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.  U.S.-flag vessels transiting the region also carry humanitarian cargoes generated by U.S. AID or international organizations to the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti, Somalia and other countries in East Africa or South Asia. 

As mentioned, seajackings off the Horn of Africa significantly increased in 2008, with more than 100 attacks and 40 successful seajackings.  Although only one-third of one percent of all the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden are seajacked, the cost and disruption to the flow of commerce overall is significant.  There is also a serious risk of an environmental disaster should a vessel be damaged or sunk during a hostile attack.  Press reports indicate that numerous merchant mariners have been killed or are presumed dead and that hundreds more have been traumatized by being attacked and held hostage. 

Ship owners and operators are also negatively impacted by rising daily operating costs due to increased insurance premiums and operational delays caused by longer transit times or diversions to avoid the area.  In many cases, there are additional costs related to the higher wages which must be paid to crew transiting the higher risk area.  Both the shipper and the consumer are ultimately impacted due to these higher operating costs and the delays in the supply chain.  This is particularly true where vessels are diverted around the Cape of Good Hope in an effort to avoid the Gulf of Aden altogether, which also increases fuel consumption and the carbon footprint of marine transportation.  Higher shipping costs also raise the costs of commodities for local populations.  The Horn of Africa is currently experiencing its most severe food security crisis since the early 1990s.

The United States has been a leader in international action to combat the current piracy crisis.  Historically, it has been our Nation’s long-standing policy to support freedom of the seas.  In July 2008, the United States took a leadership role in the United Nations against piracy.  This resulted in United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1816 which authorized countries cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, for which advance notification has been provided to the Secretary-General to take all necessary means within existing international law to repress piracy and armed robbery in Somali Territorial waters.  This was followed by additional Security Council resolutions 1838 and 1846 in the fall of 2008.  In December 2008, the United States drafted UN Security Council Resolution 1851 which authorizes countries cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia to take all necessary means to repress piracy and armed robbery in Somalia.  In effect, this allows states that have received the authorization of the TFG to use Somali territory and airspace to conduct counter-piracy operations ashore.   

UN Security Council Resolution 1851, which authorized all necessary means at sea and in Somalia, also encouraged the establishment of an international cooperation mechanism -- known now as the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).  The CGPCS has 24 nations as members and five international organization observers (the UN, NATO, EU, AU and the IMO).  In addition, invitations have been extended to four other nations and the Arab league.  The Department of State represents the United States on the CGPCS.  The CGPCS will facilitate the sharing of information, coordinate activities, and reach out to the shipping and insurance industries.   The first meeting of the CGPCS took place January 14^th at the United Nations in New York City. 

The CGPCS established four working groups which will provide recommendations to the CGPCS.  Working Group #1 will address activities related to military and operational coordination and will be convened by the United Kingdom.  Working Group #2 will address judicial aspects of piracy and will be convened by Denmark.  The United States has the lead for Working Group #3, which focuses on shipping self-awareness and other capabilities.  MARAD is leading efforts on this Working Group in close collaboration with the Coast Guard.  Working Group #4 will endeavor to offer recommendations to improve diplomatic and public information efforts and will be convened by Egypt.

The UN Security Council resolutions called for greater cooperation between governments and industry to reduce the incidence of piracy.  In January 2009, former-Secretary of State Rice stated that, "Once a hostage situation develops, the stakes in military operations increase. Consequently, an important part of counter-piracy efforts must be measured in enhancing self-defense capabilities of commercial vessels, increasing the odds of success against pirates until warships arrive."   This sentiment still holds true.

Because of its specialized knowledge, such as operation of our mobility sealift vessels, and established relationships with U.S. and international shipping, maritime unions, and marine insurance communities, the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD) has considerable experience in dealing with a diverse maritime industry and is actively involved in the fight against piracy.  MARAD is perhaps unique among government agencies with regard to its interest in piracy issues and its ability to assist.  MARAD operates a fleet of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels which have transited the Gulf of Aden region in support of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF).  As OIF winds down, RRF vessels may play a significant role again in support of the demobilization of forces, exposing vessels and crews to threats from pirate attacks.  Further, many vessels supported by MARAD’s Maritime Security Program (MSP), which participate in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), transit the Gulf of Aden on a routine basis.  Finally, MARAD has oversight over government cargoes transiting the region – particularly aid and military cargoes that are carried mainly aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels transiting the Gulf.  As an interface between U.S. maritime labor and the federal government, the Maritime Administration also has great interest in protecting the welfare of U.S. mariners who sail aboard vessels in the region. 

MARAD also provides operational advice to U.S.-flag owners and operators, including counter-piracy measures and awareness, on a regular basis through MARAD Advisories and through a comprehensive and frequently updated website.   We play a key role in the training of merchant mariners through the development of International Maritime Organization (IMO) maritime security courses and workforce development.  Working with the U.S. Coast Guard and IMO, Vessel Security Officer, Company Security Officer, and Facility Security Officer courses were developed by the United States Merchant Marine Academy.  MARAD continues to certify maritime security training providers who meet the criteria established by the U.S. Coast Guard.  To date, more than 50 training providers have been certified across the country.

In late December, the State Department asked MARAD to assist with the CGPCS Industry Outreach Working Group.  To this end, MARAD continues to meet with industry to help shape best management practices to counter piracy and to share industry concerns with U.S. government agencies.  Also in December, the National Security Council published an action plan, the National Strategy for “Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan” (CPAP).  MARAD and the Department of Transportation were actively involved in developing this Plan, and MARAD posted the CPAP on its website for the benefit of industry. 

MARAD also supports the Military Sealift Command’s proposal to create and implement “Anti-Piracy Assessment Teams.”  These teams will consist of personnel from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and MARAD.  On a voluntary basis, these teams will board U.S.-flag vessels and offer recommendations on how to improve a vessel’s physical defenses against piracy, and review tactics, techniques and procedures.  The American industry has embraced this proposal, and we plan to share the process with the international community for similar implementation.

MARAD’s continuing outreach to the maritime industry on the piracy issue has taken many forms.  In addition to leading informal meetings and participating in international forums, MARAD has hosted several collaborative meetings with both the American and international maritime industry community.  In October and November 2008, MARAD and the State Department sponsored meetings with representatives from the maritime industry to specifically discuss piracy in the Gulf of Aden.  Participants included company security officers from major U.S. flag carriers,  including American President Lines (APL), Horizon Lines, Maersk, Intermarine, Interamerican Ocean Shipping, American Roll On/Roll Off, Crowley, American Overseas Marine, and Ocean Shipholdings.  Flag states with U.S.-owned vessels or with vessels serving strategic U.S. interests also participated, including representatives from Denmark, Marshall Islands, Liberia and Panama.  The U.S. Navy’s Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain and the United Kingdom’s Maritime Transport Office were also included. Topics specifically addressed at these meetings were maneuvering and speed, illumination, communication, duress terminology, armed force protection, and self-defense devices which may be used to deter piracy.

At the request of the maritime industry, MARAD facilitated extensive discussions on piracy with the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard).  In November 2008, MARAD participated in a public hearing hosted by the Coast Guard, focused on piracy initiatives being conducted by the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC).  In December 2008, MARAD staff played an instrumental role in several other international planning events related to piracy.  MARAD participated in the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee meeting held in Brussels, Belgium, by the NATO Planning Board on Ocean Shipping.  This Planning Board is chaired by MARAD.   

On December 2, 2008, MARAD hosted a Piracy Round Table meeting to discuss industry “self-help” and best practices to counter piracy.  This meeting brought U.S. government agencies together with the maritime industry to develop a mutual understanding of the problem and to develop best practices recommendations.  Members of the industry included shipping associations, registries, carriers, marine insurance companies and representatives from the European Union.  U.S. government representatives included personnel from the Coast Guard, State Department, Department of Defense, Office of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Agency for International Development, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council.  MARAD established an Anti-Piracy portal on the Agency’s website, which is continuously updated.  MARAD Advisories are posted on this site as are any recent developments and key contact information.

MARAD hosted an international maritime industry Piracy Summit on December 11, 2008, with representatives from more than 50 industry associations, insurers, shipping companies, and labor to encourage them to further develop best management practices to combat piracy and to implement these strategies.  Representatives from government included the Department of State (State Department), the Department of Homeland Security , Coast Guard, U.S. Transportation Command, Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Sealift Command.

In late December, MARAD joined the State Department for discussions in London between representatives of European Union navies and maritime trade associations.  The purpose of these discussions was to further develop and implement best management practices and to improve communication between maritime companies and military forces in the Gulf of Aden region.  MARAD continues to meet with industry to finalize best management practices and share industry concerns with government agencies.

In early 2009, MARAD intensified its efforts in the fight against piracy to further improve coordination between industry and the various navies participating in the Gulf of Aden, to provide voluntary assessments of security on U.S. vessels, and to further establish best management practices to prevent piracy.  Additional industry meetings, UN meetings, meetings hosted by the Baltic International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and a counter-piracy meeting held in Dubai and hosted by the Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain, have all pursued these objectives.  Since maritime labor is such an important factor in pirate attacks, and since mariners have been killed or held hostage as part of ransom demands, MARAD has included maritime labor in discussions and meetings, when feasible.    

It is clear that combating international piracy is no small effort, evidenced by its long history.  Much work has already taken place, but much remains to be done, before international piracy can be eliminated.  Due to its unique and positive relationship with U.S.-flag and international vessel owners, MARAD has a vital role in the development of U.S. anti-piracy policy.  Additionally, through its training role, MARAD provides a valuable service to the commercial fleet. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Transportation and the Maritime Administration stand ready to assist in any way possible to address piracy and any other issue that threatens the national and economic security of the United States and our allies. 

I want to thank the members of this Subcommittee and Chairman Cummings for your leadership in holding this hearing today.  I will be happy to answer any questions you might have.

##

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE RANDOLPH BABBITT,
ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

BEFORE THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,

ON

THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION’S CALL TO
ACTION ON AIRLINE SAFETY AND PILOT TRAINING.

SEPTEMBER 23, 2009.

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Call to Action on airline safety and pilot training. As you know, on June 15, 2009, we made this call to action to encourage the aviation industry in this country to come together to share their best practices across the board and implement actions we know can improve safety. History has shown that we are able to implement better safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when we work together on problems and their solutions. We have received a wealth of information from the Call to Action, and we are taking several steps to use that information to make the industry and traveling public safer.

To start, we had several short-term actions that we wanted to achieve in June and July of this year. These included:

Flight and Duty Time Rulemaking: As a result of the Call to Action, FAA made the creation of a new flight and rest rule based on fatigue science a high priority, with an aggressive timeline. FAA chartered an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC), which began meeting in July 2009. The ARC, which consisted of representatives from FAA, industry, and labor organizations, was charged with producing recommendations for a science-based approach to fatigue management by September 1, 2009. I am pleased to report to you that the ARC met its charge and that we are currently reviewing its recommendations. Although our review is ongoing, I would also like to share with you how pleased I am with the work that we accomplished in the ARC. While some details remain unresolved, the ARC gave us a broad philosophical framework that will form the basis for our NPRM.

Focused Inspection Initiative: Recognizing the urgency of proposals in the Call to Action, FAA required its principal operations inspectors for part 121 carriers to conduct a focused program review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and management practices.

The focused inspection initiative has two parts. The first part of the initiative required FAA inspectors to meet with the carrier’s director of operations, director of safety, and company officials responsible for flight crewmember training and qualification programs. The purpose of these meetings was to determine the carrier’s ability to identify, track, and manage low-time flight crewmembers and those who have failed evaluation events or demonstrated a repetitive need for additional training. Inspectors also looked at whether the carrier adopted the suggestions in Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06015 to voluntarily implement remedial training for pilots with persistent performance deficiencies. The meetings were to occur as soon as possible, but no later than July 15, 2009. I am pleased to report that all of these reviews have been completed.

As a result of these meetings, our inspectors found that about two-thirds of the carriers operating under the traditional regulatory requirements for pilot training and checking (i.e. carriers that do not participate in an Advanced Qualification Program) had systems in place to identify and manage low-time flight crewmembers and those with persistent performance problems. We strongly encouraged carriers without such systems to establish them. For those who will not commit to implementing these systems, we will increase oversight to ensure their training and qualification programs meet regulatory requirements.

The second part of the initiative is currently underway. Inspectors are conducting additional inspections to validate that the carrier’s training and qualification programs meet regulatory standards in accordance with FAA guidance materials, including, among other items:

·      Review the entire performance history of any pilot in question;

·      Provide remedial training as necessary; and

·      Provide additional oversight by the certificate holder to ensure that performance deficiencies are effectively addressed and corrected.

We expect to complete the second part of the focused inspection initiative by September 30.

Training Program Review Guidance: Using results from initial elements of the focused inspection initiative, FAA will provide guidance material on conducting a comprehensive training program review. This guidance will describe the training program review in the context of a safety management system and its role in a corporate safety culture.

Although our original goal (as indicated in the Action Plan) was to develop this document by July 31, we have postponed development of the Training Program Review Guidance for two reasons. First, the Action Plan indicates that we will use the results of FAA’s focused inspection initiative in developing the material. Although FAA inspectors completed Part I by July 15, Part II (which calls for a more in-depth review of training) is not slated to be complete until September 30, as stated above. Second, we found that the initial July timeframe would not allow us to benefit from suggestions and ideas developed in the series of Call to Action safety forums held around the country in July and August.

Once FAA inspectors complete the second part of the focused inspection initiative, we will analyze this information, along with ideas gathered from the regional safety forums, and begin developing the SAFO. As we may want to provide time for industry comment, our goal is to complete it by December 31.

Obtain Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: To solidify oral commitments made at FAA’s June 15 Call to Action, I sent a letter to all part 121 operators and their unions and requested written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards, with specific commitments on the following key topics:

·      Pilot Records: While Congress is working to amend the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 and the FAA amends Advisory Circular 120-68D, I asked that air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants for voluntary disclosure of FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events.

·      FOQA and ASAP: I asked that air carriers who have not done so, establish flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) programs and develop data analysis processes to ensure effective use of this information.

I can tell you that of the responses we have examined so far, carriers have overwhelmingly indicated a willingness to make the commitments I have requested - this includes responses from those who have already done so. But not everyone has responded yet. We have reiterated to these airlines the importance of responding to my request. Our final findings and recommendations resulting from this effort will be summarized in the final report on the Call to Action that will be published by the end of the calendar year.

Labor Organizations: I asked labor organizations for their commitment in the following areas:

·      Establish and support professional standards and ethics committees to develop peer audit and review procedures, and to elevate ethics and professional standards.

·      Establish and publish a code of ethics that includes expectations for professional behavior, standards of conduct for professional appearance, and overall fitness to fly.

·      Support periodic safety risk management meetings between FAA and mainline and regional carriers to promote the most effective practices, including periodic analysis of FOQA and ASAP data with an emphasis on identifying enhancements to the training program.

The initial responses have been informative. As with the air carrier responses, we have not heard from everyone. We will continue to track responses to this request and will include the results findings and recommendations we will be making as we wrap up this Call to Action with a report later this year.

Mentoring: To address issues in the professional standards and flight discipline area, FAA developed and sought industry comments on the prospect of creating a range of mentoring programs. I am still very much in favor of mentoring, but there is no question that it is also one of the most challenging concepts to address. We found this to be true during the discussions held at Call to Action safety forums around the country. Still, these discussions have produced some interesting and potentially promising ideas. For example:

·      Establishing Joint Strategic Councils within a “family” of carriers (mainline and regional partner(s)). This approach could lead to individual as well as corporate mentoring relationships.

·      Using Professional Standards Committee Safety Conferences to provide opportunities for two-way mentoring – a very good reminder that good ideas are not unique to larger mainline carriers.

·      Exploring mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation programs.

We will be looking more closely at these ideas as we analyze data gathered from the forums and develop a mentoring guidance document for industry comment.

Regional Safety Forums: Beginning in July, FAA conducted a series of regional safety forums to discuss the Call to Action initiatives, listen to stakeholder comments, and seek ideas for and commitments to additional actions in the areas in which FAA is already taking specific action. By the end of August, FAA held 12 well-attended forums in the following locations:

The Call to Action also included several intermediate term actions, intended for completion in the August-December 2009 timeframe. These include:

Crew Training Requirements: At the time we initiated the Call to Action, the FAA already had an NPRM open for comment, intended to enhance traditional training programs for crewmembers and dispatchers by requiring the use of flight simulation training devices for flight crewmembers, and including additional training requirements in areas critical to safety. The public comment period closed on August 10 with over 3000 pages of comments. FAA is reviewing these comments and is committed to applying the resources necessary to complete a final rule on an aggressive timeline. The final rule will be consistent with the philosophy of enhancing the quality and effectiveness of training rather than focusing on traditional quantitative measures such as total flight time.

One of the things that the Call Action has also shown a light on is the issue of varying operational experience. We do not believe that simply raising quantity – the total number of hours of flying time or experience – without regard to the quality and nature of that time and experience – is an appropriate method by which to improve a pilot’s proficiency in commercial operations. For example, a newly-certificated commercial pilot with the minimum number of hours might be limited to certain activities until he or she could accumulate the type of experience deemed potentially necessary to serve as a first officer for an air carrier. Such experience would need to include training and operational experience in the multi-pilot environment, as well as training and exposure to icing, high altitude operations and other areas common to commercial air carrier operations.

Guidance to Inspectors on Safety Oversight: Consistent with the report of the Independent Review Team on Managing Risks in Civil Aviation, on which I served, FAA’s Aviation Safety organization included scenario-based training in safety oversight as part of the August All-Managers Conference. This training was intended to address issues raised in the report, including:

·      Management of varying regulatory interpretation styles within the inspection workforce;

·      Methods for harmonizing extremes in regulatory application; and,

·      Methods for optimizing the regulatory effectiveness and coherence across a diverse team of inspectors.

Final Report: By December 31, FAA will finalize a report summarizing our findings and recommending additional action items based on the Call to Action meeting, regional safety forums, results of the focused inspection initiative, and other actions. The report will include performance metrics for auditing and assessing progress.

While these are the steps we have and will be taking, I want to point out the biggest factor affecting safety: professionalism in the workplace. Safety begins at the top, but whether one has a wrench in his or her hand, sits at a yoke or carries a clipboard, wears a headset or works in the galley, safety is everyone’s responsibility. In spite of this, we have not seen the required level of professionalism consistently from the aviation industry across the board. Although professionalism prevails in the vast majority of the aviation workforce, it is not uniform throughout the industry. The standards are the same, the training is the same, but the mentality is not the same, and this is what we have to change.

One aspect of professionalism that needs further review is the professional responsibility of pilots to report for duty ready to fly. This can be a challenge for those who commute from one city to their work domicile in another. One of the things that requires further analysis is the effect commuting has on fatigue for crew members. As I have alluded to in the past in front of this Committee, one of the challenges with commuting is that it is virtually impossible to regulate fatigue as it relates to commuting. Who can say that someone who commutes for an hour on the shuttle from DC to NY (or a two-hour flight from Chicago, for that matter) arrives to work less rested than someone who lives in the greater NY metropolitan area, but drives three hours through a snowstorm from Connecticut to arrive at JFK? Who can mandate that no pilot’s child ever gets sick and needs an emergency room visit in the middle of the night, just hours before that pilot is supposed to go on duty? This is where professionalism – taking responsibility for showing up fit for duty – has to govern.

Those who have captured the essence of the professionalism need to have opportunities in and out of the cockpit to pass it on. Experience is a wonderful teacher, and there is no substitute for learning at the hands of someone who has already been there. The inexperienced people in the system need to meet the ones who have been around the block. They need to seek them out and mine whatever golden nuggets they have. That is one of the main reasons I think we need to see more mentoring throughout the industry.

I also think that we need to see greater use of the tools at hand like safety management systems across the board. It is often difficult to spot a trend with a slope that has only three data points on it. Safety management systems can help us plot more points and produce better information to help us make the right safety decisions.

When people know that they can raise their hand and say, “Hey, I think there’s a problem here,” it is then, and only then, that we are able to move forward in safety. If you have a situation where someone raises a hand and then is punished for doing so, all you have done is encourage silence. When you make silence the rule, when sweeping issues under the rug becomes the status quo, you have a recipe for disaster.

Unfortunately, we also need to recognize a basic truth here: we cannot regulate professionalism. No matter how many rules, regulations, advisories, mandatory training sessions, voluntary training sessions, it still comes down to the individual – the individual pilot, mechanic, technician, or controller.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.