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P3s concessions are an integrated service delivery approach where a public transportation agency enters a contractual agreement with a private sector entity to deliver a service and/or facility for a specific period. Under the P3 approach, the private sector entity is singly responsible for the design, construction, finance, operations, maintenance, operation and renewal (if needed) of facilities for a specified concession period. This Guide presents key concepts for the structuring and development of legal contracts for highway transportation P3s in the United States. The Guide illustrates how P3 contracts are developed and structured and explains the major provisions in typical P3 contracts and is designed to provide industry-standard concepts, relevant common tools and mechanisms, and situational examples applicable to P3 transactions.
Preface

On July 17, 2014, the Build America Investment Initiative was implemented as a government-wide effort to increase infrastructure investment and economic growth. As part of that effort, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) established the Build America Transportation Investment Center (BATIC). The BATIC helped public and private project sponsors better understand and utilize public-private partnerships (P3s) and provided assistance to sponsors seeking to navigate the regulatory and credit processes and programs within the Department. In December 2015, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) was enacted, which directed USDOT to establish a National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Finance Bureau, which was renamed the Build America Bureau (the Bureau).

Building upon the work of the BATIC, the Bureau was established in July 2016 as USDOT’s go-to organization to help project sponsors who are seeking to use Federal financing tools to develop, finance and deliver transportation infrastructure projects. The Bureau serves as the single point of contact to help navigate the often complex process of project development, identify and secure financing, and obtain technical assistance for project sponsors, including assistance in P3s. The Bureau replaces the BATIC and is now home to DOT’s credit programs, including Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) and Private Activity Bonds (PAB). The Bureau also houses the newly-established FASTLANE grant program and offers technical expertise in areas such as P3s, transit oriented development and environmental review and permitting. The Bureau is also tasked with streamlining the credit and grant funding processes and providing enhanced technical assistance and encouraging innovative best practices in project planning, financing, P3s, project delivery, and monitoring.

Working through the Bureau, USDOT has made significant progress in its work to assist project sponsors in evaluating the feasibility of P3s, and helping simplify their implementation. In response to requirements under the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) and the FAST Act to develop best practices and tools for P3s, the Bureau, jointly with FHWA, is publishing this report on U.S. highway P3 concessions.
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Public-Private Partnership Toll Concessions Model Contract Guide

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Highway Administration

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1 Introduction

On July 17, 2014, the Build America Investment Initiative was implemented as a government-wide effort to increase infrastructure investment and economic growth. As part of that effort, the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) established the Build America Transportation Investment Center (BATIC). The BATIC helped public and private project sponsors better understand and utilize public-private partnerships (P3s) and provided assistance to sponsors seeking to navigate the regulatory and credit processes and programs within the Department. In December 2015, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) was enacted, which directed USDOT to establish a national surface transportation infrastructure finance bureau, which is the Build America Bureau (the Bureau).

Building upon the work of the BATIC, the Bureau was established in July 2016 as DOT’s go-to organization to help project sponsors develop, finance and deliver transportation infrastructure projects. The Bureau serves as the single point of contact to help navigate the often complex process of project development, identify and secure financing, and obtain technical assistance for project sponsors, including assistance in P3s. The Bureau replaces the BATIC and is now home to DOT’s credit programs, including Transportation Infrastructure Finance Innovation Act (TIFIA), the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) and Private Activity Bonds (PAB). The Bureau also houses the newly-established FASTLANE grant program and offers technical expertise in areas such as P3s, transit oriented development and environmental review and permitting. The Bureau is also tasked with streamlining the credit and grant funding processes and providing enhanced technical assistance and encouraging innovative best practices in project planning, financing, P3s, project delivery, and monitoring.

Since the beginning of the Build America series of initiatives in July 2014, the Department – and now the Bureau - has closed more than $13 billion in DOT financing for 24 projects with over $31 billion in total project costs (including the recent $2.45 billion Amtrak loan – the largest in DOT’s history).

Working through the Bureau, USDOT has made significant progress in its work to assist project sponsors in evaluating the feasibility of P3s, and helping simplify their implementation, including a series of model contract provisions for popular P3 project types. Development of these tools fulfills a requirement under The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) that directs DOT and FHWA to develop public-private partnership (P3) transaction model contracts for the most popular type of P3s for transportation projects. Additionally, the FAST Act requires the Build America Bureau to develop standard contracts for the most common types of public-private partnerships. Based on public input favoring an educational, rather than prescriptive, contract model, the Build America Bureau, in cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), is concurrently publishing two guides describing terms and conditions typically adopted in P3 concession agreements: the first for Toll Concessions and the second for Availability Payment Concessions.

This Guide, for Availability Payment Concessions, presents key concepts for the structuring and development of legal contracts for highway transportation Public-Private Partnerships (P3) in the United States involving availability payments to the concessionaire. It is part of the broader effort by the Build America Bureau and FHWA to promote understanding of P3 transactions. The Guide is designed to provide industry-standard concepts, relevant common tools and mechanisms, and situational examples applicable to P3 transactions.

A glossary of terms is included as Appendix A to assist in understanding the terminology used in this Guide.
1.1 Public-Private Partnerships

A P3 describes a contractual arrangement between a Department (public authority) and a Developer (private entity) in connection with the design, construction, financing, operation and maintenance of an asset that will be used by or is otherwise valuable to the public. Unlike conventional methods of contracting for new construction (e.g., design-build), in which discrete functions are divided and procured through separate solicitations, P3 transactions contemplate a single private entity (generally a consortium of private companies comprising the Developer) which is responsible and financially liable for performing all or a significant number of the Project functions, including design, construction, financing, operation and maintenance. In recent years, Departments, including transportation agencies, have turned to P3 transactions to procure new transportation facilities, including highway projects, in an attempt to obtain time savings, cost savings, and more innovative, higher quality Projects with reduced risks. In exchange, the Developer receives the opportunity to earn a financial return commensurate with the risks it has assumed either through the receipt of Toll Revenues (on which the Developer takes both demand risk and toll collection revenue risk) or availability payments (on which the Developer takes appropriations risk) on such terms as may be outlined under the Concession Agreement. This Guide focuses on the terms and issues relevant to transactions for which the Developer takes the risk of traffic demand and the resulting Toll Revenues. Transactions based on an availability payment mechanism will be treated in a separate guide.

1.2 Contractual Terms of P3s

The contractual agreement between the Department and the Developer, generally known as the Concession Agreement, lies at the heart of the P3 transaction structure. Traditionally, important contractual terms related to P3 transactions have included the following:

- The term of the concession, which for highway projects have extended beyond 30 years and up to 99 years.
- Requisite design-build specifications.
- Requisite operations and maintenance standards.
- Requisite hiring and employment standards.
- Requisite pricing and costing of services to the public.
- Supervening events, to a large extent defining the risk allocation in the contract.
- Defaults and Early Termination of the contract.

Because the Concession Agreement dictates the essential short and long-term dynamics of the P3 transaction, it is critical to the long-term success of the Project that the Department and the Developer are able to develop contracts that effectively exercise the intentions and priorities of the public sector.

1.3 P3s, the Federal Highway Administration, and the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act

The P3 transactions represent a potential option for State and local governments as a form of procuring the development, financing, construction, and operation and maintenance of transportation facilities, including highway projects. The value to the Department in a P3 transaction is the transfer of costs and subsequent risk related to the design, build, financing, operations, and management of the Project to the Developer. In return the Developer is rewarded via an agreed-upon compensation (e.g., Toll Revenues or availability payments for services performed) for a prescribed term. Whether a P3 transaction is attractive to the Department and offers value-for-money for the public is to be assessed on a case-by-case-basis, and implementation is the prerogative
of the State or local level agency responsible for the asset. Through this Guide, the FHWA seeks to create a better understanding of P3 market terms and possible contract structures for use in the consideration and development of P3 transactions.

1.4 Background

The development of this Guide stems from section 1534 of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21). This section requires the Secretary of Transportation to compile and disseminate best practices. Upon request, the Secretary may also provide technical assistance to State and local transportation agencies in the development of P3s. The MAP-21 also requires the development of standard model contracts for the most common types of P3 transactions, with a view to encouraging transportation agencies and other officials to use these model contracts as a base template for use in P3 transactions.

In meeting these requirements, the FHWA has already taken several actions prior to the publication of this Guide. An initial “listening session” on model contracts used in P3 transactions for the public and stakeholders was held in January 2013. The FHWA received a total of 28 comments following this listening session, and these comments were taken into account when selecting the topics to be covered in this Guide.

The P3 transactions are being undertaken by transportation agencies with increasing frequency in order to deliver complex highway projects in the United States. The MAP-21 contains several sections that facilitate the use of P3 transactions for highway projects, including the development of model contracts and best practices focused on protecting the interests of the traveling public, taxpayers, and public agencies, including State departments of transportation (State DOT) and local governments. The focus of this Guide is on P3 transactions that involve long-term concessions for designing, building, financing, operating, and maintaining highway projects. This document complements other primers and tools the Office of Innovative Program Delivery (OIPD) developed on the topic of P3s, including the primer, Establishing a Public-Private Partnership Program; documents on conducting evaluation of P3 proposals, including risk assessment, value for money analysis, and financial assessment; and the suite of educational tools known as P3-VALUE.

1.5 Objectives/Purpose

Based on public and stakeholder input from the listening session, the FHWA has ascertained that a set of prescriptive, standardized contracts for use in P3 transactions would not be acceptable or desirable to all State DOTs and other public agencies in the United States that are interested in using P3 for highway projects. As such, it is the objective of the FHWA that this Guide will assist in educating public agencies and stakeholders on key issues in highway projects procured as P3 transactions, the trade-offs, and ways to provide protections to the traveling public and State and local governments while continuing to attract private investment. Using the knowledge base of highway projects previously undertaken as P3 transactions, this Guide attempts to educate agencies and stakeholders that may be only beginning to approach P3 transactions, while still providing relevant information to more sophisticated and experienced State and local transportation agencies. Overall objectives include the following:

- Increase State and local agency understanding of standard P3 market terms and possible contract structures, including the rationale behind such terms and structures.
- Enhance State and local agency understanding of market/investor perspectives, goals, and objectives.
Present and analyze current legal and regulatory dynamics relative to highway projects procured as P3 transactions.

Present and analyze current tools and mechanisms used in Concession Agreements for P3 transactions.

Incorporate international best practices, where relevant.

Encourage discussions with State and local agencies and stakeholders (via Webinar discussions to be conducted following the publication of this Guide).

1.6 Description of Chapter Topics

This Guide provides specific analysis for State and local transportation agency personnel on the following topics related to highway projects procured as P3 transactions procured as toll road concessions.

- **Chapter Error! Reference source not found.: Introduction** – Topics include the background to the development of this Guide, an overview of its intended purpose and suggested approaches for utilizing its contents.

- **Chapter 2: Tolling Regulation** – Topics discussed include toll collection, user classification, toll rate setting, toll collection system and administration, enforcement of collections, management of demand risk, and use of revenue funds.

- **Chapter 3: Benefit-Sharing** – Topics discussed include the setting of revenue-sharing triggers, financial modeling and structuring of triggers within the P3 model, treatment of operating costs, capital costs, grants, the effects of refinancing on revenue-sharing, and other timing issues.

- **Chapter 4: Supervening Events** – Topics include a definition of Supervening Events, the types of contractual relief generally granted in Supervening Events, and the role of insurance in mitigating supervening risks.

- **Chapter 5: Changes in Equity Interests** – Topics include the definition of a change in ownership, example contractual provisions related to a change in ownership, permitted and prohibited changes, and participant concerns.

- **Chapter 6: Changes in Law** – Topics include the concerns of parties, unforeseeable changes in law and relevant considerations, tax-related issues, and compensation due to changes in law.

- **Chapter 7: Defaults, Early Termination, and Compensation** – Topics include events related to default by the Developer and the Department, cure periods, and termination rights of both parties in the event of a default, as well as all issues related to compensation for Early Termination.

- **Chapter 8: Handback** – Topics include Handback requirements, inspections, reserve accounts, letters of credit, and payments related to Handback.

- **Chapter 9: Construction Performance Security** – Topics include the role of performance security in traditional contracting, the approach taken in mature P3 markets outside of the United States and the approach taken in the United States P3 market to date.

- **Chapter 10: Insurance** – Topics include the background and incorporation of insurance requirements applicable to the Developer in the Concession Agreement.

- **Chapter 11: Lender Rights and Direct Agreement** – Topics include the Lenders’ rights to cure defaults of the Developer under the Concession Agreement, step into the shoes of the Developer, substitute a different entity to continue the Concession Agreement, other rights to enforce security, and the use of a separate Direct Agreement to document such rights.
Chapter 12: Department Step-In – Topics include events triggering the Department’s step-in right and its effect on the rights of the Developer.

Chapter 13: Performance Standards and Non-Compliance Points – Topics include factors relevant to setting performance requirements, monitoring the Developer’s performance, and remedies of the Department in the case of non-compliance by the Developer.

Chapter 14: Consumer Protections – Topics include user protections against monopolistic behavior by Developers (e.g., excessively high tolls and windfall profits), parameters surrounding the Department’s ability to develop competing facilities, non-Developer access to the Project, and national security considerations.

Chapter 15: Federal Requirements – Topics include a brief discussion of the types of Federal requirements which may apply if a Project receives Federal funding assistance.

Chapter 16: Governmental Approvals and Permits – Topics include the Developer’s obligation to secure approvals and permits, the Department’s obligation to assist, and certain permits the Department may undertake to provide.

Chapter 17: Utilities and Third Party Rights – Topics include the allocation of risks relating to utilities, the railroads, and other third parties with an interest in the Project and procedures for identifying utilities and Federal provisions which may be applicable to the funding of utility relocations.

Chapter 18: Financial Model Adjustments – Topics include circumstances in which the financial model may be updated and limitations on the scope of updates.

Chapter 19: Department and Developer Changes – Topics include the right of the Department to require changes in the work, the procedures for compensating the Developer, and the right of the Developer to propose changes.

Chapter 20: Additional Capacity Construction Requirements – Topics include triggers requiring the Developer to make capacity enhancements to the Project and considerations relevant to setting the triggers.

Chapter 21: Nature of Proprietary Interest – Topics include the nature of the Developer’s proprietary interest in the Project and considerations relevant to determining the type of interest to grant.

Chapter 22: Contract Term – Topics include the various considerations relevant to setting the Term.

Chapter 23: Developer Indemnities – Topics include circumstances under which the Developer may be required to indemnify the Department, including the scope of indemnities and payments.

Chapter 24: Dispute Resolution – Topics include procedures for the resolution of disputes between the Developer and the Department.

Chapter 25: Intellectual Property – Topics include ownership and licensing of intellectual property necessary for the performance of the work under the Concession Agreement and transfers to the Department on expiry of the Term.

Chapter 26: Amendments to Key Developer Documents – Topics include rights of the Department relating to changes in key contracts to which the Developer is a party other than the Concession Agreement.

Chapter 27: Assignment – Topics include restrictions on the right of the Department and the Developer to assign their interests in the Concession Agreement.

Chapter 1: Labor-Related Provisions – Topics include various labor provisions and practices the Department and the Developer may consider, including prevailing wage and fringe benefits, employee
benefits, incumbent worker nondisplacement and protections, workplace health and safety, and project labor agreements.

- **Chapter 1: General Provisions** – Topics include the application of, and consideration to be given to general provisions that are typically standard and not heavily negotiated.

**1.7 Suggested Use of the Toll Concession Contracts Chapters**

The FHWA encourages States, transportation agencies, and other public entities to use this Guide as a resource when developing their own Concession Agreements.

**1.7.1 Educational Reference**

The suggested primary purpose of this Guide is as an educational tool for State and local agencies and is not intended to be used as legal advice. Each chapter contains high level introductions to key topics, example definitions and provisions as well as guidance on contract structuring in respect of those key topics.

This Guide is designed to be an informational tool for State and local governments to refer to when considering a P3. Every Project is unique and attention will need to be given to the specific factors relevant to each transaction. This Guide introduces and analyzes several areas that have generally required significant consideration in highway projects structured as P3 transactions in the United States to date. Each such P3 transaction may require consideration of more or fewer factors than those covered herein. This Guide is for informational purposes only. FHWA recommends that Departments utilize their own counsel and other qualified and appropriate external expert advisors (typically with legal, technical and/or financial expertise) in any P3 transaction.

**1.7.2 Illustrative and Example-Based**

Existing Projects and Concession Agreements have informed the structure of this Guide. Furthermore, market-standard provisions have been discerned and analyzed for the benefit of the reader. The goal of these inclusions is to provide real-life examples of the theoretical analysis presented in the Guide. They also provide State and local agencies with a broader perspective and understanding of the P3 market and several non-contractual dynamics that may play a significant role in P3 transactions. The example provisions, when taken together with the explanations and descriptions of key issues, provide insight into best practices and may be utilized to develop solutions that can protect the interests of State and local governments, tax-payers and the traveling public. The inclusion of specific example provisions that may be derived from particular Projects does not indicate a recommendation or promotion of one particular form of P3 transaction over another. Instead, the examples illustrate a technique, mechanism, or dynamic that the FHWA views as valuable for the purposes of educating State and local agencies. Every P3 transaction is different, and what is applicable for one transaction may not be applicable for another transaction.

**1.7.3 Glossary of Terms and Example Provision Definitions**

A glossary of terms is included as Appendix A to assist in understanding the terminology in this Guide. Capitalized terms used throughout this Guide are defined in Appendix A, in the same manner as if used in a contract. The terms are for informational purposes only and are not designed to be used in legal documentation, even though a number of the terms may also be used in example provisions found in this Guide. The example contractual provisions contained throughout this Guide include bracketed capitalized terms. These terms are commonly used in the industry but both the terminology and substantive meaning of these terms will differ from transaction to transaction. Therefore, use of these terms (and the technical legal definitions that will accompany them in the Concession Agreement) should be considered carefully for each
P3 transaction. As noted above, the descriptions contained in the glossary of terms do not represent legal definitions of these bracketed capitalized terms, and readers of this Guide should consult with their legal advisors prior to implementing example contractual provisions provided in this Guide.

1.8 Conclusion

This Guide is intended to contribute to a better understanding of P3s and considerations for structuring a highway project procured as a P3 transaction. The FHWA has designed the Guide to be as effective as possible in supporting public agencies in their exploration and implementation of successful P3 transactions, with the aim of promoting better and more efficient highway projects.
2 Tolling Regulation

2.1 Introduction

When procuring a new Project by means of a concession, the Department will generally address the threshold question of whether the Developer should bear the economic risk of the Project’s performance during the Term, including, in particular, the risk of user demand for the Project. If the Department determines that transferring the risk of user demand for the Project to the Developer is a marketable proposition and is otherwise desirable, the Department will tender a Concession Agreement for the Project that entitles the Developer to tolling rights, being the right to establish, assess, collect, enforce (subject to Applicable Law), and retain tolls paid by users of the Project. Under such an arrangement, the Developer relies on Toll Revenues, rather than government appropriations, as its principal source of funds for financing the performance of its obligations under the Concession Agreement, paying debt service to its Lenders, and realizing a reasonable return on its equity investment in the Project.

When providing for tolling rights under the Concession Agreement, the Department may establish a series of limitations on the Developer’s exercise of tolling rights to address important public policy objectives, including limiting the Developer’s pricing power in relation to users, achieving certain mobility and traffic management outcomes, establishing exemptions of certain users from tolls, and producing Toll Revenues sufficient to pay a return on investment that will attract private investment in the Project.

Therefore, where the Concession Agreement establishes tolling rights in favor of the Developer, the Concession Agreement will generally, among other things:

- Expressly provide for the right of the Developer to establish, assess, collect, and enforce tolls on the Project and retain the related Toll Revenues free and clear of any interest of the Department in such revenue, subject to certain limitations set forth in the Concession Agreement and Applicable Law.
- Specify when the Developer’s tolling right takes effect and terminates or otherwise expires.
- Identify the users of the Project who are subject to tolls and set out the procedure for changing the classification of such users.
- Establish a procedure for changing the limitations on, or methodologies for determining, future toll rates.
- Specify the mechanism for toll collection and administration of the toll collection mechanism.
- Identify the circumstances under which the Department or others may suspend the tolling rights of the Developer.

2.2 Right to Collect Tolls

2.2.1 Granting of the Tolling Right

The Concession Agreement generally expressly grants to the Developer the right to toll certain specified users of the Project and recites the Department’s legal authority for granting such a right to the Developer. To ensure clarity, the Project must be precisely identified (along with relevant geographic dimensions or cartography in an appendix, if necessary), and if defined elsewhere, a reference to that definition should be made.
2.2.2 Duration of Tolling Right

In the case of a newly constructed Project, the start date of tolling is generally the date when the Project is available and open for public use, which is generally defined as either the Substantial Completion Date of the Project or the Service Commencement Date of the Project. In cases where the Concession Agreement relates to both an existing asset and a greenfield project, the start date with respect to the existing asset is the date of transfer of such asset from the Department to the Developer (generally the effective date of the Concession Agreement), while tolling with respect to the newly constructed portion of the Project will generally commence on the date that the newly constructed portion becomes available and open for public use. The date of termination is generally the last day of the Term.

An example provision establishing the tolling rights of the Developer is set forth below.

Pursuant to the [relevant statute or legal provision] and subject to the terms and conditions of this [Concession Agreement] as may be further described in the other [Project Documents], the [Department] hereby grants to the [Developer] the exclusive right from and after the [Substantial Completion Date/Service Commencement Date/effective date of this Concession Agreement] and until the end of the [Term], to manage, operate, maintain, improve, and equip the [Project] and establish, impose, charge, collect, use, and enforce payment of tolls from users of the [Project].

2.3 User Classification

2.3.1 Tolled and Exempt Users

The various classes of users of the Project, which are subject to tolls, are often identified in the Concession Agreement. Users exempted from tolls, if there are any, are also specifically mentioned. Because the demand risk is generally borne by the Developer in a toll road concession, the Developer generally wants to limit the types of users who are exempt from paying tolls. Ordinarily, vehicles belonging to the Department, subcontractors of the Department working on the Project, law enforcement and emergency services vehicles, and public transportation vehicles are exempt from paying tolls. The Department may also exempt certain users, such as commuter buses, school buses and motorcycles, from paying tolls based on public policy considerations, such as fuel efficiency, space utilization, or congestion relief. The list of exempted users will differ from one Concession Agreement to another based on the context and purpose of the Project. Furthermore, if local laws where the Project is located specifically exempt certain users from being tolled, the Concession Agreement will generally reflect this exemption.

When the Project is a traditional toll road concession, where all users are subjected to tolls, user classification primarily serves to identify the toll rates for various types of users. For managed lanes facilities, the Concession Agreement may require a more detailed definition of users. In the context of a toll road concession, a managed lane facility may be a high-occupancy toll lane, express toll lane or even an exclusive/special-use lane with tolls for certain users. The Concession Agreement contains a detailed definition of the various types of users, including users who are eligible to use the managed lane facility and eligible users who are exempt from tolls. Provisions dealing with user classification can generally be found in the form of an appendix to the Concession Agreement.

An example user classification provision for a managed lane facility is set forth below.

(a) Only [Permitted Vehicles] will be allowed to use the [Project/relevant lane].
(b) [High-Occupancy Vehicles] equipped with a transponder will be entitled to use the [Project/relevant lane] at a [X%] discount from otherwise applicable tolls.
Public-Private Partnership Toll Concessions Model Contract Guide

2.3.2 Change of User Classification

The Concession Agreement will generally include a provision allowing the Developer to change user classification in the future subject to specific approval from the Department. A procedure is generally set forth for the Developer to apply for a change in the existing classification of users. The Department generally has the right to accept (with or without conditions or modifications) or reject the Developer’s application based on its public policy considerations, and the extent of this right differs from one Concession Agreement to another. Generally, certain conditions are set forth in the Concession Agreement that guide the Department’s decision regarding the application. If there are costs relating to change in the classification of users and/or in integrating such changes into any regional toll collection system, the Developer is generally required to compensate the Department. Changes in the classification of users may potentially impact future projected toll revenues. The Concession Agreement may contain provisions for adjusting the Department’s revenue sharing if the change is projected to increase the Developer’s revenues.

An example change of user classification provision is set forth below.

(a) The [Developer] may not change, add to or delete any of the classification of users of the [Project] for the purposes of determining toll rates without the [Department]’s express prior written consent.

(b) If the [Developer] desires to change classification of users of the [Project] for the purposes of determining toll rates, then the [Developer] shall apply to the [Department] for permission entitling the [Developer] to implement such change at least [X] days prior to the proposed effective date of such change. Such application shall set forth:

(i) the change in classification or category requested;

(ii) the date such change shall become effective;

(iii) the length of time such change shall be in effect;

(iv) the reason the [Developer] requests such change;

(v) the effect such change is likely to have upon users and traffic patterns;

(vi) a proposed schedule of toll rates reflecting such change; and

(vii) such other information and data as the [Department] reasonably may request.

If the Concession Agreement intends to grant limited power to the Department on whether to accept or deny the Developer’s application and offer the Developer recourse to a Dispute Resolution Procedure, then the following wording may be used:

(a) The [Developer]’s application shall be deemed granted unless within [X] days after receipt of a completed application the [Department] advises the [Developer] that it has granted the [Developer]’s application with conditions or denied the [Developer]’s application. If the Department makes such a finding the [Developer] may modify its application and supporting documentation, and resubmit the same to the [Department] or

(c) [Relevant vehicles e.g., mass transit vehicles, commuter buses, school buses, motorcycles] and [Exempt Vehicles] equipped with a transponder will be entitled to use the [Project/relevant lane] at a [Y%] discount from otherwise applicable tolls.

(d) [Permitted Vehicles] (other than vehicles referred to in clauses (b) and (c) above) will be entitled to use the [Project/relevant lane] subject to payment of the applicable tolls.
appeal the [Department]'s decision pursuant to the [Dispute Resolution Procedure] set forth in the
[Concession Agreement]. If the [Developer] resubmits an application as aforesaid, the above procedures shall
apply to the resubmitted application.

(b) The [Department] shall not deny an application or impose conditions unless the [Department] finds that the
proposals set forth in the application are not reasonable under the circumstances, the supporting
documentation is in error or is insufficient to support the proposal or that the assumptions of projections set
forth in the application are unrealistic.

If the Concession Agreement grants greater power to the Department in the determination of the
Developer’s application, then the following wording may be used:

The [Department] may deny an application or impose conditions to granting an application in its sole
discretion. The [Department]'s decision shall not be subject to the [Dispute Resolution Procedure] under this
[Concession Agreement]. If the [Developer] finds the [Department]'s conditions to the grant of an application
to be unacceptable, the [Developer] may withdraw the application and continue with the existing
classification of users. If the [Developer] resubmits an application after rejection or imposition of conditions,
the above procedures shall apply to the resubmitted application.

2.4 Toll Rates

The Concession Agreement may provide details regarding the toll rates that the Developer is permitted to
charge and collect from various classes of users; it may also specifically mention how the tolls are to be
determined. The toll rates may be fixed or varied based on the time of the day or the amount of traffic on the
toll road, either dynamically (based on real-time traffic conditions) or according to a set schedule. The setting
of toll rates generally depends on the type of Project and the policy the Department has adopted.

An important element in setting toll rates relates to the increase and escalation of toll rates. To the extent that
the toll rates are predetermined in real (constant) dollars and expected to account for inflation, the rates are
generally accompanied by a methodology to convert toll rates into nominal (current) dollars. Often toll rate
escalation is achieved by linking the rates to a relevant consumer price index (CPI), gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate, or a certain annual percentage escalation. The choice of the escalation factor may be either
the lower or greater of the listed escalation factors. In some instances, it is also possible to combine CPI or
GDP-based escalation and a certain annual percentage escalation. In contrast to escalation, which is generally
linked to an index, toll rate increase is aimed at achieving real increases in toll rates through a certain annual
percentage increase or a predetermined schedule. The frequency of toll rate increases or escalation is also
generally expressly stated in the Concession Agreement, namely, whether adjustments are semiannual or
annual or whether they occur at other intervals. Additionally, the Concession Agreement may also state how
the toll increase or escalation may account for maximum allowable toll increase or escalation that was not
made in prior years by the Developer.

Where the toll rates are dynamic or variable in relation to user demand, they are generally determined by an
algorithm agreed upon by the Developer and the Department. Details of such an algorithm are also
incorporated into the Concession Agreement.

The role of the Department in establishing toll rates is often specified. Because the Developer bears the
demand risk, it generally would prefer as little restriction on the setting of toll rates as possible. However,
given that toll roads and toll rate changes often come under public scrutiny, the Department may wish to
retain some control over the setting of toll rates to achieve public policy objectives. These objectives may
include protecting the interests of users, achieving certain mobility and traffic levels, preventing the Developer from making unreasonably high profits, and fostering public acceptance of tolling. If the Department envisions certain restrictions on the setting of toll rates, including minimum and/or maximum toll rate, increase or escalation, then such restrictions are expressly included in the Concession Agreement.

The Concession Agreement may also specify whether the Developer is permitted or required to offer discounts on toll rates. It is also common for the Department to prohibit discrimination in charging and collection of toll rates. Consequently, the Developer may be required to ensure that the toll rates are the same for users under like conditions; which may take into consideration type, weight, and occupancy of a vehicle, number of axles, time-of-day and/or day-of-week travel, traffic congestion and other traffic conditions, and type of facilities.

Other related aspects may also be outlined in the Concession Agreement, such as the procedure to establish the toll rates and notification of toll rates to users.

Two example toll rate provisions are set forth below.

The [Developer] shall have the right to establish, and thereafter to modify from time to time, the toll rates applicable to (a) various classes of vehicles; (b) vehicle occupancy levels; (c) times of use; and (d) portion of the [Project] utilized. The [Department] shall have no right to regulate or participate in the setting of toll rates.

Subject to the foregoing paragraph, the maximum toll rate from and after [Substantial Completion Date/Service Commencement Date] will be no more than [$X], subject to escalation in accordance with the relevant index agreed between the [Department] and the [Developer].

***

(a) The [Developer] shall impose congestion pricing, which may include dynamic tolling with potential toll rate changes at frequent intervals, with a view to maintaining free flow conditions of traffic, and there shall be no restrictions upon toll rates except as set forth in [Exhibit [X]] to this [Concession Agreement].

(b) The toll rates shall be the same for persons using the [Project] under like conditions, and for this purpose “like conditions” may take into consideration type, weight and occupancy of the vehicle, number of axles, time-of-day and/or day-of-week travel, traffic congestion and other traffic conditions and type of facilities, provided, however, that the [Developer] may adopt and implement discount programs for different classes or groups of persons using the [Project] under like conditions, subject to the provisions of this [Concession Agreement].

**Exhibit [X] – Toll Rate Schedule**

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<tr>
<td>[Axle and/or Occupancy]</td>
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<td>[Axle and/or Occupancy]</td>
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<td>$F</td>
<td>$I</td>
<td>$L</td>
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</table>
2.5  Toll Collection

2.5.1 Toll Collection System and Administration

The toll collection system that the Department and the Developer agree to institute is documented in the Concession Agreement. This system could be electronic, video-based, or any other system agreed to between the Department and the Developer. This system may be accompanied by an obligation on the part of the Developer to establish and administer such a system by entering into required contractual relationships.

Two widely used technologies for toll collection are (1) electronic tolling and (2) video-based tolling (also referred to as license plate tolling). In the case of an Electronic Toll Collection System, the Department may prescribe that it be interoperable with the system on other toll roads both within and outside the State. Many transportation agencies in the United States have subscribed to a common Electronic Toll Collection System. Broad subscription has made toll collection technology compatible across States and gives users seamless access to toll roads across multiple States. As such, the Department may require the Developer to use a certain technology.

If the Department has subscribed to a particular toll collection technology, the Department may prescribe a form agreement whereby the Developer is allowed access to use that technology on the Project for a certain fee. Similarly, if the Department has delegated toll collection in a particular region to a separate entity, it may require the Developer to use the services of such entity. Typically, a tolling services agreement with such entity, which defines pricing and other terms and conditions, is developed before submission of the bids.

Where the Department conducts tolling of toll roads other than the Project, the Developer and the Department may enter into agreements that make the “back office” functions of the Department’s tolling operations available to the Developer, including, for example, an “Electronic Toll Collection Agreement,” pursuant to which the Department (or a separate entity responsible for toll collection) would provide toll transaction account management services to the Developer.

An example set of provisions on toll collection system and administration is set forth below.

\[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline
\text{The \text{[Developer]} shall have the right, in its sole discretion, to select, install, modify, and utilize vehicle identification, traffic surveillance, and toll collection equipment and technology that meets the published standards of \text{[the Department]}.} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

***

(a) From and after the \text{[Substantial Completion Date/Service Commencement Date/effect date of this Concession Agreement]} through the end of the \text{[Term]}, the \text{[Developer]} will operate and maintain a toll collection system with respect to the \text{[Project]} that will be interoperable with the \text{[Electronic Toll Collection System]} utilized on \text{[State Highways]} at that time. If the \text{[Department]} intends to change any State-wide interoperability or compatibility standards, requirements or protocols for toll collection systems, it will coordinate with the \text{[Developer]} prior to the implementation of such change so as to minimize the loss of \text{[Toll Revenues]}, disruption and cost to the \text{[Developer]}, but the \text{[Department]} will not be liable in any event for any loss of \text{[Toll Revenues]}, disruption, or cost attributable to such change.

(b) If the \text{[Developer]} selects an electronic toll and traffic management system other than the system then utilized on other \text{[State Highways]}, it will coordinate with the \text{[Department]} prior to the implementation or any change of such system to ensure interoperability and compatibility with \text{[the Electronic Toll Collection System]}.\]
The [Developer] shall implement a toll collection system that charges, debits and collects tolls only at or through electronic toll collection facilities physically located on the [Project] or through global positioning system technologies or other remote sensing technologies that charge, debit, and collect tolls only for actual vehicular use of the [Project] in accordance with the following sub-clauses:

(a) The [Developer] shall maintain and operate an [Electronic Toll Collection System] for the [Project] that meets applicable State-wide interoperability and compatibility standards, requirements and protocols, if any, including any pertaining to any clearinghouse system that the [Department] participates in, implements, and operates.

(b) Interoperability is required as to (i) functionality, enabling use of a single electronic toll collection transponder across all [State Highways], (ii) user account maintenance, management and reconciliation, and (iii) funds transfers among all participant, enabling a user to have a single electronic toll collection transponder to pay for tolled travel on all [State Highways].

2.5.2 Enforcement of Toll Collection

In a toll road concession, the Developer generally assumes the primary responsibility and risk of toll collection, including the checking/monitoring of user toll violations. In assuming this responsibility, the Developer generally outsources monitoring of toll violations and enforcement of violation fees to law enforcement and other State agencies, although the approach taken for each Project will depend on Applicable Laws regarding the enforcement of toll violations. Where the Department has existing agreements with law enforcement and State agencies, the Developer may be given the option to enter into an agreement with the Department (or a separate entity, such as a regional authority, responsible for toll collection) to secure toll enforcement and violations processing services, sometimes referred to as a “Toll Enforcement and Violation Processing Services Agreement.” A form of such an agreement is generally provided as an appendix to the Concession Agreement. Such a form of agreement needs to identify the role and responsibilities of the Developer, the Department, and other State agencies that may be party to that agreement. Usually, such an agreement does not transfer toll revenue risk from the Developer to the respective toll collection entity; it may, in some instances, transfer the risk of processing toll payments or the use of certain technology to the toll collection entity.

An example toll enforcement provision reflecting outsourcing of toll violations monitoring and enforcement of violation fees to the Department by the Developer is set forth below.

(a) The [Department] has implemented and maintains a processing system for the enforcement of penalties for toll violations in [name of province] on [State Highways]. The [Developer] may, but is not obligated to, enter into an agreement with the [Department] to obtain the benefits of such enforcement system, in accordance with the [Toll Enforcement and Violations Processing Services Agreement] in the form attached as [Exhibit [X]] to this [Concession Agreement]. In consideration of such services, the [Developer] will pay the [Department] its customary charges for such services in effect from time to time.

(b) For purposes of identifying and apprehending toll violators, provided it is authorized under [Law], and any applicable agreements or arrangements between the Developer and the Department, the [Department] will make available to the [Developer] the benefits of any agreements or arrangements which the [Department]
has in place with other State authorities or agencies that provide access to records in their possession relating to vehicle and vehicle owner data, and will coordinate with the regional police in accordance with [relevant clause, if any, with respect to this provision] of policing services, emergency services, traffic patrol, and traffic law enforcement services on the [Project].

(c) The [Developer] understands and agrees that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this [Concession Agreement] or any other [Project Document], the risk of enforcement and collection of tolls, and related charges (including user fees and civil penalties and administrative fees) remains with the [Developer], and that the [Department] does not, and will not be deemed to, guarantee collection or collectability of such tolls and related charges to the [Developer]; provided, however, that the foregoing will not limit the [Department]’s obligations or duties under the [Toll Enforcement and Violations Processing Services Agreement] or any other agreement with the [Developer].

2.6 Use of Toll Revenues

The Concession Agreement may also set forth requirements concerning the use of Toll Revenues the Developer collects to ensure that the Developer does not divert Toll Revenues for unauthorized purposes. Generally, the Department may want the Developer to use the Toll Revenues to meet payment obligations to the Department (if any), operating and maintenance expenses (if applicable), taxes owed to the State agencies, or debt service related to the Project before making payments to Equity Members. The objective is to ensure continued operation of the Project by ensuring payment to key stakeholders, including the Subcontractors, Lenders, State agencies, the concerned Department, and others owed various monies. To meet this objective, the list of authorized uses of Toll Revenues under the Concession Agreement may follow a certain order of priority. Priority is often given to operating and maintenance expenses, including the funding of major maintenance costs, and debt service payments relating to the Project over distributions to the Developer’s Equity Members and any other noncompetitive payments. While the Department may prescribe a list of authorized uses of Toll Revenues, some Concession Agreements may leave the decision regarding the full order of priority to the Lenders and the Developer. The Financing Documents of a Project often include a flow of funds, known as a cash flow waterfall, and it is common for the uses of Toll Revenues in the Concession Agreement and flow of funds in Financing Documents to mirror each other.

Federal law also imposes certain restrictions on the use of Toll Revenues collected from Projects that have received Federal assistance. These restrictions are generally incorporated into the section of the Concession Agreement dealing with compliance with Federal requirements (see Section 2.7.3 below).

An example provision providing for authorized uses of Toll Revenues is set forth below.

(a) [Toll Revenues] shall be used first to pay all current and delinquent costs and expenses of operating and maintaining the [Project] (including premiums for insurance, bonds, other performance security) and payments to the [Department] before they are used and applied for any other purpose.

(b) The [Developer] shall not use [Toll Revenues] to make any distribution to the holder of an equity interest in the [Developer] or to pay the noncompetitive fees and charges of its affiliates unless and until the [Developer] first pays:

(i) all current and delinquent costs and expenses of operating and maintaining the [Project] (including premiums for insurance, bonds, other performance security);
(ii) current and delinquent debt service, and other current and delinquent amounts, due under any [Project Debt];

(iii) all taxes currently due and payable or delinquent;

(iv) all currently required or delinquent deposits to the [Major Maintenance Reserve Account];

(v) all current and delinquent costs and expenses of major maintenance not capable of funding from the [Major Maintenance Reserve Account]; and

(vi) all current and delinquent amounts due to the [Department] under this [Concession Agreement] that are being contested in good faith and by appropriate proceedings and with respect to which adequate reserves as required by generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied have been established by the [Developer].

(c) The [Developer] shall have no right to use [Toll Revenues] to pay any debt, obligation, or liability unrelated to this [Concession Agreement], the [Project], or the [Developer]'s services under this [Concession Agreement].

2.7 Other Matters Related to Toll Regulation

2.7.1 Suspension of Tolling

The Department generally reserves the right to suspend tolling in case of certain types of emergencies expressly declared pursuant to law and to divert the use of the Project to meet the needs of such an emergency or any other alternate purpose. Such suspension of tolling is primarily intended to be temporary to enable the Department and other Governmental Authorities to deal with emergent situations.

Concurrently, the Concession Agreement also details the rights of the Developer when tolling is suspended for an emergency, including any compensation that the Department is liable to pay for loss in Toll Revenues or an increase in costs incurred by the Developer. Generally, the Developer is not entitled to compensation when the Department has concurrently ordered the suspension of tolling on all other toll roads in the region or if the suspension has been declared by a government agency other than the Department, such as the Federal Government. Such suspension is generally called for during natural disasters. If the underlying reason for suspension of tolling persists, it is possible for it to be dealt with as one of the Supervening Events discussed in Chapter 4 (Supervening Events).

Where the Department has ordered suspension of tolls only on the Developer’s Project to deal with incidents or emergencies (of a limited nature), the Department is commonly required to compensate the Developer for loss of Toll Revenues or higher costs the Developer incurred provided that the order of suspension extends beyond a certain duration (hours/days).

Finally, the right to order a suspension of tolling generally comes with an obligation on the part of the Department to lift the suspension as soon as the need for such suspension ceases to exist. This obligation is critical as it seeks to protect the Developer from unduly extended or unwarranted suspension of tolling by the Department.
An example suspension of tolling provision is set forth below.

(a) In addition to its rights granted pursuant to law, the [Department] shall have the right to order immediate suspension of tolling in the event the [Project] is designated for immediate use as an emergency mass evacuation route. The [Department] shall have no liability to the [Developer] for the loss of [Toll Revenues] or the increase in costs and expenses attributable to such order, provided that the [Department]:

(i) concurrently suspends tolling on all other [Department]-operated facilities that are located within the area designated for evacuation or facilitation of evacuation;

(ii) concurrently orders suspension of tolling on all other facilities operated by others within such area and over which the [Department] has the authority to order such suspension; and

(iii) lifts such order over the [Developer] concurrently with the lifting of such order for all other facilities.

(b) The [Department] shall lift such order as soon as the need for emergency mass evacuation ceases. The [Department] shall have no liability to the [Developer] for the loss of [Toll Revenues] or the increase in costs and expenses attributable to any order to suspend tolling to facilitate emergency mass evacuation issued pursuant to [Applicable Law] by the [Department] or any other [Governmental Entity].

(c) In the event the [Project] is designated for immediate use as the alternate route for diversion of traffic from another [State Highway] temporarily closed in one or both directions due to an incident or emergency, the [Department] shall have the right to order immediate suspension of tolling in the direction(s) of diversion. The [Department] shall have no liability to the [Developer] for the loss of [Toll Revenues] or the increase in costs and expenses attributable to the duration that such order is in effect, except that if such order remains in effect for more than [X] days, the [Department] shall compensate the [Developer] for the financial impact of such order beyond the first [X] days. The [Department] shall lift such order as soon as the need for such order ceases.

2.7.2 Demand Risk

For the avoidance of doubt, the Concession Agreement may expressly provide that the Developer bears the risk of traffic volume not meeting projections or a shortfall in Toll Revenues.

An example provision providing for transfer of demand risk to the Developer is set forth below.

Except for its specific obligations to the [Developer] under the terms and conditions of this [Concession Agreement], the [Department] will not have any risk or liability related to actual traffic volume and toll revenue, including but not limited to the risk that actual traffic volume is less than the traffic volume projected in the [Base Case Financial Model].

2.7.3 Compliance with Federal Requirements Related to Tolling

As will be discussed in Chapter 6 (Change in Law), Concession Agreements often contain a compliance with laws provision obligating the Developer to comply with all Applicable Laws. Of specific importance is Title 23 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), which is applicable to highways.

Under section 301 of Title 23, tolling is generally prohibited on highways, bridges, and tunnels that have received Federal-aid funding for their construction. However, Federal law has also carved out a limited
number of exceptions to this general prohibition through special programs and provisions, including the following:

- Section 129 of Title 23, which relates to toll roads, bridges, and tunnels (also referred to as the General Toll Program).
- Section 166 of Title 23, which deals with high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) facilities, including charging of tolls on certain users of HOV lanes.
- The Interstate System Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Pilot Program.
- The Value Pricing Pilot Program.
- The Express Lanes Demonstration Program.

If the Project is a Federal-aid highway, bridge, or tunnel, then the authority to toll must be obtained from one of these programs, which have certain requirements with which the Department with responsibility for the Project is obligated to comply. These requirements vary from program to program, but generally include such items as limitations on the use of Toll Revenues (including the submission of audits to document compliance); certifications of adequate maintenance; and monitoring and reporting on the performance of the facility. These and other commitments may be memorialized in a tolling agreement between the responsible Department and the FHWA. The Concession Agreement will generally require the Developer to comply with the applicable requirements of the relevant Federal tolling program and to provide supporting documentation demonstrating such compliance to the Department for reporting to the FHWA.

If any Project procured by the Department receives Federal assistance, then, except to the extent that the terms of an applicable tolling or pricing program require otherwise, the use of the revenues from the operation of such facility will be subject to the restrictions set forth in Section 129(a)(3). In the event that such Project is procured by the Department pursuant to a Concession Agreement, the Department may include in the Concession Agreement an undertaking from the Developer to comply with Section 129(a)(3) and to assist the Department with documentation of such compliance.

Section 129(a)(3) also requires that a Department with jurisdiction over a Title 23-assisted Project use “all toll revenues received from operation of the toll facility” exclusively for “(i) debt service with respect to the projects on or for which the tolls are authorized, including funding of reasonable reserves and debt service on refinancing; (ii) a reasonable return on investment of any private person financing the project, as determined by the State or interstate compact of States concerned; (iii) any costs necessary for the improvement and proper operation and maintenance of the toll facility, including reconstruction, resurfacing, restoration, and rehabilitation; (iv) if the toll facility is subject to a public-private partnership agreement, payments that the party holding the right to toll revenues owes to the other party under the public-private partnership agreement; and (v) if the Department certifies annually that the tolled facility is being adequately maintained, any other purpose for which Federal funds may be obligated by a State [under Title 23, U.S.C.].”

Two observations are noteworthy in the context of the Concession Agreement. First, Section 129(a) expressly reserves for the States (and agencies existing under interstate compact) the right to determine what constitutes payment of a reasonable return on investment from Toll Revenues. Second, Section 129(a) does not establish an order of priority among permitted uses of proceeds from Toll Revenues. For example, it is not a requirement of section 129(a) that the payment of a reasonable return on investment be made prior to paying costs necessary for the improvement or proper operation of the facility. Similarly, it is not a requirement that the payment of financing costs takes priority over payment of maintenance costs. Such flexibility permits the

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1 The FHWA’s authority to enter into new tolling agreements under the Express Lanes Demonstration Program expired on September 30, 2012.
Developer and the Department to determine the priority of uses of toll revenue in the Concession Agreement, provided that the uses are otherwise eligible uses of toll revenue under Section 129.

An example provision providing for compliance with Federal requirements is set forth below.

The [Developer] agrees, at all times, to comply with the provisions of [Section 129(a)(3), Title 23 of the United States Code/Applicable Law], and its successor provisions, all regulations promulgated thereunder, in the performance of its obligations under this [Concession Agreement]. The [Developer] shall coordinate its compliance efforts with the [Department] so as to enable the [Department] to provide the certifications required by [USDOT].
3 Benefit-Sharing

3.1 Introduction

Departments often seek to minimize the potential for excess or windfall profits under the Concession Agreement. Departments may do so by including provisions in the Concession Agreement that require the Developer to share certain financial benefits with the Department during the Term. Generally, benefit-sharing is known by a number of terms, including concession fee, permit fee, or revenue-sharing payments. Such benefit-sharing provisions support the public credibility of the Project.

The benefit-sharing provisions of the Concession Agreement also serve to ensure that the Developer receives a financial benefit that reflects the risk-adjusted return on its investment in the Project. These provisions should make clear that the Developer is entitled to a financial return within certain parameters. These provisions should also provide justification for toll setting and toll rate increases based on the overall risk-return calculation of the Concession Agreement. Departments may refer to these provisions if they are subject to public criticism about toll rates or rate increases.

A third reason for benefit-sharing is the Department’s need to receive a return on its effort to help defray the cost of the Project, if the Department made a financial contribution, or to pay for other related or other regional transportation projects. However, Departments rarely seek an actual return on grants provided or other in-kind contributions in Concession Agreements in the same sense that Developers do.

3.2 Revenue-Sharing Triggers

Generally, Concession Agreements have thresholds, or triggers, which require revenue-sharing when revenues or investment returns exceed prescribed levels.

3.2.1 Types of Triggers

There are two main types of triggers. One is based on Gross Revenues, known as revenue triggers, and the other is based on the Equity Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of the Developer, known as return triggers.

Revenue Triggers

Revenue triggers are generally thresholds established in the Concession Agreement, such that if revenues collected are above certain pre-agreed levels, the Developer must pay a percentage of the excess revenues to the Department. Revenue triggers do not take account of costs (whether higher or lower than originally expected) given their assumptions regarding the approximate correlation between revenues and return. Revenue triggers are generally considered easier to calculate and administer because there is generally less dispute about what constitutes Gross Revenues in a Project with limited revenue sources.

An example of a revenue trigger provision is set out in section 3.2.2.

Return Triggers

Return triggers generally refer to triggers based on some measure of return on equity or invested capital. The calculation of such returns generally relies on the Equity IRR concept used widely in finance that compares an outflow (the investment) with the stream of inflows (dividends, interest payments, or other forms of compensation), taking into account the timing of such outflows and inflows. While the underlying math used in these calculations is widely understood, return calculations are often more complex because identifying the inflow is not always transparent. Unlike a revenue trigger, which uses a simple measure of Gross Revenue,
the inflow calculation used in a return trigger must take into account a number of the costs paid by the Developer, such as operating and maintenance expenses, capital costs, and sometimes taxes. This leads to an auditing requirement and the potential for abuse, disputes and increased monitoring costs in comparison to revenue triggers.

Return triggers directly address the concern that the Developer might receive excessive profits and/or charge excessive toll rates, and prevent the Developer from not only receiving excess profits but also being unfairly penalized when the profits are lower than expected. However, given the complexities associated with the calculation of return triggers, careful consideration should be given to the way in which revenues, costs, and profits are treated.

An example Equity IRR-based trigger provision is set forth below.

<table>
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<th>Trigger Provision</th>
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<td>(a) Following completion of an annual update to the [Base Case Financial Model], at which the actual [Equity IRR] exceeds the cash flow sharing thresholds, a cash flow sharing amount payment will be due from the [Developer] to the [Department].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) If the actual [Equity IRR] as of the cash flow review date exceeds the cash flow sharing threshold, the [Developer] shall pay to the [Department] cash flow sharing amounts based on the incremental amount of revenue above the cash flow sharing threshold times the cash flow sharing rate of [X%].</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Department may use a “Total Return on Investment” concept in the Concession Agreement, reflecting various forms of debt and equity. The Concession Agreement would establish bands representing certain total Equity IRR percentages and for each band, the Department may require sharing of allocated percentages of Gross Revenues.

Departments should analyze the approach they wish to take to determine the trigger that is most appropriate for the specific Project, taking into account the oversight costs and public perception impact of each approach. Departments should also consider the legal requirements applicable to the specific Project. Some P3 authorizing statutes may call for a sharing arrangement based on concepts such as a reasonable Equity IRR for the private sector, which will favor the use of a return trigger as opposed to a revenue trigger. Other statutes may similarly state that the Concession Agreement can provide for a reasonable Equity IRR without expressly contemplating a sharing mechanism. Where these statutes apply, Departments should consider the extent to which benefit-sharing mechanisms can assist them in achieving these statutory mandates and the extent to which the potential Developer should be provided with guidance during the procurement phase of a Project in relation to the applicable requirements.

### 3.2.2 Using One or Multiple Triggers

The triggers derived by the Department or its advisors are generally based on research of comparable investments in the financial markets. Calculating the appropriate Equity IRR can be more of an art than a science. As extensive rate making of public utility commissions has shown, public advocates and private companies continually argue about the appropriate rates of return. It is rare that both sides agree on a public utility commission rate decision, underscoring the challenge of identifying the appropriate Equity IRR.

A solution to this challenge is the application of multiple triggers in the Concession Agreement. An example is the structuring of one trigger occurring at a specified level of return with the next trigger occurring at a higher-level return. In such structures, the amounts generally shared with the Department increase with each progressive trigger, or band.
Another reason for multiple triggers is to incentivize the Developer to continue to perform well and for the Department to receive its share of benefits above the trigger levels. However, such a benefit-sharing provision incentivizes the Developer only if the alternative is a categorical cap on the Developer’s revenue or return (see Section 3.2.4 below) and the benefit of any incremental revenue or return the Developer retains under the provision is not unduly small.

An example benefit-sharing trigger provision is set forth below.

The amount of revenue paid to the [Department] shall be calculated at the end of each calendar year, commencing at the end of the calendar year in which the [Substantial Completion Date] occurs and continuing for each calendar year until the end of the [Term]. The revenue payment amount shall equal the sum of the following amounts (calculated based on the bands and revenue payment percentages reflected in [Exhibit [X]]):

(a) the portion of the cumulative [Toll Revenues] to date above the band 1 band floor and up to the band 1 band ceiling as reflected in attachment 1 for the current year multiplied by the band 1 revenue percentage; plus

(b) the portion of the cumulative [Toll Revenues] to date above the band 2 band floor and up to the band 2 band ceiling as reflected in the attachment for the current year multiplied by the band 2 revenue percentage; plus

(c) the portion of the cumulative [Toll Revenues] to date above the band 3 band floor as reflected in the attachment for the current year multiplied by the band 3 revenue percentage; less

(d) any amounts paid by [Developer] to [Department] in previous calendar years; less

(e) any amounts that were deferred from a previous period and are now available.

Exhibit [X] – Bands and Revenue Payment Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Band</th>
<th>Toll Revenues Band Floor</th>
<th>Toll Revenues Band Ceiling</th>
<th>Revenue Payment Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>[A]</td>
<td>[B]</td>
<td>x%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>[C + 1 cent]</td>
<td>[D]</td>
<td>y%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>[D + 1 cent]</td>
<td></td>
<td>z%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3 Deriving Triggers through a Financial Model

As discussed, deriving a revenue trigger is relatively easy as it entails comparing the actual revenue in a period, such as a quarter, semiannual period, or year, to estimated revenue figures provided during the Project procurement process.

Deriving the return triggers generally requires using a financial model, which takes into account initial investments and the subsequent dividends to Equity Members, interest payments to Lenders, and other forms of compensation, as well as operating costs. Many Concession Agreements rely on a “Base Case Financial Model” that is attached to the Concession Agreement or required to be placed into escrow. When the Developer’s actual return on equity exceeds the threshold contained in the Concession Agreement (which is generally set at a percentage above the Equity IRR projected in the Base Case Financial Model), the Concession Agreement’s benefit-sharing provisions will often be triggered.

Departments have many ways to ensure the integrity of the Base Case Financial Model. The Base Case Financial Model is generally developed and operated by the Developer and generally should be audited by an independent third party initially or regularly. The Department and its advisors often have full access to the Base Case Financial Model because a copy will have been placed into escrow at the outset of the Project. In addition, the accounts of the Developer are generally subject to regular audits, which are provided to the Department.
The revenue or return trigger calculations may be carried out periodically and the Concession Agreement may require a reporting function to alert the Department when the trigger thresholds have been reached. At that point, the Developer may be obligated to pay the Department its share of any revenue or return in excess of the trigger to the extent contemplated in the Concession Agreement.

The trigger calculations may show that the Department is owed sharing compensation in future periods. To the extent the Developer pays these amounts to the Department in advance of actually receiving the revenue (such as a lump sum payment), the Concession Agreement will generally incorporate mechanisms that ensure that the Department does not have to return any sharing compensation should the actual revenue or return the Developer receives be below the respective triggers.

### 3.2.4 Sharing Caps and Collars

In some European jurisdictions, some Concession Agreements establish caps and floors that limit both the upside and downside revenues of the Developer. Together they create a band that is generally set at the time of the signing of the Concession Agreement based on forecasted traffic levels or revenues. If traffic or revenues are lower than the band, then the Department may compensate the Developer based on a predetermined formula. If the band is exceeded, the Department may require the Developer to share much or all of revenues above the band, as established in the Concession Agreement, again leaving enough incentive for the Developer to continue to perform at the highest levels. These arrangements have been used in Europe but have not been adopted in the United States to date, and Departments that see a potential benefit in such an arrangement should carefully consider the extent to which Applicable Laws in their jurisdiction may prohibit them. In particular, the provisions providing for downside protection may be limited by statutes that prohibit guarantees of private obligations.

### 3.3 Revenue-Sharing Mechanics

#### 3.3.1 Treatment of Operating Costs, Capital Costs, and Grants

As discussed above, revenue-sharing mechanics can be more complex when a return trigger is involved. One issue that often must be considered is that Departments are concerned that the Developer might “game” the calculation by creating operating costs that are not directly related to the operation of the Project, but are essentially substitute forms of dividends. This action would have the effect of transferring funds to Equity Members without the amounts being counted as a return on equity for purposes of the return trigger. Unsubstantiated overhead charges may constitute such payments. For example, a parent company may charge each of its subsidiaries a portion of the cost of headquarters facilities, which may not be appropriate or allowable in the Concession Agreement. In theory, third-party auditing and the right to “see the books” at any time provides comfort to the Department that such expenses will be prevented.

The Department may also have concerns that certain operating expenses may not be in the public interest. For instance, many Departments prohibit contractors from invoicing for alcoholic beverages, donations, or entertainment costs. To provide guidance on ensuring that operating costs do not become a way for the Developer to earn returns from such costs, some Concession Agreements refer to using the Federal Contract Cost Principles and Procedures, 48 C.F.R. 31.205, as nonbinding guidance, or in cases in which Federal funding is contributed as a source of financing, then they are a requirement. The manner in which Federal requirements in this respect are incorporated varies from one Concession Agreement to another.
An example of such guidance provision is set forth below.

At the request of either party from time to time (but not more than once per year), the [Developer] and the [Department] will discuss in good faith possible adjustments to the operating costs, using the Federal Contract Cost Principles and Procedures, 48 C.F.R. 31.205, as nonbinding guidance to ensure that only reasonable and customary costs are included as operating costs.

Furthermore, if the Department is not satisfied with how the Developer has treated certain costs or calculated the benefit-sharing, it can revert to the dispute resolution provisions under the Concession Agreement. Depending on the terms of the Concession Agreement, the Department can also revert to legal remedies.

An example of such dispute resolution provision is set forth below.

The [Department] shall have the right to dispute the [Developer]’s calculation of the [Concession Fee] or to request additional information, clarification or amendment of such calculation, at any time for a period of one year following the submission of the audit and other data referenced above. The [Developer] shall deliver to the [Department] such information, clarification or amendment within [X] days following the delivery of the [Department]’s request. If the [Department] does not agree with the calculation of the [Concession Fee], the dispute shall be resolved according to the dispute resolution procedures of the [Concession Agreement].

3.3.2 Timing Issues
Concession agreements have a variety of mechanisms when the revenue-sharing payment is made once a threshold has been reached and/or notice has been made that the Department is due a payment. Some payments may be made immediately in a lump sum; for others, the payments are made in the next major accounting period. Some may even allow for Refinancing Gain payments (see Section 3.3.3 below) to be paid over a period of time, subject to the requirement that the net present value of those payments is equal to as if the payment were made immediately.

3.3.3 Refinancing
A Developer may choose to refinance outstanding Project Debt and/or substitute its equity with additional debt during the Term. Such a refinancing may result in a large cash payment to the Developer or a reduction in debt service, thereby improving the Developer’s cash flows.

An example provision providing for Department compensation in a refinancing is set forth below.

The [Developer] agrees to pay the [Department] such amount as compensation to the [Department] in exchange for the [Department]’s grant to [Developer] of rights to impose and receive tolls pursuant to this [Concession Agreement]. If the [Refinancing Gain] is greater than zero, the [Developer] shall pay to the [Department] an amount equal to [X%] of any such [Refinancing Gain].

Because a refinancing can generate substantial economic benefits to the Developer, Concession Agreements often require that such benefits are shared with the Department. Furthermore, such a refinancing may reduce the amount of equity, or “skin in the game” of the Developer, which may be contrary to the goals of the public entity and would need to be considered within context of Federal credit program requirements that borrowers
have capital at risk in their business for the duration of the Federal loan.\textsuperscript{7} Where the Developer is able to replace its existing debt with new debt having better than expected interest rates or where the Developer is able to raise additional debt to finance a cash payment to its Equity Members, the Concession Agreement will generally require the Developer to share a percentage of the resulting financial benefit with the Department, subject to certain conditions (in some Concession Agreements, for example, the Developer may not be required to share any gains if it has not yet achieved its Equity IRR).

A refinancing may be contemplated in the original Base Case Financial Model for a Project. In these circumstances, the resulting financial benefits are integrated into the Developer’s bid that is placed for the Project during procurement, and the Department will generally be deemed to have already taken the benefit. As a result, the resulting gain is not generally shared once the refinancing is actually undertaken.

If, however, the benefits were not expected at the signing of the Concession Agreement or they were uncertain, then sharing may be appropriate. This sharing may be required where a refinancing of the existing debt occurs that was not contemplated in the original Base Case Financial Model or if the Developer receives a TIFIA loan or is allowed to issue private activity bonds (PAB) under the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) program that was not originally expected. These instruments result in lower debt service costs.

The Department may require the Developer to share a percentage of the Refinancing Gains not previously contemplated and such Refinancing Gains may also be required to be shared with other Project Debt providers.

An example of such sharing provision is set forth below.

\begin{quote}
The [Department]’s portion of the [Refinancing Gain] shall be calculated as if realized entirely in the year in which the refinancing occurs and the [Developer] shall pay to the [Department] the [Department]’s portion of the [Refinancing Gain] concurrently with the close of the refinancing; provided, however if the [Developer] demonstrates that it will only be able to actually make distributions on account of such [Refinancing Gain] over future years, then (a) the calculation of the [Refinancing Gain] shall be made on a net present value basis and (b) the [Department] shall reasonably approve and the parties shall set for in writing a payment schedule spreading payment of such portion of the [Refinancing Gain] over such future years corresponding with the anticipated timing of such future distributions such that these payments yield the same net present value to the [Department].
\end{quote}

As throughout the Guide, these refinancing provisions refer to toll concessions. Refinancing provisions may vary for availability payment transactions.

\footnote{“Circular No. A-129: Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables,” Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, January 2013, Sections II C 1.b and III A.3.b.}
4 Supervening Events

4.1 Introduction

During the Term, the Developer may encounter events or circumstances that negatively impact its ability to perform its obligations under the Concession Agreement within the time and/or cost originally projected for the Project. Some of these risks may be beyond the control of the Developer; others may be best managed by the Department. Accordingly, one of the key exercises in the preparation of any Concession Agreement is to allocate risk appropriately between the parties. To the extent that a risk allocated to the Department under the Concession Agreement arises during the Term, the Concession Agreement will generally provide contractual protection to the Developer.

As the global P3 market has developed (including in the United States), three different categories of these Supervening Events have broadly evolved. Terminology for each category of these events varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (and from State to State), but for the purposes of this Guide, these three categories of Supervening Events can be described as follows:

- **Compensation Events** – a discrete set of events for which the Department broadly accepts the risk. To the extent that a Compensation Event arises during the Term, the Developer will typically be afforded sufficient protection in the Concession Agreement to ensure that, as result of the Compensation Event occurring, the Developer is not left in a better or worse position than it would have been had that Compensation Event not occurred. The aforementioned protection typically manifests itself in the form of monetary compensation, relief from any failure by the Developer to comply with its obligations under the Concession Agreement as a direct result of the Compensation Event and (where necessary) extensions to deadlines that the Developer is required to meet under the Concession Agreement and is delayed in achieving as a direct result of the relevant Compensation Event.

- **Delay Events** – a discrete set of events typically outside of the Developer’s control, the risk of which the Developer is (relative to the Department) best placed to manage. Although the Concession Agreement would not typically require the Department to pay monetary compensation to the Developer if a Delay Event occurs, the Concession Agreement would typically relieve the Developer from any failure to comply with its obligations under the Concession Agreement that arise as direct result of the Delay Event and (where necessary) extend deadlines that the Developer is required to meet under the Concession Agreement and is delayed in achieving as a direct result of the relevant Delay Event.

- **Force Majeure Events** – Force Majeure Events are generally a subset of Delay Events that are likely to have a catastrophic effect on the Project if they occur. In practice, their occurrence is highly unlikely, but termination rights can arise if they do occur.

4.2 The Role of Insurance to Mitigate Against Risk

Insurance is a key risk mitigant in any Project and for this reason it is not unusual for the Department to retain external insurance advisors regarding a Project. The Developer will generally be able to take out advance loss of profit or business interruption insurance to mitigate certain risks or events that arise during the Term, thereby providing a replacement revenue stream for Lenders and other parties dependent on the revenue of the Project. Such insurance will generally be subject to a deductible, so the occurrence of any such event may result in a material cost to the Developer. It should be noted, however, that such insurance is generally only available where there is physical damage to the Project and for the period that the Project is being reinstated.
Of the P3 transactions that have closed in the United States to date, several have categorized events that are either insurable or best managed by the Developer as Force Majeure Events, meaning that the Developer has the ability to terminate the Concession Agreement if the relevant Force Majeure Event continues for an extended period of time. Additionally, some Projects have included insurable events as Compensation Events, albeit that the level of compensation payable by the Department in the event that such risk arises is generally paid net of any Insurance Proceeds that are capable of being recovered. These approaches generally run contrary to international best practice for two reasons:

1. Except in exceptional circumstances (which are generally value-for-money driven), deductible risk and the risk of non-recovery under insurance policies is generally a Developer risk on the basis that the Developer is responsible for managing its insurance program; and
2. The non-availability of insurance with respect to a risk should not, of itself, be sufficient justification for a particular risk being treated as a Force Majeure Event.

4.3 Categorization of Supervening Events

4.3.1 Compensation Events

Compensation Events consist of those events that are under the control of the Department, that are most efficiently managed by the Department or the risk of which represents value for money when assumed by the Department. Such events are generally dealt with by compensation methods, rather than by being treated as defaults of the Concession Agreement by the Department, on the basis that termination should, at all times, be a last resort (although the Department may always elect to terminate the Concession Agreement at its convenience if it believes that the continuance of a Compensation Event renders the relationship between the parties untenable). The occurrence and/or continuance of a Compensation Event may cause the Developer to incur (a) a delay in the performance of its obligations under the Concession Agreement, (b) a loss of revenue, (c) an increase in its costs, or (d) buildup of third-party liabilities. Any compensation mechanism would generally allow the Developer to make a claim against the Department with respect to each of these exposures.

An example definition of Compensation Event is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compensation Event</th>
<th>means the occurrence of any one or more of the following events or conditions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>a breach of the [Concession Agreement] by the [Department];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>the construction or expansion of a [Competing Facility];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>the development or implementation of any change in the [Work] or technical requirements applicable to the [Work] that the [Department] has directed the [Developer] to perform pursuant to a [Change Order] or a directive letter pursuant to the [Concession Agreement];</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 Please see Section 4.3.4 for a discussion of those risks that the Developer may encounter during construction that it may, on project specific grounds, represent value for money for the Department to take the financial risk of.

4 Amongst other things, this Compensation Event is intended to include any failure by the Department to (a) deliver certificates or approvals within time periods required under the Concession Agreement, (b) comply with its obligations in respect of Right of Way for the Project (in terms of either acquisition responsibilities or ongoing access), (c) ensure that the Developer has the ongoing ability to toll and collect tolls in respect of the Project.
(d) any [Discriminatory Change in Law];

(e) one or more injunctions or other legal proceedings enjoining or estopping the [Developer] from the performance of its obligations pursuant to the [Concession Agreement], in any case for more than [X] days in the aggregate;

(f) the imposition of (i) any State or local property tax or similar ad valorem tax or charge (including property taxes) or recordation tax on a deed, release or other document recorded in connection with the [Concession Agreement], unless recorded by or at the behest of the [Developer]; and (ii) any license fee or sales, use, receipts or similar tax on or measured by receipts or revenues levied, rated, charged, imposed or assessed by the State or any county, city or town of the State with respect to [Toll Revenues] paid to or collected by the [Developer] for travel on the [Project]; but excluding (x) any taxes of general application on overall net income or (y) any taxes levied, rated, charged, imposed or assessed in connection with any transfer during the [Term] of all or any portion of the [Developer]’s interest in the [Concession Agreement] or of any interest in the [Developer];

(g) (i) the enactment of any law after the [Proposal Due Date], or (ii) any change, amendment to, repeal or revocation of any law or in the interpretation or application thereof by any [Governmental Entity] after the [Proposal Due Date] that expands the vehicles exempted from the obligation to pay tolls on the [Project]; excluding, however, any such change in or new law enacted but not yet effective as of the [Proposal Due Date];

(h) discovery of archeological, paleontological or cultural resources on the [Project Right of Way], excluding any such resources known to the [Developer] on the [Proposal Due Date];

(k) any release of [Hazardous Substances] into the [Project Right of Way] by the [Department] or any [Department Related Party]; and

(l) an exercise by the [Department] within the [Project Right of Way] of its right to develop and pursue, anywhere in the world, entrepreneurial, commercial and business activities that are ancillary or collateral to the use, enjoyment and operation of the [Project] and [Project Right of Way] and the collection, use and enjoyment of [Toll Revenues] as provided in the [Concession Agreement], provided, however, that each of the above events does not arise by reason of:

(1) the negligence or misconduct of the [Developer] or its [Subcontractors]; or

(2) any act or omission by the [Developer] or its [Subcontractors] in breach of the provisions of the [Concession Agreement].

4.3.2 Competing Facilities

Competing Facilities broadly consist of transportation facilities managed by or on behalf of the Department during the Term that are likely to reduce traffic (and therefore revenue) on the Project. The implementation of a Competing Facility will not generally result in any delay in performance by the Developer of its obligations, but there is a risk that it could lead to lower revenues for Developers. Because Developers (and their Lenders) invest substantial amounts of money in projects on the basis of certain traffic and revenue assumptions, they may be concerned about any potential development undertaken by the Department that is likely to reduce traffic. Departments, on the other hand, may be concerned about any contractual restriction
that would constrain their ability to undertake necessary improvements to improve the transportation network in their jurisdictions.

The generally accepted approach is not to restrict the Department’s ability to proceed with the development of any transportation facility, but rather to define a set of potential facility developments or improvements that would constitute a Competing Facility and to permit the Developer to claim a Compensation Event to the extent a facility undertaken by or on behalf of the Department falls within the agreed definition. The definition will often be limited in geography to the areas expected to be served by the Project and will generally exclude any transportation projects that are already under construction or planned at the time when bids for the Project are submitted (generally by reference to a medium-term transportation program or similar planning projection of the Department then in effect for the jurisdiction). The commercial characteristics of a Project may also be a factor in defining the scope of potential Competing Facilities, including non-road facilities. For example, the Developer of a Project that is expected to serve commuter traffic may not require protection against the development of a freight rail line immediately adjacent to it, but if the Project is expected to serve long-haul tractor trailer traffic, then the Developer may require protection.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the location of the Project may also cause the Department to be concerned that future enhancements to neighboring facilities could enhance the Developer’s projected future revenues (e.g., through the introduction of additional interchanges or feeder roads). In such circumstances, the Department may seek to include a mechanism in the Concession Agreement that allows such additional revenue to be offset against any decrease in revenue attributable to the introduction of a Competing Facility.

Although each Project will be particularly unique in this regard, an example definition of Competing Facility is set forth below.

**Competing Facility** means any newly constructed or materially expanded transportation facility that is built and opened to traffic during the [Term] by (x) the [Department] or a private entity pursuant to a contract with the [Department] or (y) by any other [Governmental Entity] or a private entity pursuant to a contract with the [Governmental Entity], but only where the [Department] has discretionary authority to effectively prevent its construction or opening to traffic or to control its location; in each case, however, excluding the following:

(a) all those highway projects excluded by statutes in effect on the [Proposal Due Date];
(b) all highway projects included in any of the long range transportation plans and programs set forth in [Exhibit [X]] to this [Concession Agreement];
(c) all highway projects located outside the competing facilities boundaries set forth in [Exhibit [X]] to this [Concession Agreement], and all projects located inside the competing facilities boundaries that are specifically listed as exclusions in such [Exhibit [X]];
(d) all transportation projects and facilities that are not highway projects, including passenger and freight rail facilities;
(e) any and all frontage roads, except as otherwise set forth in [Exhibit [X]] to this [Concession Agreement];
(f) all work and improvements on highway projects necessary for improved safety, maintenance, or operational purposes;
(g) all [High-Occupancy Vehicle] exclusive lane additions, or other work, on any highway project required by environmental regulatory agencies;
(h) any work and improvements undertaken to increase traffic capacity by modifying already-constituted highway projects through the installation of traffic sensors, metering devices, intelligent vehicle highway system
equipment or other intelligent transportation systems, through intersection grade separation, or localized operational improvements through the restriping of traffic lanes, medians, and shoulders, including restriping that adds lanes; and

(i) changes to the [Project] directed by the [Department], unless such changes are operated by the [Department] or a person other than the [Developer] after completion.

4.3.3 Delay Events

Delay Events are events typically outside of the Developer’s control, the risk of which the Developer is (relative to the Department) best placed to manage. Although the Developer typically takes any financial risk associated with the occurrence of Delay Events, the Concession Agreement would typically provide a reasonable extension to any deadlines that the Developer is required to meet under the Concession Agreement and is delayed in achieving as a direct result of the relevant Delay Event, and would also provide relief from any Developer Default associated with the accumulation of Noncompliance Points or arising as a result of the Delay Event

An example definition of Delay Event is set forth below.5

Delay Event means the occurrence of any one or more of the following events or conditions:

(a) a [Force Majeure Event];
(b) *[the discovery of an [Unknown Geological Condition] during the carrying out of the [Construction Work]];
(c) *[the discovery of any [Unknown Endangered Species] during the carrying out of the [Construction Work]];
(d) *[the discovery of any [Unknown Hazardous Environmental Condition] during the carrying out of the [Construction Work]];
(e) *[the discovery of any [Unforeseen Utility] during the carrying out of the [Construction Work]];
(f) *a failure to obtain, or an unreasonable and unjustifiable delay in obtaining, a [Governmental Approval] by the deadlines specified in the [Concession Agreement];
(g) any [Change in Law] that is not a [Qualifying Change in Law];
(h) a failure to relocate, or delay in relocating, by the deadlines specified in this [Concession Agreement] utilities by a utility with which the [Developer] has been unable to enter into an agreement providing for such relocation; or
(i) any [Non-Discriminatory O&M Change];
(j) any release of [Hazardous Substances] into the [Project Right of Way] after the [Setting Date] other than by the [Developer] or its [Subcontractors];

except, in each case, to the extent attributable to any breach of this [Concession Agreement] by, or any negligent act, or negligent omission of, the [Developer] or any of its [Subcontractors].

* see Section 4.3.4 for a discussion of the circumstances in which the Developer may be granted a Compensation Event relief in respect of these matters.

5 For further clarification and context, please see also Section 4.3.4 (Unanticipated Circumstances during Construction).
4.3.4 **Unanticipated Circumstances during Construction**

One of the key benefits of a greenfield project being undertaken as a P3 transaction is the transfer of certain risks associated with the Site to the Developer. The transfer of these risks is not wholly unique to a P3 transaction, but it is often more comprehensive than other procurement methods. Given that the level of Site related risks that the Project may be exposed to is, in part, a function of the Developer’s design, Departments are typically reluctant to retain any Site related risks (including permitting) in relation to the Project.

Notwithstanding the typical reluctance of Departments to retain Site related risks in respect of the Project, international experience (including in the United States) has demonstrated that the value for money impact of transferring Site related risks (including permitting) to the Developer needs to be carefully considered. In practice, the value for money of transferring these risks to the Developer is directly linked to (as relevant):

- the quality (and timing of provision) of relevant information made available to Proposers during the procurement process; and/or
- the extent to which Proposers are permitted to undertake their own Site investigations during the procurement process; and/or
- the extent to which Proposers are permitted to interact with (particularly in respect of permitting and utility related matters) the relevant governmental agencies and/or utility providers; and/or
- the location and/or nature of the Project.

It is extremely difficult to generalize about the extent to which unforeseen geotechnical risk, hazardous substance risk, utility risk and/or unanticipated discovery of endangered species should be treated as Compensation Events or Delay Events in Concession Agreements. By way of example, the Developer is likely to be much more sensitive to unanticipated risks relating to utilities on a downtown project than on a rural project. Similarly, risks associated with delays are far more readily capable of being mitigated on projects where the construction work does not have to be undertaken sequentially, than on projects where it does.

Given that the approach to risk allocation in relation to these matters can vary significantly from project to project the example definition of “Compensation Event” does not include events relating to such risks, but that is not to say that it is unusual for events relating to such risks to be included as Compensation Events. As previously mentioned, the circumstances surrounding any particular project may mean that it represents value for money for a particular risk to be accepted by the Department and included as a Compensation Event.

4.3.5 **Force Majeure Events**

The purpose of force majeure protection is to give the party affected by the relevant Force Majeure Event relief from liability and, if the event continues for an extended period, an opportunity to terminate the Concession Agreement. The definition of Force Majeure Event will generally be limited to those events that will likely have a catastrophic effect on either party’s (although generally the Developer’s) ability to fulfill its obligations under the Concession Agreement.
An example definition of Force Majeure Event is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Majeure Event</th>
<th>means the occurrence after the date of this [Concession Agreement] of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>war, civil war, invasion, violent act of foreign enemy or armed conflict;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>nuclear, chemical or biological contamination unless the source or cause of the contamination is brought to or near the Site by [Developer] or its [Key Contractors] or is as a result of any breach by [Developer] of the terms of this [Concession Agreement]; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>ionizing radiation unless the source or cause of the ionizing radiation is brought to or near the Site by [Developer] or its [Key Contractors] or is as a result of any breach by [Developer] of the terms of this [Concession Agreement]; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>any blockade or embargo;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>any:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>official or unofficial strike;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>lockout;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>go-slow; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv)</td>
<td>other dispute,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>generally affecting the construction industry or a significant sector of it;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>any act of [Terrorism],</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in each case which directly causes either [Party] (the Affected Party) to be unable to comply with all or a material part of its obligations under this Agreement.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In recognition of the general inability of the Developer to protect itself financially against the occurrence of Force Majeure Events through insurance, as well as the potential for Force Majeure Events to cause substantial damage to the Project and its long-term economic viability, the Concession Agreement will generally include an additional right of either party to terminate the Concession Agreement if a Force Majeure Event continues for an extended period of time. The other party will generally have a right to veto the election to terminate under these circumstances, provided that the vetoing party will be required to pay the cost of restoring the Project and continuing the Concession Agreement. In the event of a termination following an extended Force Majeure Event, the Concession Agreement generally requires the Department to pay termination compensation to the Developer as more fully described in Section 7.4 below.

Some transactions in the United States have also provided for a similar termination right if a Compensation Event or Delay Event continues for an extended period (often lasting several consecutive months). A Department may wish to consider the following points before agreeing to the inclusion of such a provision in a Concession Agreement:

- many Delay Events are insurable and provided the Developer places sufficient loss of revenue insurance to mitigate against the lost income suffered as result of the occurrence of an insurable event, there should be no need for either party to have a right to terminate;
in the event of a substantial loss of the Project, reinstatement of the asset could take a significant period of time, perhaps in excess of the extended period of time that would otherwise give rise for either party to have the right to terminate the Concession Agreement;

- in the international P3 market, the inclusion of such a termination right is the exception, rather than the norm, principally because in the event of a termination, the Department will be required to pay a significant level of termination compensation to the Developer and nevertheless have a need to complete the construction and/or reinstatement of the Project; and

- the benefits of considering the inclusion of such a termination right on a risk by risk basis, rather than generically in respect of all Compensation Events and/or Delay Events.

An example provision permitting termination for an extended Force Majeure Event is set forth below.

If one or more [Force Majeure Events] occurring after the [Financial Closing Date] results in the [Project] being substantially unavailable for public use or the suspension or substantial reduction of toll collections for a period in excess of (i) [X] consecutive days or (ii) [Y] days in the aggregate within any [Z]-day period, then:

- the [Developer] may elect to terminate this [Concession Agreement] unless the [Department] elects, within [X] days following receipt of the [Developer]'s written notice of election to terminate, to treat such [Force Majeure Event] as a [Compensation Event]; and

- the [Department] may elect to terminate this [Concession Agreement] unless the [Developer] elects, within [X] days following such [Force Majeure Event], to restore any resulting damage or destruction at the [Developer]'s sole cost and expense and furnishes a restoration plan acceptable to the [Department] with respect to such damage or destruction,

provided, however, in each case, that if this [Concession Agreement] is terminated, the [Department] will pay to the [Developer] the [Force Majeure Termination Sum].

4.4 Types of Contractual Relief Generally Granted

4.4.1 Notice of occurrence of Supervening Event

The mere occurrence of a Supervening Event generally will not automatically entitle the Developer to relief. The Concession Agreement will often require the Developer to give notice of the occurrence of the Supervening Event within a specified period of time and to provide evidence to support the extent of the relief that is claimed. The burden of proof for any claim will be on the Developer, and the Department will generally be permitted to deny the requested relief if it is not sufficiently supported, subject to the right of the parties to submit any dispute relating to a claim (or denial thereof) to the Dispute Resolution Procedures set out in the Concession Agreement.

An example provision providing for this notice and the provision of associated supporting information, using a Compensation Event as an example, is set forth below.

If at any time the [Developer] determines that a [Compensation Event] has occurred or is imminent, the [Developer] shall submit a written notice to the [Department]. The [Developer] shall identify the [Compensation Event] in reasonable detail, describe the [Developer]'s current estimate of the anticipated effects of the [Compensation Event], and include a written analysis of the calculation of the [Developer]'s
4.4.2 Relief for Nonperformance and Extension of Time to Key Dates

During the occurrence of a Compensation Event or Delay Event, the Developer will generally be excused from the performance of its obligations to the extent performance is prevented or delayed by the relevant Compensation Event or Delay Event. The Developer will often be required to continue performing those obligations not affected by the relevant Compensation Event or Delay Event and to mitigate the effects of the Compensation Event or Delay Event. Generally, the Developer’s obligation to pay money and its obligation to comply with Applicable Law and the Project’s Technical Requirements (except to the extent of a temporary inability to comply as a direct result of the relevant Compensation Event or Delay Event) will not be suspended.

The Developer’s obligation to meet construction milestones or other deadlines will often be suspended and such milestones and deadlines will generally be extended as part of the relief the Department provides. However, the length of the extension may not necessarily be equal to the duration of the relevant Compensation Event or Delay Event. Concession Agreements will generally provide for an analysis of the critical path items actually impacted by the relevant Compensation Event or Delay Event, and may require that available float (or some portion thereof) in the then-current schedule be exhausted before an extension is granted. In addition, relief will not generally be granted where there are concurrent delays in the Work that
are unrelated to the relevant Compensation Event or Delay Event (for example, where the Developer’s D&C Contractor is merely late in completing the Work).

In the case of Delay Events only, the Developer will generally continue to incur noncompliance/performance points under the Concession Agreement to the extent its performance failures are the result of the Delay Event.

An example provision providing for the calculation of time relief in the context of Delay Events is set forth below.

(a) During the performance of the [Construction Work], extensions of key milestones and/or activities identified in the most recent [Project Schedule] for [Compensation Events or Delay Events] affecting the [Work] will be made based on [Time Impact Analysis], and will extend each of the construction deadlines affected thereby.

(b) A [Compensation Event or Delay Event] will excuse the [Developer] from performance of its operations and maintenance obligations only to the extent such [Compensation Event or Delay Event] directly affects such obligations.

(c) For purposes of paragraph (a) above, Time Impact Analysis means a time impact analysis, (i) establishing the influence of an event on the most recent [Project Schedule], and will include a fragmentary network, and for events that have not yet occurred, the fragmentary network will demonstrate how the [Developer] proposes to incorporate such event in the most recent [Project Schedule], and (ii) demonstrating: (A) the time impact based on the date the event occurred or notice of a proposed change is given to the [Developer], (B) the status of the [Work] at such point of time; and (C) the time computation of all affected activities.

### 4.4.3 When Is Compensation Appropriate?

**Calculating Compensation**

In calculating the monetary relief payable to the Developer following a Compensation Event, the Concession Agreement will generally apply the principle that the Developer should be left in a no better or no worse position than it was in immediately prior to the Compensation Event. The net impacts to both costs and revenues will generally be considered, including by reference to estimates prepared by independent engineering firms and traffic and revenues consultants, respectively.

Once determined, monetary relief can generally be paid as a lump sum cash payment upfront, as a periodic fixed payment during the Term, as an adjustment to any revenue or Refinancing Gain-sharing mechanism contained in the Concession Agreement, or through such other means as the parties may agree. Some Concession Agreements may require the Developer to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain financing to fund the Compensation Amount albeit on the understanding that the underlying commercial terms of the Concession Agreement may need to be amended in order to substantiate the Developer incurring such additional debt. This approach helps to alleviate the potential burden of a large lump sum payment on the Department; however, the failure of the Developer to actually raise financing will not prejudice its right to receive the amounts due.

An example provision providing for the calculation and payment of compensation is set forth below.

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6 A fragmentary network is generally a breakdown of the schedule into its component parts and (and their sub-parts) which substantiates the build-up of time needed to complete an activity.
(a) The amount of any compensation payable with respect to any Compensation Event (such amount, the Compensation Amount) will be calculated based on the sum of (A) any adverse Net Cost Impact and (B) any adverse Net Revenue Impact for each year that there is an impact attributable to such Compensation Event; provided, however, that, subject to paragraph (c) below, any Net Cost Savings and positive Net Revenue Impact attributable to such Compensation Event will be used to decrease the Compensation Amount. The calculation of the Compensation Amount will be based on the difference in the projected cost and revenue related to the Project immediately prior to the occurrence of the Compensation Event and the projected cost and revenue related to the Project after taking into account the impact of the Compensation Event.

(b) For purposes of this Concession Agreement:

(i) Net Cost Impact means the aggregate value of any net increase in the Developer’s costs reflected on an annual basis directly attributable to a Compensation Event, as compared with what the Developer’s costs would have been absent the occurrence of the Compensation Event, less the increased costs that can reasonably be mitigated by the Developer.

(ii) Net Cost Savings means the aggregate value of any decrease in the Developer’s costs reflected on an annual basis directly attributable to a Compensation Event as compared with what the costs would have been absent occurrence of a Compensation Event, but excluding any savings in costs taken into account to reduce the Net Cost Impact attributable to such Compensation Event.

(iii) Net Revenue Impact means the aggregate value of any net increase or decrease in Gross Revenues reflected on an annual basis directly attributable to a Compensation Event, less any lost Gross Revenues that can reasonably be mitigated by the Developer (excluding any mitigation of costs subtracted from Net Cost Impact for the same Compensation Event).

(c) Following a determination of the Compensation Amount pursuant to paragraph (a) above, the Department will compensate the Developer for such Compensation Amount in such manner as agreed upon by the parties in writing or as may be determined through the dispute resolution procedures; provided, however, that:

(i) in the case of any lump sum payment of the Compensation Amount or any other payment schedule that differs from the projected timing of the Compensation Amount, the present value of the Compensation Amount will be determined using the then appropriate risk adjusted discount rate(s), as agreed between the Department and the Developer; and

(ii) the amount and timing of payment of the Compensation Amount related to a Compensation Event will take into account the ability of the Developer to obtain funding in relation to such Compensation Amount in accordance with paragraph (d) below and will take into account the ability of the Developer to have available funds at such times as the Developer is required to make payments to third parties in respect of any Compensation Amount.

(d) If requested by the Department, the Developer will use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain funding for the Compensation Amount; provided, however, that the Developer will not be obligated to obtain such funding if the Developer, in its reasonable discretion, determines that obtaining such funding will diminish the Project Value. If the Developer is able to obtain funding for all or part of the Compensation Amount, the Developer will submit a funding proposal for the Department’s review and approval. Such funding...
The funding proposal will identify the terms and conditions required to secure funding for such [Compensation Amount], including any proposed adjustments to the toll rate schedule, proposed extensions of the [Term] and/or proposed payments by the [Department]. The [Department] will reject or accept the funding proposal within [X] days of receipt of the funding proposal. If the funding proposal is accepted by the [Department], the [Department] will issue a [Change Order] to implement the funding proposal and, to the extent such funding proposal secures financing for less than 100% of the [Compensation Amount], the [Change Order] will provide funding for the remainder thereof on terms and conditions mutually agreed by the parties.

Deductibles – Factors to Consider

Some Concession Agreements include so called "deductibles" in respect of certain Compensation Event claims that require the Developer to absorb the financial impact of specific risks before the Department is required to pay compensation. A deductible might be applied on a per claim basis or on an aggregate basis across all claims for a particular risk or basket of risks.

The merits of utilizing deductible arrangements in the context of Compensation Event claims are debatable and require complex analysis by Departments. On the one hand, the use of deductibles can be an attractive proposition to the Department as it reduces the likelihood of the Developer making claims against the Department during the Term, and any contingency that the Developer includes in its pricing is passed on to users of the Project as it will be reflected in the toll pricing. On the other hand, the inclusion of contingency by the Developer raises the possibility that the Department may ultimately pay for a risk that never materializes, which can be unattractive on public policy/value for money grounds.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Department proposes to apply deductibles to certain Compensation Event claims, it will be important for the Department to be confident that such an arrangement represents better value than fully compensating the Developer in respect of the financial impact of the relevant Compensation Event.

Extensions to the Term

The Department may wish to reserve the right to extend the Term to compensate the Developer for a Compensation Event. Doing so will provide the Developer with additional years of revenue that may be used to offset its Losses and will permit the Department to avoid having to pay a large sum of money out of its then current operating budget (or reserves).

However, this remedy may not be wholly satisfactory to the Developer in circumstances where the Compensation Event has caused the Developer to incur substantial out-of-pocket costs or loss of revenue in a short period of time because the promise of revenue several years or even decades in the future will not resolve an immediate funding gap and the Developer may nevertheless have to seek additional financing to cover the gap. However, a Term extension may be a more welcome remedy where the impact of the Compensation Event is less acute and its primary effect is to reduce the Developer’s Equity IRR over the original Term (without impacting the Developer’s ability to service its ongoing debt obligations). Under those circumstances, the Developer may be less concerned about immediate funding needs and may take more comfort from the promise of additional years of revenue to restore its Equity IRR. Because the utility of the remedy is uncertain, however, Developers may seek a right in the Concession Agreement to determine how and when this remedy is exercised.

In some jurisdictions, authorizing statutes limit the permissible length of a Concession Agreement. If the initial Term is equal, or nearly equal, to this upper limit, then this remedy may be unavailable or of only limited value.
5 Changes in Equity Interests

5.1 Introduction

In the early stages of the procurement process for any P3 transaction, the Department will generally solicit requests for qualification from prospective bidder teams in the market. The Department will generally evaluate each respondent in a number of predetermined areas, concluding with the shortlisting of several bidders who are then invited to submit detailed proposals.

As part of the aforementioned evaluation, an assessment is generally undertaken of the respondent team’s Equity Members’ credentials, principally in the following areas:

- Availability of capital that can be committed to invest in the Project;
- Experience investing in similar projects;
- Demonstrated ability to manage effectively all aspects of future Work on the Project; and
- To the extent relevant, experience of managing the self-performance of operations and/or maintenance by special-purpose Developers that choose not to subcontract out those responsibilities on a long-term basis.

During the competitive bidding process, the Department will generally reserve for itself approval rights with respect to changes to certain key members of a bidder’s team. The reservation of such rights affords the Department the opportunity to ensure that the qualifications of each bidder team (which led to those teams being shortlisted) cannot be eroded through changes being made to key members of the teams. As a general rule, if a bidder team requests approval of a change to a key member of its bidding team, the Department should only approve any such request if it can be confident that the proposed change does not have an adverse impact on the Department’s original evaluation of the bidder team’s credentials.

The Department’s concerns with respect to changes to members of the bidding team during the competitive bidding process apply equally during the Term. Accordingly, the Concession Agreement will generally include provisions that require the Department’s approval to certain changes in the identity of the Developer’s investors or supply chain members.

For the purposes of this Guide, discussion is limited to the extent to which the Department should have approval rights with respect to any Change in Ownership of the Developer (i.e., changes in the ultimate ownership, either directly or indirectly, of the equity interest in the Project).

5.2 When Does a Change in Ownership Occur?

Broadly, a Change in Ownership can arise in one of two ways:

- **Directly** – i.e., through a change in the ownership of shares or membership interests in the Developer.
- **Indirectly** – i.e., as a result of a change in the ownership of shares or membership interests in any entity that is a direct or indirect holding company of shares or membership in the Developer.

Although the Concession Agreement will generally include provisions relating to direct changes in the ownership of shares or membership interests in the Developer, the Department will also generally seek to ensure that the provisions of the Concession Agreement capture a change in the ownership of any shares or
membership of any entity in the vertical ownership chain between the Developer and the relevant investors that were first evaluated by the Department in putting together the shortlist of bidders for the Project.\(^7\)

The Department will want to ensure that any Change in Ownership restrictions cannot be circumvented through sophisticated legal structuring of equity transfers and accordingly, any such restrictions would generally capture transfers of any interest (whether such interest is legally held by the transferor (e.g., the owner of a share of stock in the Developer who wishes to sell it to a third party) or held by a third party for the benefit of the transferor (e.g., a trust that owns the stock in the Developer for the benefit of an owner, where the owner seeks to sell its beneficial interest to a third party)) in shares or membership interests, together with transfers of economic interest in the same (e.g., voting or dividend rights).

An example definition of Change in Ownership is set forth below.

**Change in Ownership** means:

(a) any sale, transfer or disposal of any legal, beneficial or equitable interest in any or all of the shares or membership interests in the [Developer] and/or any [Related Entity];

(b) in respect of any of the shares or membership interests referred to in (a) above, any change in the direct or indirect control over:

(i) any voting rights conferred on those shares or membership interests; or

(ii) any right to appoint or remove directors; or

(iii) any right to receive dividends or distributions; and

(c) any other arrangements that have or may have or which result in the same effect as paragraph (a) or (b) above.

**Related Entity** means [Names of each entity to be incorporated from the Successful Proposer’s Proposal] [Note to Proposers: Each Related Entity shall be those entities that were evaluated for the purposes of the RFQ short-listing process, or as otherwise approved by the Department pursuant to the RFP].\(^8\)

### 5.3 Common Equity Member Concerns

In contrast to the concerns of the Department, the Equity Members in the Project will want maximum flexibility to transfer their interests in the Developer throughout the Term. Although such a level of free transferability is unlikely, Departments do generally recognize that permitting transfers of equity interests in projects allows Equity Members to free up capital for other projects and generally makes the market more liquid, which in turn can help improve pricing on the Project. Additionally, Equity Members in the Project, particularly investment or pension funds, may be required to diversify their interest in certain sectors over

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\(^7\) The change in ownership provisions are in contrast to general restrictions on assignment and transfer, which cover a direct transfer or sale of the Project from one Developer to another Developer.

\(^8\) Depending on the Department’s requirements with respect to indirect changes in ownership. This definition would generally include each entity in the ultimate ownership structure between the Developer and either (a) each relevant investment entity that was evaluated for the purposes of determining the shortlisted bidders in the Project and/or (b) any parent of such investment entity not evaluated for purposes of determining the shortlisted bidders in the Project but that the Department considers important to the success of the Project.
time, and restricting transfer, particularly in relation to a long-term concession, may have the effect of deterring potential investors in the Project.

5.4 Permitted and Prohibited Changes in Ownership

To the extent that the Developer’s ability to perform its obligations under the Concession Agreement will not be prejudiced by a direct or indirect change in ownership, the Developer and its investors will generally maintain that the Department should not have an approval right over such Change in Ownership. However, best practice in the United States and internationally has tended to adopt the following principles in connection with permitted and prohibited Changes in Ownership:

- At all times during the Term, any Change in Ownership arising from a transfer of shares or membership interests to a Prohibited Person is prohibited.
- Subject to paragraph (3) below, Changes in Ownership are prohibited until the end of the Defects Liability Period (generally two years following Substantial Completion, but occasionally longer if the Project is technically complex). Generally speaking, the Department will take comfort from the ongoing involvement of the original Equity Members in the Project until construction has been completed. Amongst other things, the concern for the Department will be that the incoming investor may disrupt momentum in the delivery of the construction and introduce new relationships into the Project at a critical time.
- Changes in Ownership that result from a transfer of shares or membership interests between affiliated entities are generally permitted.9
- Once the Defects Liability Period has expired, Changes in Ownership are generally only prohibited to the extent that they would reasonably be likely to prejudice the Developer’s ability to perform its obligations under the Concession Agreement. By way of example, if the Developer self-performed its operation and maintenance responsibilities (and its ability to do so was principally a function of the outgoing investor’s experience in managing operation and maintenance), the Department may wish to consider the incoming investor’s experience of managing the operation and maintenance of similar projects.

An example Change in Ownership provision is set forth below.

\[
\text{A Restricted Change in Ownership shall arise if:}
\]

1. \(i\) at any time on or before the last day of the Defects Liability Period, any Qualified Investor ceases to own (directly or indirectly) the same percentage of the issued share capital or membership interests in the Developer that it owned (directly or indirectly) at the date of this Concession Agreement;
2. \(ii\) a Change in Ownership occurs which involves the transfer of any shares or membership interests to a Prohibited Person; or
3. \(iii\) a Change in Ownership occurs which would be reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the Developer’s ability to perform its obligations under the Transaction Documents, taking

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9 With respect to transfers between affiliated funds, the Department may wish to ensure that a transfer of interests between two funds managed by the same fund manager represents a bona fide transfer between similar funds and that the fund manager is not simply “fronting” a new fund for the purpose of selling to a new investor.
into account the financial strength and integrity of the transferee, compared to that of the transferor.

(b) Any [Restricted Change in Ownership] will constitute a [Developer Default] for the purposes of [Section [X] (Termination for Developer Default)].

(c) A [Restricted Change in Ownership] shall not arise pursuant to paragraph (a) above as a direct result of:

(i) the grant or enforcement of security in favor of the [Lenders] over or in relation to any shares or membership interest in the [Developer] under the [Financing Documents];

(ii) a change in legal or beneficial ownership of any shares that are listed on a recognized stock exchange, including without limitation such transactions involving any public offering; or

(iii) a transfer of interests between managed funds that are under common ownership or control or between the general partner, manager or the parent company of such general partner or manager and any managed funds under common ownership or control with such general partner or manager (or parent company of such general partner or manager), provided that the relevant funds and the general partner or manager of such funds (or the parent company of such general partner or manager) have been approved by the [Department] in writing prior to the date of this [Concession Agreement].

(d) For the purposes of paragraphs (a) through (c) above, a person will only be deemed to own shares or membership interests in another person if such person owns the legal, beneficial and equitable interest in the relevant shares or membership interests of that other person.

(e) Except in respect of any change in legal or beneficial ownership of any shares that are listed on a recognized investment exchange, the [Developer] shall provide the [Department] with at least [X] days prior written notice of any [Change in Ownership].

(f) The [Developer] agrees to reimburse the [Department] for all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses (including, without limitation, reasonable and proper fees of consultants and legal counsel) incurred by the [Department] in connection with its review of any [Change in Ownership] that it receives notice of pursuant to (e) above.
6 Change in Law

6.1 Understanding the Concerns of All Parties

A core requirement of the Concession Agreement should be for the Developer to comply, and cause all of its Subcontractors to comply, with all Applicable Law in the development and operation of the Project. A failure to comply with this requirement may ultimately result in termination for Developer Default (see Chapter 7 (Defaults, Early Termination, and Compensation)). Accordingly, to the extent that a Change in Law arises during the Term, the Developer may need to incur additional costs to comply with the requirements of the Change in Law.

Broadly speaking, there are two questions that are generally discussed when determining whether the Developer should be protected against the financial impact of a Change in Law:

- Was the Change in Law foreseeable (e.g., based on publically available information such as draft legislation) at the time the Developer submitted its final bid?

- In the absence of being contractually protected against any negative impact of a Change in Law on the Developer’s business, is the Developer in any other way able to mitigate such negative impact without negatively impacting its own financial position?

Except in unique circumstances, costs and timing impacts of complying with current or foreseeable laws are generally for the account of the Developer and are therefore required to be priced into the Developer’s bid. Thus, the question then becomes to what extent the Developer should be contractually protected when unforeseeable Changes in Law arise during the Term.

6.2 Unforeseeable Changes in Law – Relevant Considerations

Developers generally express the view that Change in Law is a risk that they cannot control and that the Department is better placed to manage. In practice, however, Departments only have influence over certain categories of legislation. Accordingly, some level of risk sharing is generally accepted as being appropriate in respect of Changes in Law.

Consequently, most Departments have (consistent with international best practice) focused on the following three risk allocation issues when considering the extent to which the Developer should be protected against unforeseeable Changes in Law:

- Should the Developer be protected with respect to the negative financial impact of all categories of unforeseeable Changes in Law?

- Should the Department bear the risk of the negative impact on the Developer of Changes in Law introduced at all levels of government?

- Should the Developer be protected with respect to any increases in taxes or the introduction of new taxes that, in each case, either increase the Developer’s costs or have a negative impact on the after-tax return of investors in the Developer?

Any consideration of the above issues is generally undertaken in conjunction with an assessment of the circumstances under which the Developer can increase toll rates and the toll rate setting policy generally. This relationship is particularly relevant when considering the extent to which the Developer should be protected with respect to a Change in Law that results in an increase in the Developer’s operating costs. That is not to
suggest that the Developer is generally permitted to apply one-off increases in toll rates in the event of a Change in Law, but rather that the toll rate setting policies will often permit annual increases in line with indexation and, by definition, indexation of the tolls may, over time, provide a suitable hedge against certain categories of Change in Law (e.g., a general increase in corporation tax).

6.3 Trends in the United States P3 Market

Consideration by Departments of the issues highlighted in Section 6.2 above has broadly resulted in the emergence of three relatively consistent themes:

- The Developer generally bears any negative financial impact associated with any unforeseen change in Federal law on the basis that (unlike in other transportation sectors (e.g., aviation) regulation of highways is largely devolved down to State government and the private business community is as well (if not better) placed as any Department to address any unforeseen Change in Law, and (subject to the terms of the toll rate schedule) an increase in toll rates may afford some level of “hedge” against any negative impact of such a Change in Law.

- With respect to any unforeseen change in a non-Federal law, the Department only bears any negative financial impact associated with such Change in Law to the extent that it is a “Discriminatory Change in Law” (see Section 6.5 below for a discussion of the definition of Discriminatory Change in Law).

- The negative financial impact associated with any “Non-discriminatory Change in Law” generally borne by the Developer, except that with respect to changes in sales tax rates or exemptions (whether of general application to suppliers or not), protection is often afforded to the Developer (see Section 6.7 below).

6.4 Compensation, Relief from Delay, and Mitigation

Discriminatory Changes in Law (for which the Department bears all of the risk) are generally Compensation Events for which the Developer is entitled to claim compensation and performance relief (e.g., an extension of time), so as to ensure that the Developer is left in a no better and no worse position than it would have been in had such Discriminatory Change in Law not arisen. With respect to any other unforeseeable Change in Law, these are generally treated as Compensation Events for which the Developer is only afforded performance relief with respect to such Change in Law. Chapter 4 (Supervening Events) sets forth the process that applies to any Compensation Event or Delay Event claim that the Developer proposes to make during the Term.

As with any other Compensation Event, a key concern for the Department will be to ensure that the Developer mitigates the negative impact associated with any Discriminatory Change in Law. Given that any Discriminatory Change in Law will most likely apply beyond the limits of the Project, this duty to mitigate should be capable of being measured, in part, by reference to the extent to which price increases in comparable sectors are experienced. It will also require the Developer to foresee and anticipate the effect of Changes in Law, particularly in relation to expenditures which it has already planned to incur in the performance of its obligations under the Concession Agreement. For example, the Developer cannot on one day replace the overhead lighting on the Project under its normal maintenance program and then argue that it immediately has to replace it due to a subsequent Change in Law which the Developer should have anticipated at the time of the replacement. For that reason, any compensation should reflect any anticipated future savings of maintenance costs.
6.5 **Discriminatory Changes in Law**

Generally, a Discriminatory Change in Law will arise if the relevant Change in Law is not applicable across all modes of business. For example, an increase in general corporation tax or capital gains tax of broad application will not constitute a Discriminatory Change in Law. Similarly, a Change in Law that relates to the operating standards of all highways in the United States (such as a change in Federal regulations requiring the replacement of all guardrail along the Project) would not be considered to be a Discriminatory Change in Law. However, a Change in Law that is purely targeted at private operators of highways would be. In broad terms, the concept of equivalence determines whether a Change in Law can be categorized as a Discriminatory Change in Law: if the change is targeted at one business community or asset class that competes against another business community or asset class that is not impacted by such change, the relevant change will generally be considered to be a Discriminatory Change in Law.

6.6 **Example Provisions**

An example provision governing compliance with laws and its associated definitions are set forth below.

(a) The [Developer], in addition to performing all other requirements of the [Transaction Documents], shall comply with, and require that all its [Subcontractors] comply with, all requirements of all [Applicable Law].

(b) To the extent that any [Discriminatory Change in Law] arises during the [Term], the [Developer] may exercise its rights pursuant to [Section X (Compensation Events)].

(c) To the extent that any [Non-Discriminatory Change in Law] arises during the [Term], either party may notify the other of the [Non-Discriminatory Change in Law’s] likely effect on the [Project], including by (a) expressing an opinion on necessary changes to the Project and (b) proposing any amendments to the [Project Documents] to deal with the [Non-Discriminatory Change in Law].

(d) When a party receives a notice given pursuant to subsection (c), the parties shall discuss and agree on issues raised by the notice, including any ways in which the [Developer] can mitigate the effects of the [Non-Discriminatory Change in Law].

**Change in Law** means:

(a) the enactment of any [Law];

(b) any change, amendment to, repeal or revocation of any [Law] or in the interpretation or application thereof by any [Governmental Entity], excluding, however, any change in or new [Law] which was foreseeable as of the [Setting Date].

**Discriminatory Change in Law** means:

(a) any [Change in Law] [with respect to [Laws] of the State and any county, city or town of the State] that has the effect of discriminating solely against the [Project], the [Developer], any [Key Contractor], or private operators of substantially similar [transportation assets] in the State; or

(b) a [Change in Law] which involves [Capital Expenditure].

**Law** means all laws, treaties, ordinances, judgments, Federal requirements, decrees, injunctions, writs and orders of any [Governmental Entity], and all rules, regulations, orders, formal interpretations of any [Governmental Entity] that are applicable to the [Developer], the [Project] or the [Work], in each case as the same may be amended from time to time.
6.7 Tax-Related Issues

Discriminatory changes in tax law should come within the definition of Discriminatory Change in Law provided above.

Changes in tax law of general application would not generally afford the Developer any right to receive compensation under the Concession Agreement, except with respect to the following categories of Nondiscriminatory Changes in Law:

- With respect to the procurement of goods and materials by the Developer during the Construction Period, any revocation of sales tax exemption (particularly in States where materials procured pursuant to public works contracts are exempt from such taxes).
- Any introduction or increases in sales tax on tolls paid by users of the Project.

6.8 Example Provisions

An example compliance with laws provision and associated definitions are set forth below.

| (a) | The [Developer], in addition to performing all other requirements of the [Transaction Documents], shall comply with, and require that all its [Subcontractors] comply with, all requirements of all applicable laws. |
| (b) | To the extent that any [Discriminatory Change in Law] arises during the [Term], the [Developer] may exercise its rights pursuant to [Section X (Compensation Events)]. |
| (c) | To the extent that any [Nondiscriminatory Change in Law] arises during the [Term], the [Developer] may exercise its rights pursuant to [Section X (Delay Events)]. |

**Change in Law** means:

- the enactment of any [Law];
- any change, amendment to, repeal or revocation of any [Law] or in the interpretation or application thereof by any [Governmental Entity], excluding, however, any change in or new [Law] which was foreseeable as of the [Setting Date].

**Discriminatory Change in Law** means:

- any [Change in Law] [with respect to [Laws] of the State and any county, city or town of the State] that has the effect of discriminating solely against the [Project], the [Developer], or private operators of [toll transportation assets] in the State, except where such [Change in Law] is (a) in response, in whole or in part, to any (i) failure to perform or breach of the [Concession Agreement], (ii) violation of [Law] or [Governmental Approval], or (iii) culpable act, omission or negligence on the part of any [Related Entity], or (b) otherwise permitted under the [Concession Agreement]; or
- a [Relevant Tax Event].

**Law** means all laws, treaties, ordinances, judgments, Federal requirements, decrees, injunctions, writs and orders of any [Governmental Entity], and all rules, regulations, orders, formal interpretations of any [Governmental Entity].
that are applicable to the Developer, the Project or the Work., in each case as the same may be amended from time to
time.

**Nondiscriminatory Change in Law** means a [Change in Law] which is not a [Discriminatory Change in Law].

**Relevant Tax Event** means:

(i) any State or local property tax or similar ad valorem tax or charge or recordation tax on a deed, release or 
other document recorded in connection with the [Concession Agreement], unless recorded or at the behest of 
the [Developer]; and

(ii) any license fee or sales, use, receipts or similar tax on or measured by receipts or revenues levied, rated, 
charged, imposed or assessed by the State or any county, city or town of the State with respect to [Toll 
Revenues] paid to or collected by the [Developer] for travel on the [Project];

but excluding (a) any taxes of general application on overall net income or (b) any taxes levied, rated, charged, imposed 
or assessed in connection with any [Transfer] during the [Term] of all or any portion of the [Developer]’s interest in 
the [Project] or of any interest in the [Developer].

**Setting Date** means [the date falling [45] days prior to the [Proposal Due Date]].
7 Defaults, Early Termination, and Termination Compensation

7.1 Introduction

The intention of the parties to any Concession Agreement should be that it will run its full course and terminate on the last day of its Term. However, situations may arise during the Term that take either party beyond its point of indifference where the ability to call a default is necessary, along with the ability to terminate the Concession Agreement in the absence of cure of the relevant default. Accordingly, the Concession Agreement will generally:

- Define the circumstances under which the Concession Agreement may be terminated early;
- Define the circumstances under which either party will be in default under the Concession Agreement;
- Where appropriate, provide the defaulting party with the ability to cure the relevant default;
- Set out the process that the non-defaulting party must follow if it elects to terminate the Concession Agreement; and
- Specify precisely what compensation (if any) is payable by the Department to the Developer if the Concession Agreement is terminated early.

Early Termination can generally be caused by Department Default, Developer Default, Uninsurable Risks or a Force Majeure Event. It can also generally be caused by the Department exercising a right to terminate the Concession Agreement voluntarily, for its own convenience. This Guide looks at each of these Early Termination scenarios and discusses the issues generally of concern to each party in the relevant scenario.

In addition to the termination scenarios described more fully below, Concession Agreements will also typically be terminable by the Department if the Developer fails to achieve the Financial Closing Date by a specified deadline. Where the failure to achieve financial close is outside the control of the Developer, the Department will, if permitted by Applicable Law, typically pay the Developer a fee to reimburse a portion of the Developer’s costs associated with attempting to reach financial close.

Concession Agreements may also include a right of the Developer to receive termination compensation (typically equal to the amount that would be payable following a termination for extended Force Majeure Events, as described in Section 7.4 below) if a ruling is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that declares the Concession Agreement void or unenforceable, or that renders performance substantially impossible. The inclusion of such a termination right may or may not be appropriate in the context of a particular Project, and Departments should consult their legal advisors to determine the scope of such a provision, if appropriate.

7.2 Termination for Department Default

7.2.1 Events Giving Rise to Department Default

The Developer is generally allowed to terminate the Concession Agreement in circumstances where the Department acts in a way which either (a) renders the parties’ contractual relationship untenable or (b) completely frustrates the Developer’s ability to perform the services that are the subject of the Concession Agreement. A minor breach of the Concession Agreement would not generally fall into this category and even a material breach is likely to be insufficient if the Department’s actions do not have either of the aforementioned effects. Termination by the Developer should be a last resort. It is important to ensure that
there are no “hair trigger” defaults that could put the Department at risk of termination before it has had an opportunity to cure its default.

Accordingly, the Department needs to have a thorough understanding of both the scope of its obligations under the Concession Agreement and the likelihood of it breaching those obligations when determining both the scope of the definition of Department Default and the extent to which cure periods should be required in respect of Department Defaults. As a general point, however, when assessing the likelihood of a Department Default occurring under the Concession Agreement, Departments generally take comfort from the fact that their obligations under the Concession Agreement are far less substantive than those of the Developer.

Although the scope of a common definition of Department Default is, in contrast to the definition of Developer Default, very limited, Developers generally are comfortable with this approach because a failure by the Department to comply with its obligations under the Concession Agreement can in most cases be adequately dealt with by way of a Compensation Event (see Chapter 4 (Supervening Events)), and any failure by the Department to make a payment when due generally gives rise to interest on late payment being payable.

An example definition of Department Default is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department Default means the occurrence of any one or more of the following events or conditions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) any representation or warranty made by the [Department] in this [Concession Agreement] is false or misleading or inaccurate when made or omits information when made, the effect of which is to have a material adverse effect on the [Project Value] or the [Developer]’s ability to perform its obligations or exercise its rights under the [Concession Agreement];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) the Department fails to comply with any of its material obligations under this [Concession Agreement] and such failure has a material adverse effect on the [Project Value] or the [Developer]’s ability to perform its obligations or exercise its rights under the [Concession Agreement]; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) any confiscation, sequestration, condemnation or appropriation of a material part of the [Project], the equity interests in the [Developer] or the [Developer]’s rights under the [Concession Agreement], in each case except to the extent permitted under the terms of this [Concession Agreement].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.2 Department Default Cure Periods

To the extent that a Department Default arises, the Department would, except in limited circumstances, generally have the benefit of a cure period. The purpose of a cure period is to allow the defaulting party an opportunity to cure the relevant default and avoid the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement for its default. The appropriateness of a Department Default having a cure period is generally a function of the nature of the Department Default: a Department Default that is unlikely to be curable or that arises as a result of an affirmative action being taken by the Department would not generally benefit from a cure period.

The length of any cure period will be an issue of concern to both parties to the Concession Agreement. In particular, Developers are generally uncomfortable with long cure periods if they have no ability to terminate the Concession Agreement in the event that the Department is not taking positive action to cure the relevant Department Default. Accordingly, cure periods for covenant defaults of the Department are often set at relatively short periods (e.g., 30 days), but may then be extended (provided that the Department is diligently attempting to cure the default and subject to a maximum extension period) if the initial period is an insufficient period of time for the Department to cure the relevant Department Default. Payment defaults of the Department, however, typically have a relatively longer cure period (e.g., 45-60 days), but will not be subject to any extension. No cure period is appropriate for a Department Default that is incapable of cure, such as if
the legislature revokes or materially limits the Department’s statutory authority to make payments under the Concession Agreement.

With reference to the example definition of Department Default shown in Section 7.2.1 above, an example provision relating to the cure period for a Department Default is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>The Developer shall provide written notice to the [Department] of the occurrence of a [Department Default]. Upon receipt of the [Developer]’s notice, the [Department] shall have the following cure periods with respect to the following [Department Defaults]:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i) for a [Department Default] referred to in paragraph (a) of that definition, a period of [X] days after the [Developer] delivers to the [Department] the written notice of such a [Department Default];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) for a [Department Default] referred to in paragraph (c) or (e) of that definition, a period of [X] days after the [Developer] delivers to the [Department] the written notice of such a [Department Default] or, to the extent that the [Department Default] is capable of cure and the [Department] has, despite using its best efforts, failed to cure such [Department Default] within the [X] day period, such cure period may be extended by such additional period as may be reasonably necessary to cure such [Department Default], subject to a maximum extension of [X] days; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(iii) for any other [Department Default] not referred to in paragraph (a), (c), or (e) above, there is no cure period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Any extension of a cure period in accordance with sub-paragraph (a)(ii) above is subject to the [Department] continuing to use its best efforts to cure or cause to be cured such [Department Default] during the period of such extension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>In the event that a [Department Default] occurs and it has either (i) not been cured within any relevant cure period, (ii) in the case of an extended cure period, the [Department] ceases to use its best efforts to cure the [Department Default], or (iii) there is no cure period, the [Developer] may terminate this [Concession Agreement] in accordance with [Section [X] (Developer’s Rights to Terminate for Department Default)].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.3 Developer’s Rights to Terminate for Department Default and Procedure

An example provision permitting the Developer to terminate the Concession Agreement for Department Default is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>If a [Department Default] occurs and it has not been cured within any relevant cure period set out in [Section [X]], the [Developer] may serve a termination notice on the [Department] at any time during the ongoing continuance of that [Department Default].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>A termination notice issued pursuant to paragraph (a) above must specify the [Department Default] that has occurred and has entitled the [Developer] to issue the termination notice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>This [Concession Agreement] will terminate on the date falling [X] days after the date the [Department] receives the termination notice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Many Concession Agreements will limit the ability of the Developer to terminate for a Department Default to circumstances where the Department Default arises from an uncured failure of the Department to pay a material sum due to the Developer. In some cases, it may be appropriate to expand this limitation to include performance-related Department Defaults where such Department Defaults have a direct impact on the Project’s ability to generate profits and thus negatively impact the Developer’s return on equity (e.g., the Department initiates an unpermitted condemnation or other confiscation of the Project).

**7.2.4 Compensation on Termination for Department Default**

**Basis of Calculation**

In the event of an Early Termination caused by a Department Default, the broadly accepted principle is that the Department should pay the Developer sufficient compensation to ensure that the Developer is left in a no better and no worse economic position than it would have been had the Early Termination not occurred and the Concession Agreement had continued until the last day of its Term. In practical terms, this broadly means that there will be three components to the amount of compensation that will be paid to the Developer by the Department as a result of an Early Termination of the Concession Agreement for Department Default:

- The value of the invested and committed equity (whether in the form of capital contributions or Shareholder Loans) in the Developer at the time of the termination.
- An amount sufficient to allow the Developer to repay all Project Debt, including amounts due as a result of the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement, such as breakage costs; and
- Reasonable costs and liabilities that the Developer incurs as a result of having to terminate Subcontracts as a direct result of the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement.

**Valuing the Equity in the Developer**

Determining the market value of the equity in the Developer in the event of an Early Termination of the Concession Agreement has been an issue encountered in most P3 transactions that have closed in the United States to date. The basic philosophy underlying the valuation methodology should be to ensure that the Equity Members are put in the same financial position that they would have been in had it not been for the Early Termination. In other words, the Department should pay compensation that equates to the true market value of the equity in the Developer.

The sensitivity for both parties will generally be that any determination of the value of the equity in the Developer requires relatively subjective projections of future revenues and costs which, by definition, involves the projection of future traffic levels using the Project. To address this concern and the scope for dispute between the parties, the Concession Agreement will typically provide for the parties to either jointly appoint an independent expert who undertakes the evaluation, with such evaluation being final and binding on both parties, or submit evidence in the event of dispute for ultimate determination by a court or other dispute resolution forum. As an alternative, the Department and Developer could agree at the time of closing on a minimum base case traffic projection for the life of the Project, and value the equity according to such minimum base case rather than performing a projection based on then-current (and then-expected) conditions at the time of termination. This approach would eliminate the need for a forecast of future revenues, and would limit the compensation payable for equity in the event that traffic turned out to be higher than expected.
Departments considering whether to adopt this alternative approach should consult with their legal and financial advisors based on the particular circumstances of a particular Project.

In the context of projects that anticipate a “ramp-up” period before traffic volumes reach steady state, the Developer may be concerned about how any independent expert would value the equity interest in the Developer in the event that an Early Termination for Department Default occurred during construction or the ramp-up period. To address this concern, some Concession Agreements have adopted an alternative approach in the early years of the Project to determining the valuation of the equity in the Developer, with such valuation being based on the revenue and cost projections included in the Base Case Financial Model.

**Calculating the Developer’s Liabilities under its Financing Arrangements**

To the extent the Termination Sum includes amounts that are calculated by reference to the amount of outstanding Project Debt, the Developer and the Lenders will seek to ensure that the provisions which calculate such amounts are sufficiently broad so as to accommodate all potential financing structures that the Developer may seek to use during the Term. The Department, by comparison, will need to ensure that amounts which are not genuine third party debt are not required to be paid and that the provisions do not permit legitimate amounts to be inflated or revised unexpectedly. Concession Agreements will generally include a defined term to encapsulate these amounts and related issues, the overall purpose of which is to properly describe only those debt obligations that the Department is willing to pay in the event of a termination of the Concession Agreement (whether in whole or in part, depending on the other provisions of the Concession Agreement).

When addressing the scope of obligations that may be included, Developers will seek to ensure that all potential debt financing solutions for the Project, including bank loans, bonds (including PABs), TIFIA loans, guarantee obligations, letter of credit obligations, and others, as well as related costs and expenses, such as interest, fees, hedging arrangements, and others are included. Departments should seek the advice of their legal and financial advisors when deciding whether to include or exclude particular items, as the market for financing opportunities is constantly changing. Departments should, however, be cautious wherever Developers seek to include any type of subordinated indebtedness within this definition because Developers may structure their equity investments as Shareholder Loans extended by Equity Members to the Developer to take advantage of tax benefits associated with the payment of interest. Shareholder Loans of this type will be subordinated to the debts owed to third-party Lenders, so it will be important to distinguish these Shareholder Loans from other debt that third-party Lenders provide that may also be subordinate to the debt the Developer’s senior Lenders provide. For example, TIFIA loans are generally included within the scope of Project Debt compensated on termination, even though they are subordinate in payment to other sources of debt in the ordinary course. The Department may wish to provide protection to other bona fide subordinated third-party Lenders (or may not, if such Lenders are not secured lenders) and should consult with their financial advisors regarding the costs and benefits of doing so in the context of each individual Project.

**Subcontractor Breakage Costs**

The Developer may incur costs or liabilities (e.g., breakage costs in respect of cancellation of orders for materials and goods) as a direct result of the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement for Department Default. To the extent that the Developer will incur such costs, it would generally be included in the compensation payable by the Department on Early Termination. One point that Departments generally want to ensure in relation to the costs of breaking Subcontracts is that they are not required to pay any compensation with respect to future loss of profits or other consequential Losses.
An example definition of Subcontractor Breakage Costs is set forth below.

**Subcontractor Breakage Costs** means [Losses] that have been or will be reasonably and properly incurred by the [Developer] under a [Subcontract] as a direct result of the Early Termination of this [Concession Agreement] (and which shall not include lost profit or lost opportunity), but only to the extent that:

(a) the [Losses] are incurred in connection with the [Project] and in respect of the works required to be provided or carried out, including:

(i) any materials or goods ordered or [Subcontracts] placed that cannot be cancelled without such [Losses] being incurred;

(ii) any expenditure incurred in anticipation of the provision of services or the completion of works in the future; and

(iii) the cost of demobilization including the cost of any relocation of equipment used in connection with the [Project];

(b) the [Losses] are incurred under arrangements and/or agreements that are consistent with terms that have been entered into in the ordinary course of business and on an arm’s length basis; and

(c) the [Developer] and the relevant [Subcontractor] have each used their reasonable efforts to mitigate such [Losses].

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### 7.3 Termination for Developer Default

#### 7.3.1 Events Giving Rise to Developer Default

The Concession Agreement will generally provide for a series of events or circumstances that constitute Developer Defaults. Broadly speaking, such events occur when the Developer fails to perform its obligations or otherwise takes, or permits to be taken by its Subcontractors, some action that calls into question its fitness to continue performing under the Concession Agreement. A number of remedies are typically available to the Department following a Developer Default, such as stepping in and performing the Developer’s obligations or drawing on any performance security which may have been provided by the Developer. The occurrence of a Developer Default will also generally permit the Department to terminate the Concession Agreement subject to additional procedures and conditions, though some Concession Agreements may permit the Department to terminate the Concession Agreement only in the case of a limited set of Developer Defaults which are designated as material.

The list of Developer Defaults contained in a Concession Agreement often ranges from a generic failure of the Developer to perform its material obligations under the Concession Agreement to more specific events, such as the bankruptcy of the Developer or violation of a State’s anticorruption laws in connection with the award of the Concession Agreement. The precise set of Developer Defaults varies from Project to Project, but the goal is to clearly establish the Department’s threshold for taking action relating to various acts or omissions of the Developer without creating a risk of a “hair trigger” that could discourage investors or Lenders from investing in the Project. Because the consequences of a termination for Developer Default are so severe, including the loss of potentially substantial amounts of money invested by both Equity Members and the Lenders, the list of Developer Defaults may be the subject of significant negotiation.
An example definition of Developer Default is set forth below.

**Developer Default** means the occurrence of any one or more of the following events or conditions:

(a) the [Developer] fails to comply with, perform or observe any material obligation, covenant, agreement, term or condition in this [Concession Agreement] or any other [Project Document], which failure materially adversely affects the [Department]’s rights or obligations hereunder;

(b) any representation or warranty made by the [Developer] under this [Concession Agreement] is false or misleading in any material respect on the date made;

(c) the [Developer] fails (i) to pay to the [Department] when due any undisputed sum payable to the [Department] pursuant to this [Concession Agreement], or (ii) to deposit funds to any reserve or account, in either case in the amount and within the time period required by this [Concession Agreement];

(d) the [Developer] fails to commence the [Construction Work] within [X] days of the issuance of the notice to proceed;

(e) the [Developer] fails to achieve [Substantial Completion] of all of the [Project] by the [Long Stop Date], as such date may be extended pursuant to this [Concession Agreement];

(f) this [Concession Agreement] or all or any portion of the [Developer’s Interest] is transferred, or there occurs a [Change in Ownership], in either case in contravention of this [Concession Agreement];

(g) a voluntary or involuntary insolvency event, including the commencement by any third party of liquidation, dissolution, reorganization or similar proceedings, arises with respect to (i) the [Developer], (ii) any investor in the [Developer], or (iii) the [Developer]’s [D&C Contractor] (but only during the [Construction Period]) or [O&M Contractor], in each case unless such [Subcontractor] is replaced by the [Developer] with a reputable counterparty reasonably acceptable to the [Department];

(h) the Developer abandons or otherwise ceases work on the [Project], or following a permitted suspension of the work ceases to resume the work, for more than [X] days, except as otherwise permitted under this [Concession Agreement];

(i) the [Developer] fails to comply with any permits or [Applicable Laws] in any material respect;

(j) the [Developer] fails to obtain, provide and maintain the insurance policies in accordance with the [Concession Agreement];

(k) the [Developer] fails to comply with any written suspension of work order issued by the [Department];

(l) the [D&C Contract] or the [O&M Contract] is terminated (other than non-default termination on its scheduled termination date) and the [Developer] has not entered into a replacement of such contract with a reputable counterparty reasonably acceptable to the [Department]; or

(m) the [Developer], any investor in the [Developer], any [Key Contractor] whose work is not completed, or any affiliate of [Developer] for whom transfer of ownership would be permitted without the [Department]’s consent, or any of their respective officers, directors, employees or agents, is suspended or debarred, following exhaustion of all rights of appeal, or there goes into effect an agreement for voluntary exclusion, from bidding, proposing or contracting with any Federal or State department or agency.
7.3.2 Cure Periods for Developer Default

Following the occurrence of a Developer Default and before the Department has the right to terminate the Concession Agreement, the Developer will generally have a period of time during which it may take corrective action to cure the Developer Default. If the Developer Default is corrected during the cure period, the Department will not be permitted to terminate the Concession Agreement (although the Developer may remain liable for Department losses attributable to the Developer Default).

The standard cure period for most Developer Defaults is often 30 days, running from the date on which the Department notifies the Developer in writing of the occurrence of the Developer Default. However, cure periods may vary depending on the nature of the Developer Default. For example, the cure period for a Developer Default consisting of the failure to pay money to the Department is often not more than 3–5 days because the only acceptable cure is actual payment, which under ordinary circumstances can be completed quickly. By comparison, the cure period for a Developer Default consisting of a general failure by the Developer to perform its material obligations may initially be 30 days, but if the circumstances giving rise to the Developer Default cannot be cured within the initial 30 days, but are nevertheless capable of being cured and the Developer is actually taking steps to do so, then the cure period may be extended up to a maximum of as long as 120 or, in some cases, 180 days.

Certain Developer Defaults indicating willful or otherwise affirmative acts suggestive of the Developer’s unreliability or unsuitability to continue the Project, such as a failure to comply with an order to suspend work issued by the Department, may not be capable of cure. For these Developer Defaults, the Concession Agreement will generally not include a cure period or may expressly state that no cure period is afforded to the Developer.

Although the exact cure periods are often the subject of negotiation and will vary from one Project to another, the Concession Agreement should strike a balance between giving the Developer a meaningful opportunity to correct a Developer Default, on the one hand, and on the other, not unduly delaying the right of the Department to terminate the Concession Agreement.

A Concession Agreement may be drafted in one of two ways with respect to the description of the cure periods. First, the cure periods may be included in the description of the Developer Default, in which case the Developer Default and its consequences do not arise until the expiration of the relevant cure period.

An example provision drafted in this style is set forth below.

The [Developer] fails to comply with, perform, or observe any material obligation, covenant, agreement, term or condition in this [Concession Agreement] and such failure continues without cure for a period of [X] days following the date the [Department] delivers written notice thereof to the [Developer], or for such longer period as may be reasonably necessary to cure such failure up to a maximum cure period of [X] days; provided, however, that in the latter case, (i) the [Developer] is proceeding with all due diligence to cure or cause to be cured such failure, (ii) such failure is capable of being cured within a reasonable period of time, and (iii) such failure is in fact cured within such period of time.

Second, the cure periods may be described in a separate provision of the Concession Agreement, such that the Developer Default arises immediately but the consequences are delayed until after the expiration of the relevant cure period.
An example provision drafted in this style is set forth below.

The [Department] shall provide written notice to the [Developer] of the occurrence of a [Developer Default]. Upon receipt of the [Department’s notice], the [Developer] shall have the following cure periods:

(a) for a [Developer Default] under Section [X] of this [Concession Agreement], a period of [X] days after the [Developer] receives written notice from the [Department] of such [Developer Default];

(b) for a [Developer Default] under Section [X] of this [Concession Agreement], a period of [45] days after the [Developer] receives written notice from the [Department] of such [Developer Default]; provided, however, that if such [Developer Default] cannot be cured within such time period, despite the [Developer]’s commencement of meaningful steps to cure immediately after receiving the default notice, the [Developer] shall have such additional period of time, up to a maximum cure period of [X] days, as is reasonably necessary to diligently effect cure; and

(c) for any other [Developer Default] not referred to in paragraphs (a) or (b), there is no cure period.

Either approach is generally accepted (although the latter style is more common in both the U.S. and international P3 market), but in cases where the cure periods are drafted into the description of the Developer Defaults, the Concession Agreement should not also contain a provision that grants the Developer an additional cure period following receipt of a notice of default, and vice versa.

7.3.3 Department’s Right to Terminate for Developer Default and Procedure

The Department is generally permitted to terminate the Concession Agreement following the occurrence of a Developer Default and the expiration of any cure period associated with it. However, the Department’s right to terminate the Concession Agreement is subject to the right of the Collateral Agent (acting on the instructions of designated senior Lenders, the composition of which may differ depending on the nature of the Project) to an additional cure period after the expiration of the Developer’s cure period, during which time they will be permitted to cure any Developer Default on behalf of the Developer. The right of the Collateral Agent to cure a Developer Default will generally be set forth in a stand-alone Direct Agreement among the Collateral Agent, the Developer and the Department (see Chapter 11 (Lender Rights and Direct Agreement) for further information on such agreements). If the Developer Default is cured before the Department exercises the right to terminate the Concession Agreement, then the termination right will cease.

If the Department chooses to terminate the Concession Agreement, it will be required to deliver written notice of its decision to the Developer. The Concession Agreement may terminate immediately upon the Department’s delivery of a termination notice to the Developer, or it may terminate automatically after the passage of a short period of time after delivery of the termination notice (generally not more than 60 days thereafter).

An example provision describing the Department’s right to terminate the Concession Agreement is set forth below.

(a) Upon the occurrence of a [Developer Default] that has not been cured within the relevant cure period, the [Department] may, subject to the rights of the [Collateral Agent] under the [Direct Agreement], terminate this [Concession Agreement] by issuing a written notice of termination to the [Developer] specifying the [Developer Default] giving rise to the right of the [Department] to terminate this [Concession Agreement].
This Concession Agreement will terminate immediately on the date specified in the termination notice referred to in paragraph (a) above, which must be a minimum of X days after the date of receipt of the notice by the [Developer].

If this Concession Agreement is terminated for Developer Default in accordance with paragraph (a) and (b) above, the [Department] shall pay the [Developer Default Termination Sum] to the [Developer] in accordance with [Section X] of this Concession Agreement.

If the Project involves multiple assets—particularly if such assets are widely dispersed geographically—the Department may prefer that the Developer remediate its practices and procedures that gave rise to the Developer Default instead of terminating the Concession Agreement. For example, the Department may prefer that the Developer prepare a Remedial Plan that identifies how to cure ongoing Developer Defaults with respect to certain assets and lessen the likelihood of them recurring with respect to the remainder. This approach may be preferred by the Department because there may be substantial costs and delays in replacing a Developer that is engaged in a Project that is not confined to one particular asset. Where the Department elects to require a Remedial Plan, it will typically do so without prejudice to other rights it has under the Concession Agreement.

An example provision describing the Department’s option to require the Developer to prepare a Remedial Plan following a Developer Default is set forth below.

(a) In the event that a [Developer Default] occurs and it has not been cured within the relevant time period set forth in [Section X] of the Concession Agreement, or no cure period is afforded, the [Department] may give notice to require the [Developer] to prepare a remedial plan within X days. If the [Department] elects to require such remedial plan, it shall not prejudice any other rights or remedies available to it under the Concession Agreement.

(b) The remedial plan described in sub-paragraph (a) shall set forth (i) a schedule and specific actions to be taken by the [Developer] to cure the relevant [Developer Default], and (ii) specific actions the [Developer] shall take to reduce the likelihood of such defaults occurring in the future, which may include (without limitation) improvements to the [Developer’s] quality management practices, plans and procedures, increased monitoring and inspections, changes to personnel or [Contractors], or other similar measures.

(c) Within X days of receipt of the [Developer’s] remedial plan prepared pursuant to sub-paragraph (a) and (b), the [Department] shall notify whether, in its sole discretion, the remedial plan is acceptable. If the [Department] finds the remedial plan acceptable, the [Developer] shall implement such remedial plan in accordance with its terms. If the [Department] finds the remedial plan not acceptable, the [Department] may terminate the Concession Agreement in accordance with the terms of [Section X].

7.3.4 Compensation on Termination for Developer Default

Following a termination of the Concession Agreement for a Developer Default, the Department will still generally be required to pay compensation to the Developer. Departments may find this unusual given that the termination will likely be caused by the act or omission of the Developer, whereas in many service contracts entered into by Departments, it is often the case that the contractor, not the Department, makes a payment on termination. In the context of a greenfield project, however, compensation is paid because upon termination the Department will receive an asset of potentially considerable value that it did not have before the Concession Agreement was entered into, and if compensation is not paid, then the Department will be
unjustly enriched as a result. This principle is often considered alongside the need to impose a financial consequence on Developers (and their Lenders) to discourage them from walking away when the possibility of termination arises, while not imposing such drastic consequences that the risks are too high to justify investment in the Project. The amount of termination compensation payable will generally be adjusted to reflect other pools of cash available to the parties, such as Account Balances held by the Developer and Insurance Proceeds received by the Developer (or that would have been received had the Developer procured or compiled with the required insurance policies).

The amount of termination compensation payable following a Developer Default will depend on whether the construction of the Project is completed at the time of termination. If the construction of the Project is not complete, then the termination compensation will generally be calculated by reference to the value of the Work performed to date (taking into account the anticipated cost to the Department of completing the remaining Work) or the amount owed to the Developer’s Lenders. This calculation provides the Developer’s Lenders with some comfort that they will receive compensation in the event of a termination, but also provides the Department with the opportunity to ensure that it does not pay any more than is necessary to receive the Project it originally contracted for. Departments should confer with their legal advisors regarding applicable State law, however there is a low risk of claims against the Department for unjust enrichment in the event that the debt-based calculation is the lower of the two measures (i.e. where the value of the work completed is greater than the compensation to be paid), because it is the equity investors who will suffer a loss in that situation and their “at risk” position is accepted in the market.

An example provision describing the calculation of termination compensation payable prior to completion of the Project is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On termination of the [Concession Agreement] following a [Developer Default] prior to the [Substantial Completion Date], the [Department] shall pay to the [Developer] an amount equal to the lower of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If the construction of the Project is complete, then the termination compensation will generally be calculated by reference to the amount owed to the Developer’s Lenders. During this period, the Department will generally be concerned about the cost to correct any outstanding maintenance issues rather than the Cost to Complete the Project. In addition, the Department will generally look to impose some financial consequences on the Developer’s Lenders and its Equity Members, because they have chosen not to cure the outstanding Developer Default that leads to termination.

An example provision describing the calculation of termination compensation payable after completion of the Project is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calculation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>[Project Debt] ([X%]) of Project Debt]; minus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>[Insurance Proceeds]; minus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>[Account Balances]; minus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>all [Losses] that the [Department] determines it is reasonably likely to incur as a direct result of the termination of this [Concession Agreement], including the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>those costs (internal and external) that the [Department] is reasonably likely to incur as a direct result of carrying out any process to request tenders from any parties interested in entering into a contract with the [Department] to carry out [Maintenance Work], including all costs related to the preparation of tender documentation, evaluation of tenders and negotiation and execution of relevant contracts; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>those costs reasonably projected to be incurred by the [Department] in relation to: (A) remediation or, if remediation is not possible or would cost more than renewal, renewal of any defective [Work]; (B) rectification or cure of any breach of this [Concession Agreement] by the [Developer]; and (C) carrying out of all other matters necessary in order to ensure that within a reasonable period after the [Early Termination Date], the [Project] complies with the requirements of the [Project Documents] and has a reasonable prospect of continuing to perform to the same standard and cost that it would have continued to perform at had this [Concession Agreement] not been terminated and the [Project] been in compliance with all of the requirements of the [Project Documents]; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>any amount of unfunded equity that has been committed to the [Developer] and is shown to be available for use in the [Base Case Financial Model] prior to the [Substantial Completion Date], but only to the extent that the commitment to provide such amount is supported by an irrevocable on-demand letter of credit issued by or for the account of an [Equity Members] naming the [Developer] and/or the [Collateral Agent] as beneficiary and guaranteeing the provision of the committed amount by a date that is not later than the [Substantial Completion Date]; plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>the balance standing to the credit of the [Handback Reserve Account] on the [Early Termination Date].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 7.4 Termination for Extended Force Majeure Events or Uninsurable Risks

### 7.4.1 Rights of Either Party in the Event of Extended Force Majeure Events and Procedure

As described in Chapter 4 (Supervening Events), the Concession Agreement generally defines the Force Majeure Events that can lead to termination and provides for the rights of the parties if one occurs. If a Force Majeure Event occurs and the parties cannot agree on a solution within a specified period of time, either party is generally entitled to terminate the Concession Agreement with compensation payable to the Developer as summarized in Section 7.4.2 below. However, it should be noted that in the event that the Developer elects to terminate the Concession Agreement due to the continuance of an extended Force Majeure Event, the Concession Agreement will often give the Department the right to prevent termination by allowing the Department to pay the Developer compensation as if the Project was continuing to perform at the same level as it was prior to the occurrence of the relevant Force Majeure Event. As discussed in Section 7.3.4 above, the Department may also expand this termination right to include any Compensation Event or Delay Event for which a solution is not agreed within a specified period of time, rather than just Force Majeure Events. For the sake of clarity, the following discussion refers only to Force Majeure Events, but would apply, subject to the considerations discussed in Section 7.3.4, to the extent the termination right is extended to these additional events.

### 7.4.2 Compensation on Termination for Extended Force Majeure Events

To the extent that the Concession Agreement is terminated due to the continuance of an extended Force Majeure Event, the Department will generally pay compensation to the Developer on the basis that the financial consequences of the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement should to some extent be shared. The justification for this approach is that the Early Termination is not the fault of either party.

In determining the extent to which the financial consequences of the Early Termination should be shared between the parties, a common approach is generally taken across all jurisdictions, which can be summarized as follows:

- Lenders do not take on the risk of Force Majeure Events and, accordingly, are compensated for all amounts owed to them by the Developer as a direct result of the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement;
- The Developer will generally be compensated for any Subcontractor Breakage Costs (see Section 0); and
- The Equity Members will generally be compensated an amount equal to the amount of any unrecovered equity invested in the Developer (i.e., capital contributions and Shareholder Loans).

In other words, the extent of the sharing of the financial consequences of Early Termination relates to the Developer indirectly foregoing all equity return that it has previously received prior to the Early Termination, together with any future equity return that it would have received had the Concession Agreement continued through to the last day of its Term.

Although the Department may be required to fund a material amount of compensation in the event of an Early Termination of the Concession Agreement due to an extended Force Majeure Event, it should be noted that the Early Termination may result in the Project effectively being acquired from the Developer by the Department at an undervalue. Additionally, the scope of the definition of Force Majeure Event is generally drafted very narrowly and with reference to extreme events, thereby reducing the likelihood of the Concession Agreement being terminated early due to the extended continuance of a Force Majeure Event.
An example provision calculating the Termination Sum due in the event of an extended Force Majeure Event is set forth below.

If the [Concession Agreement] is terminated following an extended [Force Majeure Event], the [Department] will pay to the [Developer] the [Extended Force Majeure Termination Sum].

Extended Force Majeure Termination Sum means the aggregate of (i) the [Project Debt], [(ii) all amounts at par paid by the [Equity Members] in the form of capital contributions or [Shareholder Loans] up until the termination date, less any amounts actually received by the [Equity Members] from the [Developer] as distributions or payment of principal and interest for such [Shareholder Loans], and (iii) all [Subcontractor Breakage Costs]; (iv) less [Account Balances]; and (v) less [Insurance Proceeds].

7.4.3 Compensation on Termination for Uninsurable Risks

In the event that the Department elects to terminate the Concession Agreement following a determination that a risk has become an Uninsurable Risk (as described in further detail in Section 10.2), the Department will be required to pay to the Developer a Termination Sum that is typically equal to the Extended Force Majeure Termination Sum.

7.4.4 Termination for Convenience and Procedure

The intention of the parties to any Concession Agreement should be that it will run its full course. Concession Agreements are, however, long-term agreements and circumstances may arise where the Department is no longer willing or able to continue the relationship it has with the Developer under the Concession Agreement. For example, the Department may wish to grant a concession with respect to the facilities that are the subject of the Concession Agreement as part of a broader concession arrangement, perhaps as a result of a policy decision on the part of the Department to place operations and maintenance of all Projects in a region (including those that are the subject of the Concession Agreement) under common management. Additionally, notwithstanding the ability of many Departments (particularly those that are beneficiaries of P3-enabling legislation in their relevant jurisdiction) to enter into long-term Concession Agreements, most jurisdictions require (as a matter of public and administrative law) that the relevant government’s ability to exercise its statutory powers should not be fettered by the terms of contracts that it enters into. Accordingly, it is generally considered a matter of best practice and common for Concession Agreements to include provisions that allow the Department to terminate the Concession Agreement at its convenience, whereupon compensation generally becomes payable by the Department to the Developer (see Section 7.2.3 above).

An example provision permitting the Department to terminate the Concession Agreement for convenience is set forth below.

(a) The [Department] may terminate this [Concession Agreement] at any time by issuing a termination notice to the [Developer] stating that:

(i) the [Department] is exercising its right to terminate this [Concession Agreement] in accordance with its terms; and

(ii) this [Concession Agreement] will terminate on the date specified in such termination notice, such date to be a minimum of [X] days after the date of receipt of the notice by the [Developer].

(b) This [Concession Agreement] will terminate on the date specified in the termination notice referred to in (a) above.
7.4.5 Compensation on Termination for Convenience

The Termination for Convenience Termination Sum is generally an amount equal to the Department Termination Sum (see Section 7.2.3 above). Choosing different approaches to how Early Termination compensation should be calculated for these two types of termination scenario could lead to the Department being incentivized to default in certain circumstances or, in the anticipation of a forthcoming Department Default, terminate the Concession Agreement for convenience, which is why it is common that the methods used for both Termination for Convenience and Termination for Department Default are the same.

7.5 Other Issues Related to Calculation of Compensation for Early Termination

7.5.1 Increased Termination Liabilities Arising from Changes to Financing Documents

To the extent that the amount of compensation payable by the Department to the Developer on an Early Termination is calculated in whole or in part by reference to the level of Project Debt that the Developer has outstanding at the time of the termination payment, the Department may seek to ensure that the level of Project Debt outstanding at any time is not inflated in a way that will significantly and unexpectedly increase the Department’s liabilities on termination beyond the levels anticipated at the time the Concession Agreement was entered into. Examples of how such circumstances could arise include the borrowing of additional debt by the Developer during the Term or a rescheduling of the Developer’s debt during the Term.

The approaches taken to this issue in Concession Agreements in the United States are relatively binary. Either any additional liabilities that arise as a result of the Developer refinancing or rescheduling its debt during the Term are automatically taken into account when calculating compensation on Early Termination or they are not. A specific provision is generally only included in the Concession Agreement with respect to this issue to the extent that the Department wishes to exclude additional liabilities from the compensation calculation to which it has not consented.

An example provision addressing such concern is set forth below.

No amendment, waiver or exercise of a right under any [Financing Document] shall have the effect of increasing the amount of the [Department]’s liabilities on Early Termination of this [Concession Agreement], unless the [Developer] has obtained the prior written consent of the [Department] to such increased liability for the purposes of this provision.

Another approach is to specifically exclude such additional amounts from the definition of Project Debt in the Concession Agreement.

To the extent that the Developer takes the risk of a future refinancing in the context of its financial plan for the Project, the Developer is likely to require some level of comfort in the Concession Agreement that any such future refinancing will be covered by the compensation on termination provisions in the Concession Agreement.
7.5.2 Rights of Set-off on Early Termination

The Department is generally entitled to exercise a right of set-off in respect of any outstanding liabilities of the Developer against the amounts it pays in compensation on an Early Termination of the Concession Agreement.

Notwithstanding the above principle, the Lenders (particularly non-governmental affiliated Lenders) will generally want to ensure that the Department’s ability to set-off such liabilities cannot result in the amount of compensation payable on Early Termination being less than the amount of the Project Debt. This principle is often reflected in Concession Agreements, except in the case of a termination for Developer Default, where the Lenders have the opportunity to avoid the termination by exercising their rights to cure the Developer Default.

An example provision allowing the Department to exercise such right of set-off is set forth below.

```
The [Department] is not entitled to set-off any amount against the [Department Termination Sum], the [Termination for Convenience Termination Sum], or the [Extended Force Majeure Termination Sum] if the effect of exercising such right of set-off would be to reduce the amount payable to the [Developer] to an amount that is less than the amount of the [Project Debt].
```

7.5.3 Timing of Payment

In the event of an Early Termination of the Concession Agreement, the Developer (and its Lenders) will want to ensure that the Department is required to pay the Termination Sum to the Developer within a reasonable period of time after the amount is calculated.

There is some significant divergence among Concession Agreements with respect to the length of time that the Department is afforded to make payment of the Termination Sum. In particular, this issue is frequently of concern to any Department that believes that an appropriation would need to be made at the relevant State level to fund the relevant payment. Experience has shown that, within reason, Developers and Lenders are willing to agree to the Department having a material period of time to pay the Termination Sum, particularly where an appropriation is required. However, the acceptability of this issue to Developers and Lenders is generally a function of the extent to which (in terms of both time period and interest rate) the Department is willing to pay interest on the Termination Sum between the date that the amount is finally calculated and the date that it is paid to the Developer.

7.5.4 Treatment of Assets on Early Termination

On the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement, any proprietary interest that the Developer may have in the Project (e.g., a leasehold interest) will automatically terminate (on the basis that the Developer’s right to operate the relevant Project has come to an end) as the Department will need to be immediately able to continue to operate the Project and provide continuity of service to the users of the Project. However, the reversion of the Project to the Department may not be sufficient to allow its continued and efficient operation by the Department. By way of example, if the Developer is collecting tolls from users of a Project on behalf of the Department, the Department may not be able to effectively operate the Project without the right to access intellectual property associated with toll collection equipment.

To address the above concerns, the Concession Agreement will generally include a provision that requires the Developer to transfer to the Department (as a condition precedent to the payment of the Early Termination compensation by the Department) certain Key Assets to the Department, such assets intended to be those that the Department needs access to provide continued and seamless operation of the facilities to its users.
An example provision providing for a transfer of assets is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As a condition precedent to the payment of any [Termination Sum], the [Department] may require [Developer] to transfer its rights, title and interest in and to the [Key Assets] to the [Department].</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Assets</strong> means all assets and rights to enable the [Department] or a successor contractor to own, operate and maintain the [Project] in accordance with this [Concession Agreement], including the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) any land or buildings;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) any equipment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) any books, records, drawings, surveys, designs and other design documentation (including operating and maintenance manuals, health and safety manuals and other know how);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) any borings, samples, spare parts, tools and other assets (together with any warranties in respect of assets being transferred);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) any policies of insurance including rights to outstanding claims;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) any contractual rights, including rights under the [D&amp;C Contract] or [O&amp;M Contract] or any other design-build agreement or operations and maintenance agreement then in effect; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) any intellectual property.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7.5.5 Compensation on Termination as an Exclusive Remedy

During the negotiation of the Concession Agreement, significant time is generally spent by both parties assessing the adequacy of the compensation provisions related to Early Termination of the Concession Agreement. Accordingly, both parties generally expect that on an Early Termination, their respective liabilities to each other in connection with the Early Termination will be limited to the following:

- In the case of the Department, the Termination Sum payable to the Developer; and
- In the case of the Developer, the extent of any deductions that are made in the calculation of the Termination Sum.

Accordingly, it is common for both parties to agree that Early Termination compensation payments represent their exclusive and only remedy against each other with respect to the recovery of Losses incurred as a result of the Early Termination. As a consequence of this, the Developer and its Lenders (particularly non-governmental affiliated Lenders) will conduct significant due diligence over the scope of the compensation on Early Termination provisions, so as to ensure that they adequately compensate the Developer for the costs and Losses that it incurs in the context of the relevant termination scenario.

The exclusivity of this remedy for recovery of Losses that arise in the context of termination should not be confused with each party’s ongoing right to pursue the other party for Losses associated with breaches of the Concession Agreement that arose prior to the Early Termination Date. Such rights of claim would generally fall outside of any exclusive remedy arrangements relating to compensation on Early Termination of the Concession Agreement.
An example exclusive remedy provision is set forth below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clause</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any [Termination Sum] irrevocably paid by the [Department] to the [Developer] shall be in full and final settlement of each party’s rights and claims against the other for breaches and/or termination of this [Concession Agreement] whether under contract, tort, restitution or otherwise, but without prejudice to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) any antecedent liability of either party to the other that arose prior to the [Early Termination Date] (but not from the termination itself) to the extent such liability has not already been taken into account in the calculation of the [Termination Sum]; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) any liabilities arising in respect of any breach by either party after the [Early Termination Date] of any obligation under this [Concession Agreement] that survives the [Early Termination Date], to the extent not taken into account in the calculation of any [Termination Sum].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8 Handback

8.1 Introduction
The Term of a toll road concession generally ranges from 30 to 50 years, although Projects have run as long as 99 years, and the Term will ultimately depend on the nature of the Project, the authorizing legislation and the needs (and relative bargaining power) of the parties. On termination or expiration of the Term, the Project will generally pass back to the Department. Because the Department will be responsible for operating and maintaining the Project after the end of the Term, it will have a strong interest in ensuring that all of the Project assets it receives are not in a condition that will require immediate and costly life-cycle maintenance. The Developer, by comparison, will naturally seek to minimize its costs and may be unlikely to voluntarily make long-term investments in the Project during the final years of the Term (as it will not receive much of the benefit of those investments). Although the ongoing performance specifications contained in the Concession Agreement would require the Developer to comply with such items as ride quality and cracking of the roadway, there is nevertheless a risk that the Developer could defer necessary renewals and instead choose to incur additional routine maintenance costs, together with the possibility of incurring noncompliance deductions for failure to meet performance requirements. For this reason, special provision should be made in the Concession Agreement to ensure that the Developer does not hand back a Project to the Department requiring extensive major maintenance.

The Concession Agreement should therefore include provisions for dealing with what will happen to the Project (and particular assets) at the end of the Term, including the rights and obligations of the Department and the Developer with respect to the long-term condition of the Project on Handback, including any Required Residual Life of the Project assets. These provisions are important to avoid disputes at the end of the Term and also to further incentivize the Developer to make life-cycle investments in the Project at the appropriate time. The extent of the obligations the Department places on the Developer with respect to the Handback condition of the Project may be reflected in the pricing of the Developer’s bid for the Project and may have an impact on the design, construction, or maintenance strategies considered during the procurement process.

8.2 Handback Requirements

8.2.1 Defining Handback Requirements
Generally, the Developer will be required to transfer the Project back to the Department in accordance with prescribed Handback Requirements. From the Department’s perspective, Handback Requirements are particularly important as they play an important role in incentivizing the Developer to renew and replace Elements of the Project at the optimum time (from a life-cycle perspective), rather than perform the minimum maintenance required and, as described above, possibly accept some payment deductions for breach of its performance requirements. The Developer will seek to economize its long-term life-cycle costs in light of the performance specifications required under the Concession Agreement, so a well-defined set of Handback Requirements will likely impact the Developer’s approach to operations and maintenance at all stages of the Project life-cycle. In particular, the Department should give careful consideration to complex assets, such as bridges, tunnels and other major structures, because properly crafted Handback Requirements can encourage the Developer to invest in these assets early and avoid the need for the Department to undertake expensive replacement efforts after the end of the Project.

Handback Requirements are generally contained in a schedule to the Concession Agreement within the technical specifications for the Project and should include the Developer’s obligations, including valuation
methodologies and inspection requirements, in relation to maintenance and condition of each Element of the Project during what is known as the Handback Period, generally commencing five years prior to the end of the Term.

The Handback Requirements should draw a distinction between long-life Elements and those Elements that naturally wear out during the Term. Although not every Element of the Project needs to be in “as-new” condition at the time of Handback, the Developer will generally be required to demonstrate a specified Residual Life for each major long-life Element, such as structural foundations, and if these Elements are not performing as expected, the Developer must repair them before the end of the Term. For Elements that generally wear out more quickly (and will likely have been replaced at least once during the Term) such as road signs, the Developer is generally not required to renew each such Element immediately before Handback (provided the Element remains serviceable) but instead may be asked to pay an amount to the Department that will depend upon the condition, Useful Life, and age of each such Element. For these short-life Elements, a formula-based approach to determining the amount payable to the Department will generally be adopted. In addition, the operation and maintenance requirements in the Concession Agreement may require that short-life and medium-life Elements have a minimum Useful Life at the time of replacement or renewal to prevent the Developer from taking a sub-par approach to renewals during the final years of the Term.

8.2.2 Residual Life

The primary component of the Handback Requirements will generally stipulate the condition each Element of the Project must be in at the end of the Term. The condition of the Project and each of its Elements is generally evaluated during the Handback Period before the end of the Term to determine the expected Residual Life of the asset at the end of the Term.

The Handback Requirements will generally prescribe the following matters:

- How to calculate the Residual Life of each Element of the Project at each year during the Handback Period and at the end of the Term. This calculation will generally include an agreement to put in place a Residual Life Methodology toward the end of the Term, generally commensurate with the length of the Handback Period, containing the criteria to be adopted for the calculation of the Residual Life of each Element. The Residual Life Methodology should be described in general terms and should not place undue reliance on current technologies for the testing of Elements. A specific Residual Life Methodology is not generally put in place at the beginning of the Term because the methods and techniques for establishing Residual Life will have progressed by the time the Handback Inspections are performed.

- The Residual Life Requirements for each Element of the Project.

- How to calculate the cost of completing repairs and renewals on each Element to ensure that it will meet the Residual Life Requirements; and

- How to calculate the Handback amount payable to the Department at the end of the Term in respect of any relevant short-life Elements.

The following complexities may arise when setting the Residual Life Requirements of an Element and determining the corresponding Renewal Work required to achieve the Handback Requirements:

- Certain assets are difficult to handle at Handback if their Useful Life is approximately the same as the Term. This may apply, for example, to bridge decks constructed with conventional reinforcing steel and subject to a regular deicing program, for which a Useful Life of around 50 years (which may coincide with the length of the Term) appears to be in line with expectation. Specialist advice will often be needed on how best to treat these Elements. It is generally not good practice to specify in the Concession Agreement
that Renewal Work such as major bridge deck renewals are to be performed just before Handback because
(a) the renewal may not in fact be needed at that time and (b) the Developer’s incentive to perform the
Renewal Work to the appropriate level of quality at that time will be diminished; and

- Where a Concession Agreement includes significant parts of existing assets within the Developer’s
operation and maintenance obligations, such as an “online” widening of an existing roadway where the
expectation is that the existing road pavement foundation or existing bridges are to be retained, this adds
complexity to the Handback Requirements. For example, it may not be practical or economical to specify
a Residual Life Requirement that exceeds the Residual Life of the existing road pavement. Often in these
situations, the Handback Requirements are based on a detailed assessment of the condition of the existing
road pavement and the Handback Requirements may be less stringent than those applicable to a “new
build” Project.

8.2.3 Additional Handback Requirements

In addition to specific provisions regarding the Residual Life of each Element and a Handback amount for
short-life Elements, the Handback Requirements will generally require the Developer to prepare a Handback
plan that will be used to determine the condition and performance of the Project and identify the testing,
evaluation, and calculation methods that are to be used to demonstrate to the Department that all equipment
and systems function as intended and meet all applicable code and standards of the technical specifications.

The Developer may also be required to prepare and deliver to the Department, as a condition to the
achievement of Substantial Completion, a Life-Cycle Maintenance Plan that outlines the estimated life of the
Project, major maintenance to be undertaken by the Developer, pavement deterioration assessments, and how
the Developer will meet its performance and Handback Requirements during the Term. This plan will be
updated annually to take into account developments in each of these areas and reflect updated technologies
for, among other things, measuring Residual Life (including potentially the adoption of technologies that are
not well-developed at the beginning of the Term). For example, where a Residual Life of 50 years may be
specified for concrete and steel Elements, current technologies may not be able to predict the incipient onset
of major deterioration and corrosion beyond 10 years. Such a case reinforces the need for the Department to
require the Developer to produce a Life-Cycle Maintenance Plan for all Elements and to monitor and report
their condition and performance in service throughout the Term.

During the Handback Period, the Developer generally will be required to prepare enhanced annual updates
to the Life-Cycle Maintenance Plan that, in addition to the matters described above, will also include the
Developer’s calculation of Residual Life for each Element (using the Residual Life Methodology and taking
into account the results of inspections during the Handback Period).

The Handback Requirements will also generally outline the Handback Inspections requirements (see Section
8.3 below).

An example Handback requirements provision is set forth below.

(a) Upon the end of the [Term], the [Developer] will hand back the [Project] to the [Department], at no charge
to the [Department], in the condition and meeting all of the [Handback Requirements].

(b) The [Developer] will diligently perform and complete all [Renewal Work] required to be performed and
completed prior to transfer of the [Project] to the [Department], based on the required adjustments and
changes to the [Life-Cycle Maintenance Plan] resulting from the inspections and analysis under the
[Handback Requirements].
8.3 **Handback Inspections**

During the Handback Period, the Developer will generally be required to perform Handback Inspections to determine the condition and Residual Life of each Element of the Project. These inspections may be required to take place annually or in other increments during the Handback Period, and should also take place at the expiration of the Term. The results of such inspections should be used by the Developer and the Department to determine (a) the Residual Life of the long-life Elements, (b) the condition, Useful Life and age of the short-life Elements and (c) the dollar amount of funds to be maintained in the Handback Reserve Account covering the cost of completing maintenance, repairs, and remediation of long-life Elements, as well as any cash payments for the short-life Elements, to ensure that the Project is transferred back to the Department at the end of the Term with the specified Residual Life Requirements.

The requirements of conducting Handback Inspections are generally detailed in the Handback Requirements in the technical specifications schedule of the Concession Agreement. The level of detail is varied, with some projects incorporating a detailed outline of the inspection requirements of each Element of the Project and others including a more general requirement for inspections to be conducted with appropriate coverage such that the results are representative of the Project. Generally, the inspections will be conducted by an independent testing agency, and the Department will have the right to be present during the inspections.

An example Handback Inspections provision is set forth below.

```
Beginning five years prior to the projected expiration of the [Term] and every year thereafter, the [Developer] will conduct annual inspections of the [Project] and provide reports of such inspections to the [Department] pursuant to the [Handback Requirements].
```

8.4 **Handback Reserve Accounts and Letters of Credit**

8.4.1 **Handback Reserve Account**

The Concession Agreement will generally include a provision requiring the Developer to establish and fund a Handback Reserve Account at the beginning of the Handback Period. This reserve account is generally required by the Department as security for the obligation of the Developer to transfer the Project back to the Department in the agreed condition, with each Element meeting the relevant Residual Life Requirement.

The Handback Reserve Account should remain funded with the Handback Reserve Amount which generally equals the amount necessary to ensure the Project meets the Handback Requirements at the end of the Term, although it may also include a contingency buffer of 10 percent of such amount. The Concession Agreement will generally either allow the parties or an independent consultant to determine the estimated Handback Reserve Amount or will require an independent consultant to determine the amount that it reasonably determines is equal to an amount sufficient to cover all costs necessary to cause the Project to meet the Handback Requirements. In each case, this amount is based on the then-current Residual Life of the Project, the Residual Life Requirements of each Element of the Project, the Handback Inspections, and other technical parameters outlined in the Handback Requirements. The Handback Reserve Amount will generally be calculated yearly, and the funds in the Handback Reserve Account would be adjusted accordingly if necessary.

The Developer may have an incentive to underestimate the likely cost of Renewal Work when calculating amounts to be transferred to the Handback Reserve Account. By comparison, the Department may have an incentive to increase the calculation of the Handback Reserve Amount. If Renewal Work is to be performed by the Department after Handback using the proceeds of the Handback Reserve Account, the Department’s costs may be higher because of procurement costs and the risk that the Developer may not have adequately
priced the Handback Reserve Account. To the extent possible, the pricing of the required Renewal Work should take into consideration what the Department’s future commitments may be if required to perform the Renewal Work rather than simply what the Developer estimates.

The Handback Reserve Account will generally be in the name of and controlled by a third-party Escrow Agent or otherwise held by the Developer for the sole benefit of the Department, which allows the Department to control the withdrawals the Developer makes from the account. While the Concession Agreement will generally set out the conditions for the account, an account control (or similar) agreement may also be entered into by the parties shortly following establishment of the account.

The Developer will generally only be able to make withdrawals from the Handback Reserve Account to fund the cost of Renewal Work to ensure the Residual Life of the Project at the end of the Term is equal to the Residual Life Requirements, though in some cases the Department may permit withdrawals to fund work necessary to meet the Developer’s safety compliance obligations. The Department can get comfortable with these types of withdrawals as generally the amount of the withdrawal to pay for repairs or renewal costs would equally reduce the amount the Department would need to cover the costs of such Renewal Work in the event the Developer transfers the Project to the Department in less than the agreed-upon condition. However, even for such withdrawals, the Developer would generally still have to give notice to the Department, along with information surrounding the amount of the withdrawal and associated works, and the Department would have to provide consent prior to the withdrawal being made.

If the Handback Inspection conducted by the Department prior to the end of the Term determines that any Element of the Project does not meet the Handback Requirements or that the Residual Life of one or more long-life Elements does not equal or exceed the Residual Life Requirements, then the Concession Agreement should permit the Department to use the funds in the Handback Reserve Account to pay for the necessary Renewal Work to the extent necessary to meet the Handback Requirements. In addition, the Department will generally retain from the Handback Reserve Account an amount based on a formula for short-life Elements, if applicable. Any residual amounts left in the account following the payment of such costs will generally be paid to the Developer. If the Developer meets all of the Handback Requirements at the end of the Term and no further repairs or Renewal Work are required in respect of the Project, the amounts in the Handback Reserve Account will be paid to the Developer.

8.4.2 Letters of Credit

The Concession Agreement will generally allow the Developer to substitute some or all the Handback Reserve Amount with a letter of credit issued in favor of the Department. This substitution may be preferred by a Developer that wants to free up cash flow during the Handback Period, as the Handback Reserve Amount may be significant and would be locked up in the Handback Reserve Account for five or more years. It is important to note that, unless dis-applied by the P3 statute of the State applicable to the Project, State law may impose additional requirements concerning the use and content of letters of credit with which the Developer will be required to comply.

An example Handback Reserve Account provision, including provisions for substitution of letters of credit, is set forth below. The following example contemplates the use of an independent consultant to determine the appropriate amount, although as noted above the Department and the Developer may agree on the amount without a third party’s input.

(a) No later than the first day of the year that is seven years prior to the expiration of the [Term], and no later than the first day of each subsequent year, the [Department] and the [Developer] will cause an independent consultant to set forth an amount that it reasonably determines is equal to an amount sufficient to cover all
costs necessary to cause the [Elements] to meet the [Handback Requirements] at the end of the [Term]. The amount determined in the preceding sentence is the **Handback Reserve Amount**.

(b) Five years prior to the expiration of the [Term], the [Developer] shall establish the [Handback Reserve Account] for the sole and exclusive benefit of the [Department] to be held and controlled by a third party (the **Escrow Agent**) to be agreed between the parties.

(c) Concurrently with the establishment of the [Handback Reserve Account], the [Developer] will deposit therein cash, a [Handback Performance Security] or a combination of the two in an aggregate amount equal to at least 100% of all costs necessary to cause the [Elements] to meet the [Handback Requirements] at the end of the [Term] as reasonably determined by the independent consultant pursuant to paragraph (a) above. Within [X] days of the date of each annual determination of the [Handback Reserve Amount], the [Developer] will cause the amount on deposit in the [Handback Reserve Account] to be equal to at least 100% of the [Handback Reserve Amount] so determined. If the sum of the amount available under the [Handback Performance Security] and the amount of cash on deposit in the [Handback Reserve Account] exceeds 100% of the new [Handback Reserve Amount], the [Developer] will be permitted (A) to cause the stated amount of the [Handback Performance Security] to be reduced by an amount equal to such excess, or (B) to direct that the excess cash then on deposit in the [Handback Reserve Account] be transferred to the [Developer].

(d) At its sole cost, the [Developer] will be permitted to deposit a [Performance Security] (the **Handback Performance Security**) to the credit of the [Handback Reserve Account], which will have a scheduled expiration date no earlier than the first anniversary of the scheduled end of the [Term] (or, if it expires earlier than such date, permits a drawing of the full amount of the [Handback Performance Security] if the [Handback Performance Security] is not renewed or extended at least [X] days prior to its stated expiration date). The [Handback Performance Security] will be considered a part of the [Handback Reserve Account] and the amount available thereunder will be included in any calculations of the amount required to be on deposit in the [Handback Reserve Account]. The [Handback Performance Security] will provide that, if its [Term] is scheduled to expire prior to the termination of the [Handback Reserve Account], then the [Department] may draw thereon in an amount equal to the full amount available to be drawn thereunder. The [Department] will deposit the proceeds of any drawing on the [Handback Performance Security] into the [Handback Reserve Account].

(e) The [Developer] shall be entitled to withdraw funds from the [Handback Reserve Account] in such amounts and at such times as needed only to pay for the improvement, repair, renewal or replacement of any [Element] to ensure each [Element] has the [Required Residual Life], and otherwise meets the [Handback Requirements], at the end of the [Term].

(f) Prior to drawing funds from the [Handback Reserve Account], the [Developer] shall give written notice to the [Department] of the amount to be drawn and the purpose for which funds will be used, together with such other supporting information as the [Department] may reasonably require. Within [X] days from the date of the receipt of such notice, the [Department] shall either approve or withhold its approval to [Developer]’s proposed withdrawal. The [Department] may only withhold its approval to any proposed withdrawal from the [Handback Reserve Account] to the extent that:

(i) the [Developer] is unable to demonstrate to the reasonable satisfaction of the [Department] that the proposed withdrawal amount will be used to meet costs incurred by [Developer] in undertaking improvement, repair, renewal or replacement of any [Element] to ensure each [Element] has the...
8.5 Payments in Lieu of Meeting Handback Requirements

Some Projects may include a specific provision in the Concession Agreement allowing the Developer to make a payment to the Department in an amount equal to the cost of performing any necessary repairs or renewals in lieu of meeting the Handback Requirements for some or all of the Elements of the Project. This payment may be in addition to general Handback amounts payable to the Department in respect of short-life Elements.

This provision may be particularly relevant if the Equity Members at the end of the Term have changed from those at the beginning of the Term and these new Equity Members are mere investors rather than experienced contractors or operators of roads and highways (see also Chapter 5 (Changes in Equity Interests)). In such cases, it would be preferable for the investor to arrange for a payment to be made to the Department rather than to perform the Renewal Work needed to restore the Project to the condition that the Handback Requirements dictate. A payment in lieu of performance may also be desirable if the Department anticipates that near or just after the end of the Term the Project will need to undergo major maintenance, such as a road widening project or similar capital expenditure. However, the Department’s exercise of such a right would need to be accompanied by modified Handback Requirements in relation to the Work that will not be performed.

An example in-lieu payments provision is set forth below.

(a) The [Developer] shall have the option to pay an amount equal to the cost of the [Renewal Work] that will be necessary for the [Department] to perform after the end of the [Term] to ensure that the [Residual Life] at the end of the [Term] of the [Element] equals or exceeds the [Required Residual Life] for the [Element] in lieu of the [Developer] itself performing such [Renewal Work] necessary to meet the [Handback Requirements].

(b) The [Developer] shall make the payment required under paragraph (a) by making a deposit into the [Handback Reserve Account] for transfer and release to the [Department] at the end of the [Term], free and clear of all liens, pledges, and encumbrances.
The Developer shall deliver written notice to the Department prior to the first day of the fifth full calendar year prior to the end of the Term setting forth its election to exercise its rights under paragraph (a) above for each applicable Element of the Project. Failure by the Developer to deliver such written notice to the Department by such deadline or failure of the Developer to include any Element in the written notice shall be deemed an election by the Developer to perform all Renewal Work necessary to ensure that the Residual Life at Handback of the Element meets or exceeds the Required Residual Life.
9 Construction Performance Security

9.1 Introduction

This Chapter considers the extent to which it is appropriate for the Department to require the Developer or its D&C Contractor to provide defined levels and/or types of construction performance security in connection with the Project. Common forms of construction performance security include surety bonds, on-demand letters of credit, retention requirements and parent company guarantees. The FHWA recognizes that participants in the P3 market have differing views regarding the relative benefits offered by different forms of construction performance security and the role that each may play in providing support to a Project. The FHWA encourages a robust dialogue with respect to these and other issues, and as a result, this Chapter does not analyze the extent to which there is a role in P3 projects for any particular form of construction performance security, nor the relative strengths and weaknesses of different forms of such security as may be commercially available in the United States. Departments should consult with their legal, financial and technical advisers to determine the type and amount of construction performance security that may be required by law or otherwise advisable for any particular Project. In addition, FHWA’s primary role is that of a provider of funding, not an administrator of highway construction programs. Accordingly, FHWA’s regulatory requirements for performance bonding (e.g., 23 CFR 635.110) do not specify when or how performance bonding must be used or the amount of such bonding when used, and as a matter of policy FHWA generally defers to the policies and practices employed by recipients of Federal aid, who are responsible for all aspects of highway planning, design, construction, maintenance and operations.

In the United States P3 market to date, the approach taken on construction performance security has varied significantly from State to State and from project to project. Some of the reasons for this are discussed in this Chapter. Some Concession Agreements have not required construction performance security to be provided by the D&C Contractor, whereas others have required performance and/or payment bonding in amounts up to as much as 100% of the construction price for the Project.

By way of contrast, in P3 markets outside of the United States, it is unusual for a procuring authority to prescribe minimum levels of construction performance security for a Project in the Concession Agreement. Some of the reasons for the approach taken in other markets are also discussed in this Chapter and may be applicable to Projects in the U.S.

9.2 The Role of Performance Security in Traditional Contracting

In Design-Bid-Build and Design-Build projects, Departments typically require the contractor to provide performance bonding and, in some circumstances, payment bonding. The typical bonding levels vary from State to State and from project to project, but can range between 10% and 100% of the contract price.

Departments are typically required to demand some level of performance and/or payment bonding as a matter of law (e.g., “Little Miller Acts”). The relevant law in some States may even prescribe the minimum level of performance and/or payment bonding required for each construction project the Department procures. This Chapter does not provide a comparative analysis of the relevant laws of each State on this issue.

In those States where there is no legal requirement for such bonding, the Department would nevertheless, as a matter of best practice, consider the extent to which it should require performance and/or payment bonding from the contractor in respect of the work the Department will pay the contractor to perform. To the extent that the Department requires bonding to be provided, in the absence of a legally prescribed amount, the level of bonding required is typically a function of the complexity of the construction project and the “maximum
probable loss” in the event of a contractor default. The basis upon which “maximum probable loss” analyses are typically undertaken is not discussed in this Chapter.

Some Departments also require that the payment and performance of the D&C Contractor’s obligations to the Department be guaranteed by the parent company, or parent companies, of the D&C Contractor. The principal function of such a guarantee is to provide a robust balance sheet with sufficient assets to stand behind the obligations of the D&C Contractor in circumstances where the legal entity signing the D&C Contract is a subsidiary of a larger corporate organization and depends on financial support from its affiliated organizations. A contract with such an entity is only as strong as the financial commitment from such affiliated organizations, and entering into a guarantee arrangement with a creditworthy affiliate (typically the parent of a corporate group) will contractually oblige the affiliated organizations to provide the D&C Contractor with further support in the event the D&C Contractor is unable to pay or perform its obligations.

9.3 The Approach Taken in Mature P3 Markets Outside of the United States

By comparison, as the international P3 market has matured, Projects have increasingly adopted construction performance security packages tailored to their specific requirements. The approach taken to each Project is a function of the cost and commercial availability of the relevant performance security instruments and the financial strength of the D&C Contractor that the Developer proposes to use, as well as the payment mechanisms utilized in the D&C Contract.

With respect to payment bonding, the international P3 market, consistent with the international construction market as a whole, has adopted a number of approaches to secure payment of amounts due to subcontractors and suppliers. For example, in Australia subcontractors typically do not look to payment bonds, but rather rely on either a fast-track dispute resolution process for payment disputes under the Building and Construction Industry Payments Act of 2004, or a right to seek payment directly from the Developer under the Subcontractor’s Charges Act of 1974. By comparison, French law tightly regulates the use of subcontractors and requires that they either be paid directly by the Developer or that the D&C Contractor provide a bank guarantee covering all sums due. Accordingly, the use of payment bonds from surety providers is not a universally adopted approach to securing payments due to subcontractors and suppliers.

Under a traditional Design-Bid-Build or Design-Build contract, the Department suffers the “first loss” in the event of a contractor default (e.g., bankruptcy), and it is for this reason that construction performance security is typically required, as it provides confidence to the Department that notwithstanding the D&C Contractor’s performance, non-performance or financial condition, the relevant asset will be constructed for the contracted price. Conversely, in a P3 project, the “first loss” is suffered by the equity providers to the Project, and the “second loss” (which only arises if the losses are greater than the level of the equity committed to the Project) is suffered by the senior lenders to the Project. To the extent that there is a “third loss” (which would only arise if the cost to complete the Project was greater than the aggregate of the equity and debt committed to the Project), that loss would be suffered by the Department following the termination of the Concession Agreement, but only to the extent that the level of termination compensation payable by the Department to the Developer results in a loss to the Department. In the event of a termination of the Concession Agreement, however, the level of compensation payable by the Department to the Developer will typically take into account the amount it would cost the Department to complete the construction of the Project, meaning that (all other things being equal) the Department should not suffer any loss as a result of the termination of the Concession Agreement.

In other P3 markets (e.g., Canada, Australia, France and the United Kingdom), the level of construction performance security required to be provided by the D&C Contractor for the Project is typically prescribed
by the Developer (in consultation with its equity and senior debt providers) on the basis that responsibility for the management of the construction is outsourced to a private Developer and that Developer is responsible for funding the construction cost and securing performance by the D&C Contractor.

As a practical matter, Departments should bear in mind that performance bonds “travel” with the underlying D&C Contract entered into between the Developer and its D&C Contractor, meaning that in the event of a termination of the Concession Agreement, the Department would only be able to take advantage of the performance bond (and require the surety to complete the construction) if it agreed to take over the Developer’s obligations under the D&C Contract (and in respect of which the performance bond had been issued). The Department should also bear in mind that it would continue to be bound by its payment obligations under the bonding arrangement. Although the Concession Agreement can mandate this quite easily, in practice the implementation of this requirement is a more complex undertaking, because the D&C Contract will typically be drafted to work in conjunction with the Concession Agreement rather than as a stand-alone document. In other words, the terms of the D&C Contract may need to undergo significant amendment to reflect the fact that the Concession Agreement had been terminated, potentially resulting in a negotiation with the relevant surety.

If the Concession Agreement prescribes the form and/or amount of performance security that the D&C Contractor must provide in support of the Project, this may cause an unfair advantage or disadvantage to one particular bidder team (e.g., a D&C Contractor with comparably high financial strength may be unfairly disadvantaged if it is required to provide the same level of performance security as a D&C Contractor with comparably low financial strength, that the high financial strength D&C Contractor would not otherwise have needed to procure), while also adding costs to the proposals of other bidder teams which would not, in the absence of the requirement in the Concession Agreement, have been incurred.

9.4 The Approach Taken in the United States P3 Market to Date

Although some recent Concession Agreements in the United States have not required the D&C Contractor to provide defined levels of construction performance security, most P3 projects that have closed to date in the United States have had this requirement. Among the reasons for this:

- the majority of P3 projects that have closed to date in the United States have been procured in States where, as a matter of law, the D&C Contractor for the Project is required to provide a minimum level of construction performance security for the Project;
- in some States where the D&C Contractor is not required as a matter of law to provide a minimum level of construction performance security for the Project, the D&C Contractor is nevertheless required to provide a minimum level of payment bonding in order to secure the payment of amounts due and owing to subcontractors and suppliers, and it is typically the case that when a surety provides a payment bond to a D&C Contractor, they will also offer to provide a performance bond in an equivalent amount at no additional cost; and
- with respect to some of the early P3 projects to close in the United States, material levels of design and construction work were undertaken by the Developer between commercial and financial close and, at the time of commercial close, the senior debt financing solution was still being explored by the Department and the Developer. Accordingly, the Department took significant comfort from the D&C Contractor’s activities on the Project being supported by committed construction performance security.

In addition, where the Lenders to a P3 Project determine that a parent company guarantee of the D&C Contractor’s obligations to the Developer is appropriate in light of the particular entity that a Developer is contracting with, the Concession Agreement will typically mandate that the Department be named as a
beneficiary of the guarantee in addition to the Developer and the Lenders. Departments considering including parent company guarantee(s) should consider carefully both any legal or practical challenges that may be anticipated in enforcing a foreign parent company’s guarantee in a foreign jurisdiction.

9.5 Conclusion

In the absence of a governing requirement for minimum levels of construction performance security to be provided in respect of P3 projects, the appropriate level of such security will typically be a function of:

- the credit strength of the proposed D&C Contractor;
- the complexity of the Project (in terms of both design, engineering & construction, and the length of the construction period); and
- the proposed payment arrangements under the D&C Contract.

If the Department’s principal objective is to ensure best value through its procurement of a P3 project, it may wish to consider, to the extent permitted by Applicable Law, the merits of not prescribing minimum construction performance security requirements in the draft Concession Agreement and, alternatively, allowing bidders and their respective equity and debt providers to determine the most cost effective and creditworthy approach to construction performance security. In any case, Departments may wish to consider the relationship between this issue and the level of compensation it would owe the Developer due to Early Termination of the Concession Agreement for Developer Default prior to Substantial Completion (see Chapter 7, Defaults, Early Termination and Compensation).
10 Insurance

10.1 General Insurance Requirements

The Concession Agreement will typically specify minimum insurance requirements applicable to the Developer and its Subcontractors during both the construction period and the operating period of the Project. The scope and amounts of insurance carried by the Developer are often of interest to the Department because they represent a significant resource on which the Developer will rely when unexpected and potentially expensive events occur. Unlike the construction performance security, however, which is not intended to be called upon except in severe circumstances, the insurance coverage is a resource upon which the Developer and its Subcontractors are expected to rely. Without adequate insurance coverage, there is an increased risk that the Developer may become unable to perform its obligations and/or enter bankruptcy. In addition, many of the other provisions of the Concession Agreement, such as the scope of Compensation Events and Delay Events, are drafted on the presumption that the Developer has adequately insured itself against the risks it is required to bear. As a result, the Department will typically want to be sure that the terms of the Concession Agreement require minimum levels of insurance coverage to be carried by the Developer.

The insurance policies that the Department will require the Developer to obtain and maintain during the construction and operating phases of the Project are typically listed in an exhibit to the Concession Agreement. During the construction phase of the Project, the required coverage will often include builder’s risk, commercial general liability, pollution liability, professional liability, worker’s compensation, automobile liability, excess/umbrella liability, railroad protective liability and marine or aviation liability if appropriate. During the operating phase of the Project, the required coverage will often include “all-risk” property coverage, commercial general liability, pollution liability, professional liability, worker’s compensation, automobile liability, excess/umbrella liability, railroad protective liability and marine or aviation liability if appropriate. Additional types of insurance coverage may be specified depending on the needs of the Project or the environment in which it will be constructed. The insurance requirements will also typically include the minimum amount of the required coverage, requirements to name entities (such as the Department and, in some cases, Lenders) as additional insured parties, and other terms and conditions specific to each type of insurance coverage.

In addition to minimum insurance requirements, the Concession Agreement will often:

- specify a minimum financial size category rating according to the relevant insurance rating system for all insurers providing the required coverage,
- require evidence, delivered to the Department annually, that the required insurance policies are in place, and
- set out a procedure for adjusting minimum coverage amounts, if appropriate, from time to time.

The minimum requirements and other insurance terms will differ during the construction period and the operating period due to the different risks that the Project may encounter, and both sets of requirements should be developed in consultation with an insurance advisor experienced in P3 transactions that is under contract with the Department.

Many Concession Agreements will also state that if the Lenders require stricter insurance coverage than the Department, then fulfilling those requirements will be deemed to satisfy the Developer’s obligation under the Concession Agreement.
### 10.2 Uninsurable Risks

In addition to the risk that the cost of insurance may temporarily increase in material and unexpected ways during the life of a Project, Developers also face the possibility that insurers may no longer provide coverage against certain risks the Concession Agreement requires the Developer to insure against. For example, the Concession Agreement may require the Developer to insure against the risk of damage from named windstorms, but insurers may no longer offer such coverage. Given the importance of insurance to any P3 transaction, the existence of such an “Uninsurable Risk” could place the Project in jeopardy if the applicable risk arose.

The concept of an “Uninsurable Risk” should not be confused with Force Majeure Events, however; a Force Majeure Event would not constitute an “Uninsurable Risk” unless the Concession Agreement required the Developer to insur e against it and such insurance is not available (as described below). Departments, in consultation with their insurance advisors, do not typically require coverage on terms that cannot be obtained in the market from the outset. Provisions governing Uninsurable Risks are intended to address the possibility that the products and coverage offered in the insurance markets change over time. The minimum insurance requirements set by the Department in the Concession Agreement are likely to be reasonable and appropriate when originally mandated, but over the long Term of a Concession Agreement may be eclipsed by market practice.

An example definition of Uninsurable Risk is set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uninsurable Risk</th>
<th>means a risk for which:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>insurance is not available to [Developer] in respect of the [Project] in the worldwide insurance or reinsurance markets on the terms required under the [Concession Agreement] with reputable insurers of good standing; or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>the insurance premium payable for insuring that risk on the terms required under the [Concession Agreement] is at such a level that the risk is not generally being insured against in the worldwide insurance or reinsurance markets with reputable insurers of good standing by contractors in relation to transportation-related infrastructure projects in North America.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If a risk becomes an Uninsurable Risk, the Department will typically have the right to choose whether to terminate the Concession Agreement and pay compensation to the Developer (see Section 10.3 below) or act as the insurer of last resort. [In case of the latter, the Developer will not be required to pay any premium to the Department for the coverage. Instead, the Department is typically entitled to reduce the Maximum Availability Payment by the amount of the premium that the Developer was most recently paying for insurance to cover the relevant risk. If the risk occurs, the Department will pay the Developer an amount equal to the insurance proceeds that would have been payable by an insurer had the risk been insured against, though the Developer will be required to pay the applicable deductible.]

As is the case with insurance premium benchmarking, if the Department is acting as insurer of last resort because a risk is determined to be an Uninsurable Risk, the Developer will typically be required to enter the market at regular intervals to determine whether the risk continues to be an Uninsurable Risk.

### 10.3 Unavailability of Insurance Conditions

Concession Agreements will also typically include provisions addressing a similar situation with respect to the requirements of insurance that are unrelated to the risks that must be insured against. For example, the Concession Agreement may require the insurance policies to name certain governmental entities as additional...
insured parties. If insurers are generally not willing to do so at some point in the future, then the Developer will be unable to meet its obligations under the Concession Agreement.

The Department might be unwilling to terminate the Concession Agreement for such a breach and may elect to waive it[; however, under such circumstances the Developer would continue to receive Availability Payments that were sized to include the cost of all such conditions. By contrast, if the Concession Agreement treats such circumstances as an Unavailable Condition, the Developer will not be in breach of the Concession Agreement, but the Department will typically be entitled to reduce the Maximum Availability Payment by the amount of the premium that the Developer was most recently paying for insurance to cover the relevant Insurance Condition.]

An example definition of Unavailable Condition is set forth below:

| (a) | **Unavailable Condition** means the occurrence of either or both of the following: |
|     | (i) any [Insurance Condition] is not available to [Developer] in the worldwide insurance market with reputable insurers of good standing; and/or |
|     | (ii) the insurance premium payable for insurance incorporating such [Insurance Condition] is such that the [Insurance Condition] is not generally being incorporated in insurance procured in the worldwide insurance market with reputable insurers of good standing by contractors in North America, |
| (b) | **Insurance Condition** means any terms and/or conditions required to be in a policy of insurance by the terms of the [Concession Agreement], but excluding any risk. |

Unavailable Conditions should be distinguished from Uninsurable Risks. An Unavailable Condition is generally related to the legal and commercial terms of the coverage, whereas Uninsurable Risks are generally related to the scope of risks against which coverage may be taken out. The occurrence of an Unavailable Condition is therefore not as significant to the Project’s overall risk profile, since the risks themselves continue to be insured against albeit on different terms. As a result, the Department will not typically be given the option to terminate the Concession Agreement in the event of an Unavailable Condition.

As is the case with insurance premium benchmarking and Uninsurable Risks, if there is an Unavailable Condition the Developer will typically be required to enter the market at regular intervals to determine whether the Insurance Condition continues to be an Unavailable Condition.
11 Lender Rights and Direct Agreement

The Lenders that fund a Project have a vested interest in ensuring the Project is completed and generates the projected cash flows by which the Lenders will be repaid. Given that the Lenders are not generally party to the Concession Agreement, another mechanism is needed through which the Lenders’ interests in the Project are protected. The rights of the Lenders with respect to the Concession Agreement are therefore typically documented in a Direct Agreement entered into among the Developer, the Department and the Lenders (or the Collateral Agent acting on behalf of the Lenders). This agreement is critical to the financing of any Project because it provides a direct contractual relationship between the Lenders (or their representative) and the Department pursuant to which the Department will provide the Lenders with certain assurances regarding their rights and under which the Lenders can enforce those rights directly against the Department. The Direct Agreement’s most important provisions fall into three categories: (a) certain administrative acknowledgments by the Department, (b) the Lenders’ right to take action in the event of a default by the Developer, and (c) in the event of a Developer Default, the Department’s agreement not to terminate the Concession Agreement for a period of time, so as to afford the Lenders an opportunity to remedy the relevant default.

11.1 Administrative Acknowledgements

A basic provision in a Direct Agreement is the acknowledgment and consent from the Department that the Developer has granted the Lenders a security interest in its rights under the Concession Agreement. Although many Concession Agreements expressly permit the Developer to grant a security interest to its Lenders, this acknowledgment is important because it avoids any ambiguity regarding the rights of the Lenders or the extent to which the Department was aware of their interest. This provision may also contain an acknowledgment from the Department that it has no knowledge of, and has not consented to, the grant of a security interest in favor of any other Lenders to the Developer (although Developers are unlikely to have any other debt because they are typically special purpose vehicles formed specifically for the Project).

In addition, Direct Agreements generally contain an agreement from the Department to deposit any money owed to the Developer under the Concession Agreement into a particular bank account designated at the time of execution of the Direct Agreement. This provision is important for the Lenders because one of the key components of their security package is control over the bank accounts of the Developer and the funds held in them. They are concerned that money paid to the Developer (including funds payable by the Department as termination compensation) could be directed to an account outside of their control, and will therefore seek to protect against this risk.

11.2 Lenders’ Right to Take Action

The Direct Agreement will generally provide that, upon the occurrence of a Developer Default under the Concession Agreement, the Department will provide a notice to the Lenders of the Developer Default (including an explanation of its nature and circumstances) and will agree not to terminate the Concession Agreement or initiate bankruptcy proceedings against the Developer for a specified period of time (the “Lender Cure Period”). The length of the Lender Cure Period will generally depend on the nature of the Developer Default. For example, the Lender Cure Period for remedying payment defaults is generally shorter than the Lender Cure Period for remedying non-completion defaults.

This stay on termination and/or bankruptcy proceedings is particularly important to Lenders because they have financed the Project on the basis of projected cash flows under the Concession Agreement (e.g., Toll Revenues), so if the Concession Agreement is terminated, Lenders will be unlikely to recover the full amount
of the Project Debt they have provided (even after taking into account the Termination Sum payable by the Department). Full repayment is generally possible only after the Project is completed and successfully operated for a significant period of time, so Lenders should be motivated to “revive” the Project. The Direct Agreement therefore permits the Lenders to take the actions described below during the Lender Cure Period.

11.2.1 Cure Rights
The simplest action that can be taken by the Lenders during the Lender Cure Period is to remedy a Developer Default on behalf of the Developer. The Direct Agreement will permit the Lenders during the Lender Cure Period (or during a shorter portion of the Cure Period) to cure a Developer Default without “stepping in” to the shoes of the Developer, thereby avoiding liability while pursuing such a remedy. As a result, the Lender can remedy the Developer Default while all liabilities continue to be borne by, and all obligations remain the responsibility of, the Developer. This mechanism works well for payment defaults because there is little risk to the Department that actions taken by Lenders to cure such a Developer Default could make matters worse. However, the absence of Lender liability may be of greater concern to the Department for non-completion defaults, where actions taken by Lenders to cure could put the Department in a worse position. Given such concerns, the Department may seek to limit the Lenders’ right to cure without incurring liability to an initial period that is shorter than the total Lender Cure Period.

11.2.2 Step-In Rights
Where the remedy required to cure a Developer Default is more complex, the Collateral Agent (or a qualified substitute developer designated by the Lenders) may “step in” and become a party to the Concession Agreement, with joint and several liability with the Developer for all of its rights and obligations under the Concession Agreement. These “step-in” rights are broader in scope than the cure rights discussed above, giving the Lenders the ability to take greater action where necessary to remedy more complex breaches of the Concession Agreement (including directing the Department to ignore instructions or requests delivered by the Developer).

Once the Lenders have exercised their “step-in” rights, the Department will be prohibited from terminating the Concession Agreement until the expiration of the Lender Cure Period or the date when the Lenders relinquish their step-in rights, if earlier. Though Lenders are generally motivated to “revive” the Project (as discussed above), they will typically step-in only if there is a reasonable chance of success. It is therefore not unusual for the Lenders, following an exercise of these step-in rights, to agree with the Department on a plan for reviving the Project that may obligate the step-in entity to take certain specific actions – the breach of which would give the Department a new termination right – in exchange for more time (i.e., extended Lender Cure Periods). Notwithstanding this, Lenders will usually have the right to step-out and avoid further liability with respect to the Concession Agreement at any time during the Lender Cure Period. Stepping out before the Developer Default is cured is a significant decision for Lenders, as it will invariably lead to the termination of the Concession Agreement for Developer Default.

(a) Substitution Rights
The most significant action the Lenders can take during the Lender Cure Period is to propose a substitute developer that assumes the Developer’s role and to cause the Developer to assign all of its rights and obligations under the Concession Agreement to the substitute developer, including all unperformed obligations arising prior to the substitution date. Generally, in addition to having the legal capacity, power, and authority to become a party to, and perform, the Concession Agreement, the substitute developer will need to have available and committed to it the resources that are required to perform the obligations of the Developer under the Concession Agreement.
A substitution, if approved by the Department, will release the existing Developer (and any step-in entity then acting on behalf of the Lenders) from all of its obligations under the Concession Agreement as of the substitution date. The Lenders or the substitute developer may also pay to the Department any outstanding amounts owed by the Developer as a condition to the Department’s approval, but once provided the Department will agree to waive its right of termination and any other rights the Department may have had which were suspended during the Lender Cure Period. Substitution effectively restores the Concession Agreement as if the Developer Default had not occurred, with the new developer permanently replacing the original Developer.

11.3 Subordination of Department’s Rights

Both Lenders and the Department will generally enter into separate direct agreements with the Developer’s D&C Contractor giving them rights to step into the shoes of the Developer under the D&C Contract in the event of a default by the Developer under the Finance Documents or the Concession Agreement, respectively. As a result, the Department and the Lenders will have competing step-in rights. Lenders will seek to address these competing step-in rights by requiring the Department not to exercise its step-in rights while the Lenders still have the right to exercise theirs. Departments typically agree to this arrangement in order to preserve the Lenders’ incentive to monitor the Concession Agreement and take action to cure a Developer Default. However, the Department will generally not agree to subordinate its rights indefinitely and will often require the right to take action under its direct agreement with the D&C Contractor in certain circumstances, including at any point after:

- termination of the Concession Agreement;
- the expiration of the Lenders’ rights under their own direct agreement with the D&C Contractor;
- receipt of confirmation that the Lenders do not intend to exercise their rights under their direct agreement or have no further claims thereunder; or
- the Lenders have stepped-out or otherwise relinquished control under their direct agreement.

11.4 Impact of Bankruptcy

In the event that the Developer is the subject of formal bankruptcy proceedings, there is a risk that the presiding judge will reject or terminate the Concession Agreement during the course of such proceedings. To provide comfort to the Lenders under these circumstances, Direct Agreements will typically allow the Collateral Agent (or any of its designees, including any substitute developer) to certify to the Department that it will perform all of the Developer’s obligations under the rejected or terminated Concession Agreement and request that the Department deliver to the Collateral Agent a new Concession Agreement that includes the same terms as the rejected or terminated Concession Agreement (revised only to reflect the removal of obligations thereunder that have already been fulfilled). This feature functions as a backstop in the event that the Lenders’ ordinary right to step in and cure a Developer Default is made impractical by ongoing bankruptcy proceedings.

The Lenders’ right to designate a substitute developer should be distinguished from a Change in Ownership of the Developer that results from the enforcement by the Lenders of their security interest over the ownership of the Developer in the event of the Developer’s default under the Financing Documents. Any Change in Ownership that results from such enforcement typically will not qualify as a Restricted Change in Ownership under the Concession Agreement and therefore, in contrast with the substitution of the Developer under the Direct Agreement, will not require the prior consent of the Department under the Concession Agreement.
12 Department Step-In

12.1 Events Triggering the Department’s Step-In Rights

Under the Concession Agreement, the Department is typically given the right to “step-in” and perform the Developer’s obligations following a Developer Default or in other circumstances where it may be in the public interest for the Department to temporarily take control of the Project.

The step-in rights of the Department are generally increased in certain default scenarios, such as closure of a part of the Project or failure to perform certain safety compliance obligations. In such circumstances, the Department will generally want the right to step-in, without waiting for any cure period of the Developer to lapse, in order to perform such actions as may be necessary to rectify the closure or danger to public safety.

12.2 Effect on the Obligations of the Developer

If the Department cures a Developer Default or otherwise steps-in to perform the Developer’s obligations, the Developer will be obligated to indemnify the Department for the costs and expenses incurred by the Department in respect of such cure or performance.

12.3 Effect on Rights of the Department

Following a Developer Default, if the Department exercises its step-in rights, it does not affect the Department’s other rights against the Developer arising from the Developer Default. In addition, the Department will generally not be liable for any act or omission of the Department during the course of remedying any Developer Default or stepping in to perform the obligations of the Developer under the Concession Agreement. Furthermore, even if the Department commences cure of the Developer Default or steps in to perform obligations of the Developer, generally the Department will not be required to continue to, or otherwise complete, the cure or performance.
13 Performance Standards and Non-Compliance Points

Concession Agreements typically require the Developer to meet certain minimum performance standards relating to the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the Project. Rather than dictate the use of particular methods and materials, however, many Concession Agreements include outcome-based performance standards focusing on measurable indicators of achievement. The goal of using outcome-based performance standards is to make service delivery more efficient by allowing the Developer to decide how best to achieve the intended results. In addition, outcome-based performance standards encourage the Developer to utilize resources efficiently over the life of the Project, because decisions made at one phase of the Project's life cycle, such as construction or major maintenance, will determine the techniques and costs that are necessary for the Developer to satisfy the minimum performance standards at another phase.

The use of outcome-based performance requirements will require the Department to consider carefully the types of outcomes it wishes to achieve. Traditionally, many Departments have prescribed the precise means and methods that contractors must apply to the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of a facility. An outcome-based performance requirement, by comparison, might specify minimum ride quality or durability benchmarks that must be met, but not the means and methods to be utilized to achieve those benchmarks. Traditional construction and operations specifications are unlikely to be appropriate for these purposes, although discrete portions (such as safety requirements, procedures for handling hazardous materials, environmental mitigation, and other critical functions) may be applicable without variation. Departments should consider carefully what outcomes they wish to achieve and prepare technical specifications for inclusion in the Concession Agreement that are appropriate for an outcome-based approach.

In setting performance standards, the Department may look to benchmarks set in other Concession Agreements or equivalent facilities. There is a natural tension, however, between flexibility and accountability in setting performance standards. If a standard is too flexible, the public sector risks receiving a lower level of performance from a concession. If a standard is inflexible, the Department might unwillingly reduce the opportunity for innovation.

The Department is responsible for monitoring the performance of the Developer. The Concession Agreement will typically establish procedures to facilitate monitoring of the Developer’s performance, including self-reporting, independent audits, regular meetings and reports, and the use of automated data collection and reporting processes.

The Concession Agreement typically includes a representative, but not exhaustive, list of minimum performance standards and classifies them in different categories (varying in terms of significance). Most Concession Agreements prescribe processes for penalizing non-compliance, but rewards for superior performance are rarely used. The failure to meet a minimum performance standard will be reflected in the accumulation of Non-Compliance Points. The Concession Agreement defines the procedures to report and record each failure, cure periods that may apply before such points are assessed, and the maximum number of Non-Compliance Points the Department may assess for each failure. Departments should carefully analyze the types of outcomes they wish to achieve with any given Project and the relative severity of failing to achieve them when compiling the performance points system applicable to a Project.
The accumulation of Non-Compliance Points by the Developer may trigger some or all of the following remedies:

- The Department may be permitted to increase the level of monitoring of the Project, for which the Developer will be required to compensate the Department;
- The Department may require the Developer to prepare and submit a remedial plan for the Department’s approval, setting forth a schedule and specific actions the Developer will undertake to improve its performance, such as improvements to quality management practices, plans, and procedures; changes in its organizational and management structures; increased monitoring and inspections; changes in key personnel; and the replacement of Subcontractors; and
- In the event of systemic performance failure, termination of the Concession Agreement for Developer Default.
14 Consumer Protections and Public Policy Issues

14.1 Overview

A properly structured Concession Agreement will protect the public interest by transferring risk to the Developer and heightening accountability to the public for the performance of the Project. In addition, the Concession Agreement will contain provisions that address a number of common consumer concerns about Developer behavior in P3 transactions. This chapter describes several common consumer concerns and the manner in which a typical Concession Agreement will address them.

14.2 Excessively High Tolls and Fines

One of the most common concerns of consumers is the possibility that the Developer will impose excessive tolls and fines on Project users. As noted in Chapter 2 (Tolling Regulation), the ability of the Developer to establish, escalate, collect, and enforce tolls is strictly limited by the contractual terms contained in the Concession Agreement and approved by the Department. In setting the limits on maximum toll rates that the Developer will be permitted to charge users, the Department, in consultation with its financial advisers, should consider the extent to which consumers may be willing to pay toll rates above levels seen historically in the region or in comparable facilities, and the possibility that the revenue maximizing toll rate may from time to time be below the highest rate which is permitted by the Concession Agreement. In addition, the amount of fines which may be assessed against users for non-payment of tolls, if any, is not set by the Developer, but rather by Applicable Law. In light of the public interest in managing the cost of using the toll roads, the Concession Agreement may require the Developer to operate a customer service center in order to field questions or concerns from the public regarding tolls and fines. Departments may mandate minimum response times following receipt of a customer complaint, and may prescribe the type of information to be provided by the customer service center.

14.3 Windfall Profits

The public may also be concerned that the Developer can capitalize on unexpected changes in market conditions to realize windfall profits for its own account. While there is an opportunity for the Developer to earn more profit when demand is unusually high, as noted in Chapter 3 (Benefit Sharing), the Concession Agreement may entitle the Department to participate in the economic “upside” of the Project by requiring the Developer to share with the Department a portion of (i) the Developer’s revenues from the Project above certain thresholds, or (ii) the Developer’s refinancing gains that were not contemplated in the original Base Case Financial Model for the Project. These protections allow the public to share in the benefit of uniquely positive market conditions.

14.4 Emergencies

A concern often expressed by the public is that the Developer could unduly restrict the ability of law enforcement and other first responders to protect the public welfare in the event of emergencies. As noted in Chapter 2 (Tolling Regulation), the government may suspend tolls on the Project in the event of emergencies, and at all times law enforcement agencies will have the right of entry and jurisdiction necessary to enforce laws and regulations of the State. Moreover, the Department may expressly reserve its right to exercise all of its regulatory and police powers granted by law, including rights necessary to enable first responders to perform their duties, and as a legal matter such regulatory and police powers of government cannot be abridged by contract.
14.5 **Competing Facilities**

Of particular concern to the public is the possibility that the Developer might seek to prevent the government from developing other vital transportation facilities in order to protect its profitability. As noted in Chapter 4 (Supervening Events), the Concession Agreement will permit the Department to develop and procure any competing transportation facility it wishes to construct. The Department can typically do so without compensating the Developer (so long as the facility was contemplated by the long-term transportation plan of the relevant jurisdiction at the time of the successful bid or commercial close for the Project), although for the reasons described in Chapter 4 (Supervening Events), in some cases it will be necessary for the Department to provide compensation.

14.6 **National Security**

Members of the public may express concern about investors from foreign jurisdictions having access to information regarding public safety and critical infrastructure as a result of their ownership interests in the Developer. When reviewing the qualifications of bidders at the outset of the procurement process, the Department should receive assurances from bidders that none of its owners or controlling persons is named on the “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” list maintained by the Office of Foreign Asset Control at the United States Department of the Treasury. The use of this list is a commonly accepted means of determining whether an individual may be a threat to national security, so Departments may refer to it in order to screen out bad actors and avoid their participation in a Project. The Department may additionally seek such assurances at the time of the bid by the Developer for the Project, and the Concession Agreement may include representations and warranties from the Developer to the same effect. In addition, the Concession Agreement will either bar transfers in ownership of the Developer to such persons or entitle the Department to disallow such transfers in its sole discretion.
15 Federal Requirements

In the event that the Project receives Federal assistance at any time pursuant to Title 23 of the United States Code (e.g., credit assistance in the form of a TIFIA loan or Federal grant assistance that may be used to purchase right of way for the Project), the Developer is required by law to comply with multiple Federal laws and regulations as if the Developer were the Department. Therefore, the Concession Agreement will require that the Developer comply (and require its Subcontractors to comply) with such Federal laws, including compliance with Federal law pertaining to the use of Federal-aid funds. For example, the Concession Agreement will require that the Developer and its Subcontractors procure the Project in compliance with (among others): (i) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, or national origin); (ii) the “Buy America Requirements” (requiring the use of domestically produced steel and see, e.g., Section 17.3 of this Guide for the applicability of such requirements in the context of utility relocations); (iii) the Davis-Bacon Act (requiring the payment of prevailing wages, as determined by the United States Department of Labor); (iv) Disadvantaged Business Enterprise regulations (requiring good faith efforts to hire minority, female-owned, veteran-owned, and other disadvantaged contractors); (v) Equal Employment Opportunity and affirmative action regulations (concerning employment of individuals who are members of protected categories); (vi) the applicable National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) determinations; and (vii) any applicable Federal tolling and operational requirements and regulations. Additional requirements and restrictions under Federal law will apply based on a variety of factors unique to each Project, all of which the Developer will be required to comply with.

The FHWA has published a guide for how to apply Federal-aid requirements to P3 transactions. A copy of this Guide can be found at the following URL:
16 Governmental Approvals and Permits

Prior to commencing a particular activity in relation to the Project, a “Government Approval” may need to be acquired, either as a matter of law or otherwise. Accordingly, the Concession Agreement will allocate responsibility between the parties with respect to the procurement of Government Approvals and the associated costs in obtaining them. For the purposes of the Concession Agreement, “Government Approvals” may include all local, regional, State, and Federal agreements, studies, findings, permits, approvals, authorizations, certifications, consents, decisions, exemptions, filings, leases, licenses, registrations, rulings, and other governmental authorizations required to be obtained or completed under law prior to undertaking any particular activity contemplated by the Concession Agreement.

As a general matter, the Department will often procure certain Governmental Approvals in advance of (or in parallel with) the procurement of the Project, the most notable examples being environmental related Governmental Approvals required as a matter of Federal law, which are typically fundamental to the feasibility of the Project.

The Concession Agreement will typically set out a discrete list of Governmental Approvals that the Department is responsible for procuring and the Department will be required to procure them by defined dates. These permits will typically be those which are considered either fundamental to the feasibility of the Project or materially beneficial to the construction schedule (if procured in advance). Responsibility for procuring all other Governmental Approvals typically sits with the Developer, at its sole cost and expense, although the Department will typically agree to provide reasonable assistance and cooperation to the Developer, as requested by the Developer, in obtaining Governmental Approvals relating to the Project and any revisions, modifications, amendments, supplements, renewals, reevaluations, and extensions of Governmental Approvals. The Department may additionally agree under the Concession Agreement that it will not unreasonably withhold or delay any Governmental Approval for which the Department is the issuing Governmental Entity with respect to the design, construction, operation, or maintenance of the Project.

It should be noted that, as a practical matter, certain Governmental Approvals obtained by the Department in advance of (or in parallel with) the procurement of the Project may need to be obtained on the basis of an assumed design. Accordingly, to the extent that the Developer proposes a design that differs from that assumed when the relevant Governmental Approval was procured by the Department, the Developer may need to amend the relevant Governmental Approval or obtain a re-evaluation of the differing design by the relevant agency issuing the relevant Governmental Approval.
17 Utilities and Third Party Rights

17.1 Risk Allocation and Coordination with Utilities and Railroads

Most Projects will impact existing utility lines or other assets owned by third parties (such as railroads) that will need to be avoided, relocated, temporarily disabled, or otherwise accommodated during the course of construction. The basic risks presented by these activities will be familiar to most Departments because they also arise in traditional construction arrangements. In a P3 transaction, the risk of cost and schedule impacts associated with unknown utilities or intransigent third parties is addressed largely in the same manner as the risk of differing site conditions. Developers are expected to budget and schedule for these impacts and limited relief may be provided in respect of risks that cannot be reliably quantified at the time the Concession Agreement is executed (often by reference to baseline information that the Department provides prior to submittal of the bids for the Project (see Chapter 4 (Supervening Events) for further information regarding the use of baselines)).

Many Departments enter into master utility relocation agreements with utility companies governing the standard terms of any utility relocation that will be performed in connection with the Department’s construction projects. These agreements typically contemplate that a Project-specific utility relocation agreement will be executed in connection with each Project, incorporating the terms of the master agreement and specifying the particular terms applicable to the individual relocation, particularly the extent to which the Department or the utility will bear the cost of any relocation. Concession Agreements will often provide that the Developer must perform the Department’s obligations under these agreements. As such, to the extent the Department is obliged to pay for relocation under the utility relocation agreement, the Developer will be required to make a payment on behalf of the Department.

The principal difference between the management of these risks and other differing site conditions is the presence of third parties whose cooperation is required in order for the Developer to successfully perform the Work. When these third parties have been uncooperative with the Developer despite the Developer’s best efforts, the Concession Agreement will often require the Department to use its own reasonable efforts to compel cooperation (typically excluding the use of eminent domain or the initiation of formal legal proceedings), and may entitle the Developer to claim a Compensation Event or Delay Event to the extent that it is prejudiced by the unreasonable failure of the third parties to cooperate.

17.2 Other Third Parties’ Rights

In addition to railroads and utilities, a variety of other third parties’ rights may be impacted in connection with any given Project (e.g., relevant local townships may have the right to review and comment on the design of portions of the Project or impose scheduling and other restrictions on the performance of construction work within their jurisdiction). These rights will typically be set out in existing contracts between the Department and the relevant third party. The terms of the Concession Agreement will often require that the Department assign, and the Developer accept, the Department’s contractual rights and obligations under those contracts. The relevant third parties will need to be notified, and in some cases their consent, which may take considerable time to acquire, may be required in order to effect the assignment. Departments should therefore begin the process of identifying these contracts and contacting the relevant third parties relatively early during the procurement, in order to resolve issues as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Some third parties’ rights may not be set out in contracts. It is not uncommon that when a Department begins to acquire right-of-way, the owners from whom it is acquired will negotiate certain rights in connection with the sale of their land. These rights may take the form of permanent or long-term real property interests, such
as easements to cross the right-of-way, which are not set out in a contract but rather are recorded in the relevant government records. When describing the rights of access that the Developer will have to the right-of-way for purposes of constructing and operating the Project, it is therefore important to specify that the Developer’s rights of access are subject to these real property interests. This is often accomplished by reference to a title report, produced by a title company on behalf of the Department. If existing real property interests are not reflected in the report, the Developer may be entitled to claim a Compensation Event for the impact to its rights of access.

17.3 Buy America Requirements

“Buy America Requirements” are Federal laws which require that steel and iron products permanently incorporated into Projects and paid for, in whole or in part, with Federal highway funds must be manufactured in the United States. Historically, these requirements were applicable only to contracts where Federal funds were actually used for the construction; however, section 1518 of MAP-21 recently expanded the applicability of these requirements to include any contract eligible for Federal funds for a Project within the scope of any applicable National Environmental Policy Act determination regardless of whether Federal funds are actually used. As a practical result, to the extent that a utility relocation associated with a Project meets these new criteria, the "Buy America Requirements" will apply even if the utility relocation itself is not actually paid for with Federal funds.
18 Financial Model Adjustments

The Concession Agreement will require the Developer to deliver and maintain a base case financial model containing all of the cash flow projections (including all costs and revenues) and calculations relating to the Project ("Base Case Financial Model"). This Base Case Financial Model is the successor to the financial model that the Developer submitted as part of its bid for the Project. On the Financial Closing Date, the Base Case Financial Model may be placed in an escrow in order to avoid unauthorized tampering or modification. After the Financial Closing Date, updates and adjustments to the Base Case Financial Model are allowed only under certain conditions and are generally subject to approval under the Concession Agreement by both the Developer and the Department. Additionally, Lenders may separately require similar approval rights under the relevant Financing Documents.

Updates to the Base Case Financial Model consist of changes performed to reflect the financial consequences of certain events, including the incorporation of historical information. Typically, updates are performed in order to account for the impact of Compensation Events, Delay Events, refinancing events, annual updates of audited financial information, and other circumstances that are deemed appropriate by the Department and the Developer.

Adjustments to the Base Case Financial Model can also include changes to assumptions, logic, mathematical formulas/calculation and forecasted information resulting from material changes to the Project.

18.1 Definition of the Base Case Financial Model

Developed in a spreadsheet computer program, typically Microsoft Excel™, the Base Case Financial Model is a set of calculations that incorporate standard accounting principles as well as unique features reflecting the specific P3 transaction. Often developed as a workbook, the Base Case Financial Model may consist of tables or spreadsheets that describe revenues, operating and maintenance costs, capital costs, debt repayment, equity returns, Project cash flows, cash flow prioritization, tax treatments, coverage ratios and other financial statistics. They usually include sections on assumptions and may summarize results in numbers and/or charts.

The Base Case Financial Model helps Developers create an optimal financial proposal in a competitive procurement and demonstrate to the Department that the proposed financing package makes financial sense. Furthermore, it can be used to demonstrate to 1) debt providers—banks and capital markets intermediaries—that loans and bonds can be repaid under reasonable circumstances, and 2) equity investors that their returns throughout the life of the Concession Agreement will yield an adequate return on their investments.

In addition, the Base Case Financial Model is used to determine the financial consequences of certain events, including refinancing, relief and compensation events over the life of the P3 project. The advantage of using a financial model to determine those financial consequences is that they precisely reflect the financial consequences in great detail and therefore can lead to a “fair price”. The downside of using a financial model is that its operation can become very complicated. Some international Departments are concerned that Developers may take advantage of their lack of expertise with financial models, and therefore decide not to make the Base Case Financial Model part of the Concession Agreement. Instead, they use simpler algorithms to calculate the financial consequences of refinancing and Compensation Events or Delay Events. However, the market standard in the U.S. and internationally now is to make the Base Case Financial Model part of the Concession Agreement and agree upon clear and fair procedures to manage the model. The sections below detail how the Base Case Financial Model is handled in the Concession Agreement and how it addresses key events.
18.2 Handling of the Base Case Financial Model

The Base Case Financial Model is often submitted as part of a Developer’s proposal in hard copy in the appendix of a signed Concession Agreement, with the software version maintained in an escrow (see below). The Base Case Financial Model in the Concession Agreement is used in commercial close and usually updated at financial close. Neither the Department nor the Developer can change the Base Case Financial Model assumptions or formulas without notifying the other party.

The Base Case Financial Model contains key Project financial and economic assumptions, including the following:

- Key dates;
- Revenue projections;
- Operations and maintenance estimates;
- Description of capital expenditures and required technology enhancements;
- Debt service coverage ratios (“DSCRs”) and other debt statistics;
- Equity IRR;
- Debt to equity ratios;
- Amounts held in debt service, Major Maintenance Reserve Account, Handback Reserve Account, and other accounts; and
- Hedging instruments (such as for interest rates), if appropriate.

Often the two most important parameters in the Base Case Financial Model are the DSCRs and the Equity IRR.

The preparation and submission of the Base Case Financial Model imposes obligations upon the Developer. In many Concession Agreements, the Developer must represent and warrant to the Department that the Base Case Financial Model and any subsequent changes:

- were prepared in good faith;
- fully disclose all cost, revenue and other financial assumptions that the Developer has used;
- were audited by an independent model auditor;
- take into account all requirements imposed by Applicable Laws related to taxes; and
- contain formulas that are the same as those that the Developer uses internally and in making disclosures to potential equity investors and Lenders.

Because the Base Case Financial Model is crucial in determining the financial consequences of events throughout the lifetime of the Concession Agreement, both the Department and the Developer have an interest in fair and realistic procedures for updates and/or adjustments. The procedures typically include a review by an independent auditor (including allocating responsibility for the fees and expenses of the auditor) and requirements resolving disputes arising out of the Base Case Financial Model. The Concession Agreement aims to ensure easy access to the Base Case Financial Model for both the Department and the Developer, and therefore will often prohibit password-protected files, or macros or hidden rows, columns, cells or worksheets.

An escrow agent often holds the Base Case Financial Model, financial modeling data, and any updates in escrow. Usually the Department, the Developer and their representatives have the right to examine the model at their convenience. Besides ensuring that the Base Case Financial Model is not changed, the Base Case
Financial Model is kept with an escrow agent because it is often considered confidential and it contains significant, commercially sensitive information, which helps the Department avoid unintentional disclosures.

Financial modeling data can include:

- All back-up information which form the basis for Developer’s assumptions, estimates, projections, and calculations;
- A data book fully describing all assumptions underlying the estimates, projections, and calculations;
- The step-by-step instructions on the procedure to run and to optimize the Base Case Financial Model formulas; and
- All other supporting data.

### 18.3 Using the Base Case Financial Model

Updates to the Base Case Financial Model consist of changes performed to reflect the financial consequences of certain events, including the incorporation of historical information. Typically, updates are performed in order to account for the impact of Compensation Events, Delay Events, refinancing events, annual updates of audited financial information, and other circumstances that are deemed appropriate by the Department and the Developer. By comparison, adjustments to the Base Case Financial Model can include changes to assumptions, logic, mathematical formulas/calculations and forecasted information resulting from material changes to the Project, and generally require the agreement of both the Developer and the Department.

#### 18.3.1 Adjustments Between Commercial Close and Financial Close

#### 18.3.2 Refinancing Events

Concession Agreements in the United States and internationally use financial models to calculate how refinancing gains should be shared between the Department and the Developer, with some Concession Agreements sharing the gains equally between the Department and the Developer. The basis of this calculation typically is an updated Base Case Financial Model, reflecting all the actual changes in the Project just before the refinancing ("Pre-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model"). This will then be compared against an updated Base Case Financial Model that incorporates the effects of the refinancing ("Post-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model"), arriving at the exact same Equity IRR as just before the refinancing. The actual financial effect of the refinancing is typically calculated by subtracting the net present value of the distributions to Equity in both financial models. Because the Pre-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model is updated to reflect actual conditions immediately prior to the refinancing and is compared to the Post-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model immediately afterwards, the impact of the refinancing is isolated and the calculation is not influenced (positively or negatively) by other events of financial significance such as cost overruns during construction.

An example of how this is documented in a Concession Agreement is as follows:

The [Developer] shall provide the following information at least 35 days in advance to the proposed date for closing the refinancing:

(a) The [Base Case Financial Model] with the original projections duly adjusted for any changes in the project structure; ([Department] changes);

(b) Details of the actual timing and amounts of [Equity Investments];
(c) Details of the actual timing and amounts of distributions to equity from the Effective Date to the Refinancing Date;

(d) Information on the actual cash flow of [Developer] from the Effective Date to the Refinancing Date;

(e) Term sheet and other relevant information on the terms of the refinancing;

(f) A [Pre-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model], which does not take into account the effects of the refinancing, as updated by [Developer] (i) for any changes in the Project and based on the actual performance of the project to the date of calculation and other macroeconomic assumptions and (ii) with projections for the cash flow of [Developer] from the estimated refinancing date to the end of the [Term], including projected equity distributions;

(g) A [Post-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model] which fully takes into account the effects of the refinancing as projected on the basis of the term sheet and new funding agreements, as updated by [Developer] (i) for any changes in the project and based on the actual performance of the project to the date of calculation and other macroeconomic assumptions and (ii) with projections for the cash flow of [Developer] from the refinancing date to the end of the term, including projected distributions with the refinancing;

(h) A calculation of the refinancing gain based on the above and following the provisions described below; and

(i) Information on the assumptions for the projections in the [Pre-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model] and [Post-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model].

The [Pre-Refinancing Equity IRR] shall be calculated for the entire Term taking into account:

(a) Timing and amounts of the [Equity Investments];

(b) Distributions received by [Equity] up to the estimated refinancing date; and

(c) Projected distributions as shown in the [Pre-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model].

The [Post-Refinancing Equity IRR] shall be calculated for the entire term taking into account:

(a) Timing and amounts of the investment by [Equity];

(b) Distributions received by [Equity] up to the estimated refinancing date; and

(c) Projected distributions as shown in the [Post-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model].

The refinancing gain for any refinancing . . . will be equal to the greater of zero and [(A-B)-C] where:

A = the net present value of the distributions to be made from the estimated refinancing date to the end of the term as projected in the [Post-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model], discounted using the [original Equity IRR];

B = the net present value of the distributions to be made from the estimated refinancing date to the end of the term as projected in the [Pre-Refinancing Base Case Financial Model], discounted using the [original Equity IRR]; and

C = any adjustment required to raise the [Pre-Refinancing Equity IRR] to the [original Equity IRR].

18.3.3 Relief and Compensation Events

[●]
18.3.4 Early Termination

If the Department terminates the Concession Agreement for convenience, the compensation of the Developer will often also be based upon the Base Case Financial Model.

The [Termination for Convenience] amount shall be calculated as follows:

(a) The project debt termination amount; plus

(b) The amount of all distributions to equity members or their affiliates anticipated in the [Base Case Financial Model] to be paid between the [Early Termination Date] until the date of expiration of the term, each amount discounted back at the [Original Equity IRR] from the date on which it is shown to be payable in the [Base Case Financial Model] to the [Early Termination Date].

18.3.5 Using the Base Case Financial Model Efficiently

Because of the costs of updating the Base Case Financial Model, including the cost of Department and Developer staff and advisors' time, some Concession Agreements contain mechanisms to limit financial updates to material and major events or on a periodic basis.

[In addition, certain scenarios outlining the changes in the Availability Payment can be established at transaction close. For instance, if it is likely that the Department will require the Developer to make certain small, additional capital expenditures, then the consequences of these expenditures on the Availability Payment can be determined before financial close.]
19 Department and Developer Changes

19.1 Department Changes

In order to limit potential claims from Developers with respect to Compensation Events, Departments will want to ensure that the specifications governing the Project (including the Technical Requirements and any applicable codes or standards) set out in the Concession Agreement account for the Department’s long-term (not just current) requirements, and that these specifications anticipate changes that are reasonably foreseeable (e.g., any advancements in technology that the Department expects the Developer to adopt in the near future). However, Departments will also want a certain degree of flexibility to address unforeseeable advances or changes their requirements. To achieve this flexibility, the Concession Agreement will usually specify the Department’s right to require changes to the Work (a “Department Change”) subject to limited conditions (e.g., the changes cannot contravene Applicable Law), with the understanding that such changes constitute a Compensation Event and the Department will be required to compensate the Developer for the net impact of all increased costs (including the impact on future operations and maintenance costs) and decreased revenues associated with such changes.

Negotiations surrounding Department Changes, as with change orders in traditional construction contracts, can be contentious, so the Concession Agreement will generally specify the steps that each party must take once a Department Change is proposed in order to facilitate agreement on costs, likely impacts on the Developer and other relevant details. For example, the Concession Agreement may require consultation with an independent engineer. However, if the Department and the Developer cannot agree on the costs of a Department Change or whether the proposed changes qualify as a Department Change (i.e., whether the Department should bear the associated costs), the Concession Agreement will usually give the Department the right to issue a directive letter that requires the Developer to carry out the proposed changes specified therein regardless of any disagreements between the parties. In such cases, the associated costs, which are the responsibility of the Department, will typically be determined either through a pre-determined mechanism for reporting and calculating extra work costs (e.g., a force account mechanism) or the Dispute Resolution Procedures.

19.2 Developer Changes

Developers, like Departments, will also seek flexibility to propose changes to the Project, especially in situations where such changes may decrease the Developer’s costs without diminishing the quality of the Project. The Concession Agreement will give the Developer a right to propose changes, which are typically subject to the Department’s consent and must be performed at the Developer’s sole cost and expense. Departments should note that there is precedent in the U.S. market for the Concession Agreement to require the Developer to share with the Department a portion of the savings realized by the implementation of a Developer Change.
Some Concession Agreements may require the Developer to provide additional traffic capacity at its own cost and expense to meet minimum performance standards once certain pre-set triggers have been met. In order to establish the long-term necessity of the enhancements, triggers based on daily or monthly traffic levels usually must be exceeded over a meaningful period of time. The enhancements required may vary by project. They may include:

- improvements to certain intersections,
- the addition of new lanes, signs, equipment, or
- other capital changes that improve performance.

The required enhancements may be described in detail in the original Concession Agreement or may be left intentionally undefined.

These triggers may help to achieve acceptable performance over the entire life of the Project, in particular because they are intended to encourage the Developer to make the appropriate enhancements to do so. A balance must be struck when negotiating the precise triggers and corresponding capacity requirements. On the one hand, clearly defined triggers that ‘automatically’ lead to capacity enhancement measures can reduce uncertainty for both the Developer and the Department. On the other hand, if applied too rigidly, these mechanisms may lead to sub-optimal investment decisions and unintended effects.

Developers will typically be afforded a period of time after the occurrence of the trigger in order to complete the enhancements, particularly if it requires mobilizing major construction equipment, obtaining new permits, or acquiring land. In some cases, the Developer’s ability to complete the enhancement will depend on the Department’s participation, such as in the acquisition of land.

The capacity enhancements may occur years after the construction of the original Project, which can pose several challenges. For example, the Developer may not be able to obtain financing quickly or affordably, either because the financial markets are not interested in financing the enhancement or if the financial metrics for the original Project, such as coverage ratios, are not likely to be maintained if the enhancement is not undertaken. Alternatively, the enhancement stipulated in the Concession Agreement may no longer be the appropriate technical solution due to changes in technology or regulations.

Potential solutions to these challenges may include (a) ensuring that performance triggers are linked to financial triggers (such as revenue levels or debt service coverage ratios); (b) providing a reasonable amount of time for the Developer to complete the enhancements; or (c) allowing the Developer a degree of flexibility to achieve the enhancement, such as offering solutions that have comparable results or providing the Developer with the option to pay liquidated damages in lieu of implementing the enhancement. If the Department permits the Developer to pay liquidated damages in lieu of implementing the enhancement, the Developer will likely choose to pay if the cost of the enhancement exceeds the liquidated damages, so the Department, in consultation with its financial advisor and technical experts, should establish liquidated damages amounts which reflect the true cost to the Department and the travelling public of foregoing the enhancement in order to better align the Developer’s incentives with the needs of the public.
21 Nature of Developer’s Proprietary Interest

The Developer’s “proprietary interest” refers to the extent to which the Developer has a tangible or intangible interest in the Project or the underlying real estate. This issue manifests itself when determining the legal means by which the Developer is granted the access rights needed to perform its obligations under the Concession Agreement. Broadly speaking, there are two principal means by which the Developer is afforded these rights: (i) a leasehold interest in the underlying real estate; and (ii) a contractual license/permit to use.

From a practical perspective, both approaches give the Developer substantially similar rights to access the Project and perform all of its obligations under the Concession Agreement. As a general rule, however, Departments are often reluctant to grant leasehold interests in their highways (the concern being that the grant of a leasehold interest implies that legal ownership of the highway has in some way been transferred to the private sector). Additional practical and legal considerations often influence the decision on which approach to take, such as:

- Taxes – a leasehold interest may be subject to State or local real property tax, transfer tax, and recordation tax, whereas an intangible right (such as license or permit to use) may not be subject to such taxes (or may be subject to similar taxes in lower amounts);
- Legal Rights – in some jurisdictions, a lessee may have the benefit of legal rights and remedies that both undermine the traditional risk allocation in a Concession Agreement and cannot, as a matter of law, be waived; and
- Underlying Property Interest – the Department may not be capable of granting a leasehold interest to the Developer in respect of the entirety of the Project. Although significant sections of the right of way for the Project will typically be owned by the Department, it is not uncommon for the Department to be incapable of granting a lease in respect of material sections of the right of way, particularly in respect of those sections of the right of way that are secured via access rights granted by way of contract with third parties (e.g., an easement granted to the Department to establish a bridge crossing a third party’s property).
22 Contract Term

In most toll concession P3s in the United States, the Department at the beginning of the Project procurement will specify the length of the Term of the Concession Agreement. In addition to restrictions in Applicable Law with respect to the maximum permitted Term, the fundamental principle that Departments should bear in mind is that for a Project to be financeable, the Term must be long enough to permit the Developer to spread out its debt service (and other expenses) over a sufficient number of years so that the expected Project cash flows cover these amounts as they fall due. Consequently, the magnitude of construction costs to be financed and the anticipated toll revenues play a key role in determining the Term of the Concession Agreement. Departments should also bear in mind that although Lenders typically require debt to be repaid a few years prior to the expiration of the Term (in order to accommodate a potential restructuring of the debt at some point), there are limits to the length of time Lenders will wait to be repaid.

Other considerations are relevant to the Department’s determination of the Term, such as mitigating demand-risk for the Developer (e.g., in the event of lower-than-projected traffic volume or longer-than-expected ramp-up periods, a longer Term could mitigate against these risks by giving the Developer a longer period of time to “earn back” the lost revenue), the level of the toll rates (including any caps on the maximum toll rate the Developer is permitted to charge) and the Department’s expectation of the Concession Fee (if any). Even if it is economically possible for the Developer to pay its debt service, operating and maintenance expenses and earn a reasonable return in a relatively short Term (such as 20 years), these other considerations may lead the Department to prefer a longer Term that is subject to additional constraints (e.g., the expected level of tolls necessary to repay the debt in a shorter period may be unacceptable from a policy perspective, even if traffic and revenue studies indicate consumers may be capable of paying such a higher amount). However, in setting a Term that extends over a period of decades, the Department should also take into consideration its loss of direct control over the Project. For example, the Developer could be underperforming, but not to such an extent that would trigger a Developer Default. Consumer backlash could lead the Department to voluntarily terminate the Concession Agreement for convenience, although a longer Term in such a scenario could increase the cost of termination.

Potential tax benefits may also play a role in determining the length of the Concession Agreement, although their significance will vary according to a number of considerations, including the tax structuring choices made by the Developer, the rights granted to the Developer with respect to any existing assets in the Project Right of Way, and others. Both the Department and the Developer should consult their financial and tax advisors for advice on the potential tax ramifications of the proposed Term of the Concession Agreement.
23 Developer Indemnities

23.1 Scope of Indemnities

The indemnity provisions in a Concession Agreement protect the Department against the risk that the Developer’s actions generate liabilities for the Department outside of the Concession Agreement. The Developer will often be required to indemnify the Department and a class of other indemnified parties (including the Department’s employees and officers, the State itself, and any other State agency or body associated with the procurement or management of the Project) against:

- claims made by third parties that arise out of the Developer’s performance or non-performance of the Concession Agreement;
- violations of securities laws by the Developer in connection with the financing of the Project;
- patent or trademark claims associated with the Developer’s use of intellectual property on the Project;
- damage caused to property or loss of life as a result of the Work performed by the Developer; or
- other matters relevant to the particular Project.

The Developer’s indemnity obligation will usually not apply when the third party claim arises as a result of the gross negligence, willful misconduct or fraud of any of the Indemnified Parties, or where the third party claim arises due to the performance or non-performance by the Indemnified Party (including the Department) under the Concession Agreement. Departments and their legal advisors should balance the scope of indemnities with the risks the Developer is undertaking pursuant to the Concession Agreement.

23.2 Indemnification Procedures

Because the Developer will be required to pay the Department’s losses associated with third party claims, the Concession Agreement will typically provide that the Department must give notice to the Developer upon receiving notice of such a claim and afford the Developer some level of control and/or management of the defense and settlement of the relevant claim. However, the extent to which such rights can be delegated to the Developer by the Department is often complicated by matters relating to sovereign immunity and legal restrictions in the relevant State. Additionally, some States will not permit the delegation of the defense of a claim to a third party without the prior approval of the relevant Attorney General’s office.
24 Dispute Resolution

The Concession Agreement will generally establish procedures for the resolution of disputes between the Developer and the Department. The subject matter of such procedures is often broad and may include any claim, dispute, disagreement or controversy between the Developer and the Department concerning their respective actions, rights and obligations under the Concession Agreement. Typically the Concession Agreement will provide that, in the event of a dispute, the Developer and Department will first attempt to resolve it through good faith negotiations between their designated representatives. If the dispute is not resolved within a period of time set forth in the Concession Agreement, either party will typically have the right to commence formal discussions between their executive-level representatives. If such discussions fail to resolve the dispute before a deadline prescribed by the Concession Agreement, then typically either the Developer or the Department may initiate non-binding mediation and, in the event that the dispute continues after the conclusion of mediation, each party will have the right to litigate the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Concession Agreement concerning venue and choice of law. Concession Agreements may contemplate the use of binding arbitration rather than litigation, although many Departments are bound by statutes requiring disputes to be heard in court, and some laws may specify special courts to address claims against State agencies. Typically the parties will be required to bear their own costs during the course of a dispute, and the Concession Agreement will require them to continue to perform their obligations while a resolution is pending.

Where mediation of a dispute has been unsuccessful and the dispute is technical in nature (such as the proper application of particular engineering specifications, or the interpretation of Technical Requirements), the Concession Agreement may entitle either party to initiate a hearing of the dispute by a panel of independent subject matter experts appointed by the parties before commencing litigation. The decision of such a panel may entitle a party to interim relief relating to the dispute, but will not typically prejudice the right of either party to litigate the matter. In many cases, the Department cannot be party to an agreement that provides for binding arbitration of claims.
25 Intellectual Property

25.1 Ownership and Licensing of Intellectual Property

In most Projects, the Developer will need to use a variety of intellectual property in order to perform its obligations under the Concession Agreement. The intellectual property may be owned by the Department, the Developer or a third party. The Concession Agreement will usually specify that intellectual property owned by the Department, the Developer or a third party will remain the exclusive property of such party at all times. However, the Department and the Developer will typically be required to grant a license to each other for the use of intellectual property that they own. Where the intellectual property is owned by a third party, the Developer often bears the responsibility for procuring a license in favor of the Department that is similar in scope to the license it provides with respect to its own intellectual property.

Such licenses can be broad (i.e., for use in connection with the Project and other facilities or programs) or narrow (i.e., for use solely in connection with the Project). Whether a broad or narrow license is granted varies from one Project to another and can depend on the type of intellectual property in question. The Department will typically grant a narrow license to the Developer for intellectual property that is pre-existing and of general applicability (“background IP”). The Developer will typically grant a broad license to the Department for intellectual property developed specifically for the Project (“foreground IP”) or at least provide the Department the right to purchase foreground IP for use in other facilities on commercially reasonable terms.

25.2 Intellectual Property Rights on Expiry or Termination of the Concession Agreement

Developers often seek to limit access to portions of their proprietary intellectual property which constitute patents or trade secrets, fearing that any public disclosure could deprive the Developer of the property’s commercial value. Consequently, a Developer may insist that the Department only be permitted to exercise its license to such proprietary intellectual property upon the expiration or Early Termination of the Concession Agreement or exercise of the Department’s step-in rights. Departments should be aware, however, that insolvency of the Developer could render a license ineffective, or that the Developer (or its Subcontractor who owns the intellectual property) may not cooperate in handing over the relevant intellectual property in a potentially contentious termination scenario. Each possibility presents a material risk that could jeopardize the Department’s ability to operate the Project when it has assumed the obligations of the Developer under the Concession Agreement. One common means of mitigating this risk for the Department in a way that is satisfactory to the Developer is to require the Developer to place this proprietary intellectual property (such as software source codes and related documentation) in an escrow with an independent third party, subject to the express condition that it can be accessed by the Department upon the occurrence of certain termination and insolvency scenarios (e.g., termination for Developer Default).
26 Amendments to Key Developer Documents

The Concession Agreement will typically require the Developer to submit to the Department all of its primary contracts critical to design, construction, operations, maintenance, financing and any other similar activities related to the Project (the “Key Developer Documents”) for review prior to execution thereof. This review is intended to ensure that these Key Developer Documents do not adversely impact or interfere with the Department’s rights under the Concession Agreement. Once executed, however, the Developer will want to retain some measure of flexibility to amend these Key Developer Documents going forward, while the Department will not want the Developer to simply rewrite them after they have been reviewed and accepted. Of particular concern to the Department will be amendments to Key Developer Documents that increase the Department’s potential liabilities, both during the Term and on Early Termination of the Concession Agreement. The Department will typically want to ensure that its potential liabilities cannot be increased by way of an amendment, particularly in the case of the Developer’s financing documents (which can generate substantial termination compensation obligations). To protect against the risk that Key Developer Documents will be amended in a manner detrimental to the Department, the Concession Agreement will typically state that the amendments to Key Developer Documents cannot, in the absence of the Department’s prior written approval of the relevant amendments, have the effect of increasing the Department’s liabilities under the Concession Agreement.
27 Assignment

27.1 Introduction

In the early stages of the procurement process for any P3 transaction, the Department will generally solicit requests for qualification from prospective bidder teams in the market. The Department will generally evaluate each respondent in a number of predetermined areas, concluding with the shortlisting of several bidders who are then invited to submit detailed proposals.

As part of the aforementioned evaluation, an assessment is generally undertaken of the respondent team’s Equity Members’ credentials, principally in the following areas:

- Availability of capital that can be committed to invest in the Project;
- Experience investing in similar projects;
- Demonstrated ability to manage effectively all aspects of future Work on the Project; and
- To the extent relevant, experience of managing the self-performance of operations and/or maintenance by special-purpose Developers that choose not to subcontract out those responsibilities on a long-term basis.

During the competitive bidding process, the Department will generally reserve for itself approval rights with respect to changes to certain key members of a bidder’s team. The reservation of such rights affords the Department the opportunity to ensure that the qualifications of each bidder team (which led to those teams being shortlisted) cannot be eroded through changes being made to key members of the teams. As a general rule, if a bidder team requests approval of a change to a key member of its bidding team, the Department should only approve any such request if it can be confident that the proposed change does not have an adverse impact on the Department’s original evaluation of the bidder team’s credentials.

The Department’s concerns with respect to changes to members of the bidding team during the competitive bidding process apply equally during the Term. Accordingly, the Concession Agreement will generally include provisions that require the Department’s approval to certain changes in the identity of the Developer’s investors or supply chain members.

For the purposes of this Guide, discussion is limited to the extent to which the Department should have approval rights with respect to any Change in Ownership of the Developer (i.e., changes in the ultimate ownership, either directly or indirectly, of the equity interest in the Project).

27.2 Assignments

27.2.1 Assignment by the Developer

For the reasons discussed in Chapter 5 (Changes in Equity Interests), there will generally be a restriction on the Developer from directly assigning or transferring its rights under the Concession Agreement without the consent of the Department. An exception will generally be included in relation to an assignment to, or at the direction of, the Collateral Agent in an enforcement scenario in accordance with the terms of the Direct Agreement (see also Chapter 11, Lender Rights and Direct Agreement).
27.2.2 Assignment by the Department

The Department is also generally restricted from assigning or transferring its rights under the Concession Agreement without the consent of the Developer. An exception is typically provided with respect to a transfer to a public agency permitted by law, which is sometimes restricted to those public agencies that succeed to the governmental powers and authority of the Department. The Department will generally have to give reasonable notice of this assignment (e.g., 90 days) and also provide assurances that the assignee is duly authorized and financially capable of performing the Department’s obligations under the Concession Agreement.

27.3 When Does a Change in Ownership Occur?

Broadly, a Change in Ownership can arise in one of two ways:

- **Directly** – i.e., through a change in the ownership of shares or membership interests in the Developer.
- **Indirectly** – i.e., as a result of a change in the ownership of shares or membership interests in any entity that is a direct or indirect holding company of shares or membership in the Developer.

Although the Concession Agreement will generally include provisions relating to direct changes in the ownership of shares or membership interests in the Developer, the Department will also generally seek to ensure that the provisions of the Concession Agreement capture a change in the ownership of any shares or membership of any entity in the vertical ownership chain between the Developer and the relevant investors that were first evaluated by the Department in putting together the shortlist of bidders for the Project.

The Department will want to ensure that any Change in Ownership restrictions cannot be circumvented through sophisticated legal structuring of equity transfers and accordingly, any such restrictions would generally capture transfers of any interest (whether such interest is legally held by the transferor (e.g., the owner of a share of stock in the Developer who wishes to sell it to a third party) or held by third party for the benefit of the transferor (e.g., a trust that owns the stock in the Developer for the benefit of an owner, where the owner seeks to sell its beneficial interest to a third party)) in shares or membership interests, together with transfers of economic interest in the same (e.g., voting or dividend rights).
28 Labor Best Practices

28.1 Introduction

As described in Chapter 14 (“Federal Requirements”), if a Project receives any Federal assistance pursuant to Title 23 of the United States Code, the Developer is required to comply (and require its Subcontractors to comply) with certain Federal laws, including labor laws, pertaining to the use of Federal funds. Additionally, all employers associated with a Project – including the Developer and any contractors, subcontractors, and concessionaires – are required to comply with any applicable Federal labor and employment laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the National Labor Relations Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Davis-Bacon Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as well as any relevant State and local requirements.

However, as a best practice, Departments and Developers are encouraged to consider adopting labor practices that provide worker protections beyond those that are required by law. Such practices can help ensure that a Project benefits the communities in which the Project is located by creating good middle-class jobs, and can also provide significant benefits to employers and taxpayers by encouraging efficiencies that result from the reduced worker turnover, increased productivity, higher-quality work, and more reliable performance produced by a well-trained, well-compensated workforce. By adopting or promoting adoption of such practices, Departments and Developers can reward employers who invest in their workforces, create and retain high-quality jobs, and deliver the best quality performance, and can leverage public investments to produce economic benefits even beyond the value of the Project. A Project that incorporates such practices can serve as a model for other projects and employers in the area and nationwide.

Some jurisdictions already encourage or require such practices in the P3 context. For example, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, and Pennsylvania each has its own specific laws requiring contractors working on P3 projects to meet certain standards, such as the payment of prevailing wages and equal employment opportunity.

Where permitted by law, Departments can promote such “high road” labor practices in one of two ways – by incorporating them as preferences or requirements during the bidding process itself or by including them in contract requirements. Some of the sections below provide sample contract language to serve as examples for Departments choosing to incorporate these types of best practices into contracts with Developers and Subcontractors. Departments can also choose to incorporate these practices as preferences or requirements in the bidding process so that they are part of the criteria Departments use to evaluate bidders on a Project.

The sample contract language provided is intended only as guidance; it is expected that Departments will fashion their own provisions based on their specific needs, priorities, and preferences. As such, the sections below use descriptive rather than prescriptive terms in articulating the labor practices at issue. However, State and local governments are encouraged to consider implementing these practices given their benefits to workers, government entities, taxpayers, and the community at large.

The best practices and sample language included below are not intended to satisfy or replace any requirements imposed by Federal, State, or local law. Federal, State, or local law may mandate different or additional requirements or contractual clauses for certain types of contracts or subcontracts, including P3s, or may prohibit some types of arrangements or provisions. If so, the employer must follow those requirements, which may differ substantially from the sample provisions below. In particular, if a Project receives any Federal
assistance or involves a Federal contract or subcontract, Developers should ensure that they are in compliance with all relevant Federal requirements.\textsuperscript{10}

Labor practices can be adopted on a jurisdiction-wide basis (typically through State or local laws and regulations) or on a Project-by-Project basis (typically through individual contracts). The sections below outline several labor practices that Departments and Developers can incorporate into P3 agreements. Such best practices may include: (i) prevailing wages and fringe benefits; (ii) employee benefits such as paid sick and family leave and health and retirement benefits; (iii) protections for incumbent and displaced workers; (iv) practices to promote apprenticeship and workforce development; (v) programs to promote workplace health and safety; (vi) practices to promote transparency in wage payment and the proper classification of workers; (vii) practices to promote equal employment opportunity; (viii) adoption of a project labor agreement; and (ix) a systematic approach that seeks to ensure that contractors and subcontractors on a P3 Project are employers whose history demonstrates responsibility and business integrity in their compliance with labor laws and other legal obligations.

\subsection*{28.2 Prevailing Wages and Fringe Benefits}

The Federal Davis-Bacon Act ("DBA"), 40 U.S.C. Chapter 31, Subchapter IV, provides well-established standards for the payment of prevailing wages and fringe benefits for laborers and mechanics who work in construction, alteration, and repair (including painting and decorating). Likewise, the Federal Service Contract Act ("SCA"), 41 U.S.C. Chapter 67, provides well-established standards for the payment of prevailing wages and fringe benefits to service employees. Under the DBA and SCA, covered workers must be paid no less than the wages and fringe benefits that prevail for their classification (or occupation) in their locality.

The DBA and SCA apply to Federal contracts, and DBA requirements also generally apply to projects financed using Federal dollars, including federally assisted highway construction; transportation projects financed using Federal loans, loan guarantees, and credit under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 1998 ("TIFIA") program; and any other transportation projects financed under Title 49, Chapter 53 of the U.S. Code.\textsuperscript{11}

When employers involved in a P3 Project pay fair wages and benefits, they are better able to deliver a quality and timely product by attracting a stable workforce of high-quality, high-skilled, and experienced workers who will complete a job accurately and on time, reducing the high costs associated with absenteeism and worker turnover; lowering costs for recruiting, training, and employee supervision; increasing worker productivity; and receiving higher-quality performance. These outcomes benefit workers, employers, the Developer, investors in the Project, and the public at large. Departments pursuing P3 Projects that are interested in achieving such benefits are encouraged to consider including contract terms requiring that the Developer, together with all contractors, subcontractors, concessionaires, and any other employers associated with a Project, pay their workers fair wages and benefits.

\textsuperscript{10} The FHWA has published a guide for how to apply Federal-aid requirements to P3 transactions. A copy of this guide can be found at \url{http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/toolkit/publications/p3_oversight/default.aspx}. Additional requirements will apply if the Project involves a Federal contract or subcontract.

\textsuperscript{11} See 23 U.S.C. § 113; 23 U.S.C. § 602(c)(1); 49 U.S.C. § 5333(a). Other Federal funding laws that incorporate the DBA’s prevailing wage requirements are listed at 29 C.F.R. § 5.1(a).
In the event a Project is not covered by the DBA and/or SCA,\(^{12}\) Departments and Developers may be able to realize the public and private benefits of fair wages and benefits by drafting Concession Agreements requiring that all employers on a Project pay workers at least the prevailing wages and fringe benefits specified by the U.S. Department of Labor in the applicable DBA or SCA wage determination.\(^{11}\) If workers are employed on a Project to which the DBA or SCA does not apply and are employed in classifications for which DBA and SCA wage and benefit rates are unavailable,\(^{14}\) employers on the Project could pay such workers either the rates listed for the most analogous classification on the DBA or SCA wage determination for the relevant locality, or, for workers who do not have an analogous DBA or SCA classification, no less than the wages and benefits that prevail among the majority of employees who perform similar work in the geographic area at issue.\(^{15}\) Federal DBA and SCA wage rates are publicly available.\(^{16}\) If a State or locality has its own prevailing wage laws that exceed the requirements of the DBA and SCA,\(^{17}\) it may be more appropriate to incorporate these laws into the P3 agreement rather than (or in addition to) the DBA and SCA.\(^{18}\)

Finally, Departments can also choose to require a higher minimum wage “floor” independent of the applicable prevailing wage for workers on Concession Agreements. To that end, Executive Order 13658, Establishing a Minimum Wage for Contractors, establishes a minimum wage of $10.10, subject to annual increases based on the Consumer Price Index, for workers on covered Federal contracts.\(^{19}\) Departments could incorporate a similar provision into P3 agreements.\(^{20}\)

\(^{12}\) While the DBA applies both to Federal contracts and subcontracts and to most federally assisted projects, the SCA applies only to Federal contracts and subcontracts, but not to federally assisted projects.

\(^{13}\) Under the DBA and SCA, covered contractors are free to satisfy any fringe benefits requirements by paying employees the cash value of the fringe benefits specified in a wage determination. Departments and Developers choosing to implement a fringe benefit component of a prevailing wage requirement for a P3 could include a similar option to maximize flexibility.

\(^{14}\) E.g., employees who are neither “laborers and mechanics” nor “service employees” as defined by the DBA and SCA. If a project is subject to the DBA or SCA and employs workers in classifications that are not included on an applicable wage determination, the classification must be added through a conformance procedure.

\(^{15}\) If information is unavailable for the particular area, employers could use prevailing wages for similarly situated employees in a geographic area with a similar median income.

\(^{16}\) Locality-specific wage determinations under the DBA and SCA can be found at Wage Determinations Online at http://www.wdol.gov.

\(^{17}\) Neither the DBA nor the SCA preempts State or local prevailing wage laws.


\(^{19}\) See E.O. 13658 §§ 2(a), 7.

\(^{20}\) All Developers and Subcontractors must, of course, also comply with all applicable Federal, State, and local minimum wages laws and regulations.
An example provision requiring the payment of prevailing wages as well as a minimum wage “floor” is below:

(a) The [Developer] shall, and shall require that all its [Subcontractors], pay any laborers and mechanics, as defined in the regulations implementing the Davis-Bacon Act, 29 C.F.R. § 5.2(m), working at the site of the Project who work in construction, alteration, and repair (including painting and decorating) no less than the applicable prevailing wages and fringe benefits set forth by the United States Department of Labor for such workers under 40 U.S.C. Chapter 31, Subchapter IV, otherwise known as the Davis-Bacon Act [or applicable State prevailing wage requirements];

(b) The [Developer] shall, and shall require that all its [Subcontractors], pay any of their service employees, defined as any workers engaged in the performance of a contract the principal purpose of which is to furnish services (other than any workers employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity, as defined in 29 C.F.R. part 541), who are working on the Project no less than the applicable prevailing wages and fringe benefits set forth by the United States Department of Labor for such employees under 41 U.S.C. Chapter 67, otherwise known as the Service Contract Act [or the applicable State prevailing wage requirements];

(c) The fringe benefits specified in (a) and (b) may be satisfied through the [Developer’s] or [Subcontractor’s] irrevocably paying contributions to an independent trustee or other third person pursuant to an existing bona fide fund, plan, or program on the workers’ behalf; by furnishing bona fide fringe benefits to the workers; by making equivalent payments in cash to the workers; or any combination of the above methods.

(d) For any workers of the [Developer] and its [Subcontractors] working on the Project for whom the prevailing wage and benefit determinations described in (a) and (b) are not available or do not exist, the [Developer] shall, and shall require that all of its [Subcontractors], pay such workers either

1) No less than the prevailing wages and fringe benefits listed for a classification under the Davis-Bacon Act or Service Contract Act [or applicable State prevailing wage law] that is substantially similar to the worker’s classification, or

2) No less than the wages and fringe benefits that prevail among the majority of employees who perform similar work in [the geographic area].

(e) Notwithstanding the above provisions, the [Developer] shall, and shall require that all its [Subcontractors], pay each worker who performs work on the [Project] at least a minimum wage of [amount] per hour.

28.3 Employee Benefits

28.3.1 Paid Sick and Family Leave

In addition to prevailing wage and fringe benefit provisions, another best practice is for Departments to ensure that employers associated with a P3 Project provide their workers with paid sick and family leave. The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) guarantees eligible employees of covered employers up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave per year, with continuation of group health insurance coverage, to address a serious health condition of the worker or a close family member, care for a newborn, and attend to other needs. It also provides up to 26 weeks of leave to care for a covered servicemember recovering from a serious injury or illness incurred in the line of duty on active duty. However, because of minimum requirements regarding employer size and length of employee service, the FMLA covers only about 60 percent
of American workers and less than one-fifth of all new mothers. Moreover, because FMLA leave is unpaid, many workers cannot afford to take the full amount of leave they need.

Even fewer American workers have access to paid sick and family leave. According to one survey, only 53 percent of workers reported having access to paid sick days to cover their own illness, only 48 percent reported being able to take paid leave to care for a family member, and only 39 percent reported access to paid family leave for the birth of a child. Only 12 percent of American companies offer paid leave for new parents.

Paid family and medical leave improves worker productivity, enables employees who are sick or injured to stay home and recover rather than working at less than full strength and potentially passing illnesses on to other workers, and saves employers costs, all of which benefit Projects. Additionally, paid sick and family leave policies can help employers recruit and retain talented workers, which increases the quality of the work performed on a Project and decreases the recruiting and training costs and productivity losses that result from excessive turnover. For example, one survey showed that businesses with family-friendly policies including either paid or unpaid sick leave were more likely than other businesses to have above-average labor productivity. As a result, Departments that require paid sick and family leave of P3 Developers and other employers will attract productive, cost-effective bidders.


An example provision requiring the payment of paid sick and family leave is below:  

(a) The [Developer] shall, and shall require that all its [Subcontractors], permit each worker on the Project to accrue at least [number] days of leave per [time period], with full entitlement to the worker’s pay, to be used for one or more of the following reasons:

   1) Because of the worker’s physical or mental illness, injury, or medical condition;

   2) To obtain professional medical diagnosis or care or preventive medical care for the worker;

   3) Because of the birth of a child of the worker and in order to care for such son or daughter; or because of the placement of a son or daughter with the worker for adoption or foster care;

   4) To care for a child, spouse, domestic partner, parent, or [other close family member] who has any of the needs or criteria described in (1), (2), or (3);

   5) Because of a [qualifying exigency] arising out of the fact that a [close family member described in (4)] is on active military duty;

   6) An absence resulting from domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking, if the time is to seek medical attention for the employee or the employee’s [close family member described in (4)]; to recover from physical or psychological injury or disability caused by domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking; to obtain or assist a [close family member described in (4)] in obtaining services from a victim services organization; to obtain or assist a [close family member described in (4)] in obtaining psychological or other counseling; to seek relocation; or to take legal action, including preparing for or participating in any civil or criminal legal proceeding related to or resulting from domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking; or

   7) [Any other grounds the Department deems sufficient to warrant family or medical leave].

(b) The [Developer] shall, and shall require that all its [Subcontractors], permit each worker on the Project to accrue at least [number] days of leave per [time period], with full entitlement to the worker’s pay and benefits, to care for a military servicemember with a serious illness or injury if the worker is the servicemember’s [close family member described in (4)] or next of kin.  

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26 The example provision is adapted in part from the FMLA and the Healthy Families Act, proposed legislation that has been introduced in Congress. See Healthy Families Act, H.R. 932, 114th Cong. (2015). The Healthy Families Act would allow employees to accrue up to seven days of paid sick or family leave per year, but Departments may consider setting higher standards. For example, California’s family leave law provides up to six weeks of paid leave at up to 55 percent of workers’ weekly earnings up to a maximum weekly dollar amount. See Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code §§ 3301, 2655. In addition to sick leave and leave to care for a sick family member or new child, the sample provision here includes language modeled after the FMLA’s “qualifying exigency” and “military caregiver leave,” as well as a provision modeled after the Healthy Families Act’s leave for absences resulting from domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.

27 While the sample language does not include a suggested number of days of leave for the specified conditions, it includes a separate provision for military caregiver leave. This is modeled after the FMLA, which provides 26 weeks for military caregiver leave compared to 12 weeks of leave for the other conditions covered by the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(1), (3).
28.3.2 Health and Retirement Benefits

Like paid sick leave, health and retirement coverage benefits employees, employers, and the Department and its taxpayers. These benefits help attract and retain quality employees and reduce turnover, because the best and most capable workers are most likely to work for, and remain with, employers who provide these important benefits. Health benefits also enable employees to obtain quality, affordable care and treatment when they are sick or injured, and this care and treatment enables workers to return to their full productivity levels at work as soon as is practicable, saving a Project time and money. And employers who contribute to health and retirement plans are often able to realize tax savings because such contributions, as well as expenses associated with plans, can be tax-deductible. Finally, these benefits can promote a strong safety culture, because when companies make long-term investments in employees, they promote improved operational execution and productivity and a well-trained, knowledgeable, and stable workforce that is capable of meeting critical safety demands.

For these reasons, Departments may consider encouraging Developers and Subcontractors to provide health and retirement benefits through measures such as financial incentives and giving Developers and Subcontractors who provide such benefits preference or priority during the bidding process. Departments should ensure that any such incentives or preferences are consistent with Federal, State, and local law, including the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).

28.4 Incumbent Worker Nondisplacement and Protections

When a Department enters into a P3 to replace or take over a Project that was previously operated or maintained by a public entity (or by another private entity), the agreement may seek to retain workers previously working at that entity. If the P3 Project wholly displaces the existing workforce, the result can be harmful not only for the workers who lose their jobs but also for the Project, which will lose workers with a significant amount of expertise and knowledge. Additionally, if a P3 Project results in a decline in workers’ wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment, it can impair worker recruitment and retention, and may also compromise the success of future P3 initiatives. Conversely, keeping existing workers provides continuity in the delivery of services and ensures that a Project has an experienced, trained workforce that is familiar with a worksite, its operations, and its unique requirements. As such, many Departments will find it in their interests to include in P3 contracts, or in legislation, protections for incumbent workers affected by a P3.

28 As to health insurance specifically, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) added new Internal Revenue Code provisions (“Employer Shared Responsibility provisions”) that apply to certain large employers (generally, firms with at least 50 full-time and full-time equivalent employees in the prior year). Under these Employer Shared Responsibility provisions, if the applicable large employers do not offer affordable health coverage that provides a minimum level of coverage to their full-time employees (and their dependents), the employer may be subject to an Employer Shared Responsibility payment if at least one of its full-time employees receives a premium tax credit for purchasing individual coverage on one of the new Affordable Insurance Exchanges, also called a Health Insurance Marketplace. Many Developers and Subcontractors, due to their size, will be subject to the Employer Shared Responsibility provisions, but Departments may consider incentivizing Developers and Subcontractors who are not subject to these provisions to provide their employees with health benefits.

29 This may be particularly important where the previous workforce included veterans who held veterans preference under laws established by the public entity.
Federal law provides two general models for incumbent worker nondisplacement and other protections that Departments may consider adopting into P3s. One model provides incumbent employees with the right of first refusal of employment with the new employer. For example, Executive Order 13495, which applies to service employees on Federal contracts covered by the Service Contract Act, requires that when a service contract expires and a follow-on contract is awarded for the same or similar services as the same location, the new (successor) contractor generally must provide all of the service employees who had worked for the previous (predecessor) contractor during the last month of the predecessor contract the right of first refusal of employment with the successor contractor.30 There are a few exceptions to this general rule. Most notably, the successor contractor may give priority to its own employees who worked for at least three months immediately preceding the new contract and would otherwise face layoff or discharge, it need not offer employment to workers who are being retained by the predecessor contractor, and the successor has discretion to employ fewer employees than the predecessor. 31 The predecessor contractor must provide notice to its employees of their rights under E.O. 13495. 32 Another example of this type of protection can be found in a regulation that applies when Federal government work is converted to private contract work.33 This provision requires that a contractor give government workers who have been, or will be, adversely affected or separated from government service as a result of the new contract a right of first refusal for jobs under the contract for which they are qualified.

A more comprehensive model in Federal law for ensuring that a new project does not result in the worsening of employment conditions is Section 13(c) of the Federal Transit Act.34 Section 13(c) protects employee rights, including collective bargaining rights, if they pre-existed Federal assistance. Under Section 13(c), as a condition of receiving financial assistance from the Federal Transit Administration to acquire, improve, or operate a mass transit system, the State or local entity receiving such assistance is required to put arrangements in place to protect the interests of employees who may be affected by such assistance. Arrangements under 13(c) must include provisions that may be necessary for (1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) under existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise, (2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights, (3) the protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions related to employment, (4) assurances of employment to employees of acquired public transportation systems, (5) assurances of priority of reemployment of employees whose employment is ended or who are laid off, and (6) paid training or retraining programs.35 These arrangements must be certified by the Department of Labor. Departments can require similar arrangements in the P3

31 See 29 C.F.R. § 9.12(c)(1), (d). If the successor contractor employs fewer employees than its predecessor, it must still provide a right of first refusal to the predecessor’s employees for 90 days after the contract begins to fill any vacancies that arise. For a complete list of exceptions to the nondisplacement rule, see 29 C.F.R. § 9.12(c) and (d).
32 See id. § 9.11(b).
33 See 48 C.F.R. § 52.207-3.
34 See 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b).
35 Id. § 5333(b)(2).
context to protect the rights of employees affected by a P3. While the 13(c) model may be particularly appropriate in the context of transit P3 Projects, it can be adapted to non-transit projects as well. The Department of Labor’s website includes several model 13(c) agreements.\textsuperscript{16}

Other models exist in which the P3 may maintain a closer relationship with the public entity that previously operated or maintained the Project. For example, under some circumstances, Developers and Subcontractors may continue utilizing the existing public entity and its employees to work on the Project, such as by using the public entity as a contractor to the Developer or a Subcontractor or by entering into an employee leasing arrangement with the public entity. Depending on the circumstances, these types of arrangements may enable the public employees to continue their government service and, if they are still considered common-law employees of the governmental entity, to retain their governmental pay, pension, and health benefits. For example, such an arrangement might enable the former public employees to retain the defined benefit pension plans in which they participated as public employees. Departments entering into these types of arrangements should ensure that they are in compliance with all relevant legal requirements, including regulations of the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service that pertain to benefit plans.

State laws also provide useful examples for Departments seeking to require or encourage protective arrangements as a condition of entering into a P3. For example, Illinois legislation authorizing a P3 for Chicago Midway International Airport required the private entity to offer the public employees who would become employees of the private entity the economic equivalent of the standard of their public sector wages and benefits, and also required the government to offer substantially similar alternative jobs to those public employees.\textsuperscript{17} Pennsylvania requires that for any P3 in the transportation context, the development entity must offer employment to any public employees in good standing who would lose their jobs due to the execution of a Concession Agreement, including “substantially identical” salaries and benefits to those they received as public employees.\textsuperscript{18}

While the specific terms of a protective agreement in the context of a P3 will likely vary by Department and by Project, the inclusion of protections for incumbent workers, particularly those that protect such workers from displacement and maintain their wages and benefits, can yield benefits for workers, management, and Departments.

### 28.5 Workforce Development and Apprenticeship

Departments are also encouraged to consider promoting workforce development activities, including partnering with the public workforce system to assist in outreach, recruitment, screening, assessment, and job training for workers of Developers and their Subcontractors. Under these models, Developers and Subcontractors can be offered incentives or be required to work with the local Workforce Development Board to provide any or all of the following: notification of upcoming positions (including necessary experience and skills requirements), identification of on-the-job training opportunities, assistance in the development of customized training opportunities for positions associated with the project, and review of pre-screened applicants.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} See U.S. Dept’ of Labor, Office of Labor-Management Standards, Mass Transit Employee Protections, \url{http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/compltransit.htm}. This web page includes a discussion of Section 13(c) as well as links to four Section 13(c) agreements endorsed by the Department, including the Unified Protective Arrangement, the Special Warranty Arrangement, the Nonunion Protective Arrangements, and the Model (“National”) Agreement.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 615/35, 615/40. The Midway P3 Project ultimately did not go forward.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} 74 Pa. C.S. § 9110(a)(19).
\end{itemize}
One specific area of workforce development includes Registered Apprenticeships. Apprenticeships – a combination of on-the-job learning and related instruction in which workers learn how to perform a highly skilled occupation – can yield valuable benefits for workers seeking to earn wages and learn skills, for employers striving to improve their own workforce, and for local and State governments wishing to create and sustain economic growth. As such, many Departments may encourage employers associated with a Project to participate in high-quality Registered Apprenticeship programs that can lead to sustainable careers in transportation and related industries like construction.

The U.S. Department of Labor administers the National Registered Apprenticeship system, which partners with employers, employer associations, labor management organizations, State and local governments, community organizations, and others to promote high-quality apprenticeship programs. In a successful Registered Apprenticeship program, the apprentice receives a combination of on-the-job training and structured learning. The apprentice begins working from day one and earns gradual wage increases as he or she gains the necessary skills. At the conclusion of the program, the apprentice receives a portable, nationally-recognized credential that certifies that he or she has reached a certain level of proficiency. In the United States today, there are over 19,000 active Registered Apprenticeship programs that offer training to over 410,000 Registered Apprentices. Numerous industries that participate in Registered Apprenticeship programs are directly relevant to a transportation P3 Project, including construction, manufacturing, telecommunications, and information technology.

Developers and their Subcontractors who employ Registered Apprentices have the benefit of creating a pipeline of skilled workers who become, through their training, familiar with the specific needs and specifications of their industry and employer and, as a result, produce high-quality results. The on-the-job learning that apprentices receive from more experienced workers leads to increased productivity and knowledge transfer. Registered Apprenticeship programs also enhance employee retention; in 2011, 87 percent of apprentices who completed a Registered Apprenticeship program were still employed nine months after completing their apprenticeship. And because apprenticeship programs emphasize safety training, they can reduce employer costs associated with workers who become injured or sick while on the job.

State and local governments also see economic benefits from Registered Apprenticeship programs. By expanding the number of highly skilled workers in a State or locality, a Registered Apprenticeship program can help jurisdictions recruit and retain businesses that require such skilled workers. Additionally, because apprentices pay income taxes on their wages, they can generate tax revenue. For example, it is estimated that every $1 the Federal government invests in Registered Apprenticeship programs yields more than $50 in revenue. Finally, apprenticeship provides a path toward employment and higher earnings for a diverse workforce that includes minorities, women, veterans, youth, low-income individuals, and dislocated workers. For example, in 2009, Oregon passed legislation requiring the State’s transportation department to use one-half of 1 percent of eligible Federal highway funds, up to $2.1 million every two years, to increase diversity in the highway construction workforce and to prepare workers who seek to enter the highway construction

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workforce.42 Such spending is authorized by 23 U.S.C. § 140(b), and States and localities may wish to use this available funding as a means of promoting apprenticeship and diversity in the highway workforce.

Departments seeking to secure the benefits of Registered Apprenticeship in a P3 may encourage employers on a P3 to participate in a Registered Apprenticeship program by, for example, providing Developers and Subcontractors with incentives to participate in such programs or granting preferences to bidders who participate in such programs.43 Departments should ensure that any policies pertaining to apprenticeship for P3s are fully consistent with Federal, State, and local law, including ERISA.44 More information on these strategies can be found in the Department of Labor’s Federal Resources Playbook for Registered Apprenticeship.45

28.6 Workplace Health and Safety

28.6.1 Safety and Health Management Programs

Employers who prevent workplace injuries and illnesses are not only protecting their workers’ safety, health, and well-being; they are improving their own efficiency, quality, and bottom line. In a P3 Project, such savings can translate into lower cost, better value, more efficient and reliable performance, and higher-quality services for the Department and taxpayers.

Each year, approximately 4,500 workers are killed on the job and nearly three million suffer serious work-related injuries or illnesses.46 These illnesses and injuries not only have a devastating immediate effect, but can have long-term consequences as well; even with workers’ compensation benefits, the incomes of workers who are injured are, on average, almost $31,000 lower over 10 years than if they had not been injured.47 Workplace injuries have a particularly significant impact on low-wage workers, whose family members must often reduce their own hours of work and wages to care for a disabled partner or family member.48

In addition to the impact on workers, workplace illnesses and injuries cause employers to incur substantial costs and business disruptions. According to one study, the direct cost of the most disabling workplace injuries...
Another study estimated the annual workers’ compensation benefits paid for all compensable injuries and illnesses in 2012 at over $61 billion. Other direct costs may include potential fines from regulatory agencies for violations of workplace health and safety requirements. In addition to these direct costs, other indirect costs can include wages paid to injured workers for absences not covered by workers’ compensation; time lost through work stoppages; administrative time spent by supervisors following injuries; employee training and replacement costs; lost productivity related to accommodation of injured employees and new employee learning curves; and replacement costs of damaged material, machinery, and property.

One way that employers can help ensure workplace safety and health is through a safety and health management program. Such a program is a proactive process to help employers find and fix workplace hazards before workers become hurt or sick. Not only do employers who implement these programs experience dramatic decreases in workplace injuries, but they also often report a transformed workplace culture that can lead to higher productivity and quality, reduced turnover, reduced costs, and greater employee satisfaction. When workers and employers work together to develop a culture of safety, workers are encouraged to offer their ideas and contributions, which can result in greater employee loyalty and higher productivity. And through the process of comprehensively identifying, preventing, and controlling workplace hazards, workers and employers may also identify and correct other flaws and inefficiencies at the workplace, which can translate into increased output and quality.

Thirty-four States already require or encourage employers to implement safety and health management programs. Fifteen States have mandatory safety and health management program regulations for some or all employers, while others provide voluntary guidance, consultation, training, and other assistance; provide financial incentives for employers to implement such programs; or require mandatory safety committees of

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49 Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety, 2014 Liberty Mutual Workplace Safety Index (2014), http://www.libertymutualgroup.com/omapps/ContentServer?c=cms_document&pagename=LMGResearchInstitute%2Fcms_document%2FShowDoc&cid=1138365240689. The “most disabling” injuries are defined by this study as those causing the injured employee to miss six or more days of work.


51 Different entities use various terms to describe systematic approaches to reducing injuries and illnesses in the workplace. Consensus and international standards use the term “Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems,” OSHA has sometimes used “Injury and Illness Prevention Programs” and also uses “Safety and Health Management Programs,” and others use “Safety and Health Programs.” All of these refer to efforts to systematically address workplace safety and health hazards on an ongoing basis to reduce the extent and severity of work-related injuries and illnesses.
some or all employers. In the construction industry, Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") regulations already require employers to initiate and maintain programs that provide for frequent and regular inspections by competent individuals of job sites, materials, and equipment. All employers, however, regardless of industry, may adopt safety and health management programs, and as noted above, such programs are effective in improving efficiency and performance and decreasing costs.

Safety and health management programs typically involve a number of elements, all of which are flexible and can be implemented by large and small businesses alike: management leadership, worker participation, hazard identification, hazard prevention and control, education and training, and program evaluation and improvement. These elements can include, for example, encouraging workers to report concerns, such as hazards, injuries, illnesses, and near misses; identifying workplace hazards through inspections, worker input, and investigations; informing workers of any hazards that may exist; implementing a plan to prioritize and control hazards; educating workers how to recognize hazards, how to assist in eliminating, controlling, and reducing them, and how to properly report injuries and illness; and periodically reviewing the overall program to determine whether it is effective or needs improvement.

In recognition of the benefits of safety and health management programs, Departments assessing candidates for a P3 project can prioritize bidders who implement safety and health management programs, or they can include contract terms requiring bidders to implement such programs. Guidance on implementing these types of programs can be found on OSHA’s website.

28.6.2 Proper Incentives for Reporting Workplace Injuries and Safety Violations

Employers can also promote workplace safety by ensuring that they do not establish programs and systems that – whether intentionally or unintentionally – discourage employees from reporting workplace injuries. For example, some employers may provide bonuses or other incentives for employees, teams, or worksites that have not experienced any injuries in a certain period of time. While these programs often are well-intentioned, they may discourage reporting because reporting an injury can eliminate or reduce employees’ opportunity to earn the relevant reward. Additionally, to the extent that these programs effectively discriminate against workers who report injuries, they may be unlawful under Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health ("OSH") Act and other laws, and if they result in injuries not being reported,
they may cause the employer to violate OSHA regulations that require employers to keep records of workplace injuries.\textsuperscript{55}

To prevent such results and to promote true workplace safety, employers can use different types of incentives, such as those that encourage or reward workers for reporting injuries, illnesses, near-misses, and hazards, for participating in safety and health training, or for taking part in safety and health committees, and thus encourage workers to be actively involved in their employers’ safety and health management system. Departments can use the terms of their contracts or solicitation requirements to encourage such practices, rather than those that may discourage workers from reporting injuries.

An example of a provision incorporating the health and safety protections described above is below:

\begin{quote}
(a) The [Developer] and each [Subcontractor] on a Project must initiate and maintain a written safety and health management program.

(b) Such a program must provide for frequent and regular inspections of the job sites, materials, and equipment to be made by competent persons designated by the [Developer] or [Subcontractor].

(c) Such a program must also involve:
  a. Participation by both management and workers;
  b. Initiatives to regularly and proactively identify, prevent, and control hazards and risks to worker safety and health;
  c. Regular education and training of management and workers; and
  d. Regular evaluations of the program and improvement as necessary.

(d) Such a program may not use incentives that could discourage workers from reporting hazards, illnesses, or injuries, such as associating a benefit or reward for workers, managers, or teams with few or zero reported injuries over a given period of time.

(e) The [Developer] and each [Subcontractor] may not discriminate or retaliate against workers who report hazards, illnesses, or injuries.
\end{quote}

28.7 Wage and Classification Transparency

Transparency between employers and workers about their pay and classification status can help workers understand their rights under wage payment and antidiscrimination laws and receive benefits for which they are eligible. Many workers are unaware of potential compensation violations because they lack information about the number of hours they have worked (including the number of overtime hours), whether any additions or deductions have been made from their pay, and whether they are being correctly classified by their employer as employees or independent contractors. Additionally, some employers prohibit employees from inquiring about, disclosing, or discussing their pay with their fellow workers, which both decreases the

likelihood that the most qualified and productive workers will be hired at the market price and prevents the employees from learning about any wage discrimination that may exist. Early identification of wage-related issues through wage and classification transparency can benefit a P3 Project, as it may help prevent disagreements about wages and employee classification from becoming prolonged disputes that have an adverse impact on the timely completion of a Project. By enabling workers to raise any concerns about their pay as soon as they arise, transparency encourages employers on a Project to resolve those concerns quickly and effectively.

Departments can encourage such transparency by requiring Developers and other employers associated with a Project to provide wage statements to their employees each pay period that contain information about the individual’s hours worked, overtime hours, pay, and any additions made to or deductions made from pay, and by requiring a one-time notice of whether the employer is treating the worker as an independent contractor rather than an employee. Departments can encourage additional transparency by prohibiting employers on a P3 from taking adverse employment actions against workers and job applicants who inquire about, discuss, or disclose their own compensation or the compensation of other workers or job applicants.

An example of a provision incorporating these protections is below:56

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(a) The [Developer] and all [Subcontractors] must provide each individual performing work on the Project, on each payday, with a document containing the following information for that individual:

1) The worker’s gross pay for the pay period;
2) Any additions made to or deductions made from pay;
3) The basis for how the worker is paid (e.g. by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other);
4) The total number of hours worked by the worker during the pay period;
5) The total number of overtime hours worked by the worker during the pay period, if the worker is eligible for overtime pay under Federal, State, or local law or receives overtime pay pursuant to a contract or collective bargaining agreement; and
6) Whether the worker is eligible for overtime pay under Federal, State, or local law or receives overtime pay pursuant to a contract or collective bargaining agreement.

(b) The [Developer] and all [Subcontractors] must provide each individual performing work on the Project, before the individual performs any work on the Project, with a document stating whether the employer has designated the worker as an employee or an independent contractor.

(c) The [Developer] and [Subcontractors] shall provide the documents described in section (a) and (b) to each worker in English and in any language(s) other than English in which a significant portion of the [Developer’s] or [Subcontractor’s] workforce is fluent.
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56 These provisions are adapted in part from section 5 of Executive Order 13673, Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces (July 31, 2014), and Executive Order 13665, Non-Retaliation for Disclosure of Compensation Information (Apr. 8, 2014). Executive Order 13673 requires covered Federal contractors and subcontractors to provide each of their workers with a wage statement each pay period, and also requires that such contractors and subcontractors provide notices to any workers they are treating as independent contractors rather than employees. The President signed Executive Order 13665 to prohibit pay secrecy policies for Federal contractors and subcontractors.
(d) The [Developer] and [Subcontractors] shall not discharge, or in any other manner discriminate against, any worker or job applicant because such worker or job applicant has inquired about, discussed, or disclosed his or her own compensation or the compensation of another worker or job applicant.

(e) The prohibition in (d) shall not apply to instances in which a worker who has access to the compensation information of other workers or job applicants as a part of the worker’s essential job functions (e.g., a worker in human resources) discloses without authorization the compensation of such other workers or job applicants to individuals who do not otherwise have access to such information, unless such disclosure is in response to a formal complaint or charge, in furtherance of an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or action, including an investigation conducted by the [Developer] or [Subcontractor], or is consistent with the [Developer’s] or [Subcontractor’s] legal duty to furnish information.

Departments can also promote compliance with wage payment and classification requirements by requiring employers on a P3 to certify on a regular basis that they have complied with all relevant wage payment laws, have correctly classified their workers, and are complying with tax laws, workers compensation laws, and other relevant requirements – with penalties for failure to comply. This approach encourages employers who share the benefits of working on a P3 to proactively review their classification of employees.57

28.8 Equal Employment Opportunity

Equal employment opportunity principles help employers identify the person best qualified for a job, creating a more productive workforce. Many Developers and Subcontractors are bound by Federal laws governing equal employment opportunity. State and local laws and ordinances may prohibit discrimination on additional grounds and may extend nondiscrimination requirements to employers who are not covered by Federal law. As a best practice, Departments may also include nondiscrimination and equal opportunity requirements in their contracts with P3 Developers for employers that are not otherwise covered.

Most employers with at least a specified number of employees58 are required to comply with certain Federal equal opportunity laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and others. Additionally, if an employer working on a P3 project is receiving any Federal assistance, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the employer from discriminating on the bases of race, color, and national origin and provides that the Federal government may terminate its financial assistance to employers who fail to comply with these provisions.59

Additional equal employment opportunity provisions apply to many covered Federal contractors, subcontractors, and federally assisted construction contracts, as well as to the Federal government itself. Executive Order 11246, as amended, bars discrimination by covered Federal contractors and subcontractors, as well as federally assisted construction contractors (i.e., companies working on a construction contract that

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58 Each statute specifies its own requirements for coverage.
receives funds under a Federal program by means of a grant, loan, insurance, or guarantee), on the bases of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and national origin. The Executive Order also requires covered employers to take affirmative action to ensure that equal opportunity is provided in all aspects of their employment. Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination by covered Federal contractors and subcontractors against qualified individuals with disabilities and requires them to take affirmative action to employ, and advance in employment, such individuals. Similarly, the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (“VEVRAA”) prohibits discrimination by covered Federal contractors and subcontractors against qualified protected veterans and requires that they take affirmative action to employ, and advance in employment, such veterans. Finally, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act requires that Federal agencies’ electronic and information technology provide individuals with disabilities with access to, and use of, such technology that is comparable to that of individuals without disabilities, unless doing so would impose an undue burden. This ensures that job applicants with disabilities can learn about and apply for jobs with Federal agencies, and that disabled employees of the Federal government can do their jobs with the aid of assistive technology when necessary.

Departments are encouraged to consider requiring or incentivizing nondiscrimination and incorporating equal opportunity provisions into their contracts with Developers and employers on P3s even if such steps are not required by law. For example, contractual provisions or bid specifications might require that all Federal, State, and local nondiscrimination laws and ordinances apply regardless of the number of workers employed by an employer. They might also include a requirement to employ affirmative efforts to promote equal opportunity, such as self-audits to avoid disparities in hiring, promotion, and compensation and to ensure effective recruitment, training, and educational programs. The affirmative action provisions of Executive Order 11246, Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, and VEVRAA and their implementing regulations may serve as helpful guidance for Departments and employers wishing to promote such practices. And the Section 508 standards for the Federal government – both the existing standards and newly proposed ones – provide models for Departments and Developers seeking to ensure equal employment opportunities on P3s for those with disabilities through the use of assistive technology. Finally, Departments may consider requiring employers on P3s to maintain written equal employment opportunity policies that set forth the employers’ policies and procedures for complying with equal opportunity laws and promoting equal opportunity in their workforces.

### 28.9 Project Labor Agreements

It is in the strong interest of a Department for employers on a Project to maintain positive and productive relationships with their workforce and to resolve issues related to labor management before a Project begins. One way to do so is through a Project Labor Agreement (“PLA”). A PLA is a pre-hire collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that governs terms and conditions of employment on one or more construction projects and lasts only as long as the project. In transportation projects, PLAs are typically negotiated between the State or local contracting agency and appropriate labor organizations, such as an area or State building and construction trades councils and relevant local unions.

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60 29 U.S.C. § 793; 41 C.F.R. part 60-741. Section 503 does not apply to federally assisted construction contractors.
61 38 U.S.C. § 4212(a)(2); 41 C.F.R. part 60-300. VEVRAA does not apply to federally assisted construction contractors.
63 The current Section 508 standards can be found at 36 C.F.R. Part 1194. On February 18, 2015, The United States Access Board released a proposed rule to update the standards to reflect developments since the original standards were published in 2000. The proposed standards can be found at 80 Fed. Reg. 10879 (Feb. 27, 2015).
PLAs can be valuable tools that can help ensure that Departments, taxpayers, and private investors receive quality projects that are delivered on time and under budget and create good jobs that benefit families and communities. They can be particularly useful in the construction context, as construction projects typically involve numerous employers at a single location working in tandem. PLAs can provide uniformity and certainty to the Developer and the Department by prohibiting work stoppages and providing for expeditious dispute resolution procedures (usually through binding arbitration), and by having one agreement govern the terms and conditions of employment of all contractors and subcontractors. They can save both taxpayers and private investors money by providing a steady flow of highly trained labor and guaranteeing labor peace that helps ensure timely completion of a Project. And by standardizing all labor conditions on a Project, PLAs can create a level playing field where the best, most efficient bidder is awarded a contract, rather than a bidder that provides the lowest wages and benefits.

PLAs can also protect workers by ensuring that they can collectively bargain for important terms and conditions of their employment such as workplace safety, grievance procedures, wages and benefits, training and apprenticeship, and other issues. PLAs can make workplaces safer, because they often include language establishing labor-management health and safety committees, and can also be used to create structures for recruiting and training junior construction workers and to further other goals such as opportunities for small or minority-owned businesses and the use of environmentally sustainable technologies.

To take advantage of these benefits, many public agencies will seek to enter into PLAs, which have been used on numerous large-scale public and private construction projects nationwide, from the Hoover Dam in the 1930’s to schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, and baseball stadiums. PLAs have been used at a majority of the Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) key sites. DOE representatives have stated that PLAs have helped complete projects on time and within budget by providing a mechanism for coordinating wages, hours, work rules, and other terms of employment across the project; creating structure and stability for dispute resolution; prohibiting work stoppages, slowdowns, and strikes; and ensuring access to a well-trained, assured supply of skilled labor. The Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) has used PLAs on its construction projects for over two decades, during which there have been no formal strikes or organized work stoppages and a significantly reduced injury rate. The United States Navy recently entered into a PLA to facilitate the construction of a wharf on a naval base in Washington State. PLAs were also successfully used by the Los Angeles Unified School District to invest in the local workforce, promote apprenticeship, and provide opportunities for small and disadvantaged businesses,64 and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority approved a PLA for its construction projects, with specific goals for hiring workers in economically disadvantaged areas, disadvantaged workers, and apprentices.65 The State of Illinois requires contractors on P3s for new transportation facilities to enter into a PLA.66

A useful model for the types of provisions contained in a typical PLA is contained in Executive Order 13502, which encourages Federal agencies to consider PLAs for Federal construction projects.67 The Executive Order

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65 See Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Auth., Project Labor Agreement & Construction Careers Policy, http://www.metro.net/about/pla/.


67 E.O. 13502, Use of Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction Projects (Feb 6, 2009).
does not require the use of a PLA on any project, but it requires that any PLA entered into by a Federal agency contain the following components: (1) it must bind all contractors and subcontractors on the project pursuant to appropriate specifications in solicitation provisions and contract documents; (2) it must allow all contractors and subcontractors to compete for contracts and subcontracts regardless of whether they are otherwise parties to CBAs; (3) it must contain guarantees against work disruptions, including strikes as well as lockouts; (4) it must stipulate “effective, prompt, and mutually binding” dispute resolution procedures; (5) it must provide other mechanisms for cooperation between labor and management on matters of mutual interest and concern, including productivity, quality of work, safety, and health; and (6) it must fully conform to applicable law.68

The above features are by no means exclusive; they serve merely as general guidelines to Departments that enter into PLAs with Developers.

An example provision requiring a PLA (adapting the requirements of the terms of Executive Order 13502) is below:69

(a) The [Developer] shall negotiate and enter into a Project Labor Agreement that:

1) Binds the [Developer] and all [Subcontractors] on the [Project];

2) Allows [Subcontractors] to compete for contracts to work on the [Project] regardless of whether they are otherwise parties to collective bargaining agreements;

3) Contains guarantees against strikes, lockouts, and similar job disruptions;

4) Sets forth effective, prompt, and mutually binding procedures for resolving labor disputes arising during the Project Labor Agreement;

5) Provides other mechanisms for labor-management cooperation on matters of mutual interest and concern, including productivity, quality of work, safety, and health; and

6) Fully complies with Federal, State, and local law.

In addition to PLAs for the construction phase of a project, a Department may wish to consider a Labor Peace Agreement for the O&M phase. Such an agreement, entered into with a labor organization attempting to organize or representing the employees performing operations and maintenance work on the project, prohibits work stoppages and may provide for neutrality in an organizing effort or dispute resolution measures, thus preventing disruption to the operation of the project after construction has been completed.

28.10 Responsible Contractor Policy

The above sections describe a number of labor practices and protections that Departments may consider requiring of employers on P3 Projects. Any of these provisions can be implemented through State or local legislation or as part of a Department’s contract with the Developer. Another alternative is a “responsible contractor policy” in the form of a statute, ordinance, or regulation that requires all employers who bid on, or qualify for, contracts to work on a P3 Project to demonstrate their compliance with certain requirements or gives priority to employers that demonstrate compliance, such as by incorporating the labor practices of the Developer and Subcontractors into the technical scoring of a bid or proposal.

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68 Id. § 4.
69 Departments should ensure that any PLA or provision requiring PLAs is in compliance with Federal, State, and local law.
Several States and cities have adopted responsible contractor policies as part of State and local procurement statutes and ordinances. To be considered a "responsible bidder" on construction contracts in Illinois, a company must comply with State prevailing wage laws, Federal equal opportunity laws, and all State laws concerning the bidder’s entitlement to conduct business.\(^\text{70}\) Boston, Massachusetts, requires city contractors to comply with requirements that include payment of prevailing wages and proper classification of employees.\(^\text{71}\)

Many responsible contractor policies require prospective bidders to disclose any history of violations of labor laws or other legal requirements. Disclosure enables the State or local government agency evaluating the bidder to have a complete picture of the prospective contractor’s compliance with its legal obligations, which may be indicative of its ability to comply with its contractual obligations with the Department. The City of Los Angeles, for example, requires that prospective contractors complete a questionnaire that addresses, in addition to the contractor’s technical qualifications and capacity to perform the work, whether the contractor has a "satisfactory record of compliance with relevant laws and regulations" and a "satisfactory record of business integrity."\(^\text{72}\) Similarly, Executive Order 13673, Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces, when implemented, will require prospective Federal contractors and subcontractors whose contract value exceeds $500,000 to report any administrative merits determinations, arbitral awards or decisions, or civil judgments rendered against them for violations of certain labor laws over the previous three years and to update this information semiannually following an award of a contract or subcontract.\(^\text{73}\)

These types of comprehensive systems are easily translatable to the context of a P3 Project. Illinois has incorporated the “responsible bidder” requirements contained in the Illinois Procurement Code into its requirements for contractors and subcontractors working on transportation P3 Projects.\(^\text{74}\) Maryland has similarly incorporated certain responsibility requirements applicable to State contractors, including nondiscrimination, prevailing wage rates, and a living wage requirement into public-private partnerships.\(^\text{75}\) Such initiatives can help ensure that the potential cost savings that a Department may realize from a P3 Project do not come at the expense of workers and their families through the underpayment of wages and benefits, inadequate worker health and safety, or other legal violations. Additionally, they can help ensure that a P3 project progresses without the unpredictable delays and pitfalls that may result from enforcement

\(^{70}\) See 30 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 500/30-22.

\(^{71}\) City of Boston Mun. Code, Ch. VIII, § 8-9.2.

\(^{72}\) See Los Angeles, Cal., Admin Code § 10.40.2(a). The questionnaires for construction contracts and service contracts, respectively, are located at http://bca.lacity.org/site/pdf/cro/CROQ%20Construction%20Questionnaire%20(rev%2012-05-11).pdf and http://bca.lacity.org/site/pdf/cro/CROQ%20Service%20Questionnaire%20Rev%201-20-12.pdf. The questionnaires ask for information about whether the prospective contractor has been "investigated, cited, assessed any penalties, or been found to have violated" certain Federal, State, and local laws, including wage and hour laws, civil rights laws, environmental laws, worker safety laws, licensing requirements, and others.

\(^{73}\) E.O. 13673 § 2 (July 31, 2014). The Executive Order became effective immediately, and will apply to all solicitations for contracts as set forth by any final rule issued by the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council, which is forthcoming.

\(^{74}\) See 630 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/55(a).

\(^{75}\) See Md. Code, State Fin. & Procurement § 11-203(h)(2). Departments should ensure that any responsible contractor policies for P3s are fully consistent with Federal, State, and local law, including ERISA and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").
investigations, labor disputes, private litigation, and other proceedings that may follow a contractor’s or subcontractor’s failure to comply with its legal obligations.
29 General Provisions

Each Concession Agreement will contain a number of general provisions that are relatively standard, not heavily negotiated, and accordingly have not been covered in this Guide. These provisions include conditions precedent, representations and warranties, record keeping, notice provisions, payments, interest on overdue amounts and governing law. The Department will still need to consider each of these provisions in the context of a particular Project.
Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

The glossary of terms provided below is designed to be used as an educational tool to assist in understanding the Model Public-Private Partnership Core Toll Concessions Contract Guide. The terms below are illustrative and should not be construed as legal advice, notwithstanding that a number of the terms contained below may also be used in example provisions provided in the Guide. The below terms contain both “terms of art” often seen as defined terms in Concession Agreements (which are capitalized) and more general jargon commonly used in the P3 industry (which are not capitalized).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Account Balances</td>
<td>Amounts held in or credited to certain bank accounts of the Developer which reduce the total amount of Termination Sum payable by the Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable Law</td>
<td>Any local, State or Federal laws, rules or regulations that apply to the Developer or the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appropriations risk</td>
<td>The risk that a State legislature will not appropriate or allocate to the Department sufficient funds to permit the Department to meet its payment obligations to the Developer under the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Case Financial Model</td>
<td>The financial model containing agreed projections and calculations regarding revenues, expenses, dividends and repayment of debt and equity relating to the Project as well as agreed economic assumptions. The Base Case Financial Model will be prepared in Excel format and may be used, among other things, to calculate the projected Equity IRR over the Term, as may be updated in accordance with the terms of the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit-sharing</td>
<td>The sharing of financial benefits between the Developer and the Department according to the terms of the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 3.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breakage costs</td>
<td>Any commercially reasonable costs, make-whole payments or other prepayment amounts (including premiums) that the Developer must pay under any Financing Document as a result of the early repayment of such debt prior to its scheduled maturity date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caps and floors</td>
<td>Terms derived from instruments used in the financial markets, which establish a maximum (cap) and minimum (floor) price, such as an interest rate, for a financial instrument. Often used together (in which case, a collar), caps and floors are considered cost-effective ways to manage financial risks, such as changes in interest rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Law</td>
<td>A new or changed Law that is applicable to the Project as compared to that in effect when the Project was procured as described in Section 6.7 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Ownership</td>
<td>A change in the direct or indirect ownership of the Developer, as described in Section 5.2 of this Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Order</td>
<td>A written order from the Department to the Developer requesting a change in the Construction Work as compared to the Construction Work originally required to be performed by the Developer under the Project Documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collateral Agent</td>
<td>In circumstances where there is more than one secured Lender involved in a Project, the Lenders will often appoint a Collateral Agent that holds the collateral provided as security for the Project, such as a real property mortgage or an all-asset pledge agreement from the Developer, on behalf of the secured parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commercial close</td>
<td>The execution of the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation Amount</td>
<td>The amount of any compensation payable by the Department to the Concessionaire with respect to any Compensation Event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation Event</td>
<td>The occurrence of one or more events which delay or increase the cost of the Developer’s performance of its obligations under the Concession Agreement or which reduce the Developer’s revenue, as described in Section 4.3.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing Facility</td>
<td>A transportation facility managed or built by the Department in the vicinity of the Project which may give rise to a Compensation Event if the Developer’s traffic and revenue are reduced as a result, as described in Section 4.3.2 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concession</td>
<td>The contractual right granted by the Department to the Developer to design, build, finance, operate and maintain a particular asset owned by the Department, which will be documented and governed by the terms of a Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concession Agreement</td>
<td>This term is defined or otherwise described in Section 1.2 of the Guide. This document is also sometimes known in the market as a “Comprehensive Agreement,” a “Concession and Lease Agreement” or a “Public-Private Partnership Agreement.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concession Fee</td>
<td>The amount of any fee payable with respect to benefit-sharing. This fee is also sometimes known in the market as a “permit fee” or “revenue-sharing payment.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction performance security</td>
<td>A performance and/or payment security the Department may require the D&amp;C Contractor to provide in light of the requirements of Applicable Law or the individual circumstances of the Project, as described in Section 9 of this Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Period</td>
<td>The period starting upon the commencement of construction of the new asset being developed as part of the Project, and ending at the achievement of Substantial Completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Work</td>
<td>All Work to build or construct, make, form, manufacture, furnish, install, supply, deliver, landscape or equip the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost to Complete</td>
<td>The cost to the Department to complete the Project following a Developer Default prior to Substantial Completion, as described in Section 7.3.4 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defects Liability Period</td>
<td>A proscribed period (generally two to five years) following Substantial Completion of the Project during which time the D&amp;C Contractor must account to the Developer for defects in the construction of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay Event</td>
<td>The occurrence of one or more events which delay the Developer’s performance of its obligations under the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 4.3.3 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demand and revenue risk</td>
<td>The risk that traffic demand for the relevant Project, and Toll Revenues received by the Developer, do not match the projections used to generate the Developer’s expected rate of return.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>The public authority granting rights to the Developer to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the Project in accordance with the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Default</td>
<td>The occurrence of one or more specified failures of the Department to perform its obligations under the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 7.2.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Termination Sum</td>
<td>The amount payable by the Department to the Developer following a termination of the Concession Agreement for a Department Default, as described in Section 7.2.4 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;C Contract</td>
<td>The contract between the Developer and the D&amp;C Contractor pursuant to which the D&amp;C Contractor agrees to carry out the design work and the Construction Work and related services on the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D&amp;C Contractor</td>
<td>The contractor hired by the Developer to carry out the Construction Work and related services on the Project pursuant to the D&amp;C Contract. The D&amp;C Contractor may be an affiliate of the Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
<td>The private entity that contracts with the Department to undertake some or all of the design, construction, financing, operations and maintenance relating to a Project that is to become subject to a Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer Default</td>
<td>The occurrence of one or more specified failures of the Developer to perform its obligations under the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 7.3.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer Default Termination Sum</td>
<td>The amount payable by the Department to the Developer following a termination of the Concession Agreement for a Developer Default, as described in Section 7.3.4 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Agreement</td>
<td>The agreement between the Developer, the Department and the Collateral Agent under which, among other things, the Department provides consent to provision of security over the Developer’s rights in the Project and grants the Collateral Agent step-in rights and cure rights in the event of a Developer Default under the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Change in Law</td>
<td>This term is defined or otherwise described in Section 6.5 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute Resolution Procedures</td>
<td>The provisions contained within the Concession Agreement that outline how the parties will resolve disputes, which generally include an initial good faith effort to reach agreement, the use of a technical advisor and/or disputes review board and the use of arbitration and traditional litigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Termination</td>
<td>Termination of a Concession Agreement for any reason prior to the original stated expiration of the Term, including by reason of a default by either party or a Force Majeure Event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Termination Date</td>
<td>The effective date of Early Termination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Toll Collection Agreement</td>
<td>An agreement pursuant to which the Department provides toll transaction account management services and other “back office” functions to the Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic Toll Collection System</td>
<td>An automatic electronic system used to collect tolls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electronic tolling</td>
<td>The collection of tolls by a toll operator using an Electronic Toll Collection System.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Element</td>
<td>Each individual component, system, or subsystem of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity Members</td>
<td>The entities which directly or indirectly own the Developer and invest equity into the Project, also known as “sponsors” or “shareholders.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity IRR</td>
<td>The internal rate of return that the Equity Members have projected to be derived from the Project in accordance with the Base Case Financial Model, as may be updated in accordance with the terms of the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escrow Agent</td>
<td>A third party hired to hold and control the Handback Reserve Account, as described in Section 8.4.2 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exempt Vehicles</td>
<td>A class of vehicles (e.g., commuter buses) which is entitled to a discount from otherwise applicable tolls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>express toll lane</td>
<td>A traffic lane subject to tolls that vary with demand in order to maintain average speed at or above a stated level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing Documents</td>
<td>All documentation relating to the financing of the Project (excluding Shareholder Loans), including loan documentation, security documentation, credit support documentation, hedging documentation, and intercreditor documentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Closing Date</td>
<td>The date on which the conditions precedent to the provision of financing to fund the Project have been met. These conditions include execution of the Transaction Documents, delivery of the Base Case Financial Model, delivery of requisite legal opinions and confirmation that the requisite equity investment or Shareholder Loan/s have been made by the Equity Members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Majeure Event</td>
<td>One of a set of agreed events outside the control of either the Department or the Developer which may permit the Developer to seek relief under the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 4.3.5 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Majeure Termination Sum</td>
<td>The amount payable by the Department to the Developer following a termination of the Concession Agreement for a Force Majeure Event, as described in Section 7.4.2 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Approval</td>
<td>All approvals, permits, permissions, consents, licenses, certificates and authorizations required from time to time in connection with the Project whether issued by the Department or any Governmental Entity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Entity</td>
<td>Any court, Federal, State, or local government, department, commission, board, bureau, agency or other regulatory or governmental authority, other than the Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>greenfield project</td>
<td>In a P3 context, a greenfield project is one that requires the construction of a wholly new asset (rather than an expansion of an existing asset, which is often referred to as a “brownfield” project). The Concession Agreement in respect of the greenfield project will include the design and construction of the new asset, as well as the operation and maintenance of the asset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Revenues</td>
<td>All amounts received by the Developer in relation to the Project, including Toll Revenues, insurance proceeds (to the extent received to compensate for the loss of tolls and user fees) and interest income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handback</td>
<td>The return of the Project to the Department at the end of the Term, as described in Section 8.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handback Inspections</td>
<td>Regular inspections conducted by the Developer during the Handback Period, as described in Section 8.3 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handback Performance Security</td>
<td>Any performance security, including but not limited to Handback letters of credit, the amount of which is credited to the Handback Reserve Account.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handback Period</td>
<td>The final years of the Term, during which the Developer is required to prepare for and manage the Handback of the Project to the Department, as described in Section 8.2.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handback Requirements</td>
<td>The performance standards for the Project’s major assets required to be achieved by the Developer prior to Handback of the Project to the Department, as described in Section 8.2.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handback Reserve Account</td>
<td>The account in which the Handback Reserve Amount is held, as described in Section 8.4.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handback Reserve Amount</td>
<td>An amount required to be held by the Developer to pay the cost of complying with the Handback Requirements, as described in Section 8.4.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous Substances</td>
<td>Any substance which is considered a contaminant, pollutant, dangerous substance, toxic substance, solid waste, or hazardous material which is deemed hazardous or toxic under, or otherwise regulated by, environmental laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV)</td>
<td>A vehicle which contains multiple passengers, generally two or more.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high-occupancy toll (HOT) lane</td>
<td>A high-occupancy vehicle traffic lane that includes a road pricing scheme allowing motorists in non-HOVs access to such high-occupancy vehicle lanes if they pay a toll.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high-occupancy vehicle lane</td>
<td>A restricted traffic lane reserved for motorists in HOVs, generally during peak travel times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highway project</td>
<td>The design, construction, finance, operation, and maintenance of an asset comprising a highway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Proceeds</td>
<td>Any insurance proceeds available to the Department for the purposes of achieving Substantial Completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Assets</td>
<td>The assets and contractual rights necessary to enable the Department to continue a Project following a termination of the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 7.6.4 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Contractor</td>
<td>The relevant Subcontractor under designated “key contracts” relating to the Project, which will generally include the D&amp;C Contract, the O&amp;M Contract and any significant services contract with a value over a designated amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>All laws, rules and regulations applicable to the Developer or the Project, as described in Section 6.7 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenders</td>
<td>Each bank or financial institution, including the United States Department of Transportation, acting through the Federal Highway Administrator (as lender of a TIFIA loan), or any other entity that provides Project Debt (excluding Shareholder Loans or any other financing provided by Equity Members).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life-cycle</td>
<td>In relation to an asset, the course of the Useful Life of that asset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>life-cycle maintenance/ investments / costs</td>
<td>In relation to an asset, money or materials invested to maintain the asset during the life-cycle of that asset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-Cycle Maintenance Plan</td>
<td>The Developer’s plan to manage its major maintenance and Handback obligations during the life of the Project, as described in Section 8.2.3 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Stop Date</td>
<td>The date, being a designated period of days following the date Substantial Completion is scheduled to occur, following which time, if Substantial Completion has not occurred, a Developer Default will occur under the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>Any losses, liabilities, judgments, damages, fees, penalties, fines, sanctions, charges or out-of-pocket and documented costs or expenses actually suffered or incurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Work</td>
<td>Work required to be undertaken by the Developer in relation to the maintenance of the Project, including routine maintenance and Renewal Work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Maintenance Reserve Account</td>
<td>An account established by the Developer which must contain sufficient funds to pay for projected Renewal Work required over a given period in respect of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>managed lane facility</td>
<td>A toll road concession such as a high-occupancy toll lane, an express toll lane or an exclusive/special-use lane with tolls for certain users that vary with demand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary of Terms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Cost Impact</td>
<td>The increase in the Developer’s costs due to a Compensation Event, as described in Section 4.4.3.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Cost Savings</td>
<td>The decrease in the Developer’s costs due to a Compensation Event, as described in Section 4.4.2.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Project Debt</td>
<td>The amount of the Developer’s Project Debt less its Account Balances, as described in Section 7.3.4 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Revenue Impact</td>
<td>The net increase or decrease in the Developer’s revenue due to a Compensation Event, as described in Section 4.4.2.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Compliance Points</td>
<td>Numerical points assessed by the Department for Developer’s failure to satisfy the performance requirements in the Concession Agreement, as more particularly described in Section 13 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nondiscriminatory Change in Law</td>
<td>A Change in Law that is not a Discriminatory Change in Law, as described in Section 6.7 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M Contract</td>
<td>The contract between the Developer and the O&amp;M Contractor pursuant to which the O&amp;M Contractor agrees to carry out operations and maintenance services for the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M Contractor</td>
<td>The Subcontractor hired by the Developer to carry out the operations and maintenance services on the Project pursuant to the O&amp;M Contract. The O&amp;M Contractor may be an affiliate of the Developer or the Developer may perform the Operations and Maintenance services itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permitted Vehicle</td>
<td>In the context of a managed lane facility, those vehicles that are allowed to use the managed lane for public policy reasons, and generally include motorbikes, buses, transit vehicles, maintenance vehicles of the Department, and emergency vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Activity Bonds (PABs)</td>
<td>A bond issued for the purpose of financing a Project. PABs are often issued via a conduit issuer (generally a finance vehicle of the State), which then on-lends the money to the Developer. The Developer (rather than the Department) is liable for the payment of interest and redemption of the PABs. When issued for a designated purpose and provided other Federal and State requirements are complied with, interest earned on PABs will be tax-exempt (though not exempt from the alternative minimum tax).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibited Person</td>
<td>In the context of Change in Ownership provisions, and depending on the Department’s requirements with respect to changes in ownership to particular entities of concern, those entities that give rise to concerns associated with national security, debarment from State or Federal procurement processes or egregious reputation who may not become Equity Members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>The asset to be designed, constructed, financed, operated, and maintained by the Developer pursuant to the terms of the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Debt</td>
<td>The bona fide indebtedness related to the Project, including bank debt, PABs, TIFIA loans, guarantees and credit support facilities. Project Debt includes not just principal and interest but also fees, expenses and any breakage costs. Project Debt does not include Shareholder Loans or any other financing provided by Equity Members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Documents</td>
<td>All documentation relating to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of the Project, including the Concession Agreement, the D&amp;C Contract and the O&amp;M Contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Right of Way</td>
<td>The real property which is necessary for the performance of the Work and operation of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Schedule</td>
<td>The construction schedule for the Project as agreed between the Department and Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Value</td>
<td>The fair market value of the Developer’s interest in the Project. This fair market value is generally determined by an independent appraiser and based on the projected cash flows of the Project as of the date of determination until the end of the original Term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal Due Date</td>
<td>The due date for potential Developers (or their Equity Members) to submit their proposals in response to a “Request For Proposals” issued by the Department in relation to an upcoming Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-Private Partnership / P3 / P3 Transaction</td>
<td>A contractual arrangement between a Department and a Developer as described in Section 1.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualified Investor</td>
<td>A list of Equity Members in the Project that the Department has vetted as part of the procurement process and is comfortable with and has an interest in keeping as investors in the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramp-up period</td>
<td>The initial period of operations for a Project before traffic reaches its expected steady state, as described in Section 7.2.4.2 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refinancing Gain</td>
<td>The net financial gain the Developer may receive as a result of refinancing some or all of the Project Debt by, for example, securing lower interest rates as part of the refinancing or paying Equity Members a dividend with the proceeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Entity</td>
<td>In the context of Change in Ownership provisions, this would generally include each entity in the ultimate ownership structure between the Developer and the Equity Members, as well as all affiliated legal entities under common ownership and control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewal Work</td>
<td>The renewal, repair or replacement of worn-out, obsolete, damaged, or under-performing components so that the Project does not prematurely deteriorate and remains fully functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Residual Life</td>
<td>The required Useful Life an Element must have following Handback from the Developer to the Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Life</td>
<td>The approximate Useful Life of an asset less its age if the asset has performed in service in the manner and with the levels of traffic and wear and tear originally expected by the Developer and if the Developer has properly maintained the asset in accordance with its obligations under the Project Documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Life Methodology</td>
<td>The methodology for calculating the Residual Life of an asset at the end of the Term of a Concession Agreement, as described in Section 8.2.2 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted Change in Ownership</td>
<td>A change in the ownership of the Developer that is restricted by the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 5.5 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return trigger</td>
<td>Equity IRR levels which trigger revenue sharing provisions in the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 3.2.1.2 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revenue sharing</td>
<td>The Developer’s sharing of revenues generated by a Project with the Department in accordance with the terms of the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 3.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revenue trigger</td>
<td>Levels of revenue which trigger revenue sharing provisions in the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 3.2.1.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Commencement Date</td>
<td>The date the Project opens for normal and continuous operations and use by the traveling public. This often, but not always, occurs at the same time as Substantial Completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set-off</td>
<td>The right of one party to deduct, from the amount owed to another party, any amount owed from such other person to the first person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholder Loans</td>
<td>Equity investments in the Developer which take the legal form of loans from the Equity Member to the Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site</td>
<td>The development location of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Highway</td>
<td>Any highway designated as a “State Highway” by the relevant State regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontract</td>
<td>An agreement between the Developer and a Subcontractor under which the Subcontractor will perform certain services contracted to be performed by the Developer under the Concession Agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontractor</td>
<td>The subcontractor under a Subcontract, including the D&amp;C Contractor and the O&amp;M Contractor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subcontractor Breakage Costs</td>
<td>Liabilities incurred in respect of demobilization of Subcontractors and the cancellation of orders for materials and goods which arise as a result of the Early Termination of the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 7.2.4.4 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Completion</td>
<td>When the Developer has completed all the Construction Work required by it under the Concession Agreement and the Project is substantially ready for normal and safe use and operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Completion Date</td>
<td>The date Substantial Completion is achieved, usually evidenced by a certificate issued by the Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervening Events</td>
<td>A set of defined events or circumstances giving rise to a claim for relief under the Concession Agreement, as described in Section 4.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Requirements</td>
<td>A set of performance requirements and specifications agreed between the Department and the Developer as to the Work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>The duration of the grant of the concession to the Developer under the Concession Agreement, usually from the date of the Concession Agreement for a fixed period of years, unless terminated early.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination for Convenience Termination Sum</td>
<td>The amount payable by the Department to the Developer following a termination of the Concession Agreement for convenience by the Department, as described in Section 7.5.2 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination Sum</td>
<td>The amount of compensation payable to the Developer from the Department in the event the Concession Agreement is terminated early, including, depending on the reason for the Early Termination, the Termination for Convenience Termination Sum, the Department Termination Sum, the Developer Default Termination Sum and the Force Majeure Termination Sum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIFIA</td>
<td>The US DOT program administering loans under the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act, which provides Federal credit assistance in the form of direct loans, loan guarantees, and standby lines of credit to finance eligible surface transportation projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Impact Analysis</td>
<td>A method used to determine the extent of a delay in the critical path of a construction project, as described in Section 4.4.1 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 23 of the United States Code</td>
<td>The United States Code is a codification of the general Federal laws of the United States. Title 23 outlines the role of highways, including Federal-aid and other highways, highway safety and research and technology relating to highways.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toll Enforcement and Violation Processing Services Agreement</td>
<td>An agreement pursuant to which the Developer secures toll enforcement and violations processing services, usually through existing agreements the Department has with law enforcement and State agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toll Revenues</td>
<td>The fees, tolls, rates, and other charges generated from vehicles using the Project and other amounts received by the Developer in connection with such revenues, including proceeds of insurance, amounts payable by the Department under the Concession Agreement and amounts awarded as damages or from enforcement action or settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolling rights</td>
<td>The right to establish, assess, collect, enforce (subject to Applicable Law), and retain tolls paid by users of the Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>toll road concession</td>
<td>A concession granted to a Developer in relation to a toll road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction Documents</td>
<td>All documentation relating to the Project, including Financing Documents and Project Documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transportation facilities</td>
<td>Facilities relating to transportation, including bridges, railways, freight ways, highways and toll roads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Endangered Species</td>
<td>Endangered or threatened species found on the Site or other Project Right of Way that were not contained in the site conditions report prepared for the Project or otherwise known (or should have been known) to the Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Geological Condition</td>
<td>Subsurface or latent geological conditions found on the Site or other Project Right of Way that were not contained in the site conditions report prepared for the Project or otherwise known (or should have been known) to the Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Hazardous Environmental Condition</td>
<td>Hazardous Substances found on the Site or other Project Right of Way that were not contained in the site conditions report prepared for the Project or otherwise known (or should have been known) to the Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unforeseen Utility</td>
<td>Public or private utility systems found on the Site or other Project Right of Way that were not contained in the site conditions report prepared for the Project or otherwise known (or should have been known) to the Developer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful Life</td>
<td>The period a new, renewed, or replaced asset is expected to remain in service under ordinary maintenance until it next requires reconstruction, rehabilitation, restoration, renewal, or replacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>video-based tolling</td>
<td>The collection of tolls using video technology to capture license plate data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>All services required to be undertaken by the Developer in relation to the Project under the Concession Agreement, including design work, Construction Work and Maintenance Work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Value</td>
<td>The value of completed work for a construction project, calculated as described in Section 7.3.4 of the Guide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>